Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 20.9°C 69.62°F at Taegu [note]

Rainy, windy weather [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Taegu)


Overview

The Senate passes a $1.2 billion military assistance bill, $200 million of which is earmarked for South Korea under emergency provisions of the bill. It is passed to the House for action.

U.S. President Truman signed a law extending the drafting of men into the military, days before the selective service program had been scheduled to expire. The bill, passed by Congress the day before, initially exempted veterans of World War II from being called up, and covered all men between the ages of 19 and 25, for up to twenty-one months of military service

[note]

June 30 - President Truman orders U.S. ground forces into Korea and authorizes the bombing of North Korea by the U.S. Air Force. U.S. troops notified of movement to South Korea. 

[note]

 

ACFAE

 

 

Korean_War

On 30 June, five days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Zhou Enlai decided to send a group of Chinese diplomats, most of whom were military intelligence personnel, to North Korea to establish better communications with Kim Il-sung as well as to collect first-hand materials on the fighting.[72]

[note]

 

ACR

Korean_War


Orbit missions and weather reconnaissance flights continued at Flight "D", Ashiya AB this date. Three (3) SB-17s were utilized this date for these missions logging a total of twenty-seven hours (27:00). There were four (4) false alerts as enumerated below.


At 0900/K the Flight was notified that an aircraft was down twenty five (25) miles west of Inch'ŏn 37° 30' N 126° 35' E. Due to the fact that this was north of the battle line FAF diverted Naval vessels to the search area and informed Rescue not to search in that area. (Just north if Inch'ŏn).


At 0935/K the flight received a call from ADCC that a "MAYDAY" was heard sixty (60) miles from Fukuoka on a heading of 340° degrees. A SB-17 dispatched to that area with negative results.


At 1000/K the Flight was notified of a pilot bailing out with no further location, but at 1020/K the information was received that the bailout was north of the battle line and no search search would be made.


At 1322/K Flight "D" was again alerted for a F-80 low on fuel returning to Ashiya AB from Korea. SB-17 dispatched to follow the flight line, but the F-80 landed safely at 1355/K at Itazuke Air Base.


At month's end it is gratifying to report no 3rd Rescue Squadron personnel injured or missing due to the Korean incident. One (1) bullet hole in a SB-17 has been the sole battle damage to aircraft.

[note]

 

 

AF

June 30: President Truman ordered the use of US ground troops in Korea and a naval blockade of North Korea.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 77 Squadron arrived in Korea to support 5th Air Force, to which it was subsequently attached.

North Korean forces reached Samch'ŏk on the east coast and in the west crossed the Han River, threatening Suwŏn airfield.

FEAF began evacuation of the airfield and authorized improvement of Kimhae airfield (K-9), 11 miles northwest of Pusan, to compensate for the presumed loss of Kimp'o and Suwŏn. K-Map

The first 5th Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) arrived at Suwŏn.

B-26s from the 3rd BG strafed, bombed, and rocketed enemy troops and traffic in the Sŏul area. One flight hit a stalled enemy column. Fifteen B-29s attacked railroad bridges, tanks, trucks, and troop concentrations on the north bank of the Han River in the Sŏul area.

[note]

 

KPA commences "Second (Suwŏn) Phase"

[note]

 

 

Shoot downs

Wurster USAF F-80C 1 x Yak-9 1

Thomas USAF F-80C 1 x Yak-9

[note]

 

Austtl

 

 

June 30
N.K. 3rd Division (N.K.-3) crosses Han River; N.K. drives down Peninsula
June 30
President Truman commits US troops to enforce UN demand

[note]

 

 

CIA

 

Korean_War

Korean Situation

176. The Soviet inspired invasion of South Korea and the prompt and vigorous US reaction have overnight changed the complexion of the cold war and will lead to the development of new and critical problems for the US in nearly every quarter of the globe.

[note]

 

Korean_War

177. Intelligence Memorandum 301, 30 June 1950,

Subject: Estimate of Soviet Intentions and
Capabilities for Military Aggression

 

[note]   [note]

 

 

CmdCtl

 

On 30 June, the 24th Division was ordered to fly its division headquarters and two battalions to Pusan; because of airlift constraints, only 450 men were actually flown in, on 2 July.

[note]

 

 

KMAG

Before the first U.S. ground troops reached Korea, the Americans pulled out of Suwŏn. While General Church and Colonel Wright were out of town on other missions, misleading reports of an approaching enemy column posed the possibility of an attack on the night of 30 June. What later turned out to be a false alarm caused the U.S. staff to pack up hurriedly and travel through eighty miles of driving rain to Taejon. This time it was the Americans who left the ROK Army headquarters behind and decamped hastily.

By the end of June, the North Koreans were in possession of all territory north of the Han River and had shattered most of the ROK forces. Almost half of the Army—44,000 out of 98,000—had been killed or captured or were missing, and only two divisions, the 6th and 8th, had been able to retreat with their equipment and weapons intact. Many of the 54,000 troops that remained had lost or discarded even their personal weapons and equipment.[46] To help collect stragglers and reorganize the disrupted units as they moved southward, Colonel Wright sent advisors to key points along the main routes of retreat. He sent other members of his staff north on patrol duty to collect accurate information on the whereabouts of the North Korean forces.[47]

[note]

 

 

Kp

 


"NKPA (North Korean People's Army) GAINS, 30 JUNE - 1 AUGUST 1950"


Map copied from "The Inch'ŏn-Sŏul Operation", Volume II of "U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-53", page 29.

Korean_War

 

[note]

 

MiGs

 

President Truman ordered US ground forces to Korea. He authorized the US Air Force to bomb North Korea.

