Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 20.9°C 69.62°F at Taegu [note]

Rainy, windy weather [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Taegu)


Overview

Korean_War

On 30 June, five days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Zhou Enlai decided to send a group of Chinese diplomats, most of whom were military intelligence personnel, to North Korea to establish better communications with Kim Il-sung as well as to collect first-hand materials on the fighting.[72] [note]

The Senate passes a $1.2 billion military assistance bill, $200 million of which is earmarked for South Korea under emergency provisions of the bill. It is passed to the House for action.

U.S. President Truman signed a law extending the drafting of men into the military, days before the selective service program had been scheduled to expire. The bill, passed by Congress the day before, initially exempted veterans of World War II from being called up, and covered all men between the ages of 19 and 25, for up to twenty-one months of military service [note]

June 30 - President Truman orders U.S. ground forces into Korea and authorizes the bombing of North Korea by the U.S. Air Force. U.S. troops notified of movement to South Korea. [note]

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Orbit missions and weather reconnaissance flights continued at Flight "D", Ashiya AB this date. Three (3) SB-17s were utilized this date for these missions logging a total of twenty-seven hours (27:00). There were four (4) false alerts as enumerated below.


At 0900/K the Flight was notified that an aircraft was down twenty five (25) miles west of Inch'ŏn 37° 30' N 126° 35' E. Due to the fact that this was north of the battle line FAF diverted Naval vessels to the search area and informed Rescue not to search in that area. (Just north if Inch'ŏn).


At 0935/K the flight received a call from ADCC that a "MAYDAY" was heard sixty (60) miles from Fukuoka on a heading of 340° degrees. A SB-17 dispatched to that area with negative results.


At 1000/K the Flight was notified of a pilot bailing out with no further location, but at 1020/K the information was received that the bailout was north of the battle line and no search search would be made.


At 1322/K Flight "D" was again alerted for a F-80 low on fuel returning to Ashiya AB from Korea. SB-17 dispatched to follow the flight line, but the F-80 landed safely at 1355/K at Itazuke Air Base.


At month's end it is gratifying to report no 3rd Rescue Squadron personnel injured or missing due to the Korean incident. One (1) bullet hole in a SB-17 has been the sole battle damage to aircraft. [note]

June 30: President Truman ordered the use of US ground troops in Korea and a naval blockade of North Korea.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron arrived in Korea to support 5th Air Force, to which it was subsequently attached.

North Korean forces reached Samch'ŏk on the east coast and in the west crossed the Han River, threatening Suwŏn airfield.

FEAF began evacuation of the airfield and authorized improvement of Kimhae airfield (K-9), 11 miles northwest of Pusan, to compensate for the presumed loss of Kimp'o and Suwŏn. K-Map

The first 5th Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) arrived at Suwŏn.

B-26s from the 3rd BG strafed, bombed, and rocketed enemy troops and traffic in the Sŏul area. One flight hit a stalled enemy column. Fifteen B-29s attacked railroad bridges, tanks, trucks, and troop concentrations on the north bank of the Han River in the Sŏul area. [note]

KPA commences "Second (Suwŏn) Phase" [note]

Shoot downs

Wurster USAF F-80C 1 x Yak-9 1

Thomas USAF F-80C 1 x Yak-9

[note]

June 30
N.K. 3rd Division (N.K.-3) crosses Han River; N.K. drives down Peninsula
June 30
President Truman commits US troops to enforce UN demand

[note]

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177. Intelligence Memorandum 301, 30 June 1950, Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Military Aggression [note] [note] [note]

On 30 June, the 24th Division was ordered to fly its division headquarters and two battalions to Pusan; because of airlift constraints, only 450 men were actually flown in, on 2 July. [note]

Map copied from "The Inch'ŏn-Sŏul Operation", Volume II of "U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-53", page 29.

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[note]

Although the squadron did not possess 18 aircraft as the original planners had envisioned and CNO had approved, by the end of June, HMX–1 was one aircraft in excess of the authorized level .

Personnel strength at the end of June was like - wise near the authorized level. It had been readjusted in April 1950 to 20 officers and 90 enlisted men with the squadron reporting a total of 23 officers and 86 enlisted. [59]
59.Ibid. [note]

President Truman ordered US ground forces to Korea. He authorized the US Air Force to bomb North Korea. [note]

President Truman announced that, in keeping with the UN Security Council request for support to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in repelling the invaders and restoring peace, he had authorized the USAF to bomb military targets in North Korea, the use of Army ground troops in action to support ROK forces, and had directed a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. [note]

N.K. 3rd Division (N.K.-3) crosses Han River; N.K. drives down Peninsula [note]

MacArthur

Within twenty-four hours, President Truman authorized the use of ground troops. The number of combat elements which might be withdrawn from Japan without impairing that country's safety was left to my discretion. Thus the United States accepted Communism's challenge to combat in Korea. The risk that the Soviet or the Chinese Communists might enter the war was clearly understood and defiantly accepted. The American tradition had always been that once our troops are committed to battle, the full power and means of the nation would be mobilized and dedicated to fight for victory — not for stalemate or compromise. And I set out to chart the strategic course which would make that victory possible. Not by the wildest stretch of imagination did I dream that this tradition might be broken.

In Japan, I had four occupation divisions, the 7th, 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry, comprising the Eighth Army, with garrisons extending from Kyushu to Hokkaido. The army commander was General Walton Walker, a seasoned and experienced officer who had been one of George Patton's corps commanders in the European war. The Air Force was under Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, and the Navy under Admiral C. Turner Joy, both able and efficient veterans of the war. All of my old commanders and most of my staff had long since returned to the United States.

The occupation infantry in Japan was one-third below strength. The regiments had only two instead of three battalions, light tanks instead of heavy, 105-mm. howitzers instead of 155-mm. cannon. The Korean War meant entry into action "as is." No time out for recruiting rallies or to build up and get ready. It was move in—and shoot. This put the bulk of the burden on the G.I. The story of the infantry soldier is an old and honorable one. He carries his home with him and often his grave. Somehow, he has to bring along the whole paraphernalia of fighting, as well as domesticated living: the grocery store, the ration dump; the hospital, the Medical Corps; the garage, the motor pool; the telephone, the Signal Service. He must sleep and eat and fight and die on foot, in all weather, rain or shine, with or without shelter. He is vulnerable day and night. Death has his finger on him for twenty-four hours, in battle, going toward it, or retreating from it. It is a wonder that the morale of those uniformed gypsies never falters.

The North Koreans had advanced across the 38th parallel in an estimated strength of six infantry divisions and three constabulary brigades, spearheaded by nearly 200 Soviet tanks, with supporting units of heavy artillery, all under cover of an air umbrella. The main attack was along the central corridor, with simultaneous attacks to the west and down the east-coast road, -and amphibious landings at various South Korean coastal points. They crossed the Han River, and South Korean resistance became increasingly unsuccessful.

The immediate necessity was to slow down the Red advance before it enveloped all of Korea. My only chance to do this was to commit my forces piecemeal as rapidly as I could get them to the front, relying upon the stratagem that the presence of American ground forces in the battle area would chill the enemy commander into taking pre-cautionary and time-consuming methods. By this method of buying time for space I could build up a force at Pusan, which would serve as a base for future operations. Speed in getting the troops to Korea was of the essence. Every ship, every plane, every train was commandeered. Never had I known such a fast mobilization to a battle front. Elements of the 24th Division were first in by air. Road- " blocks were thrown up and defended desperately. Every artifice of harassment and deception was practiced, and the stratagem worked.???BS!!!!

The effect of American ground troops, however small in number, resisting the enemy advance confirmed my hopes. The enemy commander at once brought his advance to a stop to permit the laborious bringing up of artillery from across the river without benefit of the regular bridges, which our air force by then had destroyed. He had no way of knowing either the strength of the American forces al-ready committed, and in their immediate support, or what change in the battle situation their presence presaged. He decided, as I had anticipated, against taking any chance. So, instead of continuing to drive his tank columns forward, he deployed all of his forces across the difficult terrain in conventional line of battle. This was his fatal error. It had exacted a painful sacrifice from my men committed to this unequal battle, but it paid off in precious time, so essential if any tactic in the prevailing situation was to be successful. [note]

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Name Rank Service Unit Flying Shoot Down Credit
1 Thomas, John 1Lt AirForce 36 Sq 3rd wing F80 YAK 9 1
2 Wurster, Charles 1Lt AirForce 36 Sq 3rd F80 YAK 9 1

Two YAK-9's were shot down today. [note]

South then North

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Of the various factors contributing to the quick defeat of the ROK Army, perhaps the most decisive was the shock of fighting tanks for the first time. The North Koreans had never used tanks in any of the numerous border incidents, although they had possessed them since late 1949. It was on 25 June, therefore, that the ROK soldier had his first experience with tanks. The ROK soldier not only lacked experience with tanks, he also lacked weapons that were effective against the T34 except his own handmade demolition charge used in close attack. [03-65]

[03-65] On Friday, 30 June, the sixth day of the invasion, the first antitank mines arrived in Korea. Eight hundred of them were flown in from Japan. Crawford, Notes on Korea.

[note]

At the end of June, after six days, everything north of the Han River had been lost. [note]

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[note]

In the next day or two remnants of four South Korean divisions assembled on the south bank or were still infiltrating across the river. [03-66] Colonel Paik brought the ROK 1st Division, now down to about 5,000 men, across the Han on 29 June in the vicinity of Kimp'o Airfield, twelve air miles northwest of Sŏul. He had to leave his artillery behind but his men brought out their small arms and most of their crew-served weapons. [03-67]

Of 98,000 men in the ROK Army on 25 June the Army headquarters could account for only 22,000 south of the Han at the end of the month. [03-68]

When information came in a few days later about the 6th and 8th Divisions and more stragglers assembled south of the river, this figure increased to 54,000. But even this left 44,000 completely gone in the first week of war-killed, captured, or missing. Of all the divisions engaged in the initial fighting, only the 6th and 8th escaped with their organization, weapons, equipment, and transport relatively intact. Except for them, the ROK Army came out of the initial disaster with little more than about 30 percent of its individual weapons. [03-69]

[note]

This directive, [from Washingtonon 29th EST] received by the Far East Commander on 30 June, Tokyo time, authorized him to

(1) employ U.S. Army service forces in South Korea to maintain communications and other essential services;

(2) employ Army combat and service troops to ensure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan-Chinhae;

(3) employ naval and air forces against military targets in North Korea but to stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union;

(4) by naval and air action defend Formosa against invasion by the Chinese Communists and, conversely, prevent Chinese Nationalists from using Formosa as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland;

(5) send to Korea any supplies and munitions at his disposal and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid required outside his control.

It also assigned the Seventh Fleet to MacArthur's operational control, and indicated that naval commanders in the Pacific would support and reinforce him as necessary and practicable. The directive ended with a statement that the instructions did not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervened in Korea, but that there was full realization of the risks involved in the decisions with respect to Korea. [04-37]


[37] JCS 84681 DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50; Schnabel, FEC, GHQ
Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch. 2, p. 26; MacArthur
Hearings, pt. I, pp. 535-36, Secy of Defense George C. Marshall's testimony; New York Times, May 12, 1951.

It is to be noted that this directive of 29 June did not authorize General MacArthur to use U.S. ground combat troops in the Han River area - only at the southern tip of the peninsula to assure the retention of a port. [note]

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On 30 June he [General Stratemeyer] informed Washington that he needed 164 F-80C's, 21 F-82's, 23 B-29's, 21 C-54's, and 64 F-51's. The Air Force informed him that it could not send the F-80's, but would substitute 150 F-51's in excellent condition. The F-51 had a greater range than the F-80, used less fuel, and could operate more easily from the rough Korean airfields. [05-8] [note]

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On the last day of the month, American planes dropped pamphlets over South Korea bearing the stamp of the United Nations urging the ROK soldiers,

"Fight with all your might," and promising, "We shall support your people as much as we can and clear the aggressor from your country."

[note]

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The next morning, 30 June, under cover of artillery and tank fire the 8th Regiment crossed from Sŏul to the south side of the Han in the vicinity of the Sobinggo ferry. Some of the men crossed in wooden boats capable of carrying a 2 1/2-ton truck or twenty to thirty men. Others crossed the river by wading and swimming. [05-17]

These troops drove the South Koreans from the south bank in some places and began to consolidate positions there. But they did not penetrate far that first day nor did they occupy Yŏngdŭngp'o, the big industrial suburb of Sŏul south of the river and the key to the road and rail net leading south.

