Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 28.6°C 83.48°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Normally a new army expanded this quickly would face severe problems in creating and sustaining tactical skill among the tens of thousands of men conscripted beginning in the summer of 1948. During July 1950 , however, many NKPA units demonstrated high levels of tactical skill on the battlefield.

A major reason for the success of the NKPA was that approximately one-third of its strength comprised ethnic Koreans who had served with the Chinese Communist forces during the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Communists allowed these men to return to North Korea, where they were immediately incorporated into the NKPA; eleven of the 21 infantry regiments that invaded South Korea mainly comprised these veterans. Additionally, these veterans filled many of the key leadership positions in other units of the NKPA. [39]


[39] Ibid, 9-10; Richard A. Mobley, "North Korea: How Did It Prepare for the 1950 Attack?" Army History, no.49 (Spring 2000), 4, 7-8.

These veterans, along with the thousands of conscripts, benefited from the Soviet Union's extensive assistance to the NKPA. The Soviets provided the NKPA with the weapons, equipment, and supplies needed to create a modern combined-arms force. While the heavy weapons, the tanks and artillery, supplied to North Korea far exceeded what the U.S. supplied to South Korea, they were generally older designs superseded by more modern equipment in the Soviet Army.

For example, the NKPA received the T34 / 85 tank instead of the IS-III tank. Several thousand Soviet advisors assisted in the creation and training of units, and a special team of officers helped the NKPA in 1950 plan the invasion of South Korea. The result of this Soviet assistance was an NKPA whose organization and tactical doctrine closely matched the World War II Soviet Army. The NKPA infantry divisions resembled Soviet rifle divisions of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and supporting units. The battalions of the NKPA's tank brigade were attached to infantry divisions to help break through enemy defenses. Following Soviet doctrine, the standard NKPA tactic in the attack was a double envelopment; while infantry supported by tanks and artillery penetrated the enemy's defenses frontally, other infantry units would move around the distracted enemy's flanks. Caught in this double envelopment, the enemy would either be destroyed or forced to withdraw with heavy losses in men and equipment. However, the NKPA lacked the large numbers of non-divisional artillery and tank units that in the Soviet Army provided significant combat power for breaking through and deeply penetrating enemy defenses. [40]


[40] John A English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, revised edition (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 89; Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea, "Enemy Tactics," 26 December 1951, 5660, in File "Enemy Tactics," U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historianís Office Organizational History Files, Box 73, RG 338, NARA; Appendix E, Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950 , File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Chief of Staff Classified Decimal File 1950 , Box 558, RG 319, NARA; Mobley, 3, 5-6.

XII. North Korean Infiltration Tactics
Also in accordance with Soviet doctrine, the NKPA supported its combined-arms attacks with extensive infiltration efforts. Reconnaissance units infiltrated to gather intelligence about enemy positions, particularly the locations of the enemy's flanks to assist

-31-


in envelopment attacks and the enemy's artillery positions so that NKPA artillery could suppress them with counter-battery fire. Other infiltrated units would assist envelopment attacks by hitting enemy defensive positions from the rear, destroying enemy artillery positions and supply points, and establishing road blocks that would prevent the enemy from either reinforcing its defensive line or withdrawing from that line. Infiltrated NKPA units would also attempt to contact any South Korean guerrilla forces or civilian sympathizers in the area for assistance in gathering intelligence and attacking enemy units. [41]


[41] English and Gudmundsson, On Infantry, 90; "Enemy Tactics," 21-23, 41-44, 112-117; Appendix E, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command."

[Note]

24th 05 Deployment

The Korean War: Deployment and Initial Combat


The mistrust endemic to the 24th Infantry began to appear just as soon as word arrived at Gifu in early July 1950 that the regiment was to depart for Korea along with its associated engineers and artillery.

Almost immediately, rumors began to circulate among both whites and blacks that the regiment would never go into combat because of the supposed poor performance of all-black units in earlier wars.

Then, as the date of departure approached, white officers began to hear reports that a black chaplain had undermined the chain of command by suggesting during a meeting that it was inappropriate for men of color to fight one another on behalf of whites.

