Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 25.1°C 77.18°F at Taegu [note]

Rainy, windy weather [note] [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Taegu)

Overview

Today begins week two of the conflict. By the end of he week 171 Americans will have lost their lives in Korea.

Air Force 4
Army 167
Marines 0
Navy 0
Casualties for second week 171

[note]

2 Jul The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directs that Marine reinforced regiment with supporting air be prepared for assignment to Far East.
2 Jul The Commander in Chief, Far East (CinCFE) requests a Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT)-air unit for Far East. This was inception of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (1st ProvMarBrig), formed less than a week later. [note]

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Gromyko sent the first draft of the Soviet statement on the American intervention to Stalin on July 2, a full week after the beginning of the war.[71] [note]

The Soviet reaction to the U.S. intervention in Korea in June 1950 and the pattern of subsequent Soviet intervention in the war also indicate that Stalin was surprised and alarmed by the U.S. response and extremely reluctant to confront the United States militarily over Korea.

First, the Foreign Ministry had no reply to an American intervention prepared by June 25. Gromyko sent the first draft of the Soviet statement on the American intervention to Stalin on July 2, a full week after the beginning of the war.

Second, Soviet authorities immediately took steps to avoid engaging the American forces. On June 26, Soviet ships that had sailed from Dairen were ordered “to return to their own defense zone immediately” and throughout the war Soviet naval vessels stayed clear of the war zone.

Third, in an attempt to distance itself from the conflict, the Soviet government refused to approve the fervent requests of Soviet citizens of Korean nationality to join their fellow Koreans in defending their homeland against “the barbarous attack by the American imperialists.”

Finally, when the course of the war turned against the DPRK in the wake of the American landing at Inch'ŏn, the Soviet Union refused to intervene in order to defend its client state.

When Stalin at last sent military forces to Korea he did so only in support of Chinese forces, to whom he was bound by a mutual defense treaty. After first backing down from his promise to Mao to provide air support for Chinese troops crossing the Yalu, Stalin finally sent two air force divisions to defend the Yalu river bridges in November 1950,

[note]

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Three SB-17's were utilized this date for orbit and weather recon missions. A total of twenty four hours and forty five minutes (24:45) was flown on these flights.


One SB-17 was utilized for search mission this date to search the area along the west coast of Korea from 35°-30N - 36°-10E for a B-26 which was reported to have crashed in that area. Negative results reported and a total of ten hours and twenty minutes (10:20) was logged on the flight.


One H-5 was dispatched this date to Fukaeshima 37°-40N - 128°-45E, to pick up one survivor of a B-26 crash. The survivor, the pilot of the B-26, was returned to Itazuke Air Base where he was turned over to Medical Authorities at that Station. Five hours and fifteen minutes (5:15) was logged on this flight.


At 1105/K an SOS was reported. No further instructions from ADCC. At 1200/K a Mayday was reported fifty (50) miles north of Fukaeshima 37°-40N - 128°-45E.

At 1215/K the Flight was notified to disregard Mayday.

At 1800/K received a call from ADCC on F-80 who was eighty (80) miles out and low on fuel.

There were three (3) false alerts recorded this date. Maydays as used this chronology are emergency signals as transmitted from an IFF set.

[note]

General MacArthur was concerned that the small force lacked artillery, and on 2 July he ordered General Walker to fly in howitzers from Japan if he had to. It was unnecessary to do so, for elements of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion were already on their way by LST, and they landed in Pusan that evening and moved at once to the battle area. [05-5]

[note]

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RAAF F-51D committed to combat [note]

"At the last minute, our orders were changed and we were told that an LST had been located and would arrive that evening for us to load out the complete battery. The LST could land in our motor park because Camp Hakata had been a Japanese seaplane base and the motor park road dropped directly into the bay.

We sailed by ship out of Fukouka on 2 July 1950 for Pusan, Korea. During the sea trip, we test-fired weapons and performed general maintenance.

[note]

because of airlift constraints, only 450 men were actually flown in, on 2 July. [note]

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Moving Up.
25th Division infantrymen head for the front, Korea, July 1950.

[note]

"The only major naval engagement of the war occurred when the USS Juneau (CLAA-119), the HMS Jamaica (C-44), and the HMS Black Swan (U-57) intercepted four North Korean torpedo boats escorting ten converted trawlers on the east coast. Naval gunfire sank two of the four torpedo boats and seven of the trawlers."

[note]

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The Royal Australian Air Force 77 Squadron began flying F51 Mustang missions in Korea. [note]

While the movement was in progress on 2 July, Smith and his staff moved in jeeps north of P'yŏngt'aek for a personal reconnaissance toward Sŏul. During that drive Smith spotted a good defensive position on the main highway just above the town of Osan which is about twelve miles above P'yŏngt'aek. Upon his return, Smith recommended that his command be reunited at the Osan position. [note]

South then North

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([ the N.K. 7th Division was] redesignated the 12th about 2 July 1950). [02-6] [note]

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[note]

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This artillery contingent comprised one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries and all of A Battery with 6 105-mm. howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lt. Col. Miller O. Perry.