General Church directed General Chae to counterattack the North Koreans at the water's edge, but enemy artillery prevented the ROK troops from carrying out this order. [note]

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

SUN TZU, The Art of War

Across the Korea Strait events of importance were taking place in Japan that would soon have an impact on the Korean scene. In Tokyo, General MacArthur on 30 June instructed General Walker, commander of Eighth Army, to order the 24th Infantry Division to Korea at once. Its proximity to Korea was the principal reason General MacArthur selected it for immediate commitment. [06-1] General Walker gave Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Commanding General, 24th Division, preliminary verbal instructions concerning the division. [note]

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On 30 June, Lt. Col. Lewis A. Hunt led the vanguard of American officers arriving in Korea to organize the logistical effort there in support of United States troops.

Less than a week later, on 4 July, Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin and members of his staff arrived at Pusan to organize the Pusan Base Command, activated that day by orders of the Far East Command. This command was reorganized on 13 July by Eighth Army as the Pusan Logistical Command, and further reorganized a week later. The Pusan Logistical Command served as the principal logistical support organization in Korea until 19 September 1950 when it was
redesignated the 2nd Logistical Command. [09-20] [note]

It was a matter of the greatest good fortune to the U.N. cause that the best port in Korea, Pusan, lay at the southeastern tip of the peninsula. Pusan alone of all ports in South Korea had dock facilities sufficiently ample to handle a sizable amount of cargo. Its four piers and intervening quays could berth twenty-four or more deepwater ships, and its beaches provided space for the unloading of fourteen LST's, giving the port a potential capacity of 45,000 measurement tons daily. Seldom, however, did the daily discharge of cargo exceed 14,000 tons because of limitations such as the unavailability of skilled labor, large cranes, rail cars, and trucks. [09-21]

The distance in nautical miles to the all-important port of Pusan from the principal Japanese ports varied greatly.

The sea trip from the west coast of the United States to Pusan for personnel movement required about 16 days; that for heavy equipment and supplies on slower shipping schedules took longer.

From Pusan a good railroad system built by the Japanese and well ballasted with crushed rock and river gravel extended northward. Subordinate rail lines ran westward along the south coast through Masan and Chinju and northeast near the east coast to P'ohang-dong. There the eastern line turned inland through the east-central mountain area. The railroads were the backbone of the U.N. transportation system in Korea.

The approximately 20,000 miles of Korean vehicular roads were all of a secondary nature as measured by American or European standards. Even the best of them were narrow, poorly drained, and surfaced only with gravel or rocks broken laboriously by hand, and worked into the dirt roadbed by the traffic passing over it.

The highest classification placed on any appreciable length of road in Korea by Eighth Army engineers was for a gravel or crushed rock road with gentle grades and curves and one and a half to two lanes wide.

According to engineer specifications there were no two-lane roads, 22 feet wide, in Korea. The average width of the best roads was 18 feet with numerous bottlenecks at narrow bridges and bypasses where the width narrowed to 11-13 feet.

Often on these best roads there were short stretches having sharp curves and grades up to 15 percent. The Korean road traffic was predominately by oxcart. The road net, like the rail net, was principally north-south, with a few lateral east-west connecting roads. [09-22] [note]

Task Force Smith

Quote

On the evening of June 30th, 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Brad Smith assembled his task force, packed up equipment and prepared to move out. [note]

The NKPA continued southward over the next several days and General MacArthur was convinced U.S. troops must fight a delaying action "to buy some time to bring more troops..." [91] He sent a TOP SECRET message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 30, 1950, as follows:

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a US regimental combat team to (Korea] for the reinforcement of [the ROK and the] build-up to a two [U.S.] division strength from troops in Japan for an early counter offensive. Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air Force team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worse, it might even be doomed to failure.[92]

[note]

The Forgotten War

Contrary to later descriptions, Inch'ŏn was neither a "brilliant" nor an extraordinary concept. It could be classified as standard Army doctrine for peninsular warfare, wherein an overextended enemy force, lacking air and sea power, becomes ever more vulnerable on its flanks. It was doctrine that in World War II led to Allied landings first at Salerno, then at Anzio during the peninsular campaign in Italy. The Pentagon, which produced war plans for every conceivable contingency, had only recently (June 19, 1950) approved and distributed a plan known as SL17, which assumed a NKPA invasion, a retreat to and defense of a perimeter at Pusan, followed by an amphibious landing at Inch'ŏn. Its author, Donald McB. Curtis, later remembered that in the "week of June 26, 1950," GHQ "urgently requested" fifty copies of SL17, and he asserted that "this is where General MacArthur got his idea for the Inch'ŏn landing. "[2] [note]

On paper, Bluehearts seemed to make good sense. Its centerpiece - the quick, surprise amphibious landing at Inch'ŏn - would employ modern air and naval weapons unavailable to the NKPA, and a technique of warfare the NKPA had not been trained to confront. It would bring to bear the fullest possible weight of MacArthur's slim military resources in the shortest possible time.

In reality, Bluehearts was absurd. It was a highly complex military maneuver that demanded at the very least well trained, well led, well equipped, and combat experienced infantry. Eighth Army was in no way prepared to carry out such a demanding and risky task. As Ned Almond later conceded, the Army was merely "40 percent combat effective." That estimate may have been on the rosy side.[4-4]

Nonetheless GHQ proceeded to issue orders for Bluehearts in a perfect frenzy. Customary and ordinary military prudence and common sense were thrown to the four winds. When Almond gave the 1st Cav its marching orders he told the division commander to expedite the Inch'ŏn landing "to the utmost limit"; otherwise the only thing the 1st Cav would hit on landing would be the "tail end of the 24th Division" as it passed northbound through Sŏul. The 1st Cav drew its weapons in a frenzy and made plans to board ship in Yokohama. Its men were led to believe they would return "in a matter of a few weeks."[4-5]

No man knew better the grave weaknesses of Eighth Army than Johnnie Walker. Yet he raised no objections to the GHQ orders. One reason was that Walker knew well that neither MacArthur nor Almond trusted him. As the Army's general manager, Matt Ridgway, put it later:

"MacArthur did not have confidence in Walker. . . . Their relations were very strained at the time. He had even considered relieving Walker of command."

Had Walker expressed serious objections to Bluehearts he would probably have found himself out of a job, a ruinous end to a long and distinguished career.[4-6]

Thus the mad momentum at GHQ was adopted by Eighth Army headquarters in Yokohama without reservations. All orders emanating from GHQ, however unrealistic, were carried out without question and with utmost urgency. [note]

Korean_War

The 24th Division was commanded by a "can do" general, William F. Dean, who seemed ideally suited for the frenetic job at hand. At age fifty Dean was the youngest of the four division commanders in Eighth Army and the only one who had commanded troops in combat. He was also the only one of the four who knew South Korea well.[4-8] [note]

The 24th Division staff, like that of most divisions in Japan, was a mixed bag. Dean's ADC (in case of incapacitation, his immediate successor) was fifty-eight-year-old Brigadier General Pearson Menoher, a West Point classmate (1915) of Eisenhower and Bradley's who, during World War II, had been chief of staff of Ham Haislip's XV Corps. As such he had often given Bill Dean orders. Menoher's position as Dean's ADC was largely honorary, perhaps a returned favor from Dean. He was really too old and senior to replace Dean in combat. The artillery commander was Brigadier General Henry J. D. Meyer, fifty, another West Pointer (1919) and "superb soldier" who had commanded the 45th Division artillery in combat in the ETO. Unfortunately for Dean, Meyer was on leave in the States. The chief of staff of the division was Meyer's West Point classmate William J. Moroney, fifty-two, a regimental commander in the Pacific during World War II who was now a "drunk" and a "weak spot.[4-14] [note]

Dean's forces immediately at hand on Kyushu, the 21st and 34th regiments, were in no way prepared for war. Of the two outfits, the less ready in every respect was the 34th Infantry.

Earlier in the year the 34th had performed so poorly in its readiness tests that Johnnie Walker had sacked its commander. The new leader was Jay B. Lovless (University of Montana, 1925), most recently an Eighth Army logistician. In World War II George Marshall had recommended that no regimental commander in the Army should be more than forty-five years old. Lovless was then forty-nine, merely one year younger than Dean. In World War II (at age forty-three) Lovless had been named commander of the 23rd Infantry Regiment in Normandy on D plus ten and had commanded it well through VE day, earning a DSC. But that was one war back; Lovless was now well over Marshall's recommended age limit for regimental command. Moreover, he had shortcomings as a battle leader: According to his senior assistant, Lovless was a "martinet" who was "a nervous, high-strung, impatient, dictatorial type of officer.[4-15]

Lovless had worked hard to shape up the 34th in his brief tour as commander, but the difficulties were nearly insurmountable. The regiment was physically fragmented: The HQ was in Sasebo; the two battalions were five miles away in the countryside.* Under the tough Lovless regime one of the battalions was always in the training area, but it was located forty miles from the billeting area "on top of a mountain and so cut up," Lovless wrote, "that it was impossible to conduct a satisfactory battalion exercise." On Lovless's recommendation, Dean had approved a consolidation of the 34th at an area near Hiroshima, but this had not yet been done. In May the two battalions had been tested individually. "Detailed results were not known," Lovless wrote, but it was believed the scores were still far from satisfactory. Moreover, "the 34th had never trained or practiced as an entire regiment."

*A normal infantry battalion was a powerful force and a key maneuver element of the regiment and division. It consisted of about 900 men, divided into three rifle companies (of three platoons), each composed of about 200 men, plus one heavy weapons company of about 166 men, manning 81mm or 4.2inch mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, and .30 and .50caliber machine guns. These forces were directed by a battalion commander and a sizable staff, which included the battalion exec, the S1 (personnel), S2 (intelligence), S3 (plans), and S4 (logistics), grouped into a headquarters company, plus other supporting units. [note]


There was a chronic shortage of "qualified, trained officers," Lovless added. Two key men, the regimental exec, William T. Ramsay, and the commander of the 1st Battalion (or 1/34), Lawrence G. Paulus, forty-six, were in Lovless's view, "not satisfactory." Ramsay had "had no troop or staff duty" in the infantry; the 1/34 commander, Paulus, was "an artilleryman with no infantry troop training." Lovless had urged their replacement, but apparently because the Pentagon had assigned them to their jobs, Dean had been reluctant to ask for a change.


In the judgment of the regimental S3 (plans), John J. Dunn, a tough-minded former enlisted man who won a DSC in World War II, the equipment provided the 34th was "a national disgrace." He wrote that "between 25 and 50 percent of our small arms were unserviceable." The regiment had not been supplied the new 3.5inch antitank bazooka; it was still equipped with the 2.36 inch bazooka of World War II, which Dunn believed to be "worthless." Nor had the supporting artillery been provided with new armor piercing "shaped charge" antitank ammo, technically known as high explosive antitank or HEAT. There was an acute shortage of 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars. Moreover, what little mortar ammo there was on hand "was so old and corroded" that "eight out of ten shells fired failed to explode." The .30caliber machinegun barrels were "worn out and not accurate" and lacked aiming lights and chronometers. Until very recently the 34th had only one third of its "required vehicles," such as trucks and jeeps, and it got more only because Lovless had connections in the logistic command. Owing to a shortage of Army issue shoes and boots, many men in the 34th were forced to wear tennis shoes.


