Korean Climate

Mean Temp 28.6°C 83.48°F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


April 28, 1950 (Friday)

The King and Queen


USS Mindoro (CVE-120) underway, 28 April 1950, as blimp K-69 leaves her. K-69 was a non-rigid patrol airship used in ASW operations (USN photo).



Bio   Bio   Bio

Despite the President's optimism, the Fahy Committee was beginning to have doubts about just how everything would work out. Specifically, some members were wondering how they could be sure the Army would comply with the newly approved policies. Such concern was reasonable, despite the Army's solemn commitments, when one considers the committee's lengthening experience with the Defense Department's bureaucracy and its familiarity with the liabilities of the Gillem Board policy. The committee decided, therefore, to include in its final report to the President a request for the retention of a watchdog group to review service practices. In this its views clashed directly with those of Secretary Johnson, who wanted the President to abolish the committee and make him solely responsible for the equal treatment and opportunity program.[14-134]

Niles, anxious to settle the issue, tried to reconcile the differences[14-135]and successfully persuaded the committee to omit a reference in its final report to a successor group to review the services' progress. Such a move, he told Kenworthy, would imply that, unless policed, the services would not carry out their programs. Public discussion about how long the committee was to remain in effect would also tend to tie the President's hands. Niles suggested instead that the committee members discuss the matter with the President when they met with him to submit their final report and perhaps suggest that a watchdog group be appointed or their committee be retained on a standby basis for a later review of service actions.[14-136]



Bio   Bio

Nevertheless, since certain governments had from time to time indicated an unwillingness to accept black servicemen, Secretary Johnson directed the services to inform him in advance when black troops were to be dispatched to countries where no blacks were then stationed so that host countries might be consulted. This new statement produced immediate reaction in the services. Citing a change in policy, the Air Force issued directives opening all overseas assignments except Iceland to Negroes. After an extended discussion on the assignment of black troops to the Trieste (TRUST) area, the Army followed suit.[15-33] [3 years later? immediate reaction 1950-1953????]

Yet the problem refused to go away, largely because the services continued to limit foreign assignment of black personnel, particularly in attaché offices, military assistance advisory groups, and military missions.




The CIA Weekly summary suggested that the Soviets would continue to use militant means to get their way, and also addressed the loss of the PB4Y2 on the 8th of the month. Saying that "in decorating the Soviet pilots who presumably participated" they were rubbing our nose in it.







Unfortunately, China and Russia had been preparing the North Korean regime for an offensive war. For its basic combat strength the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) had raised three regular infantry divisions (10,970 men each), an independent mixed brigade approaching division strength, and five constabulary brigades. The divisions had been formed around seasoned officers and noncommissioned officers who had fought with the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF); the commanding general of the NKPA 3rd Division, for example, had been a member of the CCF Eighth Route Army. The battle-wise cadres were made up of Koreans who, during the Japanese occupation of their country, had fled to China where, in the Yŏnan region, they had been organized into a Korean Volunteer Army for service with the CCF against the Chinese Nationalists. Other Koreans, living in Manchuria, had been conscripted into the CCF. While these veterans of the Red Chinese armies provided cadres for new North Korean divisions, their organization and training was supervised by Russian officers, as many as 15 to each division. As the date for hostilities neared, Korean-manned Red Chinese units began to leave China: the CCF 164th and 166th Divisions crossed the Yalu beginning on 20 July 1949 and were secretly reorganized as the NKPA 5th and 6th Divisions; in May 1950 the CCF 12th was passed to Korean control. In addition to these six divisions, the NKPA quickly mustered other strength when combat began south of the 38th parallel. A tank division appeared and no less than 13 rifle divisions were identified; in all, an estimated 150,000 troops were in combat during the first two months of the South Korean campaign.

 Supplied with information from a North Korean plot who defected to the ROK on 28 April 1950, American intelligence, which had tended to underrate the North Korean Air Force, was brought up to date. This information, when correlated with that obtained from a Major Pak Kyung Ok, shot down near Suwŏn at the outbreak of hostilities, furnished the following North Korean air order of battle, which (with some allowance for variations in plane designations) may be taken as accurate for 29 June:


Location Type Number
Yŏnp'o Yak-7B 10
Yŏnp'o Yak-11 12
Yŏnp'o IL-10 18
Sinmak Yak-7B 10
Sinmak IL-10 2
P'yŏngyang IL-10 8
P'yŏngyang Yak-7B 20
P'yŏngyang Yak-11 2
P'yŏngyang IL-10 40
40 YAK-7B
14 YAK-11
68 IL-10

Supplied with information from a North Korean plot who defected to the ROK on 28 April 1950, American intelligence, which had tended to underrate the North Korean Air Force, was brought up to date.



Notes for Friday April 28, 1950