It had crossed from Japan on an LST 2 July, disembarking at Pusan late that night. [note]

[Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment loaded at Sasebo during the night of 1 July, ] and arrived at Pusan the next night. [note]

General Dean CG 24th Infantry also was on his way to Korea. Failing on 2 July to land at Taejŏn because his pilot could not find the airstrip in the dark, [note]

Most of the KMAG officers who had left Korea by air on 27 June returned aboard the ammunition ship USNS Sergeant George D. Keathley (T-APC-117) on 2 July. [06-15]

By this time the ROK Army had assembled and partly reorganized about 68,000 men. [note]

Eastward, the N.K. 7th Division advanced down the mountainous central corridor of Korea after it had helped the 2nd Division capture Ch'unch'ŏn in the opening days of the invasion. Retiring slowly in front of it and fighting effectively was the ROK 6th Division.

Between Ch'unch'ŏn and Hongch'ŏn, the 6th Division inflicted approximately 400 casualties on the enemy division and knocked out a number of its T34 tanks.

From Hongch'ŏn the battle continued on down the road toward Wŏnju, the action reaching the edge of that rail and road center on or about 2 July.

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There, the North Korean High Command relieved Maj. Gen. Chon U, commander of the 7th Division, because his division was behind schedule in its advance.

At the same time, the North Korean high command redesignated the 7th Division the 12th, and activated a new 7th Division. [note]

2nd Lt. Scotty: "While in Japan, I suddenly received an order to prepare 10 jeeps and trailers along with 50 soldiers to be airlifted to Korea. We were told that the North Korean Army had attacked south and that we would pick up Korean howitzers and join Task Force Smith in Korea. We scurried around the compound, packing all the ammunition we could carry and other necessities in the trailers.


"At the last minute, our orders were changed and we were told that an LST [landing ship, tank] had been located and would arrive that evening for us to load out the complete battery.

The LST could land in our motor park because Camp Hakata had been a Japanese seaplane base and the motor park road dropped directly into the bay.

We sailed by ship out of Fukouka on 2 July 1950 for Pusan, Korea. During the sea trip, we test-fired weapons and performed general maintenance.


"On the evening of July 2nd, the battery loaded onto a train and proceeded north to the rendezvous at P'yŏngt'aek on the 3rd.

It wasn't quite as simple as it sounds. First, we had to find the railroad cars, then we had to load the battery on the cars and figure out how to tie down the equipment with grass ropes.


"During the trip north to P'yŏngt'aek, we were strafed by enemy air. I had been strafed during World War II, but my troops had never been in combat. We arrived at P'yŏngt'aek after dark [on the 3rd] , and the town had been bombed and most of the village was in flames. [note]

Citations

Medals

 

RUTHERFORD, JAMES

USAF

 

 

As of this date, 12 aircraft have been lost. Koreans officially take over the F–51s given them tomorrow. The RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force] (77th Fighter Group, based at Iwakuni) joins us in combat missions in their F–51s.[54-Actually No. 77 Squadron RAAF. MacArthur requested the squadron on the 29th in a message to Lt Gen Sir Horace Clement Hugh Robertson, Commander in Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF). Correspondents with MacArthur during his Korean visit knew the text of the message and filed stories about this request when they returned to Tokyo. Release of this message irked the Australian government which, with U.S. approval, had begun withdrawing its forces from the occupation forces in Japan prior to the war. Thus, this request came as a nasty shock to the Australians. After some discussion, the Australian government approved on June 30 No. 77 Squadron’s use in Korea. Robertson felt that MacArthur’s release to the press of the request for the squadron had been done deliberately to force the Australian government’s hand. (Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-1953, Vol. 1: Strategy and Diplomacy, Canberra, 1981, pp 36-37, 51-55.)]
Made the following rather disconnected report during staff meeting in GHQ this morning. Morale of 8th Fighter Wing and 3d Bomb Wing “superior.” In spite of the strenuous flying and fighting that has been done, they were all raring to go. I described the particular flight of the F–80C that took off in order to gather weather over the Seoul area. This particular pilot flew the entire distance on instruments, under severe turbulence, let down over the sea to some 600 feet, flew in over the Seoul area and returned, giving his weather report. The trip was entirely on instruments. Seven (7) C–54 loads successfully going into Pusan under the most adverse weather. General Timberlake ran this show similar to VITTLES, taking off every 20 minutes, letting down, and if they got into the airdrome, well and good; if not, they were to continue their flight and return to base.[55-“Operations Vittles” was the Bverlin Airlift of June 26, 1948-September 30, 1949.] I also described the miraculous return of four F–80Cs to Itazuke where they arrived with a ceiling of 100 feet and one mile visibility. I further explained
that I had talked to the Koreans undergoing training and they with their fighters would proceed to Taegu which would be turned into a fighter base. I stated that Pusan Air Base would be improved to take all the airlift heavy transports.[56-Luckily for the Americans, the best port in Korea and the closest one to Japan was Pusan, on Korea’s southeast corner. Plans were initiated to make Pusan the main supply base in South Korea. Also, since the two best airfields in the country, Kimp’o and Suwon, had been (or were about to be) lost, airfields near Pusan would be needed. It appeared that the already built Pusan airstrip could be utilized, but it quickly broke up under the weight of trans- port aircraft. Only heroic efforts by engineers kept the field operating until other airstrips were ready.]


