Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.6°C 76.28°F at Taegu [note]

Rainy, windy weather [note] [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Taegu)

Overview

Inch'ŏn
captured by North Koreans.

[note]

ROK forces mistakenly attacked by US and Australian Air Units

[note]

July 3 - South Korean forces mistakenly attacked by Australian and U.S. air forces. [note]

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, 24th Infantry Division commander, arrives in Korea ahead of the rest of the division.

-- Planes from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and the HMS triumph carry out the first carrier attacks against North Korea by hitting airfields around P'yŏngyang and Chinnam. (Chinnamp'o, North Korea )

-- The 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C., is the only division fully manned and trained for combat, according to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson.

-- The Joint Chiefs of Staff decide to send Marine ground and air units to Korea. The 1st Marine Division will probably be selected, along with the 1st Marine Air Wing.

-- The Detroit Chamber of Commerce said the $3,345 annual average salary ($278.75 per mo.) of plant workers in the area make them the highest paid in the country.

[note]

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Three SB-17's were utilized this date for weather recon and orbit missions. Total flying time for these aircraft was twenty two hours and fifty minutes (22:50).

One SB-17 was airborne for one hour and forty five (1:45) on a false alert. At 1945/K ADCC notified us that a C-47 was overdue. At 2050/K the missing C-47 was found on the ramp at Ashiya Air Base. Two (2) false alerts this date.

[note]

July 3: FEAF continued to airlift US Army troops to Korea but substituted smaller C-46s and C-47s for C-54s, which damaged the Pusan runways. Pilots of four F-80s on the first mission with external rockets reported excessive drag that shortened their range.

[note]

[note]

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Lieutenant (jg) Leonard H. Plog and Ensign Elton W. Brown, Jr.

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On 3 July, the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE), Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, promulgated his Operation Order 7-50, which directed the ships of Amphibious Group 1, designated Task Force 90, to move the 24th Infantry Division by sea to Pusan or some other designated port.

COMNAVFE reported directly to MacArthur. Joy’s forces consisted, aside from TF 90, only of Task Force 96:

It controlled various Japanese-manned ships, mostly former U.S. Navy tank landing ships (LSTs), which were owned by Shipping Control Administration, Japan and had been used for logistic support of the occupation and for repatriating Japanese POWs from the Asian continent. Naval base facilities comprised a minor ship-repair facility at Yokosuka, a small supply section, an ordnance facility, and a hundred-bed hospital.

The Naval Air Facility at Yokosuka supported two seaplanes (loaned by the Seventh Fleet) for search and rescue, which, along with one target-towing plane for antiaircraft gunnery training, exhausted land-based air. Operations plans focused on passive defense, security under air attack, and evacuation of American citizens in an emergency, on the assumption that any future war would be with the Soviet Union and centered elsewhere. Day-to-day activities principally involved mine clearance of Japanese ports and showing the flag.

[note]

Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, duly assumed operational control of the Seventh Fleet, issuing Operation Order 5-50 as the basic order for Korean operations and also, on 3 July, Operation Order 8-50, directing a naval blockade of Korea south of forty-one degrees north latitude. Struble was senior to Joy, and their relations had never been entirely cordial. Previously, this had not been a problem, given the separation of their commands. Now the Korean emergency had placed them in a close working relationship, which gave Struble considerable heartburn. Figure 1 shows the Far East Command structure in effect on 1 July 1950.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

The 34th Infantry, as part of the 24th Division, arrived in Korea on July 3 with 1,898 officers and enlisted men. The 1st Battalion numbered just over 600 men, and the 3rd (there was no 2nd) had about 640. A full U.S. Army battalion normally numbered 900 troops. [note]

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Photo #: NH 96976
USS Valley Forge (CV-45)
Flight deck crewmen wheel carts of rockets past a Vought F4U-4B fighter, while arming planes for strikes against North Korean targets in July 1950.

[note]

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Five Royal Australian Air Force F51s accidentally attacked ROK troops between Osan and Suwŏn during their second day in combat. [note]


"Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Leonard H. Plog, flying a F9F Panther jet fighter, shot down a Yak9P, claiming the first US Navy aerial victory of the Korean War." [note]

South then North

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Of immediate benefit to close ground support were the two tactical air control parties from the Fifth Air Force that arrived at Taejŏn on 3 July.

[note]

The first U.N. carrier-based air strike of the war came on 3 July by planes from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and the British HMS Triumph (R16), of Vice Admiral Struble's Seventh Fleet, against the airfields of the P'yŏngyang-Chinnamp'o west coast area. [05-13]

[note]

After securing Yŏngdŭngp'o (K-16) on 3 July, the N.K. 4th Division prepared to continue the attack south.

[note]

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After Task Force Smith had left Japan the rest of the 21st Infantry Regiment, except A and D Companies which sailed from Moji, loaded at Sasebo 3 July and departed for Pusan, arriving there early the next morning. [06-12]

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[06-Caption] ROAD LEADING TO Suwŏn is visible for eight miles from the Task Force Smith position near Osan.

[note]

The next afternoon [7/3] two LST's arrived with equipment. All that night loading went on at the railroad station. [note]

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This division [N.K. 7th Division. ] was activated on 3 July 1950; its troops included 2,000 recruits and the 7th Border Constabulary Brigade of 4,000 men. An artillery regiment had joined this division at Kaesŏng near the end of July. [note]

Scotty: "During the trip north to P'yŏngt'aek, we were strafed by enemy air. I had been strafed during World War II, but my troops had never been in combat. We arrived at P'yŏngt'aek after dark, and the town had been bombed and most of the village was in flames. [note]


Scotty: "While in Japan, I suddenly received an order to prepare 10 jeeps and trailers along with 50 soldiers to be airlifted to Korea. We were told that the North Korean Army had attacked south and that we would pick up Korean howitzers and join Task Force Smith in Korea. We scurried around the compound, packing all the ammunition we could carry and other necessities in the trailers.


"At the last minute, our orders were changed and we were told that an LST [landing ship, tank] had been located and would arrive that evening for us to load out the complete battery.

The LST could land in our motor park because Camp Hakata had been a Japanese seaplane base and the motor park road dropped directly into the bay.

We sailed by ship out of Fukouka on 2 July 1950 for Pusan, Korea. During the sea trip, we test-fired weapons and performed general maintenance.


"On the evening of July 2nd, the battery loaded onto a train and proceeded north to the rendezvous at P'yŏngt'aek on the 3rd.

It wasn't quite as simple as it sounds. First, we had to find the railroad cars, then we had to load the battery on the cars and figure out how to tie down the equipment with grass ropes.


