

# Monday May 22, 1950



[Sun Rise](#) 0517 1936  
[Moon Rise](#) 1122 ----  
[Moon Phase](#) 29% 6 days

## Weather

### [Korean Climate](#)

Mean Temp 17.2°C 62.96°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

### [1950 Pacific Typhoon Season](#)

### [Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 \(Daegu\)](#)

## Overview

May 22, 1950 (Monday)

- Celal Bayar became the third President of Turkey, and Adnan Menderes became the new Prime Minister.



In order to find a method by which the Marine Corps could further expedite and improve upon the new assault concept during the period 1950 to 1954, and also, to be able to find a solution to the ever-increasing maintenance problems of the aging HRP's, another joint helicopter conference was held on **22 May 1950**. Attending were members from:

- BuAer
- DCNO (Air) Aviation Plans
- DCNO (Air) Readiness
- HQMC
- [Major General William J. Wallace \(DivAvn\)](#)
- [Brigadier General Pollock \(Plans and Policies\)](#)

After a discussion of the problem by the conference members, it was determined that the helicopter program of the future should be composed of two parts.

First, and as the longer-range solution, the Marine Corps should continue with the program to obtain a carrier-based assault helicopter which would meet the

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requirements of AO-17501 (XHR2S-1), as was recommended by the March helicopter conference, and simultaneously attempt to persuade the Army and Air Force to cancel the XH-16 project and join with the Marine Corps in developing the XHR2S-1.[32]

Secondly, and the one related to immediate Marine Corps needs, was the proposal to procure an interim assault helicopter from the best design currently available. General Wallace 's conference proposed that the most practical and expeditious way to obtain an interim helicopter, and accelerate the program's pace, was to establish a board to make a survey of all current designs and production helicopters which gave promise of meeting Marine Corps requirements. The survey board would examine the production capability of each helicopter manufacturer. The capability of a manufacturer to produce the required number of assault helicopters would be one of the prime considerations in the choice of design.

Dependent upon CNO approval of the aviation plan calling for two Marine assault helicopter squadrons in 1953-1954, a production contract would be let for 40 off-the-shelf interim assault helicopters; 16 for each of the squadrons, and eight for support. [33]


The Marine Corps planners were also concerned that an attempt should be made to increase the number of total aircraft allowed in Marine aviation so that no cut-back in current fixed-wing aircraft would result from this program. However, it was agreed by Generals Wallace and Pollock "that if the numerical ceiling for Marine Corps aircraft could not be increased, they would accept a reduction in other type aircraft in order to have sufficient aircraft billets to provide for the two assault helicopter squadrons.[34]

[note]



David K. Niles

David K. Niles, anxious to settle the issue, tried to reconcile the differences [135] and successfully persuaded the committee to omit a reference in its final report to a successor group to review the services' progress.





Edwin Wentworth Kenworthy

Such a move, he told [Kenworthy](#), would imply that, unless policed, the services would not carry out their programs. Public discussion about how long the committee was to remain in effect would also tend to tie the President's hands.

Niles suggested instead that the committee members discuss the matter with the President when they met with him to submit their final report and perhaps suggest that a watchdog group be appointed or their committee be retained on a standby basis for a later review of service actions.[136]

Before the committee met with the President on 22 May , Niles recommended to Truman that he make no commitment on a watchdog group.[14-137]



Clark McAdams Clifford

Privately, Niles agreed with [Clark Clifford](#) that the committee should be retained for an indefinite period, but on an advisory rather than an operating basis so that, in Clifford's words, "it will be in a position to see that there is not a (p. 375) gap between policy and an administration of policy in the Defense Establishment." [14-138]

The President proceeded along these lines. Several months after the committee presented its final report, Freedom to Serve,[139] in a public ceremony, Truman relieved the group of its assignment.

Commenting that the services could have the opportunity to work out in detail the new policies and procedures initiated by the committee, he told Fahy on 6 July 1950 that he would leave his order in effect, noting that "at some later date, it may prove desirable to examine the effectuation of your Committee's recommendations, which can be done under Executive Order 9981. " [140]

[note]



[note]



[music]



[note]

[Notes for Monday May 22, 1950](#)