Overview


Korean_War

Statement by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, July 4,1950:


The events now taking place in Korea broke out on June 25 as the result of a provocative attack by the troops of the South Korean authorities on the frontier areas of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. This attack was the outcome of a premeditated plan.


From time to time Syngman Rhee himself and other representatives of the South Korean authorities had blurted out the fact that the South Korean Syngman Rhee clique had such a plan.


As long ago as October 7, 1949, Syngman Rhee, boasting of success in training his army, stated outright, in an interview given to an American United Press correspondent, that the South Korean Army could capture P'yŏngyang in the course of three days.


On October 31, 1949,

 

Sin Sen Mo,[Defense Minister ROK]

other spelling

Sinh Sung Mo [Defense Minister ROK]

 

of the Syngman Rhee Government, also told newspaper correspondents that the South Korean troops were strong enough to act and take P'yŏngyang within a few days. Only one week before the provocative attack of the South Korean troops on the frontier areas of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Syngman Rhee said, in a speech on June 19 in the so-called "National Assembly" where Mr. Dulles, adviser to the U.S. State Department, was present: "If we cannot protect democracy in the cold war, we shall win in a hot war."


It is not difficult to understand that representatives of the South Korean authorities could only make such statements because they felt that they had American support behind them. One month before the present developments in Korea, on May 19, 1950, Mr. Johnson, chief American administrator of aid to Korea, told the American Congress House of Representatives' Appropriations Committee that 100,000 officers and men of the South Korean Army, equipped with American weapons and trained by the American Military Mission, had completed their preparations and could begin war at any time.


It is known that only a few days before the Korean events, the United States Defense Secretary, Mr. Johnson, the Chief of the General Staff of the United States Armed Forces, General Bradley, and the State Department adviser, Mr. Dulles, arrived in Japan and had special conferences with General MacArthur, and that afterwards Mr. Dulles visited South Korea and went to frontier areas on the 38th Parallel.


Only one week before the events-on June 19-Mr. Dulles, adviser to the State Department, declared in the above-mentioned "National Assembly" of South Korea that the United States was ready to give all necessary moral and material support to South Korea which was fighting against Communism.


These facts speak for themselves and need no comment. . . .
The United States Government tries to justify armed intervention against Korea by alleging that it was undertaken on the authorization of the Security Council. The falsity of such an allegation strikes the eye.


What really happened? It is known that the United States Government had started armed intervention in Korea before the Security Council was summoned to meet on June 27, without taking into consideration what decision the Security Council might take. Thus the United States Government confronted the United Nations Organization with a fait accompli, with a violation of peace.


The Security Council merely rubber-stamped and back-dated the resolution proposed by the United States Government, approving the aggressive actions which this Government had undertaken. . . .


The illegal resolution of June 27, adopted by the Security Council under pressure from the United States Government, shows that the Security Council is acting, not as a body which is charged with the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace, but as a tool utilized by the ruling circles of the United States for unleashing war. This resolution of the Security Council constitutes a hostile act against peace.


If the Security Council valued the cause of peace, it should have attempted to reconcile the fighting sides in Korea before it adopted such a scandalous resolution. Only the Security Council and the United Nations Secretary-General could have done this. However, they did not make such an attempt, evidently knowing that such peaceful action contradicts the aggressors' plans.


Source:
from the Soviet News, No. 2393 (July 5, 1950), pp. 1-2.

[note] [note]

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the commander in chief of the U.S. Far East Command (FECom), was authorized to commit American troops, and by 4 July Task Force Smith was in contact with the enemy near Osan. Unfortunately, the first Americans sent to Korea from Japan were poorly equipped and vastly outnumbered. They could not stand up to the enemy assault, and the NKPA quickly pushed United Nations Command (UNC) forces back toward the southeast corner of the Korean Peninsula, an area soon to become famous as the Pusan Perimeter.

[note]

July 4 to 5 - Task Force Smith under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. (Brad) Smith, moves into position north of Osan. [note]


July 4
Forty-four of the 58 UN members go on record backing the early resolution supporting South Korea. Russia and countries from the Middle East are against it.
-- Three to four North Korean divisions complete crossing the Han River and spread out to isolate the Sŏul-Inch'ŏn-Suwŏn area of about 200 square miles. Inch'ŏn and Suwŏn fall.
-- Maj. Gen. Dean assumes command of the new U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) that will control all Army troops in Korea.
-- U.S. Army soldiers in P'yŏngt'aek get into a fight with about 30 North Korean saboteurs dressed as refugees. The communists are driven off. [note]

Korean_War

Three SB-17s were used this date for weather recon and orbit missions. Twenty-six hours and twenty minutes (26:20) was flown on these missions.

A patient who had been shot in the foot while in action in Korea was evacuated by helicopter from Ashiya Air Base to Itazuke Air Base this date. A total of one hour and forty minutes (1:40) was logged.

At 2145/K ADCC informed the Flight of a Mayday 25 miles out on a heading of 351° at 2210/K the Mayday had landed safely at Itazuke Air Base. One false alert this date.

[note]

USN F9F-3 1 x Yak-9 10 x KPAFAC aircraft damaged on ground

[note]


On 4 July, Joy ordered Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious Group 1 (and thus TF 90) to travel with selected staff members to Tokyo to plan amphibious operations.

His command had spent early May 1950 conducting landing exercises in southern California for the benefit of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College observers.[cmdctl-12] MacArthur had requested that the Navy train his Eighth Army troops in amphibious techniques, and on 20 May Amphibious Group 1 had sailed for Japan, where it had reported to COMNAVFE and was designated Task Force 90. Its only ships were

  1. the command ship USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7)

  2. the assault transport USS Cavalier (APA-37)

  3. the assault cargo ship USS Union (AKA-106)

  4. the tank landing ship USS LST 611

  5. and the fleet tug USS Arikara (ATF 98).


However, Doyle himself had considerable amphibious experience, and his staff officers were virtually all veterans of World War II’s Central and Southwest Pacific amphibious operations.[cmdctl-13]


Doyle, in Tokyo, was now directed to plan for the immediate combat-loading of the 1st Cavalry Division (actually an infantry formation, part of the occupation force in Japan) for an amphibious landing “somewhere in Korea.” [note]

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"NKPA (North Korean People's Army) GAINS, 30 JUNE - 1 AUGUST 1950" [note]

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Photo #: 80-G-417148
First Korean War Carrier Air Strikes, 3-4 July 1950

A North Korean railroad train is attacked just south of P'yŏngyang by planes from the joint U.S.-British Task Force 77, 4 July 1950 The carriers involved were USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and HMS triumph.

[note]

Korean_War


Photo #: NH 97289
Wŏnsan Oil Refinery, North Korea
Aerial reconnaissance photograph showing damage to the refinery from bombing by Air Force B-29s and Navy carrier aircraft. Taken circa the Summer of 1950
[note]

Korean_War

General MacArthur informed the Communists that the UN expected all prisoners of war to be well treated. [note]

South then North

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[note]


Admiral Joy received from General MacArthur instructions with respect to the blockade and instituted it on 4 July. [05-11]


Three blockade groups initially executed the blockade plan:

(1) an east coast group under American command,

(2) a west coast group under British command, and

(3) a south coast group under ROK Navy command.

