Overview

Tropical storm (SSHS)
Duration July 15 – July 19
Peak intensity
110 km/h (70 mph) (1 -min), Unknown

Korean_War

July 15 to July 19 Tropical Storm Flossie

Category 1 typhoon (SSHS)
Duration July 16 – July 21
Peak intensity
130 km/h (80 mph) (1 -min), Unknown

Korean_War

July 16 to 21 Typhoon Grace

[note]

 

19500717 0000 Memo of Conversation

Korean_War

France had some concerns regarding Korea, and European rearmament.

[note]

John M Chang, forwards the text of a cable from Syngman Rhee to President Truman.

[note]

Korean_War

July 17-19
U.S. and Australian fighters and bombers hit North Korean forces all along the front. American pilots down two Yak-9s July 17 and three more on July 19, making 31 air kills for the U.S. Air Force.

[note]

July 17
The Army drops the required score on entrance exams for volunteers from 90 to 70. Half of all New York volunteers scored below 90. -- The Senate Banking Committee announces an investigation of "unreasonable" price hikes on food and other goods immediately after the Korean War began.

[note]

Korean_War

3rd Rescue Squadron
Korean War Operations
17 July 1950

17 July 1950
Three SB-17s were dispatched on orbit missions this date. Total time was twenty-four hours and thirty-five minutes (24:35).
One SB-17 was dispatched this date to search the area (133° 25' E 36° N to 133° 25' E 36° 30' N to 134° 15' E to 36° 30' N to 134° 15' E to 133° 35' E 36 N). 100% coverage was reported with negative results. A total of six hours and forty-five minutes (6:45) logged.

Once C-47 was dispatched this date for a radar calibration mission. The route was given by ADCC. Three hours and twenty minutes (3:20) logged on this flight.

This Flight was notified at 0858/K of a Mayday 5 miles west of Bofu. ADCC notified the Flight to stand by for further instructions. Nothing more developed and it was classified as a false alert.

At 1940/K* this Flight received information from ADCC about another Mayday. At 1810/K we were instructed to disregard the Mayday.


At 1940/K alerted for another Mayday 27 miles out of Fukuoka. At 1950/K the alert was canceled. A total of three false alerts recorded this date.

This information taken from the official 3rd Rescue Squadron history archived at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base.

*- the time [1940/K] was recorded in the original document but is probably incorrect and should be 1800/K or earlier.

USAF Museum Info --- Driving Directions
Please read the Privacy, Security and Use Statement and FAQ

[note]

Korean_War

Bomber Command

July 17: Three B-29s accidentally bombed friendly civilians in Andong, South Korea, illustrating the dangers of using B-29s on close air support missions. [B-29's are medium bombers, according to the Air Force - so what's the problem?]

[note]

Korean_War

Clark USAF F-80C 1 x Yak-9

[note]

Korean_War

The heads of the division staff sections were called together by the commanding general of the division, Major General Laurence B Keiser on July 4th. The information presented at that meeting was top secret. Activities for the rest of the week continued on a routine basis. The Korean crisis was no longer as important a topic of conversation as it had been.


The routine of normal training absorbed both officers and men

PLANNING

On Saturday, 8 July, members of the 2nd Division General Staff were called together in a conference to discuss the plans involving the commitment of the division. On the following morning the alert was announced in radio and press releases.

The deployment of the 2nd Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the battlefront in Korea began on 8 July when the unit was alerted for shipment. [05-48]

Nine days later, [17th] the first elements of the division sailed for Korea.

[note]

Korean_War

General MacArthur's chief of staff, General Almond, contended in a letter to General Collins on 17 July that the North Koreans hoped to capture Taegu mainly for the psychological effect. The enemy commanders, having outflanked the Americans, were attacking as well down the central corridor along the axis Ch'ungju-Taegu, and were pushing back the South Koreans.

Almond assumed Collins that General MacArthur was aware of this "vital threat" down the middle. Referring to the plans for the future which General MacArthur had sketched to him three days before, Almond reported:

Our proposed projects are developing as planned and we are confident that while the enemy stubbornly persists in his efforts to drive us back, we have blunted his principal strikes, and he is bound to be getting more exhausted while we become stronger each day and better organized to stop him.... We have no fear of the outcome and thoroughly understand that current conditions are the growing pains precedent to future operations.