For all these reasons, and more, on June 30, 1950, the 34th Infantry was still in poor shape. One of Dean's senior officers put it this way: "The morale and spirit of that regiment was [4-sic] not good."[4-16]


The other regiment at hand, the 21st Infantry, was commanded by West Pointer (1924) Richard ("Dick") W. Stephens. At forty-seven, he, too, exceeded George Marshall's recommended age limit for regimental commanders. Stephens had not before led troops in battle; in World War II he had been chief of staff of the 30th Infantry Division in the ETO. His exec remembered that Stephens was "built like a bull and getting heavy around the middle" and losing his hair. He was "unconventional in many respects" and a "real character" who was "certainly outspoken in his relations with seniors" and who "loved his evening martinis." Between Lovless and Stephens, Bill Dean much preferred Stephens.[4-17] [note]

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The 21st was slightly ahead of the 34th in its training cycle. Both of Stephens's battalions had "passed" battalion level readiness tests; the 1/21 had even had some air transportability training. However, the 21st's exec, forty-year-old Charles F. ("Fritz") Mudgett (University of North Dakota, 1933), an able World War II battalion commander in Italy, remembered that the regiment had not maneuvered as a unit and was "unprepared for war." He wrote in retrospect that it was "rather sad, almost criminal, that such under strength, ill-equipped and poorly trained units were committed. ..."[4-18]

Bill Dean well knew his division was in no way prepared for combat, but he raised no objections to Johnnie Walker. In view of the existing frenzy, had he done so it is likely he would have been relieved of command, if not by Walker, then by GHQ. Dean rationalized his indifference to the welfare of his men by saying he believed the division's mission in South Korea would be "short and easy." He subscribed to the prevailing American view that his division, however ill trained and ill equipped, had merely to make an appearance on the battlefield and the NKPA would melt into the hills.[4-19]

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That conviction spread all through the 24th Division, dangerously and cruelly misleading the men. Platoon leaders soft-soaped their men with Truman's euphemistic terminology: "You've been told repeatedly that this is a police action, and that's exactly what it's going to be." Dean's men were soon boasting that "as soon as those gooks see an American uniform they'll run like hell." The belief grew that in no time at all the division would return to its soft billet in Japan - and to great glory.[4-20]

Yet, deep down, Bill Dean must have suspected rougher times than he let on. Soon after the alert he requested that Eighth Army send him three combat experienced men to shore up the command in the 34th Regiment. Two of these men had fought with Dean in the 44th Division in the ETO: Robert R. Martin (Purdue University, 1924), forty-eight, and Robert L. ("Pappy") Wadlington, forty-nine. The other, Harold B. ("Red") Ayres, thirty-one, then serving in the 25th Division, had won a DSC in Italy and was reputed to be the "best battalion commander in the Far East." Pappy Wadlington replaced the exec; Ayres would replace the 1/34 commander. Robert Martin, who had commanded a regiment in Dean's 44th Division in the ETO, would be near at hand should Lovless fail.[4-21]

* * *

Walker's initial orders to Dean, telexed on the night of June 30, reflected the frenzy in the Eighth Army staff. Dean was to fly his division headquarters and one infantry regiment (of two battalions) to Pusan; the heavy gear, such as artillery, trucks, ammo, and food, was to follow by ship. [note]

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In issuing these orders, GHQ apparently overlooked or dismissed some hard-earned airborne lessons of World War II:

Korean_War

To spearhead this mission Dean chose Dick Stephens's 21st Regiment. However, on analysis the original plans had to be discarded. Owing to the budget cuts, FEAF had only about two dozen C54s in Japan. Up to then these had been employed in flying emergency ammo to South Korea and evacuating personnel, and as a result of this hard use, many planes were undergoing maintenance and repairs. Inasmuch as a C54 could hold only fifty men (fewer with heavy gear), it would take many days - perhaps even a week - to assemble all the serviceable planes and lift the designated divisional units to South Korea. Moreover, the weather was so bad - heavy rains and low ceilings - the Air Force could not absolutely guarantee the delivery of so much as a single squad.[4-23]

In view of these factors, it would have been prudent to abandon the "airlift" altogether, but this was out of the question. GHQ had specified "air movement," and in the existing climate no one was willing to challenge GHQ. The airlift plans were therefore hurriedly scaled down to meet operational realities. Only a single "combat team" of about 450 men would be flown to Pusan; all the rest of the division and its equipment would go by ship.

Since Stephens's 21st Regiment had already been chosen for the air movement, the "combat team" would come from his outfit, drawn from either the 1/21 or the 3/21. There was no hesitation over this decision. The 1/21 commander, West Pointer (1939) Charles B. ("Brad") Smith, thirty-four, had ably commanded an infantry battalion on Guadalcanal. The 3/21 commander, West Pointer (1922) Delbert A. Pryor, had not before led troops in combat, was too old for the job (forty-four), and was, in the words of the 21st exec, Fritz Mudgett, "physically unfit."[4-24] [note]

President Truman commits US troops to enforce UN demand [note]

US Air Force

 

Unfavorable weather; what sorties we had concentrated on strafing, materiel, personnel, and marshaling yards. F–80 lost and a B–26 down.
Beginning to get our first casualties. Reds begin to cross the
Han River in numbers.[51-A major river, and major obstacle for invading forces, the Han is born in the T’aebaek Range (only about 20 miles from the Sea of Japan). It runs some distance south before turning northwest to flow through Seoul and empty into the Yellow Sea.] 851 persons airlifted with no incidents from Korea. Wired CSAF [Chief of Staff, USAF] for permission to keep General Eubank and his team until 15 July. (His IG [Inspector General] team had just completed their yearly inspection of FEAF. Their services will prove invaluable.) $6,500,000 completely obligated at 2400 hours this date for construction on all airfields in Japan and the aircraft and warning sites.

[note]

Three days later, President Truman authorized U.S. aerial forces to attack military targets inside North Korea.

The USAF immediately began striking at the invader, using WWII vintage B-26s, B-29s, F-51s, and F82s, supplemented by four squadrons of modern jet-propelled F-80s. Together with U.S. Navy and Marine aircraft, USAF aircraft practically wiped out the North Korean Air Force in a matter of days and paralyzed the enemy's transportation network. In addition, close air support was provided to front-line units but because of the vast numerical superiority of enemy troops, U.N. forces were driven southward. By August, they had been squeezed into a small defensive pocket around the seaport of Pusan. [note]

Throughout the battle for South Korea, FEAF gave top priority to the close support of the out-numbered U. N. ground forces, and without this close support the Eighth Army would surely have been driven from the Korean peninsula. table 1 reveals the predominance of close support missions in FEAF's total air effort during the time of the defensive in South Korea:

Most of the close support sorties were flown by Fifth Air Force fighters under the direction of a MOSQUITO controller or a TACP on the ground. These missions are most difficult to describe in any detail. Very often the fighter pilot was routed to a forward area by the control system and there directed to bomb and strafe a target which he frequently did not actually see because of covering vegetation; consequently, he knew little of his mission accomplishment.

The form of intelligence report required for missions over Korea, moreover, was little more than a, statistical recapitulation of the mission. Such a report furnished little information from which higher headquarters could determine operational conditions, pilot problems, tactics and technique found profitable, and the many other valuable details incorporated in the narrative missions reports of World War II interpretation of the effect of close support air action must be in terms of its relationship to the friendly ground campaign and to its destruction of the enemy.

The South Korean campaign permits such an analysis. {BAD and SORRY}

Period Duration Close Support Sorties per Day Interdiction Sorties per Day Strategic Sorties per Day Other Sorties per Day Total Sorties per Day
25-30 June 6 408 68 59 9.83 0 0 100 16.67 94.5
1-31
July
31 4635 149.52 1023 33 56 1.81 1827 58.94 243.26
1-30 August 30 7397 246.57 2963 98.77 539 17.97 1582 52.73 416.03
1-30 September 30 5969 198.97 3818 127.27 158 5.27 5382 179.4 510.9

[note]

Korean_War

On 30 June Stratemeyer cabled Washington that he needed:

164 F-80C's,
21 F-82 's,
22 B-26 's,
23 B-29 's,
21 C-54's,
15 C-47 's, and
64 F-51's

which he suggested would be "exceptionally well suited for long-range, low level missions required in the Korean war." Instead of 164 F-80C's the USAF proposed to send FEAF 150 F-51's, which could be obtained from the National Guard or from storage, all in excellent condition.

The USAF also foresaw sending F-51's instead of F-82's and recommended use of RF-51's in the tactical reconnaissance squadron if RF-80's could not operate from Korean fields. FEAF replied that the F-51's were highly desirable and requested expeditious shipment; it intended to withdraw F-82's from ground support in order to conserve them for night interceptions. The RF-80's seemed suitable to FEAF for use in Korea. [note]

The State Department advised MacArthur to make it clear that U.S. effort in Korea was solely to restore the ROK to its territorial status as of 25 June 1950. Although the U. N. had held the ROK to be the only legal government in all of Korea and had desired peaceful unification of the country, MacArthur was cautioned not to confuse the limited objective by introducing ultimate U. N. objectives for Korean unification.

Authority for General MacArthur to use a regimental combat team in the Korean battle area required additional consideration by the President, and while a teleconference was in progress between General J. Lawton Collins and General MacArthur on 30 June, the Secretary of the Army took the matter to the White House. General Collins urged that the JCS authority to protect the port area at Pusan-Chinhae already constituted authority to use a regiment in Korea, but MacArthur wanted a clear-cut decision on his proposition. Time was important because even then the North Koreans were, breaking the Han River barrier.

[note]

MacArthur saw only one possible hope for holding the Han line and regaining lost ground in Korea: the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops to the battle. Early on the morning of 30 June he asked the JCS for authority to move a regimental combat team (RCT) to Korea immediately and to provide for a possible build-up to two-division strength with U.S. troops from Japan.

"Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area," he concluded, "our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst, it might even be doomed to failure."

[note]

Korean_War

On 30 June 1950 the U.S. Department of State, noting that United Nations political and military objectives were distinct and separate, advised General MacArthur to make it clear that American military effort in Korea was intended solely to restore the ROK to its territorial status as of 25 June 1950.#6 [note]

Thus on 30 June General MacArthur enjoined Stratemeyer to take "special care...to insure that your operations in Northern Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union.#12 [note] [note]

On 29 June 1950, when the National Security Council discussed air operations in North Korea, President Truman stated that he wanted to be sure that the bombardment of North Korea was "not indiscriminate.#15

As a result of the President's concern, the directive which General Stratemeyer received on 30 June specified that FEAF would attack "purely military targets" in North Korea.#16

These humanitarian ideals were reinforced by criticisms which sporadically appeared in the world's press. [note]

Rapid rotation cycles had alternately filled the battalions to excess, causing serious administrative troubles, or depleted the units so much that work projects had to be curtailed. As of 30 June 1950 aviation engineer personnel was on the ebb flow of the "boom or bust" cycle. With a total war-strength authority for 4,315 persons, FEAF engineer organizations possessed only 2,322 officers and men. Viewed in the light of their tables of organization and equipment, engineer aviation battalions possessed imposing capabilities to build the facilities which Air Force units required, but commanders of the engineer battalions in the Far East estimated their combat effectiveness to be not more than 10 to 25 percent of that expected from equivalent units during World War II.#85 [note]

At the end of June 1950, as FEAF shifted its existing units from a defensive to an offensive deployment, General Stratemeyer's purpose was to bring as much of his force to bear against the North Korean aggressors as was consistent with the requirement that he continue to maintain the air defenses of the Far East Command. General Stratemeyer and his staff sought the answers to three thorny questions:

  1. What air defenses would FEAF continue to maintain?
  2. Where would the air striking force be based?
  3. The third question would need answering both in Tokyo and Washington: What kind of striking force could the USAF support in the Far East without jeopardizing its world-wide commitments?

[note]


General Stratemeyer sent his first requirements to USAF on 30 June. One message asked for enough personnel in specified categories to bring all assigned units up to war strength (one and one-half times peace strength). #102

A second message requested 164 F-80's, 21 F-82's, 22 B-26's, 23 B-29's, 21 C-54's, 64 F-51's, and 15 C-47's. Most of these planes were needed to round out squadrons to their war strength and provide a 10 percent reserve for combat attrition. The C-47's would haul cargo into smaller Korean airfields. Added to those FEAF already had, the Mustangs would be used to equip a provisional Mustang group. General Stratemeyer explained that both F-51's and F-82's were exceptionally well suited for the long-range, low-level missions required in Korea.#103 [note]

Personnel slashes in late 1949 and early 1950 brought Air Force strength down to 411,277 officers and men on 30 June 1950-less than 18 percent of the peak wartime strength of 2,411,294 officers and men.#108

That was the peek of WW-II! How dumb can you get. Does he compare Korea to WW-2? [note]

By 1 September 1950 FEAF had an authorized strength of 46,233 officers and men and possessed 45,991 assigned. This was a substantial increase in personnel strength from the strength of 39,975 authorized and 33,625 assigned total personnel which FEAF had possessed on 30 June.#117

If you say so!!!!! a 6,258 difference in 3 months. [note]

Under the leadership of Maj. Dean E. Hess, the Korean and American personnel of "Bout-One" moved to Taegu on the evening of 30 June and there reported to the local KMAG headquarters.