[note]

By the morning of 4 July two of the best divisions of the North Korean People's Army stood poised at Yŏngdŭngp'o. With tank support at hand they were ready to resume the drive south along the main rail-highway axis below the Han River. [note]

Korean_War

The next day, 4 July, Smith's divided command reunited at P'yŏngt'aek, and was joined there by a part of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion. [Commanded by Col Perry]

[note]

[After Task Force Smith had left Japan the rest of the 21st Infantry Regiment, except A and D Companies which sailed from Moji, loaded at Sasebo 3 July and departed for Pusan,] arriving there early the next morning. [06-12] the 4th.

[note]

Less than a week later, on 4 July, Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin and members of his staff arrived at Pusan to organize the Pusan Base Command, activated that day by orders of the Far East Command. [note]

The N.K. 3rd Division Crosses the Kum Against the 19th Infantry

The third and last regiment of the 24th Division, the 19th Infantry, commanded by Col. Guy S. Meloy, Jr., began to arrive in Korea on 4 July.

Nearly ninety years earlier the 19th Infantry Regiment had won the sobriquet, "The Rock of Chickamauga," in a memorable stand in one of the bloodiest of Civil War battles.

Fourteen years earlier General Dean had served as captain in the regiment in Hawaii. [note]

[note]

The Landing at Inch'ŏn

The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off.... We shall land at Inch'ŏn, and I shall crush them [25-the North Koreans].

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

It was natural and predictable that General MacArthur should think in terms of an amphibious landing in the rear of the enemy to win the Korean War. His campaigns in the Southwest Pacific in World War II-after Bataan-all began as amphibious operations. From Australia to Luzon his forces often advanced around enemy-held islands, one after another. Control of the seas gives mobility to military power. Mobility and war of maneuver have always brought the greatest prizes and the quickest decisions to their practitioners. A water-borne sweep around the enemy's flank and an attack in his rear against lines of supply and communications appealed to MacArthur's sense of grand tactics. He never wavered from this concept, although repeatedly the fortunes of war compelled him to postpone its execution.

MacArthur's Early Plans

During the first week of July, with the Korean War little more than a week old, General MacArthur told his chief of staff, General Almond, to begin considering plans for an amphibious operation designed to strike the enemy center of communications at Sŏul, and to study the location for a landing to accomplish this.

Korean_War

At a Far East Command headquarters meeting on 4 July, attended by Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives, Generals MacArthur and Almond discussed the idea of an amphibious landing in the enemy's rear and proposed that the 1st Cavalry Division be used for that purpose.

Col. Edward H. Forney of the Marine Corps, an expert on amphibious operations, was selected to work with the 1st Cavalry Division on plans for the operation. [25-1]

[note]

Korean_War

On 4 July they were joined at P'yŏngt'aek by 134 men of their division's 52nd Field Artillery battalion which had crossed from Japan on an LST. [note]


On 3 July General Dean arrived at Taejŏn and assumed command of all American forces in Korea,

The following day he approved Smith's request to occupy the Osan position.

At the same time he attached to Task Force Smith a battery of 105 mm howitzers of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion and placed it under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Miller O. Perry.

Perry's command numbered 140 officers and men and raised Task Force Smith's total to 540 when the latter moved out to occupy the Osan position on the night of 4 July.

[note]


"On July 4th, the52nd Field Artillery battalion consisted of A Battery and one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries. We linked up with Task Force Smith at P'yŏngt'aek. [This linkup is estimated to have added approximately 134 men; 1,200 rounds of 105-mm high explosives (HE) and six rounds of (HEAT); four .50 caliber machine guns; four bazooka teams and 73 vehicles to Task Force Smith.[4].

[note]

US Air Force

 

 

 

Just received information, Vandenberg to Stratemeyer, that Major General Rosie O'Donnell[61-Maj Gen Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell, Jr. commanded a squadron of the 19th BG in the Philippines in the early days of World War II. Later in the war he commanded the 73d BW in the Marianas. Since 1948, he had commanded SAC's 15AF, the parent organization of the 22d and 92d Groups. Being an experienced bomber leader and familiar with the two bomb groups, O’Donnell was an obvious and good choice to command them in Korea. His temporary duty was for an indefinite period. Headquartered at Yokota, his command was designated the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command (Provisional). The "provisional"ť designation indicated that this command had been organized with personnel and equipment from other units and was just a temporary organization intended for a specific mission.] as bomber commander, and the 22d and 92d Bomb Groups, were proceeding to Far East Command for temporary duty. Vandenberg suggested that the 19th Bomb Group be placed under General O'Donnell.

Armorers load a 2.75-inch rocket on an F–80 for a July 4 mission.

Vandenberg wishes - although he apologized - that all targets back of immediate battlefront within North Korea be taken out; of course I agree with this procedure and that was my intent. LeMay[62-During World War II, Curtis E. LeMay led the 305th BG in Europe, then moved up to command the 3d Bombardment Division, followed by the XX and XXI Bomber Commands and 20AF. For several months he was Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. Returning to the U.S., he became the first Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development in the AAF. As a lieutenant general, he next commanded the U.S. Air Forces in Europe before becoming commander of SAC in October 1948.] personal radio received urging teleconference with me; answered that [I] would hold a teleconference only after my conference this afternoon at 1430 hours with my Air Force commanders and FEAF staff, at which time specific information would be obtained, and forwarded by radio. If after this FEAF conference and my radios LeMay had any unanswered questions, then would hold the teleconference with him. Word received that Generals Wolfe, Everest, Strother, Weyland, accompanied by a party of colonels and lt. colonels and a Brigadier General Guest, Signal Corps, USA, would land approximately 2240, Haneda.[63-Because the gulf between what Stratemeyer wanted and the Air Force could supply was so wide, General Vandenberg dispatched an inspection team from the U.S. to explain why FEAF was not going to get certain items and what was being done to alleviate other shortages. Leading the team was Lt Gen Kenneth B. Wolfe, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, Headquarters USAF. Others in the party included Maj Gen Frank F. Everest (Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations), Maj Gen Otto P. Weyland (Commander, Tactical Air Command), Maj Gen Dean C. Strother (Director of Military Personnel), and Brig Gen Wesley T. Guest (Chief, Signal Plans and Operations Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, U.S. Army.)] General Wolfe will be my houseguest. The rest of the party to stay at the Imperial. Press reports the President is sending Marine air units and members of the U.S. Marines to Korea. Also received word that inadvertently, portion of the South Korean line was strafed by my planes inflicting some damage to that portion of the line.[64-This “blue on blue” attack was made by No. 77 Squadron F–51s at P'yŏngt'aek. It was the squadron’s first combat action in Korea. An interesting account of this mission and MacArthur’s subsequent claims that no such attack on friendly forces took place is found in George Odgers, Across the Parallel (London, 1952), pp 42-52.]


9:35 P.M., or 2135 hours, VIP party landed. Also in group is Brigadier
General Agee.[65-Brig Gen Walter R. Agee, Chief, Collections Division, Headquarters USAF.]


Project name for F-80 squadron from Clark Field joining FEAF is called the "Dallas"ť squadron.


Our mission over Korea report strafing with results on materiel - trains, convoys, etc. Also reported refugees still streaming south out of Seoul.
Press reports that small advance American infantry unit successfully repelled North Korean ground reconnaissance unit. However, as was emphasized in papers, clash on small scale.