General Almond did not believe that Taejŏn could be held but was not unduly alarmed. "It may not last there," he told Collins, "but the trend is much better." [06-31]

Korean_War

The 25th Division, although its first elements had reached Korea on 9 July, had not yet met the enemy. Nor had the 1st Cavalry Division, en route to Korea while Almond was addressing Collins.

Korean_War

The 24th Division, weakened and disorganized, fell back upon Taejŏn alone, the enemy hard on its heels.

[note]

The next day, 17th, the North Korean divisions attacked the 24th Infantry Division's headquarters in Taejŏn and overran it in the Battle of Taejŏn. In the ensuing battle,922 men of the 24th Infantry Division were killed and 228 were wounded of 3,933committed there. Many soldiers were missing in action, including the division commander, Major General William F. Dean, who was captured and later won the Medal of Honor.

Korean_War

(F) THE CHAPLAIN-MEDIC MASSACRE
On July 17, 1950, the North Korean Communists surprised and slaughtered approximately 20 seriously wounded American soldiers. These soldiers were being administered aid by the regimental surgeon wearing the Red Cross armband, and an Army chaplain wearing the Christian cross, neither of whom was armed. The chaplain was also slain and the surgeon, although wounded, managed to survive and escape.14

Capt. Linton J. Buttrey, the regimental surgeon and sole survivor, testified:

Senator Potter. Was he marked as a chaplain with a white cross?

Captain Buttrey. Yes, sir; he was.

Senator Potter. What happened to him?

Captain Buttrey. He got killed, sir.

Senator Potter. What was he doing at the time he was killed?

Captain Buttrey. He was administering last rites, extreme unction, to the patients.

Senator Potter. He was administering the last rites to the patient, to a patient on a litter?

Captain Buttrey. Yes.

Senator Potter. And how did they kill him?

Captain Buttrey. He was shot in the back, sir.

[note]

Korean_War

Pohang-Dong landing command and control, click to see larger chart.

[note]

Korean_War


Out of 220 targets designed by the GHQ Target Group from 17 July to 2 August, some 20 percent did not exist. The principal reason was inaccurate maps, but in one instance the Target Group misread a map and ordered B-29s against a river "bridge" that was marked as a ford on the map consulted.


In Tokyo, Lt Gen. George Stratemeyer acknowledged that Korea would doubtless have fallen to onrushing Communist tank columns without all-out air attacks of some sort. He also knew, however, that continued air employments at the front lines in always "urgent" strikes would be extremely wasteful in a war of any duration.

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

Acting on his own initiative in Washington, General Vandenberg got approval to move two medium-bomber groups--the 22nd and 92nd--from Strategic Air Command's Fifteenth Air Force to the Far East on temporary duty.

He sent the B-29 groups because of

"the vital necessity of destruction of North Korean objectives north of the 38th parallel." "While I do not presume to discuss specific targets,"

he informed Stratemeyer,

"it is axiomatic that tactical operations on the battlefield cannot be fully effective unless there is a simultaneous interdiction and destruction of sources behind the battlefield."

Vandenberg sent out Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., Fifteenth Air Force commander, to serve as the first of a succession of bomber commanders. O'Donnell would remember being called to Washington, where Vandenberg simply said,

"Rosie, go out there and do some good and take some pictures of it."

[note]

Korean_War

In 1950 , American units, under-strength, attempting to defend wide frontages, and without training or doctrine on infiltration tactics, quickly found the NKPA's infiltration abilities to be a formidable threat.

Many U.S. veterans interviewed by the U.S. Review Team stated they had been warned about infiltrators.

On July 17, Eighth Army issued "Combat Lesson Number One," which warned that the NKPA would infiltrate troops behind American lines as individuals or in small groups.

These troops would then move to an assembly area from where they would stage attacks on American positions.

Depending on the depth of the infiltration and the time used to conduct the maneuver, the NKPA could build a force of "100 to 1,000 men or even more."

"Combat Lesson Number One," drawing on American doctrine for defense of wide frontages, advised Eighth Army's units to locate the infiltrators' assembly areas

"promptly by aggressive patrolling and intelligence operations."