During the first few days American pilots flew with the Korean pilots on missions, and then Major Hess began to allow the Koreans to fly combat missions alone. This, however, did not work out. Some of the Koreans had flown with the Japanese in World War II, but none of them had been in a fighter plane for five years. The heavy F-51's were too tricky for the inexperienced Koreans and following the death of the ROK troop commander on a combat sortie, American pilots began to fly all of the combat missions.#42

The Mustangs which "Bout-One" brought to Korea had been towing targets for several years in Japan and were in sad mechanical condition. "Had not the pressure been on at that time," said Major Hess, "we would probably have declared the 51's non-combat operational."

The control system for the detachment was "a little haphazard." At first Major Hess received requests for missions from the local KMAG.

When the 24th Division started to operate, communications were established with General Dean's command post. And on several occasions Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, who was setting up his Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu City, came directly to the airfield to request air strikes.

Most requests for missions were completely informal.

"I recall on one occasion," said Hess, "individuals came out from KMAG in the middle of the night, about three o'clock in the morning, and they requested an air strike verbally just by sticking their heads in the tent and requesting an air strike over a city at a certain time and then they disappeared in the night."

Major Hess gave "greater preference" to strikes requested for the 24th Division, for the heaviest enemy pressure was being encountered in this sector.

But "Bout-One" did not neglect the central and eastern fronts, where smaller enemy forces were advancing against ROK ground defenses.

Sometimes the Mustang pilots would drop their bombs on hostile targets on the Hamch'ang front and then climb over the mountains to strafe targets of opportunity on the east coast. Extremely heavy demands were made upon the Mustangs, and "Bout-One" was able to cause much damage to enemy vehicles and troop movements.

Located near the front, the detachment could get its planes immediately into action when the Army reported targets. It could also operate its Mustangs for two to three hours over the enemy's lines, searching out targets when none were reported by the Army.#43

Where or where was "Bout-One" on July 5? [note]

One North Korean pilot, shot down over Anyang on 29 June, confirmed this estimate of Communist war-plan assumptions. "Soviet advisors have ordered us to bomb South Korea," said this North Korean pilot, "because they know for sure the South Koreans have very few planes and only small ones."#83

#83 Msg. A-017, ADCOM to CINCFE, 30 June 1950.

[note]

US Marine Corps

The 1st Marine Division had meanwhile been reduced to 3,386 officers and men as compared to a strength of 7,789 on 30 June 1950. It had been stripped of its principal operating elements to build up the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which numbered about 5,000 officers and men when it sailed from San Diego to the Far East on 14 July under the command of Brigadier General Edward A. Craig. [1]

[note]

At El Toro, the near-by Marine Corps Air Station, it was the same story. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a total strength of 4,004 officers and men on 30 June, provided most of the 1,548 officers and men of Marine Aircraft Group 33, the air component of the Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, who was also deputy Brigade commander.[2] [note]

The nature of these accomplishments becomes increasingly clear when one considers the situation of the Marine Corps and its reserve components on 30 June. On this date, five days after the North Korean People's Army had begun invasion of the South, the strength and disposition of the Marine Corps Regular Establishment and its reserve organizations may be briefly summarized as follows:

The Marine Corps had 74,279 Marines on active duty, or approximately 97 percent of its authorized strength, 76,921. [2,642 short of 100%, in 2008 the authorized strength of the active force was raised 202,00] The personnel were distributed as follows:

1. The Operating Forces, which participate directly in carrying out the assigned missions and tasks of the Marine Corps, 40,364;

2. The Supporting Establishment, comprising those organizations that furnish the life-blood of the Operating Forces--trained personnel, supplies, and administrative guidance--, 24,552.

3. Special & Other Assignment, including all personnel serving with organizations outside the Regular Establishment, 3,871;

4. Non-Availables, made up of personnel hospitalized, confined, or in travel status, 5,492.

Within the Operating Forces,

The Fleet Marine Forces had a strength of 27,656 and
the security detachments had 11,087; afloat were 1,574 Marines.

Within FMFPac there were 11,853 Marines, a great majority of whom were serving in the
1st Marine Division (Reinforced) (7,779) and in the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (3,733).

In FMFLant there were 15,803 men; of these
8,973 were serving in the 2nd Marine Division (Reinforced) and 5,297 in the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.

Both ground and air units were organized on a peacetime table of organization, and the obvious inadequacy of military forces so organized to meet a strong and premeditated threat is graphically illustrated by a comparison between the peacetime and wartime tables of organization.

The planned peacetime strength of a Marine aircraft wing was approximately 7,670 men, including three air groups of approximately 1,250 men each.

At its war strength, a Marine aircraft wing normally functions with a complement of approximately 12,000 men. It also possesses three aviation groups, each having an approximate strength of 2,000. Under both tables of organization, a Marine aircraft group can support two or more squadrons; plans contemplate that it support four--circumstances sometimes permit only three. The marked differences between a war strength and peacetime Marine division may best be seen in the following two charts.

Peace Time table of Organization Chart

War Time table of Organization Chart

[note]

During the post-world War II years, the nation steadily decreased. the strength of the Marine Corps, which placed a correspondingly heavier reliance on a strong Marine Corps Reserve as a complement to the Regular Establishment.

Strength, of Regular Establishment as of 30 June*
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
155,592 92,222 83,609 79,103 74,279
Strength of Reserve, Components as of 30 June**
19,807 45,536 111,122 123,817 128,959

*Includes Regulars and Volunteer Reservists on active duty.

** Includes Organized Reservists, Fleet Reservists, and Volunteer Reservists not on active duty.


It was essential, therefore, that this reserve have three important characteristics:

  1. Large size, given the small size of the Regular Establishment;
  2. Capability for quick employment, since any future war was certain to have the characteristic of suddenness of attack;
  3. High quality, for reservists were to be integrated into regular units and would have to measure up to the traditional standards of Marine fighting forces.

[note]

Reserve Situation

The Marine Corps made every effort to create such a reserve. Subsequent events have proved the soundness of the concept and have fully justified the faith that the nation and the Marine Corps had placed in the conception and administration of the reserve program, and in the caliber of its potential accomplishment.

By 30 June 1950, within the limits of the appropriation allotted to the Marine Corps for the development of its reserve program, all Organized Reserve units, aviation and ground, had been activated and a substantial actual strength achieved.

The Organized Reserve (Ground) stood at a strength of 33,527 or approximately ?7 percent of its authorized strength, while

the Organized Reserve (Aviation) had a strength of 6,342 or 94 % of its authorized strength of 7,670 (82%).

The Organized Reserve (Ground) personnel were distributed among the following units:

The Organized Reserve (Aviation) strength was distributed among 30 Marine Fighter Squadrons (VMF) and 12 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadrons (MGCIS).

Thus, with a total authorized strength of 50,156, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve had an actual strength of 39,869 or approximately 80 % of its authorized strength.

By far, however, the largest potential source of personnel was the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. On 30 June, there were 89,920 men and women in the Volunteer Reserve as compared with the 39,869 in the Organized Reserve. Of these, 2,265 Volunteer Reservists were on continuous active duty with the 'Regular Establishment of the Marine Corps, and approximately 5,000 were voluntarily training in approximately 200 Volunteer training Units. Finally, there were 1,316 men in the Fleet Reserve,

By totaling the strength of the various Marine Corps Reserve components, less Volunteer Reservists on active duty, we arrived at the figure, 128,959 -- almost double the actual total strength of the Regular Establishment on 30 June. Obviously, therefore, the role of the Marine Corps Reserve loomed large in any projected wide-scale expansion of the Regular Establishment, [note]

During the perilous post-World War II years, the Marine Corps made every effort to create and maintain a strong and military proficient Organized Ground Reserve readily available for mobilization in the event of a national emergency or war. The storm clouds gathering on the horizon gave a sense of urgency to these efforts, and by 30 June 1950, there were 2,657 Marines of the Regular Establishment, including reservists on continuous active duty, devoting full time to the reserve program. Should the storm clouds unleash the hurricane of war, the Marine Corps wanted to be ready with the maximum possible number of trained and available reservists for rapid integration into the depleted Regular Establishment.

Through the reserve districts, which were responsible for defined geographical areas, a close check was kept on the performance of reserve units. Inspector-Instructor staffs were constantly available for consultation and help; and when corrective action was indicated to improve performance, this action was taken. All units in existence for more than six months were required to submit monthly reports of drill attendance, and within the units, a constant selection and weeding-out process was carried on so that they might increase and preserve their vitality. [note]

The need for trained and ready reservists was not long forthcoming. Five days after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the President received Congressional authorization "to order into active service any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces." [note]

On 30 June 1950, the Volunteer Reserve was by far the largest component of the Marine Corps Reserve. Indeed, the Volunteer Reserve, with 87,655 Reservists on inactive, duty exceeded the strength of the Regular Establishment by 13,32. In addition, it should be noted that the strength of the Regular Establishment included 2,265 Volunteer Reservists serving on continuous active duty.

128,959 Reserves

074,279 Regulars Establishment

054,680 Difference

[note]

Four days after the President's announcement of 26 June, Congress approved The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950. This measure in effect nullified the guarantee that reservists would not be called to active duty except in time of war or national emergency. The pertinent part of The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 reads:

Until July 9, 1951--.the President shall be authorized to order into the active military or naval service of the United States for a period not to exceed twenty-one consecutive months, with or without their consent, any or all members and units of any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States...."

The President chose, however, to delay the invocation of this new authority until a later and more practical date. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces conducted rapid but extensive surveys of their material and manpower resources in preparation for the. eventuality that sizable American military forces would-be committed in the Far East.

As a result, the Department of Defense and its subordinate military departments arrived at certain basic conclusions, which thereafter contributed to the decisions and events affecting the mobilization of the reserve components. Prominent among the resulting decisions was the resolution that, in the interest of an expeditious and effective mobilization, voluntary separation from the reserve components should be suspended except in unusual cases.

The first measure taken to implement this decision came on 15 July, when the Chief of Naval Personnel ordered that the discharge of Naval reservists upon their own request held in abeyance. [note]

US Navy

Two more organizational problems faced Admiral Joy in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June

July 1

and ordered by the President next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50 promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96.

[note]

The main thrust of the Communist invasion, three infantry divisions with armored and air support, was directed initially toward the capital at Sŏul. Poorly disposed for defense and considerably outnumbered at the scene of action, the Army of the Republic of Korea broke under the weight of the attack; the government fled to Taejŏn; Sŏul fell. As the enemy pressed southward down the road toward Suwŏn the South Korean Army appeared to be in the process of dissolution. On 30 June, after describing its heavy losses of supplies and equipment, General MacArthur had concluded that it was no longer capable of united action, and that only by commitment of American ground forces could the Han River line be held. At sea the invasion was accompanied by a number of small unopposed landings along the east coast, which were magnified by rumor both as to number and as to location. These maritime efforts, which extended as far south as Samch'ŏk, would end with the arrival of United Nations naval forces, but in the first crucial hours of the war they were confronted only by the Navy of the Republic of Korea.

This Navy had its principal establishment at Chinhae, just west of Pusan, where the Japanese during their occupation had developed a considerable naval base with docks, barracks, petroleum storage, and a marine railway. Next in importance was the base at Inch'ŏn, seaport of the capital city, and rudimentary facilities had been established at Mukho and P'ohang on the east coast, at Pusan and Yŏsu on the south, and at Mokp'o and Kunsan on the shore of the Yellow Sea. [note]

June 30

on the next day similar action was taken by the Australian government; in Canada three destroyers were ordered to prepare to sail; from New Zealand came promise of the early dispatch of two frigates.

Commonwealth naval strength in Japanese waters was by no means inconsiderable. Andrewes' command included

HMS Triumph (R16), a 13,000-ton light carrier, completed in 1946 and operating about 40 aircraft; two 6-inch gun cruisers, heavily armored HMS Belfast (C-35), the largest cruiser in the Royal Navy, and HMS Jamaica (44); three destroyers and four frigates. The hospital ship HMS Maine, soon to be added to the force, was for some time to be the only such vessel available for the evacuation of casualties from Korea. In the absence of American naval air bases in Japan the Royal Australian Air Force seaplane base at Iwakuni on the Inland Sea, which was at once made available, was to be of great assistance.

table 4.--COMMONWEALTH NAVAL FORCES, 30 JUNE 1950

TASK GROUP 96.8

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES.

REAR ADMIRAL SIR W. G. ANDREWES, RN.