Following is a list of colonels who accompanied VIP party: Colonels J. L. Hicks, C. P. Brown, E. D. Ely, J. L. Jeffers, A. G. Stone, W. M. P. Northcross, C. R. Landon and C. A. Winton. [66-Col Joseph. H. Hicks, the Chief, Programs Monitoring Office, Directorate of Supply and Maintenance, Air Materiel Command; Col C. Pratt Brown, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, HQ USAF; probably Col E. B. Ely, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army; Col Alexander G. Stone, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, U.S. Army; Col W. M. P. Northcross, in the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, U.S. Army; Col Charles R. Landon, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, HQ USAF; Jeffers and Winton have not been identified.]
The SAC bomber group headquarters and one bomb group will be located at Yokota; the other bomb group and 19th Bomb Group will be located at Kadena in Okinawa.[67-The 92d BG was based at Yokota and the 22d BG was at Kadena.]

[note]


GENERAL MACARTHUR had hoped that American intervention in Korea would rally the ROK forces for a stand along the Han River, but the North Korean Peoples' Army, after pausing to regroup at Sŏul, forged across the Han and occupied Suwŏn in force on 1 July.

This day, 374th troop Carrier Wing C54's shuttled six loads of 24th Division troops to Pusan before foul weather forced other elements of the division to cross by water.

On 4 July one battalion of the 24th Division reached Osan, about ten miles south of Suwŏn, beginning U.S. ground forces participation in the Korean action.

Enemy attacks, spearheaded by some 30 tanks, drove these troops back to the road junction at Ch'ŏnan on 6 July, and continued enemy pressure made this position untenable on 8 July. Unable to match the North Korean onslaught, ROK and U.S. troops fell back in a series of delaying actions until they reached Kongju and Choch'iwŏn on 11 July.

[note]

The strangest phenomenon of the Korean war was that the North Korean forces should have been so excellently equipped with Russian armor and ordnance, reinforced with Chinese trained troops, and yet so meagerly supplied with Russian aircraft. The Communists must have thought that the United Nations would not intervene in Korea and that the obsolete Russian planes allotted to the NKAF could easily achieve air superiority over the almost nonexistent ROK air force. By the same token, North Korean ground troops at the beginning of hostilities revealed that they had not been trained to withstand hostile air attack. Whatever the reason for the paucity of North Korean air opposition, General Stratemeyer called the lack of determined enemy air power the paramount feature of the North Korean operation.

It was his opinion that any conclusions to be drawn from the first phase of the war in Korea had to be predicated upon the fact that the U. N. naval forces could operate close inshore, that Air Force planes remained virtually unchallenged by counter-air, and that the ground troops had nothing to fear from enemy air attacks. After its initial aggressiveness over Kimp'o and Suwŏn in the opening days of hostilities, the NKAF declined rapidly in effectiveness, but not without making determined efforts to assist the ground campaign. [Which was more that FEAF did!]

On 3 July

Minor strafing attacks were directed against the HMS Black Swan (U-57) and two ROK vessels on 3 July, and four Yaks dropped anti-personnel bombs on ROK troops south of Kimp'o, killing 68 ROK soldiers.

On 4 July aircraft knocked out a communications repeater station near Osan. Four planes strafed and bombed Chŏnju

On 4 July aircraft knocked out a communications repeater station near Osan. Four planes strafed and bombed Chŏnju

[note]

Movement of Strategic Air Groups to Combat - Deployment Airlift

Korean_WarKorean_War

The warning alert, followed by appropriate operations and movement orders, went out to the 22nd and 92nd Groups on or soon after 1 July. Officers and airmen who had been planning Fourth of July celebrations found themselves packing crates, loading cargo planes, or standing in lines before the boarding ramps of planes bound for the Far East. (They will not actually begin deployment until the 5th of July).

1-4 July

The days immediately prior to departure were hardly long enough for completing all the numerous tasks necessary to carry out the mobility plan and the special orders for the movement. Preparation for the movement of planes and materiel entailed, for one thing, tremendous effort on the part of maintenance crews.

The first orders requested that all engines with over 150 hours be changed, but this was later altered to 250 hours.

In the 22nd Group, of the 67 engines with over 250 hours, time permitted change of only 16 prior to take-off. The remainder made the trip overseas with only intermediate inspections before departure.

In each squadron special project officers had been made responsible for assembling, packing and crating, establishing priorities, and estimating total weight and cubage of materiel requiring airlift. The loading of cargo aircraft presented problems not easily anticipated: the 22nd Group was supplied 10 C-54 aircraft with a pay load of 7,000 pounds each, but when the total UEE requirement exceeded the amount authorized, an additional 1,000 pounds had to be added to the airplanes scheduled to leave the second day; and a still greater amount of weight had to be lifted by the planes taking off on the final day of the movement.

Some difficulty was encountered by the 22nd Group when, due to changes in aircraft departure schedules, several of the project officers departed on early flights. New project officers had to be designated, which complicated the execution of the original loading and priority plan. The 92nd Group's movement was confused by the arrival of C-74 cargo planes when its manifests and priority lists had been made out for C-54's. Because of the increased shipment allocations, project officers had to revise their manifests, a shortage of personnel on work projects developed, and general confusion plagued the crews assigned to load the cargo aboard transport aircraft.

[note]

Existence of FEAF and NAVFE on coequal status within the command structure without a joint representation of Air Force and Navy on the GHQ FEC staff, would prevent any unified command of the air operations over Korea.

Without some form of centralized control, the mass of Air Force and Navy Air could not be effectively employed in the attack, and with Air Force and Navy air commanders choosing their targets independently, flying over Korea could actually become hazardous.

On 3 and 4 July, for example, Task Force 77 struck targets in Korea, making attacks in an area into which FEAF had ordered a B-29 attack for the same day.

FEAF learned of the projected Navy attack on the 4th, too late to draw up another operations order for its B-29's, with the result that the medium bombers had to stand down on this date.

[note]

After its initial aggressiveness over Kimp'o and Suwŏn in the opening days of hostilities, the NKAF declined rapidly in effectiveness, but not without making determined efforts to assist the ground campaign. Minor strafing attacks were directed against the HMS Black Swan and two ROK vessels on 3 July, and four Yaks dropped anti-personnel bombs on ROK troops south of Kimp'o, killing 68 ROK soldiers.

On 4 July aircraft knocked out a communications repeater station near Osan.


Four planes strafed and bombed Chŏnju on 11 July, and the next day two Yaks destroyed a B-29 near Sŏul, while two others shot down an L-4 and attacked F-80 's near Choch'iwŏn.

[note]

TACP

Effective on 4 July, MacArthur formed the U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) under the command of the 24th Division's Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, who was ordered to assume control of all U.S. Army Forces fighting there.

The Eighth Army was directed to plan the movement of one additional infantry division to Korea as quickly as possible.

For better or worse, U. S. Army combat troops were to be committed to Korea in an effort to rally the ROK forces. They were ordered to battle in piece-meal fashion, without any comprehensive planning.

General Partridge later commented that his TACP's had been forced to catch up with the 24th Division, thereby losing precious time while they looked for the division in the combat zone.

From the outset, moreover, political limitations had been placed upon the employment of air power in Korea, first the 38th parallel and then the Manchurian-Siberian border.

While the limitations were necessary for political reasons, they imposed a severe handicap upon the U.S. forces which were available to meet the crisis.

[the playing field was limited in size, so the 10 B-29's they had, had fewer targets and that caused the air force a problem????]