[note]

N.K. 3rd Division (N.K.-3) crosses Han River; N.K. drives down Peninsula

[note]

 

Reminisces

 

 

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South then North

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U.S. Air Force

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Peace Time table of Organization Chart

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In the early morning hours of 30 June these operations orders had to be changed. Shortly after midnight General Church established secure communications into Tokyo, and he was insistent that the B-29's ought to attack the Han bridges and the enemy troops massing on the north bank of that river. The question now was whether or not, and how soon, the 19th Bombardment Group could change its force preparations from those made to attack the airfield at Wŏnsan to those required to hit troops and bridges at Sŏul. The air echelon of the 19th Group had just completed a 1,200-mile change of station, and it had been able to bring to Kadena only a few maintenance and service personnel.#112 The B-29's were already loaded with 260-pound fragmentation bombs; to unload and reload the bombers with other ordnance would take a minimum of six hours.#113 The frags would be useless against bridges, but they would serve antipersonnel purposes. FEAF therefore directed the Twentieth Air Force to scratch the Wŏnsan strike and to attack troop concentrations and landing craft along the north bank of the Han River east and west of Sŏul.#114


As a result of the change in operations orders, nearly all of FEAF's air effort on 30 June was again employed against targets of opportunity north of the Han River. At intervals during the morning 15 B-29's strewed frag bombs on enemy troops along the river. The results of these attacks remained "unknown" to FEAF, but one of General Church's officers told him that the strikes "were too distant from the river to be effective. #115

The 3rd Bombardment Group sent 18 B-26 sorties to strafe, bomb, and rocket enemy traffic and troops in and around Sŏul. One flight from the 13th Squadron, checking the status of the Sŏul railway bridges early in the morning, discovered North Korean tanks, trucks, and other vehicles jammed up bumper to bumper, waiting to cross the center rail bridge. These vehicles could not go forward because the Reds had not finished the wooden decking and they were parked too close together to escape rearward. The B-26 flight swept in, wing to wing, using all of their offensive weapons in one murderous pass. All of the crews agreed that this strike must have hurt the Reds badly.#116


First Six Days 33


The Shooting Star jet fighters from Itazuke continued to exploit the combined air-patrol and ground-attack tactics which they had devised and used the day before. Few enemy aircraft made an appearance, but Lt. Charles A. Wurster and Lt. John B. Thomas of the 36th Squadron bounced two Yak-9's and each destroyed one of the hostile planes. The strafing passes, flown by the F-80's after they completed their air patrols, usually ac-counted for several trucks or similar moving targets, and the speedy jets got in and away before the enemy hardly knew it. One unlucky pilot, however, flew through an electrical power line which left him just enough wing to get back to Suwŏn and bail out.#117

From his station at Suwŏn Airfield Colonel McGinn continued to manage air strikes in support of the South Koreans. Early in the morning a courier aircraft brought him gridded maps of Korea which had been printed in response to a request he had made two days earlier. The crews leaving Itazuke and Ashiya also carried these maps, and when McGinn had a supporting target he could call it out in grid coordinates. The maps were small scale, making it difficult to pinpoint the target, but the grid procedure was better than passing targets over the radio in the clear. Working as he was, almost single-handed, Colonel McGinn could not provide many close-support targets. During the day only 25 such sorties were flown in support of the ROK's.#118

Perceiving that McGinn needed assistance, FEAF directed the Fifth Air Force to establish in Korea, probably at Suwŏn, a tactical air-direction center, which could control tactical air operations in the forward areas. #119

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11:00 AM 6/29 Washington Time

Reports coming into the Pentagon from the Far East during the morning of 29 June described the situation in Korea as so bad that Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson telephoned President Truman before noon. In a meeting late that afternoon the President approved a new directive greatly broadening the authority of the Far East Commander in meeting the Korean crisis.

[note]

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New American decisions were necessary, and at about noon [Thursday, 29 June] [2 am 30th] Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requested President Truman to schedule another top-level meeting concerning Korea. [note]

0210 Korean Time

In a telecon discussion in the first hours of Friday morning General MacArthur stated that the line could not be held without American help, and recommended the immediate movement of one regimental combat team to the Korean front as nucleus for a possible buildup to two divisions for early offensive action. This in time would prove a notable underestimate of the required force, but the view that the invaders would cease and desist, once confronted by U.S. Army contingents, was shared in Washington. In any event the highest authority on the spot, the man who would be responsible for conducting the campaign, had spoken. The decision could not be deferred.

[note]

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MacArthur's personal appeal, in fact, received even wider recognition on 30 June when he was told,

"Restriction on use of Army Forces ... are hereby removed and authority granted to utilize Army Forces available to you." [04-59]

[note]

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President Truman's decision to send American ground troops against the North Koreans had come in time, but barely. Regardless of American air strikes against their cities, communication lines, and troop columns, and despite naval surface attack against their coastal installations and shipping, the invaders drove the ROK Army down the peninsula. As the vague line of battle receded southward in late June and early July it became clear that the Republic of Korea could not stand by itself.

Armed with Presidential authority, MacArthur sent ground troops into the fight as fast as he could move them. On 30 June, he ordered the 24th Division from Japan to Korea, retaining the unit, for the time being, under his personal control. On the recommendation of his chief of staff, General Almond, he ordered a small task force from the division flown into Korea ahead of the main body to engage the North Korean Army as quickly as possible, sacrificing security for speed. Because it would go by air, he restricted its size to two rifle companies, some antitank teams, and a battery of light artillery. This makeshift unit was to report to General Church at Suwŏn by 1 July; but, realizing that Suwŏn might fall at any time, General MacArthur authorized Church to divert the force to Pusan if necessary. [05-1]

General Church meanwhile struggled to keep the ROK Army in the fight. He had no real authority over the South Koreans, but his status as MacArthur's personal representative gave weight to his advice to the ROK Chief of Staff. In effect, Church took charge of the faltering South Korean Army. Many KMAG officers stayed with ROK combat units, patrolling, feeding information to General Church, and doing whatever they could to stiffen ROK resistance and morale. [05-2] [note]

0513 Sun Rise

[note]

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Korean_War

Note: President Truman's two hundred and twentyninth news conference was held in the Indian Treaty Room (Room 474) in the Executive Office Building at 4 p.m. on Thursday, June 29, 1950.

THE PRESIDENT.

[I.] I have an announcement to make.
We have appointed an economic survey mission to go to the Philippines as soon as it can make the arrangements.
It is headed by the Honorable Daniel W. Bell, president of the American Security and trust Co. of Washington and former Under Secretary of the treasury; and by Gen. Richard J. Marshall, president of the Virginia Military Institute.


And as soon as the appointment of the mission is completed, why they will leave for the Philippines as promptly as possible.


