

# Tuesday June 6, 1950 (Day -19)



[Sun Rise](#) 0511 1946  
[Moon Rise](#) 0015 1054  
[Moon Phase](#) 57% 21 days

## Weather

### [Korean Climate](#)

Mean Temp 24.9°C 76.82°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

### [1950 Pacific Typhoon Season](#)

### [Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 \(Daegu\)](#)

## Overview

### CIA Reports



### Daily Summary

The United States and British Embassies in Bangkok suggest the imminent departure for Moscow of the Soviet Minister and the former [charge d'affaires](#) as well as other Soviet officials indicate an important consultation or planning conference on Southeast Asia may be taking place soon..

The CIA reported this information and added that except for China, all Eastern Asia diplomatic posts, including the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and an expert on US thinking, would be at the gathering and expected them to be determining strategies on how to counter Western inroads into anti-communist activities in the Far East, and especially Southeast Asian.

[\[note\]](#)

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[\[note\]](#)

### [KMAG](#)

[General Roberts](#) and [William C. Foster](#), as the Deputy Administrator of the [Economic Cooperation Administration \(ECA\)](#), had been (and will continue) issuing, glowing reports on the capabilities of the ROK Army.



Today, Ambassador Muccio provided statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee just a little contrary to theirs:

*"The undeniable materiel superiority of the North Korean forces would provide North Korea with the margin of victory in the event of a full-scale invasion of the Republic... [132]*

However the good news was preferred to the bad, and nothing was ever communicated to the White House, that things were souring in Korea.

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In contrast to these optimistic reports [see 6/11 & 9/47] by Roberts and Foster, Ambassador Muccio provided statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 6, 1950, stating:

*"The undeniable materiel superiority of the North Korean forces would provide North Korea with the margin of victory in the event of a full-scale invasion of the Republic... [132]*

By materiel superiority, Muccio was talking about heavy infantry support weapons, such as tanks and artillery --to include aircraft. It was a known fact that the nearly 100,000 man ROK army was under strength and under equipped. The "South Korean forces had no tanks or medium artillery whatsoever. Nor could South Korea field any fighter or bomber aircraft.[133]

Contrary to Foster's and Roberts' statements, it was obvious that the South Korean Army was not prepared to meet the horde of the NKPA crossing over the 38th parallel. Senior military leadership did not control these various sources of information, but it is clear that they should have been aware of the disparities and possible consequences. Also the civilian

leadership in Washington must bear responsibility for neglecting to take appropriate action. Presidential advisors kept crucial information from the President even when intelligence information made its way back to Washington. The advisors simply chose not to believe the reports coming from Korea. In retrospect, the misjudgment was astonishing. Intelligence reports to Washington provided an almost classic description of enemy preparations for imminent war. North Korean civilians were being evacuated from the immediate vicinity of the parallel. Non military freight deliveries in the area had been halted. transport was being restricted to military purposes, including large shipments of weapons and ammunition . . . the intelligence reports were greeted by Washington officials with all sorts of rationalizations. Forgetting the same kind of misjudgment before, at the time of Pearl Harbor, they hoped and believed that the North Koreans were unlikely to do that which they had the capacity to do. Washington was simply not persuaded that the North Korean's intended to involve themselves in armed conflict.[134]

There are no records that show any of Truman's advisers, civilian or military ever went to him in the month of June, 1950, to tell him of the serious developments near the 38th parallel.[135]

[\[note\]](#)

**6 June 1950** The United States Government received a clear warning that the ROK Army was not strong enough when Ambassador Muccio, in the same month South Korea was attacked, told the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the materiel superiority of the North Korean forces, particularly in heavy infantry support weapons, tanks, and combat aircraft which the USSR had supplied, would provide North Korea with the margin of victory in any full-scale invasion of the republic. Ambassador Muccio told the legislators that it was vital that the ROK Army be maintained on an effective defensive level of equality in manpower, equipment, and training, in relation to those forces which immediately threatened it. [02-75]

In opposition to Ambassador Muccio's testimony was that of William C. Foster, then deputy administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), given before the Senate Appropriations Committee **one week later**. Speaking about the ROK Army, Mr. Foster said: The rigorous training program has built up a well-disciplined force of 100,000 soldiers, one that is prepared to meet any challenge by North Korean forces, and one that has cleaned out the guerrilla bands in South Korea in one area after another. If American legislators were somewhat confused at this point they could scarcely be blamed. [02-76]

[\[note\]](#)

Given the CIA's reports, and **KMAG** and company, no one in authority in the states was thinking hostilities were in the offing.



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As early as September of 1947, **Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer** investigated the military conditions that existed at that time in Korea. His assessment of the military situation noted that the North Korean Army was a potential threat to the peace of Korea - especially if the United States were to withdraw its troops.[126] He concluded in his report to President Truman that the United States would suffer an "immense loss in moral prestige among the peoples of Asia..."[127] if troops were withdrawn as South Korea was being invaded.: He also noted in the document that he considered Korea as "strategically important" and he cautioned that **Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's** two divisions could not hold back invading North Korean forces if attacked.128

**Wedemeyer's** report had clearly shown that Korea was a hot spot that should not be overlooked. The indications were clear that future actions and policies regarding U.S. involvement in Korea should have been formulated based upon the possibility of conflict with the North Koreans. Nevertheless, Truman apparently did not take Wedemeyer's report seriously; one year later tactical U.S. troops under General Hodge were withdrawn from Korea.



