Overview

Korean_War

July 7 United Nations Command created, under General Douglas MacArthur

[note]

United Resolution 84 passes 7-0.

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The Battle of Ch'ŏnan was the third engagement between United States and North Korean forces during the Korean War. It occurred on the night of July 7/8, 1950 in the village of Ch'ŏnan in western South Korea. The fight ended in a North Korean victory after intense fighting around the town, which took place throughout the night and into the morning. [note]

July 7 - United Nations creates United Nations Command, under General Douglas Mac Arthur, who is appointed by the U.S. [note]

July 7
President Truman authorizes the Department of Defense to draft young men in the nation's build-up for the Korean War.


-- Truman also asks Congress for $260 million to build hydrogen bombs and other nuclear weapons.


-- United Press reporter Peter Kalischer, thought to have been captured by North Koreans, returned to American lines after 60 hours in communist-held territory. [note]

July 7-9
The UN Security Council requests the United States to be its executive to form a UN Command to oversee military operations in Japan. Two days later Truman names Gen. Douglas MacArthur to lead the UN Command. [note]

Politicians and pundits begin laying blame for the unexpected North Korean invasion, as well as the poor state of readiness of both South Korean and American forces.


-- Calling the situation in Korea "another grisly Pearl Harbor," Sen. Alexander Wiley Jr., R-Wis., says the only reason American troops had been pulled out of Korea was the State Department wanted to appease Russia.


-- Joseph and Stewart Alsop, writing a series in the New York Herald tribune, say Truman and his defense secretary did not pursue an adequate defense policy. Republicans also blocked all aid programs [note]

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Newly arrived 24th Infantry Division troops are thrown against advancing North Korean forces. Outnumbered and outgunned, they are only able to slow down the communists.

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-- The 34th Infantry Regiment fights delaying actions in P'yŏngt'aek and Ch'ŏnan on July 6.

[note]

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Three SB-17s were utilized this date for weather recon and orbit missions. A total of twenty-nine hours and forty-five minutes (29:45) was logged on these flights.

One (1) SB-17 and one (1) H-5 searched the area ten (10) miles north of Ashiya Air Base for a pilot reported to have bailed out at that point. A total of eleven hours and thirty-five minutes (11:35) was flown with negative flights.

At 0900/K the Flight was notified that one L-5 was missing from a flight from Brady Field (33° 40' N 130° 25' E) to Pusan (35° 05' N 130° 26' E), Korea. Later notified that the L-5 had landed on the beach at Pusan.

At 1435/K ADCC notified the Flight that an emergency existed 100 miles north of Fukuoka. No further instructions were received.

At 2140/K ADCC notified the Flight that a B-29 was in trouble 100 miles south of Itazuke Air Base.

At 2150/K ADCC notified the Flight that the B-29 had landed safely. A total of three false alerts recorded this date.

[note]

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July 7: Partridge resumed active command of 5th Air Force. The UN Security Council established the UN Command, designated the United States as executive agent for prosecuting the Korean War, and requested that the US President appoint a UN Commander. The RAAF No. 77 Squadron, representing Australia's contribution to airpower in the theater, was attached to FEAF.

[note]

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On 30 June, five days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Zhou Enlai decided to send a group of Chinese diplomats, most of whom were military intelligence personnel, to North Korea to establish better communications with Kim Il-sung as well as to collect first-hand materials on the fighting.[72]

[note]

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The Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. Clifton B. Cates Jr., immediately offered FMF units to bolster the U.S. presence in Korea.

His proposal was accepted and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, composed of Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 5th Marines and Marine Air Group, MAG-33 under the command of Brig. Gen. Edward A. Craig, was formed in California on 7 July. On 7 July the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was reactivated in California.

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The 5th Marines was the nucleus around which the 1st Brigade ground combat element was formed.

At the time, the regiment was only a skeleton unit composed of six understrength rifle companies and a few small combat support units (two companies per battalion).

Lieutenant General LeManuel Shepherd, an old 5th Marines hand who had just become commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, recommended that Marine units be brought to full strength before shipping out to the combat zone.

Accordingly, a third platoon was added to each rifle company by stripping all the other infantry units at Camp Pendleton.

However, the third rifle companies for each battalion could not be formed in time to sail. Personnel shortages meant new units were made up of Marines from widely scattered posts and stations, ship detachments, and activated Reservists.

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Sadly, not enough of them could be gathered in the short time available before the 5th Marines embarked.

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The bobtailed regiment that sailed for the Far East included regimental headquarters, a 4.2inch mortar platoon, an antitank company, three heavy weapons companies, and three two company rifle battalions.

Added to these organic 5th Marines units were the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines; Company A, 1st Motor transport Battalion; Company C, 1st Medical Battalion; Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion; Company A, 1st Tank Battalion; 1st Amphibian tractor Company; and service, ordnance, signals, military police, and reconnaissance detachments that combined to form Marine RCT 5.

The 5th Marines commander, Raymond L. Murray, was a tall, highly respected combat veteran. He graduated from Texas A&M, served in China and Iceland before World War II, and held the Navy Cross and two Silver Stars for gallantry at Saipan, Guadalcanal, and Tarawa.

Although only a lieutenant colonel, Murray was held in such high esteem that he was allowed to command the regiment.

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Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton's 1st Battalion was composed of Capt. John R. Stevens' A and Capt. John L. Tobin's B Companies and Maj. John W. Russell's Weapons Company.

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Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise's 2nd Battalion had Capt. John Finn Jr.'s D and Capt. George E. Kittredge's E Companies and Maj. Theodore F. Spiker's Weapons Company.

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Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett's 3rd Battalion included 1st Lt. Robert D. Bohn's G and Capt. Joseph C. Fegan Jr.'s H Companies and Capt. Patrick E. Wildman's Weapons Company.

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1st Battalion 11th Marines

[note]

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The 5th Marines spent four days [7,8,9,10] packing, boxing, and preparing supplies and equipment for embarkation at Camp Pendleton. A few men were hurriedly sent to the range to familiarize themselves with new weapons like M20 3.5inch rocket launchers and M26 Pershing tanks. Concurrently, streams of men from Camp Pendleton and trainloads of refurbished World War II–era equipment from the desert supply center at nearby Barstow flooded the port of embarkation at San Diego.

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The 5th Marines spent four days [7,8,9,10] packing, boxing, and preparing supplies and equipment for embarkation at Camp Pendleton. A few men were hurriedly sent to the range to familiarize themselves with new weapons like M20 3.5inch rocket launchers and M26 Pershing tanks. Concurrently, streams of men from Camp Pendleton and trainloads of refurbished World War II–era equipment from the desert supply center at nearby Barstow flooded the port of embarkation at San Diego.

[note]

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KPA commences "Third (Taejŏn) Phase"

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Army Policy

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But by 7 July his views had changed materially. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "It is now apparent that we are confronted in Korea with an aggressive and well-trained professional army equipped with tanks and perhaps other ground material quite equal to, and in some categories, superior to that available here." The enemy's leadership was "excellent."

The North Koreans showed understanding of and skill in tactical and strategic principles-demonstrated by their break across the Han River. To halt and hurl back "this powerful aggression" would, in MacArthur's opinion, require from four to four and one-half full-strength American divisions supported by an airborne RCT and an armored group.

To reach this strength level in Korea 30,000 men and officers would have to be sent him from the United States at once. "It is a minimum," he warned the Joint Chiefs, "without which success will be extremely doubtful." [05-11]

[note]

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Eighth U.S. Army

As the odds grew large that the greater part of Eighth Army would have to fight in Korea, it became apparent that General Walker would have to take personal command there.

USAFIK was a provisional headquarters, hastily formed for a specific mission, and could not handle a large operation efficiently. When General Dean proposed on 7 July that his headquarters absorb GHQ ADCOM, General MacArthur had already decided that General Walker would take over. [05-19]

[note]

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the Army should send General Reserve units to General MacArthur. But the issue was so important in terms of worldwide commitments that the JCS on 7 July asked the Secretary of Defense to gain the approval of the President. Mr. Truman gave it, and the approved units were immediately ordered to prepare for shipment. [05-40]

[note]

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In spite of sympathetic consideration of the proposal by France and the United Kingdom, the United States rejected the projected U.N. committee, and a revised resolution developed. Because the United States occupied a privileged position in the terms of the resolution, it would not have been seemly for the American representative to introduce it.

Accordingly, on 7 July, the delegations of France and the United Kingdom brought the draft before the Security Council. Seven votes in favor had been lined up in advance. The resolution therefore passed the Security Council, by a vote of seven to zero, with three nations, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, abstaining. The Soviet representative had not yet returned to the council and cast no vote.

This resolution made President Truman executive agent for the council in carrying out the United Nations fight against aggression in Korea.

The Security Council recommended that contributing member nations furnish forces to a unified command under the United States. It asked that the American Government select a commander for this unified command and that the United States submit periodic reports on the course of operations in Korea.

President Truman designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff his agents for Korea.

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To General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, fell the task of serving the Joint Chiefs as their primary representative in Korean operations.

At the Army level, General Bolté, the G-3, handled operational details for General Collins. Thus, with authority granted by the United Nations, vested in the President, and running downward through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Army became responsible for planning and directing the military operations of United Nations forces in Korea. [06-5]

[note]

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The commanding general MG Lyman L. Lemnitzer of the 11th Airborne Division had been informed of the possible deployment on 7 July, but with the decision against air transport to Japan, no immediate action was taken. Planning continued, however, for possible movement by ship.