"During the trip north to P'yŏngt'aek, we were strafed by enemy air. I had been strafed during World War II, but my troops had never been in combat. We arrived at P'yŏngt'aek after dark [on the 3rd] , and the town had been bombed and most of the village was in flames. [note]

on July 3, after the fog had cleared, friendly fighters strafed and bombed ROK forces at P'yŏngt'aek and Suwŏn, destroying a nine car ROK ammo train, the P'yŏngt'aek depot (and half the town), the Suwŏn depot, and thirty ROK trucks. More than 200 ROK soldiers - and uncounted civilians - had been killed in these uncoordinated and careless air attacks.[4-39] [note]

Where were they two days from now??????

US Air Force

 

 

Radioed Vandenberg for full colonel to be head of my PIO as section must be augmented and a colonel needed. Colonel Van Meter doing a superb job. Received information from SAC [Strategic Air Command] that the 22d and 92d Bomb Groups (Medium) were being alerted for service in the Far East. [60-SAC units, the 22d BG came from March AFB, and the 92d BG from Spokane AFB. When Lt Gen Curtis E. LeMay took command of SAC in October 1948, he insisted on a high standard of training. He also insisted that his units be mobile and prepared to fight anywhere in the world. Still, LeMay said later that these two units had been low-priority units that were neither fully manned nor combat-ready for the overall strategic war plan. However, the movement of these two groups proved SAC’s mobility plans were sound. (It should be noted that the movement of these groups was aided considerably by the use of seven commercial carriers to move both personnel and cargo. Air Force airlift capability was still hindered by peacetime cutbacks.) The two groups began leaving their stateside bases on July 5. On July 13, they flew their first combat missions. (Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 50, Vol. I, pp 15-20.)] Have queried Twentieth and Thirteenth [Air Forces] re sites. Mission reports for day meager.  Those reports that are in indicate heavy traffic moving south. Lost an F-80; shot down by tank fire. The 24th Infantry under General Dean in Korea or in transit.  Our ground forces and those of the North Koreans should clash within the next day or two. Suwon reported holding; heavy fires observed about that airfield.

[note]

 

 

** - This section is reproduced with slight change from the monograph prepared by the Historical Branch, SAC, The Deployment of Strategic Air Command Units to the Far East, July-August 1950, pp. 6-17.

On 3 July after General Omar Bradley had obtained approval from the President and Secretary of Defense, the JCS ordered two medium bombardment groups from SAC's Fifteenth Air Force to temporary duty with FEAF. Although their diversion was a considerable cost to the USAF's over-all strategic capabilities, General Vandenberg sent them out primarily because of

"the vital necessity of destruction of North Korean objectives north of the 38th parallel." "While I do not presume to discuss specific targets," he wrote General Stratemeyer , "it is axiomatic that tactical operations on the battlefield cannot be fully effective unless there is a simultaneous interdiction and destruction of sources behind the battlefield."

[note]

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Air Force-Navy Coordination in Close Support

Defects in the control system were most obvious when naval carriers moved into South Korean waters to augment Fifth Air Force close support. On 3 July the fast carrier USS Valley Forge (CV-45), the first of a number of carriers to be made available to Admiral Joy, ** went into action, but it retired to replenish after continued strikes against interdiction targets on the next day.

** - The arrival and departure of aircraft carriers in the Far East during 1945 was as follows -

[note]

Tactical Build-up in Korea and Kyushu - Airfields

Pusan in the early stages of planning seemed to offer acceptable possibilities for a jet airfield. However, Colonel Shoemaker on 3 July found that the runway, mere concrete wash on four inches of rubble, was rapidly breaking up under transport traffic. The north end of the runway, moreover, was at the water level of surrounding rice paddies. So situated, the field offered almost nothing in the way of dispersal parking or cantonment areas. Shoemaker set up a small detachment to keep the airfield in some degree of repair and got the field closed to planes heavier than C-47 's. Using Korean conscripts and when this proved unsatisfactory locally contracted workers, the detachment kept the airfield patched up on a day-to-day basis until other airfields were available for use.

[note]


Australian F-51 's of 77 Squadron strafed ROK vehicles on the road between P'yŏngt'aek and Osan on 3 July, at a time before ROK equipment was marked with the distinctive white star.

[note]

Existence of FEAF and NAVFE on coequal status within the command structure without a joint representation of Air Force and Navy on the GHQ fec staff, would prevent any unified command of the air operations over Korea. Without some form of centralized control, the mass of Air Force and Navy Air could not be effectively employed in the attack, and with Air Force and Navy air commanders choosing their targets independently, flying over Korea could actually become hazardous. On 3 and 4 July, for example, Task Force 77 struck targets in Korea, making attacks in an area into which FEAF had ordered a B-29 attack for the same day. FEAF learned of the projected Navy attack on the 4th, too late to draw up another operations order for its B-29's, with the result that the medium bombers had to stand down on this date.

[note]

After its initial aggressiveness over Kimp'o and Suwŏn in the opening days of hostilities, the NKAF declined rapidly in effectiveness, but not without making determined efforts to assist the ground campaign. Minor strafing attacks were directed against the HMS Black Swan and two ROK vessels on 3 July, and four Yaks dropped anti-personnel bombs on ROK troops south of Kimp'o, killing 68 ROK soldiers.

On 4 July aircraft knocked out a communications repeater station near Osan.


Four planes strafed and bombed Chŏnju on 11 July, and the next day two Yaks destroyed a B-29 near Sŏul, while two others shot down an L-4 and attacked F-80 's near Choch'iwŏn.

[note]

The Fifth Air Force formed its operations section for the JOC at Itazuke on 3 July, drawing officers from Fifth Air Force headquarters and airmen from the 8th Communications Squadron, in all, 10 officers and 35 airmen. [note]


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The United Nations' decision to resist aggression in Korea with armed force posed new and complex problems to a world organization which lacked any staff capable of directing military operations and possessed no international police force.

Looking toward an answer to both of these deficiencies on 3 July 1950, Secretary General Trygve Lie circulated a draft resolution which he hoped the Security Council might be willing to adopt.

This resolution requested the United States to assume the responsibility for directing such armed forces as United Nations member states might furnish in response to the resolution of 27 June. It also proposed to establish a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea.#

Lie urged that this committee was necessary both to stimulate and coordinate offers of assistance and to provide some measure of supervision for the United Nations military security action in Korea. Lie suggested that the members of the committee would represent the nations who furnished troops to fight in Korea. Delegates of Britain, France, and Norway liked the idea of the supervisory committee, but Lie recorded that the United States "promptly turned thumbs down.#1

While Lie was circulating his draft resolution, the American Departments of State and Defense were jointly preparing another draft resolution, which accepted the essence of Lie's proposal less the provision for the committee on coordination.