[note]

The forward elements of the tactical control system are the Tactical Aircraft Control Parties (TACP), which are teams specially organized to control close air support strikes in the vicinity of forward ground elements.

Two TACP's were being formed in Japan for an amphibious maneuver at the outbreak of hostilities, and, equipped with AN/ARC-1 radio jeeps, they were flown to Korea, where they were on hand when General Dean's 24th Division command post opened at Taejŏn on 4 July. [note]

Before the Korean hostilities were concluded they would provide a combat test for the principles of armed-force unification which the United States had adopted after World War II. The National Security Act of 1947 had provided for the unification of the armed services of the United States in a departmental agency originally called the National Military Establishment and after 1949 the Department of Defense. Under the Department of Defense were three independent military departments and armed services: Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Policy guidance papers had foreseen that combat forces of each of these armed services would normally be found in geographical theaters of operations, and each service had been assigned roles and functions which its forces would perform. A theater commander was expected to stand separately from his own service and to provide the command authority over the theater ground, sea, and air forces, which would cooperatively employ their capabilities to attain the theater mission.

Looking toward the accomplishment of armed-force unification, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had dispatched on 14 December 1946 a directive to all theater commanders which required these unified commanders to establish a

"joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the services...in key positions of responsibility.#22

Such a joint staff would provide the theater commander with the specialized knowledge and advice which he needed in order to employ his ground, naval, and air forces in a common war against an enemy.

Nearly three years elapsed before General MacArthur took cognizance of this directive, and then, on 20 August 1949, he established a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) of GHQ Far East Command and charged it

"to assist and advise the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on matters pertaining to his exercise of unified command over Army, Navy, and Air Force forces, allocated to the Far East Command. #23

The JSPOG comprised three Army, three Navy, and two Air Force officers, and it was frequently cited as evidence that GHQ was a joint staff. But it was apparent both from the statement of its functions and from the small number of its assigned personnel that the JSPOG could not serve in lieu of a joint staff contemplated by the JCS.#24

By this same type of logic the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) of GHQ Far East Command reorganized his section on a "joint basis" in January 1948 by assigning to it

"one suitably qualified Air and Naval Intelligence officer...to act as the Air and Naval representatives and experts, for the various publications of Theater Intelligence. "25

At the highest headquarters level, unification had never reached the Far East; yet in 1949 General MacArthur had assured General J. Lawton Collins that unification was "working well" in his theater and that he stood "squarely behind" the Department of Defense's efforts to carry out the unification act.#26

In June 1950 the composition and functioning of General Headquarters, Far East Command clearly demonstrated an absence of any vestige of unification principles. In theory, the major commands of the Far East Command were the Army Forces Far East (AFFE), the Naval Forces Far East (NavFE), and the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), but General MacArthur had never organized an Army Forces Far East headquarters. Instead, AFFE was a shadow headquarters, in which CINCFE personally commanded and the GHQ Far East Command staff doubled in brass as the theater-level Army headquarters staff. The commanding general of each Army command reported directly to CINCFE. Almost wholly manned by Army personnel and predominantly concerned with Army business, the GHQ Far East Command was quite naturally "dominated by Army thinking and prone to honor Army concepts.#27

Plans, Preparations 45

During World War II General MacArthur had never employed a joint staff, but, observing that he had

"found that it takes an aviator to run aviators," he had left the details of air matters to the control of his air commander.#28

As theater commander, MacArthur had assigned FEAF tasks to perform, but the FEAF commander had determined how these tasks would be executed. Much of this same philosophy of control was obtained between FEAF and its subordinate air forces. General Stratemeyer assigned to his subordinate air commanders tasks or duties and the necessary wherewithal to execute them, but he did not normally tell these air commanders how they were to execute their missions. In short, FEAF controlled and supervised; the subordinate air forces operated and executed their missions.

At the outset of hostilities in Korea, however, many of MacArthur's staff subordinates manifested an inclination to direct air operations from the theater staff level. In fact, many of the men on the GHQ staff wanted to run the Korean war from Tokyo. As soon as radio communications were established, Lt. Col. John McGinn, the air officer on the ADCOM staff in Korea, received "definite and explicit orders" not to contact the Fifth Air Force advance headquarters at Itazuke to arrange for air support. He was directed to address requests for air support to GHQ in Tokyo, and the requests had to be passed through FEAF to the Fifth Air Force advanced headquarters at Itazuke. "This was a shameful way to operate," said General Timberlake, "because it normally took us about four hours to get the messages.

Effective on 4 July, General MacArthur established a new ground command, U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) under Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, and General Dean was instructed to communicate directly with the commanders of FEAF and NavFE (with information copies to CINCFE) to secure the air and naval support which he required. General Dean sent several requests for air support directly to FEAF in Tokyo, but this arrangement was too roundabout to permit adequate and timely air support.#29

General Stratemeyer recognized that Korea would have fallen to the onrushing Communists if air units had not laid on all-out attacks against the forward prongs of the North Korean ground penetrations, but he also knew that any continued employment of air resources in always "urgent" operations would be extremely wasteful in a war of any duration. Accordingly, during the first week of July General Stratemeyer began to organize his theater air forces and assign them missions after the patterns which World War II had proved would make the best use of air capabilities.

From the first days of the war the Fifth Air Force had been supporting friendly ground forces in Korea, but as American ground troops went into action there General Stratemeyer sought to formalize the relationship.[Rather than just do it]

[note]


[Too bad they were not doing "close support" like they were told to]

Having had no advance indication that the carrier air strikes would continue for an additional day, FEAF operations had scheduled a medium bomber strike against P'yŏngyang's airfields for 4 July. As a result, the scheduled B-29 strike for 4 July had to be canceled, and, since it was too late to devise a new mission, the Superfortresses were grounded that day.

The Navy air operations presented another complication: Task Force 77 preserved radio silence while at sea,* and for several days General Stratemeyer was unable to get any knowledge of the results of the carrier air strikes against P'yŏngyang.#43

*The inability of Navy forces in the Far East to communicate freely and fully with Army and Air Force commands would long continue to be a major interservice problem. In large measure the difficulty was attributable to the fact that the Navy had a different communications philosophy: Naval forces afloat were traditionally closely-knit organizations which generally operated in accordance with pre-briefed orders.

Because of their physical characteristics, moreover, naval vessels had only a limited amount of space which could be given to communications equipment. Because of requirements and capabilities, the Navy made its electronics messages as brief as possible.

On the other hand, the Army and Air Force used more elaborate communications systems designed to handle a large volume of traffic and habitually passed what the Navy called "correspondence" by electronic means. As a result of the difference in philosophy and capability, Navy forces off Korea were unable to receive or dispatch the many long, encrypted messages required by the local combat situation.

[What a bunch of crap]

(CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet, Interim Evaluation Rpt. No. I, Korean War, 25 June to 15 Nov. 1950, Vol. XIII, pp. R56 and R57.)

[note]

JOC & TACC

When General Dean established USAFIK headquarters at Taejŏn on 4 July, General Partridge instructed Timberlake to move his advanced headquarters to Taejŏn as soon as communications were available there.#8

Because of a shortage of communications equipment, however, the advanced echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters would remain, for the time being, in southern Japan.

In order to integrate the effort of air and ground forces, each operating under its own command, official doctrine recognized the requirement for a joint agency which served to ex-change battle information, to provide the Army commander with a facility at which he might present his requirements for air support, and to provide the Air Force commander with an agency for timely planning and control of the supporting air effort.