Then

"reserve echelons supporting front line units, particularly artillery or armored vehicles, must be promptly dispatched to the area in order to liquidate the assembled forces." 43

[note]

Korean_War

The primary mission of the F–80s and the F–82s in the Fifth Air Force was the air defense of Japan. As of mid-July 1950 , two F–80 squadrons (the 7th Fighter-Bomber Squadron and 41st Fighter Interceptor Squadron) and one F–82 squadron (339th Fighter Interceptor Squadron) remained with the air defense and training missions in northern and central Japan. 95

95 Hist 5AF, Vol. III, Chap. I; Hist Study #71, p. 14; Msg, COMAF FIVE to COMFtrWG 35, et al, OPS 1882, 16/2335Z, Jul 50.

The need for better ground attack aircraft led the Air Force to convert some squadrons back to the propeller-driven F–51s from the jet-propelled F–80s. At that time the F–51s could carry bombs and fly from Korean bases. The 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron converted to F–51s on July 16 and deployed to P'ohang on the east coast of Korea. The 39th Fighter Interceptor Squadron followed on August 7. 96

96 Hist Study #71, p. 20; Msg, 5AFHQADV to 35FtrGP, ADV631, 10/0151Z, Jul 50; Msg, COMAF 5, to ADV HQ FAF, OPR 1831, 12/1056Z, Jul 50; Memo, L/G G.E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, to M/G E.E. Partridge, CG 5AF, 23 Aug 50, with 1 attachment, paper on P'ohang by Col. R.W. Whitty, CO K-3, 17 Aug 50, Document 26. Hereafter to be cited as “Whitty Paper.”

The sector of primary interest for this report is the central front, where the North Koreans were driving down the main railroad from Taejŏn toward Taegu. Taejŏn fell on July 20 and the North Koreans took Yŏngdong on July 25. The UN held the next significant town on the rail line, Hwanggan, until July 29. 97

97 Appleman, p. 196-205; ROK MOND HIST, vol. IV, chap. VII, pp. 145-152; Melbourne C. Chandler, “Of Gary Owen in Glory,” 1960, pp. 245-248.

Thus, one of the key targets on July 26 was Yŏngdong and any North Korean forces moving through that location. (See U.S. Air Force Mission Diagram and Charts in Appendix E.)

[note]

Black Solder, White Army

Korean_War

With the 21st Regiment of the 8th South Korean Division opposing the 31st Regiment’s advance toward Yech’on and reports arriving that the enemy was threatening Hamch’ang, General Kean decided to organize Task Force Able under General Wilson to secure the Hamch’ang- Kumch’on road. Receiving permission to detach the 2d Battalion of the 24th from Eighth Army reserve, on the evening of 17 July he moved it north from Kumch’on to hold roads coming through the mountains near Sangju, a town some ten miles south of Hamch’ang. Wilson took operational control of that battalion, the 3d Battalion of the 24th, and Company A of the 79th Tank Battalion shortly thereafter. He planned to use the 3d Battalion to block the roads around Hamch’ang. Employing the vehicles of Company B of the 65th Engineer Battalion to assist in transporting the unit to Hamch’ang, he left the engineers at Yech’on temporarily to serve as a rear guard.91

p88

On 17 July the commander of the 25th Infantry Division, General William B. Kean, visited Colonel White at Kŭmch'ŏn to discuss the situation. The 27th Infantry and White’s 3d Battalion were already supporting the South Koreans on the approaches to Andong. It seemed time to send additional units north to cover other areas. To that end, Kean decided to keep Fisher ’s 35th Infantry at the east coast port of P’ohang-dong, where the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was slated to land shortly. Meanwhile, to fill the gap between Hamch’ang and Kŭmch'ŏn, White was to dispatch the 24th Infantry’s 2d Battalion to Sangju to participate in General Wilson’s Task Force Able. The 1st Battalion and the regimental headquarters would remain in reserve at Kumch’on.2 Although White kept tabs on his 2d and 3d Battalions, they were out of his control. His attention was thus of necessity directed toward his 1st Battalion, where minor organizational problems had developed.

p95

[note]

South then North

Korean_War Korean_War

On 17 July, four days after he assumed command of Korean operations, General Walker received word from General MacArthur that he was to assume command of all Republic of Korea ground forces, pursuant to President Syngman Rhee's expressed desire.