When General Collins learned during his conference in Tokyo that General MacArthur's plan for Inch'ŏn included a role for the airborne RCT, he was somewhat concerned. He told General Almond, after hearing the latter describe the planned seizure of the north bank of the Han River by an airborne unit, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take a very personal interest in how General MacArthur employed the airborne troops.

[note]

United Nations Command created, under General Douglas MacArthur

[note]

Central Intelligence Agency

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TOP SECRET #179 Invaders Momentum Undiminished - The missing 60 Assemblymen, who apparently remained in Sŏul voluntarily, include virtually all the middle-of-the-roaders. This group offers the invaders their best opportunity to set up a "legitimate" facade for any provisional government in the occupied areas.

[note]

SECRET #180 Weekly Summary Excerpt, 7 July 1950, The Korean Situation: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities

[note] [note] [note]

Bio

On 4 July, Joy ordered Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious Group 1 (and thus TF-90) to travel with selected staff members to Tokyo to plan amphibious operations. His command had spent early May 1950 conducting landing exercises in southern California for the benefit of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College observers.[cmdctl-12]

MacArthur had requested that the Navy train his Eighth Army troops in amphibious techniques, and on 20 May Amphibious Group 1 had sailed for Japan, where it had reported to COMNAVFE and was designated Task Force 90. Its only ships were the command ship USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), the assault transport USS Cavalier (APA-37), the assault cargo ship USS Union (AKA-106), the tank landing ship USS LST-611, and the fleet tug USS Arikara (ATF-98) (not ATF 72).[error ATF-72 Kiowa ] However, Doyle himself had considerable amphibious experience, and his staff officers were virtually all veterans of World War II’s Central and Southwest Pacific amphibious operations.[cmdctl-13]

TASK FORCE 90. Amphibious Force, Far East. Rear Admiral James. Henry Doyle, USN
Mount McKinley (AGC-7), Flagship 1 Amphibious Command Ship
Cavalier (APA-37) 1 Amphibious transport
Union (AKA-106) 1 Amphibious Cargo Ship
LST 611 1 Landing Ship Tank
Arikara (ATF-98) 1 Fleet Tug


Doyle, in Tokyo, was now directed to plan for the immediate combat-loading of the 1st Cavalry Division (actually an infantry formation, part of the occupation force in Japan) for an amphibious landing “somewhere in Korea.” The following day, Inch'ŏn, the port of Sŏul on the west coast of the Korean Peninsula at the mouth of the Han River, was selected as the objective, and planning proceeded. Simultaneously, Almond directed the commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, Major General Hobart Gay, to expedite the Inch'ŏn landing “to the utmost limit.” The division—diminished by 750 senior noncommissioned officers sent to the 24th Division—hurriedly drew its weapons and prepared to board ship in Yokohama.[cmdctl-14] The 1st Cavalry Division’s planning for the landing was materially aided by Colonel Edward Forney, U.S. Marine Corps, and his staff from Mobile Training Team A (or “Able”), whom Doyle had seconded to the division—in fact, they largely wrote its operation order.


On 7 July, Kunsan, a seaport about 120 miles south of Inch'ŏn, was identified as an alternate objective and incorporated in the planning. Only two days later, however, events on the ground made P'ohang-Dong, on the southeastern coast, the most probable objective, and “intensive research on that area [was] started.”

[note]

Acknowledging the United States as the major contributor to the effort in Korea, the U.N. Security Council on 7 July 1950 recommended that other nations supplying forces and materiel contribute them to a single command under the United States.[01-11]

[note]

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HMX-1 was ordered, on the 7th of July, to send 8 officers and 30 men to the 1st Provisional Brigade for assignment to Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6) of MAG-33. These Marines would fly and maintain four HO3S-1 helicopters and would be the first helicopter unit organized for combat.

[note]

by 7 July the U.S. Marines were ordered to activate a Regimental Combat Team. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated under the command of Brig. Gen. Edward A. Craig and was built around the 5th Marine Regiment and the 33rd Marine Air Group (MAG-33) of the 1st Marine Air Wing. 6,534 officers and men prepared to go to Korea.13

[note]

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1950/07/07 - MacArthur proposes his plan to "compose and united" all Korea in a great counterattack, but Truman delayed approval until N.K. attack was stopped.

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"The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated at Camp Pendleton, California. The brigade, formed around the 5th Marine Regiment, began embarkation for Korea within a week."

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The UN Security Council recommended that all military assistance provided to the UN should be made available to a unified command under US authority. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was named Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

[note]

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24th Infantry Division Prisoner of War (PW) Interrogation, time of capture July 7, 1950 -- "20 men are sent from each division dressed as civilian to get information on the number of men, type of weapons of the enemy before attacking." 45
45
Prisoner of War Interrogation Report, 24th Infantry Division, 7 Jul 50. In Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.

[note]

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On July 7th I made my first call to Washington for reinforcements. In a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff I explained that we were facing "an aggressive and well trained professional army operating under excellent top level guidance and demonstrated superior command of strategic and tactical principles." My immediate need was for not less than five full-strength divisions and three tank battalions, together with reinforcing artillery and service elements. My ultimate purpose, I said, was "fully to exploit our air and sea control and, by amphibious maneuver, strike behind his mass of ground forces." Should Soviet Russia or Communist China intervene, I added, "a new situation would develop which is not predictable now."

Frustration in Korea * 383

I was amazed when this message of desperate need for the necessary strength to implement a Washington decision was disapproved by Washington itself. The reasons given were that:

  1. no increase in any part of the armed services had been authorized;

  2. a suitable United States military posture in other parts of the world had to be maintained; and

  3. there was a shortage of shipping.

What all this amounted to actually was the old faulty principle of "priorities," under which the Far East was again at the bottom of the list. That it reaffirmed a principle that had lost us the Philippines and immeasurably retarded the defeat of Japan was surprising enough in itself, but the circumstances under which the decision was being formulated made it almost unbelievable. The all-important difference, of course, was that while during World War II we had been fighting in Europe, now we were not. And it could not fail to be obvious even to the non-military mind that Soviet military dispositions in eastern Europe were defensive rather than offensive. I repeated my original request. It was again disapproved.

[note]

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The Security Council of the United Nations on July 7th, directed the establishment of a unified Korean command. The United States was to be the U.N.'s operative agent, and was instructed to appoint the over-all commander.

[note]

South then North

Lieutenant Bernard [not mentioned in July so far] and twelve men of the reserve platoon of B Company reached Ch'ŏnan two days (5th + 2 = 7/7] after the Osan fight. Five times he and his men had encountered North Korean roadblocks.

They arrived at Ch'ŏnan only half an hour ahead of the enemy. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast. [06-56]

None of the 5 officers and 10 enlisted men of the artillery forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came back.

On 7 July 5 officers and 26 enlisted men from the artillery were still missing. [06-57]

The N.K. 4th Division and attached units apparently lost approximately 42 killed and 85 wounded at Osan on 5 July. [06-58]

A diary taken from a dead North Korean soldier some days later carried this entry about Osan: "5 Jul 50 . . . we met vehicles and American PWs. We also saw some American dead. We found 4 of our destroyed tanks. Near Osan there was a great battle." [06-59]

[note]

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General Barth remained at Ch'ŏnan overnight and then started for Taejŏn [the 7th]. He remained in command of the 24th Division artillery until 14 July when he assumed command of his regular unit, the 25th Division artillery. [07-9]

[note]

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General MacArthur was aware of the enemy division advancing down the coastal road, and he knew that unless halted it would constitute, a grave menace.

On 7 July, he ordered General Dean to halt hostile troops moving south along the east coast near Yŏngdök, and instructed him to provide security for Col. Robert Witty and his 35th Fighter Group at the air base being established at Yŏnil, five miles south of P'ohang-dong. Pursuant to these instructions, General Dean ordered the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment, then assembling at Taegu, to proceed to P'ohang-dong, [where it arrived on 8 July. ]

[note]

During the evening of 6 July General Walker telephoned Col. William A. Collier at Kobe and asked him to report to him the next morning at Yokohama.

7/7

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When Collier arrived at Eighth Army headquarters the next morning [7/7] General Walker told him that Eighth Army was taking over command of the military operations in Korea, and that he, Walker, was flying to Korea that afternoon but was returning the following day. Walker told Collier he wanted him to go to Korea as soon as possible and set up an Eighth Army headquarters, that for the present Col. Eugene M. Landrum, his Chief of Staff, would remain in Japan, and that he, Collier, would be the Eighth Army combat Chief of Staff in Korea until Landrum could come over later.

General Walker and Colonel Collier had long been friends and associated in various commands going back to early days together at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. They had seen service together in China in the 15th Infantry and in World War II when Collier was a member of Walker's IV Armored Corps and XX Corps staffs. After that Collier had served Walker as Chief of Staff in command assignments in the United States. Colonel Collier had served in Korea in 1948 and 1949 as Deputy Chief of Staff and then as Chief of Staff of United States Army forces there. During that time he had come to know the country well.