This agency was called a "Joint Operations Center."

The physical make-up of the center included an Air Force combat operations section and an Army air-ground operations section.

Designed to operate in close association with the Joint Operations Center (JOC) was an Air Force activity designated as the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).

Primarily a communications organization, the TACC was the focal point for aircraft control and warning activities of the tactical air force.



Drawing the Battleline 79

[note]

As the forward elements of the 24th Division advanced northward from Taejŏn to engage the enemy, Lieutenants Chermak and Duerksen joined the advanced command posts on 3 and 4 July. Here they immediately began to run into trouble. "The weather was .. . murky, ceiling was on the ground," recalled Duerksen. Chermak's radio broke down, and he had to go back to Taejŏn for another jeep.

[note]


When he requested authority to send American ground troops to Korea, General MacArthur had expressed a hope that American intervention would rally the South Koreans for a stand along the Han River, but the North Korean People's Army had begun to break across this barrier before the first elements of the 24th Infantry Division reached Korea. Although this American division was committed to action in fragments, General MacArthur's headquarters announced on 4 July that the U.S. Army Forces in Korea were making "tentative plans for an advance directly north from P'yŏngt'aek to secure Suwŏn as the first objective and continue north on Sŏul.#19

But the 24th Division proved no match for the North Koreans. Like other Eighth Army divisions, the 24th Division was at reduced strength. Because of appropriations limitations, all Eighth Army divisions had been restricted to 12,000 men, a ceiling which the Eighth Army had met by deleting one infantry battalion from each regiment and by slashing division artillery, armored, and automatic weapons strength. Not only was division artillery deficient, but no army or corps field artillery support was present in the Far East theater.#20

[note]

TF-77


Launching its first strikes of the Korean war, Task Force 77 attacked the airfields at P'yŏngyang and Onjong-ni on 3 and 4 July. The carrier pilots shot two Yaks out of the air and damaged ten other planes on the ground in the two-day assault.#87 [note]

Korean_War

In the absence of established procedures and responsibilities, aeromedical evacuation gained acceptance through its demonstrations of utility, but the system employed was always far from perfect.

When American troops landed in Korea in July 1950, the Eighth Army implemented traditional systems for moving and hospitalizing its sick and wounded.

As a matter of policy, the Eighth Army stated the rule that patients expected to return to duty within thirty days would be hospitalized in Korea.

Men requiring specialized treatment or more than thirty days' hospitalization could be moved to general hospitals in Japan. (At the outbreak of the Korean war, the Military Air transport Service was providing aeromedical evacuation for about 350 patients a month who were moved from Tokyo to the United States. )

Recognizing that the speed with which a front-line casualty received adequate medical care frequently determined his survival, and knowing of Korea's limited surface transportation, General Stratemeyer moved quickly to afford medical air evacuation to the Eighth Army troops in Korea.

At the war's beginning Flight-3, 801st Medical Air Evacuation Squadron, was attached to the 374th troop Carrier Wing at Tachikawa, and on 4 July 1950 General Stratemeyer informed General MacArthur that FEAF was prepared to accomplish air evacuation of casualties from Korea. #95

#95 Office of Surgeon General, Dept. of AF, First Report of the USAF Medical Service, 1 July 1949-30 June 1952, p. 237; FEAF Opns. Hist., I, 35.

The first C-54 loaded with Korean war casualties left Haneda International Airport on 20 July 1950, and the Military Air transport Service soon employed the routes, facilities, and planes that transported personnel and cargo to Japan to return casualties to the United States.

Between 26 June 1950 and 31 July 1953 the Military Air transport Service transported 43,196 Korean war casualties to the United States for further hospitalization or special medical treatment.

[note]

US Maine Corsp


On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to Korea. Two days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact of the United States ground forces with the enemy was made near Osan, about 8 miles south of Suwŏn.


[so what happened on the 4th?]


The American force consisted of 2 infantry companies, a battery of artillery, two 4.2" mortar platoons, a platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifles, and six 2.36" rocket-launcher teams. Named Task Force Smith after its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, the first United States contingent collided on the morning of 5 July with a whole NKPA division supported by 30 T–34 tanks. Despite the odds against it, Task Force Smith put up a good delaying fight of 4 or 5 hours before pulling out with the loss of all equipment save small arms.[9] [note]

Korean_War

Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of FMFPac, and a G–3 staff officer, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, had been ordered on 4 July to proceed immediately to Tokyo and confer with General MacArthur. Before leaving, Shepherd found time to recommend formation of third platoons for rifle companies of the 5th Marines, and CNO gave his approval the following day.[18]

[note]

While General Shepherd stopped for a few days at Pearl Harbor, the possibility of an Inch'ŏn amphibious operation was mentioned officially for the first time at a conference in Tokyo attended by two Marine officers. On 4 July a party given by the American colony was interrupted by a message for Brigadier General William S. Fellers, commanding general of troop training Unit, Amphibious training Command, Pacific Fleet, and Colonel Edward S. Forney, commanding Mobile training Team Able of that organization. As specialists in amphibious techniques, they were summoned along with Army and Air Force officers to a meeting at Headquarters, FECOM, presided over by General MacArthur’s chief of staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, USA.[7]

The Marine officers were in Japan as a result of General MacArthur’s belief in the efficacy of amphibious tactics. Early in 1950, several months before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, he had foreseen the necessity of recovering lost ground by means of a ship-to-shore assault if an enemy ever won a foothold in the Japanese Islands. His request for amphibious instructors to train U.S. Army troops in Japan had found the Navy and Marine Corps ready with units set up for just such a purpose.[8]

[note]

After beginning the reorganization of the ROK forces, it was absorbed on 3 July by Headquarters, U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. And with the establishment next day of the Pusan Logistical Command (Brigadier General Crump Garvin, USA), a start was made toward handling the mountains of supplies which would be required.[16]

[note]

PhibGru One and the ANGLICO team were immediately assigned to new duties in connection with the sea lift of Eighth Army troops to Korea.

They had just begun this task when orders came for Admiral Doyle and his staff, in the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) at Sasebo, to proceed by air on 4 July to the conference at Tokyo. (Sasebo to Tokyo)[12]

There at FECOM Headquarters, they met General Fellers, Colonel Forney, and the Army officers who had been summoned from the Independence Day celebration of the American colony.

The Inch'ŏn-Sŏul Operation, Ch 1, First Conference on Inch'ŏn Landing Page 1 of 2

At the conference it was made plain that the concept of an Inch'ŏn landing had originated with General MacArthur.

Even at this early date (July 4), he envisioned not only a ship-to-shore assault on some east or west coast seaport, preferably Inch'ŏn, but also a drive inland to cut enemy communications and envelop Sŏul.

The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, U.S.A. (FECOM G–3) was then drawing up the outline of such an amphibious attack plan.

Code-named Operation BLUEHEARTS, it called for a landing in the Inch'ŏn area by a Marine RCT and an Army assault force in coordination with a frontal attack from the south by the 24th and 25th Divisions. Inch'ŏn had been designated the objective area for the amphibious assault, and the date would depend upon the availability of troops for the combined operation. [13]

It would be an understatement to say that the naval and Marine officers were impressed by the boldness of MacArthur’s thinking. At a time when he could send only a battalion-size force to the aid of the shattered ROK army, his mind had soared over obstacles and deficiencies to the concept of an amphibious operation designed to end the war at a stroke.