I pointed out that in strike pictures of the P'yŏngyang strike, not only much materiel was destroyed and the hangars, but six airplanes were destroyed on the ground. I further pointed out that as soon as I could release General Partridge, he would return to the command of the Fifth Air Force and he would establish his advance command post along side General Dean, the U. S. Army ground commander in South Korea.[57-Dean’s tenure as commander of his own 24th Division and of U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) was distressingly short. On July 20, during the retreat from Taejon, Dean became separated from his men. After 36 days of wandering alone through the hills trying to reach his own lines, Dean was captured by the North Koreans. Only in September 1953, after being released by the enemy, did he rejoin the Army. For his actions at Taejon, where he personally destroyed a tank, Dean was awarded the Medal of Honor.] I pointed out that the Australian 77th Squadron had been turned over by General Robertson and that one mission of three airplanes had flown as cover this morning and that seven others were acting as cover for the B–26 strike in the Seoul area. General MacArthur dispatched my draft signal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting certain Air Force units and combat crews to the extent of 700 airplanes.[58-This refers to a message from MacArthur to the JCS endorsing Stratemeyer’s needs and requesting immediate action. General Stratemeyer sent several requests to Washington. Two, on June 30, were for 164 F–80s, 21 F–82s, 22 B–26s, 23 B–29s, 21 C–54s, 64 F–51s, and 15 C–47s, plus enough men in certain categories to bring all assigned units up to wartime strength (1&1/2 times peacetime). The additional aircraft would also provide a ten percent reserve for combat attrition. On July 1, Stratemeyer requested more units - a medium bomb wing, two F–51 wings, two F–82 all-weather squadrons, one troop carrier wing, three F–80C squadrons, a B–26 wing, another two B–26 squadrons to bring the 3d BW up to strength, an RF–51 reconnaissance squadron, an RB–26 night photo squadron, and a tactical air-control squadron. Some of these units were to be used in Korea, others for the air defense of Japan. (Futrell, pp 68-69.)]


Our B–29 bomb strike on Yŏnp'o, North Korea, was not successful as strike photos showed only 16 airplanes on the ground while our recon photos showed 68. The airdrome was fully covered with frags [fragmentation bombs].[59-Another reason for the lack of success was that the B–29 crews reported many of the bombs bursting thousands
of feet in the air. (FEAF Opns Hist, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, Vol. I, p 32.)]


General Eubank returned from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and reported that the morale of the Twentieth Air Force, and particularly the crews of the 19th Bomb Wing, was high. 

[note]

 

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[note]

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Air transport in Korea - MATS

The Korean airlift was only one phase of the story of air transport, for on 2 July the Military Air transport Service (MATS) had assumed responsibility for all airlift into the theater from the United States and within the area comprising Japan, Iwo Jima, Guam, Okinawa, and the Philippines. This airlift was to become the longest in history.** To accomplish this MATS increased its pre-Korean level of about 260 tons per month to the FEC to over 100 tons per day, and plane miles finally eclipsed those of the Berlin airlift by September 1950 MATS was averaging 252,000 plane miles per day as compared with 242,000 for Operation VITTLES. [note]



Disposition of Fifth Air Force units on 2 July 1950:

At the outset of Korean hostilities many of these units had been engaging in summer maneuvers away from their home bases. So many movements plus the sudden plunge into combat resulted in some confusion, but from the first these units set a standard which has held good during the conflict in Korea: at no time did a unit have to cease combat operations in order to move to another base. The 3rd Bombardment Group had been engaged on a FEAF test maneuver at Ashiya, with many of its personnel left behind at Johnson, but even while the two divided elements were concentrating at Iwakuni the group was held to maximum effort each day.

The 19th Bombardment Group at the beginning of hostilities had just completed an exhausting operational readiness test which had fatigued the combat crews and left the aircraft in need of maintenance.

[note]

Fortunately MATS fell heir to already established routes across the Pacific, although two of them had been closed down and reopening the way stations would be troublesome.


In June 1950 only the mid-Pacific route was in use: Travis, Hickam, Johnston Island, Kwajalein, and Japan, with a stop at Iwo Jima if necessary;


the great circle route - McChord, Anchorage, Shemya, and Japan -had been used by a contract carrier until June 1949 and then discontinued.