Black officers received unsubstantiated word that the black commander of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel James F. Lofton, had been reassigned to prevent him from commanding whites in combat. [note]

Korean_War

[larger map] Guam, Wake and Hawaii islands

But by July even the test score for first-time enlistment into the Army had declined to seventy because men were needed for the Korean War. The law required that whenever Selective Service began drafting men the Army would automatically lower its enlistment standards to seventy. Thus, despite the committee's recommendations, the concentration of low-scoring Negroes in the lower grades continued to increase, creating an even greater pool of men incapable of assignment to the schools and specialties open without regard to race.

Even the Army's promise to enlarge gradually the number of specialties open to Negroes was not carried out expeditiously. By July 1950, the last month of the Fahy Committee's life, the Army had added only seven more specialties with openings for Negroes to the list of forty published seven months before at the time of its agreement with the committee. [note]

This sensible procedure freed the Air Force for a decade from the charges of on-base discrimination that had plagued it in the past.


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Maintenance Crew,
462nd Strategic Fighter Squadron, disassembles aft section of an F-84 Thunderstreak.



Without (p. 410) a doubt the new policy improved the Air Force's manpower efficiency, as the experience of the 3202nd Installation Group illustrates. A segregated unit serving at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the 3202nd was composed of an all-black heavy maintenance and construction squadron, a black maintenance repair and utilities squadron, and an all-white headquarters and headquarters squadron. This rigid segregation had caused considerable trouble for the unit's personnel section, which was forced to assign men on the basis of color rather than military occupational specialty.


For example, a white airman with MOS 345, a truck driver, although assigned to the unit, could not be assigned to the heavy maintenance and construction squadron where his specialty was authorized but had to be assigned to the white headquarters squadron where his specialty was not authorized. Clearly operating in an inefficient manner, the unit was charged with miss-assignment of personnel by the Air Inspector; in July 1950 it was swiftly and peaceably, if somewhat belatedly, integrated, and its three squadrons were converted to racially mixed units, allowing an airman to be assigned according to his training and not his color.[16-44]

Footnote 16-44: History Officer, 3202nd Installations Groups, "History of the 3202nd Installations Group, 1 July -31 October 1950," Eglin AFB, Fla., pp. 8-9.(Back)
[note]

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[larger map] Johnston Island

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Photo #: NH 96905

Crewmen handling ammunition beside USS Toledo (CA-133)

[note]

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Comment: Photo #: 80-G-427790
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, (left), talks with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific and Pacific Fleet, during a press conference at Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California, in July 1950. .

[note]

Korean_War

Photo #: 80-G-427791

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, CNO and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CINCPACFLT


Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, (center), and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific and Pacific Fleet at a press conference at Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California, in July 1950. Note electronic gear on and near the table, including a case in lower left labeled "Columbia Broadcasting System".

[note]


"July debate" over strategy - MacArthur supported by John Allison that U.S. should liberate and unite Korea - but Omar Bradley and JCS supported by George Kennan that U.S. should only restore boundary of 38th parallel and seek a political settlement rather than a military solution. [note]

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[larger map] Kwajalein Island

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[larger map] San Francisco

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[larger map] Shemya and Tokyo

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[larger map] Shemya in the Aleutians

Of necessity, an airlift of critically needed items began almost at once from the United States to the Far East. The Military Air transport Service (MATS), Pacific Division, expanded immediately upon the outbreak of the war. The Pacific airlift was further expanded by charter of civil airlines planes. The Canadian Government lent the United Nations a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron of 6 transports, while the Belgian Government added several DC-4's. [09-16]

Altogether, the fleet of about 60 four-engine transport planes operating across the Pacific before 25 June 1950 was quickly expanded to approximately 250. In addition to these, there were MATS C-74 and C-97 planes operating between the United States and Hawaii.


The Pacific airlift to Korea operated from the United States over three routes. These were


The airlift moved about 106 tons a day in July 1950. [09-17]


From Japan most of the air shipments to Korea were staged at Ashiya or at the nearby secondary airfields of Itazuke and Brady.