It was an idea that fired the imagination. But the amphibious specialists of TTU and PhibGru One had been trained to view the risks with a realistic appraisal. Their admiration was tempered by caution, therefore, when they took into account the difficulties.[14]

The end of World War II had found the United States at a peak of military strength never before attained in the Nation’s history. Then, within a year, the popular clamor for the immediate discharge of citizen-soldiers had left the Army with scarcely enough troops for the occupation of strategic areas in the Far East.

It took vigorous recruiting to fill the ranks in time of peace, and on 25 June 1950 the U.S. Eighth Army in Japan included the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division. Infantry regiments were limited to two battalions.

In the lack of trained amphibious assault troops, a definite decision could not be reached at the conference of 4 July. But it was proposed by FECOM officers that Major General Hobart H. Gay’s 1st Cavalry Division be employed as the Army assault force of the proposed Inch'ŏn operation.

[note]

On 4 July the initial contact of U.S. ground forces with the enemy took place near Osan. The little task force from Major General William F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division could not attempt anything more ambitious than delaying actions. But preparations were afoot to send the rest of the division to Korea as soon as possible, to be followed by Major General William B. Kean’s 25th Infantry Division. [note]

US Navy

Korean_War

First Korean War Carrier Air Strikes, 3-4 July 1950. A North Korean railroad train is attacked just south of P'yŏngyang by planes from the joint U.S.-British Task Force 77, 4 July 1950. The carriers involved were USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and HMS Triumph (R16).

Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives (# 80-G-417148).

[note]


Two more organizational problems faced Admiral Joy in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June and ordered by the President next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50 promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96. [note]

On the east coast, on 4 July, Juneau and Black Swan worked up and down the shore between Samchok and Chumunjin, firing on bridges and on the coastal road. [note]

With a fine disregard of these instructions Task Force 77 celebrated the Glorious Fourth with further attacks on P'yŏngyang.

This time a break was made in one of the Taedong River bridges, some locomotives were destroyed, and some small ships in the river were attacked.

Antiaircraft opposition had increased somewhat over that of the previous day, four ADs were damaged, and one, unable to lower its flaps, landed fast and bounced over the barrier, destroying three planes and damaging six more. With completion of flight operations the Striking Force retired southward. [note]

Korean_War

Squadron Aircraft Tail Code Notes
VMF-214 F4U-4B WE (aboard 1 Aug-13 Nov)
VS-21 TBM-3E/S BS (aboard to 3 Dec)
HU-1 Det HO3S-1 UP

USS Sicily (CVE-118), alerted on 2 July, was sailed on the 4th for Pearl Harbor and Guam, to strengthen the antisubmarine capabilities of Western Pacific forces.

The division commander, Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble, was ordered forward with his staff by air to help handle the rapid build-up of naval air strength in Japan.

On 10 July admiral and staff reached Tokyo, and two days later Ruble took over command of Task Group 96.2, Naval Air Japan.


[note]

Korean_War

On the 4th, as CincPacFleet, he ordered the Commander 14th Naval District to establish facilities for transport aircraft at Midway, and called upon Patuxent River for an additional increment of planes.

Three more R5Ds were at once assigned the Moffet Field squadron, but backlogs were piling up on the west coast, more were urgently needed, and on the 7th the Fleet Marine Force Pacific was asked to contribute ten more transport aircraft.

All this was little enough. Air transport is not always the economical way of moving men and goods, but its expediency in time of crisis creates irresistible pressures.

Despite the transfer of additional equipment to the Pacific run, and despite creation of a west coast coordinating office to make some sense out of priorities inflated beyond all meaning, the jam increased.

[note]

Admiral Doyle had brought his ships into Sasebo on 3 July only to find that his prospective passengers had already departed.

Next day, on orders from Admiral Joy, he flew back to Tokyo with members of his staff to work on a plan for the landing of two regimental combat teams of the 1st Cavalry Division on the west coast of Korea.

For this operation CincFE’s preferred objective was Inch'ŏn, seizure of which would give access to the Sŏul transportation complex and would cut the enemy’s main supply route; alternatively, it was proposed to land the cavalrymen at Kunsan, at the mouth of the river Kum, whence they could strike inland toward Taejŏn and the enemy’s right flank.

The concept of a landing at Inch'ŏn was certainly strategically appealing, and was the germ of the operation which in September would put the enemy to ignominious flight.

Its proposal in early July was evidence of early confidence in the efficacy of American intervention. But a few short days sufficiently demonstrated the visionary aspects of the idea, and even Kunsan, a much more modest alternative, was soon seen to be an impossibility.

Almost at once the problem came to be not one of throwing the 1st Cavalry Division against the enemy’s flank, but of getting this force into Korea while there remained some Korean territory to get into.

[note]

By 6 July that port [Pusan] had handled 55 ships, more were on the way, and although the Army had set up a Pusan Logistical Command on the 4th, the port facilities were overloaded and in danger of being swamped.

[note]

Two more organizational problems faced Admiral Joy in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June

July 1

and ordered by the President next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50 promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96.

[note]

Two more organizational problems faced Admiral Joy in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations on 30 June

July 1

and ordered by the President next day. These matters were dealt with by ComNavFE in Operation Order 8-50 promulgated on 3 July and effective on the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization of Task Force 96.

[note]

On 3 July the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated a proposed resolution to the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It suggested that the Government of the United States would direct the armed forces of member nations in Korea, but with the help of a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea." This committee would coordinate all offers of assistance, promote continuing participation in Korea by member nations, and receive reports from the field commander. The exact extent of its control was not stated in the proposal. [06-2]

[06-2] Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations, p. 119.
When, on 4 July, the Department of State sought the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the resolution, the latter [the next day]

opposed forming such a committee. They felt that placing a United Nations committee in the channel between the U. S. Government and the field commander would raise serious operational difficulties. Even though the committee might never try to control military operations, the possibility that it might do so brought the Joint Chiefs together in opposition.

They told the Secretary of Defense that, if a committee were needed for political reasons, its powers must be defined and restricted so exactly that it could never take on the nature of a U.N. command headquarters. [06-3]

[06-3] Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy. Defense, 5 Jul. 50, sub: Proposed U. S. Position With Regard to Forces in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a command arrangement in which the United States, as executive agent for the United Nations, would direct the Korean operation, with no positive contact between the field commander and the United Nations.

The major decisions, especially those of political content, must not in any way be made, or influenced, by the officer commanding the U.N. forces in Korea.

If the United Nations were to deal directly with the commander on assistance offers, for example, the top levels of the U. S. Government would be bypassed and forces accepted or rejected by a commander, very likely an American, whose outlook would be restricted by his own local situation. [06-4]

[06-4] JCS 1776/19, Rpt by JSSC, 5 Jul. 50, sub: Proposed U. S. Position With Regard to Forces in Korea.

[note]

Korean_War

[note]


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The next morning, at 0600, it [N.K. 4th Division]departed on the Suwŏn road with the 5th Regiment in the lead.