A third route from Hickam to Japan via Wake had been abandoned in May 1950, when the Navy and a civil airline had ceased operating at Wake.


In addition to reopening all three of these routes, MATS Pacific Division was to make several C-97 flights directly from Hawaii to Japan. [note]

At the beginning of Korean hostilities MATS was in no position to throw its entire air transport fleet into the Pacific airlift. In addition to a lack of aircrew personnel, particularly navigators, the service could not concentrate its entire fleet in the Pacific except at the expense of other commitments.

Therefore, the Air Force turned to the civil air carriers for immediate help,. In July seven prime contractors -


Pan American World Airways,
Transocean Airlines,
Overseas National Airlines,
United Airlines,
Seaboard and Western Airlines,
Flying Tigers Airlines, and
Northwest Airlines

later

Alaska Airlines

California Eastern Airways

Canadian Pacific Airlines


- were given service orders for a total of 190 round trips across the Pacific.

With the addition of
Alaska and
California Eastern Airways
in August, approximately twice as many flights were scheduled as in July; as of 1 September, service orders issued by MATS called for 345 trans-Pacific flights.

Other United Nations aircraft also provided some assistance to MATS:

the RCAF furnished six Northstar transports of the RCAF 426th transport Squadron;


the Canadian Pacific Airlines operated as a contract carrier; and


Belgium's Sabena Airlines furnished three DC-4 aircraft.

[note]

During the darkness, when the evacuation from Suwŏn was taking place, it had seemed that North Koreans were all around, but actually the enemy did not get to the airfield in any strength until 2 July. In this interim period [7/1] the OSI agent, Donald Nichols, went back to Suwŏn with a party of Koreans and destroyed the damaged planes left there.#122 [note]

After a State-Defense conference in Washington, Secretary of Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, on 2 July, directed USAF

"to stress the importance of briefing all our air crews so that there is no chance of attacking targets beyond the North Korea area.#13



The sanctity of the borders of Manchuria and Siberia was thus established at the outset of Korean hostilities, and the rule would never be relaxed. In fact, after a few inadvertent violations of the borders by wandering airmen, the restrictions would be significantly tightened in the autumn of 1950. [note]

On 2 July, preparatory to Task Force 77's first air strikes to be made on the following day, Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander NavFE, requested and received "exclusive use" of a large airspace area of northwestern Korea, encompassing P'yŏngyang. [note]



On 1 July General Stratemeyer dispatched another requirements message to Washington. This time he asked for air units, some for service in Korea and some for air defense. Wanted were:
one medium bombardment wing,
two Mustang wings,
two F-82 all-weather squadrons,
one troop carrier wing,
three F-80C squadrons to augment the Japan-based fighter wings,
a B-26 wing,
two B-26 squadrons to fill out the 3rd Bombardment Wing,
an RF-51 reconnaissance squadron,
an RB-26 night photographic squadron,
and a tactical air-control squadron.#104


