Overview

North Korean military build up

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In 1946 the Society was required to transfer its aircraft and trained personnel to the Aviation Section of the P'yŏngyang Military Academy. Soviet-trained Korean officers were placed in positions of responsibility under the command of Colonel Wang Yun, a former captain in the Soviet air force who replaced Lee Hwal.    

The first political-military school in the DPRK, the P'yŏngyang Military Academy (became No. 2 KPA Officers School in January 1949), headed by Kim Chaek, an ally of Kim Il-sung, was founded in October 1945 under Soviet guidance to train people's guards, or public security units. In 1946 graduates of the school entered regular police and public security/constabulary units. These lightly armed security forces included followers of Kim Il-sung and returned veterans from the People's Republic of China, and the Central Constabulary Academy (which became the KPA Military Academy in December 1948) soon followed for education of political and military officers for the new armed forces.

 [note]

 

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The final phase of development came in January 1950 with the expansion of the air regiment into a division under the command of Wang Yun, promoted to major general. Strength of the unit in April 1950 was estimated at about 1,675 officers and men, including 364 officers, 76 pilots, 875 enlisted men, and 360 cadets.

[note]

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After a meeting of USSR and Communist China officials, reportedly held in Peiping early in 1950 to explore the advisability of using the North Korea People's Army for an invasion of South Korea, there was a rapid build-up of that Army. It increased its training program, transferred ordnance depots from urban to isolated rural sites, and readied hidden dump areas to receive supplies, weapons, and munitions of war from the USSR. At the beginning of this build-up there were in Korea about 16,000 repatriated North Koreans from the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF).

The differences in Kim Il Sung's account were supported by additional discussions with the Chinese leader in May and September where he made things completely clear. In the spring North Korea would strive to put pressure on the doubting Stalin by stressing that they had the complete support of Mao Zedong for their plans: in September 1949 and again in January 1950 Kim Il Sung again strove to press the Soviet leader, but this time from another tack. By this time, the civil war in China had reached its conclusion, and that meant that the time had come for Mao Zedong to begin to carry out the previous agreement to support real action to unite the Koreas. Kim Il Sung was very crafty in his actions at all these instances, and taking into account the psychology of the Soviet leader, who was apprehensive of the surprising and unwanted independence of Mao.

 [note]

Later this month you will see that the CIA will report a meeting in Moscow occurred, but the speculation wasn't along the lines of a NKPA attack on the south.

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North Korean civilians who had worked in P'yŏngyang's arsenals told a bombing-evaluation team that these munitions factories had been reopened in January 1950 with all-out production goals. When they were blasted by the B-29's, the P'yŏngyang arsenals were employing more than 40,000 persons in the manufacture of small arms, munitions, and field guns.#46

 [note]

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USMC Heavy Left Helicopter Program

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Nov, Dec, Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr
Between 25 November 1949 and 5 April 1950 , operations with the HRP were halted as all aircraft of that model were grounded for mechanical reasons.

[note]

 

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The Piasecki HUP-1, shown practicing a rescue lift, was one of the last helicopters introduced in the 1940s and was the first of the multipurpose helicopters (Marine Corps Photo 529604) .

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Following the relatively successful U.S. Navy trials with the HRP, the Navy ordered the improved HJP for shipboard utility and rescue duties, especially “plane guard” for pilots who crashed into the sea during carrier landings or takeoffs. The HJP designation was changed to HUP in 1949 when U was substi­tuted for J in aircraft and squadron designations. In the fleet the HUP was known as the “hup-mobile” or “shoe” (because of its shape). The U.S. Army procured 70 of these helicopters as H-25s but subsequently transferred 50 to the Navy. Nine­teen were procured for foreign use, mostly by the French and Canadian navies.