[note]

Korean_War

Just after daylight of 4 July the 1st Battalion [34th ir] started north by rail; by evening the last of the regiment was following. Col. Jay B. Lovless commanded the regiment, which had a strength of 1,981 men. [07-1]

[note]

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Meanwhile, Jay Lovless had been assembling his 34th Infantry Regiment (1,981 men) at Pusan for the move north. Pappy Wadlington had taken over as the new exec; Lawrence Paulus had relinquished command of the 1/34 to Red Ayres, who flew from Japan to Pusan on a plane with the 21st commander, Dick Stephens, assumed command of the 1/34 without having met Lovless, and went ahead to P'yŏngt'aek to scout positions.[4-40]

In Pusan a KMAG officer was detailed to brief the officers of the 34th for battle.

One of the 34th's platoon leaders, West Pointer (1948) William B. Caldwell, recalled the briefer's absurd remarks:

"He explained to us that he had been in Sŏul when the North Koreans attacked on the twenty-fifth of June. He had to swim the Han River to escape the North Koreans. But now he felt very confident and comfortable: As soon as the flag and the troops of the U.S. Army were in position, it would stop this sort of rabble organization of the NKPA. He described it as a group of young soldiers, many of them teenagers, oftentimes without weapons, who were ill trained and lacked combat capability. I remember how incongruous his remarks seemed in view of the fact that he had barely escaped with his life."[4-41]

[note]

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The 34th entrained at Pusan and began moving north on July 4: The train stopped in Taejŏn, where Lovless had a heated confrontation with Dean.

As the regimental S3, John Dunn, remembered it, when Dean unfolded his plan to deploy Lovless's 1/34 at P'yŏngt'aek and his 3/34 eleven miles away at Ansŏng, Lovless, believing the plan was bad for all the obvious reasons, "protested in a very spirited manner." Lovless argued that he would be "much more effective if he was allowed time to get his regiment together to fight as a unit."[4-42]


This was apparently the first time any senior officer in Eighth Army had raised a question about the soundness of its plan of operation. John Dunn thought Lovless was "basically sound in his thinking," but Dean was disappointed by his negative attitude. Dean elaborated on his plan, "giving numerous reasons" for his decisions, Dunn wrote, but when Lovless remained unconvinced, Dean, "becoming a bit exasperated [4-,] said `I want a battalion up there' and that ended the discussion."[4-43]


On this sour note Lovless continued north and established his CP at Songhwan, six miles south of P'yŏngt'aek. Red Ayres, whom Lovless had still not met, took formal command of the 1/34 in P'yŏngt'aek and dug into position. [note]

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"On July 4th, the 52nd FAB consisted of A Battery and one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries. We linked up with Task Force Smith at P'yŏngt'aek. [This linkup is estimated to have added approximately 134 men; 1,200 rounds of 105-mm high explosives (HE) and six rounds of (HEAT); four .50 caliber machine guns; four bazooka teams and 73 vehicles to Task Force Smith.[4]. [note]

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Later in the day David H. Smith, commanding the 3/34 (less the regimental reserve, L Company), detrained and went northeast to Ansŏng.

The 63rd FAB, commanded by Robert H. Dawson, whom Lovless did not know either, had orders to move north from Pusan as rapidly as possible to support the 34th, but it was delayed in unloading its gear at Pusan and in finding transportation north. As a result, the 34th deployed for battle with no artillery support. Moreover, it had no internal communications. Such unit radios as were available and operating would not reach from the regimental CP at Songhwan to P'yŏngt'aek or Ansŏng or from the 1/34 CP at P'yŏngt'aek to the 3/34 CP at Ansŏng.


Nor was there any immediate help to be had from the rest of Dick Stephens's 21st Regiment, coming by ship. Through no fault of Stephens's, it was lagging.

First to arrive were the other two companies (A and D) of Brad Smith's 1/21. They went north, but when they got to Ch'ŏnan (south of Lovless's CP), unknown to Lovless or to Brad Smith, Bittman Barth, who had no tactical responsibility or authority, told them to halt and dig into defensive positions two miles south of Ch'ŏnan, for reasons never made clear.

Red Ayres or David Smith could have used these two companies to reinforce their thin positions.

Unknown to Lovless or Red Ayres, these quixotic orders left Smith's 1/21 divided between Osan and Ch'ŏnan with Ayres's 1/34 interposed at P'yŏngt'aek and the 34th's CP at Songhwan, with no communications between any of the units.

Meanwhile, Dick Stephens, his staff, and Delbert Pryor's 3/21 were still in Pusan trying to find transportation north.[4-44]


When Red Ayres took command of the 1/34 at P'yŏngt'aek, he was not a little appalled, by both Dean's blocking plan and the pitiful state of his outfit. He later wrote:

"Dean and Barth acted as if they were deploying corps against numerically inferior forces instead of three weak, poorly armed battalions against divisions of well armed and well trained and well supported NKPA forces. . . . Dean's impression that this [4-P'yŏngt'aek] was a strong position with its left flank secured by the Yellow Sea was erroneous."[4-45]
[note]

1145 Korean Time

Just before noon on 4 July, eleven enemy tanks with accompanying infantry were in Anyang-ni, halfway between Yŏngdŭngp'o and Suwŏn. The road from Suwŏn through Osan toward P'yŏngt'aek was almost solid with ROK Army vehicles and men moving south the afternoon and evening of 4 July.

The 5th Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division attempted to delay the enemy column between Anyang-ni and Suwŏn, but fourteen T34 tanks penetrated its positions, completely disorganized the regiment, and inflicted on it heavy casualties.

The Australian and U.S. Air Forces, striving to slow the North Korean advance, did not always hit enemy targets.

On that day, 4 July, friendly planes strafed ROK troops several times in the vicinity of Osan. The ROK Army headquarters left Suwŏn during the day.

[note]

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"At about noon on July 4th, Colonel Perry and I [Scotty] went forward on reconnaissance. The trip was difficult because we had to smash our way through hordes of South Korean troops attempting to flee south.

We met Colonel Smith and his commanders on a hill overlooking the future front line. During the time he delivered his operations order, we were being strafed by enemy aircraft, so we were somewhat dispersed. He delivered a by-the-book, five-paragraph field order; however, I don't remember him mentioning a major armor threat. The single thing I remember-other than the structure of the order-was that he said, `Gentlemen, we will hold for 24 fours; after that, we will have help.'

"When the order was completed, Colonel Perry and I started back to select the battery position and were again strafed by enemy air. I jumped out of the jeep and dove into a flooded rice paddy. When the attack ended, I was wet but alive.

"We selected a battery position approximately 1,500 yards behind the infantry positions [see the map]. Having very little information of the enemy situation and certainly not expecting to meet armored forces, we chose a position on the forward slope of a hill about 50 yards off the main road. We could only find room in this position for five howitzers, so we put the sixth one about 500 yards in front of the battery as a direct fire weapon.

"Due to the limitations of the position, I was unable to take my mess and supply sections forward, so I left them at the rendezvous point with approximately 1,000 gallons of gas I had brought from Japan. I ordered them to remain in that position until I contacted them or sent additional instructions.

Korean_War

[note] [note]

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After spending two days checking equipment, organizing supplies, and arranging for transportation north, the [34th] regiment, crowded onto five South Korean-operated trains, had started north on the afternoon of 4 July. [01-2] [note]

Colonels Smith and Perry, and some others, went forward in the late afternoon of 4 July to make a final reconnaissance of the Osan position. At this time Perry selected the positions for his artillery. On the road ROK engineer groups were preparing demolitions on all bridges.

Back at Taejŏn General Dean, a big six-footer with a bristling crew cut cropping his sand-colored hair, and beanpole General Church, slightly stooped, always calm seemingly to the point of indifference, discussed the probability of imminent American combat with the enemy.