This mission was appointed at the request of the Philippine President. He made that request of me when he was here on his visit.


And we have had some difficulty in finding the people to head the mission, and in ironing out some differences between the various departments of the Government. Everything has been ironed out now, and that mission will go to work.


That’s all the announcements I have to make.

(this was followed by about 26 questions and answers)

[note]

USS Cabezon (SS-334) made a fast turnaround at Hong Kong and joined with the others on the 28th off the northern tip of Luzon. Revised orders from Commander Seventh Fleet changed their destination also from Sasebo to Okinawa, and there they arrived on 30 June, to be joined next day [July 1] by the submarine rescue vessel USS Greenlet (ASR-10) from Guam.

At Buckner Bay new orders were received, and on the 3rd Greenlet and her three charges sailed in company for Yokosuka. [note]

At 0630 in the morning of 30 June Task Force 77 reached Okinawa and dropped anchor in Nakagusuku Wan, now known as Buckner Bay in honor of the commanding general of the Tenth Army, killed in June 1945 in the moment of victory. At this base, strategically located between Korea and Formosa, the fleet did have the protection of distance, but there were no antisubmarine defenses other than those provided by the force's own destroyers, and no stocks of ammunition.

[note]

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That same afternoon, June 29, at 5:00 P.M., the Blair House conferees met again. By then the news from South Korea was grim. The ROKs were fleeing in disarray; John Church would almost certainly have to abandon Suwŏn soon. In order to maintain a "foothold" in South Korea in the Pusan area, the JCS recommended unlimited air and naval attacks against North Korea - north of the 38th Parallel - and the defensive deployment of one American RCT and certain communications and service troops in the Pusan-Chinhae area, to protect the airfield and ports.[3-45] [note]

On 29 June General MacArthur flew to Suwŏn, held conferences with Muccio and President Rhee, and then drove up the Sŏul road to the vicinity of the Han. He found that the Korean army and coastal forces were in confusion, had not seriously fought, and lacked leadership. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintaining interior order, the Korean army had been unprepared for attack by armor and air. South Korean military strength, now estimated at not more than 25,000 effective's, was scarcely enough to defeat the North Korean force, but every effort was being made to hold a line at the Han River, the natural defense barrier essential to the protection of the only airhead remaining in central Korea, Suwŏn. Back in Tokyo, however, FEC staff members had started considering another east-west defense line north of Taegu in the event that the North Koreans penetrated ROK defenses along the Han.

Korean_War Korean_War

Late in the afternoon of 29 June, Washington time, President Truman decided upon more positive action in Korea, and the JCS authorized MacArthur to extend his air operations into North Korea against airfields, tank farms, troop columns, and other targets judged essential in the clearing of North Korean forces from the area south of 38°. These air operations, however, were to keep well clear of Manchurian and USSR borders, and if forces actively opposed such attacks the U.S. planes should defend themselves without taking aggressive action until Washington could be advised. MacArthur was also authorized to use Army combat and service forces needed to insure the retention of the port and air base in the Pusan-Chinhae area on the southeastern coast of Korea. The JCS noted that this decision was made with full realization of risks, and they cautioned that it did not constitute a decision to engage in a war with the USSR if the latter's forces actively intervened in Korea.

[note]

Congressional action on 30 June 1950 gave the President the authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and units of the National Guard of the United States into active federal service for a period of twenty-one months. [07-18] [note]

Another factor bearing on the problem was that an important provision of Public Law 80-810, 80th Congress 1948, was in the process of being implemented as of 30 June 1950. This provision required those members of the Volunteer Reserve who had not been sufficiently active to earn the specified minimum number of retirement credit points under the above law would be involuntarily transferred to the Inactive Reserve. The screening of the Volunteer Reserve to determine who should thus be transferred had just begun when the Korean War broke out. It was known, however, that a large number of officers in the Volunteer Reserve would be affected.

When the first order went out for the involuntary recall of individual Reserve officers, no real distinction could be made between the Inactive and Volunteer Reserve since there were so many in the Volunteer Reserve who had been as inactive as those assigned to the Inactive Reserve. The first recall program, authorized by the Extension Act of 1950 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, consequently specified that officers be recalled from either the Volunteer Reserve or the Inactive Reserve without establishing a priority or any other distinction between the two categories.

The Army met numerous problems in recalling Reservists. It had no clear picture of the actual number who would be available for duty. It knew, for example, that on 30 June 1950 it had 416,402 in the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves and 184,015 in the organized units of the Reserve. It did not know, however, how many of these were physically qualified for duty. The required periodic physical examinations for Reservists had been suspended in February 1947. Many more Reservists had to be called for physical examination than the number needed because of the large numbers found physically disqualified. Considerable administrative overhead and delay hindered selections. Further, many Reservists had undergone changes in economic status after entering the ORC which made active duty an undue hardship. The result was authorization of large numbers of justifiable delays which caused further difficulty in filling quotas. Records on Reserve officers were inadequate, and virtually did not exist for enlisted men.

Page 122

Finally, the recall of Inactive and Volunteer Reservists engendered much ill-will from the public, the press, and the Congress.

[note]

Congressional action on 30 June 1950 gave the President the authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and units of the National Guard of the United States into active federal service for a period of twenty-one months. [07-18] [note]

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On 30 June, as a movement of ground forces into Korea appeared increasingly probable, all ships of the Amphibious Group were placed on four-hour notice for getting underway. No reports of enemy mining had as yet come in, although in time there would be plenty, but there was no lack of tasks for the small ships of Minron 3. The eight AMS were at once deployed on picket duty, harbor defense, and convoy escort. In this they were joined by USS Pledge (AM-277), the only operational AM, while at Yokosuka the work of activating the other ships of Mindiv 32 was at once begun. [note]


Early in the morning of the 30th Admiral Joy assumed operational control of Andrewes' forces, and in the evening modified Operation Order 5-50 to include the Commonwealth units for Korean operations only, thus exempting them from the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores, which remained a purely American affair.


