Overview

Korean_War

July 8 3rd Bn, 34th Regiment (3-34-24), crushed by N.K.-4 at Ch'ŏnan

Korean_War

8–12 July 21st Infantry stalls NKPA advances at Choch'iwŏn.

[note]

Korean_War


July 6 (continued through the 12th)
Newly arrived 24th Infantry Division troops are thrown against advancing North Korean forces. Outnumbered and outgunned, they are only able to slow down the communists.
-- The 34th Infantry Regiment fights delaying actions in P'yŏngt'aek and Ch'ŏnan on July 6. Two days later, the 34th engages the North Korean Army in a five-day battle at Choch'iwŏn.
-- There were many reports of green American troops breaking and running just like South Korean troops when they couldn't stop tank-supported North Korean troops with bazookas, rifles and grenades. In their fear and frustration, they complained about the "slaughterhouse."
-- An unidentified officer was quoted July 12,

"You don't fight two tank-equipped divisions with .30 caliber carbines. I never saw such a useless damned war in all my life."


-- U.S. tanks that went into action against Russian-built tanks July 10-12 were no match for the heavier enemy armor. There were many counts of bravery among the outgunned Americans. One was Sgt. J.R. Glaze, Dallas, who couldn't stop a heavier Russian tank after hitting it 13 times from 30 meters. He dismounted his tank and knocked out two North Korean tanks with a bazooka.

6, 7, 8, 9, 10,11,12

[note]

July 8-12
Airstrips are built in South Korea, enabling short-range F-80 Shooting Star jet fighters to support American soldiers. On July 10 U.S. and Australian aircraft fly 300 missions.

8, 9,10,11, 12

[note]


Korean_War


8 July 1950
Three SB-17s were used on weather recon and orbit missions this date. A total of twenty-four hours and forty minutes (24:40) was logged on these flights.


Two SB-17s were dispatched this date to search the same area as covered yesterday. (10 miles north of Ashiya Air Base). Twelve hours and forty minutes (12:40) were logged on this mission and negative results reported.


At 1305/K the Flight received an alert from ADCC that an aircraft was overdue at Itazuke Air Base (34° 35' N - 130° 26' E) and last heard from over Osaka. The report was listed as false as the aircraft was discovered on the ground at Itazuke Air Base.

At 1440/K the Flight received a call from ADCC that an F-80 was in trouble 140 miles out,

at 1500/K ADCC had another Mayday.

Received a call at 1505/K that both aircraft had landed safely.

At 1520/K received a call that ADCC had another Mayday.

At 1525/K it was reported that a B-29 had Mayday on by mistake. A total of four false alerts this date.

[note]

July 8: President Truman designated MacArthur as Commander in Chief of UN forces in the Korean Theater.

FEAF organized Bomber Command (Provisional) at Yokota, with Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell Jr. as commander.

Lt. Oliver Duerksen and Lt. Frank Chermak provided from radio-equipped jeeps the first forward air control to direct air-to-ground attacks in the Korean War.

[note]

Korean_War

The 5th Marines spent four days [7,8,9,10] packing, boxing, and preparing supplies and equipment for embarkation at Camp Pendleton. A few men were hurriedly sent to the range to familiarize themselves with new weapons like M20 3.5inch rocket launchers and M26 Pershing tanks. Concurrently, streams of men from Camp Pendleton and trainloads of refurbished World War II–era equipment from the desert supply center at nearby Barstow flooded the port of embarkation at San Diego.

[note]

Citations

 

biography

1st Lt Ward Neville

 

Army Policy

Korean_War

Someone obviously had to take over the responsibility, and General Stratemeyer made the first bid for over-all control of air operations in Korea. On 8 July, he told General MacArthur:

It is my understanding that the Navy contemplates bringing into your theater some land-based aircraft; also, as you know, the Seventh Fleet contemplates another strike with air at your direction in North Korea. I request that all land-based naval aviation and carrier-based aviation when operating over North Korea or from Japan, except those units for anti-submarine operations, be placed under my operational control. [06-26]

When the Navy objected to Stratemeyer's acquiring control of naval aircraft for operations in Korea, General Almond, the chief of staff, worked out a compromise in a directive issued in MacArthur's name on 8 July whereby Stratemeyer would control all aircraft "operating in the execution of the Far East Air Force mission as assigned by CINCFE." However, when engaged in naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and support of naval tasks such as amphibious assault, naval aircraft were to remain under the operational control of COMNAVFE. [06-27]

U. S. and ROK ground troops needed every bit of close support that could be given them in the first weeks of the Korean fighting. Artillery was at a premium. There were not enough batteries, nor was there enough ammunition. In view of shortages of infantry units and their organic support weapons, the Air Force had to undertake a larger than normal role in ground force support.

Unfortunately, the Far East Air Force had an insufficient number of planes of the most desirable types for supporting ground troops in close contact with the enemy. Lacking, too, were men and facilities for air-ground control and coordination. Drastic measures were taken. Aircraft normally employed in interdiction missions behind enemy lines assumed ground support missions.

The use of B-29 bombers as close-support weapons, to the necessary neglect of other functions behind enemy lines, prompted criticism and serious objections by Air Force officials in the Far East.

[Never mind, the USAF are the ones that designated the B-29 a MEDIUM BOMBER - instead of just calling the B-36 and XL..... Dumb shits.]

But General MacArthur overrode them on the basis that, if the ground troops were overrun, interdiction of targets deep behind enemy lines would have no significance. He ordered Stratemeyer to send his B-29's "to strafe, if necessary" in order to stop the North Korean drive. Within several weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Air Force established the FEAF Bomber Command as a subordinate element of FEAF.

The bomber command consisted of several bombardment groups comprised of medium bombers (B-29's), the aircraft which had been so successful in World War II in the strategic bombing of Japan. In the Air Force concept, this type of bomber should have been employed against strategic targets beyond the area of ground fighting including such installations as factories, rail yards, warehouses, and other vital points on enemy lines of communication.

Nevertheless, because of immediate needs and the lack of other proper aircraft, General MacArthur decided that these medium bombers would operate in support of ground troops wherever necessary. General Stratemeyer had ordered the medium bombers to operate only north of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur overruled him on several occasions in mid-July and ordered the mediums sent against enemy troop concentrations and other tactical targets immediately in front of the Eighth Army lines.

[note]

Korean_War

Painfully familiar with the structural weaknesses of his combat divisions General MacArthur appealed to the Department of the Army on 8 July saying,

"In order to provide balanced means for tactical maneuver, fire power, and sustaining operations, it is urgently required that infantry divisions operating in this theater be immediately expanded to full war strength in personnel and equipment."

The gravity of his concern prompted a second appeal two days later.

"I am sure that the Joints Chiefs of Staff realize," he said, "that the division now in action in Korea, and the other two divisions soon to be committed are at neither war strength nor at full authorized peace strength."

General MacArthur asked that completely manned and equipped battalion units be sent from the United States wherever possible. [05-30] He needed 4 medium tank battalions, 12 tank companies, 11 infantry battalions, and 11 field artillery batteries (105-mm. howitzers). [05-31]

If these units could not be sent fully trained and battle-ready as he desired, he wanted trained cadres, followed by filler replacements. Asking that organized units, even if under-strength, be sent first, he said he would find filler personnel in his own command.

The Far East Command could provide no trained cadres for new units. Only 60 percent of the first three grades authorized for existing FEC units were available. If noncommissioned officers were taken from divisions already fighting, these divisions would be dangerously weakened. General MacArthur urged all possible speed in sending him units, cadres, and fillers. [05-32]

Korean_War

The acute shortage of infantry, artillery, and service support units in the General Reserve in the United States turned these relatively modest demands into a problem of major proportions. In marshaling organized combat units to fill out the divisions in Korea and Japan, the Department of the Army stripped battalions, companies, and batteries from the General Reserve. It pulled trained noncoms from other units and formed provisional cadres for General MacArthur's command. These drastic procedures not only vitiated the combat readiness of the remaining units, but greatly reduced the mobilization base for a later build-up of the Army General Reserve.

The dangers of denuding the General Reserve in the United States came under consideration only as a secondary factor of the larger planning effort: how and where the General Reserve should be tapped to bring FEC units to war strength. The Department of the Army took in stride the decision to accept the great risk of military weakness in the continental United States as it accepted at face value General MacArthur's statement of his needs. [05-33]


Infantry Strength

Korean_War


The main considerations in selecting infantry battalions for Korea were early arrival and combat effectiveness. Army authorities could have sent eleven cadres for new infantry battalions, but new battalions, even with full cadres and basic-trainee fillers, needed six months to become combat ready. Only in the case of the 7th Division, still in Japan, were three battalion cadres substituted for ready-to-fight units.

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The General Reserve held only eighteen battalions of infantry at this time. From this small reservoir the Department of the Army finally selected for the Far East Command 2 full battalions and 3 battalion cadres from the 3rd Infantry Division; 1 full battalion from the 14th RCT; and 3 battalions from the 5th RCT on Hawaii. The remaining 2 battalions were taken from the 29th RCT on Okinawa. This unit was already part of the Far East Command and its disposition did not affect the General Reserve.

Korean_War Korean_War

The Department of the Army spared the 82nd Airborne Division and the infantry units of the 2nd Armored Division. The former unit was not touched because General Collins felt he must keep a completely manned and effective unit for last-resort operations. The armored infantry battalions of the 2nd Armored Division were not particularly suited to the type of action taking place in Korea and were passed over for that reason.