[note]


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He replied on 7 July that to halt and hurl back the North Koreans would require, in his opinion, from four to four and a half full-strength infantry divisions, an airborne regimental combat team complete with lift, and an armored group of three medium tank battalions, together with reinforcing artillery and service elements. He said 30,000 reinforcements would enable him to put such a force in Korea without jeopardizing the safety of Japan. The first and overriding essential, he said, was to halt the enemy advance. He evaluated the North Korean effort as follows: "He is utilizing all major avenues of approach and has shown himself both skillful and resourceful in forcing or enveloping such road blocks as he has encountered. Once he is fixed, it will be my purpose fully to exploit our air and sea control, and, by amphibious maneuver, strike him behind his mass of ground force." [09-24]

By this time General MacArthur had received word from Washington that bomber planes, including two groups of B-29's and twenty-two B-26's, were expected to be ready to fly to the Far East before the middle of the month.

The carrier USS Boxer (CV-21) would load to capacity with F-51 planes and sail under forced draft for the Far East.

But on 7 July Far East hopes for a speedy build-up of fighter plane strength to tactical support of the ground combat were dampened by a message from Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, U.S. Air Force Director of Operations. He informed General Stratemeyer that forty-four of the 164 F-80's requested were on their way, but that the rest could not be sent because the Air Force did not have them. [09-25]

[note]

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On 7 July the Security Council of the United Nations took the third of its important actions with respect to the invasion of South Korea. By a vote of seven to zero, with three abstentions and one absence, it passed a resolution recommending a unified command in Korea and asked the United States to name the commander. The resolution also requested the United States to provide the Security Council with "appropriate" reports on the action taken under a unified command and authorized the use of the United Nations flag. [09-6]

[note]

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1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward A. Craig was activated on 7 July,

[note]

 

Citations

Silver Star

Carrington, Henry P. [Capt SS 63rdFAB]

 

[note]

The Forgotten War

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* * *

On July 7 Johnnie Walker flew into Taejŏn for his first visit to the battlefield. There was no hint of criticism then or later about Dean's brash deployment plan. As Walker's chief of staff, Gene Landrum, recalled, Walker admired Dean unreservedly. He was just what Walker wanted: "a fighter and a doer." Walker believed that American forces could win only by relentless and continuous attacks, which would throw the NKPA off balance, that every opportunity to attack should be seized.[4-71]

[note]


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The requests were accompanied by steadily escalating rhetoric. On July 7 MacArthur reported that he was confronted by an "aggressive and well trained professional army" which had "demonstrated superior command of strategic and tactical principles" in the drive south of Sŏul.

By July 10 he had judged the situation to be "critical." Expressing doubt that the Americans could hold the southern tip of Korea, MacArthur requested, in addition to the foregoing, "a field army of four full divisions and component services."[5-3]

[note]

US Air Force

 

 

As of noon, released General Partridge who will return to command of Fifth Air Force. General Eubank appointed vice commander. USAF group depart for Washington 1340.


1440 Colonel Van Meter called Colonel Bunker[79-Col Laurence L. Bunker, MacArthur’s aide-de-camp.] the ADC to CINCFE re: Colonel Van Meter explained to Colonel Bunker that numerous correspondents had requested a press conference with me as they believe that as air commander on CINCFE’s staff, I should be able to give the American public something of the first ten days of air operations over Korea. Another request for an interview was received by me from Mr. Harry F. Kern, the foreign editor of Newsweek, re his doing a personalized story for his magazine. Colonel Bunker was told by Colonel Van Meter that he (Colonel Van Meter) had contacted Colonel Echols (PIO for CINCFE)[80-Col Marion P. Echols] on several occasions requesting info whether CINCFE had any objections to my holding a press conference or holding interviews and to date he (Colonel Van Meter) had not had a reply of any kind. While Colonel Van Meter was on the telephone, Colonel Bunker said he would speak to CINCFE re same, which apparently he did, because when Colonel Bunker returned he told Colonel Van Meter that CINCFE had no objections to my either granting interviews or holding a press conference.


General O’Donnell arrives this evening (1900 hours, Haneda) and I have directed he report to me at 8:30 A.M. in time for the briefing. Colonel Nuckols[81-Col W. P. Nuckols] due to arrive, accompanied by his wife, and he will be appointed PIO.


Complimented by General Almond, Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC, on our news release as of today which started out - “Far East Air Forces has now completed 1,100 sorties.” He directed we back it up with some pictures which we are doing soonest. I told PIO that he could release the name of the bomber commander immediately after his arrival tonight.
3:00 P.M. had interview by Newsweek foreign editor, Mr. Harry F. Kern. I gave him background on what we have done, what we are doing and what we contemplate doing.

Sent memo to CINCFE requesting he send following radio to Collins[82-Gen J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army chief of staff. Collins commanded the 25th Infantry Division in the Pacific in late 1942 and early 1943. In 1944, he took command of the VII Corps in Europe. Other assignments following the war included; Chief of Staff, Army Field Forces; Army chief of information; deputy chief of staff to General Eisenhower; vice chief to General Bradley; and on Oct. 1, 1949, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.], personal from MacArthur:

Due to current situation in this theater and the recent decision of Secretary of Defense that SCARWAF [Special Category Army Personnel with Air Force] units would remain with D/A [Department of the Army], it is essential that immediate action be taken to supply SCARWAF personnel for Far East Air Forces units as they are under strength both in numbers and quality.[83-These personnel were aviation engineer troops that were recruited, trained, and assigned to units by the Army but were charged against Air Force strength. Two aviation engineer group headquarters and service companies, five aviation engineer battalions, and one aviation engineer maintenance company were assigned to FEAF. Unfortunately, these units were ill-trained and ill-equipped for what they were being asked to do. When the Korean War began, these units had only 2,322 officers and men assigned as com- pared to a war-strength authority of 4,315. In mid-July, the first of some 870 specialists arrived in Japan, and any SCARWAF people slated to rotate home were kept in the Far East. It was not until September that FEAF was allowed to reorganize its aviation engineer units under new increased-strength TO/Es. Despite this increase, SCARWAF units remained a problem area throughout the war. (Futrell, pp 62, 72-73.)] Requirement for runway rehabilitation and extension, taxi- ways, hardstands, and communications facilities in Korea, Japan and Okinawa is urgent and is far beyond capabilities of FEAF SCARWAF units as currently manned. Stratemeyer sent personal message to Vandenberg on this subject 5 July 50 and Department of Air Force is familiar with detailed manning requirements for these units. I urge that you take immediate action to supply the required personnel as I can give him no help at this time.

Issued memo to my Deputy for Operations:

Navy-Land-Based Aircraft and Navy Carrier-Based Aircraft - Operational Control.... We must obtain the results of Navy reconnaissance and operations immediately upon completion. You will take the necessary steps to contact Admiral Joy to see that they are delivered by air courier and, in turn, rushed to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. We must be very careful when we give the Navy targets and a section of North Korea in which to operate that it does not interfere with and is well coordinated with the operations of our three B–29 medium bomber groups.... All land- based Navy aviation and carrier-based, except those units used for anti- submarine operations, will be under my operational control. You will take the necessary steps to see that this is done. I have written a memo to General MacArthur today recommending same. When any Navy units are based ashore, except the P2V squadron to be based at Johnson, they must have their own support ashore as we will be unable to support them operationally. Make this clear.

Sending to CINCFE (dated 8 July), subject: “Navy Unit.” Text of memo follows:

It is my understanding that the Navy contemplates bringing into your theater some land-based aircraft (CVE’s [escort carriers] - fighters); also, as you know, the Seventh Fleet contemplates another strike with air at your direction in North Korea. I request that all land-based naval aviation and carrier-based aviation when operating over North Korea or from Japan, except those units used for anti-submarine operations be placed under my operational control. The land-based fighters based in either Japan or Korea will in turn be placed under the operational control of the Commanding General Fifth Air Force. In the case of the carrier-based aviation in order that proper coordination can be maintained with my Bomber Command (B–29s) and with the Fifth Air Force, I must be able to direct their operations, including the targets to be hit and the area in which they must operate. I urge your immediate approval and that both Admiral Struble and Admiral Joy be so advised. Should you so desire, I am on call for any discussion on this subject.[84-Stratemeyer would not gain operational control of the Navy air units. Admirals Joy and Struble felt that giv- ing Stratemeyer “operational control” of their air units was asking too much of them. The often acrimonious]

(Sending copy of my memo to CINCFE to CSAF with an informal note for- warding same for his info and also thanking him for sending the Wolfe party.)


1750. General Dean called from Korea and gave me four targets over which he wanted air support. Apparently as has been shown by test, our bazookas can not penetrate the Soviet tank. Report received that during a penetration test, starting at 30 yards, our fire failed to penetrate and then only at a distance of 10 feet. General Dean’s targets were all mostly on arteries - rail, ferry crossing and the road between P'yŏngt'aek and Osan. The latter target we had already scheduled, but the other three I  have to [schedule] Ops for follow through.


Weather unfavorable; two F–80s lost; missions directed against factories in the North, bridges, convoys, and troop movements. F–82 on an “intruder mission” in the Inch'ŏn area dropped one napalm bomb; results believed by pilot to be good. Reported by returning flyers that rocket fire from planes does not appear to penetrate Soviet tanks.