[note]

Acting on his own initiative, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the USAF Chief of Staff, had secured approval [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ] on 3 July to move two medium bombardment groups-the 22nd and 92nd-from the Strategic Air Command's Fifteenth Air Force to temporary duty with FEAF.

This diversion was a considerable cost to the SAC's strategic capabilities, but General Vandenberg sent the groups out primarily because of

"the vital necessity of destruction of North Korean objectives north of the 38th parallel.#
"While I do not presume to discuss specific targets," he informed General Stratemeyer, "it is axiomatic that tactical operations on the battle-field cannot be fully effective unless there is a simultaneous interdiction and destruction of sources behind the battlefield. #32

[note]

On 3 July he directed the Thirteenth Air Force to form such a squadron from the most apt personnel of the 18th Group and to send the squadron-which would be called "Dallas"-to Johnson Air Base for equipment with Mustangs.#101



Korean mechanics work on the engine of an ROK F-51.
Having made the plans to employ the forces he had available.

[note]

With a few important exceptions, USAF would have to support the initial year of Korean hostilities from stored stocks of equipment left over from World War II.

On 3 July General Vandenberg secured approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to move the 22nd and 92nd Bombardment Groups (Medium) from the United States to the Far East. This more than met FEAF's request for an additional B-29 group. But other divergences between FEAF's requirements and USAF's capabilities were so wide that General Vandenberg dispatched a team of officers, headed by Lt. Gen. K. B. Wolfe, USAF's Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, to the Far East.

[note]



From Tokyo General Partridge sent word that he wanted the advanced echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters to move to Pusan and become operational not later than 8 July,#6

#6
Msg. AX-2004, CG FEAF to COMAF 5, 3 July 1950.

[note]


Although he could not yet move the advanced echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters to Korea, General Partridge was anxious to open a Joint Operations Center at Taejŏn.#9

At Itazuke, on 3 July, General Timberlake accordingly organized a combat operations section, drawing officers from the advanced echelon and airmen from the 8th Communications Squadron, in all, 10 officers and 35 airmen. Lt. Col. John R. Murphy was named officer-in-charge of the operations section, and he moved his personnel and equipment to Taejŏn on 5 and 6 July, and set up for business at the 24th Division's headquarters in an office adjoining the division G-3. Later on FEAF would say that the JOC opened at Taejŏn on 5 July, #10 [note]

As the forward elements of the 24th Division advanced northward from Taejŏn to engage the enemy, Lieutenants Chermak and Duerksen joined the advanced command posts on 3 and 4 July. Here they immediately began to run into trouble. "The weather was .. . murky, ceiling was on the ground," recalled Duerksen. Chermak's radio broke down, and he had to go back to Taejŏn for another jeep. [note]

In view of the confusion, some mishaps were almost inevitable. Such a mishap occurred on 3 July, when five RAAF No. 77 Squadron Mustangs in their second day of combat erroneously attacked ROK troops between Osan and Suwŏn.

What had happened was that Fifth Air Force advance headquarters had received a report of a Communist convoy headed southward, but the message had passed through Tokyo and had not reached the operating level for some several hours after it was filed.

Noting this delay, Fifth Air Force operations officers estimated where the North Korean convoy would probably be found at the hour of the Mustang attack.

Unfortunately, ROK troops were holding the positions where it was thought that the North Koreans would be.#34 [note]

Launching its first strikes of the Korean war, Task Force 77 attacked the airfields at P'yŏngyang and Onjong-ni on 3 and 4 July. The carrier pilots shot two Yaks out of the air and damaged ten other planes on the ground in the two-day assault.#87 [note]

*General Stratemeyer had issued positive orders cautioning against any violation of the Manchurian or Siberian borders on 3 July and again on 14 August 1950. Some errors nevertheless occurred, though not so many as the Communists alleged. Two American Mustang pilots apparently strayed across the border and strafed a Red Chinese airstrip near Antung on 27 August. [note]


"While I do not presume to discuss specific targets," General Vandenberg informed General Stratemeyer on 3 July, "it is axiomatic that tactical operations on the battlefield cannot be fully effective unless there is a simultaneous interdiction and destruction of sources behind the battlefield." A year later General Vandenberg offered these same thoughts to congressional investigators.

"The proper way to use air-power," he said, "is initially to stop the flow of supplies and ammunition, guns, equipment of all types, at its source."#1


#1 Msg. TS-1814, CofS USAF to CG FEAF, 3 July 1950; 82nd Cong. 1st Sess., Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1382.

But in early July 1950 it was already evident that the North Korean People's Army was drawing a major proportion of its logistical support from Communist production centers beyond the borders of Korea, sources which were off limits to American strategic bombers.

Although USAF commanders recognized that strategic air attacks aimed at the enemy's military, industrial, political, and economic system could not be decisive in Korea, they also knew that North Korea's industries had made very important contributions to Japan's war effort in the world-wide struggle which had concluded in 1945. American intelligence in 1950 could not say whether North Korea's industrial potential had the same capability to support the Red Korean war effort as it had offered to the Japanese. Whether the industries had fallen into disuse, had been dismantled by the materiel-hungry Russians, or were operating at reduced capacity would have to be determined by aerial reconnaissance.#2


#2 Hist. FEAF BomCom, July-Oct. 1950, I, 5.


Any industries in North Korea operating directly or indirectly in support of the Red regime's war effort, however, had to be destroyed at the earliest possible moment. Under no circumstances could the Red Koreans be allowed the luxury of an uninterrupted industrial system in support of their military forces in the field.

As soon as the 22nd and 92nd Bombardment Groups were ordered to the Far East, the Directorate of Intelligence of the Strategic Air Command instituted a "crash" project looking toward the recommendation of strategic targets and target systems in North Korea.

This Strategic Air Command intelligence research soon showed North Korea to have five major industrial centers: Wŏnsan, P'yŏngyang, Hŭngnam (Konan), Ch'ŏngjin (Seishin), and Rashin (Najin).

