Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 28.6°C 83.48°F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

The following are references to the month of May, without any more specific information.

American Caesar

May 1950

Korean_War

In May 1950 Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explicitly stated that Russia could seize South Korea at her convenience and the United States probably would not intervene, since Korea was not "very greatly [sic] important."

In subsequent interviews he said substantially the same thing to G. Ward Price and to William R. Matthews of the Arizona Daily Star. Like Acheson, he omitted both Formosa and Korea.172

What is significant here is that the General, unlike Acheson and Connally, did not say this after Chiang's - flight to Formosa. He saw, as they did not, that an American people aroused by the fall of China would not stand for the sacrifice of another. Asian country to Communist aggression. The McCarthy's, Wherry's, Taft's, and Wiley's had won their suit in the court of public opinion. Democrats like Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson knew it; to the end of their lives they would believe that the relinquishment of another Oriental state to the Communists would be political suicide.

[note]

MacArthur's admirers later insisted that he had sought the reassignment of American garrison troops to Sŏul, on the ground that his office were more reliable than the "untrustworthy" State Department types in Sŏul and because he suspected an approaching North Korean attack. There is no record of this, and it is unlikely; as late as May of 1950 he said, "I don't believe a shooting war is imminent " He had complete confidence in Sebald, who was briefing him on developments across the Korea Strait. And he ignored accumulating evidence of an imminent attack by the In Min Gun, the North Korean People's Army (PA).

[note]

American Federation

Korean_War

Meanwhile, in South Korea, elections for a new National Assembly had been conducted during May 1950. The U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the elections in which 130 seats went to Independents, 49 to parties supporting Syngman Rhee, and 44 to other parties. In the north, these elections and the presence of the U.N. commission were loudly condemned, and the campaign for a unified assembly was revived.

[note]

Army Policy

Korean_War

Meanwhile, in South Korea, elections for a new National Assembly had been conducted during May 1950. The U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the elections in which 130 seats went to Independents, 49 to parties supporting Syngman Rhee, and 44 to other parties. In the north, these elections and the presence of the U.N. commission were loudly condemned, and the campaign for a unified assembly was revived.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Reporting on his findings to the Secretary of the Army, General Collins said:

As a result of the reductions in strength of personnel . . . and because our troops were primarily engaged in occupation missions until recently, the troops of Eighth Army are not now in fighting condition. However, they have recently been brought back up to strength, are making excellent progress with realistic field training and are planning exercises with close fighter-bomber support by the early spring of 195O. Given another six months the divisions I inspected should be in excellent shape. [03-45]

Korean_War

All units of Eighth Army had completed the battalion phase of their training by the target date of 15 May 1950. An air transportability school had been established and was functioning, pointing toward battalion airlift exercises. At an amphibious training center near Tokyo, one battalion from each division had received training in landing techniques and a joint landing exercise was scheduled for August 1950.

Reports on the Eighth Army's divisions which were sent to the Department of the Army in May 1950 showed estimates ranging from 84 percent to 65 percent of full combat efficiency for the four divisions in Japan. [03-46]

FEC Supply Status

Equipment in the hands of MacArthur's troops was for the most part of World War II vintage. Much of it had been through combat, and a good deal of it, particularly the vehicles, had been serviced and maintained under difficulty during the years of occupation.

Adding to the difficulty of the logistic situation was the unusual dependence upon indigenous personnel which had developed within the U.S. Army in Japan during the years following World War II. Basically, this dependence stemmed from the acute shortages of trained American soldiers to perform specialized functions of the type normally carried out by service units. In the absence of sufficient service units and with emphasis transferred to a great extent from field-type operations, the natural result had been to exploit the enormous pool of manpower available in Japan. Japanese workmen carried out duties in support of U.S. Army units and in installations ranging from menial mess-hall tasks to highly technical functions calling for advanced training and great skill. Base areas, depots, and ports were manned by Japanese personnel under Army supervision, while protection of these installations, as well as other less sensitive areas throughout Japan, was largely delegated to Japanese guards.

[note]

But in early May 1950 the American Embassy in Sŏul reported little likelihood of a North Korean invasion in the near future. [04-9]

In May 1950, the Department of the Army G-2 said, "The movement of North Korean forces steadily southward toward the 38th parallel during the current period could indicate preparation for offensive action."

[note]

Forgotten War


Bio

In cables to State in May and June of 1950 Muccio described the ROK Army as "superior" to the NKPA in "training, leadership, morale, marksmanship, and better small arms equipment, especially M-1's [rifles]. . . ."

[note]


Bio

During the month of May 1950 Darrigo's deep concern intensified. From January to May "border incidents" had continued unabatedly. During one week, March 3 to March 10, there had been eighteen "incidents," as well as twenty-nine major guerrilla raids in South Korea. But in May border incidents and guerrilla raids suddenly dropped off sharply, North Korean civilians were evacuated from the border zone, and the NKPA mysteriously removed the railroad tracks leading from Kaesŏng north to P'yŏngyang.