#104 Msg. VC-0083CG, CG FEAF to CofS USAF, 1 July 1950.
`````
In a separate message to the

General MacArthur endorsed Stratemeyer's requirements messages and urged that they receive immediate action.I05 [note]

A full-scale C-54 airlift into Pusan began on the morning of 2 July, but the lightly surfaced concrete runway rapidly deteriorated under the pounding of the heavily loaded transports. [note]

On 27 June General Timberlake had already established an advanced echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters at Itazuke, and

on 2 July the Fifth Air Force's director of operations [Timberlake] and his staff went down to this airfield in southern Japan, completing the manning of the advanced echelon.#5

#5 Hist. Cmbt. Opns. FAF, 25 June-31 Oct. 1950, p. 5.


From Tokyo General Partridge sent word that he wanted the advanced echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters to move to Pusan and become operational not later than 8 July,#6

#6 Msg. AX-2004, CG FEAF to COMAF 5, 3 July 1950.


but these orders proved premature. At Pusan Airfield, on 2 July, General Timberlake found nothing useful to a headquarters installation. Moreover, Timberlake talked to General Dean, who said that he was not yet sure where he would locate the ground command post.#7

#7 Barcus Bd. Rpt., appen., bk. 1, p. 7; FAF Adv., Staff Mtg. Sum., 5 July 1950. [note]

Acting on a report that a concentration of 65 aircraft was based at Yŏnp'o Airfield, southwest of Hungnam on the east coast of Korea, FEAF sent ten B-29's of the 19th Group there on 2 July. When these medium-bomber crews reached Yŏnp'o, however, they sighted only 16 planes on the ground, none of which were apparently destroyed by the frag bombs which the B-29's dropped.#86 [note]

USMC

Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take to move (a) a Marine BLT and (b) a Marine RCT from the Pacific Coast.

Admiral Radford replied the next day [7/2]that he could load the BLT in 4 days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and sail in 10.[14]

Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired it. COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just returned from a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only did CINCFE accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in expressing his appreciation.[15] [note]

During the first 5 days of the invasion, the 4 torpedo boats escorted convoys which transported NKPA troops down the east coast for unopposed landings as far south as Samch'ŏk. But on 2 July 1950 the tiny North Korean “navy” was almost literally blown out of the water when it encountered UN Task Group 96.5 off Chumunjin while escorting 10 converted trawlers.

With more bravery than discretion, the small North Korean craft accepted battle with the American light cruiser USS Juneau (CLAA-119) and two British warships, the light cruiser HMS Jamaica (C-44) and the frigate HMS Black Swan (U-57)

Evidently the enemy hoped to score with a few torpedoes at the cost of a suicidal effort, but the U. N. guns sank 2 of the aluminum craft and drove a third to the beach, where it was soon destroyed along with 7 of the convoy vessels.

The North Koreans were credited with “great gallantry” in the British dispatch after the fourth torpedo boat escaped.[6]

But it was the last naval effort of any consequence by an enemy strangled in the net of the UN blockade. [note]

On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to Korea.

Two days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact of the United States ground forces with the enemy was made near Osan, about 8 miles south of Suwŏn.

[note]

Sunday 2 July was the date of the message from General MacArthur requesting the immediate dispatch of a Marine RCT with supporting air to the Far East. CNO acted that same day. With the concurrence of JCS and the President, he ordered Admiral Radford to move a Marine RCT with appropriate air to the Far East for employment by General MacArthur.[16]


Later, when General Cates asked CNO how the historical decision had been accomplished, Admiral Sherman replied cryptically in baseball language, “From Cates to Sherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, to JCS!”[17] [note]

Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take to move (a) a Marine BLT and (b) a Marine RCT from the Pacific Coast.

Admiral Radford replied the next day that he could load the BLT in 4 days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and sail in 10.[14]


Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired it. COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just returned from a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only did CINCFE accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in expressing his appreciation.[15] [note]

On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to Korea.

Two days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact of the United States ground forces with the enemy was made near Osan, about 8 miles south of Suwŏn.

[note]

Appointed to his new command only nine days before, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) was motoring from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico to the West Coast. From Yellowstone Park he advised Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, of his readiness to proceed to Hawaii and the Far East. His offer was accepted, and a Marine plane from El Toro transported him from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. There he boarded the first available plane to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the early morning hours of 2 July.[1]

On this date, with the Korean conflict only a week old, the armed forces of the United States were already committed. From the outset the United Nations had viewed the Red Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea as a challenge issued to free nations by World Communism.

The so-called North Korean People’s Republic had been set up after World War II as a Communist puppet state, and the army of invasion was both trained and armed by Soviet Russia. [note]

The date was 2 July 1950. And on this same Sunday, CinCFE sent a request to Washington for the immediate dispatch of a Marine regimental combat team (RCT) with appropriate air to the Far East.

It is not quite a coincidence that 2 July happened also to be the date of General Shepherd’s arrival at Pearl Harbor. Previous decisions in Washington had made it virtually certain that General MacArthur’s request would be granted, and CG FMFPac was on his way to the Far East to prepare for the reception of the Marine reinforcements. [note]