With the exception of P'yŏngyang, all of these industrial centers were on the northeastern coast of Korea. Wŏnsan was a major seaport and railway center and the site of petroleum refining in Korea. The Chosen Oil Refinery on the south edge of Wŏnsan's harbor was the largest Korean oil refinery and one of the largest in Asia. Five miles northwest of the city the Rising Sun Petroleum Company had a large petroleum tank farm. Wŏnsan's port and dock area could accommodate ocean-going vessels; its railroad yards were one of the three most important rail hubs in Korea; and its locomotive shops were the second largest rail-repair and manufacturing establishment in Korea. P'yŏngyang, the capital of the North Korean regime, was also the army arsenal center of Korea. Second in size in Asia to the Mukden arsenal in Manchuria, P'yŏngyang's armaments plants produced rifles, automatic weapons, ammunition, artillery shells, grenades, bombs and mines, and military vehicles. P'yŏngyang had large freight yards and a major railway shop which manufactured and repaired rolling stock.

184 U.S. Air Force in Korea


The old Showa Aircraft Factory and the air section of the arsenal were believed to be the center of North Korea's aircraft maintenance and supply. On the northeastern coast of Korea the Hungnam (Konan) area constituted the most extensive basic-chemical and light-metals production complex in the Far East. In the environs of Hungnam were located the Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Company, the Chosen Nitrogen Explosives Factory, and the Bogun (Motomiya) Chemical Plant. In the mountainous northeastern section of Korea the port city of Ch'ŏngjin (Seishin) possessed two major harbors, important railway yards and workshops, the Japan Iron Works, and the Mitsubishi Iron Company. Far to the northeast and only sixty miles from Vladivostok was the important port and naval base of Rashin (Najin), whose naval oil-storage facilities and railway yards were of significance both to the North Koreans and the Russians.

In addition to the major industrial complexes at Wŏnsan, P'yŏngyang, Hungnam, Ch'ŏngjin and Rashin, North Korea held a few other more scattered strategic objectives. On Korea's west coast, at the mouth of the Taedong River, Chinnamp'o harbor had anchorage for ships of any draft. In the city were the Chosen Riken Metals Plant, producing aluminum and magnesium, and the Japan Mining Company Smelter, producer of copper and low-grade zinc. The Kyŏmip'o Steel Plant, ten miles east of Chinnamp'o on the Taedong River, produced pig iron and steel. On the east coast at Sŏngjin other metals plants produced high-grade steels. In order to supply energy to the chemical and light-metals industries, the Japanese had built in North Korea one of the world's principal hydroelectric complexes.

On the shallow western slopes of the spinal mountains of the eastern coast the Japanese had built storage dams; they had tunneled through the drainage divide and dropped stored water down the precipitous eastern mountain slopes through penstocks to a series of generating plants. There were five of these eastern power systems:

Fusen,

Chosin,

Kyosen,

Funei, and

Kongosan.

At Sui-ho, on the Yalu River about 30 miles northeast of Antung, the Japanese had developed the world's fourth largest hydroelectric power project. Unlike the east-coast facilities, Sui-ho had an impounding dam with adjacent powerhouses, and it exploited a large volume of water rather than head for its hydraulic pressure. Ever since May 1948, when the Red Koreans had cut off power transmissions south of the 38th parallel, North Korea had possessed a surplus of electrical power for export to the Communist nations of the Far East. Nearly half of Sui-ho's output of 300,000 kilowatts powered Chinese Communist factories in Manchuria.#3


#3 Ibid., Hist. FEAF BomCom, July-Oct. 1950, I, 2-22.


As soon as intelligence officers established the magnitude of North Korea's industrial development, the Strategic Air Command gave thought to target priorities and force requirements. Under normal circumstances, strategic target priorities are calculated in terms of the immediacy of the effect of their destruction on an enemy's ability to wage war: thus direct war-supporting industries would be in first priority, end-product or general industries in second priority, and basic-processes industries in third priority. Because of the relative smallness of the five main areas of industrial concentration in North Korea, however, the Strategic Air Command's director of intelligence recommended attacks by area rather than by target systems.

Since all priority targets were close together, a minimum number of raids would eliminate all targets within areas more quickly than would scattered attacks against targets in a given target system. Computation of force requirements involved such matters as weather forecasts, the bombing techniques to be used, and the type of munitions to be employed. The Strategic Air Command recognized that most North Korean target areas could be most efficiently destroyed with a predominant employment of incendiary bombs.

Using less accurate radar aiming, the medium-bomber crews could direct incendiary bombs against area targets by day or night, regardless of target weather. Fire-bomb raids would not only destroy the major industrial targets but would eliminate many subsidiary factories near the major plants. But the Strategic Air Command had some doubt as to whether fire raids would be acceptable in Korea, and it accordingly devised twin plans: one involving the employment of incendiaries against the target areas, the other foreseeing the employment of demolition bombs in precision attacks against the industrial plants.#4

[note]

US Marine Corps

Task Force 77, ranging along the west coast, gave P'yŏngyang its first large-scale bombing on 3 July.

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Gull-winged F4U Corsairs, leading off from the Valley Forge flight deck with 5-inch rockets, were followed by AD Skyraiders and new Douglas dive bombers [???? the AD again ???]. Bridges and railway yards were destroyed by raiders who shot down two YAK-type planes in the air and destroyed two on the ground.

Along the east coast the USS Juneau (CLAA-119) and other warships of the Anglo-American blockading force patrolled the enemy’s MSR, which followed the shoreline. Salvos from the cruisers, fired at the sheer cliffs, loosed avalanches of earth and rock to block the highway. Railways were mined and tunnels dynamited by commando parties landing from ships’ boats.

The combined U. N. efforts inflicted heavy material and personnel losses while slowing up the NKPA offensive. But it is a testimonial to Soviet and Red Korean preparations for aggression that the army of invasion kept on rolling. There was even some prospect late in July that the enemy would yet make good his boast of being able to take Pusan within 2 months in spite of United States intervention. [note]

Two days later General Cates “attended SecNav’s conference.” And on 3 July his calendar recorded more history:

“Attended JCS meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.”[12]

The steps leading up to this decision may be traced back to the conference of 28 June,

[note]

This is an example of how units were assembled at Pendleton and El Toro. Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, appointed commanding officer of VMO–6 on 3 July, had orders to ready his squadron for shipment overseas by the 11th.