HMS triumph (R-16)

1 Light Cruiser

HMS Belfast (C-35) (Flagship),

HMS Jamaica (C-44)

2 Light Cruisers

HMS Cossack (D-57),

HMS Consort (D-76),

HMAS Bataan (D-191)

3 Destroyers

HMS Amethyst (Black Swan class) (F-116),

HMS Alacrity (F-57),

HMS Hart (F-58),

HMAS Shoalhaven (F-535)

4 Frigates

[note]

Nevertheless the clans were gathering. On the west coast, where USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729) had joined USS Mansfield (DD-728) on 30 June, the patrol of areas Yoke and Zebra continued without contact with the enemy. On the east coast, following conferences with southbound ROK naval personnel, USS Juneau (CLAA-119) returned to Mukho to expend a further 43 rounds of 5-inch VT against troop positions and a shore battery. USS Collett (DD-730) came up from Pusan, where she had embarked ROK interpreters, signalmen, and liaison officers for distribution throughout the force, and at 2200 HMS Jamaica (C-44) joined. [note]

OO-6-50

Early on the 30th Struble queried his staff by dispatch as to how soon USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and HMS Triumph (R16) could conduct a first strike in the area of the 38th parallel, and in a conference with General MacArthur, Admiral Joy, and General Stratemeyer, the decision was reached to strike objectives in the P'yŏngyang area. First emphasis would be given to the airfield complex of the North Korean capital, second priority to the railroad yards and to the bridges over the Taedong River. Following these discussions Struble flew on to Okinawa to rejoin his force, and early in the evening ComNavFE promulgated Operation Order 6-50 governing the employment of the carrier striking force.

The prospect of operating this mixed force presented some problems, owing to the differences between British and American aircraft types and to the fact that Triumph's maximum speed of 23 knots was 10 knots slower than that of Valley Forge. But the British were eager to go; many of their officers had had experience in joint operations in the Second World War and the two forces had recently held joint maneuvers; the advantages outweighed the difficulties. Although obscurity still surrounded the intentions of Communist submarines, Seventh Fleet forces had already reported two contacts, one some distance off Okinawa, one at the entrance of Buckner Bay; the Seventh Fleet submarine commander was therefore drafted as antisubmarine warfare adviser to ComCardiv-3. [note]

As early as 27 June an Advance Command Group under Brigadier General John H. Church, USA, had been established at Suwŏn, some 25 miles south of Sŏul, to help in reorganizing ROK forces and to expedite logistic assistance. But events soon demonstrated the optimism of this assignment, and on 30 June, with the arrival of the North Korean People's Army momentarily expected, this group was withdrawn to the southward. As ADCOM was retiring the first units of the 24th Infantry Division were being flown into Korea, and as the rest of the division was hastily embarking in Japan this advanced element, two infantry companies with supporting artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, USA, began its northward movement from Pusan. [note]

The total strength of the Pacific Fleet Service Force, as of the end of June, came to 91 auxiliaries of various types. The largest share of these mobile support units, 47 ships, was organized in Service Squadron 1, Captain Bernard L. Austin. This command was responsible for the logistic support of fleet units in the Eastern Pacific, including Alaska; most of its units were located in west coast ports. At Pearl Harbor, under the direct control of ComServPac, were the 26 auxiliaries of the Logistic Support Group, whose area of responsibility included fleet units and bases in the Western, Central, and South Pacific. The 18 remaining units were assigned to Service Division 51, a subordinate echelon of the Logistic Support Group, located at Guam and charged with the administration of Service Force responsibilities in the Marianas and Caroline's.

In the first days of hostilities uncertainty as to the identity of the enemy and the extent of the underwater threat had led ComNavFE to call for additional small craft for offshore patrol. In response to this request Admiral Denebrink recommended to CincPacFleet the reactivation of the three mine-sweepers in caretaker status at Yokosuka, and of five sub-chasers and three fleet tugs. At the same time the Service Force staff turned its attention to the urgent problems of logistic support for the forces going into action in the Far East.

Ammunition came first. At Yokosuka, under the control of Commander Fleet Activities Japan, there was a small stock of some two or three thousand tons of various types, but with one surprising deficiency: there was no antisubmarine ordnance in Japan. Ammunition in the Philippines was negligible; at Guam there were some 6,000 tons. Necessarily, therefore, the supply of items lacking at Yokosuka and Guam, and the replacement of expenditures from these stocks, had to be made from the Hawaiian Islands, more than 3,000 miles away, where there were wartime leftovers in massive quantities. To lift ammunition to the forward area, ComServPac had available a single ammunition ship, USS Mount Katmai (AE-16), at Port Chicago, and an assortment of cargo types which, with special sheathing of the holds, could be made to do.

Lacking word from Admiral Joy as to the pattern of anticipated needs, and lacking also a subordinate Service Force commander in the forward area to coordinate requirements, the staff at Pearl Harbor undertook at once, by deduction and by intuition, an estimate of what was required. This work was expeditiously done. The estimate was ready by the night of 26-27 June in the form of a revised loading plan for Mount Katmai, and was at once promulgated by dispatch for comment. Within two days the views of the operational commanders concerned had been received and integrated and a detailed loading list was on its way by air to the west coast.


But Mount Katmai’s arrival was weeks away, and in the next few days, as special requests came in from ComNavFE, ammunition was moved forward from Guam by cargo ship. In the absence of underwater ordnance in Japan, and with the submarine problem still un-clarified, depth charges were given priority: on 13 July a shipload reached Yokosuka, followed on the next day by another of 5-inch and 40-millimeter ammunition. By this time also a load of 8-inch cruiser ammunition was at sea en route from Guam to Sasebo, and another ship had been sailed for Buckner Bay with aircraft ordnance for Task Force 77.


The second problem of immediate and overriding importance was that of fuel. In the Pacific the responsibility for petroleum supply was a divided

one: Commander Service Force, as logistic agent for CinCPac, was responsible for the Pacific Area outside of General MacArthur’s command, while the

Area Petroleum Office at CincFE’s headquarters was charged with procurement for the forces of the Far East Command. Throughout the Pacific POL inventories were low, in consequence of directives based on budgetary restrictions; this situation was potentially most dangerous in aviation gasoline, production of which is inelastic and not susceptible to rapid expansion. Anticipating a rapid increase in consumption, ComServPac’s Petroleum Office made early requests for larger allocations, and fortunately so. The timely arrival of these from the continental United States would provide adequate stocks for the trans-Pacific pipeline, and make it possible to help out the Far East Command, where serious shortages developed owing to lack of similar foresight.


The need for aviation gasoline was matched by that for black oil for the naval forces moving westward. Of the ten fleet oilers assigned to the Service Force, two were on shuttle duty serving the Seventh Fleet and the mid-Pacific, eight were in west coast ports.

Four of these—USS Cimarron (AO-22), USS Cacapon (AO-52), USS Caliente (AO-53), and USS Platte (AO-24)—were immediately ordered forward and sailed in company with Admiral Hartman’s cruisers and destroyers [on July 6th]. Three were routed onward from Pearl to Okinawa and Japan, while Caliente, on 24 July, discharged 65,000 barrels of fuel oil at Midway Island to keep that newly reactivated base in business. [note]








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In the early morning hours of 30 June these operations orders had to be changed. Shortly after midnight General Church established secure communications into Tokyo, and he was insistent that the B-29's ought to attack the Han bridges and the enemy troops massing on the north bank of that river. The question now was whether or not, and how soon, the 19th Bombardment Group could change its force preparations from those made to attack the airfield at Wŏnsan to those required to hit troops and bridges at Sŏul. The air echelon of the 19th Group had just completed a 1,200-mile change of station, and it had been able to bring to Kadena only a few maintenance and service personnel.#112 The B-29's were already loaded with 260-pound fragmentation bombs; to unload and reload the bombers with other ordnance would take a minimum of six hours.#113 The frags would be useless against bridges, but they would serve antipersonnel purposes. FEAF therefore directed the Twentieth Air Force to scratch the Wŏnsan strike and to attack troop concentrations and landing craft along the north bank of the Han River east and west of Sŏul.#114


As a result of the change in operations orders, nearly all of FEAF's air effort on 30 June was again employed against targets of opportunity north of the Han River. At intervals during the morning 15 B-29's strewed frag bombs on enemy troops along the river. The results of these attacks remained "unknown" to FEAF, but one of General Church's officers told him that the strikes "were too distant from the river to be effective. #115

The 3rd Bombardment Group sent 18 B-26 sorties to strafe, bomb, and rocket enemy traffic and troops in and around Sŏul. One flight from the 13th Squadron, checking the status of the Sŏul railway bridges early in the morning, discovered North Korean tanks, trucks, and other vehicles jammed up bumper to bumper, waiting to cross the center rail bridge. These vehicles could not go forward because the Reds had not finished the wooden decking and they were parked too close together to escape rearward. The B-26 flight swept in, wing to wing, using all of their offensive weapons in one murderous pass. All of the crews agreed that this strike must have hurt the Reds badly.#116


First Six Days 33


The Shooting Star jet fighters from Itazuke continued to exploit the combined air-patrol and ground-attack tactics which they had devised and used the day before. Few enemy aircraft made an appearance, but Lt. Charles A. Wurster and Lt. John B. Thomas of the 36th Squadron bounced two Yak-9's and each destroyed one of the hostile planes. The strafing passes, flown by the F-80's after they completed their air patrols, usually ac-counted for several trucks or similar moving targets, and the speedy jets got in and away before the enemy hardly knew it. One unlucky pilot, however, flew through an electrical power line which left him just enough wing to get back to Suwŏn and bail out.#117

From his station at Suwŏn Airfield Colonel McGinn continued to manage air strikes in support of the South Koreans. Early in the morning a courier aircraft brought him gridded maps of Korea which had been printed in response to a request he had made two days earlier. The crews leaving Itazuke and Ashiya also carried these maps, and when McGinn had a supporting target he could call it out in grid coordinates. The maps were small scale, making it difficult to pinpoint the target, but the grid procedure was better than passing targets over the radio in the clear. Working as he was, almost single-handed, Colonel McGinn could not provide many close-support targets. During the day only 25 such sorties were flown in support of the ROK's.#118

Perceiving that McGinn needed assistance, FEAF directed the Fifth Air Force to establish in Korea, probably at Suwŏn, a tactical air-direction center, which could control tactical air operations in the forward areas. #119

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Reports coming into the Pentagon from the Far East during the morning of 29 June described the situation in Korea as so bad that Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson telephoned President Truman before noon. In a meeting late that afternoon the President approved a new directive greatly broadening the authority of the Far East Commander in meeting the Korean crisis.

[note]

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New American decisions were necessary, and at about noon [Thursday, 29 June] [2 am 30th] Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requested President Truman to schedule another top-level meeting concerning Korea. [note]

0210 Korean Time

In a telecon discussion in the first hours of Friday morning General MacArthur stated that the line could not be held without American help, and recommended the immediate movement of one regimental combat team to the Korean front as nucleus for a possible buildup to two divisions for early offensive action. This in time would prove a notable underestimate of the required force, but the view that the invaders would cease and desist, once confronted by U.S. Army contingents, was shared in Washington. In any event the highest authority on the spot, the man who would be responsible for conducting the campaign, had spoken. The decision could not be deferred.

[note]

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MacArthur's personal appeal, in fact, received even wider recognition on 30 June when he was told,

"Restriction on use of Army Forces ... are hereby removed and authority granted to utilize Army Forces available to you." [04-59]

[note]

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President Truman's decision to send American ground troops against the North Koreans had come in time, but barely. Regardless of American air strikes against their cities, communication lines, and troop columns, and despite naval surface attack against their coastal installations and shipping, the invaders drove the ROK Army down the peninsula. As the vague line of battle receded southward in late June and early July it became clear that the Republic of Korea could not stand by itself.

Armed with Presidential authority, MacArthur sent ground troops into the fight as fast as he could move them. On 30 June, he ordered the 24th Division from Japan to Korea, retaining the unit, for the time being, under his personal control. On the recommendation of his chief of staff, General Almond, he ordered a small task force from the division flown into Korea ahead of the main body to engage the North Korean Army as quickly as possible, sacrificing security for speed. Because it would go by air, he restricted its size to two rifle companies, some antitank teams, and a battery of light artillery. This makeshift unit was to report to General Church at Suwŏn by 1 July; but, realizing that Suwŏn might fall at any time, General MacArthur authorized Church to divert the force to Pusan if necessary. [05-1]

General Church meanwhile struggled to keep the ROK Army in the fight. He had no real authority over the South Koreans, but his status as MacArthur's personal representative gave weight to his advice to the ROK Chief of Staff. In effect, Church took charge of the faltering South Korean Army. Many KMAG officers stayed with ROK combat units, patrolling, feeding information to General Church, and doing whatever they could to stiffen ROK resistance and morale. [05-2] [note]

0513 Sun Rise

[note]

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Korean_War

Note: President Truman's two hundred and twentyninth news conference was held in the Indian Treaty Room (Room 474) in the Executive Office Building at 4 p.m. on Thursday, June 29, 1950.