[note]

 

 

Air Rescue

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The function of air rescue, like that of air evacuation, was not new in the Korean war, but its performance was aided by new plane types and efficient management. The 2nd and 3rd Air Rescue Squadrons had been assigned to FEAF during World War II, but on 1 May 1949 they had been transferred to the world-wide Air Rescue Service, a subordinate to MATS.

During the Korean conflict the 2nd Squadron's flights remained at Clark, Kadena, and Anderson, but the 3rd Squadron, participated more directly in the war. The latter was initially divided into four flights - based at Johnson, Yokota, Misawa, and Ashiya - to which another was added when part of the 5th was dispatched to the Far East on 7 July.

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The USAF attempt to get F-51's to FEAF became more evident early in July when a party of key members of the USAF staff visited Japan for firsthand observation of operational problems. At a meeting on 7 July Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, USAF Director of Operations, explained that 150 F-51's could be sent out on an aircraft carrier, to reach the theater within 13 to 20 days after leaving Alameda. In addition to these aircraft, the USAF could still draw on 764 F-51's in the National Guard and 794 in storage.

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While the USAF representatives were in Tokyo, FEAF also requested additional tactical units, and the staff conferences made suitable adjustments. For night photographic reconnaissance an RB-26 squadron was to be furnished; this unit, the 162nd tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, (NP) began moving from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on 12 July and arrived in Japan by 18 August.

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FEAF's request for a tactical control group started the 502nd Tactical Control Group, the 934th Signal Battalion, and the 2nd Radio Relay Squadron moving from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, to Japan. As planning for offensive ground operations progressed, FEAF was to request additional transport units for supporting purposes, but the conferences in early July provided that the 374th troop Carrier Group would be re-formed with two C-54 squadrons, and one squadron with C-47 's and a few C-119 's. FEAF also requested an additional B-26 group which was to be formed by mobilizing an Air Reserve group in the United States.

Although FEAF asked for only one medium bomber group from the Strategic Air Command, USAF had already begun preparations to send two such groups to the Far East on temporary duty.

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Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr. , Commanding General of the Fifteenth Air Force, was also made available on temporary duty with FEAF to command a new and provisional FEAF Bomber Command.

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The first teams went into operation on 5 July at Ch'ŏnan, and two other teams, formed from fighter squadron personnel, went into action on 7 July at Ch'ŏnui, just south of Ch'ŏnan; the fighter pilots, detached for duty as forward air controllers, normally served on three weeks temporary duty.

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According to General Stratemeyer , if the aviation engineer units with FEAF at the beginning of hostilities had been anywhere near full strength and proper specialty training, Air Force units could have begun operating from Taegu and Pusan as early as 7 July, two weeks before [7/21] they were able to make a rather hesitant entry into bases in the zone of battle.

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General O'Donnell reached Tokyo on 7 July, selected Yokota as his command post, and prepared to base the 92nd Bombardment Group at Yokota and the 22nd Bombardment Group at Kadena on Okinawa.

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7,8,9 - During the three days 7-9 July, in the P'yŏngt'aek-Sŏul area Fifth Air Force planes claimed 197 trucks and 44 tanks destroyed. N.K. Armor Unit

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The USAF attempt to get F-51's to FEAF became more evident early in July when a party of key members of the USAF staff visited Japan for firsthand observation of operational problems. At a meeting on 7 July Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest , USAF Director of Operations, explained that 150 F-51's could be sent out on an aircraft carrier, to reach the theater within 13 to 20 days after leaving Alameda. In addition to these aircraft, the USAF could still draw on 764 F-51's in the National Guard and 794 in storage. On the other hand, F-80C's were in short supply. Of the 164 F-80C's ordered by FEAF, 44 were en route; the balance could not be met from USAF resources because they simply did not exist. F-82's were similarly limited in number, but FEAF was to get those released by the reequipment of Alaskan air units in the fall of 1950. The USAF staff members also urged that conversion of six F-80 squadrons to F-51's would be desirable because:

F-51 's could operate from rough Korean fields better than jet aircraft;
the F-51's had a longer operating radius especially at low altitudes; propeller-driven aircraft would be adequate in performance against the current NKAF opposition; and use of the F-51 's would simplify logistical requirements, since they consumed less fuel than the F-80's.

The conferees recognized that the F-80's thus far in combat had given excellent tactical support with rockets and strafing, and the decision to use F-51's was in no way a reflection of dissatisfaction with the F-80C or jet type aircraft. In the light of actuality, the canard that the F-51 was used in Korea because the F-80 jets were unsatisfactory evidently resulted from misinformation.

Unfortunately the USAF could not state the real reasons for use of the F-51 without endangering national security.

[And the reason I've got a big flashy Cadillac in my garage and I ride a scooter to work, isn't because I'm unhappy with the Cadillac, I just like to feel the wind in my hair and the rain on my face.]
[What a Croke]

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While Lie was circulating his draft resolution, the American Departments of State and Defense were jointly preparing another draft resolution, which accepted the essence of Lie's proposal less the provision for the committee on coordination. The American resolution was adopted by the Security Council on 7 July. It established a unified command under the President of the United States; designated the United States as the executive agent for matters dealing with the Korean conflict; and requested the President to appoint a commander for the United Nations forces.#2

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USAF planners were completely aware of the operational limitations of the F-80 aircraft, but these planes were designed as short-range interceptors and were not meant to be used for ground attack. Specifically adapted for air-ground operations was the RepublicF-84E "Thunderjet." FEAF had been scheduled to get some of these more modern F-84's beginning in 1949, but because of the inadequate Japanese airfields General Stratemeyer had been compelled to ask, instead, for nothing "hotter" than F-80C's.#76

#76 Ltr., Stratemeyer to CINCFE, subj:
Airfield Program for Japan, 17 June 1949.

But General Partridge had not been content to let the matter rest, for he maintained that he had to get the longest range aerodynamically possible from his F-80's. He had therefore assigned the problem to the 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing, and at Misawa Lieutenants Edward R. Johnston and Robert Eckman had devised an improvisation.

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Two center sections of a Fletcher tank could he inserted in the middle of the standard Lockheed tank, thus making a modified tank which could hold 265 gallons of fuel. These big "Misawa" tanks provided enough fuel for an extra hour of flight and increased the radius of action of an F-80C to approximately 350 miles, depending on the type of combat mission flown.#77

#77 Ltr., Partridge to Stratemeyer, 10 Apr. 1950; memo. for Brig. Gen. J. H. Doyle, CG FEAMCom from Maj. H. H. Hower, 7 July 1950.

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After visiting several Fifth Air Force bases the Wolfe party returned to Tokyo for a final meeting with the FEAF staff on 7 July.

At this conference FEAF agreed to convert six of its F-80 squadrons to F-5l aircraft, and it also promised to withdraw the F-82 all-weather fighters from combat. FEAF recognized that it would not get the F-51, F-82, and F-80 units it had requested.

Everyone agreed that the two Strategic Air Command groups more than met the B-29 requirements. Back in the United States more B-29's would be processed out of storage, but for the time being the 19th Group would remain under strength.

Enough RF-80's would be provided to keep the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at war strength, and FEAF therefore withdrew its request for an RF-51 squadron.

Detailed discussions of air-transport requirements led to a mutually agreeable solution whereby FEAF would re-form the 374th troop Carrier Group with two squadrons of C-54 aircraft and one squadron of C-47 planes. If Army airborne units were sent to the Far East, FEAF would he further augmented with temporary-duty troop carrier units from the United States.

The Tokyo conferees agreed that FEAF had a legitimate need for an additional light bombardment wing plus two light bombardment squadrons, but this requirement could not be satisfied from active resources. Such units would have to be called into active service from the Air Reserve.

The request for a tactical air-control squadron would be difficult to meet. The USAF had only one tactical control group (the 502nd) at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. FEAF initially agreed that the Fifth Air Force would satisfy its needs with a provisional air-control squadron which it was organizing from its own resources.#111

Although the USAF party was able to enlighten FEAF officers as to the thinking in Washington, it was actually able to give the FEAF staff little exact guidance concerning the air units which it might expect to receive as reinforcements.

Throughout the month of July the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed service plans for the movement of units to the Far East. Not a week of fighting had passed before General MacArthur was sending in requests for additional troops which would, at the proper moment, make an amphibious landing behind the North Korean army.

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Among the troops he wanted was the Army's 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, and. in order to mount an airborne operation, FEAF would require additional troop-carrier effort.

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With JCS approval, USAF alerted the 314th troop Carrier Group for a stint of temporary duty in the Far East.

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Photo interpreters check the thousands of reconnaissance contact prints taken by an RB-29 only twelve hours earlier.

General MacArthur requested a Marine division and a Marine air wing. Not all of these Marines could he had at once, but the Navy undertook to dispatch a 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the Far East. This brigade would be accompanied by elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing.#112

At its meeting on 7 July the Joint Chiefs approved USAF's projected deployment of air units. The 162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photo (NP), and the 1st Shoran Beacon Unit were put on orders to move from Langley Air Force Base. Virginia. Committed for eventual movement to FEAF were the 437th troop Carrier Wing and the 452nd Bombardment Wing (Light). Both of these wings were Air Force Reserve organizations which would be recalled to active duty and given sixty-day refresher training before they would be ready for the trip overseas.#113

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July 5, 6 7,

The warning alert, followed by appropriate operations orders, went out to the 22nd and 92nd Groups on or soon after 1 July. Officers and airmen who had been planning Fourth of July holidays found themselves packing crates, loading cargo planes, or standing in line before the boarding ramps of planes bound for the Far East. After hurried hours of packing and preparation, the deployment airlift got under way. The two groups scheduled flights of ten B-29's each day, departing their home bases on 5 through 7 July.