With these augmented but by no means extravagant forces Admiral Joy confronted his tasks. He was required to evacuate American citizens, support the Republic of Korea, blockade the North Korean coastline, and at the same time to remain prepared for the unpredictable in connection with Formosa, the protection of his flanks, and a possible expansion of the conflict. And as his responsibilities and his forces grew, further difficulty was presented by the inadequacy of his staff and of those of subordinate commands.

The total strength, officer and enlisted, of the NavFE staff at the end of June was 188; by November it would have reached 1,227. But in the first weeks, before reinforcements arrived, the job had to be done with what was on hand. Rarely in the history of 20th century warfare can so many have been commanded by so few.


It was not done without effort. The Plans Section went to heel and toe watches, 12 hours on and 12 off. The Operations Officer moved in a cot and did such sleeping as he could in his office; his people found themselves working a 12-hour day, with an additional four-hour night watch four days out of five.

For Communications the situation became a nightmare as high-precedence traffic skyrocketed; in the first days the load of encrypted messages went up by a factor of 15, and was further complicated by great quantities of interservice and United States-British dispatches. Somehow they made do

Even as anguished requests were sent off to Washington for more personnel, the round the clock efforts of those on the spot were accomplishing the reorganization and redeployment of available naval strength. To Naval Forces Japan had now been added the Seventh Fleet and British Commonwealth units; with these accessions Admiral Joy had gained all that would be available until reinforcements could come from afar. This strength was organized in three principal groups: Naval Forces Japan, the Seventh Fleet, and the Amphibious Force.



table 5.-NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, 25 JUNE-20 JULY 1950
(NavFE OpOrds 5-50 (revised), 8-50)

rOf these, Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force Far East, Task Force 90, had been moved forward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, where it was awaiting instructions.

Under the direct control of ComNavFE, Task Force 96, Naval Forces Japan, was engaged in various tasks.

The long range aircraft of VP 47 had been organized as the Search and Reconnaissance Group, Task Group 96.2, under Captain John C. AIderman, Chief of Staff to Commander Fleet Air Guam, who had been on leave in Japan at the onset of hostilities and found himself shanghaied for this purpose.

In Korean waters the Support Group, Task Group 96.5, originally consisting of Juneau and Destroyer Division 91, had been reinforced by HMS Jamaica (C-44), HMAS Shoalhaven (K535), and HMS Black Swan (U-57), and HMS Alacrity (U-60) was about to join up.

Although Admiral Andrewes' ships had received the designation of Task Group 96.8, these for the moment were divided between the Support Group and the Seventh Fleet Striking Force, which had reached Okinawa on 30 June.

[note]

0945 Korean Time

While the Blair House conferees slept that night, June 29, MacArthur arose early on the morning of June 30, Tokyo time, and went to the Dai Ichi Building. There he polished his report on his visit to South Korea and cabled it to the Pentagon, addressed to the JCS via the Department of the Army, the executive agency and communications channel for all Korean War matters. [note]

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1045 Korean Time

President Truman receives Congressional authorization to order into active service any or all reserve components of Armed Forces for a period of 21 months. [note]

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1145 Korean Time

While MacArthur stood by the teletype, permission was given him to move one RCT to the combat area, and shortly before noon, Washington time, the JCS signaled that his proposition for moving two divisions into Korea was approved, subject only to requirements he judged necessary for the safety of Japan. In Korea, however, the Communist attack was not to be retarded at the Han barrier, which they had actually penetrated when they captured Kimp'o several days before.

On 30 June the North Koreans forced numerous crossings, and on the night of 30 June / l July they began attacking Suwŏn, whose airfield FEAF had hoped to make an airhead for supplies and an advanced base in central Korea. MacArthur therefore lost no time in issuing directives for the expanding war. On 30 June he ordered the 24th Infantry Division to Pusan, whence it was to proceed northward and engage the enemy. That same day he authorized FEAF to extend its operations into North Korea, keeping well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and Siberia. [note]

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In ground action the situation deteriorated. At noon, 30 June, American observers at the Han River sent word to General Church that the ROK river line was disintegrating. About this time, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon of the South Korean Army arrived from Tokyo to replace General Chae as ROK Army Chief of Staff. [note]

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1345 Korean Time


While the Blair House conferees slept that night, June 29, MacArthur arose early on the morning of June 30, Tokyo time, and went to the Dai Ichi Building. There he polished his report on his visit to South Korea and cabled it to the Pentagon, addressed to the JCS via the Department of the Army, the executive agency and communications channel for all Korean War matters. The report arrived at the Pentagon shortly before midnight, June 29 [2 pm 30th]. Alerted by a duty officer, Joe Collins got out of bed and went to the Pentagon to read it.[3-49] [note]

Shortly after midnight the report from the Supreme Commander came in. 6/29? [note]

I have today inspected the South Korea battle area from Suwŏn to the HAN River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission. . . . Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order [04-the Korean Army was] unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as that embodied in the North Korean Army.

The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made not executed for the destruction of supplies or materiel in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost or abandoned their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no means of intercommunication. In most cases, the individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance of example of leadership of high quality.

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according to their scale of living. They have retained a high degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Sŏul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.

South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effective's. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well-trained, well- directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at Suwŏn and the southern port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, but is subject to constant air- attack. Since air-cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean air, operating from near-by bases, has been savage in its attacks in Suwŏn area.

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwŏn-Sŏul corridor is essential to the retention of the only airhead in central Korea.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the 105t ground, is through the introduction of US Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the Forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United States Regimental Combat Team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two-division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive. Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy- Air team in this shattered area, our mission will be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it might even be doomed to failure. [04-55]

This message reached Washington an hour before midnight on 29 June. Because of its urgent tone and extremely pessimistic outlook, General Collins consulted with General MacArthur in a teleconference four hours later (3am 6/30 WDC) . He informed the Far East Commander that one RCT could be moved to Pusan to guard that port. MacArthur protested that this hardly satisfied the basic requirements. He urged speed in securing permission to place American forces in the battle area.