During the day, as a symbol of United Nations Command, General Walker accepted from Col. Alfred G. Katzin,, representing the United Nations, the United Nations flag and hung it in his Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu. [09-5]

A word should be said about General MacArthur's and General Walker's commend relationship over ROK forces. President Syngman Rhee's approval of ROK forces coming under United Nations Command was never formalized in a document and was at times tenuous. This situation grew out of the relationship of the United Nations to the war in Korea.

[note]

Korean_War

All night long and into the next day, 17 July, stragglers and those who had escaped through the hills filtered into Yusŏng and Taejŏn.

Only two rifle companies of the 19th Infantry were relatively intact-G and E Companies. On the eastern flank near the railroad bridge, E Company was not engaged during the Kum River battle and that night received orders to withdraw.

When Captain Barszcz encountered Colonel Meloy at the stalled tank the latter had ordered him to dig in across the road at the first good defensive terrain he could find.

Barszcz selected positions at Yusŏng. There G Company dug in and occupied the most advanced organized defense position of the U.S. 24th Division beyond Taejŏn on the morning of 17 July. [10-67]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

During 17 July, B Company of the 34th Infantry relieved G Company, 19th Infantry, in the latter's position at Yusŏng, five miles northwest of Taejŏn.

Korean_War Korean_War

The 18th Infantry that afternoon moved to Yŏngdong, twenty-five air miles southeast of Taejŏn, to re-equip. [10-71]

Capital Division (1st, 17th, 18th Regiments)

[note]

Korean_War

Early in the afternoon of the 17th the 34th Infantry took over the entire defensive line north and west of Taejŏn. Except for General Dean and three or four other officers, the 24th Division headquarters left for Yŏngdong, 28 miles southeast on the main highway and rail line.

Korean_War

Remaining with Dean at Taejŏn were Lieutenant Clarke, an aide; Capt. Richard A. Rowlands, Assistant G-3; Capt. Raymond D. Hatfield, transportation Officer and Assistant G-4; and two drivers. Dean instructed Maj. David A. Bissett to establish an office for him at the 21st Infantry command post at Okch'ŏn so that he could from there more easily keep informed of affairs east of Taejŏn. Dean said that he would spend nights at Okch'ŏn. "But," commented Bissett, "he never did, and indeed none of us there expected him to." [11-1]

Korean_War

Before the battle of the Kum, Dean had selected two regimental positions three miles west of Taejŏn for the close-in defense of the city. These positions were on a 500-foot high, 3-mile long ridge behind (east of) the Kap-ch'on River. Each extremity covered a bridge and a road immediately to its front. The position was a strong one and well suited to a two-regimental front. It was known as the Yusŏng position. A village of that name lay across the Kap-ch'on River about a mile from the northern end of the ridge.

Dean's plan had been to place the 19th Infantry on the northern part of the line covering the main Sŏul-Pusan highway where it curved around the northern end of the ridge and to place the 34th Infantry on the southern part to cover the Nonsan-Taejŏn road where it passed along a narrow strip of low ground at the southern end of the ridge. But with the 19th Infantry combat-ineffective after the ordeal of the 16th and at Yŏngdong for re-equipping, the defense of the entire line fell upon the 34th Infantry. [11-2]

General Dean had no intention of fighting a last-ditch battle for Taejŏn. He looked upon it as another in the series of delaying actions to which the 24th Division had been committed by General MacArthur to slow the North Korean advance, pending the arrival of sufficient reinforcements to halt and then turn back the enemy.

Korean_War

[11-Caption] AERIAL VIEW OF Taejŏn AIRFIELD, looking south.

Korean_War

Aerial view of Taejŏn City

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Two days later [16th] the ROK 23rd Regiment gave way and streamed south. The KMAG advisers considered the situation grave. In response to an inquiry from Colonel Collier of Eighth Army, Colonel Emmerich sent the following message:

Situation deplorable, things are popping, trying to get something established across the front, 75% of the 23rd ROK Regiment is on the road moving south. Advisers threatening and shooting in the air trying to get them assembled, Commanding General forming a straggler line. If straggler line is successful we may be able to reorganize and re-establish the line. If this fails I am afraid that the whole thing will develop in complete disintegration. The Advisory Group needs food other than Korean or C rations and needs rest. [12-2]

[note]

Korean_War

Redesignated from 8072nd

About mid-July, [xxx] Eighth Army activated the 8072nd Medium Tank Battalion, which was to receive fifty-four old World War II medium tanks rebuilt in Japan.

