

Thursday June 1, 1950 (Day -24)



Sunrise 0512 1943

Moonrise 2103 0512

Moon Phase 97% 16 days

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Weather

[Korean Climate](#)

Mean Temp 16.2 °C 61.16 °F at Taegu

[1950 Pacific Typhoon Season](#)

[Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 \(Taegu\)](#)

Overview

NKPA



The North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) strength is estimated at 135,000, with seven (7) assault divisions and 150 T-34 tanks. [\[note\]](#) Why they had tanks and the ROK's did not is an interesting question. The Army planners did not think tanks would be of any value in a country whose roads were only about half the width of a tank. In Viet Nam twenty (??) years later, the same Army planners didn't think tanks would work in the jungle, and fifty (??) years later in Afghanistan they didn't think they would work in hilly country. In both the last two cases, when they finally sent in the Marines, the Marines brought their own tanks, as part of their Standard [TO&E](#).

Integration



As the improved military bearing and efficiency of black trainees and the subsequent impressive performance of the two new infantry battalions would suggest, the reports on the [Grafenwöhr](#) training were optimistic and the lessons drawn ambitious. They prompted [Huebner](#) on **1 December 1947** to establish a permanent training center at [Kitzingen Air Base](#).[\[8-26\]](#)

[Footnote 8-26: The training center had already moved from Grafenwöhr to larger quarters at [Mannheim Koafestal, Germany](#).]

Essentially, he was trying to combine both drill and constant supervision with a broad-based educational program. trainees received basic military training for six hours daily and academic instruction up to the twelfth grade level for two hours more. The command ordered all black replacements and casuals arriving from the United States to the training center for classifying and training as required. Eventually all black units in Europe were to be rotated through Kitzingen for unit refresher and individual instruction. As each company completed the course at Kitzingen, the command assigned academic instructors to continue an on-duty educational program in the field. A soldier was required to participate in the educational program until he passed the general education development test for high school level or until he clearly demonstrated that he could not profit from further instruction.

Thousands of soldiers—at the peak in **1950** more than 62 percent of all Negroes in the command—were enrolled in the military training course at Kitzingen or in on-duty educational programs organized in over two-thirds of the black companies throughout the command. By June 1950 the program had over 2,900 students and 200 instructors. A year later, the European commander estimated that since the program began some 1,169 Negroes had completed fifth grade in his schools, 2,150 had finished grade school, and 418 had passed

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the high school equivalency test.[8-28]

Footnote 8-28: EUCOM Hist Div, EUCOM Command Report, 1951, pp. 128, 251, copy in CMH. [\[note\]](#)

U.S. Air Force



On this day according to the history of the "United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953",

"... FEAF intelligence recognized that the North Koreans had enough military power to undertake a war against the Republic of Korea at any time it selected. "South Korea," predicted FEAF, "will fall before a North Korean invasion, which will be initiated whenever Soviet strategy so dictates."

I have three versions of the USAF History, (no 71, 72 and 131) and I can attest, hindsight can be godsend [\[see all 3 cover pages\]](#). [\[note\]](#)

SECRET—Security Information

report that the invasion would take place in June 1950.²⁰ Ambassador Muccio predicted in May 1950 that the ROK would be increasingly threatened by the transfer of men released from the successful Chinese Communist forces.²¹ Yet the FEC G-2 in April 1950 "believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer . . . The most probable course of North Korean action this spring and summer is the continuation of its efforts to overthrow the South Korean Government by the creation of chaotic conditions in the republic through guerrilla activities and psychological warfare."²²

Mr Donald Nichols, commander of the Office of Strategic Intelligence District No. 8 in Korea, had collected and forwarded to the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) valuable information gained through close relationships with Korean political, military, and police officials. It was the Nichols'

reports which largely formed the basis for estimates made by KMAG, the embassy, and FEAF. While unable to predict an exact date for the beginning of trouble, FEAF intelligence recognized on 1 June 1950 that the North Korean régime had the military power to undertake a war against the ROK at any time it selected. "South Korea," predicted FEAF, "will fall before a North Korean invasion, which will be initiated whenever Soviet strategy so dictates, rather than upon the occurrence of a legitimate *casus belli* . . . The precise timing of such an invasion depends largely on the progression of events in South and Southeast Asia."²³ U. S. military and air intelligence in the Far East thus correctly assessed the build-up of North Korean forces, but they were understandably unable to predict an exact date for the beginning of a Korean war.

Casualties

Friday June 2, 1950 Day (-23)



Date	USAF	FUSA	USMC	CUSN	Other	Total
Previous						
Losses						
To Date						

Aircraft Losses Today 000

[Notes for Thursday June 1, 1950](#)