Lacking the authority to grant this request, Collins told MacArthur he would try to gain Presidential approval. Collins called Secretary of the Army Pace, who called the White House. The President immediately approved dispatching one RCT to the battle area. In less than an hour (4am WDC), word was flashed to Tokyo, "Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further build-up." [04-56]

Throughout this period of intensive search for decisions, culminating finally in the decision to meet the aggressor in ground combat, the President of the United States had been the ultimate arbiter of each step. President Truman had solicited the advice of those best qualified to judge the military effects and requirements of each move taken. General Collins briefed him daily, passing on the views of the Joint Chiefs. But the President made the final choice himself.

Earlier the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not favored the use of American ground forces in Korea, [04-57] primarily because they knew how unprepared they were for large-scale combat. They were reluctant also to weaken the small General Reserve in the United States, which represented the minimum essential for defense. Deploying any part of the Reserve to the Far East would be a risky, perhaps disastrous, undertaking because of possible Soviet involvement following American action. [04-58]

General MacArthur quite clearly had tipped the balance in favor of troop commitment. The risks had not changed or lessened, but the nation's leaders became convinced that communist seizure of Korea could not be tolerated.

[note]

The report arrived at the Pentagon shortly before midnight, [3-2345] June 29. Alerted by a duty officer, Joe Collins got out of bed and went to the Pentagon to read it.[3-49]

MacArthur began by describing his visit to Suwŏn and the Han River battlefront, painting a lugubrious picture. He went on to excoriate the ROK Army. It was "in confusion" and "had not seriously fought" and "lacked leadership" and had "absolutely no system of communications." It now numbered no more than "25,000 effective's" and was "entirely incapable of counter action." Every effort had been made to establish a defense of the "Han River line" and the Sŏul–Suwŏn "corridor," but "the result is highly problematical." If the NKPA advance continued further, it would "seriously threaten the fall of the Republic!"[3-50]

His conclusion was galvanizing:

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Army and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive. . . . Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it might even be doomed to failure.

Included in this report was a sketchy (one sentence) outline for deploying and utilizing the American ground forces. As a first step MacArthur would "immediately move" one American RCT into the Han River line or the Sŏul–Suwŏn corridor. While this force blocked the southerly advance of the NKPA, MacArthur would rush "a possible" two full American infantry divisions to South Korea. These would then be deployed for an "early counter offensive," presumably designed to destroy the NKPA or at least to push it back beyond the 38th Parallel.

This historic plan, ringing with boldness, deserves closer scrutiny than it has hitherto received. The crux of the plan - deployment of an RCT in the Sŏul–Suwŏn Corridor in time to dig in and block the NKPA - was simply preposterous. The NKPA was already crossing the Han River and driving south on Suwŏn, scattering the remnants of the ROK Army before it. There was no RCT in Japan in a sufficient state of readiness to "rush" to South Korea. An RCT would have to be improvised. Since there was insufficient airlift in Japan to bring over the heavy equipment of an RCT, most of it would have to go by sea. All this would take time - far too much time to do the job MacArthur had in mind. [note]

MacArthur's glib assurance of an "early offensive" by two full American divisions was no less preposterous. All the problems faced in getting a single RCT to South Korea would be multiplied enormously by moving two full divisions. Moreover, the two green divisions would land in South Korea in the teeth of an onrushing hostile army flush with victory. Even if they survived, it would take weeks or months to regroup and launch a "counter offensive."

This fantastical MacArthur plan bore an eerie likeness to another fantastical plan he had conceived ten years before for the defense of the Philippines from a Japanese attack. Like the South Korean plan, the earlier plan had drastically underrated the enemy and overrated his own forces. There were also certain tactical similarities, such as an early and aggressive confrontation with an advancing enemy without a scheme for defense in depth. The Philippine plan had failed under the weight of overwhelming Japanese superiority, forcing MacArthur into his famous perimeter defense in Bataan and Corregidor. Events in South Korea were to follow a remarkably similar course.

As Joe Collins pondered MacArthur's report, he was well aware of its profound implications: that notwithstanding all previous decisions to avoid an American war against Asians on the Asian mainland at all costs, MacArthur was urging just that and proposing to do it with troops that were not sufficiently trained or equipped for combat. Yet Collins raised no objections. On the contrary, he enthusiastically embraced this proposal which went far beyond the JCS decision of that day to limit the American ground forces to a defensive role near Pusan.

Seldom in American history had there been an occasion fraught with greater peril or demanding more thoughtful analysis. A more prudent man than Collins might have felt compelled to summon the full JCS to the Pentagon for one last discussion on so momentous a matter. But not "Lightning Joe," the man noted for speed and snap judgments in tight corners. He decided to take matters into his own hands, and in the dark of that night he embarked on a course that was to hasten America into full-scale war in Korea.

Collins had a well developed sense of history and public relations, honed by a postwar tour as the Army's chief publicist. Fully conscious of the historic nature of the moment, he decided to confer person to person with MacArthur by telecon. As he and his advisers gathered in a darkened room before the movie screen, Collins wrote later, "the air was fraught with tension."[3-51]

From the outset Collins let MacArthur know that he was in his corner. He dutifully stated the obvious - no doubt for the record - that MacArthur's request to introduce American ground forces into combat in South Korea would require "presidential approval." This would take "several hours," Collins said, because Truman would want to confer carefully with his top advisers. But more to the point, Collins reminded MacArthur that he, MacArthur, already had authorization to move one RCT to the Pusan area. Would that authorization not permit "initiation of movement" per MacArthur's plan pending approval of its entirety? Collins asked. There was no suggestion whatsoever that the president was likely to disapprove MacArthur's plan.[3-52] [note]

MacArthur was not satisfied with this bureaucratic dallying. Cutting straight through to the core of the matter, he said that while the movement of one RCT to Pusan established the "basic principle" that American ground combat forces could be deployed in South Korea, it did not give him "sufficient latitude for efficient operations" or, in fact, satisfy his specific request to move an RCT into the battle area. "Time is of the essence," MacArthur prodded, "and a clear cut decision without delay is imperative."

Collins capitulated at once: "I will proceed immediately through Secretary of Army to request presidential approval your proposal to move RCT into forward combat area. We will advise you as soon as possible, perhaps within a half hour." [note]

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At1600 [30 June] General Church sent a radio message to Tokyo describing the worsening situation. Three hours later he decided to go to Osan (Osan-ni), twelve miles south of Suwŏn, where there was a commercial telephone relay station, and from there call Tokyo.

