<u>Yesterday</u>

<u>Weather</u> Overview

<u>DSC</u>

TFW

0300 0400 0500

<u>Sun Rise</u> 0600 0700

0800 0900 1000

<u>1700</u>

<u>1800</u>

<u>2000</u> 2100

2<u>200</u> 2<u>300</u> Casualties Fomorrow

<u>Sun Set</u>

## Tuesday June 20, 1950 (Day -5)



<u>Sun Rise</u> 0510 1952 <u>Moon Rise</u> 0909 2323 <u>Moon Phase</u> 25% 5 days

#### Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.9°C 76.82°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)

#### **Overview**

North Koreans claim to have intercepted South Korean attack plans.

[note]



On 20 June the "Supreme People's Assembly" passed a decree which demanded the establishment of an all-Korean legislative body to draw up a constitution and organize a government of the republic. The decree designated leading figures of the South Korean Government as national traitors, called for the unification of military and security forces, and demanded the withdrawal of the U.N. commission.

[note]



this is the botto


The State Department also proved incompetent and negligent in analyzing intelligence information. After the election of <u>Syngman Rhee</u> in August, 1948,. <u>MacArthur</u> had no further responsibility to deal with Korean issues; that responsibility came under the jurisdiction of the <u>State Department</u>. <u>Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk</u> testified before the <u>House Foreign Affairs Committee</u> five days before [6/20/50] the North Korean invasion. Rusk's testimony was faulty and showed a lack of knowledge and understanding about the real conditions existing in Korea. When asked about the strength of the ROK Army and the potential of North Korea invading South Korea, he stated that

"we see no present indication that the people across the border have any intention of fighting a major war for that purpose.[136]

He added that the ROK Army would meet credibly the kind of force which the North Koreans have established.[137] This statement was contrary to known information about the size and combat power wielded by the NKPA. General Ridgway later commented that Syngman Rhee and other ROK leaders had expressed their concerns about a formidable North Korean Army because they knew their own Army was so weak.[137]

[note]





All that day, Sunday [25th], Washington planners and policymakers huddled in urgent conferences. These early discussions were influenced to no small degree by the Roberts-Muccio view that the ROK Army was the best army in Asia and could handle the NKPA. That belief was reinforced that day by a memo from Bradley to the JCS.

During his recent trip to Tokyo he had spent nearly an hour on June 20 in conference with Lynn Roberts, who was in Tokyo on his way home to retirement. In this private soldier-to-soldier talk, Roberts had assured Bradley the ROK Army could "meet any test the North Koreans imposed on it."

Bradley memoed the JCS for planning purposes: "After my talk with General Roberts, I am of the opinion that South Korea will not fall in the present attack unless the Russians actively participate in the action.[3-12]

[note]



By June 1950, the North Korean military machine was ready and the populace was psychologically prepared for war. As part of this build-up, the communist regime conducted a "peaceful unification" campaign. During the spring of 1950 it made a last effort at a guerrillaled overthrow of the Republic of Korea, but failed. At this juncture, under cover of two unification proposals to the Republic of Korea, offered on 7 June and 20 June 1950, the final steps for invasion were taken, as the main body of the North Korean Army moved to positions along the parallel. [02-71]

[note]



[note]

There are a couple of articles that sound interesting in this issue "Can we afford Truman and the Fair Deal?" Very germane to what is happening today, with our \$15 trillion debt. Plus: "Evil Los Angeles smog, with great photos."

There was a "strange" series of exchanges between the Soviet ambassador in P'yŏngyang and Moscow immediately prior to the commencement of hostilities by the North Korean army against the South in June 1950. On 20 June 1950, T.F. Shtykov informed Moscow that at 2000 hours Moscow time the DPRK had intercepted orders saying that the South would commence hostilities against the North at 2300 hours. On 21 June, Kim Il Sung informed Stalin via the Soviet embassy that the South Koreans had been given the news about a prospective offensive by the KPA. In this communiqué he also noted that he would begin combat operations precisely on the 25th. And this is what did take place.