USN

Escort of shipping between Japan and Korea had so far been on a wholly catch-as-catch-can basis: USS Arikara (ATF-98) and HMAS Shoalhaven (K535) had been so used on 1 and 2 July, HMS Jamaica (C-44) and USS Collett (DD-730) on the 3rd.

But now provision was made for an Escort Group, Task Group 96.1, with a commander and units to be assigned when available.

Shortly the job would be turned over to the frigates under Captain A. D. H. Jay, DSO, DSC, RN, commanding officer of HMS Black Swan (U-57).

[note]

In view of the Formosan commitment, the carrier strikes had been originally planned as a one-day affair. But this had been modified during the approach, owing to the "rapidly deteriorating Korean situation," and General MacArthur had authorized the attack to continue as practicable beyond the first day.

Targets for the second day, selected by CincFE, were designated by dispatch on the night of the 2nd, with first priority given the railroad facilities and bridges in the neighborhood of Kŭmch'ŏn, just north of the parallel on the main line from P'yŏngyang to Sŏul, second priority to similar installations at Sariwon, halfway between the two capitals, and third priority to those near Sinanju, where the main road and rail lines from Manchuria cross the Chongchon River. [note]

USS Sicily (CVE-118), alerted on 2 July,

was sailed on the 4th for Pearl Harbor and Guam, to strengthen the antisubmarine capabilities of Western Pacific forces.

The division commander, Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble, was ordered forward with his staff by air to help handle the rapid build-up of naval air strength in Japan.

On 10 July admiral and staff reached Tokyo, and two days later Ruble took over command of Task Group 96.2, Naval Air Japan.

[note]


Three days [7/1] later Admiral Sherman queried CincPacFleet as to the time necessary to move out a battalion landing team or a regimental combat team. Admiral Radford’s reply, received on Sunday the 2nd, stated that a BLT could be loaded in four days and sailed in six, and an RCT loaded in six and sailed in ten.

CNO at once advised Admiral Joy by dispatch that a Marine regimental combat team could be made available to CincFE if desired, and this offer, relayed to General MacArthur by ComNavFE in person, was accepted with enthusiasm.

Before this busy Sunday was over the 1st Marine Division had been alerted and Admiral Sherman, with JCS approval, had ordered CincPacFleet to move an RCT with appropriate attached air strength to the Far East for employment by CincFE. [note]

This force had done good work. The action off Pusan at the outbreak of war had been of profound importance, and other engagements had followed.

On the east coast, on 2 July, the P'ohang Naval Base Detachment exterminated a small enemy force that had landed near Ulsan. In the west, where the invaders were attempting the forward movement of supplies and personnel by sea, YMS 513 sank three enemy small craft off Chulpo, south of Kunsan.


But invasion had brought disorganization; Admiral Sohn, the Chief of Naval Operations, had not yet returned from the United States, and naval headquarters at Sŏul had been quickly overrun. Since a functioning Korean Navy was of prime importance, both for its resources of local knowledge and for its monopoly of types capable of inshore operations, ComNavFE moved quickly to restore cohesion.

Arriving by air from the United States, Commander Michael J. Luosey found himself designated Deputy Commander, Naval Forces Far East, and put on the first plane for Korea. [note]

but the important inshore patrol had thus far been largely left to the ROK Navy.

This force had done good work. The action off Pusan at the outbreak of war had been of profound importance, and other engagements had followed.

On the east coast, on 2 July, the P'ohang Naval Base Detachment exterminated a small enemy force that had landed near Ulsan. In the west, where the invaders were attempting the forward movement of supplies and personnel by sea, YMS 513 sank three enemy small craft off Chulp'o, south of Kunsan.

But invasion had brought disorganization; Admiral Sohn, the Chief of Naval Operations, had not yet returned from the United States, and naval headquarters at Sŏul had been quickly overrun. Since a functioning Korean Navy was of prime importance, both for its resources of local knowledge and for its monopoly of types capable of inshore operations, ComNavFE moved quickly to restore cohesion.

Arriving by air from the United States, Commander Michael J. Luosey found himself designated Deputy Commander, Naval Forces Far East, and put on the first plane for Korea.

[note]


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Korean_War

The commanding general of the 24th Division, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, flew to Pusan early in the morning of 2 July.
He also asked for a Marine RCT! [note]

2 July 1950 Send me some Marines!


The first request by General MacArthur for a major unit from the United States came when he sought a Marine RCT with attached air support elements. Made on 2 July, the request was approved on the next day by the Joint Chiefs, and General MacArthur was told that the Marine unit would be sent to him as soon as possible. [05-42] [note]


On 2 July General MacArthur had pointed out that he must have more armored units since his four heavy tank battalions were skeletons with only one company apiece. Two were already in Korea and the remaining two were going. He asked for trained and organized tank companies from the United States to bring these battalions to full strength. He asked also for three additional medium tank battalions.


At the same time he made a bid for an RCT from the 82nd Airborne Division and another for an Engineer Special Brigade. The weakness of his antiaircraft artillery defenses impelled him also to seek quick shipment of four additional battalions of antiaircraft artillery. He backed up this request by pointing out that Sasebo, the principal Japanese port of embarkation for Korea, was completely undefended by antiaircraft artillery. [05-43]


These requests did not surprise Department of the Army officials, but they did pose a serious problem and involve major decisions. General Bolté advised General Collins to take units from the General Reserve and to send them to Korea as reinforcing units.