[Brigadier General William Lynn Roberts](#), head of the Korean Military Advisory Group ([KMAG](#)) under [Ambassador Muccio](#), rendered contrary and misleading intelligence reports to the Pentagon. He believed tank warfare in Korea was impossible because the roads were too narrow and the rice paddies were too soft. 129 General Roberts' reports were taken seriously and, in fact, were the basis of the testimony given to a congressional hearing in [June 1949](#) defending the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. On that subject, [Major General Charles L. Bolté](#) testified before Congress:  
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We feel that the [native] forces in Korea now are better equipped than the North Korean troops...the Army as the Executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Far East is not only agreeable to the withdrawal of the tactical formations from Korea, but is heartily in favor of it as they [sic] feel that the point has been reached in the development of South Korean forces and in the supplying of material aid to the South Korean forces that it has reached a point [sic] where the tactical units can and should be withdrawn.[130]*

Reports and testimonies such as this were pervasive and show the ineptness of the leadership to ascertain and interpret the reality that existed prior to the invasion. For example, [two weeks before the invasion](#), [William C. Foster](#), as the Deputy Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee regarding the ROK's ability to meet an attack from the North. He told the committee:

*The rigorous training program [of the ROK Army] has built up a well-disciplined army of 100,000 soldiers, one that is prepared to meet any challenge by the North Korean forces, and one that has cleaned out the guerilla bands in South Korea in one area after another.[131]*

All these reports were being digested by Congress who were allowed to believe that all was well.

[\[note\]](#)

**0000 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/05/50	06/05/50	06/06/50
9:00 AM	10:00 AM	3:00 PM	12:00 AM

**0100 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea

06/05/50 10:00 AM	06/05/50 11:00 AM	06/05/50 4:00 PM	06/06/50 1:00 AM
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**0200 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 11:00 AM	06/05/50 12:00 PM	06/05/50 5:00 PM	06/06/50 2:00 AM

**0300 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 12:00 PM	06/05/50 1:00 PM	06/05/50 6:00 PM	06/06/50 3:00 AM

**0400 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 1:00 PM	06/05/50 2:00 PM	06/05/50 7:00 PM	06/06/50 4:00 AM

**0500 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 2:00 PM	06/05/50 3:00 PM	06/05/50 8:00 PM	06/06/50 5:00 AM

**0511 Sunrise**

**0600 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 3:00 PM	06/05/50 4:00 PM	06/05/50 9:00 PM	06/06/50 6:00 AM

**0700 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 4:00 PM	06/05/50 5:00 PM	06/05/50 10:00 PM	06/06/50 7:00 AM

**0800 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50 5:00 PM	06/05/50 6:00 PM	06/05/50 11:00 PM	06/06/50 8:00 AM

**0900 Korean Time**

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/05/50	06/06/50	06/06/50

6:00 PM | 7:00 PM | 12:00 AM | 9:00 AM

1000 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/05/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
7:00 PM	8:00 PM	1:00 AM	10:00 AM

1100 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/05/50	06/05/50	06/06/50
8:00 PM	9:00 PM	2:00 AM	11:00 AM

1200 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/05/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
9:00 PM	10:00 PM	3:00 AM	12:00 PM

1300 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/05/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
10:00 PM	11:00 PM	4:00 AM	1:00 PM

1400 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/05/50	06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
11:00 PM	12:00 AM	5:00 AM	2:00 PM

1500 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
12:00 AM	1:00 AM	6:00 AM	3:00 PM

1600 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
1:00 AM	2:00 AM	7:00 AM	4:00 PM

1700 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50	06/06/50
2:00 AM	3:00 AM	8:00 AM	5:00 PM

1800 Korean Time

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Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50 3:00 AM	06/06/50 4:00 AM	06/06/50 9:00 AM	06/06/50 6:00 PM

1900 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50 4:00 AM	06/06/50 5:00 AM	06/06/50 10:00 AM	06/06/50 7:00 PM

1946 Sunset

2000 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50 5:00 AM	06/06/50 6:00 AM	06/06/50 11:00 AM	06/06/50 8:00 PM

2100 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50 6:00 AM	06/06/50 7:00 AM	06/06/50 12:00 PM	06/06/50 9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time


Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50 7:00 AM	06/06/50 8:00 AM	06/06/50 1:00 PM	06/06/50 10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/06/50 8:00 AM	06/06/50 9:00 AM	06/06/50 2:00 PM	06/06/50 11:00 PM

Casualties

Tuesday June 6, 1950 (Day -19)

	<p>0 Casualties</p>
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Date	USAF	FUSA	USMC	CUSN	Other	Total
Previous						
Losses						
To Date						

Aircraft Losses Today 000

[Notes for Tuesday June 6, 1950](#)

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