Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.9°C 76.82°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Forgotten War




Sikorsky HO3S-1 Dragonfly


Bell 47 HTL-3


The net effect of the Roberts campaign was to create the impression that the ROK troops were the best in the Far East and lacked only air power and heavy artillery to be completely invincible. As KMAG internal reports showed, this was far from the truth. There were continuing grave, fundamental weaknesses in the ROK Army, and by June 15, 1950, it was still far from being trained. Only about 25 percent of the ROK Army (sixteen of sixty-seven battalions) had completed battalion level training and was ready to move on to regimental exercises.


Moreover, the widespread corruption in the infrastructure and profligacy in the field had seriously sapped the efficiency and staying power of the ROK Army. The original stockpile of 51 million rounds of small arms ammo had dwindled to 19 million.

Owing to the careless use and loss of spare parts, "35 percent of the vehicles" were out of commission, leaving only 2,100 trucks and jeeps. For the same reasons, "10 to 15 percent" of the weapons were "unusable."[2-72]

2-72. training status: Military Advisors in Korea, p. 78. Corruption: FRUS VII, 1950, pp. 93-96 (Roberts memo to KMAG personnel). Ammo, trucks, etc.: FRUS VII, 1950, and South to the Naktong, p. 17; Military Advisors in Korea p 98.

Beyond that, the gravest threat to the ROK Army was not the dubious 100 plane NKPA Air Force but rather its awesome force of 150 Soviet T34 tanks. In the Roberts campaign in the spring of 1950 the Soviet tanks were scarcely mentioned - and never stressed - either publicly or privately.

Tanker Roberts had fostered the belief that Korea was "not good tank country," and apparently for that reason he was not overly concerned about the NKPA armored forces. For an experienced tanker like Roberts, who knew firsthand the terror that German panzer divisions had evoked among some tank-less American infantry in the Bulge, his apparent indifference to the NKPA armored forces was simply inexplicable.[2-73]

2-73. "Not good tank country": Military Advisors in Korea, p. 100. Swayers wrote: "The Americans did not include tanks... in part because of fiscal limitations and in part because the KMAG staff felt ta thte roads and bridges of South Korea did ot lend themselves to efcient tank operations"


V The ROK 1st Division, anchoring the left flank of the four-division force deployed at the 38th Parallel, had placed its 12th Regiment at Kaesŏng, the ancient capital of all Korea. One of its senior KMAG advisers was Army Captain Joseph R. Darrigo, aged thirty. He was a conscientious, competent adviser, one of the few in KMAG who liked duty in Korea.







But by 15 June 1950 only the ROK Capital Division’s 9 battalions, 6 battalions of the ROK 7th Division, and a battalion of the ROK 8th Division had completed the battalion phase of training. Thirty others were through the company phase, and 17 had not yet finished the platoon phase. Two battalions had had 75 percent of their platoon training and 50 percent of their company training. Seventeen battalion staffs and 5 regimental staffs had participated in command post exercises; 14 battalions had taken the 8-day maneuver exercises; and 6 battalions had taken Tank Hunting Team training. All Korean troops had fired for record with the M1 rifle, however, and qualification firing of other individual arms and of crew-served weapons was well along. The technical services were progressing satisfactorily despite the difficulty with which Korean Army personnel absorbed and applied technical instruction.[28]




The schools program promised to be KMAG’s most successful enterprise. By 15 June 1950, ROK Army schools had graduated a total of 9,126 officers and 11,112 enlisted men, and had begun to produce graduates who could form an effective military organization. Nearly all officers in the rank of lieutenant colonel and higher had completed the advanced course at the Korean Army Infantry School, the command and general staff course, or the senior officers’ course. More important, by attending school Korean officers had become aware of the value of schooling as a supplement to training and operations, and the concept had gained a more respected place in their thinking. The only real flaw in KMAG’s plan, as later expressed by General Roberts, was that “. . . time ran out.” [56]‌




On 15 June 1950 the U.S. Military Advisory Group reported that the Korean Coast Guard could be considered but 70 percent effective. The group warned at that time that the transfer of civilian Coast Guard advisors to Department of State payrolls did not diminish the need for additional advisors.[63]

American assistance to the Korean National Police was also limited. The police force had grown by 1949 to a strength of approximately 48,000 and was distributed by divisions according to population and guerrilla activity throughout the eight provinces of South Korea and on the islands of Cheju-do and Ullung-do.