The removal of battalions from the General Reserve would reduce the training and mobilization base in the United States by one-sixth. The 3rd Division, the 2nd Armored Division, because of losses other than in infantry units, and the 14th RCT would be fit only to serve as nuclei around which to build new units. Since it would require from twelve to fourteen months to rebuild these combat units, the Army's ability to carry out emergency missions would be nullified for at least one year. [05-34]


Division Artillery Units

The same general criteria were used in choosing division field artillery batteries from the General Reserve for shipment to the Far East. Although taking only battery cadres would have placed less strain on Regular Army units, complete batteries were withdrawn.

Korean_War Korean_War

The 3rd Infantry and 2nd Armored Divisions each furnished three 105-mm. howitzer batteries. Three batteries were originally scheduled from the 14th RCT and two from the 6th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

Korean_War

With the decision to commit the three batteries of the 5th RCT from Hawaii, the levy on the 14th RCT was reduced to two and that on the artillery battalion was canceled. These eleven artillery batteries were scheduled to reach Korea at about 60 percent strength and at an estimated combat effectiveness of 40 percent. [05-35] The field artillery mobilization base was cut about 30 percent by these transfers to Korea, and the ability of the Army to support other operations with artillery was cut in half for a full year.

Battalion-sized units could be ready to leave their home stations two weeks after receiving warning orders. But there was no hurry about alerting infantry and artillery units, because all water shipping from the west coast was tied up until about 15 August. The Chief of transportation, U.S. Army, reporting that 30,000 men and 208,000 measurement tons of equipment were going to the Far East under the most urgent priorities, recommended not shipping the augmentation units until mid-August. General MacArthur was notified that the new infantry and artillery units would reach him before the end of that month. [05-36]

[note]

He reconsidered this problem in the next few days, decided on 8 July to accept the risks, and released two additional battalions to General MacArthur at once. [05-44]

While waiting for its recommendations to be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army suggested to General MacArthur certain priorities for shipping units if their deployment was approved.

"It is emphasized," General MacArthur was told, "that final decision by higher authority to furnish major reinforcements requested by you has not yet been taken."

The Department of the Army then outlined a proposed shipment schedule for these units. General MacArthur reacted immediately and, citing his most recent appraisal of the deteriorating combat situation, underscored the "impelling urgency" of getting a favorable decision at once. He reversed the proposed order of water shipment and asked that the armored units come first, to be followed by the 2nd Division, the antiaircraft artillery battalions, and the Engineer Special Brigade. He asked also that the airborne RCT be flown to Japan at once, together with its supporting airlift. [05-45]

[note]

Korean_War
The 2nd Division


The deployment of the 2nd Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the battlefront in Korea began on 8 July when the unit was alerted for shipment. [05-48]

[note]

CIA




Korean_War




The U.S.S.R. may consider U.S. intervention in Korea either as the prelude of an inevitable global war or as justification for beginning a global war...


The following documents are excerpts of Central Intelligence Agency memoranda and weekly summaries:

Intelligence Memorandum No. 302

[note] [note] [note] [note]

Bio

P'ohang-Dong was definitely selected as the objective on 8 July, and the draft plans for Inch'ŏn were filed for possible future use.[cmdctl-15]

[note]

Korean_War

One of the larger ordnance units with a depot in P'yŏngyang when the withdrawal started was the 44th Ordnance Company. It was the first field ordnance depot to arrive in Korea, entering Pusan harbor on 8 July 1950. Its mission then was to supply ordnance equipment to the US 24th Division, the first American infantry division to be committed in the Korean War

[note]

President Truman formally accepted the responsibilities of leadership on 8 July.
The evolving command structure placed Truman in the role of executive agent for the U.N. Security Council, although he had no obligation to clear his decisions with that agency. Assisting him in this role were the U.S. National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who helped develop the strategic concept of operations in Korea. In the strictly military channel, the joint Chiefs issued instructions to the unified command in the field through its Army member.[01-12]

This method followed an existing Department of Defense agreement whereby the chief whose service was playing the primary role in a command area, in this case Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, would serve as executive agent for the joint Chiefs.

[note]

Korean_War

On the following day, July 8, the 34th fought advancing troops of the NKPA 4th Division's 16th and 18th Infantry regiments, backed by T-34/85 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade.

During the fight for Ch'ŏnan, the Americans set one T-34 tank afire with five grenades and used rocket launchers to destroy two others. Colonel Martin joined a tank-hunter team, but he was killed by the tank they were hunting. The executive officer, Lt. Col. Robert L. "Pappy" Wadlington, assumed command of the 34th.

The regiment had lost two commanders in two days, along with the operations officers of the regiment and of the 3rd Battalion. A number of other senior officers were also gone. Moreover, the two battalions of the 34th had been placed in no-win situations, as at P'yŏngt'aek and Ch'ŏnan.

[note]

The Forgotten War

Korean_War Korean_War

The next day, July 8, Walker and Dean jeeped forward to the hills overlooking Ch'ŏnan, where they watched the 3/34 BUGOUT. A "sweating officer" of the 3/34 came to tell Dean of Robert Martin's futile heroism - and ghastly death. Dean put Martin in for a DSC - the first to be awarded in the Korean War.[4-72]*

*Brad Smith and Miller Perry later received DSCs for the action at Osan.

Dean laid the blame for the failure of his blocking plan not on its design but on the 34th Regiment. He was "quite bitter about the 34th Infantry," Dick Stephens wrote, and became determined to "instill a will to fight in that regiment." Since the exec, Pappy Wadlington, temporarily commanding the 34th's survivors, was too old and "too weak" to continue as top man, and there was no logical replacement in South Korea, Dean asked Walker to send a new regimental commander from Japan.[4-73]

The same day - perhaps at Walker's suggestion - Dean got off a personal letter to MacArthur which revealed that Dean's initial belief that his mission in South Korea would be "short and easy" had been shattered. "I am convinced," Dean wrote MacArthur, "that the North Korean Army, the North Korean soldier and his status of training and the quality of his equipment have been underestimated." Its armored force, in particular, was formidable.

Dean's men could not stop the T34 tank with the 2.36 bazooka or ordinary high explosive 105mm artillery shells. They urgently needed the new 3.5 inch bazooka, HEAT shells, and 90mm antitank guns, which were slightly more powerful than the T34's 85mm gun, and tanks with 90 mm guns. Moreover, Dean wrote, "The two-battalion regimental organization with which we are operating does not lend itself to effective combat."

He asked for additional infantry battalions to bring his division up to "regular triangular organization" and urged that other regiments heading for South Korea be so organized.[4-74]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Before Walker returned to Japan that day, he and Bill Dean reviewed options. It was decided that the city of Taejŏn, where Dean had located the 24th Division CP, was now the key real estate and that an all-out effort would be made to hold it for as long as possible. The major elements of Dean's 24th Division - the surviving units of the 21st and 34th regiments plus the newly arriving 19th Regiment - would consolidate where they might have been more effectively deployed in the first place: in a defensive line along the meandering Kum River, north of Taejŏn.[4-75]

The task of setting up a Kum River line with the NKPA in close, hot pursuit and with such slim American forces was difficult. It was further complicated by the geography and road network. South of Ch'ŏnan, where the 3/34 had been routed, the Sŏul–Pusan highway divided, one fork going to Kongju, one to Choch'iwŏn, before it reunited near Taejŏn. This compelled Dean to divide his thin forces to fight delaying actions on both forks.

See Kum Gang, Kongju, Choch'iwŏn and Taejŏn map.

Korean_War

He assigned Pappy Wadlington's shattered 34th the Kongju fork;

Korean_War

Dick Stephens's 21st, the Choch'iwŏn fork, which was believed to be the main line of advance of the NKPA.[4-76]

This difficult delaying mission would be Dick Stephens's introduction to combat in Korea. Owing to the heroic, but futile, fight of Brad Smith's 1/21 at Osan, Stephens initially had only one and a half battalions to deploy against the NKPA: Delbert Pryor's 3/21 and A and D companies of Smith's 1/21 (less Smith, for the time being).

Stephens courageously led Smith's two companies, together with some 1/21 fillers who had arrived from Pusan, to a forward position in Ch'ŏnui, north of Choch'iwŏn on the highway, and dug in. Pryor, as ordered, deployed his 3/21 in Choch'iwŏn. Stephens was backed up by a battery of the newly arrived 11th FAB (equipped with 155mm howitzers), commanded by Ben E. Allen, and a reduced company of M24 Chaffee light tanks - lightly armored reconnaissance vehicles mounting a 75mm cannon - and some combat engineers.[4-77]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Kean and Michaelis flew to Korea on July 8, in advance of the division's ship borne elements, in order to get the lay of the land. Jeeping forward to Bill Dean's CP in Taejŏn, they were shocked. "It was a horrifying picture," Michaelis remembered.

"They were getting whipped every place they turned. Everything seemed to be chaotic. The headquarters was filled with hundreds of troops. I don't know where they came from. It was so bad I forbade any of my troops to visit the Twenty-fourth headquarters until it got back on its feet."[6-10]

[note]

REMINISCENCES

The next day President Truman named me commander-in-chief, and (the Republic of Korea was not a U.N. member) President Syngman Rhee signified his government's approval of the appointment.

[note]

On July 8th, I authorized Japan to increase its defense force by approximately 100,000 men, and in Korea brought our units up to full strength by integrating Koreans into the ranks. This was the so-called "buddy system" which proved so successful. While I could obtain only a trickle of soldiers from Washington, under the plea that they were needed in Germany where there was no war, the local governments, just as in the Pacific war, supported my efforts with every fiber of their being.