The HUP/H-25 had the Piasecki tandem-rotor design, with a smaller and more streamlined fuselage than the HRP/H-21 design. The two three-bladed rotors overlapped, thus reducing the size of the helicopter to facilitate shipboard operation. The HUP could fit on aircraft carrier elevators without folding its blades, and on most cruiser elevators with blades folded. The pilot and copilot sat in the nose, below the forward rotor, as in the HRP/H-21. Behind the cockpit the cabin could accommodate four passengers or three stretchers, with the single Continental engine mounted aft. The tubular, metal-covered fuselage rested on a fixed undercarriage. The HUP-1s had vertical tail fins on the after rotor pylon. They were deleted in later helicopters (which had auto-pilots fitted). The Navy variants had all-weather instrumentation, and some had AN/AQS-4 dipping sonar fitted for ASW operations (designated HUP-25). A hatch in the bottom of the fuselage permitted personnel to be hoisted directly up into the cabin.


After trials with two XHJP-ls (BuNo. 37976/977), the Navy ordered 32 HUP-1 variants for shipboard operation. These were followed by 165 HUP-2s, some fitted with dipping sonar. The Marines flew 13 of the Navy HUPs. The Army procured 70 helicopters similar to the HUP-2, designated H-25A. These were too small for Army requirements and 50 were transferred to the Navy as HUP-3s. The Navy HUP-2/3 survivors were redesignated UH-25B/C, respectively, in 1962. Another 15 HUP-2s went to the French Navy and 3 HUP-3s went to the Canadian Navy.

 [note]

 

 

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Credit for energizing the helicopter program in early 1950 can be attributed to the crusading zeal of the Marine Corps Board and the subsequent actions by the Division of Aviation. The five-year waiting period for the ideal assault helicopter could not be reduced. On the other hand, the Marine Corps realized that the vacuum had to be filled during that period by an additional program which meant that a less-than-optimum assault helicopter had to be adopted to keep the concept and program viable

[note]

 

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By January 1950 the XH–16's lengthy development period was seen as seriously retarding the Marine Corps helicopter program and although it was not desired to divert funds for its support, emphasis was placed on allocation of funds toward the proposed 3,000 pound payload helicopter. The diversion of the remaining XH–16 Navy research and development funds was also viewed as meeting with CNO approval provided the Navy could be persuaded to terminate its support of the XH–16 project.

[note]

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MSTS had been created in October 1949 by directive of the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947

In the following months it developed into a world-wide operating agency, with major area commands in London, New York, San Francisco, and Tokyo. The first Deputy Commander for [MSTS] the Western Pacific [1] reached Tokyo in January 1950 to organize his command, activation of which was scheduled for 1 July.

[1] The initial commander of MSTS, Rear Admiral William M. Callaghan (subsequently promoted to Vice Admiral), coordinated the transfer of the NTS with its commander, Rear Admiral A. J. Wellings (re-assigned as Vice Commander MSTS), and Major General F. A. Heileman, the Chief of the Army Transportation Corps

[note]

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General Huebner got his chance in March 1947 when the command decided to use some 3,000 unassigned black troops in guard duties formerly performed by the 1st Infantry Division. The men where organized into two infantry battalions, but because of their low test scores Huebner decided to establish a twelve- to thirteen-week training program at the Grafenwöhr Training Center and directed the commanding general of the 1st Division to train black soldiers in both basic military and academic subjects. Huebner concluded his directive by saying:


This is our first opportunity to put into effect in a large way the War Department policy on Negro soldiers as announced in War Department Circular No. 124, 1946. Owing to the necessity for rapid training, and to the press of occupational duties, little time has been available in the past for developing the leadership of the Negro soldier. We can now do that .... I wish you to study the program, its progress, its deficiencies and its advantages, in order that a full report may be compiled and lessons in operation and training drawn.

As the improved military bearing and efficiency of black trainees and the subsequent impressive performance of the two new infantry battalions would suggest, the reports on the Grafenwöhr training were optimistic and the lessons drawn ambitious. They prompted Huebner on 1 December 1947 to establish a permanent training center at Kitzingen Air Base.

Essentially, he was trying to combine both drill and constant supervision with a broad-based educational program. Trainees received basic military training for six hours daily and academic instruction up to the twelfth grade level for two hours more. The command ordered all black replacements and casuals arriving from the United States to the training center for classifying and training as required. Eventually all black units in Europe were to be rotated through Kitzingen for unit refresher and individual instruction. As each company completed the course at Kitzingen, the command assigned academic instructors to continue an on-duty educational program in the field. A soldier was required to participate in the educational program until he passed the general education development test for high school level or until he clearly demonstrated that he could not profit from further instruction.