THE PRESIDENT.

[I.] I have an announcement to make.
We have appointed an economic survey mission to go to the Philippines as soon as it can make the arrangements.
It is headed by the Honorable Daniel W. Bell, president of the American Security and trust Co. of Washington and former Under Secretary of the treasury; and by Gen. Richard J. Marshall, president of the Virginia Military Institute.


And as soon as the appointment of the mission is completed, why they will leave for the Philippines as promptly as possible.


This mission was appointed at the request of the Philippine President. He made that request of me when he was here on his visit.


And we have had some difficulty in finding the people to head the mission, and in ironing out some differences between the various departments of the Government. Everything has been ironed out now, and that mission will go to work.


That’s all the announcements I have to make.

(this was followed by about 26 questions and answers)

[note]

USS Cabezon (SS-334) made a fast turnaround at Hong Kong and joined with the others on the 28th off the northern tip of Luzon. Revised orders from Commander Seventh Fleet changed their destination also from Sasebo to Okinawa, and there they arrived on 30 June, to be joined next day [July 1] by the submarine rescue vessel USS Greenlet (ASR-10) from Guam.

At Buckner Bay new orders were received, and on the 3rd Greenlet and her three charges sailed in company for Yokosuka. [note]

At 0630 in the morning of 30 June Task Force 77 reached Okinawa and dropped anchor in Nakagusuku Wan, now known as Buckner Bay in honor of the commanding general of the Tenth Army, killed in June 1945 in the moment of victory. At this base, strategically located between Korea and Formosa, the fleet did have the protection of distance, but there were no antisubmarine defenses other than those provided by the force's own destroyers, and no stocks of ammunition.

[note]

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That same afternoon, June 29, at 5:00 P.M., the Blair House conferees met again. By then the news from South Korea was grim. The ROKs were fleeing in disarray; John Church would almost certainly have to abandon Suwŏn soon. In order to maintain a "foothold" in South Korea in the Pusan area, the JCS recommended unlimited air and naval attacks against North Korea - north of the 38th Parallel - and the defensive deployment of one American RCT and certain communications and service troops in the Pusan-Chinhae area, to protect the airfield and ports.[3-45] [note]

On 29 June General MacArthur flew to Suwŏn, held conferences with Muccio and President Rhee, and then drove up the Sŏul road to the vicinity of the Han. He found that the Korean army and coastal forces were in confusion, had not seriously fought, and lacked leadership. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintaining interior order, the Korean army had been unprepared for attack by armor and air. South Korean military strength, now estimated at not more than 25,000 effective's, was scarcely enough to defeat the North Korean force, but every effort was being made to hold a line at the Han River, the natural defense barrier essential to the protection of the only airhead remaining in central Korea, Suwŏn. Back in Tokyo, however, FEC staff members had started considering another east-west defense line north of Taegu in the event that the North Koreans penetrated ROK defenses along the Han.

Korean_War Korean_War

Late in the afternoon of 29 June, Washington time, President Truman decided upon more positive action in Korea, and the JCS authorized MacArthur to extend his air operations into North Korea against airfields, tank farms, troop columns, and other targets judged essential in the clearing of North Korean forces from the area south of 38°. These air operations, however, were to keep well clear of Manchurian and USSR borders, and if forces actively opposed such attacks the U.S. planes should defend themselves without taking aggressive action until Washington could be advised. MacArthur was also authorized to use Army combat and service forces needed to insure the retention of the port and air base in the Pusan-Chinhae area on the southeastern coast of Korea. The JCS noted that this decision was made with full realization of risks, and they cautioned that it did not constitute a decision to engage in a war with the USSR if the latter's forces actively intervened in Korea.

[note]

Congressional action on 30 June 1950 gave the President the authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and units of the National Guard of the United States into active federal service for a period of twenty-one months. [07-18] [note]

Another factor bearing on the problem was that an important provision of Public Law 80-810, 80th Congress 1948, was in the process of being implemented as of 30 June 1950. This provision required those members of the Volunteer Reserve who had not been sufficiently active to earn the specified minimum number of retirement credit points under the above law would be involuntarily transferred to the Inactive Reserve. The screening of the Volunteer Reserve to determine who should thus be transferred had just begun when the Korean War broke out. It was known, however, that a large number of officers in the Volunteer Reserve would be affected.

When the first order went out for the involuntary recall of individual Reserve officers, no real distinction could be made between the Inactive and Volunteer Reserve since there were so many in the Volunteer Reserve who had been as inactive as those assigned to the Inactive Reserve. The first recall program, authorized by the Extension Act of 1950 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, consequently specified that officers be recalled from either the Volunteer Reserve or the Inactive Reserve without establishing a priority or any other distinction between the two categories.

The Army met numerous problems in recalling Reservists. It had no clear picture of the actual number who would be available for duty. It knew, for example, that on 30 June 1950 it had 416,402 in the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves and 184,015 in the organized units of the Reserve. It did not know, however, how many of these were physically qualified for duty. The required periodic physical examinations for Reservists had been suspended in February 1947. Many more Reservists had to be called for physical examination than the number needed because of the large numbers found physically disqualified. Considerable administrative overhead and delay hindered selections. Further, many Reservists had undergone changes in economic status after entering the ORC which made active duty an undue hardship. The result was authorization of large numbers of justifiable delays which caused further difficulty in filling quotas. Records on Reserve officers were inadequate, and virtually did not exist for enlisted men.

Page 122

Finally, the recall of Inactive and Volunteer Reservists engendered much ill-will from the public, the press, and the Congress.

[note]

Congressional action on 30 June 1950 gave the President the authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and units of the National Guard of the United States into active federal service for a period of twenty-one months. [07-18] [note]

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On 30 June, as a movement of ground forces into Korea appeared increasingly probable, all ships of the Amphibious Group were placed on four-hour notice for getting underway. No reports of enemy mining had as yet come in, although in time there would be plenty, but there was no lack of tasks for the small ships of Minron 3. The eight AMS were at once deployed on picket duty, harbor defense, and convoy escort. In this they were joined by USS Pledge (AM-277), the only operational AM, while at Yokosuka the work of activating the other ships of Mindiv 32 was at once begun. [note]


Early in the morning of the 30th Admiral Joy assumed operational control of Andrewes' forces, and in the evening modified Operation Order 5-50 to include the Commonwealth units for Korean operations only, thus exempting them from the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores, which remained a purely American affair.


With these augmented but by no means extravagant forces Admiral Joy confronted his tasks. He was required to evacuate American citizens, support the Republic of Korea, blockade the North Korean coastline, and at the same time to remain prepared for the unpredictable in connection with Formosa, the protection of his flanks, and a possible expansion of the conflict. And as his responsibilities and his forces grew, further difficulty was presented by the inadequacy of his staff and of those of subordinate commands.

The total strength, officer and enlisted, of the NavFE staff at the end of June was 188; by November it would have reached 1,227. But in the first weeks, before reinforcements arrived, the job had to be done with what was on hand. Rarely in the history of 20th century warfare can so many have been commanded by so few.


It was not done without effort. The Plans Section went to heel and toe watches, 12 hours on and 12 off. The Operations Officer moved in a cot and did such sleeping as he could in his office; his people found themselves working a 12-hour day, with an additional four-hour night watch four days out of five.

For Communications the situation became a nightmare as high-precedence traffic skyrocketed; in the first days the load of encrypted messages went up by a factor of 15, and was further complicated by great quantities of interservice and United States-British dispatches. Somehow they made do

Even as anguished requests were sent off to Washington for more personnel, the round the clock efforts of those on the spot were accomplishing the reorganization and redeployment of available naval strength. To Naval Forces Japan had now been added the Seventh Fleet and British Commonwealth units; with these accessions Admiral Joy had gained all that would be available until reinforcements could come from afar. This strength was organized in three principal groups: Naval Forces Japan, the Seventh Fleet, and the Amphibious Force.



table 5.-NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, 25 JUNE-20 JULY 1950
(NavFE OpOrds 5-50 (revised), 8-50)

rOf these, Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force Far East, Task Force 90, had been moved forward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, where it was awaiting instructions.

Under the direct control of ComNavFE, Task Force 96, Naval Forces Japan, was engaged in various tasks.

The long range aircraft of VP 47 had been organized as the Search and Reconnaissance Group, Task Group 96.2, under Captain John C. AIderman, Chief of Staff to Commander Fleet Air Guam, who had been on leave in Japan at the onset of hostilities and found himself shanghaied for this purpose.

In Korean waters the Support Group, Task Group 96.5, originally consisting of Juneau and Destroyer Division 91, had been reinforced by HMS Jamaica (C-44), HMAS Shoalhaven (K535), and HMS Black Swan (U-57), and HMS Alacrity (U-60) was about to join up.

Although Admiral Andrewes' ships had received the designation of Task Group 96.8, these for the moment were divided between the Support Group and the Seventh Fleet Striking Force, which had reached Okinawa on 30 June.

[note]

0945 Korean Time

While the Blair House conferees slept that night, June 29, MacArthur arose early on the morning of June 30, Tokyo time, and went to the Dai Ichi Building. There he polished his report on his visit to South Korea and cabled it to the Pentagon, addressed to the JCS via the Department of the Army, the executive agency and communications channel for all Korean War matters. [note]

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President Truman receives Congressional authorization to order into active service any or all reserve components of Armed Forces for a period of 21 months. [note]

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1145 Korean Time

While MacArthur stood by the teletype, permission was given him to move one RCT to the combat area, and shortly before noon, Washington time, the JCS signaled that his proposition for moving two divisions into Korea was approved, subject only to requirements he judged necessary for the safety of Japan. In Korea, however, the Communist attack was not to be retarded at the Han barrier, which they had actually penetrated when they captured Kimp'o several days before.

On 30 June the North Koreans forced numerous crossings, and on the night of 30 June / l July they began attacking Suwŏn, whose airfield FEAF had hoped to make an airhead for supplies and an advanced base in central Korea. MacArthur therefore lost no time in issuing directives for the expanding war. On 30 June he ordered the 24th Infantry Division to Pusan, whence it was to proceed northward and engage the enemy. That same day he authorized FEAF to extend its operations into North Korea, keeping well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and Siberia. [note]

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In ground action the situation deteriorated. At noon, 30 June, American observers at the Han River sent word to General Church that the ROK river line was disintegrating. About this time, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon of the South Korean Army arrived from Tokyo to replace General Chae as ROK Army Chief of Staff. [note]

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1345 Korean Time


While the Blair House conferees slept that night, June 29, MacArthur arose early on the morning of June 30, Tokyo time, and went to the Dai Ichi Building. There he polished his report on his visit to South Korea and cabled it to the Pentagon, addressed to the JCS via the Department of the Army, the executive agency and communications channel for all Korean War matters. The report arrived at the Pentagon shortly before midnight, June 29 [2 pm 30th]. Alerted by a duty officer, Joe Collins got out of bed and went to the Pentagon to read it.[3-49] [note]

Shortly after midnight the report from the Supreme Commander came in. 6/29? [note]

I have today inspected the South Korea battle area from Suwŏn to the HAN River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission. . . . Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order [04-the Korean Army was] unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as that embodied in the North Korean Army.

The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made not executed for the destruction of supplies or materiel in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost or abandoned their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no means of intercommunication. In most cases, the individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance of example of leadership of high quality.

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according to their scale of living. They have retained a high degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Sŏul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.

South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effective's. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well-trained, well- directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at Suwŏn and the southern port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, but is subject to constant air- attack. Since air-cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean air, operating from near-by bases, has been savage in its attacks in Suwŏn area.

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwŏn-Sŏul corridor is essential to the retention of the only airhead in central Korea.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the 105t ground, is through the introduction of US Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the Forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United States Regimental Combat Team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two-division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive. Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy- Air team in this shattered area, our mission will be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it might even be doomed to failure. [04-55]

This message reached Washington an hour before midnight on 29 June. Because of its urgent tone and extremely pessimistic outlook, General Collins consulted with General MacArthur in a teleconference four hours later (3am 6/30 WDC) . He informed the Far East Commander that one RCT could be moved to Pusan to guard that port. MacArthur protested that this hardly satisfied the basic requirements. He urged speed in securing permission to place American forces in the battle area.