My appointment as commander-in-chief was generally well-received in the United States, despite the usual clamor of my leftist enemies. I was more than gratified at the editorial of The New York Times:

As American people watch eagerly for news from Korea one constantly recurring cause for satisfaction and assurance surely to be found is the fact that it is Douglas MacArthur who directs this effort in the field. Fate could not have chosen a man better qualified to command the unreserved confidence of the people of this country. Here is a superb strategist and an inspired leader; a man of infinite patience and quiet stability under adverse pressure; a man equally capable of bold and decisive action. His long years of experience in the Orient, his thorough grasp of fundamentals of organization and supply, the immense prestige which he enjoys not only in this country but throughout the whole Pacific world, all these are assets of unmeasurable value.

In every home in the United States today there must be a sure conviction that if any man can carry out successfully the task which truman and the Security Council of the United Nations have given him, and carry out this task honorably, efficiently and with no waste of life and effort, that man is the good soldier in Tokyo who has long since proved to the hilt his ability to serve his country well.

I felt it would be difficult indeed to live up to such extravagant encomiums.

Gloomy and doubtful as was the situation at this time, the news reports painted it much worse than it actually was. I felt obliged to issue an explanatory release:

This is the result of an experiment being tried perhaps for the first time in modern combat; that of avoiding any military censorship or undue restriction of the movements of war correspondents. Reports of warfare are, at any time, grisly and repulsive and reflect the emotional strain normal to those unaccustomed to the sights and sounds of battle. Exaggerated stories obtained from individuals wounded or mentally shocked have given a distorted and misrepresentative picture to the public. Probably the most flagrant of these exaggerated reports dealt with the so-called "lost battalion" of the 34th Infantry which was reported as being completely annihilated whereas its actual losses amounted to only 2 killed, 7 wounded, and 12 missing.
[July 5 - 94 men killed]


American ground units in Korea are fighting one of the most skillful and heroic holding and rearguard actions in history. Their excellent peacetime training is reflected in the combat record they are now compiling. They have been overwhelmingly outnumbered, in some instances more than 20 to 1, and the casualties inflicted on the enemy have been immeasurably greater than those they have sustained. They have filled a breach without which the North Korean forces would have, long ere this, completely overrun and destroyed South Korea. This has provided time for the rapid movement of reinforcements forward. Each day we reduce the enemy's relative superiority in numbers and weapons.

[note]

South then North

Eastward, In the central mountains of Korea, aerial observation on 8 July, the day Ch'ŏnan fell, showed that enemy armor, truck, and infantry columns were moving south and were already below Wŏnju. This led to speculation at the Far East Command that the North Koreans were engaged in a wide envelopment designed to cut the main north-south line of communications in the Taejŏn area. [08-1]

South of the Han River only one enemy division, the 6th, initially was west of the Sŏul-Pusan highway.

[note]

[Pursuant to these instructions, General Dean ordered the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment, then assembling at Taegu, to proceed to P'ohang-dong, ] where it arrived on 8 July.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

On the 8th, General Kean and an advance party flew from Osaka, Japan, to Taejŏn for a conference with General Dean.

[note]

Korean_War

On the morning of 8 July Colonel Collier flew from Ashiya Air Base to Pusan and then by light plane to Taejŏn.

After some difficulty he found General Dean with General Church between Taejŏn and the front.

The day before, [7/7] General Walker had told Dean that Collier would be arriving in a day or two to set up the army headquarters.

General Dean urged Collier not to establish the headquarters in Taejŏn, adding, "You can see for yourself the condition." Collier agreed with Dean. He knew Taejŏn was already crowded and that communication facilities there would be taxed.

He also realized that the tactical situation denied the use of it for an army headquarters. Yet Colonel Collier knew that Walker wanted the headquarters as close to the front as possible.

But if it could not be at Taejŏn, then there was a problem. Collier was acquainted with all the places south of Taejŏn and he knew that short of Taegu they were too small and had inadequate communications, both radio and road, to other parts of South Korea, to serve as a headquarters. He also remembered that at Taegu there was a cable relay station of the old Tokyo-Mukden cable in operation.

So Collier drove to Taegu and checked the cable station.

Across the street from it was a large compound with school buildings. He decided to establish the Eighth Army headquarters there.

Within two hours arrangements had been made with the Provincial Governor and the school buildings were being evacuated. Collier telephoned Colonel Landrum in Yokohama to start the Eighth Army staff to Korea.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

The next day, 8 July, President Truman issued a statement saying he had designated General Douglas MacArthur as the "Commanding General of the Military Forces," under the unified command.

Korean_War

He said he also had directed General MacArthur "to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating." [09-7]

[note]

To accomplish part of the build-up he needed to carry out his plan of campaign in Korea, MacArthur on 8 July requested of the Department of the Army authority to expand the infantry divisions then in the Far East Command to full war strength in personnel and equipment. [He received this authority on 19 July.] [09-26]

[note]

Meanwhile, from Korea General Dean on 8 July had sent to General MacArthur an urgent request for speedy delivery of 105-mm. howitzer high-explosive antitank shells for direct fire against tanks. Dean said that those of his troops who had used the 2.36-inch rocket launcher against enemy tanks had lost confidence in the weapon, and urged immediate air shipment from the United States of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher. He gave his opinion of the enemy in these words,

"I am convinced that the North Korean Army, the North Korean soldier, and his status of training and quality of equipment have been under-estimated." [09-27]

[note]

The 3.5-inch rocket launcher
The first of the launchers, together with an instruction team, left Travis Air Force Base in California on 8 July and arrived at Taejŏn on the 10th.


Korean_War

Today is a "RED" letter day for the Marine Corps. The Air Force will issue a note that is to be come doctrine for the rest of the war. To whit "the air force will control USMC air assets".

And the will continue to do just as well as they have done since the 5th of the month. Before the Iraqi war, the Air Force had dumped the A-10 Warthog. The jet jockeys never want to do CAS, the would rather kill a water buffalo and blow up a $10 cart on a deserted dirt road.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Earlier, on 4 October, the Far East Air Forces and the Fifth Air Force, acting on a directive of 8 July, had [was to] assumed control of the Marine squadrons at Kimp'o.

[on Oct 4th]
FEAF issued a directive that on 4 October 5th AF would assume control of Marine squadrons based at Kimp'o Japan.

This is on the same day the CCF entered Korea - what a bunch of crap.

[note]

Korean_War

In early July General MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that if Chinese combat forces did become involved in the war the assistance of the Strategic Air Command would be required to destroy communications into and through North Korea from China.

At this time the Far East Command estimated there were 116,000 CCF regular troops in Manchuria.

An increase in CCF troop strength there became perceptible during the month and continued steadily thereafter. Much of the information concerning CCF troop movements from south to north China came from Chinese Nationalist sources on Formosa.

Chiang Kai-shek's government received a steady stream of intelligence from its agents on the China mainland, and it, in turn, provided General MacArthur's command with numerous reports. [39-24]

And the 31st SRS over flights.

[note]


General MacArthur on 3 July requested that the new rocket launcher be airlifted to Korea. The first of the launchers, together with an instruction team, left Travis Air Force Base in California on 8 July and arrived at Taejŏn on the 10th. The first delivery of the new weapon arrived at Taejŏn on 12 July. That same day selected members of the 24th Infantry Division began to receive instructions in its use.

The 3.5-inch rocket launcher was made of aluminum and weighed about fifteen pounds. It looked like a 5-foot length of stovepipe. It was electrically operated and fired a 23-inch-long, eight-and-a-half-pound rocket from its smooth bore, open tube. The rocket's most destructive feature was the shaped charge designed to burn through the armor of any tank then known. [11-26]

[note]

Korean_War


First into combat in 1950, the 24th Division was the first of many to pay the price for the lack of complete fighting units. Three days after Task Force Smith had fought the North Koreans north of Osan, Major General William F. Dean, Commander of the 24th Division, conceded that the divisions must be brought up to their full triangular organization.

His letter of July eighth to MacArthur expressed his concerns on this subject as follows:

The two battalion regimental organization with which we are operating does not lend itself to effective combat. The same is true, though possibly to a lesser degree of our two battery artillery battalions. Recommend that infantry battalions be sent us to bring all regiments of the 24th Division up to regular triangular organization.[27]
None of the four divisions of the Eighth Army had the capability to project more than 62 percent of its normal combat power.[28]
The doctrine publications were based on an assumption that units would be able to deploy their full wartime strength and compliment of units.[29]
A regimental commander would normally be able to deploy his three battalions with two forward and one held in reserve. In this case, "no matter which course was adopted, the regiments tactical integrity was gravely impaired.[30]
The commanders and officers in Korea were not trained in or experienced with such a modified tactical system. This concept had not been taught in the Army schools, perhaps because it was believed that the spaces would be filled prior to combat.[31]
such was not the case in June 1950. Thus the basic tenet of train how you will fight was violated.
Reports on combat efficiency of the four division's of the Eighth Army were sent to the Department of the Army in May 1950 showing estimates ranging from 84 percent to 65 percent of full combat efficiency.[32]
These four divisions "mirrored the Army's state of un-readiness in all respects.[33]
Lack of training of the American soldier in the continental United States, as well as overseas, was known to the leadership at the most senior levels. Yet, sufficient and appropriate corrective action was not taken, nor were the actions that were taken followed up adequately.