Whether a connection can be made between the Kitzingen training program and improvement in the morale and discipline of black troops, the fact was that by January 1950 a dramatic change had occurred in the conduct of black soldiers in the European Command. The rate of venereal disease among black soldiers had dropped to an average approximating the rate for white troops (and not much greater than the always lower average for troops in the United States). This phenomenon was repeated in the serious incident rate. In the first half of 1950 courts-martial that resulted in bad conduct discharges totaled fifty-nine for Negroes, a figure that compared well with the 324 similar verdicts for the larger contingent of white soldiers.[8-30]

Footnote 8-30: Geis Monograph, Charts 3 and 4 and p. 139.

For once the Army could document what it had always preached, that education and training were the keys to the better performance of black troops. The tragedy was that the education program was never applied throughout the Army, not even in the Far East and in the United States, where far more black soldiers were stationed than in Europe.[8-31]

Footnote 8-31: Not comparable was the brief literacy program reinstituted in the 25th Regimental Combat Team at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1947.

 [note]

 

Army regulations issued this month will, in the name of efficiency, require that manpower in the Army be allocated without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. While these regulations did not require integration of units, they did make it possible.

 

[note]

In opposition to the Truman order, and the President's Committee on Equality of treatment and Opportunity also known as the Fahy Committee recommendations, during the 2nd session of the 81st Congress, integration would come to the fore, when an amendment to the Armed Services Appropriation Bill, proposed by Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, which would allow inductees and enlistees, upon their written declaration of intent, to serve in a unit manned exclusively by members of their own race. [note]

International

This month Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and others would seem to encourage the North Koreans in their belief that the United States would not take part in combat on the Korean Peninsula. [note]

The final phase of development came in January 1950 with the expansion of the air regiment into a division under the command of Wang Yun, promoted to major general. [note]

In January it was reported that March and April had been designated as the time for an attack on South Korea. [note]

After a meeting of USSR and Communist China officials, reportedly held in Peiping early in 1950 to explore the advisability of using the North Korea People's Army for an invasion of South Korea, there was a rapid build-up of that Army. It increased its training program, transferred ordnance depots from urban to isolated rural sites, and readied hidden dump areas to receive supplies, weapons, and munitions of war from the USSR. At the beginning of this build-up there were in Korea about 16,000 repatriated North Koreans from the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). [note]

The differences in Kim Il Sung's account were supported by additional discussions with the Chinese leader in May and September where he made things completely clear. In the spring North Korea would strive to put pressure on the doubting Stalin by stressing that they had the complete support of Mao Zedong for their plans: in September 1949 and again in January 1950 Kim Il Sung again strove to press the Soviet leader, but this time from another tack. By this time, the civil war in China had reached its conclusion, and that meant that the time had come for Mao Zedong to begin to carry out the previous agreement to support real action to unite the Koreas. Kim Il Sung was very crafty in his actions at all these instances, and taking into account the psychology of the Soviet leader, who was apprehensive of the surprising and unwanted independence of Mao.

[note]

Credit for energizing the helicopter program in early 1950 can be attributed to the crusading zeal of the Marine Corps Board and the subsequent actions by the Division of Aviation. The five-year waiting period for the ideal assault helicopter could not be reduced. On the other hand, the Marine Corps realized that the vacuum had to be filled during that period by an additional program which meant that a less-than-optimum assault helicopter had to be adopted to keep the concept and program viable.

[note]

Korean_War

MSTS had been created in October 1949 by directive of the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947

In the following months it developed into a world-wide operating agency, with major area commands in London, New York, San Francisco, and Tokyo. The first Deputy Commander for [MSTS] the Western Pacific [1] reached Tokyo in January 1950 to organize his command, activation of which was scheduled for 1 July.