Lacking the authority to grant this request, Collins told MacArthur he would try to gain Presidential approval. Collins called Secretary of the Army Pace, who called the White House. The President immediately approved dispatching one RCT to the battle area. In less than an hour (4am WDC), word was flashed to Tokyo, "Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further build-up." [04-56]

Throughout this period of intensive search for decisions, culminating finally in the decision to meet the aggressor in ground combat, the President of the United States had been the ultimate arbiter of each step. President Truman had solicited the advice of those best qualified to judge the military effects and requirements of each move taken. General Collins briefed him daily, passing on the views of the Joint Chiefs. But the President made the final choice himself.

Earlier the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not favored the use of American ground forces in Korea, [04-57] primarily because they knew how unprepared they were for large-scale combat. They were reluctant also to weaken the small General Reserve in the United States, which represented the minimum essential for defense. Deploying any part of the Reserve to the Far East would be a risky, perhaps disastrous, undertaking because of possible Soviet involvement following American action. [04-58]

General MacArthur quite clearly had tipped the balance in favor of troop commitment. The risks had not changed or lessened, but the nation's leaders became convinced that communist seizure of Korea could not be tolerated.

[note]

The report arrived at the Pentagon shortly before midnight, [3-2345] June 29. Alerted by a duty officer, Joe Collins got out of bed and went to the Pentagon to read it.[3-49]

MacArthur began by describing his visit to Suwŏn and the Han River battlefront, painting a lugubrious picture. He went on to excoriate the ROK Army. It was "in confusion" and "had not seriously fought" and "lacked leadership" and had "absolutely no system of communications." It now numbered no more than "25,000 effective's" and was "entirely incapable of counter action." Every effort had been made to establish a defense of the "Han River line" and the Sŏul–Suwŏn "corridor," but "the result is highly problematical." If the NKPA advance continued further, it would "seriously threaten the fall of the Republic!"[3-50]

His conclusion was galvanizing:

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Army and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive. . . . Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it might even be doomed to failure.

Included in this report was a sketchy (one sentence) outline for deploying and utilizing the American ground forces. As a first step MacArthur would "immediately move" one American RCT into the Han River line or the Sŏul–Suwŏn corridor. While this force blocked the southerly advance of the NKPA, MacArthur would rush "a possible" two full American infantry divisions to South Korea. These would then be deployed for an "early counter offensive," presumably designed to destroy the NKPA or at least to push it back beyond the 38th Parallel.

This historic plan, ringing with boldness, deserves closer scrutiny than it has hitherto received. The crux of the plan - deployment of an RCT in the Sŏul–Suwŏn Corridor in time to dig in and block the NKPA - was simply preposterous. The NKPA was already crossing the Han River and driving south on Suwŏn, scattering the remnants of the ROK Army before it. There was no RCT in Japan in a sufficient state of readiness to "rush" to South Korea. An RCT would have to be improvised. Since there was insufficient airlift in Japan to bring over the heavy equipment of an RCT, most of it would have to go by sea. All this would take time - far too much time to do the job MacArthur had in mind. [note]

MacArthur's glib assurance of an "early offensive" by two full American divisions was no less preposterous. All the problems faced in getting a single RCT to South Korea would be multiplied enormously by moving two full divisions. Moreover, the two green divisions would land in South Korea in the teeth of an onrushing hostile army flush with victory. Even if they survived, it would take weeks or months to regroup and launch a "counter offensive."

This fantastical MacArthur plan bore an eerie likeness to another fantastical plan he had conceived ten years before for the defense of the Philippines from a Japanese attack. Like the South Korean plan, the earlier plan had drastically underrated the enemy and overrated his own forces. There were also certain tactical similarities, such as an early and aggressive confrontation with an advancing enemy without a scheme for defense in depth. The Philippine plan had failed under the weight of overwhelming Japanese superiority, forcing MacArthur into his famous perimeter defense in Bataan and Corregidor. Events in South Korea were to follow a remarkably similar course.

As Joe Collins pondered MacArthur's report, he was well aware of its profound implications: that notwithstanding all previous decisions to avoid an American war against Asians on the Asian mainland at all costs, MacArthur was urging just that and proposing to do it with troops that were not sufficiently trained or equipped for combat. Yet Collins raised no objections. On the contrary, he enthusiastically embraced this proposal which went far beyond the JCS decision of that day to limit the American ground forces to a defensive role near Pusan.

Seldom in American history had there been an occasion fraught with greater peril or demanding more thoughtful analysis. A more prudent man than Collins might have felt compelled to summon the full JCS to the Pentagon for one last discussion on so momentous a matter. But not "Lightning Joe," the man noted for speed and snap judgments in tight corners. He decided to take matters into his own hands, and in the dark of that night he embarked on a course that was to hasten America into full-scale war in Korea.

Collins had a well developed sense of history and public relations, honed by a postwar tour as the Army's chief publicist. Fully conscious of the historic nature of the moment, he decided to confer person to person with MacArthur by telecon. As he and his advisers gathered in a darkened room before the movie screen, Collins wrote later, "the air was fraught with tension."[3-51]

From the outset Collins let MacArthur know that he was in his corner. He dutifully stated the obvious - no doubt for the record - that MacArthur's request to introduce American ground forces into combat in South Korea would require "presidential approval." This would take "several hours," Collins said, because Truman would want to confer carefully with his top advisers. But more to the point, Collins reminded MacArthur that he, MacArthur, already had authorization to move one RCT to the Pusan area. Would that authorization not permit "initiation of movement" per MacArthur's plan pending approval of its entirety? Collins asked. There was no suggestion whatsoever that the president was likely to disapprove MacArthur's plan.[3-52] [note]

MacArthur was not satisfied with this bureaucratic dallying. Cutting straight through to the core of the matter, he said that while the movement of one RCT to Pusan established the "basic principle" that American ground combat forces could be deployed in South Korea, it did not give him "sufficient latitude for efficient operations" or, in fact, satisfy his specific request to move an RCT into the battle area. "Time is of the essence," MacArthur prodded, "and a clear cut decision without delay is imperative."

Collins capitulated at once: "I will proceed immediately through Secretary of Army to request presidential approval your proposal to move RCT into forward combat area. We will advise you as soon as possible, perhaps within a half hour." [note]

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At1600 [30 June] General Church sent a radio message to Tokyo describing the worsening situation. Three hours later he decided to go to Osan (Osan-ni), twelve miles south of Suwŏn, where there was a commercial telephone relay station, and from there call Tokyo.

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New American decisions were necessary, and at about noon [Thursday, 29 June] Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requested President Truman to schedule another top-level meeting concerning Korea.

The National Security Council, plus most of the other officials who had attended the Blair House conferences, assembled at 1700 hours, 29 June [1700+1400=3100-2400=0700 6/30] , in the White House. Here Secretary Johnson presented a proposed directive designed to broaden and supplement General MacArthur's instructions. He explained that FEAF and NavFE were hampered by the restriction which confined their attacks to South Korea.
His directive accordingly authorized MacArthur to extend air operations into North Korea against airfields, tank farms, troop columns, and such other military targets as were essential to the purpose of clearing South Korea of hostile forces and preventing unnecessary friendly casualties. Air operations, however, were to stay well clear of the borders of Manchuria and Siberia. Johnson then explained that it was necessary for the United States to secure a firm foothold in Korea, both to assist the Republic and, if worse came to worse, to insure the evacuation of all American nationals. There-fore, his directive permitted MacArthur to send to Korea such Army combat and service troops as were required to insure the retention of the ports and airfields at Pusan and Chinhae. The decision to send American troops to the port areas of southern Korea did not authorize their use in active ground combat. President Truman stated flatly that he would want to consider carefully with his top advisors before authorizing the introduction of American combat troops into the battle area. President Truman approved the directive, subject only to the rewording of a last item which told MacArthur what to do in the event of overt Russian intervention. #124


The additional orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached Tokyo after daylight [0513] on 30 June, and FEAF viewed them as a step in the right direction. North of the 38th parallel the enemy had accumulated supplies, assembled troop units, and launched his invasion forces without any opposition. For three days these hostile concentrations had been wide open to air attack, but FEAF had not been authorized to punish the enemy in his own territory. Had the air offensive against targets in North Korea been permitted earlier, FEAF believed that a relatively small effort "could have afFECted profoundly the Communists' ability to proceed with the war, and may well have induced their leaders to reassess the whole business as a rotten enterprise.#125

On 30 June General MacArthur authorized Stratemeyer to extend his air operations into North Korea "against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns, and other purely military targets such as key bridges and highway or railway critical points." MacArthur enjoined Stratemeyer to exercise especial care to insure that air operations were kept "well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union.#126


The new directive from Washington broadened the horizons of air operations, but it did not give General MacArthur the authority to employ American Army troops in ground combat, an authority which he now desired [note]


The message bearing General MacArthur's estimates and recommendations was apparently written prior to his receipt of the new directive from the Joint Chiefs. At any rate, MacArthur's message reached the Pentagon at approximately 0300 hours, 30 June [0300+1400=1700 6/30] , Washington time. General Collins at once undertook to establish a teleconference with the Far East, and not many minutes elapsed before the consultation was in progress. General Collins explained that MacArthur's recommendations would require Mr. Truman's approval, and he added that the President would want to consider them carefully. Would not the new JCS directive serve MacArthur's purposes? MacArthur replied that the new directive did not give him sufficient latitude for effective ground operations. Already the Reds were breaking across the Han east of Sŏul, and they were repairing the Sŏul bridges as fast as FEAF's air opposition would permit.

Perhaps it was already too late to save the Suwŏn airhead. "Time is of the essence," said MacArthur, "and a clear-cut decision without delay is imperative." At this juncture General Collins stepped outside the telecon room and telephoned the problem to Army Secretary Frank Pace. Secretary Pace telephoned President Truman. When MacArthur's urgent message was repeated to him, Truman immediately authorized MacArthur to move one regimental combat team to the combat area. Within a few hours he promised to give a decision on the additional build-up to two divisions in Korea. Back in the Pentagon, the teleconference was still in progress, and before it ended General MacArthur received authority to dispatch the regimental combat team to Korea.#129

In the Far East General MacArthur lost no time directing the Eighth Army to begin to move Maj. Gen. William F Dean's 24th Infantry Division from Kyushu to Pusan by air and water. He ordered FEAF to prepare to airlift the headquarters and two rifle companies of the 24th Division into either Suwŏn or Pusan.#130 [note]


Several hours after this portentous directive had gone to the Far East Command, the Pentagon received at approximately 0300, 30 June, General MacArthur's report on his trip to Korea the previous day. This report described the great loss of personnel and equipment in the ROK forces, estimated their effective military strength at not more than 25,000 men, stated that everything possible was being done in Japan to establish and maintain a flow of supplies to the ROK Army through the Port of Pusan and Suwŏn Airfield, and that every effort was being made to establish a Han River line but the result was problematical. MacArthur concluded:
The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.