[note]

Citations

 

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500708 0000 DSC LITTLE

19500708 0000 DSC MARTIN

19500708 0000 DSC WILKES

 

Silver Star

Bush, Donald S. [Maj SS Hq 33]

Downs, Morgan Leo [SFC SS HqCo34thIR]

Little, James C. [1stLt SS HqCo3rdBn34thIR]

Simpson, Wayman Elliott [Cpl SS B63rdFAB]

Smith, Jack Edwin [Capt SS1 M34thIR]

Stovall, John R. [Pvt SS K34thIR]

Woolever, Neil F. [1stLt SS HqBtry 63rdFAB]

 

[note]

 

US Air Force

 

 

 

Major General O’Donnell arrived.[85-O’Donnell was officially designated Commanding General, Far East Bomber Command (Provisional) this day. (FEAF General Orders No. 30, 8 Jul 1950.)] Attended briefing at which time General Robertson reported how to disable Soviet tanks. These are the tanks that are of a 60-ton type, and about 21 feet in length. General Robertson stated they should be hit in the tread from the side.


Word received that Colonel Nuckols, the PIO I requested, would not arrive until the end of next week.


Dispatched copy of my memo to CINCFE to General Vandenberg in GHQ; after the briefing, took O’Donnell to meet CINCFE and heard another superior dissertation re his problems. After leaving MacArthur’s headquarters returned to the office briefly and then O’Donnell and I went to the house for lunch.


2:30 appointment with Colonel Withers[86-Col William P. Withers had been Chief, Information Section, 8th Army since 1949. Later in the month he became Armor Officer at 8th Army headquarters.] (PIO for Eighth Army) and Mr. Donald Morrison, Shell Oil Company representative. My discussion with two gentlemen re the Doolittle’s proposed visit to the Far East while on their round- the-world tour.[87-The purpose of Doolittle’s proposed visit is unknown. At this time he was a special assistant to General Vandenberg, advising on matters concerning the Air Materiel Command and the establishment of the Research and Development Command. (The latter was established on January 23, 1950, and redesignated as the Air Research and Development Command in September 1950.) Doolittle was also a member of the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board.] Colonel Withers will call my PIO upon arrival of General and Mrs. Doolittle and my PIO will call Annalee.


The first use of napalm brought about these results (I have been urging its use now for about a week): 2 F–51s on a bombing and strafing mission report using 1 x 6 napalm and destroyed: 4 small tanks, 5 trucks with 35 ft trailers. Four vehicles exploded - other equipment damaged by 50 cal. fire.

Now that General Partridge has joined his command and is in close contact with General Dean in Korea and General O’Donnell has reported in and has been placed in command of the FEAF Bomber Command, my headquarters will now get out of the operations business and divide all our missions between the Fifth Air Force and the FEAF Bomber Command.

 

[note]

     

Prospective airfield sites were lost to the enemy at P'yŏngt'aek and Taejŏn, so that by early July only the site at Taegu remained practicable as an air base in central Korea. FEAF therefore decided to concentrate the full 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, plus the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company, at Taegu.

Orders were issued to the units on Okinawa on 8 July, and by 16 July the first elements were unloading at Pusan; on 30 July the last of the battalion had moved northward into Taegu by train from the South Korean port. Here the aviation engineers hurriedly laid down a new PSP runway, seemingly without much attention to the sub-grade, and started renovation of the old strip which had been in use during the month.

On 16 August, just as the battalion was returning to work on the old strip and necessary taxiways, word was received that enemy pressure demanded evacuation of all engineer troops except a small maintenance detachment. Some 4,300 feet of the new runway, however, was in use by tactical units.

August

The engineer units thus labored to meet short deadlines with worn equipment and confused logistical support. Heavier construction equipment had to be left at the Pusan harbor because of the impracticability of moving it forward. The age of other equipment caused numerous breakdowns, and, with almost no flow of spare parts, the engineers cannibalized some items to keep like items running.

Large stocks of construction material were on hand in ECA dumps, and these stocks were drawn upon until Army supplies could begin to arrive from Japan. Pierced-steel planking assumed particular importance because of its world-wide shortage and handling difficulty. Frequently classified as a "portable" surfacing, it was shipped in bundles of 30 planks which would cover 375 square feet but which weighed approximately a ton. Thus a standard runway of 150 by 5,000 feet required 1,928 tons of PSP. The metal planking, moreover, was stored and controlled by the Pusan Logistical Command, and, being of use to non-aviation activities, some of the PSP was diverted to the construction of an ammunition unloading beach at Pusan and an ordnance service station at Taegu.

[note]

 

Korean_War

It was obviously the view of the FEC staff that most of the coordination should be undertaken at the FEC staff level, through the agency of the GHQ Target Analysis Group, which, according to the 8 July directive, was to accomplish "basic selection and priority of target areas." Thu GHQ Target Group was established on 14 July** as a part-time organization, composed of a senior officer from the G-2 Section, serving as chairman, an Air Force and a Navy member from the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, appointed by the chief of that agency, and a member of the Operations Group G-3, appointed by the G-3.

[note]



Prospective airfield sites were lost to the enemy at P'yŏngt'aek and Taejŏn, so that by early July only the site at Taegu remained practicable as an air base in central Korea.

Korean_War Korean_War

FEAF therefore decided to concentrate the full 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, plus the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company, at Taegu.

Orders were issued to the units on Okinawa on 8 July, and by 16 July the first elements were unloading at Pusan; on 30 July the last of the battalion had moved northward into Taegu by train from the South Korean port.

Here the aviation engineers hurriedly laid down a new PSP runway, seemingly without much attention to the sub-grade, and started renovation of the old strip which had been in use during the month. On 16 August, just as the battalion was returning to work on the old strip and necessary taxiways, word was received that enemy pressure demanded evacuation of all engineer troops except a small maintenance detachment. Some 4,300 feet of the new runway, however, was in use by tactical units.

[note]


Learning that Marine aircraft were also to come to the Far East, General Stratemeyer requested on 8 July that with the exception of units used in air-sea warfare operations, all land-based Navy and carrier-based aviation when operating over Korea would be placed under his operational control. Land-based fighters, based either in Japan or in Korea, would be in turn placed under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force.

[note]

Korean_War

NAVFE appears to have objected to the degree of control represented in the delegation of operational control of Naval air units to FEAF; at any rate, Maj. Gen. E. M. Almond, Chief of Staff, FEC directed a compromise. The directive which he signed for CINCFE bore no date other than a file reference of 8 July 1950; although it actually reached FEAF on 15 July, it was thereafter known as the "8 July directive" or the "Almond directive of 8 July." This command letter stated FEC policy on the control of air as follows:

Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, will have command or operational control of all aircraft operating in the execution of Far East Air Forces mission as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East. This includes operational control of naval and land based air when not in execution of naval missions which include usual reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and support of naval tasks such as an amphibious assault.

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far Fast, will have command or operational control of all aircraft in execution of missions assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to Navy Forces, Far Fast.

Coordination:

(1) Basic selection and priority of target areas will be accomplished by the General Headquarters target analysis group with all services participating.

(2) Tasks assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Far Fast, such as amphibious assault, will prescribe the coordination by designation of specific areas of operation.

(3) When both Navy Force, Far East, and Far East Air Forces are assigned missions in Korea, coordination control, a Commander-in-Chief, Far East, prerogative, is delegated to the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

[note]

Korean_War

Learning that Marine aircraft were also to come to the Far East, General Stratemeyer requested on 8 July that with the exception of units used in air-sea warfare operations, all land-based Navy and carrier-based aviation when operating over Korea would be placed under his operational control. Land-based fighters, based either in Japan or in Korea, would be in turn placed under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force.

[note]

Yet the improvised control system was less satisfactory than the Air Force desired. Air Force control was hampered by a lack of trained personnel and adequate communications channels until early October 1950, when the 502nd Tactical Control Group, having arrived from the United States, was able to assume its duties: the 20th Signal Company, Air-Ground Liaison also got into action during October, thus providing the channels required by the Eighth Army request net. During the interim of crucial ground fighting for the defense of South Korea, however, many problems arose within the extemporized air control system.

[note]

Korean_War

Problems of Tactical Air Control - Communications Difficulties

Korean_War

There was no easy solution for the lack of adequate communications. Equipment available to the TACP's was scarce and not well suited to their purposes. The AN/ARC-1 radio sets mounted in the forward air control jeeps had only four VHF communications channels, making it necessary for the ground controllers to change crystals before working a part of the fighter groups which used different frequencies. It was possible to work all groups on a common frequency, but excessive traffic made this difficult.

The VHF component of the AN/ARC-1 was light and fragile and it was rapidly jolted out of operation on the rough roads of Korea, while lack of spare parts and test equipment prevented complicated repairs in the field. Because of the short life of this VHF component (the SCR-522) under such operational conditions, each TACP was provided two radio jeeps, and the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group kept mobile repair teams in the field. Nor was the jeep a vehicle adequate to shelter and transport a TACP. The Fifth Air Force, in conjunction with the Eighth Army, designed a radio installation in the M-39 armored utility carrier which suited TACP needs, but the vehicles could not be obtained in necessary quantity. The armored carrier was hard to conceal at the front lines, for it kicked up a great deal of dust on the roads, advertising its location to the enemy.

Korean_War

Korean_War

Because of the lack of ground communications lines, the TACP's had no communications with adjoining parties, the air liaison officers at divisional headquarters, or with the JOC at Taegu. Missions were requested by the divisions, but in many cases the control parties up forward knew nothing concerning the flights until they arrived to be directed to targets. The TACP's were similarly unable to inform the JOC whether air strikes had been effective or whether they needed additional flights. An effort to provide a high frequency radio net for air liaison officers met with
little success because of operational breakdowns of the SCR-399 radio sets.

Airborne radio communications were equally unsatisfactory. The USAF had promised that the Mustangs would be in good condition before shipment to FEAF, but 18th Group maintenance men found much that was wanting. Communications men were particularly vocal shout the SCR-522 air-ground equipment, some of which had received no technical order compliance for at least two years. As a whole, the SCR-522 sets were said to be the

"most poorly maintained equipment ever encountered in one group of aircraft."