[1] The initial commander of MSTS, Rear Admiral William M. Callaghan (subsequently promoted to Vice Admiral), coordinated the transfer of the NTS with its commander, Rear Admiral A. J. Wellings (re-assigned as Vice Commander MSTS), and Major General F. A. Heileman, the Chief of the Army Transportation Corps

[note]

Korean_War

General Huebner got his chance in March 1947 when the command decided to use some 3,000 unassigned black troops in guard duties formerly performed by the 1st Infantry Division. The men where organized into two infantry battalions, but because of their low test scores Huebner decided to establish a twelve- to thirteen-week training program at the Grafenwöhr Training Center and directed the commanding general of the 1st Division to train black soldiers in both basic military and academic subjects. Huebner concluded his directive by saying:


This is our first opportunity to put into effect in a large way the War Department policy on Negro soldiers as announced in War Department Circular No. 124, 1946. Owing to the necessity for rapid training, and to the press of occupational duties, little time has been available in the past for developing the leadership of the Negro soldier. We can now do that .... I wish you to study the program, its progress, its deficiencies and its advantages, in order that a full report may be compiled and lessons in operation and training drawn.

As the improved military bearing and efficiency of black trainees and the subsequent impressive performance of the two new infantry battalions would suggest, the reports on the Grafenwöhr training were optimistic and the lessons drawn ambitious. They prompted Huebner on 1 December 1947 to establish a permanent training center at Kitzingen Air Base.

Essentially, he was trying to combine both drill and constant supervision with a broad-based educational program. Trainees received basic military training for six hours daily and academic instruction up to the twelfth grade level for two hours more. The command ordered all black replacements and casuals arriving from the United States to the training center for classifying and training as required. Eventually all black units in Europe were to be rotated through Kitzingen for unit refresher and individual instruction. As each company completed the course at Kitzingen, the command assigned academic instructors to continue an on-duty educational program in the field. A soldier was required to participate in the educational program until he passed the general education development test for high school level or until he clearly demonstrated that he could not profit from further instruction.

Whether a connection can be made between the Kitzingen training program and improvement in the morale and discipline of black troops, the fact was that by January 1950 a dramatic change had occurred in the conduct of black soldiers in the European Command. The rate of venereal disease among black soldiers had dropped to an average approximating the rate for white troops (and not much greater than the always lower average for troops in the United States). This phenomenon was repeated in the serious incident rate. In the first half of 1950 courts-martial that resulted in bad conduct discharges totaled fifty-nine for Negroes, a figure that compared well with the 324 similar verdicts for the larger contingent of white soldiers.[8-30]

Footnote 8-30: Geis Monograph, Charts 3 and 4 and p. 139.

For once the Army could document what it had always preached, that education and training were the keys to the better performance of black troops. The tragedy was that the education program was never applied throughout the Army, not even in the Far East and in the United States, where far more black soldiers were stationed than in Europe.[8-31]

Footnote 8-31: Not comparable was the brief literacy program reinstituted in the 25th Regimental Combat Team at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1947.

[note]

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In early 1950, U.S. policymakers’ concerns about the danger to the United States and its allies from further Soviet territorial expansion had been heightened by two events of the previous year, the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August [29th] 1949 and the establishment that October of a revolutionary communist government in China.

Those concerns were expressed most clearly and influentially in a far-reaching policy statement drawn up in the spring of 1950 by the State and Defense Departments, under the direction of Paul Nitze, who had recently replaced George F. Kennan as director of State’s Policy Planning Staff.

The report, NSC-68, started from the assumption that the Kremlin sought “to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.” Soviet efforts toward that end now aimed at gaining domination over the Eurasian land mass, the report concluded, and had recently grown bolder in response to America’s relative military weakness. NSC-68 argued that if the United States failed to move decisively to counter future Soviet aggression, U.S. allies in Western Europe would lose heart and drift into a dangerous neutrality. The report warned that any American failure to respond to Soviet aggression, which would more likely be “piecemeal” than total war, could lead to

“a descending spiral of too little and too late . . . of ever narrower and more desperate alternatives . . . of gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.”[4]

From the perspective of the schematic thinking represented in NSC-68, the sudden, massive assault on the American client state in South Korea by armed forces of the Soviet client state in North Korea clearly constituted a challenge the United States must answer. Indeed, the Truman administration responded immediately. Leading officials within the government concluded that the North Korean invasion of South Korea was the opening salvo in a broader Soviet assault; West Germany, or perhaps Iran, was the next likely target. The U.S. government consequently committed military forces to the defense of South Korea and took the additional measures enumerated above.[5]

The U.S. perception of the Soviet role in the outbreak of the Korean War and of Soviet aims in Korea thus played an important role in escalating and shaping the Cold War. Analyses of that role have been, therefore, a necessary part of the scholarly literature on the Cold War. In the absence of Soviet documentary sources, however, these analyses have been based on very limited evidence and have reached widely varying conclusions. The earliest accounts generally agreed with the interpretation of the U.S. government.