The third general officer to come to the forward area in Korea, Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, acting commanding general of the 24th Division artillery, now arrived in Taejŏn in the early afternoon.

General Dean decided to send Barth forward to represent him, and with instructions for Task Force Smith. So, at 1500 4 July, General Barth started north by jeep for P'yŏngt'aek. [06-16]

When he found Smith, General Barth relayed his orders to "take up those good positions near Osan you told General Church about." [06-17] [note]

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"It was a horrible field anyway-the damned thing was practically under water," said General Timberlake, who flew to Pusan at noon on 2 July to inspect the airlift. Since the runway obviously would not stand up under the loading of the heavy transports,


General Timberlake in midafternoon of 2 July closed the field to C-54's and ordered the 374th Wing to resume operations with lighter C-46's and C-47's.

Using these lighter planes, the 374th Wing completed its troop-lift mission a little before dusk on 4 July.#2 [note]

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The Wolfe [Lt. Gen. Kenneth Bonner Wolfe, USAF's Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel] party reached Tokyo [the next day] late on the evening of 4 July and began work the next day.

[note]

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A field artillery battery arrived at P'yŏngt'aek the next day [7/5] , and that evening, 4 July, Smith's entire force had moved twelve miles north of P'yŏngt'aek where it set up another blocking position just north of Osan. [01-4]


About the same time that Smith's battalion had started for Osan, the two battalions of the 34th Infantry, heading north, had passed through Taejŏn. One battalion was to reestablish the blocking position at Ansŏng; the 1st Battalion was going to P'yŏngt'aek with a similar mission.

A new commander-an experienced combat officer-had joined the 1st Battalion as the trains moved through Taejŏn.

He told his company commanders that North Korean soldiers were reported to be farther north but that they were poorly trained, that only half of them had weapons, and that there would be no difficulty in stopping them.

Junior officers had assured their men that after a brief police action all would be back in Sasebo. Officers of the 34th Infantry knew that the 21st was ahead of the 34th in a screening position.

Overconfidence was the prevailing note.


This was the background and the setting for the rainy morning when the 1st Battalion-and especially Company A, with which this account is mainly concerned-waited in the muddy streets of P'yŏngt'aek. [note]

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Using these lighter planes, the 374th Wing completed its troop-lift mission a little before dusk on 4 July.#2

[note]

1953 Sun Set

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"Shortly after dark, we started moving out of the rendezvous area. The road was a typical Korean road, very narrow with deep rice paddies on both sides. The first thing that happened was one of the howitzers slipped off the road and turned over in the rice paddy. When I walked back along the column to appraise the difficulty, one of my men fired his carbine point-blank at me-- how he missed me, I'll never know. He hadn't meant to fire at me, but the battery personnel were on edge, moving into their first combat. It took us about an hour to right the weapon and, again, we proceeded toward the battery position.

19500704 2000 boo0

2015 Korean Time

"During the daylight reconnaissance, I had been sure I knew the way. It was impossible to miss the road. But the `impossible' happened. While going through a small village, I took the wrong turn. I discovered the error after we had traveled about five blocks and began looking for an area to turn the battery around. Finally, we had to knock down several stone fences and managed to turn around by uncoupling each towed load and turning it by hand. With this last catastrophe behind us, we proceeded to the battery position."

By now, the Redlegs of A Battery 52nd FAB had been loading and unloading, packing and unpacking, and moving their equipment for more than 80 hours. Scotty had to navigate his battery into the selected position and occupy it, all at night and with most of the hard labor occurring after midnight.

Scott, Dwain L. (Scotty) LtCol USA
Scotty: "The position we had selected was on a hill about 100 yards above the road. The only road into the position was a narrow path that would not support my prime movers, so we had to uncouple each piece on the road and couple it to two jeeps hooked in tandem and tow the weapon into its position. My men hand-carried more than 1,000 rounds of 105-mm ammunition into the position.

"The overall position was one of the most completely organized and camouflaged I have ever seen. We moved one piece into a house and replaced the house around it. One was in a cornfield and the corn was replanted before morning. We did not have air superiority in Korea at this time, and I remembered the battles in Germany when I faced similar situations.

"We established a battery ammunition dump of about 500 rounds at the foot of the hill inside a Korean shack. The only reason we didn't move the ammunition into the position was that dawn came upon us before we finished.

"During the time we were organizing the position, the gun crews dug in each weapon where it stood. The weapons were dug in about two feet, and with the parapet, the soldiers were protected by approximately three feet of earth."

The infantrymen of Task Force Smith also dug in that night.

[note]

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"During the daylight reconnaissance, I had been sure I knew the way. It was impossible to miss the road. But the `impossible' happened. While going through a small village, I took the wrong turn. I discovered the error after we had traveled about five blocks and began looking for an area to turn the battery around. Finally, we had to knock down several stone fences and managed to turn around by uncoupling each towed load and turning it by hand. With this last catastrophe behind us, we proceeded to the battery position."

By now, the Redlegs of A Battery had been loading and unloading, packing and unpacking, and moving their equipment for more than 80 hours. Scotty had to navigate his battery into the selected position and occupy it, all at night and with most of the hard labor occurring after midnight.

Scotty: "The position we had selected was on a hill about 100 yards above the road. The only road into the position was a narrow path that would not support my prime movers, so we had to uncouple each piece on the road and couple it to two jeeps hooked in tandem and tow the weapon into its position. My men hand-carried more than 1,000 rounds of 105-mm ammunition into the position.

"The overall position was one of the most completely organized and camouflaged I have ever seen. We moved one piece into a house and replaced the house around it. One was in a cornfield and the corn was replanted before morning. We did not have air superiority in Korea at this time, and I remembered the battles in Germany when I faced similar situations.

"We established a battery ammunition dump of about 500 rounds at the foot of the hill inside a Korean shack.

[note]

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After securing Yŏngdŭngp'o on 3 July, the N.K. 4th Division prepared to continue the attack south. The next morning, 7/4 at 0600, it departed on the Suwŏn road with the 5th Regiment in the lead. Just before noon on 4 July, eleven enemy tanks with accompanying infantry were in Anyang-ni, halfway between Yŏngdŭngp'o and Suwŏn.

The road from Suwŏn through Osan toward P'yŏngt'aek was almost solid with ROK Army vehicles and men moving south the afternoon and evening of 4 July. The 5th Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division attempted to delay the enemy column between Anyang-ni and Suwŏn, but fourteen T34 tanks penetrated its positions, completely disorganized the regiment, and inflicted on it heavy casualties.

The Australian and U.S. Air Forces, striving to slow the North Korean advance, did not always hit enemy targets. On that day, 4 July, friendly planes strafed ROK troops several times in the vicinity of Osan. The ROK Army headquarters left Suwŏn during the day.

At midnight the N.K. 4th Division occupied the town. [05-28] [looks like Suwŏn is the town]

2308 Korean Time

Korean_War

Sun Rise 0515 1953
Moon Rise 2308 0943
Moon Phase 72% 19 days

[note]


Casualties

Tuesday July 04, 1950 (Day xxx)

Korean_War 000 Casualties

As of July 4, 1950

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 17 18 0 0 0 35
Today 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 17 18 0 0 0 35

Aircraft Losses Today 005

Notes for Tuesday July 4, 1950 - Day 10