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OY-USMC

Thus he had just 48 hours, after the arrival of the Quantico contingent, in which to weld the elements of his outfit together. Among his other problems, Gottschalk had to grapple with the fact that there were not enough OY’s in good condition at El Toro. He found a solution by taking eight of these light observation planes overseas with a view to cannibalizing four of them for parts when the need arose.[19] [note]

Task Force 77, ranging along the west coast, gave P'yŏngyang its first large-scale bombing on 3 July. [note]

After beginning the reorganization of the ROK forces, it was absorbed on 3 July by Headquarters, U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. And with the establishment next day of the Pusan Logistical Command (Brigadier General Crump Garvin, USA), a start was made toward handling the mountains of supplies which would be required.[16] [note]

US Navy

3 July

Planes of Seventh Fleet and British FES ships began carrier operations off west coast of North Korea as ordered by COMNAVFE on 30 June. [note]

USS Valley Forge (CV-45) deployed to the Far East, departing the west coast on 1 May 1950. While anchored in Hong Kong harbor on 25 June, the warship received electrifying news that North Korean forces had begun streaming across the 38th parallel into South Korea. Departing Hong Kong the next day, the carrier steamed south to Subic Bay, where she provisioned, fueled, and set her course for Korea.

The first carrier air strike of the Korean conflict was launched from Valley Forge's flight deck on 3 July 1950. Outnumbered and outgunned, the South Korean troops battled desperately against veritable tides of Communist invaders. Waves of Douglas AD Skyraiders and Vought F4U Corsairs struck the North Korean airfield at P'yŏngyang while Grumman F9F-2 Panthers flew top cover. Tons of bombs from the attacking American planes pounded hangars, fuel storages, parked Russian-built aircraft, and railroad marshaling yards. Meanwhile, the escorting Panthers downed two Yak-9s and damaged another.

[note]

The first carrier air strike of the Korean conflict was launched from Valley Forge's flight deck on 3 July 1950. Outnumbered and outgunned, the South Korean troops battled desperately against veritable tides of communist invaders. Waves of Douglas AD Skyraiders and Vought F4U Corsairs struck the North Korean airfield at P'yŏngyang while Grumman F9F-2 Panthers flew top cover. Tons of bombs from the attacking American planes pounded hangars, fuel storages, parked Russian-built aircraft, and railroad marshalling yards. Meanwhile, the escorting Panthers downed two Yak-9's and damaged another. [note]

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USS Valley Forge (CV 45) launched the first carrier air strikes in Korea.

[note]

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Carrier aircraft went into action in Korea for the first time. USS Valley Forge (CV-45) with Air Group 5, and HMS Triumph (R16) operating in the Yellow Sea, launched strikes on airfields, supply lines and transportation facilities in and around P'yŏngyang, northwest of Sŏul. This was the first combat test for the Grumman F9F Panther and the Douglas AD Skyraider. It was also the occasion for the first Navy kills in aerial combat during the war and the first shoot-down by a Navy jet, as F9F pilots of VF-51 Lieutenant (jg) Leonard H. Plog and Ensign Elton W. Brown, Jr. shot down two Yak-9s on the first strike over P'yŏngyang. [note]

and on the 3rd USS Greenlet (ASR-10) and her three charges sailed in company for Yokosuka. [note]

Escort of shipping between Japan and Korea had so far been on a wholly catch-as-catch-can basis: Arikara and Shoalhaven had been so used on 1 and 2 July, HMS Jamaica (C-44) and USS Collett (DD-730) on the 3rd.

[note]

At Buckner Bay new orders were received, and on the 3rd USS Greenlet (ASR-10) and her three charges sailed in company for Yokosuka.


The hasty redeployment of the Seventh Fleet also affected the patrol planes, and the homeward voyage of Patrol Squadron 47, so recently begun, was destined not to be completed. The two Mariners at Yokosuka were at once assigned to local antisubmarine patrol; those en route and those which had reached Pearl Harbor were recalled to the Western Pacific. One plane was lost in an accident at Guam, when it missed its buoy, grounded, and sank,

[note]

Two more organizational problems faced Admiral Joy in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June and ordered by the President next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50 promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96. [note]

The 3rd of July saw a number of dispersed skirmishes around the Korean coastline. Along the convoluted western shore Communist activities had extended far south of the formal battleline, and in the evening the ROK YMS 513 caught and sank three small boats unloading military supplies at Chulpo. On the east coast Juneau finished off the ammunition trawlers at Chumunjin, and the British frigate Black Swan was subjected to the first enemy air attack of the war. [note]

7/3

Gimcheon (YMS 513; formerly HMS BYMS-2258; transferred to South Korea in 1948)

Korean_War

From the time of the warning order, division and wing staffs had been hard at work on the problems of mounting out the brigade. The task of bringing the various components up to authorized war strength was complicated by the fact that the summer period of leave and transfer had begun, and by a directive of 3 July from the Commandant of the Corps which required that all sergeants and below whose enlistments would expire before March be transferred and left behind. But leaves were cancelled and transfers rescinded, and not all of the enlisted personnel were willing to accept this high-handed treatment by headquarters. [note]

In the course of the first week of July American infantrymen had made contact with the enemy, the 24th Division had completed its movement to Korea, and the 25th Division had begun its embarkation.

The Air Force had carried out attacks against the invading army and against targets of opportunity. A carrier strike had been flown against the North Korean capital, and the gunnery ships of Naval Forces Japan, augmented by British units, had continued their bombardment of the enemy’s east coast invasion route.

This week saw also the commencement of planning for the first amphibious operation of the campaign.

Admiral Doyle had brought his ships into Sasebo on 3 July only to find that his prospective passengers had already departed.

[note]

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[note]

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[note]


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Just after midnight, 3 July, he [General MacArthur] dispatched a message to Washington stating that an effective blockade required patrolling the ports (north to south) of Najin, Ch'ŏngjin, and Wŏnsan on the east coast, (and south to north0 Inch'ŏn, Chinnamp'o, Anju, and Sonch'ŏn on the west coast, and any South Korean ports that might fall to the North Koreans.

In order to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and the USSR, General MacArthur said, however, that he would not blockade the ports of Najin, Ch'ŏngjin, and Sonch'ŏn. On the east coast he planned naval patrols to latitude 41° north and on the west coast to latitude 38° 30' north. General MacArthur said his naval forces would be deployed on 4 July to institute the blockade within the limits of his existing naval forces. [05-10]

[note]

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General MacArthur on 3 July requested that the new 3.5" rocket launcher be airlifted to Korea.

The first of the launchers, together with an instruction team, left Travis Air Force Base in California on 8 July and arrived at Taejŏn on the 10th. The first delivery of the new weapon arrived at Taejŏn on 12 July. That same day selected members of the 24th Infantry Division began to receive instructions in its use. The 3.5-inch rocket launcher was made of aluminum and weighed about fifteen pounds. It looked like a 5-foot length of stovepipe. It was electrically operated and fired a 23-inch-long, eight-and-a-half-pound rocket from its smooth bore, open tube. The rocket's most destructive feature was the shaped charge designed to burn through the armor of any tank then known. [11-26]

[note]

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After spending 24 hours becoming acquainted with conditions, he telephoned from Taejŏn to Tokyo and spoke with General Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ. Wanting his initial fight with the North Koreans to be fully coordinated and supported, he told Hickey, "This first show must be good.... We must get food and bullets and not go off half-cocked." A few hours later, MacArthur named Dean commanding general, USAFIK. Dean assumed control of KMAG and all other U.S. Army troops in Korea.