[note]

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The gradual shift in Army integration policies and the exigencies of the battle situation in Korea finally offered a solution. Since World War II a number of studies had been made on the better utilization of Negro personnel within the Army and several steps had been taken prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict. #64

#64 For a discussion of the developments before the Korean War, see Freedom to Serve: Equality of treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, A Report by the President's committee, Charles Fahy, Chairman (Washington, 1950).

Army regulations issued in January 1950 stated that all manpower would be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency in the Army without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. #65

#65 Army Special Regulations 600-629-1, 16 Jan 50.

While these regulations did not require integration of units, they did make it possible.

[note]

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Congressional Concerns

Congress was slow to see that changes were gradually transforming the armed services. In its special pre-election session, the Eightieth Congress ignored the recently issued Truman order on racial equality just as it ignored the President's admonition to enact a general civil rights program.

But when the new Eighty-first Congress met in January 1949 the subjects of armed forces integration, the Truman order, and the Fahy Committee all began to receive attention.

Debate on race in the services occurred frequently in both houses. Each side appealed to constitutional and legal principles to support its case, but the discussions might well have remained a philosophical debate if the draft law had not come up for renewal in 1950. The debate focused mostly on an amendment proposed by Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia that would allow inductees and enlistees, upon their written declaration of intent, to serve in a unit manned exclusively by members of their own race. Russell had made this proposal once before, but because it seemed of little consequence to the still largely segregated services of 1948 it was ignored.

Now in the wake of the executive order and the Fahy Committee Report, the amendment came to sudden prominence. And when Russell succeeded in discharging the draft bill with his amendment from the Senate Armed Forces Committee with the members' unanimous approval, civil (p. 390) rights supporters quickly jumped to the attack. Even before the bill was formally introduced on the floor, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon told his colleagues that the Russell amendment conflicted with the stated policy of the administration as well as with sound Republican principles. He cited the waste of manpower the amendment would bring about and reminded his colleagues of the international criticism the armed forces had endured in the past because of undemocratic social practices.[15-42]

Footnote 15-42: Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 96, p. 8412.

When debate began on the amendment, Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts was one of the first to rise in opposition. While confessing sympathy for the states' rights philosophy that recognized the different customs of various sections of the nation, he branded the Russell amendment unnecessary, provocative, and unworkable, and suggested Congress leave the services alone in this matter.

To support his views he read into the record portions of the Fahy Committee Report, which represented, he emphasized, the judgment of impartial civilians appointed by the President, another civilian.[15-43]

Footnote 15-43: Ibid., pp. 8973, 9073.

Discussion of the Russell amendment continued with opponents and defenders raising the issues of military efficiency, legality, and principles of equality and states' rights. In the end the amendment was defeated 45 to 27 with 24 not voting, a close vote if one considers that the abstentions could have changed the outcome.[15-44]

Footnote 15-44: Ibid., p. 9074; see also Memo, Rear Adm H. A. Houser, OSD Legis Liaison, for ASD Rosenberg, 17 Mar 51, sub: Winstead Anti-non-segregation Amendment, SD 291.2.

[note]

 

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North Korean civilians who had worked in P'yŏngyang's arsenals told a bombing-evaluation team that these munitions factories had been reopened in January 1950 with all-out production goals. When they were blasted by the B-29's, the P'yŏngyang arsenals were employing more than 40,000 persons in the manufacture of small arms, munitions, and field guns.#46

#46 FEAF Release No. 219, 26 Oct. 1950.

[note]

January - Secretary of State Dean Acheson states that the Western defense perimeter of the United States stops short of South Korea.

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[note]

 

Air Force gets high rating for desecration efforts according to various Negro Newspapers.

[note]

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These pictures are identified as being take in 1950 - nothing else.
Obviously after July 7th.

[note]

 

Notes for January SitRep 1950