If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a U.S. regimental combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counteroffensive.[04-38]


General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, notified Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., of MacArthur's report and then established a teletype connection with MacArthur in Tokyo. In a teletype conversation MacArthur told Collins that the authority already given to use a regimental combat team at Pusan did not provide sufficient latitude for efficient operations in the prevailing situation and did not satisfy the basic requirements described in his report. MacArthur said, "Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision without delay is essential." Collins replied that he would proceed through the Secretary of the Army to request Presidential approval to send a regimental combat team into the forward combat area, and that he would advise him further, possibly within half an hour.[04-39] [note]

But time was rapidly running out for the Americans at Suwŏn. Late on the afternoon of 30 June ADCOM received reports that the South Korean defenses along the Han River were crumbling. The Reds had not been able to cross the Han bridges, but they had ferried tanks and troops across the river southeast of Sŏul.#120

A little after 1700 hours Colonel McGinn was summoned to the schoolhouse headquarters in Suwŏn. General Church was not present (he was at the relay station making a telephone call to Tokyo), but his second-in-command informed all present that ADCOM would have to evacuate. All cryptographic material was destroyed, and everyone moved out to Suwŏn Airfield, where they were joined at approximately 2140 hours by General Church and Mr. Muccio

[note]

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A little before five in the morning the Secretary of the Army telephoned the President to tell him what General MacArthur had reported. The President said to send the troops. [note]

0457 Washington Time

Collins immediately telephoned Secretary Pace and gave him a summary of Secretary Pace in turn telephoned the President at Blair House. President Truman, already up, took the call at 0457, 30 June. Pace informed the President of MacArthur's report and the teletype conversations just concluded. President Truman approved without hesitation sending one regiment to the combat zone and said he would give his decision within a few hours on sending two divisions. In less than half an hour after the conclusion of the MacArthur-Collins teletype conversations the President's decision to send one regiment to the combat zone was on its way to MacArthur.[04-40] [note]


The Army Chief of Staff, General Collins; quickly responded to MacArthur's request and called the Army Secretary, Frank Pace, requesting that he obtain approval of MacArthur's request from President Truman. Secretary Pace contacted President Truman at 4:57 A.M. on Friday June 30, 1950, and read MacArthur's cable to him.= Truman approved the request of MacArthur to send one regimental combat team to Korea, but delayed approving division sized forces until the matter could be looked into further. [note]

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At1600 [30 June] General Church sent a radio message to Tokyo describing the worsening situation. Three hours later [1900] he decided to go to Osan (Osan-ni), twelve miles south of Suwŏn, where there was a commercial telephone relay station, and from there call Tokyo. He reached Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, who told him that the Far East Command had received authority to use American ground troops, and that if the Suwŏn airstrip could be held the next day two battalions would be flown in to help the South Koreans. General Church agreed to try to hold the airstrip until noon the next day, 1 July. [05-22]

Back at Suwŏn, during General Church's absence, affairs at the ADCOM headquarters took a bad turn. A series of events were contributory. An American plane radioed a message, entirely erroneous, that a column of enemy was approaching Suwŏn from the east. Generals Chae and Chung returned from the Han River line with gloomy news. [note]

After stepping from the telecon room, Collins found a phone and called Frank Pace. He relayed the gist of MacArthur's request, added his own enthusiastic approval, and urged Pace to telephone the president immediately. It was now about 5:00 A.M. on June 30. The president was "up and shaved." In response he unhesitatingly approved the movement of one RCT to the combat zone but reserved decision on the larger commitment - the two full divisions - until he could confer with the Blair House group. Pace relayed all this to Collins, who, in turn, teleconned MacArthur: "Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further buildup."[3-53]

At no time during this long telecon did Collins or anyone else raise questions about the state of training in Eighth Army or the validity or feasibility of MacArthur's fantastical deployment plan. However, it is clear from several polite peripheral questions that Collins (or a stand-in) put to MacArthur that there was considerable unease over it. For example, Collins asked MacArthur if he intended to move the RCT by air, and if so, could he airlift the RCT's heavy equipment and artillery? If this question were read another way, the Pentagon was saying that for his plan to succeed, MacArthur had to move the RCT by air, and since it would be impossible to move the RCT's heavy equipment by air, the plan would fail.

Collins concluded his end of the telecon with a fawning and dissembling salute: "Everyone here delighted your prompt action in personally securing first hand view of situation. Congratulations and best wishes. We all have full confidence in you and your command." [note]

1930 Korean Time

Having thus committed American ground forces into the Korean War, Collins telephoned his JCS colleagues at about 5:30 A.M. to tell them what he had done. The official JCS historians recorded with masterful understatement that at least one of them, Forrest Sherman, "felt some unease." In fact, they all were shocked, not only because they had not been consulted but also because of the grave implication of the decision. Bradley, who had consistently opposed committing American ground forces to South Korea, later wrote in his autobiography that he had been "deeply concerned." Even so, not Bradley or Sherman or Vandenberg protested the decision formally, then or later. Sherman came to believe it was a "sound" decision; Bradley wrote that "in a sense, it was unavoidable and inevitable."[3-54] [note]

1945 Korean Time

Back at Suwŏn, during General Church's absence, affairs at the ADCOM headquarters took a bad turn. A series of events were contributory. An American plane radioed a message, entirely erroneous, that a column of enemy was approaching Suwŏn from the east. Generals Chae and Chung returned from the Han River line with gloomy news. About dusk [1954 sunset] ADCOM and KMAG officers at the Suwŏn command post saw a red flare go up on the railroad about 500 yards away. To one observer it looked like an ordinary railroad warning flare. However, some ADCOM officers queried excitedly, "What's that? What's that?" Another replied that the enemy were surrounding the town and said, "We had better get out of here." There was some discussion as to who should give the order. Colonel Wright and General Church were both absent from the command post. In a very short time people were running in and out of the building shouting and loading equipment. This commotion confused the Korean officers at the headquarters who did not understand what was happening. One of the ADCOM officers shouted that the group should assemble at Suwŏn Airfield and form a perimeter. Thereupon all the Americans drove pell-mell down the road toward the airfield, about three miles away.[05-23]

When this panic seized the ADCOM group, communications personnel began destroying their equipment with thermite grenades. In the resultant fire the schoolhouse command post burnt to the ground. At the airfield, the group started to establish a small defensive perimeter but before long they decided instead to go on south to Taejŏn. ADCOM officers ordered the antiaircraft detachment at the airfield to disable their equipment and join them. [note]

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Korean_War

Sunrise 0513 - 1954
Moonrise 2047 - 0458
Moon Phase 99% 15 days

1954 Sun Set

[note]

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It was late on the 30th, Tokyo time, that President Truman approved the commitment of American troops. [note]

Korean_War

On the evening of 30 June, Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, went to bed at 9 o'clock in his quarters at Camp Wood near Kumamoto, Kyushu, tired and sleepy after having been up all the previous night because of an alert. [note]

But time was rapidly running out for the Americans at Suwŏn. Late on the afternoon of 30 June ADCOM received reports that the South Korean defenses along the Han River were crumbling. The Reds had not been able to cross the Han bridges, but they had ferried tanks and troops across the river southeast of Sŏul.#120

A little after 1700 hours Colonel McGinn was summoned to the schoolhouse headquarters in Suwŏn. General Church was not present (he was at the relay station making a telephone call to Tokyo), but his second-in-command informed all present that ADCOM would have to evacuate. All cryptographic material was destroyed, and everyone moved out to Suwŏn Airfield,

where they were joined at approximately 2140 hours by General Church and Mr. Muccio [note]

2140 Korean Time

General Church was at first reluctant to leave Suwŏn, but after a discussion he directed that ADCOM would proceed southward by vehicle to Taejŏn, and there establish a new command post. Colonel McGinn then drove out onto the Suwŏn strip in one of the air-control jeeps and warned away two C-47's which were trying to land. He knew that he should burn the damaged aircraft parked alongside the strip, but by this time a large number of Koreans had gathered at the airfield's gate. In the dark, no one knew whether they were friendly or hostile. Either way, McGinn reasoned, the Koreans would likely resist if he tried to burn the damaged airplanes. If they were ROK's, they would assume that he was an enemy agent; if they were Reds, they would shoot to try to save the planes for capture. McGinn therefore left the damaged planes as they were and formed up as a part of the AD-COM convoy.

34 U.S. Air Force in Korea


As the American vehicles ran through Suwŏn's gate they met a desultory fire from among the crowd of Koreans, but no one was hurt. The antiaircraft artillery team served as rear guard for the column as it drove uneventfully southward through the rain to Taejŏn. Here all personnel assembled in KMAG's dependent housing area, dried their clothing, and made a head count. All Air Force people were present except one sergeant, and he hitch-hiked in the next day with the explanation that he had been asleep in a building at the airstrip and had waked the next morning to find everyone gone.#121

During the darkness, when the evacuation from Suwŏn was taking place, it had seemed that North Koreans were all around, but actually the enemy did not get to the airfield in any strength until 2 July. In this interim period [7/1] the OSI agent, Donald Nichols, went back to Suwŏn with a party of Koreans and destroyed the damaged planes left there.#122 [note]

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On the west coast, where Swenson had joined Mansfield on 30 June, the patrol of areas Yoke and Zebra continued without contact with the enemy. On the east coast, following conferences with southbound ROK naval personnel, Juneau returned to Mukho to expend a further 43 rounds of 5-inch VT against troop positions and a shore battery. Collett came up from Pusan, where she had embarked ROK interpreters, signalmen, and liaison officers for distribution throughout the force, and at 2200 Jamaica joined.

On the 1st, Alacrity and Black Swan arrived, and the day was spent in patrolling the coast and reorganizing the Support Group. DeHaven and Collett were detached to Sasebo to fuel and to escort troopships to Pusan; Alacrity was ordered into the Yellow Sea to relieve Mansfield in Area Yoke; Juneau, Jamaica, and Black Swan continued on east coast patrol.

[note]

About 2200, the column of ADCOM, KMAG, AAA, and Embassy vehicles assembled and was ready to start for Taejŏn. [05-24]

At this point, General Church returned from Osan and met the assembled convoy. He was furious when he learned what had happened, and ordered the entire group back to Suwŏn. Arriving at his former headquarters building General Church found it and much of the signal equipment there had been destroyed by fire. His first impulse was to hold Suwŏn Airfield but, on reflection, he doubted his ability to keep the field free of enemy fire to permit the landing of troops. So, finally, in a downpour of rain the little cavalcade drove south to Osan. [05-25]

General Church again telephoned General Almond in Tokyo to acquaint him with the events of the past few hours, and recommended that ADCOM and other American personnel withdraw to Taejŏn. Almond concurred. In this conversation Almond and Church agreed, now that Suwŏn Airfield had been abandoned, that the American troops to be airlifted to Korea during 1 July should come to Pusan instead. [05-26] In the monsoon downpour General Church and the American group then continued on to Taejŏn where ADCOM established its new command post the morning of 1 July.[note]

Collett came up from Pusan, where she had embarked ROK interpreters, signalmen, and liaison officers for distribution throughout the force, and at 2200 Jamaica joined. [note]

2205 Korean Time

Sebald notified State Department at 8:05 AM EST that he had talked with Muccio at 1710 his time about 5 hours earlier, regarding the deteriorating situation. He urged they do something before the situation got completely out of hand. [note]

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An hour and a half later his wife awakened him, saying, "Colonel Stephens is on the phone and wants you." At the telephone Smith heard Col. Richard W. Stephens, Commanding Officer, 21st Infantry, say to him, "The lid has blown off-get on your clothes and report to the CP." Thus began Task Force Smith as seen by its leader. [06-4] Colonel Smith had been at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor, causing him hurriedly to take D Company, 35th Infantry, to form a defense position on Barbers Point. Now, this call in the night vividly reminded him of that earlier event.

[note]

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Here was the full commitment, although its ultimate magnitude was as yet unforeseen. On the morning of Friday, 30 June [9am = 2300 K], after meeting with the Secretaries of State and of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leaders, President Truman made public the new decisions. General MacArthur was authorized to bomb north of the 38th parallel as governed by military necessity, a naval blockade of North Korea would be proclaimed, and "certain supporting ground units" would be committed to action. [note]

Around midnight,[6/30] General Almond notified the American Embassy at Taejŏn that bad flying weather had forced the diversion of the task force to Pusan, where it would land as soon as the weather improved; the first contingents of the main body of the 24th Division would land at Pusan by ship within twelve or fourteen hours.

[no one has left yet???? what diversion???? Check original text, p81 - this does not make any sense....]

General Almond emphasized that these men were not to be used as "Headquarters Guards" but to fight the North Koreans. He was assured that the railroads from Pusan to Taejŏn were operating and that there should be no problem in moving these troops to the line of battle. Almond instructed Church to concentrate railroad rolling stock near Pusan to keep it out of enemy hands and to have it ready for the 24th Division. [05-3] [note]

Korean_War

At the regimental command post, Colonel Stephens told Smith to take his battalion, less A and D Companies, to Itazuke Air Base; it was to fly to Korea at once. General Dean would meet him at the airfield with further instructions.
Colonel Stephens quickly arranged to lend Smith officers from the 3d Battalion to fill gaps in the rifle platoons of B and C Companies.


Casualties

Friday June 30, 1950 (Day 6)

Korean_War 23 Casualties



As of June 30, 1950

5 22ND TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
17 71ST SIGNAL BATTALION
1 8075TH THEATER HEADQUARTERS - RADIO RELAY
23 Casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 8 0 0 0 0 8
Today 5 18 0 0 0 23
Total 13 18 0 0 0 31

Aircraft Lost Today 003

North Korean Aircraft Lost Today 005

Notes for Friday June 30, 1950 - Day 6