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New American decisions were necessary, and at about noon [Thursday, 29 June] Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requested President Truman to schedule another top-level meeting concerning Korea.

The National Security Council, plus most of the other officials who had attended the Blair House conferences, assembled at 1700 hours, 29 June [1700+1400=3100-2400=0700 6/30] , in the White House. Here Secretary Johnson presented a proposed directive designed to broaden and supplement General MacArthur's instructions. He explained that FEAF and NavFE were hampered by the restriction which confined their attacks to South Korea.
His directive accordingly authorized MacArthur to extend air operations into North Korea against airfields, tank farms, troop columns, and such other military targets as were essential to the purpose of clearing South Korea of hostile forces and preventing unnecessary friendly casualties. Air operations, however, were to stay well clear of the borders of Manchuria and Siberia. Johnson then explained that it was necessary for the United States to secure a firm foothold in Korea, both to assist the Republic and, if worse came to worse, to insure the evacuation of all American nationals. There-fore, his directive permitted MacArthur to send to Korea such Army combat and service troops as were required to insure the retention of the ports and airfields at Pusan and Chinhae. The decision to send American troops to the port areas of southern Korea did not authorize their use in active ground combat. President Truman stated flatly that he would want to consider carefully with his top advisors before authorizing the introduction of American combat troops into the battle area. President Truman approved the directive, subject only to the rewording of a last item which told MacArthur what to do in the event of overt Russian intervention. #124


The additional orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached Tokyo after daylight [0513] on 30 June, and FEAF viewed them as a step in the right direction. North of the 38th parallel the enemy had accumulated supplies, assembled troop units, and launched his invasion forces without any opposition. For three days these hostile concentrations had been wide open to air attack, but FEAF had not been authorized to punish the enemy in his own territory. Had the air offensive against targets in North Korea been permitted earlier, FEAF believed that a relatively small effort "could have afFECted profoundly the Communists' ability to proceed with the war, and may well have induced their leaders to reassess the whole business as a rotten enterprise.#125

On 30 June General MacArthur authorized Stratemeyer to extend his air operations into North Korea "against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns, and other purely military targets such as key bridges and highway or railway critical points." MacArthur enjoined Stratemeyer to exercise especial care to insure that air operations were kept "well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union.#126


The new directive from Washington broadened the horizons of air operations, but it did not give General MacArthur the authority to employ American Army troops in ground combat, an authority which he now desired [note]


The message bearing General MacArthur's estimates and recommendations was apparently written prior to his receipt of the new directive from the Joint Chiefs. At any rate, MacArthur's message reached the Pentagon at approximately 0300 hours, 30 June [0300+1400=1700 6/30] , Washington time. General Collins at once undertook to establish a teleconference with the Far East, and not many minutes elapsed before the consultation was in progress. General Collins explained that MacArthur's recommendations would require Mr. Truman's approval, and he added that the President would want to consider them carefully. Would not the new JCS directive serve MacArthur's purposes? MacArthur replied that the new directive did not give him sufficient latitude for effective ground operations. Already the Reds were breaking across the Han east of Sŏul, and they were repairing the Sŏul bridges as fast as FEAF's air opposition would permit.

Perhaps it was already too late to save the Suwŏn airhead. "Time is of the essence," said MacArthur, "and a clear-cut decision without delay is imperative." At this juncture General Collins stepped outside the telecon room and telephoned the problem to Army Secretary Frank Pace. Secretary Pace telephoned President Truman. When MacArthur's urgent message was repeated to him, Truman immediately authorized MacArthur to move one regimental combat team to the combat area. Within a few hours he promised to give a decision on the additional build-up to two divisions in Korea. Back in the Pentagon, the teleconference was still in progress, and before it ended General MacArthur received authority to dispatch the regimental combat team to Korea.#129

In the Far East General MacArthur lost no time directing the Eighth Army to begin to move Maj. Gen. William F Dean's 24th Infantry Division from Kyushu to Pusan by air and water. He ordered FEAF to prepare to airlift the headquarters and two rifle companies of the 24th Division into either Suwŏn or Pusan.#130 [note]


Several hours after this portentous directive had gone to the Far East Command, the Pentagon received at approximately 0300, 30 June, General MacArthur's report on his trip to Korea the previous day. This report described the great loss of personnel and equipment in the ROK forces, estimated their effective military strength at not more than 25,000 men, stated that everything possible was being done in Japan to establish and maintain a flow of supplies to the ROK Army through the Port of Pusan and Suwŏn Airfield, and that every effort was being made to establish a Han River line but the result was problematical. MacArthur concluded:
The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.


If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a U.S. regimental combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counteroffensive.[04-38]


General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, notified Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., of MacArthur's report and then established a teletype connection with MacArthur in Tokyo. In a teletype conversation MacArthur told Collins that the authority already given to use a regimental combat team at Pusan did not provide sufficient latitude for efficient operations in the prevailing situation and did not satisfy the basic requirements described in his report. MacArthur said, "Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision without delay is essential." Collins replied that he would proceed through the Secretary of the Army to request Presidential approval to send a regimental combat team into the forward combat area, and that he would advise him further, possibly within half an hour.[04-39] [note]

But time was rapidly running out for the Americans at Suwŏn. Late on the afternoon of 30 June ADCOM received reports that the South Korean defenses along the Han River were crumbling. The Reds had not been able to cross the Han bridges, but they had ferried tanks and troops across the river southeast of Sŏul.#120

A little after 1700 hours Colonel McGinn was summoned to the schoolhouse headquarters in Suwŏn. General Church was not present (he was at the relay station making a telephone call to Tokyo), but his second-in-command informed all present that ADCOM would have to evacuate. All cryptographic material was destroyed, and everyone moved out to Suwŏn Airfield, where they were joined at approximately 2140 hours by General Church and Mr. Muccio

[note]

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A little before five in the morning the Secretary of the Army telephoned the President to tell him what General MacArthur had reported. The President said to send the troops. [note]