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The 22nd left March Air Force Base, California, stopped off at Hickam for a rest period, then flew on to Kadena, with stops at Kwajalein and Guam.

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The 92nd Group took off from Spokane Air Force Base, Washington, and followed a similar flight plan, with a final destination of Yokota Air Base.

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The newest developments in air rescue were taking place in the immediate area of the ground fighting in South Korea. On 7 July 1950 the 3rd Squadron sent two L-5 aircrews and aircraft to Korea. Called Mercy Mission No. 1, the L-5 pilots attempted several pickups without much luck, for the little liaison planes could not operate from the rice paddy lands of Korea.

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It also proposed to establish a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea." Lie urged that this committee was necessary both to stimulate and coordinate offers of assistance and to provide some measure of supervision for the United Nations military security action in Korea. Lie suggested that the members of the committee would represent the nations who furnished troops to fight in Korea. Delegates of Britain, France, and Norway liked the idea of the supervisory committee, but Lie recorded that the United States "promptly turned thumbs down."#1

While Lie was circulating his draft resolution, the American Departments of State and Defense were jointly preparing another draft resolution, which accepted the essence of Lie's proposal less the provision for the committee on coordination.

The American resolution was adopted by the Security Council on 7 July. It established a unified command under the President of the United States; designated the United States as the executive agent for matters dealing with the Korean conflict; and requested the President to appoint a commander for the United Nations forces.#2

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On 27 June the Fifth Air Force had established an advance echelon at Itazuke. and on 7 July General Stratemeyer relieved General Partridge from duty as acting-Vice Commander of FEAF and sent him down to Itazuke to resume active command of the Fifth Air Force. That same day Stratemeyer secured a new order from CINCFE which directed USAFIK to call directly upon Fifth Air Force advance head-quarters for supporting air strikes.#30

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Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. P'yŏngyang.

General Stratemeyer visualized that the Fifth Air Force would continue to be responsible for its former duties in Japan. In Korea it would perform tactical air-force missions: it would maintain air superiority, isolate the battlefield, and provide close support for USAFIK and ROK troops.#31

[note] [note]

Almost every aircraft sortie destroyed some enemy target. In the three days, 7 through 9 July, Fifth Air Force crews claimed 197 trucks and 44 tanks destroyed on the roads between P'yŏngt'aek and Sŏul.#32

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Soon after this episode, [7/3 RAAF No. 77 Squadron attack on ROK troops] and effective for the first time on 7 July, General MacArthur instructed USAFIK to establish a realistic bomb-line and to report changes in this line at periodic intervals during each day.#35

General MacArthur also instructed General Dean to see that the ROK troops painted white stars on the tops and sides of their vehicles, the same markings that served to identify American groundmen.#36

Although the aircrews of the Fifth Air Force were delaying and disrupting the North Korean blitz, each of the tactical air units was operating under technical disadvantages. But the quality of air leadership was high, and the tactical air units had begun to meet and overcome many of their technical problems. Some problems, however, could not be immediately solved.

Since the Twin-Mustang F-82's represented FEAF's counter-air interception capability in periods of darkness and bad weather, these scarce planes soon had to be withdrawn from the rigors of combat in Korea. The light bombers were highly effective in low-level operations, but the B-26 crews were finding it difficult to maneuver at low altitudes in the small valleys of Korea. More serious was the fact that hostile small-arms fire was wreaking substantial losses and damages upon the low-flying conventional bombers. By 7 July it was evident that the light bombers had to operate at medium altitudes if they were to survive.

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At this juncture General Partridge also received instructions from General Stratemeyer that the Fifth Air Force was expected to destroy road and rail bridges in enemy territory south of the Han River.

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This was work for the 3rd Bombardment Group, but to devise the tactics which the light bomber crews would employ to attack bridges was not simple. The group had only seven or eight B-26C aircraft, the "glass-nose" or "bombardier-nose" plane which carried bomb-sights needed for medium-level attacks.

Making the best of what it had, the 3rd Group initially used its few B-26C's to lead flights of B-26B's in medium-level attacks against bridges, road junctions, and railway targets.

Quite shortly the B-26B crews came up with an innovation which permitted them to make their own attacks from medium levels: in a combination of glide and dive bombing, the pilot of a "hard-nose" light bomber, without the aid of specialized sights, aligned his plane with the target, compensated for drift, dived at the objective with sufficient angle to allow his bombs to penetrate before they exploded, compensated for rate error, and then released his bomb load. This novel employment got good results in terms of bomb hits. Once they completed their medium-level bombing attacks, the light bombers went down "on the deck" for reconnaissance sweeps against such targets of opportunity as they might meet while heading back to Iwakuni.#37

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Anxious to make their maximum contributions in Korea, some of the jet pilots stretched their luck and used up their reserve supplies of fuel. On 7 July two pilots of the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron made dead-stick landings at Ashiya, while a third pilot of the same squadron ran out of fuel and bailed out north of the airfield.

Two factors worked together to alleviate the range problem confronting the F-80's. "Mosquito" tactical air-control operations greatly assisted the F-80 pilots, for the airborne controllers located enemy targets and had them pinpointed for attack when the faster-flying F-80's arrived at the scene.

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Most of the F-80 squadrons soon secured "Misawa" tanks which FEAMCom fabricated in a priority effort. Pilots of the 8th and 35th Groups were reported as "considerably worried" about the overstress these tanks placed on their wing tips,

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but the 9th Squadron of the 49th Group, after about 150 sorties with the big tanks, reported that they "aren't quite so acrobatic" but that "the general attitude of the entire squadron toward the F-80 is one of confidence and pride.#40


88 U.S. Air Force in Korea

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Air Attack by F-80's (Art by Arthur W. Rodriguez. Courtesy Air Force Art Collection)


Another problem which the jet pilots met during July had to do with the selection of weapons, for as yet the jet interceptors had no wing racks that could carry bombs.

The Shooting Star plane soon showed that it knew no superior as a strafer. Lack of propeller torque facilitated aiming, six .#50-caliber nose guns blasted out a lethal concentration of fire, and jet airspeeds allowed pilots to he upon the enemy before they had time to scatter and take cover.

But the only weapon which the F-80's could carry which could stand a chance of destroying a Soviet-built tank was the 5-inch high-velocity aircraft rocket (HVAR). Having had little peacetime practice with the HVAR, American pilots had to learn to use this weapon in combat.

Early in the campaign ineffective rocket attacks against enemy tanks caused unfortunate publicity. Such failures, however, were attributable to low clouds over Korea-often the base of the cloud layer was no more than 1,000 feet high-which forced pilots to attack enemy objectives from exceedingly flat angles of approach. When rockets were launched from a flat angle, aiming was often inaccurate, the projectile tended to ricochet off an armored object such as a tank, and the debris thrown up by the rocket's blast often damaged the low-flying plane.

Soon, however, Shooting Star pilots learned how best to use the HVAR. They found it best to approach a tank from a four o'clock position and to fire from a 30-degree angle from a range of about 1,500 feet.

A single 5-inch HVAR would normally disable a tank when it hit the rear of the tank's treads, but most pilots got the best results when they fired a salvo or ripple of all four of their rockets.#41


At the same time as the men of the Shooting Star squadrons were exploring the tactical capabilities of their jet fighters, Generals Partridge and Timberlake recognized that they needed to operate as many conventional F-51 Mustangs from Korean bases as could be supported over there.

The only airfield that could be used without extensive rehabilitation was five miles northeast of the city of Taegu (K-2 and K-37). Early in July Taegu Airfield had little to offer: a sod-and-gravel runway which was full of pot holes, two concrete buildings, and a wooden mess hall which the Japanese had built.

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After allocating F-51's to the provisional squadron at Taegu, FEAF had enough of these conventional fighters remaining in its theater stocks to equip another squadron for service in Korea.

Someone from FEAF reported that the old Japanese airfield on the east coast of Korea near the town of P'ohang could be repaired for Mustang operations, and after a flight over the area on 7 July General Timberlake and Lt. Col. William S. Shoemaker, the staff engineer at Advanced Headquarters, made the decision to develop P'ohang-Dong Airfield (K-3).

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Already Company A of the 802nd Engineer Aviation Battalion had loaded aboard an LST at Naha Harbor, Okinawa, and on the night of 10 July it arrived in Yŏngil Bay, off P'ohang Airfield.' Unloading its equipment across the beaches, Company A began work on 12 July, its immediate task being to put a 500-foot pierced steel plank (PSP) extension on the existing runway, to construct a taxiway, and to build 27 hardstands for Mustangs.#72

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In the war against Japan General MacArthur had proved himself a master at amphibious strategy, and it is not likely that he saw an amphibious solution to the strategic problem in Korea at the very beginning of these hostilities. If it had not been apparent earlier, however, General MacArthur fully understood by 7 July that the North Koreans possessed an "aggressive and well-trained professional army." In order to "halt" and "hurl back" this Communist army, MacArthur then informed the Joint Chiefs that he would require not less than four to four and one-half full-strength infantry divisions, an airborne regimental combat team, and an armored group, together with artillery and service elements. Once the North Korean enemy was "fixed," MacArthur explained that he intended "to exploit our air and sea control and by amphibious maneuver strike behind his mass of ground forces." #2

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US Marine Corps


There was not enough time in most instances for weapons familiarization training. Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had been accustomed to the M4A3 Medium tank with either the 75-mm. gun or the 105-mm. howitzer.