Church's GHQ, ADCOM, served as his temporary staff. At the same time, MacArthur set up the Pusan Base Command, subordinate to USAFIK and under Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin. [05-6]

The other regiments of the 24th Division-the 34th and 19th Infantry, and the remainder of the 21st Infantry, plus supporting units-moved to Korea rapidly.

[note]

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Since the evening of 1 July Task Force 77 had been steaming north from Buckner Bay, and by early morning of the 3rd Admiral Struble's Striking Force had reached the designated launching point. There, in the middle of the Yellow Sea, the force was some 150 miles from the target area, but only 100 miles from Chinese Communist airfields on the Shantung Peninsula and less than 200 miles from the Soviet air garrison at Port Arthur. The air defense problem, therefore, was potentially somewhat larger than the size of the North Korean Air Force would indicate; like the submarine situation, it required a certain investment in defensive measures. At 0500 USS Valley Forge (CV-45) launched combat and antisubmarine patrols;

0515 Korean Time

and 15 minutes later USS Valley Forge (CV-45) commenced launching her strike group. Sixteen Corsairs loaded with eight 5-inch rockets each, and 12 Skyraiders carrying i,60~ [1,600] pound bomb loads were launched against the P'yŏngyang airfield. When the propeller-driven attack planes had gained a suitable head start, USS Valley Forge (CV-45) catapulted eight F9F-2 Panthers, whose higher cruising speed would bring them in first over the target area. No serious opposition was encountered by the American jets as they swept in over the North Korean capital. Two Yaks were destroyed in the air, another was damaged, and nine aircraft were reported destroyed on the ground. For the enemy, this sudden appearance of jet fighters more than 400 miles from the nearest American airfield was both startling and salutary. Quite possibly, as one American commander observed, it may have deterred a sizable commitment of aircraft to North Korean bases.

Following the Panthers in, the Corsairs and Skyraiders bombed and rocketed hangars and fuel storage at the airfield. Both at P'yŏngyang and at Haeju enemy antiaircraft opposition was negligible, and no plane suffered serious damage.

[note]

He [General Collins] told the other members of the Joint Chiefs on 3 July that, as their executive agent for the Far East Command, he had taken action to send two battalions to General MacArthur. This was the maximum deployment of antiaircraft artillery he then believed could be made from the General Reserve without reducing the Army's ability to meet its emergency commitments. [note]

0514 Sun Rise

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beginning at 0545 HMS triumph flew off 12 Fireflies and 9 Seafires for an attack on the airfield at Haeju, [note]

Supermarine Seafires of No. 800 Naval Air Squadron and Fairey Firefly Mk 5's of No. 827 Sqn from HMS triumph fly the first non-US sortie over Korea.

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On 3 July the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated a proposed resolution to the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It suggested that the Government of the United States would direct the armed forces of member nations in Korea, but with the help of a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea." This committee would coordinate all offers of assistance, promote continuing participation in Korea by member nations, and receive reports from the field commander. The exact extent of its control was not stated in the proposal. [06-2] [note]

Without making contact with North Koreans, the two task forces from Colonel Smith's battalion had reached their assigned areas during the morning of 3 July. [note]

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On 2 July he asked Washington for a Marine RCT.

On the next day he ordered 1,200 specially trained operators for amphibious landing craft. [note]

Yŏngdŭngp'o fell to the division about 0800 3 July. ROK troops waged a bitter battle and North Korean casualties were heavy. The enemy 4th Division lost 227 killed, 1,822, wounded, and 107 missing in action at Yŏngdŭngp'o. [05-18]

The North Koreans fought the battle for Yŏngdŭngp'o without tank support and this may account in large part for the ROK troops' stubborn defense and excellent showing there. The first North Korean tanks crossed the Han River on 3 July after one of the railroad bridges had been repaired and decked for tank traffic. Four enemy tanks were on the south side by midmorning. [05-19] While the battle for Yŏngdŭngp'o was in progress, the remainder of the N.K. 3rd Division crossed the Han on 3 July. As the battle for Yŏngdŭngp'o neared its end, part of the N.K. 6th Division reached the edge of Inch'ŏn. That night an enemy battalion and six tanks entered the port city.

[note]

After a few hours' sleep he was airborne again, on the morning of July 3.

This time he found South Korea blanketed by a dense fog. Determined to find Taejŏn at any cost, the pilot dropped down to wave top level over the Yellow Sea, flew in beneath the fog and mist, and found the objective. Dean wrote: "I never thought I'd have so much trouble in getting to a war."[4-27]

[note]

At Pusan on the evening of July 2 Task Force Smith boarded a train and headed north, arriving at Taejŏn the following morning, July 3, just ahead of Bill Dean. By that time the NKPA had forced John Church and his ADCOM headquarters to retreat from Suwŏn to Taejŏn. When Smith reported to Church, the latter was still brimming with confidence, or overconfidence. He put his reedy finger on a map at Osan, a village south of Suwŏn, and laconically told Smith that all that was really required to stop the NKPA were some American GIs - men who would not run from tanks - to bolster the ROK Army.[4-29]

While Smith jeeped north to reconnoiter the terrain at Osan, a tired and frustrated Bill Dean arrived at Taejŏn and, as instructed by GHQ, took command of all American forces in South Korea from the tottery John Church. Studying the poor maps available, Dean rashly conceived a new and far more elaborate blocking plan. He put his finger on the village of P'yŏngt'aek, just south of Osan on the Sŏul–Pusan highway. As Dean saw it, P'yŏngt'aek was the key real estate. North of P'yŏngt'aek the advancing NKPA was confined to a fairly narrow corridor between Asan Bay, an arm of the Yellow Sea, and the mountains to the east, where there were few roads. South of P'yŏngt'aek the Korean peninsula opened up and spread westward, offering solid flat ground for a NKPA flanking movement. If he could hold at P'yŏngt'aek, Dean figured, the NKPA could be bottled up in the narrow corridor north of the village and denied the opportunity to spread west.[4-30]

The tactical scheme Dean evolved was as follows. Task Force Smith, reinforced by a battery of Perry's 52nd FAB, would take the positions chosen by John Church north of P'yŏngt'aek near Osan, on the main Sŏul–Pusan highway. Brad Smith would give the NKPA a bloody nose. Meanwhile, the two battalions of Jay Lovless's 34th, which had arrived in Pusan the night before, would move forward as soon as possible to man the P'yŏngt'aek "front." The 1/34 would dig in on the north side of P'yŏngt'aek at a "river" (actually a stream) crossing. The 3/34 would occupy Ansŏng, a village about eleven miles directly east of P'yŏngt'aek, where subsidiary north-south and east-west roads crossed, to hold the right flank in the foothills. In the event Task Force Smith could not hold, it would fall back through Osan to P'yŏngt'aek, reinforcing the 1/34. As other 24th Division infantry units arrived in Pusan - mainly the rest of Brad Smith's 1/21 and Delbert Pryor's 3/21 - they would rush north to reinforce this front.