Since the police force was a national organization, it nominally came under the Minister of Home Affairs; actually, each police division was directly responsible to the governor of its province for operational control. The police were equipped with a miscellaneous assortment of weapons, including the Japanese Model 99 rifle, a limited number of U.S. carbines, and pistols of various makes and calibers, all of which complicated enormously problems of supply and maintenance.[64]

For this organization, KMAG’s Table of Distribution authorized ten American advisors—one for each police division and two for the main headquarters of the police in Sŏul. As was the case with most other KMAG advisory elements, there were seldom, if ever, that many advisors on duty at any one time. Between February 1950 and 25 June 1950, for instance, there were only four KMAG police advisors, with each responsible for at least two provinces.[65]



U.S. Marine Corps




On 15 June 1950, HMX–1 was given an opportunity to demonstrate to President Harry S. Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the many tasks which Marine helicopters were now able to perform. A simulated amphibious assault was staged for the guests as the helicopters were "put through their paces" in presenting a complete amphibious demonstration similar to the Congressional exhibition given the previous year.

15 Jun CONUS———President Harry S. Truman visited the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Va. and witnessed combat demonstrations designed to prove that the Marine Corps should be allocated a bigger budget. Highlight was an assault landing using Piasecki" flying-banana" helicopters to show Mr. Truman how men and equipment could be flown from carriers to objectives behind enemy lines. (1950 FOF, l95G).




The next day a parade and review was staged at Quantico in honor of Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the outgoing Commandant of the MCS, a position he had held since April 1948. At the close of the ceremony, six HRP–ls, six HO3S-ls, and the HTL–2 made a "Fly-by" in formation . This was believed to have been the largest group of helicopters to fly in formation to date. [57]

Reviewing the progress made by HMX–1 since its commissioning date to June 1950, the squadron performed practically all aspects of its assigned missions and tasks . Evidence indicated that the operations of HMX–1 had been completely satisfactory. Although the Commandant's time-table for the helicopter program had slipped, HMX–1 had used every conceivable opportunity to ensure that fulfillment of the program had been met to the best of its capability

. Development of tactics and techniques in connection with the movement of assault troops had been accomplished by participation in the PACKARD operations. The evaluation of a small helicopter for observation purposes had been completed and specifications submitted for its characteristics .

Compliance with the last task assigned had also been completed when a proposed table of organization was submitted for a typical Marine helicopter squadron .

Although the squadron did not possess 18 air - craft as the original planners had envisioned and CNO had approved, by the end of June, HMX–1 was one aircraft in excess of the authorized level. The latest allowance list, dated 15 June 1950, established the maximum number of aircraft at 6 HRP-1s, 7 HO3Ss, and 2 HTL-2s. This compared with an actual on hand accounting of 6 HRP-1s, 9 HO3Ss, and 1 HTL-3 . [58] An HTL–3 had replaced the HTL–2 after it had sustained severe damage in a crash during April 1950. Personnel strength at the end of June was like - wise near the authorized level . It had been readjusted in April 1950 to 20 officers and 90 enlisted men with the squadron reporting a total of 23 officers and 86 enlisted . [59]




Although the squadron did not possess 18 aircraft as the original planners had envisioned and CNO had approved, by the end of June, HMX–1 was one aircraft in excess of the authorized level .

The latest allowance list, dated 15 June 1950 , established the maximum number of aircraft as indicated. This compared with an actual on hand accounting as indicated. allowed on hand deficiency 6 HRP-1s, 6 HRP-1s, 0 7 HO3Ss, and 9 HO3Ss, and -2 2 HTL-2s. 1 HTL-3. -1 [58]

58. CO HMX-1 ltr to CMC, dtd 20Jul50, Subj : Progress Report for period lFeb-30Jun50.(Rotary Requirement No. AO-17501; request for higher priority.

An HTL–3 had replaced the HTL–2 after it had sustained severe damage in a crash during April 1950 .










Moon Rise 0416 1953
Moon Phase New Moon 7:52 A.M.






 Notes for Thursday June 15, 1950

cc cc