Activated on 7 July for service with the Brigade, the unit was equipped with M–26 “Pershing” tanks and 90-mm. guns. Captain Gearl M. English, the commanding officer, managed to snatch 1 day in which to take his men to the range with 2 of the new machines. Each gunner and loader was limited to 2 rounds, and the 90-mm. guns were never fired again until they were taken into combat in Korea.[20]

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[note] [note]

On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a unified command in Korea, and President Truman named General MacArthur as commander in chief. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, who had been one of Patton’s best officers in World War II, was appointed commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) on 12 July, and 4 days later he assumed control of all ROK ground forces.

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The remaining units of the 24th Infantry Division were in action by 7 July, having arrived by sea from Japan. They were followed by the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William B. Kean, which completed the movement to Korea on 14 July.

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Even at this early date there was talk both in Washington and Tokyo of forming an entire Marine division after mobilizing the Reserve.

For the present, however, it sufficed to organize the RCT requested by General MacArthur. There could be little doubt that the assignment would be given to an air-ground team built around the two main West Coast units, the 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33.

They were activated along with supporting units on 7 July as the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, senior officer at Camp Pendleton. The air component, consisting of three squadrons of MAG–33, was placed under the command of Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman, who was named deputy commander of the Brigade.

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Among these Marines were the first helicopter pilots of the United States Armed Forces to be formed into a unit for overseas combat service. Large-scale production of rotary-wing aircraft had come too late to have any effect on the tactics of World War II, though a few Sikorsky machines had been used experimentally both in the European and Pacific theaters toward the end of the conflict. But it remained for the United States Marine Corps to take the lead in working out combat techniques and procedures after organizing an experimental squadron, HMX–1, at Quantico in 1947.

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The activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on 7 July freed General Shepherd to continue his trip to the Far East. That evening, accompanied by his G–3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, he took off from the Pearl Harbor area on the flight to Tokyo.

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Bio Bio


President Truman had named General MacArthur as supreme commander of UN forces after the Security Council passed a resolution on 7 July calling for a unified effort in Korea.

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General Walker was soon to be appointed to the command of the Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), assuming control of all ROK ground forces. The personnel situation had grown critical. After being completely routed, the ROK troops were now in process of reorganization into five divisions.

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Meanwhile, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division was being sent to Korea as rapidly as possible; and it had been decided to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Division from consideration as the landing force of the proposed Inch'ŏn operation. Not only were these troops lacking in amphibious training, but they were needed as infantry reinforcements.

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Thus it was planned for the combat-loaded 1st Cavalry Division to make a landing at the East Coast port of P'ohang-dong, under the direction of ComPhibGru One and Mobile training Team Able, before proceeding to the front.

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This would leave only the 7th Infantry Division in Japan, and it was being stripped of troops to fill out units of the other three.


The outweighed UN forces were still limited to delaying actions. But General MacArthur hoped that space could be traded for time until the arrival of stateside units enabled him to take the offensive.

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At his urgent request, the 2nd Infantry Division and 2nd Engineer Special Brigade had been alerted in the United States for immediate movement to the Far East.

Port dates commencing on 20 July had been assigned, and General Wright expressed his opinion that these units might be employed along with the recently activated 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to initiate the first UN counterstroke.[21]

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The first combat unit sent from America to Korea was a Marine air-ground team, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed at Camp Pendleton, California on 7 July 1950, under Brigadier General Edward A. Craig .

The same day the UN Security Council passed a resolution creating the United Nations Command (UNC) which was to exercise operational control over the international military forces rallying to the defense of South Korea . The Council asked the United States to appoint a commander of the UN forces ;

on the 8th, President Truman named his Far East Commander, General Mac Arthur, as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CinCUNC).

[note]

To this end, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) was activated at Camp Pendleton on 7 July, with the 5th Marines of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and MAG-33 of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing as the basic elements.

Seven days later, [14 July] the brigade, composed of approximately 6,500 well-trained aviation and ground regulars, weighed anchor for Kobe, Japan.

But while still at sea, on 25 July, the brigade ground elements were diverted from Japan and ordered to land in Korea, where reinforcements were urgently needed.

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US Navy

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7 July - UN Security Council appointed General MacArthur supreme Commander of UN Forces in Korea. --- not correct

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by 7 July six PBM's were operating out of Yokosuka. Two for the moment remained in the Philippines, but these would shortly fly north to Japan, as aircraft from the incoming VP 46 reached Sangley Point and Buckner Bay.

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Finally, the northern sector, so great in undisclosed potentialities, was also brought under surveillance. On 7 July the first patrol plane reinforcements reached the Far East, and the long range P2V Neptunes of VP 6 were at once assigned to search in the Sea of Japan. On the 23rd the submarine Remora, escorted by Greenlet, headed north from Yokosuka for a patrol of La Pe'rouse Strait.

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On the 5th Admiral Andrewes, with HMS Belfast (C-35), HMS Cossack (D-57) and HMS Consort (D-76), was detached to join the blockading forces in compliance with orders from ComNavFE, Admiral Struble flew to Tokyo by carrier plane, and Task Force 77 continued on to Buckner Bay. There it arrived on 6 July, and there it was retained until the 16th.

6, 7,8 ,9 10, 11, 12, 13,14 ,15, 16

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On 7 July the first patrol plane reinforcements reached the Far East, and the long range P2V Neptunes of VP 6 were at once assigned to search in the Sea of Japan. On the 23rd the submarine USS Remora (SS 487), escorted by USS Greenlet (ASR-10), headed north from Yokosuka for a patrol of La Pe'rouse Strait.

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On 28 June Patrol Squadron 6, a medium landplane squadron operating nine [Lockheed] P2V-5 Neptunes, was deployed forward from Barber's Point, Oahu . By the 7th the squadron had reached Japan where, in the absence of any suitable naval air station, it operated out of Johnson Air Force Base at Tachikawa .

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On 6 July USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) got underway from San Diego for Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the 14th to commence a ten-day period of accelerated training exercises.

6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,12, 13, 14

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Admiral Hartman’s force was only a day out of Long Beach when USS Toledo (CA-133) was ordered forward at best speed, and two days later USS Helena (CA-75) and Destroyer Division 111 were detached from the task group with orders to hurry onward. Thus scattered by the need for haste the ships steamed west:

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By 7 July, when the brigade was formally activated, shortages were being filled by personnel from the Marine Barracks at Camp Pendleton and from west coast stations.

Supplies and gear were moving from Pendleton and from the storage center at Barstow in the California desert to the staging areas.

The time from receipt of the alert had been well employed, but the speed with which the brigade moved out owed much to earlier planning, and to the ten-day readiness stocks of material which had been maintained for both ground forces and the air group.

[note]

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Another Marine, however, had preceded them to Tokyo. The Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, had flown west on the 7th, and on the 10th conferred with General MacArthur.

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On the same day, as a result of this discussion, CincFE asked the Joint Chiefs for the entire 1st Marine Division.

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On the 4th, as CincPacFleet, he ordered the Commander 14th Naval District to establish facilities for transport aircraft at Midway, and called upon Patuxent River for an additional increment of planes.

Three more R5Ds were at once assigned the Moffet Field squadron, but backlogs were piling up on the west coast, more were urgently needed, and on the 7th the Fleet Marine Force Pacific was asked to contribute ten more transport aircraft.

All this was little enough. Air transport is not always the economical way of moving men and goods, but its expediency in time of crisis creates irresistible pressures.

Despite the transfer of additional equipment to the Pacific run, and despite creation of a west coast coordinating office to make some sense out of priorities inflated beyond all meaning, the jam increased.

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On the 7th, as HMS Black Swan (F-57) was relieved by HMS Hart (F-58), the British cruiser destroyed an oil tank north of Ulchin, cruised northward firing at the cliff roads, and ended the day with an effective bombardment of Yangyang, the end of the coastal rail line from the north, where more oil tanks were destroyed.

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On the 7th, as HMS Black Swan (F-57) was relieved by HMS Hart (M-55), the British cruiser destroyed an oil tank north of Ulchin, cruised northward firing at the cliff roads, and ended the day with an effective bombardment of Yangyang, the end of the coastal rail line from the north, where more oil tanks were destroyed.

[note]


5 July

CINCPACFLT established Service Squadron 3, effective 7 July as principal logistic agent of COMSEVENTHFLT.

Fleet Marine Force Pacific directed 1st Marine Division to form the 1st Provisional Marines Brigade.

COMNAVFE implemented President Truman's order for a blockade of the Korean Coast.

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0000 Korean Time

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0516 Sun Rise


Nonetheless, orders were orders, and on the morning of July 7 Jay Lovless sent Charles Payne's I and R Platoon and the regimental reserve, L Company, heading north toward Ch'ŏnan. As this force was moving cautiously forward, a message came from Bill Dean in Taejŏn to reinforce the attack with David Smith's full - and as yet unbloodied - 3/34.