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Collins immediately telephoned Secretary Pace and gave him a summary of Secretary Pace in turn telephoned the President at Blair House. President Truman, already up, took the call at 0457, 30 June. Pace informed the President of MacArthur's report and the teletype conversations just concluded. President Truman approved without hesitation sending one regiment to the combat zone and said he would give his decision within a few hours on sending two divisions. In less than half an hour after the conclusion of the MacArthur-Collins teletype conversations the President's decision to send one regiment to the combat zone was on its way to MacArthur.[04-40] [note]


The Army Chief of Staff, General Collins; quickly responded to MacArthur's request and called the Army Secretary, Frank Pace, requesting that he obtain approval of MacArthur's request from President Truman. Secretary Pace contacted President Truman at 4:57 A.M. on Friday June 30, 1950, and read MacArthur's cable to him.= Truman approved the request of MacArthur to send one regimental combat team to Korea, but delayed approving division sized forces until the matter could be looked into further. [note]

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At1600 [30 June] General Church sent a radio message to Tokyo describing the worsening situation. Three hours later [1900] he decided to go to Osan (Osan-ni), twelve miles south of Suwŏn, where there was a commercial telephone relay station, and from there call Tokyo. He reached Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, who told him that the Far East Command had received authority to use American ground troops, and that if the Suwŏn airstrip could be held the next day two battalions would be flown in to help the South Koreans. General Church agreed to try to hold the airstrip until noon the next day, 1 July. [05-22]

Back at Suwŏn, during General Church's absence, affairs at the ADCOM headquarters took a bad turn. A series of events were contributory. An American plane radioed a message, entirely erroneous, that a column of enemy was approaching Suwŏn from the east. Generals Chae and Chung returned from the Han River line with gloomy news. [note]

After stepping from the telecon room, Collins found a phone and called Frank Pace. He relayed the gist of MacArthur's request, added his own enthusiastic approval, and urged Pace to telephone the president immediately. It was now about 5:00 A.M. on June 30. The president was "up and shaved." In response he unhesitatingly approved the movement of one RCT to the combat zone but reserved decision on the larger commitment - the two full divisions - until he could confer with the Blair House group. Pace relayed all this to Collins, who, in turn, teleconned MacArthur: "Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further buildup."[3-53]

At no time during this long telecon did Collins or anyone else raise questions about the state of training in Eighth Army or the validity or feasibility of MacArthur's fantastical deployment plan. However, it is clear from several polite peripheral questions that Collins (or a stand-in) put to MacArthur that there was considerable unease over it. For example, Collins asked MacArthur if he intended to move the RCT by air, and if so, could he airlift the RCT's heavy equipment and artillery? If this question were read another way, the Pentagon was saying that for his plan to succeed, MacArthur had to move the RCT by air, and since it would be impossible to move the RCT's heavy equipment by air, the plan would fail.

Collins concluded his end of the telecon with a fawning and dissembling salute: "Everyone here delighted your prompt action in personally securing first hand view of situation. Congratulations and best wishes. We all have full confidence in you and your command." [note]

1930 Korean Time

Having thus committed American ground forces into the Korean War, Collins telephoned his JCS colleagues at about 5:30 A.M. to tell them what he had done. The official JCS historians recorded with masterful understatement that at least one of them, Forrest Sherman, "felt some unease." In fact, they all were shocked, not only because they had not been consulted but also because of the grave implication of the decision. Bradley, who had consistently opposed committing American ground forces to South Korea, later wrote in his autobiography that he had been "deeply concerned." Even so, not Bradley or Sherman or Vandenberg protested the decision formally, then or later. Sherman came to believe it was a "sound" decision; Bradley wrote that "in a sense, it was unavoidable and inevitable."[3-54] [note]

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Back at Suwŏn, during General Church's absence, affairs at the ADCOM headquarters took a bad turn. A series of events were contributory. An American plane radioed a message, entirely erroneous, that a column of enemy was approaching Suwŏn from the east. Generals Chae and Chung returned from the Han River line with gloomy news. About dusk [1954 sunset] ADCOM and KMAG officers at the Suwŏn command post saw a red flare go up on the railroad about 500 yards away. To one observer it looked like an ordinary railroad warning flare. However, some ADCOM officers queried excitedly, "What's that? What's that?" Another replied that the enemy were surrounding the town and said, "We had better get out of here." There was some discussion as to who should give the order. Colonel Wright and General Church were both absent from the command post. In a very short time people were running in and out of the building shouting and loading equipment. This commotion confused the Korean officers at the headquarters who did not understand what was happening. One of the ADCOM officers shouted that the group should assemble at Suwŏn Airfield and form a perimeter. Thereupon all the Americans drove pell-mell down the road toward the airfield, about three miles away.[05-23]

When this panic seized the ADCOM group, communications personnel began destroying their equipment with thermite grenades. In the resultant fire the schoolhouse command post burnt to the ground. At the airfield, the group started to establish a small defensive perimeter but before long they decided instead to go on south to Taejŏn. ADCOM officers ordered the antiaircraft detachment at the airfield to disable their equipment and join them. [note]

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[note]

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It was late on the 30th, Tokyo time, that President Truman approved the commitment of American troops. [note]

Korean_War

On the evening of 30 June, Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, went to bed at 9 o'clock in his quarters at Camp Wood near Kumamoto, Kyushu, tired and sleepy after having been up all the previous night because of an alert. [note]

But time was rapidly running out for the Americans at Suwŏn. Late on the afternoon of 30 June ADCOM received reports that the South Korean defenses along the Han River were crumbling. The Reds had not been able to cross the Han bridges, but they had ferried tanks and troops across the river southeast of Sŏul.#120

A little after 1700 hours Colonel McGinn was summoned to the schoolhouse headquarters in Suwŏn. General Church was not present (he was at the relay station making a telephone call to Tokyo), but his second-in-command informed all present that ADCOM would have to evacuate. All cryptographic material was destroyed, and everyone moved out to Suwŏn Airfield,

where they were joined at approximately 2140 hours by General Church and Mr. Muccio [note]

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General Church was at first reluctant to leave Suwŏn, but after a discussion he directed that ADCOM would proceed southward by vehicle to Taejŏn, and there establish a new command post. Colonel McGinn then drove out onto the Suwŏn strip in one of the air-control jeeps and warned away two C-47's which were trying to land. He knew that he should burn the damaged aircraft parked alongside the strip, but by this time a large number of Koreans had gathered at the airfield's gate. In the dark, no one knew whether they were friendly or hostile. Either way, McGinn reasoned, the Koreans would likely resist if he tried to burn the damaged airplanes. If they were ROK's, they would assume that he was an enemy agent; if they were Reds, they would shoot to try to save the planes for capture. McGinn therefore left the damaged planes as they were and formed up as a part of the AD-COM convoy.