[09-16] Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Kuter, "The Pacific Airlift," Aviation Age, XV, No. 3 (March, 1951) 16-17.

[09-17] Maj. James A. Huston. Time and Space, pt. VI, pp. 93-94, MS in OCMH.

[note]


That equipment and ordnance supplies were available to the United States forces in Korea in the first months of the war was largely due to the "roll-up" plan of the Far East Command. It called for the reclamation of ordnance items from World War II in the Pacific island outposts and their repair or reconstruction in Japan. This plan had been conceived and started in 1948 by Brig. Gen. Urban Niblo, Ordnance Officer of the Far East Command. [09-14]

During July and August 1950 an average of 4,000 automotive vehicles a month cleared through the ordnance repair shops; in the year after the outbreak of the Korean War more than 46,000 automotive vehicles were repaired or rebuilt in Japan.

The Tokyo Ordnance Depot, in addition to repairing and renovating World War II equipment for use in Korea, instituted a program of modifying certain weapons and vehicles to make them more effective in combat. For instance, M4A3 tanks were modified for the replacement of the 75-mm. gun with the high velocity 76-mm. gun, and the motor carriage of the 105-mm. gun was modified so that it could reach a maximum elevation of 67 degrees to permit high-angle fire over the steep Korean mountains. Another change was in the half-track M15A1, which was converted to a T19 mounting a 40-mm. gun instead of the old model 37-m.m. weapon. [09-15]


[09-14] GHQ fec, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, p. 50; Brig. Gen. Gerson K. Heiss, "Operation Rollup," Ordnance (September-October, 1951), 242-45.

[09-15] Heiss, "Operation Rollup," op. cit., pp. 242-45.

[note]


Can we see when Dabney actually joined in July? [update the entry on 8/11 if you can]


While General Walker had many capable staff officers at his Eighth Army headquarters at this time, perhaps none was more valuable to him than Col. John A. Dabney, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, [assigned on 8/15] who had joined the Army in Korea during July.


[as of 6/20/2009 - he is not mentioned in any July documents]
[note]

Korean_War

[larger map]

In July 1950 the USAF had a total inventory of less than 2,500 jet aircraft of all types.#109


109. Hist. Air Materiel Command [AMC], Jan.- June 1952, I, 144; USAF Statistical Digest, FY-1951, pp. 162-68. [note]

Since July [29 June] the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (redesignated as the 91st Squadron on 16 November 1950) had provided FEAF Bomber Command with target and bomb-damage assessment photography. But as the 31st Squadron sought to operate along the Yalu its obsolete RB-29's proved an easy mark for MIG interceptors.

On 9 November two MIG's jumped a flak-damaged RB-29 over Sinuiju: in the aerial fight, Corporal Harry J. LaVene, the tail gunner, shot down one of the MIG's, but the other hostile plane further crippled the RB-29, which limped home to Johnson Air Base, where a crash landing killed five crewmen.

After this experience FEAF forbade the RB-29's to approach the Yalu, and the Fifth Air Force undertook to use its RF-80A photo planes to secure the needed reconnaissance in this area.#125

#125 Hist. 91st Strat. Recon. Sq., Nov. 1950; msg. DX-RC-604, Comdr. 31st Strat. Recon. Sq. to CG FEAF, 9 Nov. 1950; FEAF Release No. 283, 17 Nov. 1950; FEAF Opns. Hist., II, 51, 58.
[note]

Confident in the knowledge that their Sabre aircraft were being improved, aggressive pilots of the 4th and 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wings earnestly met the threats of superior numbers of Communist MIG's.

At mid-1952 the Communist air forces began to follow a new concept of operations which involved exploitation of all phases of their developing air-defense system. Although the Reds did not oppose the United Nations air attacks against their Sui-ho hydroelectric plant, the Red air forces in June 1952 evidently decided to employ quality instead of quantity.

Only 298 MIG sorties were sighted in the air over northwestern Korea in June, but the Red airmen who met the Sabres were aggressive and willing to fight.

The Sabres still had the edge in June's combat. At a cost of three friendlies lost, the Sabres destroyed 20 MIG's.