The Chief of Staff accepted this view. General Collins, however, reluctant to tamper with the combat effectiveness of the 82nd Airborne Division, recommended that an RCT of the 11th Airborne Division, which was less combat ready, be substituted.

He had at first felt that sending four battalions of antiaircraft artillery would be beyond the Army's capability. [note]

0514 Sun Rise

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Before the organization of these blockade groups [see 7/4/50] , the cruiser USS Juneau (CLAA-119) and 2 British ships [HMS Jamaica (C-44), and the HMS Black Swan (U-57)] at daylight [sun rise 514] on 2 July sighted 4 North Korean torpedo boats escorting 10 converted trawlers close inshore making for Chumunjin-up on the east coast of Korea. The Juneau and the two British ships turned to engage the North Korean vessels, and the torpedo boats at the same time headed for them.


The first salvo of the naval guns sank 2 of the torpedo boats, and the other 2 raced away. Naval gunfire then sank 7 of the 10 ships in the convoy; 3 escaped behind a breakwater. [05-12] [note]

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On the morning of 2 July the South Korean Support Group returned to action. At 0615 bow waves were sighted close inshore, and investigation disclosed four torpedo boats and two motor gunboats heading north from Chumunjin, whither they had escorted ten motor trawlers loaded with ammunition. As the cruisers put on speed to intercept the enemy, the torpedo boats, with more bravery than discretion, turned to attack.

Fire was opened at 11,000 yards, and by the time the range had closed to 4,000 one PT had been sunk and one stopped, a third was heading for the beach, and the fourth was escaping seaward.

The final score of the engagement was three torpedo boats and both gunboats destroyed, and two prisoners taken by Jamaica. Following this first engagement with the North Korean Navy, also in effect the last, the cruisers bombarded shore batteries at Kangnung, and late in the day Jamaica was sailed for Sasebo to fuel. [note]

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About 7 A.M. the next morning, Smith located General Church's command post and requested his orders. Church

".. pointed to a place on the map and said 'we have a little action up here. All we need is some men up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to move you up to support the ROK's'."

Smith sought and received permission to conduct a forward reconnaissance to select a position where he could stand and fight the North Koreans. He headed north, up the main Pusan-Sŏul highway, toward Suwŏn with his driver and a few staff officers.

He stopped on five different occasions - reconning possible fighting positions and recording them in case of later need.

As he proceeded North toward Osan and Suwŏn, he passed increasing numbers of ROK soldiers - headed the opposite direction - south!

[note]

The train with Task Force Smith aboard arrived at Taejŏn the next morning, 0700 2 July.

There Lt. Col. LeRoy Lutes, a member of ADCOM, met Colonel Smith and took him to General Church's headquarters where the general was in conference with several American and ROK officers. Church greeted Smith and, pointing to a place on the map, explained,

"We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to move you up to support the ROKs and give them moral support." [06-8]


Colonel Smith then suggested that he would like to go forward and look over the ground. While his men went to their bivouac area, Smith and his principal officers got into jeeps and set out over the eighty miles of bad, bumpy roads to Osan. All along the way they saw thousands of ROK soldiers and refugees cluttering the roads and moving south.


Three miles north of Osan, at a point where the road runs through a low saddle, drops down, and bends slightly northwest toward Suwŏn, Smith found an excellent infantry position which commanded both the highway and the railroad. An irregular ridge of hills crossed the road at right angles, the highest point rising about 300 feet above the low ground which stretched northward toward Suwŏn. From this high point both the highway and railroad were in view almost the entire distance to Suwŏn, eight miles to the north.


After looking over the ground, Smith issued verbal orders for organizing a position there. A flight of enemy fighters, red stars plainly visible on their wings, passed overhead, but their pilots apparently did not see the few men below. Its purpose accomplished, the group returned to the Taejŏn airstrip well after dark [2030]. [note]

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Operation CHROMITE: The Concept and the Plan
2 July 1950


MacArthur had decided on an amphibious operation against the enemy even before the first clash between American and North Korean soldiers at Osan. On 2 July he asked Washington for a Marine RCT. [note]


The next morning the airlift resumed, but then a new problem arose: The big heavy C54s were tearing up the flimsily built runways at Pusan. [note]

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"It was a horrible field anyway-the damned thing was practically under water," said General Timberlake, who flew to Pusan at noon on 2 July to inspect the airlift. Since the runway obviously would not stand up under the loading of the heavy transports,

General Timberlake in midafternoon of 2 July closed the field to C-54's and ordered the 374th Wing to resume operations with lighter C-46's and C-47's. Using these lighter planes, the 374th Wing completed its troop-lift mission a little before dusk on 4 July.#2

[note]

By noon, when Smith and 406 men had been delivered, the Air Force forbade any further operations of C54s into there. Until steel matting to reinforce runways could be rushed to South Korea, future airlifts would be restricted mainly to smaller C47 transports (the military version of the DC3), which could carry only eighteen soldiers. As a result, Smith had to leave behind nearly half his heavy firepower: two 75mm recoilless rifle teams and two 4.2inch mortar teams.[4-26]


Meanwhile, Bill Dean was trying to get to South Korea by air. He was aboard one of the C54s denied permission to land at Pusan on July 2.

After returning to Japan, he got in a C45 (a small twin-engine "executive" aircraft) with the goal of landing farther north at Taejŏn. But by the time the plane reached the Taejŏn area it was too dark to find the small, poorly marked airfield, and once again Dean was compelled to return to Japan. [note]