Since some of the younger communications technicians of the 18th Group had been trained in peacetime when it was customary to turn defective radio sets into base repair shops, they found it exceedingly difficult to get the communications equipment into operational condition.

None the less, by the directive of this date, USAF wanted total control of the air assets in theater. What a bunch of crap.

[note]


Prospective airfield sites were lost to the enemy at P'yŏngt'aek and Taejŏn, so that by early July only the site at Taegu remained practicable as an air base in central Korea.

FEAF therefore decided to concentrate the full 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, plus the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company, at Taegu.

Orders were issued to the units on Okinawa on 8 July, and by 16 July the first elements were unloading at Pusan; on 30 July the last of the battalion had moved northward into Taegu by train from the South Korean port. Here the aviation engineers hurriedly laid down a new PSP runway, seemingly without much attention to the sub-grade, and started renovation of the old strip which had been in use during the month. On 16 August, just as the battalion was returning to work on the old strip and necessary taxiways, word was received that enemy pressure demanded evacuation of all engineer troops except a small maintenance detachment. Some 4,300 feet of the new runway, however, was in use by tactical units.

[note]

7,8,9 - During the three days 7-9 July, in the P'yŏngt'aek-Sŏul area Fifth Air Force planes claimed 197 trucks and 44 tanks destroyed. N.K. Armor Unit

[note]

FEAF Bomber Command

With the organization of FEAF Bomber Command on 8 July, O'Donnell assumed control of the 19th Bombardment Group and the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. The latter unit was ordered to Yokota on 19 July, and later in the month arrangements were made at Kadena to receive still another SAC group, the 307th, and at Yokota to take a fourth, the 98th. As organized, FEAF Bomber Command was to be a purely operational headquarters; it was to occupy Fifth and Twentieth Air Force bases on a tenant status, and administration and supply of its groups was to be accomplished by those air forces. FEAF Bomber Command, however, was recognized as a major subordinate command of FEAF.

[note]


Korean_War

General Stratemeyer declared on 8 July that isolation of North Korean forces on the battlefield by the destruction of key bridges was the paramount objective of FEAF at that time.

When no enemy aircraft were present he directed that B-29 's bomb individually and continue dropping single bombs until the assigned target was destroyed.

Yet FEAF was not permitted to effect any coordinated and comprehensive program for interdiction until 28 July, more than a month [3-weeks! 20 days!] after the beginning of Korean hostilities.

This delay was due to CINCFE staff insistence that all types of air effort available be devoted primarily to close support, that such interdiction as was undertaken be in an area so adjacent to the battle area as to be little more than close support, and that targets for air attack be selected by a GHQ target group.

[note]

Pilots of the 4th Squadron, however, moved to Itazuke on 26 June and operated over Korea until 8 July, when they returned to Naha.

Korean_War

North American P-82G Twin Mustang 4th Fighter Squadron 46-400 "Call Girl" 1950 at Naha Air Base, Okinawa.

[note]

Korean_War

On 8 July President Truman named General MacArthur "as commander of military forces assisting the Republic of Korea which are placed under the unified command of the United States by members of the United Nations.#3

Several days later, in deference to world-wide political reasons, Washington advised MacArthur that, whenever practicable, he should identify himself as "Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces".

[note]


A new command was needed to control the strategic bombers, and General Stratemeyer, on 8 July 1950, organized the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command (Provisional), with headquarters at Yokota Air Base.

This command would exercise operational control over the SAC medium bomber groups and 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron and FEAF's own 19th Bombardment Group.

To serve as the strategic bomber commander, General Vandenberg dispatched on indefinite temporary duty Maj. Gen. Emmett ("Rosie") O'Donnell, Jr. An experienced bomber officer, General O'Donnell had commanded a squadron of the 19th Bombardment Group in the Philippines in the early days of World War II.

In the last years of this war O'Donnell had commanded the strategic air attacks of the Marianas-based 73rd Bombardment Wing. Since 1948 he had commanded SAC's Fifteenth Air Force.#33

According to General Stratemeyer's concept, the FEAF Bomber Command would normally operate in the area from the Han River northward. Its main duties would be to interdict the enemy's lines of communications from the Han to the Manchurian border and to destroy such North Korean industrial facilities as contributed combat support to the enemy forces.#34

By 8 July General Stratemeyer had effected the command organization which would best employ theater air capabilities. The time had arrived when the control of air operations could be placed in the field and divorced from FEAF and GHQ. Tactical air-support operations in Korea simply could not be managed from Tokyo. But General MacArthur's headquarters staff gave General Stratemeyer little sympathy and far too little understanding.

[note]

Without some form of centralized control the mass of Air Force and Navy airpower could not be effectively employed in the attack, and if Air Force and Navy air commanders were to choose their targets independently, flying over Korea could become hazardous.

Learning that Marine aircraft were also scheduled to come to the Far East, General Stratemeyer requested on 8 July that he be assigned operational control over all naval land-based and carrier-based aviation, when operating from Japan or over Korea, except those units used for the naval tasks of aerial mining or antisubmarine warfare.

If he was to insure that carrier air operations were to be coordinated with the operations of the Fifth Air Force and Bomber Command, Stratemeyer had to be able to direct carrier aircraft operations "including the targets to be hit and the area in which they must operate. #44

[note]

The 339th Squadron moved from Yokota to Misawa and Johnson, the 68th Squadron remained at Itazuke, and on 8 July the pilots of the 4th Squadron returned to Naha Air Base on Okinawa.#99

[note]

On 8 July, when working with the 21st Infantry Regiment at the little town of Ch'ŏnui, the weather cleared up enough so that Duerksen finally got a chance to control his first flight of F-80's onto a target.

Now the radio jeep revealed another vulnerability.

The control jeep had no remoting equipment, which would allow the forward air controller to leave the vehicle in a sheltered spot and advance on foot to a position from which he could see the target.

As Duerksen said,

"Any time that we would be able to get the jeep in a position where we were able to control, we would be exposed ourselves, and the Communists would start laying artillery in on us.#14

Within a few days attrition began to take a toll of the men and equipment of Detachment 1. The AN/ACR-1 was at once heavy and fragile, and it was quickly jolted out of operation by normal travel over the rough roads. Because of a lack of replacement parts and test equipment, only three radio-control jeeps were operational on 11 July.

[note]

Korean_War

Facing relentless enemy pressure, which combined frontal attacks with flanking movements, 24th Division forces were compelled to evacuate Ch'ŏnan on 8 July. The situation was getting desperate.

"The enemy threat to the 24th Division," stated MacArthur, "is critical and extremely dangerous. To date our efforts against enemy armor and mechanized elements have been inefefctive.#22
"We are endeavoring by all means now available here to build up the force necessary to hold the enemy." MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs, "but to date our efforts against his armor and mechanized forces have been ineffective." MacArthur explained that enemy armored equipment was "of the best," and the enemy infantry was "first-class quality." American troops were fighting "with valor against overwhelming odds of more than ten to one." MacArthur's one hope was to reinforce the 24th Division with additional American soldiers, but he feared that this might not be possible. "To build up, under these circumstances, sufficiently to hold the southern tip of Korea," he told the Joint Chiefs, "is becoming increasingly problematical.#23

The North Korean People's Army was managing its attack with ability. It attached tank battalions to assault rifle divisions and used them to spearhead major attacks against United Nations forces, which lacked the armored power and ground weapons to stop the tanks. The North Korean infantry showed a keen appreciation for terrain and guerrilla tactics. Employing their superior numbers, the North Koreans fixed and then outflanked each position that the 24th Division sought to establish. Other enemy soldiers, disguised as civilian refugees, often compelling women and children to accompany them, infiltrated the United Nations lines. Once at the rear of United Nations positions, the Korean Reds threw up roadblocks and cut communications to the forward units.#24

Drawing the Battleline 85

Korean_War

But the combat preparations of the North Koreans demonstrated one major weakness. The North Korean army was not prepared to withstand hostile air attack. For the successful accomplishment of blitz tactics, the North Koreans required unimpeded lines of communications. By destroying bridges the Far East Air Forces could delay the movements of the enemy's armor. Early air attacks against the bridge complex across the Han River at Sŏul, compounded by a 19th Bombardment Group B-29 strike upon these bridges on 1 July, had already delayed the Communist drive into South Korea.#25

Perceiving the enemy's weakness, General Stratemeyer enjoined that the B-29 crews would bomb individually and continue to drop single bombs until their assigned bridge targets were destroyed. Stratemeyer directed the Fifth Air Force to destroy key bridges south of the Han River [on 8 July] .#26

July 8

Korean_War

The North Korean People's Army was vulnerable to air attack on another account. The North Korean ground troops had evidently not been trained to meet the hazards of opposing air strikes. "In the early part of the combat," said Col. Stanton T. Smith, commander of the 49th Fighter-Bomber Group,

"the enemy troops were not too well indoctrinated in what airpower could do. Either that or they had a lot of guts, because we would time and time again find convoys of trucks that were bumper to bumper against a bridge that had been knocked out, and we'd go in to strafe them, and every man in the truck would stand up where he was and start firing his rifle at us. I don't think that I would have done that with the power that we were putting on them. #27

Early in July, while the pattern of the Communist blitz attack was taking shape, Fifth Air Force operations officers employed the B-26's, F-82's, and F-80's in low-level strikes against the North Koreans.