#### 0000 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/19/50	06/19/50 10:00 AM	06/19/50	06/20/50	
9:00 AM	10:00 AM	3:00 PM	12:00 AM	

## 0100 Korean Time

<b>Central</b>	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/19/50	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50
10:00 AM	06/19/50 11:00 AM	4:00 PM	1:00 AM

#### 0200 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/19/50	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50
11:00 AM	12:00 PM	5:00 PM	2:00 AM

#### 0300 Korean Time

<b>Central</b>	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/19/50	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50
12:00 PM	1:00 PM	6:00 PM	3:00 AM

#### 0400 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/19/50	06/19/50 2:00 PM	06/19/50	06/20/50	
1:00 PM	2:00 PM	7:00 PM	4:00 AM	

#### 0500 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu				Korea
06/19/	50	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50
2:00 P	M	3:00 PM	8:00 PM	5:00 AM

## 0510 Sunrise

## 0600 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea					
06/19/50	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50		
3:00 PM	4:00 PM	9:00 PM	6:00 AM		

# 0700 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu			Korea
06/19/50	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50
4:00 PM	06/19/50 5:00 PM	10:00 PM	7:00 AM

#### 0800 Korean Time

ı				Korea
ı	06/19/50	06/19/50 6:00 PM	06/19/50	06/20/50
ı	5:00 PM	6:00 PM	11:00 PM	8:00 AM

## 0900 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	
6:00 PM	06/19/50 7:00 PM	12:00 AM	9:00 AM	

#### 1000 Korean Time

ı	<b>Central</b>	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
	06/19/50	06/19/50 8:00 PM	06/20/50	06/20/50
ı	7:00 PM	8:00 PM	1:00 AM	10:00 AM

## 1100 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/19/50	06/19/50 9:00 PM	06/19/50	06/20/50	
8:00 PM	9:00 PM	2:00 AM	11:00 AM	

## 1200 Korean Time

	Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
	06/19/50	06/19/50	06/20/50	06/20/50
ı	9:00 PM	06/19/50 10:00 PM	3:00 AM	12:00 PM

#### 1300 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/19/50	06/19/50 11:00 PM	06/20/50	06/20/50
10:00 PM	11:00 PM	4:00 AM	1:00 PM

#### 1400 Korean Time

Central	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/19/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50
11:00 PM	12:00 AM	5:00 AM	2:00 PM

## 1500 Korean Time

<b>Central</b>	East Coast	Zulu	Korea
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50
12:00 AM	1:00 AM	6:00 AM	3:00 PM

#### 1600 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea					
	06/20/50				
1:00 AM	2:00 AM	7:00 AM	4:00 PM		

## 1700 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	
2:00 AM	06/20/50 3:00 AM	8:00 AM	5:00 PM	

## 1800 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea					
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50		
3:00 AM	4:00 AM	9:00 AM	6:00 PM		

#### 1900 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	
4:00 AM	5:00 AM	10:00 AM	7:00 PM	

## 2000 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
	06/20/50			
5:00 AM	6:00 AM	11:00 AM	8:00 PM	

## 1952 Sunset

### 2100 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea				
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	
6:00 AM	7:00 AM	12:00 PM	9:00 PM	

## 2200 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea					
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50		
7:00 AM	06/20/50 8:00 AM	1:00 PM	10:00 PM		

### 2300 Korean Time

Central East CoastZulu Korea					
06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50	06/20/50		
8:00 AM	9:00 AM	2:00 PM	11:00 PM		

#### **Casualties**

Tuesday June 20, 1950 (Day -5)

0 Casualties



Date USAFUSA USMCUSN Other Total						
<b>Previous</b>						
Losses						
To Date						

Aircraft Losses Today 000

Notes for Tuesday June 20, 1950

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