1215 Korean Time

Although the North Korean Air Force, in the first days of conflict, had performed useful services in demoralizing ROK troops, its strength in any serious terms was small. Estimates of its composition as of the outbreak of hostilities varied between some 75 and 130 aircraft, none of very recent types.

But on 2 July ComNavFE had alerted the Support Group against possible air attack,

and at 2012 on the 3rd two enemy fighters, thought to have been Stormoviks, came in on Black Swan from over the land and out of the haze, inflicted minor structural damage, and escaped without being hit.

[note]

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"It was a horrible field anyway-the damned thing was practically under water," said General Timberlake, who flew to Pusan at noon on 2 July to inspect the airlift. Since the runway obviously would not stand up under the loading of the heavy transports,

General Timberlake in midafternoon of 2 July closed the field to C-54's and ordered the 374th Wing to resume operations with lighter C-46's and C-47's. Using these lighter planes, the 374th Wing completed its troop-lift mission a little before dusk on 4 July.#2

[note]

1530 Korean Time

Meanwhile, Bill Dean was trying to get to South Korea by air. He was aboard one of the C54s denied permission to land at Pusan on July 2. -- Idiots, if they were on the way, left them land, stop anyone else from taking off -----

After returning to Japan, he got in a C45 (a small twin-engine "executive" aircraft) with the goal of landing farther north at Taejŏn.

[note]

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Twenty-four hours later they (24th Reg.) sailed from Sasebo, Kyushu, arriving in Pusan that evening [note]

That night, 2 July, Smith received an order to take his men north by train to P'yŏngt'aek and Ansŏng. The former is 15 miles south, and the latter 20 miles southeast, of Osan. Smith loaded his men into trains and they rolled north into the night. One company dug in at P'yŏngt'aek; the other at Ansŏng 12 miles away. Smith established his command post with the group at P'yŏngt'aek on the main highway. [note]


At Pusan on the evening of July 2 Task Force Smith boarded a train and headed north, arriving at Taejŏn the following morning, July 3,

[note]

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Owing to budget cuts in the U.S. Navy, the units of the 24th Division which moved to South Korea by ship had to scrounge transportation. The commander of the 34th Regiment, Jay Lovless, was lucky. He found some ships at the Navy base in Sasebo and embarked on the night of July 1 - the first day of the vaunted airlift - arriving in Pusan the following evening, July 2, with some elements of the division's 52nd Field Artillery Battalion (or FAB)* commanded by West Pointer (1931) Miller O. Perry.

Thus the 34th - not the 21st, as intended - became the "first" full (as then constituted) regiment to reach South Korea. The remainder of Stephens's 21st and some artillery elements, embarking at Moji and Sasebo, had a very hard time finding ships. At Sasebo, Fritz Mudgett remembered, he had to commandeer three "filthy" Japanese freighters, recently employed in returning Russian held Japanese POWs from Manchuria, plus two LSTs, on "loan" to the so-called Japanese Defense Force. "It was a hell of a way to go to war," Mudgett wrote.[4-28]


*An Army division of 1950 was authorized four artillery battalions of about 500 men each, manning 18 howitzers (in three batteries, A, B, C) per battalion. Three of the artillery battalions directly supported the three infantry regiments with 105mm howitzers. The fourth artillery battalion, equipped with longer-range 155mm howitzers (in three batteries, A, B, C), provided additional support to any or all three regiments or to other divisions nearby. [note]

2030 Korean Time

The train with Task Force Smith aboard arrived at Taejŏn the next morning, 0800 2 July.

There Lt. Col. LeRoy Lutes, a member of ADCOM, met Colonel Smith and took him to General Church's headquarters where the general was in conference with several American and ROK officers. Church greeted Smith and, pointing to a place on the map, explained,

"We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to move you up to support the ROKs and give them moral support." [06-8]


Colonel Smith then suggested that he would like to go forward and look over the ground. While his men went to their bivouac area, Smith and his principal officers got into jeeps and set out over the eighty miles of bad, bumpy roads to Osan. All along the way they saw thousands of ROK soldiers and refugees cluttering the roads and moving south.


Three miles north of Osan, at a point where the road runs through a low saddle, drops down, and bends slightly northwest toward Suwŏn, Smith found an excellent infantry position which commanded both the highway and the railroad. An irregular ridge of hills crossed the road at right angles, the highest point rising about 300 feet above the low ground which stretched northward toward Suwŏn. From this high point both the highway and railroad were in view almost the entire distance to Suwŏn, eight miles to the north.


After looking over the ground, Smith issued verbal orders for organizing a position there. A flight of enemy fighters, red stars plainly visible on their wings, passed overhead, but their pilots apparently did not see the few men below.
Its purpose accomplished, the group returned to the Taejŏn airstrip well after dark [2030]. (thats 12 hours later?) [note]

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"On the evening of July 2nd, the battery loaded onto a train and proceeded north to the rendezvous at P'yŏngt'aek on the 3rd. It wasn't quite as simple as it sounds. First, we had to find the railroad cars, then we had to load the battery on the cars and figure out how to tie down the equipment with grass ropes. [note]

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Korean_War

Sun Rise 0514 1953
Moon Rise 2212 0724
Moon Phase 89% 17days

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Casualties

Saturday July 02, 1950 (Day 007)

Korean_War 001 Casualties

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 15 18 0 0 0 33
Today 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 16 18 0 0 0 34

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Sunday July 2, 1950 - Day 7