At first the 3rd Bombardment Group's light bombers were very effective. Operating from Iwakuni, the B-26's carried adequate fuel to permit them to reconnoiter the enemy's lines of communications and select targets for their guns, bombs, and rockets. Since most of its aircraft were "hard-nose" or "gun-nose" B-26B models-with up to 14 forward-firing machine guns-the 3rd Bombardment Group was well fitted for low-level attacks.#28

The all-weather F-82's also possessed the range which gave them staying power both to escort medium bombers into North Korea and to search out targets at night along the Han River.#29

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

Operating from Ashiya and Itazuke under the immediate direction of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing, the F-80C jet fighters of the 8th, 35th, and 49th Fighter-Bomber Groups dispatched flights at periodic intervals between dawn and dusk. These flights were briefed to seek special targets from Army liaison aircraft or Air Force controllers in the forward areas, but if they received no supporting directions they reconnoitered the enemy's lines of communications and sought targets of opportunity.#30

note]

When the 24th Division was driven from Ch'ŏnan on 8 July Generals Partridge and Timberlake redoubled their efforts to base Mustang fighters in Korea. "One F-51 adequately supported and fought from Taegu Airfield," stated General Timberlake, "is equivalent to four F-80's based on Kyushu.#68

This statement was not caused by dissatisfaction with the F-80's, but it represented an appreciation of the fact that the Mustangs, for example, could carry napalm, the jellied gasoline incendiary which was equally versatile against troops or tanks.#69

On 8 July General Timberlake named Taegu as the destination of the "Dallas" squadron, which the Thirteenth Air Force was forming from a nucleus provided by the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron.

[note]

*The CINCFE "coordination control" directive was actually issued on 15 July 1950 as an answer to General Stratemeyer's letter of 8 July 1950, but it was generally referred to as the "8 July" directive. See Chapter 2, pp. 49-50.

[Of course it was]
[See 7/15 to view the "8 July Directive"]

note]

Korean_War

According to the best American intelligence estimate, the Chinese Communists had about 116,000 regular troops in Manchuria on 8 July, 217,000 on 8 August, 246,000 on 30 August, and, by 21 September, transfers from southern and central China had augmented the Manchurian garrisons to an estimated 450,000 men.

Many of these troops belonged to Communist General Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, which was normally stationed in Manchuria, but which had been transferred south to participate in operations against Hainan and Formosa, and, following the postponement of this aggression, might merely be returning to its home stations.#8

#8 efc INTSUM No. 3006, 2 Dec. 1950.

[note]

On 8 July President Truman named General MacArthur "as commander of military forces assisting the Republic of Korea which are placed under the unified command of the United States by members of the United Nations."#3

Several days later, in deference to world-wide political reasons, Washington advised MacArthur that, whenever practicable, he should identify himself as "Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces."

[note]

US Marine Corps

Korean_War

Among these Marines were the first helicopter pilots of the United States Armed Forces to be formed into a unit for overseas combat service. Large-scale production of rotary-wing aircraft had come too late to have any effect on the tactics of World War II, though a few Sikorsky machines had been used experimentally both in the European and Pacific theaters toward the end of the conflict.

Korean_War

But it remained for the United States Marine Corps to take the lead in working out combat techniques and procedures after organizing an experimental squadron, HMX–1, at Quantico in 1947

Korean_War

Seven pilots, 30 enlisted men and 4 HO3S–1 Sikorsky 2-place helicopters were detached from HMX–1 on 8 July 1950 for service with the Brigade. Upon arrival at El Toro, these elements were combined with 8 fixedwing aircraft pilots, 33 enlisted men and 8 OY planes to form the Brigade’s air observation squadron, VMO–6.

[note]

Korean_War

The first combat unit sent from America to Korea was a Marine air-ground team, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed at Camp Pendleton, California on 7 July 1950, under Brigadier General Edward A. Craig .

The same day the UN Security Council passed a resolution creating the United Nations Command (UNC) which was to exercise operational control over the international military forces rallying to the defense of South Korea . The Council asked the United States to appoint a commander of the UN forces ;

on the 8th, President Truman named his Far East Commander, General Mac Arthur, as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CinCUNC).

[note]

U.S. Navy

8 July To obtain maximum effectiveness in the employment of all air resources in the Far East Command and to ensure coordination of air efforts, Commander in Chief, Far East approved and adopted as policy the agreement of Commander, Naval Forces, Far East and Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

Under it, the Navy controlled the operations of its carrier aircraft whenever they were on missions assigned to Commander, Naval Forces, Far East and of its shore-based aircraft whenever they were on naval missions.

On all other missions, the operations of naval aircraft, both carrier and shore-based, were under the Air Force. For shore-based Marine air this control was direct, but for naval aircraft the control was of a coordination type.

The selection of targets and their priority by a General Headquarters Joint Service Target Analysis Group ensured that the air campaign was coordinated with the overall objectives.


The is a red letter day for the Marines and CAS. The Air Force will harp on this for the next 50 years. They still want to be the "Master-Mind" and control everything, even though they dropped the A-10 just be for the Iranian war.

[note]

Korean_War

On the 5th Admiral Andrewes, with Belfast, Cossack and Consort, was detached to join the blockading forces in compliance with orders from ComNavFE, Admiral Struble flew to Tokyo by carrier plane, and Task Force 77 continued on to Buckner Bay.

There it arrived on 6 July, and there it was retained until the 16th.

6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

[note]

The 24th Infantry Division had completed its movement to Korea by 6 July.

Korean_War

Hard on its heels the 25th Division began to move, its first elements loading at Moji on Shimonoseki Strait on the 8th, and subsequent echelons at Inland Sea ports and at Sasebo; for this movement Japanese time-chartered ships were extensively used.

Korean_War

The third major Army unit to be lifted from Japan was the 1st Cavalry Division, and this, since handling facilities at Pusan were clogging from overload, was put in over the beaches. This movement was accomplished by Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group, temporarily augmented by the loan from MSTS of two AKAs, three T-APs, one ocean tug, five LSTs, and four time-chartered Japanese Marus.

Korean_War

Late in July the final intra-theater movement of the initial phase brought in two battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment from Okinawa.

On the 16th MSTS assigned two Japanese passenger vessels and a cargo ship to this lift, and on the 24th these troops were landed at Pusan.

[note]

Korean_War

On [Saturday] 8 July activation of facilities at Fallbrook and Seal Beach, California, was begun, and Bangor Annex, at Keyport in Puget Sound, was made available for the outloading of Army and Air Force ammunition.

For all services requirements skyrocketed. The planned overseas movement of Army ammunition alone was to rise from zero to 77,000 tons for the month of August, a growth paralleled by increased calls for general stores, refrigerated provisions, and for personnel. The Military Sea transportation Service had prepared for a predicted movement of 66,000 tons of cargo to the Far East in July; in fact it ended up moving 312,000 tons and 30,000 passengers.

More tonnage was urgently required and was being hastily assembled by Captain William R. Thayer, Deputy Commander MSTS Pacific; by the third week in July [9-15] the transports under his control had increased from 20 to 31, and 12 commercial vessels had been taken on under time charter.

[note]

On 6 July USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) got underway from San Diego for Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the 14th to commence a ten-day period of accelerated training exercises. (12 knots)

[note]

Admiral Hartman’s force was only a day out of Long Beach when USS Toledo (CA-133) was ordered forward at best speed, and two days later USS Helena (CA-75) and Destroyer Division 111 were detached from the task group with orders to hurry onward. Thus scattered by the need for haste the ships steamed west:

USS Toledo (CA-133) reached Pearl Harbor on the 9th and left on the 11th; the USS Helena (CA-75) group arrived on the 11th and left on the 13th; the tankers, the submarines, and the two remaining destroyers pressed on behind. For destroyers en route to the Far East the distances west of Pearl posed problems of fuel consumption: steaming at 24 knots would save a day in transit, as compared to steaming at economical speed, but would also necessitate refueling. But the oilers with which they had left the coast were far behind, none was available at Pearl for forward deployment, and the facilities at Midway Island, on the direct route westward, had been deactivated in May on instructions from the Department of Defense.

The budgetary ceiling had thus affected not only the strength of the Pacific Fleet but also its mobility in time of crisis. Reactivation of Midway was clearly in the cards, but for the moment extemporization was necessary. Two chief petty officers, recent graduates of the Service Force Petroleum School, were rounded up and embarked on the first destroyer as it was leaving Pearl Harbor. On arrival at Midway the chiefs activated the fuelling system and replenished two of the destroyers from the oil which remained in the tanks, while Helena refueled the others.

With the war still in its second week very considerable reinforcements were on their way. Three days after American troops first entered action, naval fighting strength equal to the original Western Pacific deployment had set sail from the continental United States. But the departure of these units from the west coast found the Pacific Fleet approaching the bottom of the barrel. On 8 July, in order to provide some slight reserve for new contingencies, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the activation of certain units of the mothball fleet.

[note]

Korean_War

The emphasis on floating support for fleet units, made necessary by the limited base facilities in the Western Pacific, was desirable for other reasons as well. A prime virtue of naval power is its mobility; if the bases can also move this virtue is increased. For reasons of economy, and to obviate the need for an extensive shore establishment in Japan which would itself be logistically costly and complicating, mobile support was also desirable. But complete floating support for the fleet was well beyond the capabilities of the Service Force as then constituted, or indeed under any circumstances short of pretty complete mobilization. Again it is worth emphasizing how fortunate it was for this campaign that the resources and productive facilities of the Japanese base were close to hand. In the Second World War almost complete support for forces overseas had been provided from the continental United States. But now at mid-century the effort was made to live off the land, and the foraging party reappeared, not in the form of the sergeant with his squad, but in that of the supply officer armed with contract and fountain pen.