Although Lovless had greatest misgivings over these orders, he complied, and the 3/34 moved north behind the I and R Platoon and L Company. The regimental S3, John Dunn, jeeped forward to offer whatever help he could.

[note]

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The next morning (7 July) Captain Osburn got the men up and ordered them to go on digging foxholes. Groups of men went off to nearby villages looking for spades or shovels. They also got a small supply of food from the Koreans, many of whom were abandoning their homes and fleeing south. When they had finished digging their positions, Osburn's men sat barefoot in the rain, nursing their feet. Hopefully, they discussed a new rumor: they were going to a railway station south of their present location, then by train to Pusan, and from there to Japan. There was some argument about the location of the railway station, but most of the men were agreed that they were returning to Japan. The rumor pleased everyone.

Nothing of importance happened to Company A during the day, although the other battalion of the 34th Infantry, after having moved from Ansŏng to Ch'ŏnan on the previous evening, was engaged in heavy fighting just north of Ch'ŏnan. [note]

None of the five officers and 10 enlisted men of the artillery forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came back. On 7 July five officers and 26 enlisted men from the artillery were still missing.

The N. K. 4th Division and attached units apparently lost approximately 42 killed and 85 wounded at Osan on 5 July. A diary taken from a dead North Korean soldier some days later carried this entry about Osan: "5 Jul 50... we saw vehicles and American PWs. We also saw some American dead. We found four of our destroyed tanks. Near Osan there was a great battle."

img alt="Book Image" src="../../Biography/images/Smith,_Charles_Brad_LtCol_USA-img2A.gif">

For their valiant holding action which delayed the enemy advance for six precious hours, representatives of Task Force Smith, including Lt Col (later Brig Gen) Charles B. Smith, a 34-year-old West Pointer from New Jersey, were later honored by President Truman at a special ceremony held in Washington, D. C. [note]

Survivors straggled in to American lines at P'yŏngt'aek, Ch'ŏnan, Taejŏn, and other points in southern Korea during the next several days.

Lieutenant Bernard and 12 men of the reserve platoon of B Company reached Ch'ŏnan two days after the Osan fight. Five times he and his men had encountered North Korean roadblocks. They arrived at Ch'ŏnan only half an hour ahead of the enemy. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast. [note]

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Martin arrived in the 34th Regiment's command post (CP) at Ch'ŏnan around 7 a.m. on the 7th and stayed with Lovless the rest of the day. Lovless had sent a reinforced rifle company from the 3/34th forward on reconnaissance early that morning, following it with the remainder of the battalion, as Dean had ordered. [note]

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[As ordered, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry, had arrived at Ch'ŏnan from Ansŏng the afternoon of 6 July and during that night. ]


Colonel Lovless gave its [3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry] L Company the mission of advancing north of Ch'ŏnan to meet the North Koreans the morning of the 7th. With the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon in the lead, the little force started out at 0810. Only some South Korean police were in the silent town. The civilian population had fled.

[note]

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That same morning, at about ten, Robert Martin, on orders from Dean, arrived at Lovless's CP. He had no helmet or weapon and was still wearing street shoes. He had obviously come to relieve Lovless of command of the 34th, but he had no orders to that effect from Dean. He accompanied Lovless in the command jeep all that day, as Lovless sped around to the CPs of the 1/34, the 3/34, and the newly arrived 63rd FAB.[4-62]


Payne's I and R Platoon, making contact with the NKPA north of Ch'ŏnan, was ambushed and badly shot up. Escaping the trap, Payne withdrew. Hearing the news, David Smith quickly found some good defensive positions and ordered his 3/34 to break off the attack and dig in on the roadside.

While this was going on, John Dunn volunteered to lead L Company forward to rescue some of Payne's men who had been trapped. However, before Dunn could get going, the 3/34's S3, West Pointer (1943) Boone Seegers, came south on the road and reported he had already rescued them.[4-63] [note]

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Korean_War

At this point Lovless received a message from General Dean. It read,

"Time filed 1025, date 7 July 50. To CO 34th Inf. Move one Bn fwd with minimum transportation. Gain contact and be prepared to fight delaying action back to recent position. PD air reports no enemy armor south of river. CG 24 D."

[07-10] Pursuant to these instructions, the 3rd Battalion moved up behind [its] L Company.


Col. Robert R. Martin had now arrived at Ch'ŏnan from Taejŏn. He was wearing low-cut shoes, overseas cap, and had neither helmet, weapons, nor equipment. General Dean and Colonel Martin had been good friends since they served together in the 44th Division in Europe in World War II. Dean had the highest opinion of Martin as a regimental commander and knew him to be a determined, brave soldier. As soon as he was ordered to Korea, General Dean requested the Far East Command to assign Martin to him. Arriving by air from Japan, Colonel Martin had been at Taejŏn approximately one day when on the morning of 7 July Dean sent him northward to the combat area. [note]

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The 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division had now crossed from Japan to Korea. Colonel Stephens, commanding officer of the regiment, arrived at Taejŏn with a trainload of his troops before noon on 7 July. Stephens, a bluff, rugged soldier, reported to General Dean for instructions. Within the hour Dean sent him northward to take up a delaying position at Choch'iwŏn, support the 34th Infantry, and keep open the main supply road to that regiment. [07-21]

Korean_War

[07-Caption] GENERAL WALKER (left) is greeted on arrival at Taejŏn by General Dean.



At Choch'iwŏn all was confusion. There were no train schedules or train manifests. Supplies for the 24th Division and for the ROK I Corps troops eastward at Ch'ŏngju arrived all mixed together. The South Korean locomotive engineers were hard to manage. At the least alarm they were apt to bolt south with trains still unloaded, carrying away the supplies and ammunition they had just brought up to the front. American officers had to place guards aboard each locomotive. [07-22]


Colonel Stephens placed his 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Carl C. Jensen, in position along the highway six miles north of Choch'iwŏn. A little more than a mile farther north, after they withdrew from their Ch'ŏnan positions, he placed A and D Companies of the 1st Battalion in an advanced blocking position on a ridge just east of the town of Ch'ŏnui. Ch'ŏnui is approximately twelve miles south of Ch'ŏnan and three miles below the point where the Kongju road forks off from the main highway. [07-23] (Map 4)

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On July 7, a short time after the North Korean Army invaded South Korea, 32 men of the 502nd Reconnaissance Platoon learned they were to go to Korea at once. Hurst was one of them.

[note]

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As the 3rd Battalion moved north out of Ch'ŏnan it passed multitudes of South Koreans going south on foot and on horseback. Lovless and others could see numerous armed troops moving south on the hills to the west. Lovless asked the interpreter to determine if they were North or South Koreans. The latter said they were South Koreans. Some distance beyond the town, men in the point saw enemy soldiers on high ground where the road dipped out of sight.

The time was approximately 1300. These enemy troops withdrew several times as the point advanced cautiously. Finally, about four or five miles north of Ch'ŏnan enemy small arms fire and some mortar shells came in on the I & R Platoon.

The advance halted. It was past mid-afternoon. An artillery officer reported to Lovless and Martin (the latter accompanied Lovless during the day) that he had one gun. Lovless had him emplace it in a gap in the hills about three miles north of Ch'ŏnan; from there he could place direct fire in front of L Company.

[note]

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five miles north of Ch'ŏnan

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img alt="Book Image" src="../../Place_Names/Images/Ch'ŏnan,_5mi_South_Korea.jpg" height="792" width="771">

"To CO 34th Infantry, 1600 7 July. Proceed with greatest caution. Large number of troops on your east and west flanks. Near Ansŏng lots of tanks (40-50) and trucks. Myang-Myon large concentration of troops. Songhwan-ni large concentration of troops trying to flank your unit. [07-Sgd] Dean." [07-11]

Lovless and Martin now drove to the command post of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, to acquaint Colonel Ayres with this intelligence and the situation north of Ch'ŏnan. When they arrived there they found Brig. Gen. Pearson Menoher, Assistant Division Commander, 34th Division, and General Church. General Menoher gave Colonel Lovless an order signed by General Dean relieving him of command of the 34th Infantry and directing that he turn over command to Colonel Martin. Martin likewise received an order to assume command.

[note]

Korean_War

At about 4 p.m., an air-dropped message from Dean advised him to "proceed with greatest caution," and that large numbers of enemy troops were on his flanks. Lovless immediately ordered the 3rd Battalion to withdraw, then went to inform Ayres of the situation. At Ayres' CP, Lovless was given written orders by the assistant division commander relieving him of his command, which was given to Martin.

As the 3/34th dug in at new positions, Company L was sent forward to rescue some troops of the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon who had been left behind when that unit had fought its way out of an ambush. Then the 3/34th began withdrawing, as Lovless had ordered. Major Dunn, who had been with Company L, was surprised at the withdrawal. He came into the regimental CP and said that the battalion was leaving one of the best defensive positions he had seen. Martin directed Dunn to "put them back on that position," but he failed to tell him that the 3/34th had been withdrawn on regimental orders, because NKPA troops had been spotted on both of its flanks.

A confused 3/34th was turned around again and began moving north out of Ch'ŏnan. Suddenly, the lead elements were fired upon, to which they reacted by deploying and returning fire. Then the battalion suddenly began to withdraw through the town. Martin ordered it back in to defend Ch'ŏnan, but by then Major Dunn had been wounded and taken prisoner, while the battalion S3, Major Boone Seegers, who was also hit, had bled to death.