Only one Sabre pilot became an ace in June, but his was a most exceptional case. Second Lieutenant James F Low had volunteered for flight training in July 1950 and became a 4th Wing jet ace on 15 June 1952, only six months after he had graduated from flying school. [note]


*Effective on 1 May 1951, the 315th Air Division reassumed the responsibility for operating the
scheduled interisland flights in the Far East, which had been taken over temporarily by the Military Air transport Service in July 1950. These flights connected Japan with Iwo Jima, Guam, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines. [note]

In response to immediate requirements, the 1809th AACS Group drew upon men and equipment in Japan to establish AACS detachments at Pusan, Taegu, and P'ohang early in July 1950.

Meanwhile, the AACS rushed ten air-transportable AACS detachments to the Far East from the United States.

At first the AACS detachments in Korea operated under the 1955th AACS Squadron at Itazuke, but on 1 August 1950 the 1973rd AACS Squadron was organized at Taegu. Within a few days the force of North Korean ground assault compelled the AACS detachment to fight its way out of P'ohang, but the 1973rd Squadron held its position at Taegu. #133

#133 Hist. AACS, July-Dec. 1950, pp. 64-79.
[note]

Notes for July 1950 General Observations

0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
9:00 AM
07/30/50
10:00 AM
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/31/50
12:00 AM

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
10:00 AM
07/30/50
11:00 AM
07/30/50
4:00 PM
07/31/50
1:00 AM

0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
11:00 AM
07/30/50
12:00 PM
07/30/50
5:00 PM
07/31/50
2:00 AM

0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
12:00 PM
07/30/50
1:00 PM
07/30/50
6:00 PM
07/31/50
3:00 AM

0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
1:00 PM
07/30/50
2:00 PM
07/30/50
7:00 PM
07/31/50
4:00 AM

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
2:00 PM
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/31/50
5:00 AM

0540 Sunrise

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/30/50
4:00 PM
07/30/50
9:00 PM
07/31/50
6:00 AM

0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
4:00 PM
07/30/50
5:00 PM
07/30/50
10:00 PM
07/31/50
7:00 AM

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
5:00 PM
07/30/50
6:00 PM
07/30/50
11:00 PM
07/31/50
8:00 AM

0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
6:00 PM
07/30/50
7:00 PM
07/31/50
12:00 AM
07/31/50
9:00 AM

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
7:00 PM
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/31/50
1:00 AM
07/31/50
10:00 AM

1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/30/50
9:00 PM
07/30/50
2:00 AM
07/31/50
11:00 AM

1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
9:00 PM
07/30/50
10:00 PM
07/31/50
3:00 AM
07/31/50
12:00 PM

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
10:00 PM
07/30/50
11:00 PM
07/31/50
4:00 AM
07/31/50
1:00 PM

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
11:00 PM
07/31/50
12:00 AM
07/31/50
5:00 AM
07/31/50
2:00 PM

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
12:00 AM
07/31/50
1:00 AM
07/31/50
6:00 AM
07/31/50
3:00 PM

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
1:00 AM
07/31/50
2:00 AM
07/31/50
7:00 AM
07/31/50
4:00 PM

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
2:00 AM
07/31/50
3:00 AM
07/31/50
8:00 AM
07/31/50
5:00 PM

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
3:00 AM
07/31/50
4:00 AM
07/31/50
9:00 AM
07/31/50
6:00 PM


1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
4:00 AM
07/31/50
5:00 AM
07/31/50
10:00 AM
07/31/50
7:00 PM

1931 Sunset


2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
5:00 AM
07/31/50
6:00 AM
07/31/50
11:00 AM
07/31/50
8:00 PM

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
6:00 AM
07/31/50
7:00 AM
07/31/50
12:00 PM
07/31/50
9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
7:00 AM
07/31/50
8:00 AM
07/31/50
1:00 PM
07/31/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
8:00 AM
07/31/50
9:00 AM
07/31/50
2:00 PM
07/31/50
11:00 PM


Casualties

Tuesday August 8, 1950 (Day 45)

70 Casualties

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Notes for Tuesday August 1, 1950 - Day 037

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