[note]

While this scheme displayed an appropriate "can do" spirit for the Eighth Army spearhead, on analysis it could be characterized as foolhardy. It committed piecemeal three green, ill-equipped under strength battalions to the defense of three objectives eleven miles apart with scant or no communications between the units and only the haziest notion of how they might consolidate in event of a setback. A more prudent plan would have been to postpone the confrontation with the NKPA by one or two days at another, more defensible site, such as the Kum River, about thirty miles farther south. The postponement would have given Dean time to bring up his two "full" infantry regiments (comprising four battalions), the 21st and 34th, and one or two battalions of artillery. These regiments could have been deployed in consolidated positions behind the Kum River, linked to each other and to a divisional CP by a working communications net.

In drawing his plan, Dean, still convinced his mission would be "short and easy" - that the NKPA would bolt at the sight of American uniforms - overlooked or ignored a cardinal lesson of World Wars I and II: that even well trained, well equipped American divisions were skittish until bloodied. A consolidated line behind the Kum River, providing a sense of cohesion, would have minimized the insecurity as these ill-equipped and green troops entered battle for the first time.[4-31]

Dean's plan later was rationalized with the argument that it was necessary to meet the enemy in this forward thrusting fashion in order to "buy time" in which to get the remainder of the 24th Division and the full 25th Division to South Korea. However, a consolidated Kum River line might well have "bought" more "time" with less risk and fewer casualties.

* * *

As these plans were being translated into field orders, yet another American general arrived in Taejŏn. He was West Pointer (1918) George Bittman Barth, commander of the 25th Infantry Division artillery. He had come to fill in temporarily for Dean's artillery commander, Henry Meyer, who was rushing back from leave in the States. Barth, then fifty-two, was qualified as both an infantryman and artilleryman. He had made a splendid record in World War II first as chief of staff of the crack 9th Infantry Division in North Africa and Sicily, then as a courageous regimental commander in the trouble plagued 90th Infantry Division, which Gene Landrum had briefly commanded in the Cotentin. Barth had helped "save" the 90th Division (suffering a severe battle wound in the process), and for that he had earned the everlasting gratitude (plus a DSC) of VII Corps commander Joe Collins.[4-32]

[note]

The arrival of Barth raised the total number of senior Army ground commanders at the front in South Korea to five: four generals (Dean; his ADC, Pearson Menoher; Church; and Barth) and one colonel (Lovless). All were onetime European Theater commanders who were accustomed to fighting vast, mobile land battles across well-defined fronts, backed up by massive concentrations of artillery and good field communications. They tended to be "road bound." None had ever fought Asians. None had experience in guerrilla or "limited" warfare.[4-33]

Since Bill Dean had insufficient artillery to justify a fulltime job for Barth, he asked Barth to go to the P'yŏngt'aek-Ansŏng "front" to serve as his "eyes and ears." Barth promptly jeeped forward and found Task Force Smith, which had been reinforced by the 52nd FAB commander, Miller Perry. Perry had in tow one firing battery of six 105mm guns. Barth shared Dean's admiration for Brad Smith:

"Young, clean cut and vigorous, Smith was my man from the minute I saw him. He probably had no more real idea of what lay ahead than I did, but his quiet confidence gave the assurance that his men would give a good account of themselves in their first fight," even though Smith's force was "pitifully weak."[4-34]

As Task Force Smith moved north on the highway, bucking a sea of fleeing refugees and ROK soldiers, the men began to gripe. Like other American GIs before them, they found South Korea to be a miserable place. It was raining hard and, owing to some atmospheric fluke, cold. The rain had turned the dust, which layered all of South Korea, to sticky mud. The stink of human feces in the rice paddies was almost unbearably revolting. The headlong flight of the ROK soldiers was infuriating.[4-35]

Yet morale in Task Force Smith was high. As Barth wrote later, the GIs had an "overconfidence that bordered on arrogance." When they came upon a group of ROK engineers who were preparing some bridges for demolition to stop the march of NKPA tanks, Barth and Smith angrily upbraided the ROKs for cowardice and threw the explosives into a river. "No thought of retreat or disaster entered our minds," Barth wrote.[4-36]

[note]

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General Dean the next morning at Ashiya Air Base joined Capt. Ben L. Tufts on his way to Korea by General Almond's order to act as liaison between Army and the press. Tufts' pilot knew the Taejŏn airstrip and landed his plane there about 1030, 3 July. General Dean and Captain Tufts went directly to the two-story yellow brick building serving as General Church's ADCOM Headquarters. [06-13]

That afternoon a message from General MacArthur notified General Dean that United States Army Forces in Korea was activated under his command as of 0001 4 July. General Dean assumed command of USAFIK during the day and appointed General Church as Deputy Commander. Twenty-two other officers were named General and Special Staff officers of USAFIK. [06-14] ADCOM provided most of the officers for the USAFIK staff, but some KMAG officers also served on it.

[note]

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Using these sources, General Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, reported on 3 July that the Chinese had stationed two cavalry divisions and four armies in Manchuria. A Chinese army normally possessed about 30,000 men but this figure varied. [11-21] [note]

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at midday of the 3rd, while rounding the southwestern tip of Kyushu, visual sighting of a surfaced submarine was made. [note]


Early the next afternoon Admiral Joy's headquarters issued its Operation Order 7-50 assigning 16 Scajap LSTs to Admiral Doyle, and instructing him to lift the 24th Infantry Division, Major General William F. Dean, USA, from Fukuoka and Sasebo to Pusan.

Pursuant to this order CTF 90 got underway at once with USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), USS Cavalier (APA-37), and USS Union (AKA-106), escorted by HMS Hart (M-55), and headed for Sasebo.