34 U.S. Air Force in Korea


As the American vehicles ran through Suwŏn's gate they met a desultory fire from among the crowd of Koreans, but no one was hurt. The antiaircraft artillery team served as rear guard for the column as it drove uneventfully southward through the rain to Taejŏn. Here all personnel assembled in KMAG's dependent housing area, dried their clothing, and made a head count. All Air Force people were present except one sergeant, and he hitch-hiked in the next day with the explanation that he had been asleep in a building at the airstrip and had waked the next morning to find everyone gone.#121

During the darkness, when the evacuation from Suwŏn was taking place, it had seemed that North Koreans were all around, but actually the enemy did not get to the airfield in any strength until 2 July. In this interim period [7/1] the OSI agent, Donald Nichols, went back to Suwŏn with a party of Koreans and destroyed the damaged planes left there.#122 [note]

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On the west coast, where Swenson had joined Mansfield on 30 June, the patrol of areas Yoke and Zebra continued without contact with the enemy. On the east coast, following conferences with southbound ROK naval personnel, Juneau returned to Mukho to expend a further 43 rounds of 5-inch VT against troop positions and a shore battery. Collett came up from Pusan, where she had embarked ROK interpreters, signalmen, and liaison officers for distribution throughout the force, and at 2200 Jamaica joined.

On the 1st, Alacrity and Black Swan arrived, and the day was spent in patrolling the coast and reorganizing the Support Group. DeHaven and Collett were detached to Sasebo to fuel and to escort troopships to Pusan; Alacrity was ordered into the Yellow Sea to relieve Mansfield in Area Yoke; Juneau, Jamaica, and Black Swan continued on east coast patrol.

[note]

About 2200, the column of ADCOM, KMAG, AAA, and Embassy vehicles assembled and was ready to start for Taejŏn. [05-24]

At this point, General Church returned from Osan and met the assembled convoy. He was furious when he learned what had happened, and ordered the entire group back to Suwŏn. Arriving at his former headquarters building General Church found it and much of the signal equipment there had been destroyed by fire. His first impulse was to hold Suwŏn Airfield but, on reflection, he doubted his ability to keep the field free of enemy fire to permit the landing of troops. So, finally, in a downpour of rain the little cavalcade drove south to Osan. [05-25]

General Church again telephoned General Almond in Tokyo to acquaint him with the events of the past few hours, and recommended that ADCOM and other American personnel withdraw to Taejŏn. Almond concurred. In this conversation Almond and Church agreed, now that Suwŏn Airfield had been abandoned, that the American troops to be airlifted to Korea during 1 July should come to Pusan instead. [05-26] In the monsoon downpour General Church and the American group then continued on to Taejŏn where ADCOM established its new command post the morning of 1 July.[note]

Collett came up from Pusan, where she had embarked ROK interpreters, signalmen, and liaison officers for distribution throughout the force, and at 2200 Jamaica joined. [note]

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Sebald notified State Department at 8:05 AM EST that he had talked with Muccio at 1710 his time about 5 hours earlier, regarding the deteriorating situation. He urged they do something before the situation got completely out of hand. [note]

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An hour and a half later his wife awakened him, saying, "Colonel Stephens is on the phone and wants you." At the telephone Smith heard Col. Richard W. Stephens, Commanding Officer, 21st Infantry, say to him, "The lid has blown off-get on your clothes and report to the CP." Thus began Task Force Smith as seen by its leader. [06-4] Colonel Smith had been at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor, causing him hurriedly to take D Company, 35th Infantry, to form a defense position on Barbers Point. Now, this call in the night vividly reminded him of that earlier event.

[note]

2250 Korean Time

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
06/30/50
8:00 AM
06/30/50
9:00 AM
06/30/50
2:00 PM
06/30/50
11:00 PM

Here was the full commitment, although its ultimate magnitude was as yet unforeseen. On the morning of Friday, 30 June [9am = 2300 K], after meeting with the Secretaries of State and of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leaders, President Truman made public the new decisions. General MacArthur was authorized to bomb north of the 38th parallel as governed by military necessity, a naval blockade of North Korea would be proclaimed, and "certain supporting ground units" would be committed to action. [note]

Around midnight,[6/30] General Almond notified the American Embassy at Taejŏn that bad flying weather had forced the diversion of the task force to Pusan, where it would land as soon as the weather improved; the first contingents of the main body of the 24th Division would land at Pusan by ship within twelve or fourteen hours.

[no one has left yet???? what diversion???? Check original text, p81 - this does not make any sense....]

General Almond emphasized that these men were not to be used as "Headquarters Guards" but to fight the North Koreans. He was assured that the railroads from Pusan to Taejŏn were operating and that there should be no problem in moving these troops to the line of battle. Almond instructed Church to concentrate railroad rolling stock near Pusan to keep it out of enemy hands and to have it ready for the 24th Division. [05-3] [note]

Korean_War

At the regimental command post, Colonel Stephens told Smith to take his battalion, less A and D Companies, to Itazuke Air Base; it was to fly to Korea at once. General Dean would meet him at the airfield with further instructions.
Colonel Stephens quickly arranged to lend Smith officers from the 3d Battalion to fill gaps in the rifle platoons of B and C Companies.


Casualties

Friday June 30, 1950 (Day 6)

Korean_War 23 Casualties



As of June 30, 1950

5 22ND TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
17 71ST SIGNAL BATTALION
1 8075TH THEATER HEADQUARTERS - RADIO RELAY
23 Casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 8 0 0 0 0 8
Today 5 18 0 0 0 23
Total 13 18 0 0 0 31

Aircraft Lost Today 003

North Korean Aircraft Lost Today 005

Notes for Friday June 30, 1950 - Day 6