Yet however helpful, the Japanese economy could not support the war alone, and two questions called for immediate answers from Admiral Denebrink and his staff. What Service Force units would be required in the operating areas to support the fleet? What shipping would be necessary, over and above that provided by MSTS, to keep the 6,000-mile Pacific pipeline full?

A study of anticipated needs led to requests on 5 and 8 July for the activation of two gasoline tankers and the assignment of another ammunition ship, and then on the 9th the full bill was presented in a memorandum to CincPacFleet which called for the activation of 58 auxiliaries in 16 categories ranging from destroyer tenders down to tugs.

[note]

In the first week of July the crucial needs of the ground forces brought the decision to reconvert back again, and to abandon the jets for the F-51 Mustang with its superior endurance, lifting capacity, and ability to operate from rudimentary Korean airstrips. The next step was to get more planes.

The obvious imminence of increased aircraft attrition had led the Chief of Naval Operations to include, in his orders of 8 July to the Reserve Fleet, instructions to activate two transport aircraft carriers. But to get these moving would take time, and while there were a few Mustangs in Japan, FEAF’s need for more was urgent. USS Boxer (CV-21), recently returned from the Western Pacific and awaiting overhaul, had the capacity and the speed, and was ordered into the breach. After emergency repairs at San Diego, she sailed for Alameda, where on the 8th she began to load.

[note]

Korean_War

By the end of the second week of war [July 8] the American 24th Division had been driven out of Ch'ŏnan and was retiring on Taejŏn. Somewhat surprisingly, despite its overwhelming numerical strength, the North Korean army now slowed its advance: a full week was to pass before the battle of Taejŏn began.

Although not apparently appreciated at the time, this was the first evidence of the logistic limitations which forced the enemy to conduct his offensives in a series of massive lunges, and which prevented the maintenance of continuous pressure during an advance.

[note]

On the east coast 8 July saw HMS Jamaica (C-44) and HMS Hart (M-55), now joined by USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729), operating in the neighborhood of 37°. There, where the highway skirts the water’s edge, road traffic was taken under fire, enemy shore batteries were engaged, and the British cruiser received a hit from a 75-millimeter shell which killed four and injured eight.

Late in the day an alarm from P'ohang brought HMS Jamaica (C-44), HMS Hart (M-55) and USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729) south at speed, while USS Mansfield (DD-728) broke off her escort duties and USS Juneau (CLAA-119) got underway from Sasebo. All five ships joined off P'ohang on the morning of the 9th, but although the situation ashore was serious it was not yet out of control.

[note]

For four days Doyle’s staff struggled with the Inch'ŏn and Kunsan problems. But although these objectives were discarded on the 8th, the work was not wholly wasted, for the need for an amphibious operation remained. Not only was it necessary to get the troops into Korea at the earliest possible moment, but to do so if possible without putting them through Pusan.

[note]

Korean_War


On 8 July General Stratemeyer had advised CincFE that it was essential that he have "operational control" of all naval aircraft in the theater. To the Navy, quite apart from doubts as to FEAF’s technical capability to handle this effort, the implications of the request appeared excessive, involving as they did the authority to control carrier movements as well as to assign targets, and after some discussion a CincFE letter of the 15th delegated "coordination control" to the commanding general of FEAF.

[note]


0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
9:00 AM
07/07/50
10:00 AM
07/07/50
3:00 PM
07/08/50
12:00 AM

Gen MacArthur named Commander, UNC.

[note]

0010 Korean Time

After midnight, reports to the regimental command post stated that approximately eighty men and Colonel Martin, who had gone into the town, were cut off by enemy soldiers. Lt. Col. Robert L. Wadlington, the regimental executive officer, reported this to General Dean at Taejŏn, and, at the same time, said the regimental ammunition supply was low and asked for instructions. Dean instructed Wadlington to fight a delaying action and to get word to Martin in Ch'ŏnan to bring his force out under cover of darkness.

[note]

0015 Korean Time

Korean_War

Sun Rise 0517 1952
Moon Rise 0015 1344
Moon Phase 34% 23 days

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
10:00 AM
07/07/50
11:00 AM
07/07/50
4:00 PM
07/08/50
1:00 AM

0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
11:00 AM
07/07/50
12:00 PM
07/07/50
5:00 PM
07/08/50
2:00 AM

noon East Coast

7 Jul UN Security Council authorizes formation of a United Nations Command as counter force against NKPA aggression.

[note]

0220 Korean Time

Dean learned with great relief from a message sent him at 0220 8 July that Colonel Martin had returned from the town and that the supply road into Ch'ŏnan was open. [07-15]

[note]

0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
12:00 PM
07/07/50
1:00 PM
07/07/50
6:00 PM
07/08/50
3:00 AM

0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
1:00 PM
07/07/50
2:00 PM
07/07/50
7:00 PM
07/08/50
4:00 AM

General MacArthur on 3 July requested that the new rocket launcher be airlifted to Korea. The first of the launchers, together with an instruction team, left Travis Air Force Base in California on 8 July and arrived at Taejŏn on the 10th.

[note]

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
2:00 PM
07/07/50
3:00 PM
07/07/50
8:00 PM
07/08/50
5:00 AM

Korean_War

Dean echoed this conviction. In a personal letter to MacArthur on 8 July, Dean set forth his views on the enemy strength and on his own most urgent needs. He asked for battle-ready combat teams immediately, troops with full combat loads and extra supplies, ready for coordinated action. [05-12]

North Korean armor had proven extremely effective. In their first engagements, his troops, Dean pointed out emphatically, could not stop enemy tanks. The 2.36-inch rocket launcher, an American antitank weapon of World War II, proved dangerously disappointing against the enemy's heavily armored Russian tanks. The launcher was ineffective against the front and side armor, and American infantrymen quickly lost all confidence in it. [05-13]

Direct fire by artillery was of little help after the pitifully few 105-mm. antitank rounds available at the guns were exhausted. Regular high-explosive projectiles, which composed the bulk of artillery ammunition carried by his batteries, would not penetrate armor deeply enough. Dean stressed the need for getting antitank ammunition to his artillery at once. He described enemy tank tactics as excellent and unusually effective despite terrain which confined tanks mainly to roads. Asserting that "we cannot afford to be out-gunned and out-armored," the hard-pressed American general appealed for American medium tanks and for 90-mm. towed antitank guns. [05-14]

General Dean warned that the North Korean soldier was a dangerous foe. "I am convinced," he told General MacArthur, "that the North Korean Army, the North Korean soldier and his status of training and the quality of his equipment have been underestimated." [05-15]

[note]

1300 July 7 West Coast Time

1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man Brigade are 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33).

[note]


0517 Sun Rise

0520 Korean Time

At daylight the following day, July 8, the NKPA, led by five or six tanks, hit Ch'ŏnan. In the street fighting that ensued early that morning,

[about 0800] Martin, manning a bazooka like an infantryman, attacked a tank at pointblank range.

Simultaneously the tank fired off a round from its 85mm gun and cut Martin's body in half. He had commanded the 34th Regiment for fourteen hours. Sergeant Menninger commented: "When I say that the regiment lacked proper leadership, I can point to the fact that this Colonel Martin was killed in the street fighting a T34 instead of being where he could direct the movement of the troops."[4-69]

July 8
Upon Martin's death, Bill Dean wrote, the 3/34 disintegrated and bugged out again, this time in earnest. Its nominal commander, David Smith, was medically evacuated. Many of its officers were killed, wounded, or captured. Among the wounded was Walter P. ("Pinky") Meyer, who had married Lovless's daughter on the day the regiment sailed from Sasebo. The 34th's exec, Pappy Wadlington, temporarily commanding the regiment, placed the senior functioning 3/34 officer, Newton W. Lantron, in command of the battalion's 150 to 175 known survivors.

One of the survivors, Sergeant Henry Leerkamp, remembered: "Major Lantron was a rare combination of a good peacetime and good wartime officer. He was cool under fire and steadied the troops. . . . When some of the men left their positions and ran to the rear . . . Major Lantron, with pistol out, stood in the road and stopped them."[4-70]

[note]

Dean's impetuous orders to throw the green, ill-equipped 3/34 into an attack at Ch'ŏnan against NKPA tanks and infantry was, as Red Ayres observed, "ridiculous." The 3/34 had not delayed the NKPA significantly. The attack had lost, among others, three of the regiment's ablest men - Robert Martin, John Dunn, and Boone Seegers - and consigned scores of men to the hell of NKPA POW camps for years.

[note]

0530 Korean Time

Sometime before daylight Colonel Martin went back into Ch'ŏnan. About daylight a 2 1/2-ton truck came from the town to get ammunition. Returning, the driver saw an enemy tank approaching on the dirt road running into Ch'ŏnan from the northwest. Others were following it. They came right through the mine field laid the day before. Enemy soldiers either had removed the mines under cover of darkness or the mines had been improperly armed; none exploded. The driver of the truck turned the vehicle around short of the road intersection and escaped. [07-16]

This group of five or six tanks entered Ch'ŏnan and opened fire on the railroad station, the church, several buildings suspected of harboring American soldiers, and all vehicles in sight.

July 8

In the street fighting that followed, members of the 3rd Battalion reportedly destroyed two tanks with bazookas and grenades. Pvt. Leotis E. Heater threw five grenades onto one tank and set it burning.

[note]

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
3:00 PM
07/07/50
4:00 PM
07/07/50
9:00 PM
07/08/50
6:00 AM

Enemy infantry penetrated into the city about 0600 and cut off two rifle companies.