[note]


John Dunn and others managed temporarily to stop the BUGOUT of the 3/34, but late in the afternoon, in the face of what appeared to be renewed NKPA pressure, it bugged out again. At about the same time the division's aged ADC, Pearson Menoher, and the frail John Church arrived at Lovless's CP, which had been combined with that of Ayres's 1/34.

Menoher handed Lovless an order from Bill Dean formally relieving Lovless of command, with instructions to turn over the 34th to Robert Martin. Lovless, professionally ruined, accepted this not unexpected blow stoically. He generously gave Martin his .45 pistol, web belt, canteen, and first aid kit, then left the CP and ran into John Dunn coming in to report the latest disgrace of the 3/34. Lovless deflected Dunn's report, saying, "Explain it to the general," and walked away.[4-65]


Robert Martin listened attentively to Dunn's report, then asked, "Will the regiment take orders from me?" Dunn was quite startled. He had no idea who Robert Martin was, but he replied yes. Thereupon Martin ordered Dunn to take command of the 3/34 and "put it back on that position."[4-66]


Dunn raced out to stem the retreat. By that time the road was thronged with wild-eyed, thoroughly panicked southbound infantry, who had been joined by artillerymen and service troops. In an extraordinary display of leadership, Dunn turned the whole mass around and headed it back north to reoccupy its positions.

That done, Dunn and the S3, Boone Seegers, rounded up some 3/34 officers, got in two jeeps, and drove ahead of the troops to set an example. Moments later the jeeps were ambushed. Both Dunn and Seegers were badly wounded, Seegers mortally, Dunn in three places, including a severed artery. They crawled or were lifted out of the jeep and struggled into brush. "The officers who were not hurt," Dunn wrote later, "did absolutely nothing to aid the wounded."[4-67]

[note]

A 3/34 rifle company had been advancing up the road behind Dunn and Seegers. When its men heard the enemy fire, they went to ground and formed a skirmish line, halfheartedly returning the enemy fire. The wounded Dunn crawled up on a knoll, where he had a good view of the action. Stanching the flow of blood, he estimated the number of NKPA soldiers to be at most forty. The Americans were so close he could recognize the officers and hear them giving orders.

"They could easily have walked right through the few scattered enemy in the area but the officers made no effort to have the men advance." Then, with sinking heart, Dunn heard the company commander yell, "Fall back! Fall back!"

Dunn and Seegers were abandoned, Seegers to die that night, Dunn to be captured and imprisoned for thirty-eight months. He wrote:

"To think that a regular American unit commanded by professional officers, outnumbering the enemy ten to one ... would abandon their own people and leave the field in possession of a few trained monkeys was nauseating."[4-68]

Following this latest disgrace, Robert Martin came on the field and took command of the 3/34. He stopped and temporarily steadied the men and ordered them to dig in for the night, proclaiming grandly that

"as long as I'm in command, this regiment will not withdraw another inch."

[note]

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By 1700, 7 July, the 3rd Battalion was in a defensive position along the railroad tracks west of Ch'ŏnan and along the northern edge of the town. Some of the troops organized the concrete platform of the railroad station as a strongpoint. Others mined a secondary road running from the northwest into the town to prevent a surprise tank attack from that direction.

[note]

At about this time David Smith lost complete control of his 3/34. The battalion panicked and bugged out. Dunn, who could find neither Smith nor his exec, was appalled and disgusted.

"The standard of our officer corps," he wrote, "hit a new low. Cynicism and self interest had replaced duty and honor among too many of our so-called leaders."

Others agreed, although in less harsh words. The 1/34 platoon leader William Caldwell wrote that while there were many acts of individual bravery on the part of the men,

"I feel that whenever we had a breakdown that it was oftentimes due to the lack of leadership we had on the part of some of our young leaders and the lack of appreciation of what was happening possibly on the part of some more senior."

The 3/34 operations sergeant, Charles W. Menninger, a combat hardened veteran of the 3rd Infantry Division, wrote:

The thing that stands out in my mind was that there appeared to be little or no communications, and very little leadership, the feeling that it was "every man for himself." . . . We NCOs were left behind to sit around the so-called CP while the officers were out running around in jeeps, doing what the enlisted personnel were supposed to be doing. . . . The attitude of superior officers at the beginning was all wrong.[4-64]

[note]

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The change of command took place at 1800. Lovless had been in command of the regiment only a month or two before the Korean War started. He had replaced an officer who had failed to bring the regiment to a desired state of training. It appears that Lovless inherited a chaotic situation in the regiment; the state of training was unsatisfactory and some of the officers wholly unfitted for troop command. Before the regiment's initial commitment in Korea, Lovless had not had time to change its condition appreciably.

While the change of command scene was taking place at the 1st Battalion command post, Major Dunn had gone forward from the regimental command post to find the 3rd Battalion moving into a good defensive position north of Ch'ŏnan with excellent fields of fire. While he talked with Colonel Smith, the battalion commander, the I&R Platoon leader drove up in a jeep. There were bullet holes in his canteen and clothing. He reported that an estimated forty enemy soldiers had ambushed his platoon in a small village a mile ahead. The platoon had withdrawn, he said, but three of his men were still in the village.

Dunn started forward with the leading rifle company, intending to attack into the village to rescue the men. As he was making preparations for this action, Maj. Boone Seegers, the battalion S-3, came from the direction of the village with several soldiers and reported that he had found the missing men. Dunn then canceled the planned attack and directed the company to take up a blocking position. As the company started back to do this a small group of North Koreans fired on it from the west. The company returned the fire at long range. Dunn kept the company moving and got it into the position he had selected, but he had trouble preventing it from engaging in wild and indiscriminate firing. Friendly mortar fire from the rear soon fell near his position and Dunn went back to find Colonel Smith and stop it.

Upon arriving at the 3rd Battalion defensive position he found the battalion evacuating it and falling back south along the road. He could find neither the battalion commander nor the executive officer. [07-12]

Dunn went to the command post and explained to the group that the 3rd Battalion was abandoning its position. One of the colonels (apparently Colonel Martin) asked Dunn if the regiment would take orders from him. Dunn replied, "Yes." The colonel then ordered, "Put them back in that position."

Dunn headed the retreating 3rd Battalion back north. Then with Major Seegers, two company commanders, and a few men in a second jeep, Dunn went on ahead. Half a mile short of the position that Dunn wanted the battalion to reoccupy, the two jeeps were fired on from close range. Majors Dunn and Seegers were badly wounded; others were also hit. Dunn crawled to some roadside bushes where he worked to stop blood flowing from an artery in a head wound. An enlisted man pulled Seegers to the roadside. Dunn estimates there were about thirty or forty enemy advance scouts in the group that ambushed his party. An unharmed officer ran to the rear, saying he was going for help.

Korean_War

[07-Caption] traffic JAM occurs when the 34th Infantry, moving up, crosses the path of ROK troops and civilians retreating from Ch'ŏnan.

From his position on a little knoll, Dunn could see the leading rifle company behind him deploy when the firing began, drop to the ground, and return the enemy fire. The men were close enough that he could recognize them as they moved into line. But they did not advance, and their officers apparently made no attempt to have them rescue the wounded men. After a few minutes, Dunn heard an officer shout, "Fall back! Fall back!" and he saw the men leave the skirmish line and move to the rear. This exhibition of a superior force abandoning wounded men without making an effort to rescue them was, to Dunn, "nauseating." Dunn, who was captured and held thirty-eight months a prisoner in North Korea, said the main enemy body did not arrive for two hours. Major Seegers apparently died that night. [07-13]

The battalion, in withdrawing to Ch'ŏnan, abandoned some of its mortars. By the time the battalion reached the town its units were mixed up and in considerable disorder. South of the town, Colonel Smith received an order to return to Ch'ŏnan and defend it. Colonel Martin led a Headquarters Company patrol north of Ch'ŏnan and recovered jeeps and other abandoned 3rd Battalion equipment.

[note]

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7 Jul UN Security Council authorizes formation of a United Nations Command as counter force against NKPA aggression.

tomorrow at 2am here

1300 California
7 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man Brigade are 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33). [note]

Korean_War

In the early part of the evening some enemy pressure developed from the west. At 2000 a battery of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, newly arrived in Korea, emplaced south of Ch'ŏnan to support the 34th Infantry. Soon thereafter it fired its first fire mission, employing high explosive and white phosphorus shells, against a column of tanks and infantry approaching the town from the east, and reportedly destroyed two tanks. This enemy force appears to have made the first infiltration into Ch'ŏnan shortly before midnight. [07-14] [note]

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In the early part of the evening some enemy pressure developed from the west. At 2000 a battery of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, newly arrived in Korea, emplaced south of Ch'ŏnan to support the 34th Infantry. Soon thereafter it fired its first fire mission, employing high explosive and white phosphorus shells, against a column of tanks and infantry approaching the town from the east, and reportedly destroyed two tanks.

This enemy force appears to have made the first infiltration into Ch'ŏnan shortly before midnight. [07-14]

[note]


Casualties

Friday July 07, 1950 (Day 013)

Korean_War 034 Casualties

As of July 7, 1950

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 23 126 0 0 0 149
Today 4 30 0 0 0 34
Total 27 156 0 0 0 183

Aircraft Losses Today 005

Notes for Friday July 7, 1950 - Day 13