Seventy-two hours after the NKPA invasion had begun, it was obvious to Joe Darrigo and his KMAG cohorts that the battle to stop the NKPA invasion was lost. The causes for this disaster were numerous, but the main ones were Truman's inability to grasp grand strategy - to back American foreign policy with adequate military power - and his battery commander's view that he was a victim of Pentagon budget flimflams.
South Korea obviously required a continuing American military presence to ensure its survival until the embryonic ROK Army had matured and been properly equipped.
Truman's crippling cuts in the Army's budget had compelled a premature American withdrawal from South Korea, leaving that new and unstable nation ripe for conquest.
The inexplicable and ill-advised public statements by Acheson in January and Connally in April of 1950 may well have encouraged Moscow and P'yŏngyang to proceed when they did. The timing may also have been prompted by the status of training in the ROK and American Eighth armies.
Further delays would have confronted the NKPA with a better trained ROK Army and, should America intervene (as MacArthur had promised Rhee he would) a better trained Eighth Army. Whatever the case, considering the strategic situation that existed, an NKPA invasion on June 25, 1950, was bound to succeed.
Acheson and Connally in the spring of 1950