[note]

Korean_War

Back at Taejŏn, Dean had spent a sleepless night as the messages came in from the 34th Regiment. In the morning, General Walker flew in from Japan and told Dean that the 24th Division would soon have help-that the Eighth Army was coming to Korea. Walker and Dean drove north to the last hill south of Ch'ŏnan. They arrived in time to watch the remnants of the 3rd Battalion escape from the town. There they learned the news of Martin's death.

Dean ordered Wadlington to assume command of the regiment and to withdraw it toward the Kum River. Just south of Ch'ŏnan the highway splits: the main road follows the rail line southeast to Choch'iwŏn; the other fork runs almost due south to the Kum River at Kongju. Dean ordered the 21st Infantry to fight a delaying action down the Choch'iwŏn road; the 34th Infantry was to follow the Kongju road. The two roads converged on Taejŏn. Both had to be defended. [07-18] See map Ch'ŏnan to Taejŏn (via Kongju or Choch'iwŏn)

[note]

Korean_War

Full rations were available on the morning of 8 July, thus relieving one kind of discomfort. [ for Captain Osburn's men]

[note]


0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
4:00 PM
07/07/50
5:00 PM
07/07/50
10:00 PM
07/08/50
7:00 AM

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
5:00 PM
07/07/50
6:00 PM
07/07/50
11:00 PM
07/08/50
8:00 AM

Korean_War

In this street fighting, Colonel Martin met his death about 0800. Martin had obtained a 2.36-inch rocket launcher when the tanks entered Ch'ŏnan and posted himself in a hut on the east side of the main street. He acted as gunner and Sgt. Jerry C. Christenson of the regimental S-3 Section served as his loader. Sergeant Christenson told Major Dunn a month later when both were prisoners at the North Korean prison camp at P'yŏngyang that an enemy tank came up and pointed its gun at their building. Colonel Martin aimed the rocket launcher but the tank fired its cannon first, or at the same time that Martin fired the rocket launcher. Its 85-mm. shell cut Martin in two. Concussion from the explosion caused one of Christenson's eyes to pop from its socket but he succeeded in getting it back in place.

On 11 July, the Far East Command awarded Martin posthumously the first Distinguished Service Cross of the Korean War. [07-17]

[note]

0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
6:00 PM
07/07/50
7:00 PM
07/08/50
12:00 AM
07/08/50
9:00 AM


Airborne Units

Korean_War

MacArthur had no airborne troops when the fighting began in Korea. The 11th Airborne Division, which had served on occupation duties, had returned to the United States more than a year before. MacArthur now wanted airborne forces badly. The ability of such airborne troops to drop behind enemy lines, to sever lines of communications, and to disrupt rear-area activities had been proven during World War II. The increasing vulnerability of the North Korean Army to such tactics provided the perfect setting for airborne employment, particularly in conjunction with amphibious attack.

His early attempts to procure airborne troops included an effort on 8 July to have a complete regiment, with its equipment, flown to Japan. He apparently intended to use this airborne unit in Operation BLUEHEARTS. General Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff, offered to fly the regiment and its equipment to Japan in C-119 aircraft if other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it necessary. But this emergency aerial movement would have required the diversion of Military Air transport Service carriers and commercial planes which already were flying huge cargoes of men and materiel to MacArthur. If MacArthur's estimates were correct, these shipments were much more sorely needed than an airborne RCT, and should take precedence.

[note]

The fighting for Ch'ŏnan continued and, by midmorning, the remaining American forces began to withdraw and abandon the town. [01-15]

[note]

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
7:00 PM
07/07/50
8:00 PM
07/08/50
1:00 AM
07/08/50
10:00 AM

Korean_War

After Martin's death, the enemy tanks and increasing numbers of infiltrating enemy soldiers quickly caused confusion in the thinning ranks of the 3rd Battalion. It soon became a question whether any appreciable number of the men would escape from the town.

Artillery laid down a continuous white phosphorus screen and under its cloak some of the 3rd Battalion escaped from Ch'ŏnan between 0800 and 1000. The battalion commander, Colonel Smith, was completely exhausted physically and was evacuated a day or two later. Colonel Wadlington placed Maj. Newton W. Lantron, the senior officer left in the battalion, in charge of the men at the collecting point. At 1000 the artillery began to displace southward. The 1st Battalion still held its blocking position south of the town.

[note]

1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
8:00 PM
07/07/50
9:00 PM
07/07/50
2:00 AM
07/08/50
11:00 AM

1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
9:00 PM
07/07/50
10:00 PM
07/08/50
3:00 AM
07/08/50
12:00 PM

The next day he [Hurst] was one of an advance detail of ten men leaving by plane for Korea.

[note]

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
10:00 PM
07/07/50
11:00 PM
07/08/50
4:00 AM
07/08/50
1:00 PM

Korean_War

In the afternoon, a count at the collecting point showed that 175 men had escaped from Ch'ŏnan - all that were left of the 3rd Battalion. The 34th Regimental Headquarters also had lost many officers trapped in the town. Survivors were in very poor condition physically and mentally.

The North Korean radio at P'yŏngyang claimed sixty prisoners at Ch'ŏnan. The 3rd Battalion lost nearly all its mortars and machine guns and many individual weapons.

When the 34th Infantry began its retreat south toward the Kum in the late afternoon, enemy troops also moving south were visible on the ridge lines paralleling its course. [07-19]

The enemy units that fought the battle of Ch'ŏnan were the 16th and 18th Regiments of the N.K. 4th Division, supported by tank elements of the 105th Armored Division.

The third regiment, called up from Suwŏn, did not arrive until after the town had fallen. Elements of the 3rd Division arrived at Ch'ŏnan near the end of the battle and deployed east of the town. [07-20]

[note]

Korean_War

In Company A's area, the day was quiet until early afternoon, when enemy artillery rounds suddenly exploded in the battalion's area. Within a few minutes after the first shell landed, Captain Osburn gave the order to pull out. The entire battalion moved, part of it on three trucks still in its possession, but Company A marched, Captain Osburn in the lead and again setting a fast pace. This time he kept his company together.

[note]

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/07/50
11:00 PM
07/08/50
12:00 AM
07/08/50
5:00 AM
07/08/50
2:00 PM

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
12:00 AM
07/08/50
1:00 AM
07/08/50
6:00 AM
07/08/50
3:00 PM

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
1:00 AM
07/08/50
2:00 AM
07/08/50
7:00 AM
07/08/50
4:00 PM

Late in the day on 8 July, General Dean issued an operational order confirming and supplementing previous verbal and radio instructions.

Korean_War

It indicated that the 24th Division would withdraw to a main battle position along the south bank of the Kum River, ten miles south of Choch'iwŏn, fighting delaying actions at successive defensive positions along the way. The order stated,

"Hold Kum River line at all costs. Maximum repeat maximum delay will be effected."

Korean_War

The 34th Infantry was to delay the enemy along the Kongju road to the river;

Korean_War

the 21st Infantry was to block in front of Choch'iwŏn.

Korean_War

Dean ordered one battery of 155-mm. howitzers of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion to Choch'iwŏn for direct support of the 21st Infantry.

78th tanks + 24th Recon Tanks + 3rd Engineer

Korean_War

Also in support of the regiment were A Company, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion, (M24 light tanks) less one platoon of four tanks, replacing the 24th Reconnaissance Company tanks, and of the B Company, 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion.

The 3rd itself was to prepare roadblocks north of Kongju along the withdrawal route of the 34th Infantry and to prepare all bridges over the Kum River for demolition. [07-24]

Messages from General Dean to Colonel Stephens emphasized that the 21st Infantry must hold at Choch'iwŏn, that the regiment must cover the left flank of the ROK forces eastward in the vicinity of Ch'ŏngju until the latter could fall back, and that he could expect no help for four days. General Dean's intent was clear. The 34th and 21st Infantry Regiments were to delay the enemy's approach to the Kum River as much as possible, and then from positions on the south side of the river make a final stand. The fate of Taejŏn would be decided at the Kum River line.

Korean_War

63rd FAB

8 July - 16th and 18th Regiments, N.K 4th Division, reached outskirts of Ch'ŏnan 1st Battalion, US 34th RCT, moved north of Ch'ŏnan and fought delaying action back to line held by 3rd Battalion approximately one mile south of Ch'ŏnan;

34th RCT then fought south to new defensive position, with 63rd FA Battalion in support. 11th FA Battalion reached Taejŏn to support both 21st and 34th RCTs. Elements of US 78th Heavy Tank Battalion reached Taejŏn to support both 21st and 34th RCTs.

[note]

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
2:00 AM
07/08/50
3:00 AM
07/08/50
8:00 AM
07/08/50
5:00 PM

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
3:00 AM
07/08/50
4:00 AM
07/08/50
9:00 AM
07/08/50
6:00 PM

1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
4:00 AM
07/08/50
5:00 AM
07/08/50
10:00 AM
07/08/50
7:00 PM

1952 Sun Set

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
5:00 AM
07/08/50
6:00 AM
07/08/50
11:00 AM
07/08/50
8:00 PM

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
6:00 AM
07/08/50
7:00 AM
07/08/50
12:00 PM
07/08/50
9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
7:00 AM
07/08/50
8:00 AM
07/08/50
1:00 PM
07/08/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/08/50
8:00 AM
07/08/50
9:00 AM
07/08/50
2:00 PM
07/08/50
11:00 PM


Casualties

Saturday July 08, 1950 (Day 014)

Korean_War 029 Casualties

As of July 8, 1950

27 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 63RD FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
29 19500708 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 27 156 0 0 0 183
Today 0 29 0 0 0 29
Total 27 185 0 0 0 212

Aircraft Losses Today 000

Notes for Saturday July 08, 1950 - Day 014

Weekly Chart

Totals to Date