[note]

1950/03/10 - CIA predicted N.K. attack in June - Charles Willoughby, G-2 in Asia, filed 1195 reports to MacArthur in 12 months after June 1949, reported massive buildup of N.K. troops on border, large numbers Chinese troops of Korean descent entered N.K., but MacArthur ignored the reports, said May 1950: "I don't believe a shooting war is imminent"

[note]

South then North

Beginning in May 1950, incidents along the Parallel, and guerrilla activity in the interior, dropped off sharply. It was the lull preceding the storm.

[note]

In May 1950 the effective strength of the North Korean internal security forces was approximately 50,000, divided among the Border Constabulary, the regular police, and the "thought" police. [02-4]

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In the spring of 1950 the Soviet Union made particularly large shipments of arms and military supplies to North Korea.

One captured North Korean supply officer stated that in May 1950, when he went to Ch'ŏngjin to get supplies for the N.K. 5th Division, Soviet merchant ships were unloading weapons and ammunition, and that trucks crowded the harbor waterfront area.

Korean-speaking crew members told him the ships had come from Vladivostok.

Markings on some of the North Korean equipment captured in the first few months of the Korean War show that it was manufactured in the Soviet Union in 1949-50 and, accordingly, could not have been materiel left behind in 1948 when the occupation forces withdrew from North Korea, as the Soviets have claimed. [02-21]


North Korea began the war with about 180 aircraft, all supplied by Russia. Of these about

 

The North Korean Navy had approximately 16 patrol craft of various types and a few coastwise steamers reportedly equipped with light deck guns. [02-22]

[note]

Truce Tents and fighting fronts

Emblem of South Korea.svg

After the elections of 30 May 1950 in South Korea failed to strengthen their cause, the Communists decided upon sterner action. They demanded new elections, to establish a legislative body for all Korea with unification under the Communists as the objective.

[note]

USAF

Koread-War

Fortunately MATS fell heir to already established routes across the Pacific, although two of them had been closed down and reopening the way stations would be troublesome.


In June 1950 only the mid-Pacific route was in use: Travis, Hickam, Johnston Island, Kwajalein, and Japan, with a stop at Iwo Jima if necessary;

the great circle route - McChord, Anchorage, Shemya, and Japan - had been used by a contract carrier until June 1949 and then discontinued.

A third route from Hickam to Japan via Wake had been abandoned in May 1950, when the Navy and a civil airline had ceased operating at Wake.

In addition to reopening all three of these routes, MATS Pacific Division was to make several C-97 flights directly from Hawaii to Japan.

[note]

In May 1950 Ambassador Muccio predicted that the ROK would be increasingly threatened by the transfer of men released from the successful Chinese Communist campaigns.#68

[note]

Korean_War

Other Koreans, living in Manchuria, had been conscripted into the CCF. While these veterans of the Red Chinese armies provided cadres for new North Korean divisions, their organization and training was supervised by Russian officers, as many as 15 to each division. As the date for hostilities neared, Korean-manned Red Chinese units began to leave China: the CCF 164th and 166th Divisions crossed the Yalu beginning on 20 July 1949 and were secretly reorganized as the NKPA 5th and 6th Divisions;

in May 1950 the CCF 12th was passed to Korean control. In addition to these six divisions, the NKPA quickly mustered other strength when combat began south of the 38th parallel. A tank division appeared and no less than 13 rifle divisions were identified; in all, an estimated 150,000 troops were in combat during the first two months of the South Korean campaign.

[note]

USMC

The conscription program was speeded up along with other preparations as invasion plans neared completion. About 12,000 men were inducted from March through May 1950 and given 6 weeks of basic training at such camps as the No. 2 People’s training Center at Sinuiju.

In some communities the men eligible for military service were requested to attend a meeting. Upon arrival, they were taken in trucks to a training center and compelled to enlist. Harsh as such methods might seem, they were gentle as compared to the forced conscription of ROK civilians after the invasion got underway. Both men and women in captured cities were crowded into school buildings, given political indoctrination and forced to learn Communist songs. After a week of this curriculum, the men were inducted both as combat recruits and laborers. And though the women were told that their service would be limited to duty as nurses or clerks, some of them were coerced into carrying out reconnaissance or espionage missions.[20]

[note]

USN

the facilities at Midway Island, on the direct route westward, had been deactivated in May on instructions from the Department of Defense.

[note]

Notes for May 1950 General Observations

Mao Zedong learned the thoughts of Kim Il Sung during a visit to Beijing in May 1950. At the same time, he voiced his confidence that the Americans would not interfere in such a conflict. If the Japanese sent in their forces, then China would come to the aid of the DPRK. In the opinion of Mao, the Soviet Union would not subsequently participate in a Korean conflict as long as they had an agreement with the USA over the 38th Parallel, but China had no such obligations to the United States.