Korean_War

7/3

The uncertainty which still existed as to the dimensions of this war was not diminished during the journey. Two doubtful sound contacts on submarines were reported by Hart, depth charges were dropped, and at midday of the 3rd, while rounding the southwestern tip of Kyushu, visual sighting of a surfaced submarine was made.

[note]

The 3rd of July saw a number of dispersed skirmishes around the Korean coastline. Along the convoluted western shore Communist activities had extended far south of the formal battleline, and in the evening the ROK YMS 513 caught and sank three small boats unloading military supplies at Chulpo. On the east coast Juneau finished off the ammunition trawlers at Chumunjin, and the British frigate Black Swan was subjected to the first enemy air attack of the war. [note]

"During the trip north to P'yŏngt'aek, we were strafed by enemy air. I had been strafed during World War II, but my troops had never been in combat. [note]

The afternoon of July 3rd, he finally reached the location where he would set up his initial position. Located on a ridgeline about three miles north of Osan (See maps on pages 70 and 71), the position had a panoramic view overlooking the countryside clear to Suwŏn nearly seven miles in the distance. It also provided an excellent view of the main highway and a railroad close by.

Reporting back to Church, Smith gathered his force that evening in Taejŏn and headed up the main highway to P'yŏngt'aek where he was joined by Battery A of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Miller O. Perry. The battery consisted of six 105mm howitzers, 73 vehicles and 108 men.[8] [note]

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In the afternoon aircraft from HMS Triumph (R16) flew a second strike, and a second attack was launched by Valley Forge against the marshalling yards at P'yŏngyang and the bridges across the Taedong River. Considerable damage was reported inflicted on locomotives and rolling stock, but the bridges survived this effort.

[note]

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Admiral Doyle's ships reached Sasebo on the afternoon of the 3rd, only to find that the 24th Division had already begun its move. Two infantry companies with supporting artillery had been flown to Pusan on the 1st, and the rest of the division was hastily loading in locally available shipping to follow by sea. Since the situation seemed under control, the ships of Task Force 90 were retained at Sasebo for other employment. [note]

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Twenty-four hours later they [34th IR] sailed from Sasebo, Kyushu, arriving in Pusan that evening [note]

The next day at P'yŏngt'aek Colonel Smith and his men witnessed a demonstration of aerial destructiveness. A northbound ammunition train of nine boxcars on its way to ROK units pulled into P'yŏngt'aek. While the train waited for further instructions, four Mustangs flown by Royal Australian Air Force pilots made six strafing runs over it firing rockets and machine guns. The train was blown up, the station demolished, and parts of the town shot up. All night ammunition kept exploding. Many residents of P'yŏngt'aek died or were injured in this mistaken air strike. [06-9]

That same afternoon friendly air also attacked Suwŏn and strafed a South Korean truck column near the town. ROK rifle fire damaged one plane and forced the pilot to land at Suwŏn Airfield. There, KMAG and ROK officers "captured" a highly embarrassed American pilot.

One KMAG officer with the ROK Army headquarters at Suwŏn said he was under attack by friendly planes five different times on 3 July. This same officer in a letter to a friend a few days later wrote of these misplaced air attacks, "The fly boys really had a field day! They hit friendly ammo dumps, gas dumps, the Suwŏn air strip, trains, motor columns, and KA [06-Korean Army] Hq." In the afternoon, four friendly jet planes made strikes on Suwŏn and along the Suwŏn-Osan highway setting fire to gasoline at the railroad station in Suwŏn and destroying buildings and injuring civilians. On the road they strafed and burned thirty South Korean trucks and killed 200 ROK soldiers.

Church to FEAF - Stay away????

Because of these incidents throughout the day, General Church sent a strong protest to FEAF asking that air action be held to Han River bridges or northward. [06-10]

GAD

[note]

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The 3rd of July saw a number of dispersed skirmishes around the Korean coastline. Along the convoluted western shore Communist activities had extended far south of the formal battleline, and in the evening the ROK YMS 513 caught and sank three small boats unloading military supplies at Chulpo. On the east coast Juneau finished off the ammunition trawlers at Chumunjin, and the British frigate Black Swan was subjected to the first enemy air attack of the war.

[note]

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1953 Sun Set

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Although the North Korean Air Force, in the first days of conflict, had performed useful services in demoralizing ROK troops, its strength in any serious terms was small. Estimates of its composition as of the outbreak of hostilities varied between some 75 and 130 aircraft, none of very recent types. But on 2 July ComNavFE had alerterted the Support Group against possible air attack, and at 2012 on the 3rd two enemy fighters, thought to have been Stormoviks, came in on Black Swan from over the land and out of the haze, inflicted minor structural damage, and escaped without being hit. Fortunate in their evasive action, these pilots were doubly fortunate in their assignment that day, for their colleagues back at P'yŏngyang had just received a thorough working over by the aircraft of Task Force 77. In any event such attacks were not to be soon repeated: the efforts of Seventh Fleet and Fifth Air Force fighters and the airfield attacks by Bomber Command speedily demobilized the North Korean Air Force. Black Swan's experience remained for some time unique,

and not until 23 August did another U.N. ship undergo attack from the air.

[note] [note]

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We arrived at P'yŏngt'aek after dark, and the town had been bombed and most of the village was in flames. [note]

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about 2100 that night Perry's artillery group entrained and departed northward. Because of the destroyed railroad station at P'yŏngt'aek, the train stopped at Songhwan-ni, where the artillerymen unloaded and drove on the six miles to P'yŏngt'aek before daylight. [06-11]

[note]

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On 2 July, preparatory to Task Force 77's first air strikes to be made on the following day, Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander NavFE, requested and received "exclusive use" of a large airspace area of northwestern Korea, encompassing P'yŏngyang. Subsequently, at 2235 hours on 3 July, GHQ FEC informed FEAF that this same target area would again be allocated to Task Force 77 on the following day.#42 [note]

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9 AM EST

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On 3 July the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated a proposed resolution to the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

It suggested that the Government of the United States would direct the armed forces of member nations in Korea, but with the help of a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea." This committee would coordinate all offers of assistance, promote continuing participation in Korea by member nations, and receive reports from the field commander. The exact extent of its control was not stated in the proposal. [06-2] [note]


Casualties

Monday June 03, 1950 (Day 9)

Korean_War 1 Casualties

As of July 3, 1950

1 80TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
1 19500703 0000 Casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 16 18 0 0 0 34
Today 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 17 18 0 0 0 35

Aircraft Losses Today 002

Notes for Monday July 9, 1950 - Day 9