Korean_War

Formed in Japan on 17 July 1950. Assets used to form the 89th Tank Battalion on 7 August 1950 and reassigned to the 25th Infantry Division. M4A3E8 and M26 tanks.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Into Pusan harbor on the same day, 31 July, came the first ground troops from the United States, the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division. Known as the Manchu Regiment because of its part in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, the 9th Infantry was one of the oldest regiments in the United States Army.

The 2nd Battalion [9th IR] of the regiment sailed from Tacoma, Washington, 17 July, the first Army infantry troops to depart continental United States for Korea.

[note]

Korean_War

However, it should be emphasized that poor readiness was evident throughout the Army and not just with the Eighth Army in Japan. For example, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Headquarters prohibited the use of live ammunition in training exercises following the end of World War II.

"Live fire demonstrations conducted at schools continued, but unit-level exercises with live ammunition were not conducted from 1945 until the beginning of the Korean War in 1950."[57]

General Mark Wayne Clark as Chief of the Army Field Forces (AFF) Headquarters extended this policy in 1949 when he issued his Training Memorandum No. l., which stated:

"Training in infiltration courses is not authorized; Training in 'Combat in Cities and Villages' course and 'Close Combat Course' are not to be conducted with service ammunition (original emphasis)." [58]

It is interesting to note that live ammunition was not used in these training exercises until July 17, 1950, nearly two weeks after U.S. troops went into combat in Korea.[59] In a similar fashion, use of tanks in Japan was restricted:

For economy reasons and to avoid damage to the roads in Japan, the Eighth Army divisions were restricted to one company of old M-24 Chaffee light tanks, which were used primarily for ceremonial purposes. The few Sherman's and Pershing's or variants in Japan were stored in warehouses.[60]
The inaccessibility to critical training is a sad commentary of weapons and equipment for American military leadership. training certainly took a back seat in occupied Japan. Brad Smith later commented that "you couldn't get any proper training. I don't think anybody felt there was any need for it.[61]

[note]

Citations

Silver Star

Romere, Joseph S., Jr. [Cpl SS H19thIR]

 

[note]

The Forgotten War

Korean_War Korean_War

The [89th Tank] battalion commander, Welborn G. "Tom" Dolvin (West Point, 1939; ), thirty-four, who had fought in Italy and the ETO, remembered how his outfit was thrown together:

"On July twelfth, while on the golf course, I. got verbal word that my orders had been changed to Korea. I met a cadre of a hundred fifty-five men from the Second Armored Division in California on July seventeenth. We flew to Tokyo, arriving on July nineteenth, where we picked up another cadre of seventy men. My A Company left Tokyo by ship on July twenty-fourth and arrived in Pusan on July thirty-first. I flew over and met them on the dock at Pusan that day a mere fifteen days after activation of the outfit . We left Pusan for Masan, joining the Nineteenth and Twenty-seventh regiments on the following day."[7-3]

[note]

US Air Force

 

 

0130 via PanAm, General and Mrs. Doolittle arrive at Haneda. Billeted at the Imperial. Departed Okinawa 0655 hours and arrived Haneda
1130 hours.

Came direct to the office where I had a sandwich for lunch and read my personal mail. Signed a letter to General MacArthur on how we are to operate the ground support for General Walker.[128-Stratemeyer proposed that Walker make all his requests for close air support directly to General Partridge, who would honor these requests within 5AF’s capabilities. Any requests in excess of these capabilities
would be forwarded to General Stratemeyer for action. The following day, MacArthur agreed to this proposal but noted that any conflicts in this process would be decided by him. (Ltr, Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer
to Gen of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 17 Jul 1950, subj: Close Support for the Ground Troops in Korea, w/1st endorsement, 18 Jul 1950.)
] General Eubank is taking this direct to General Hickey and General Almond along with a set of pictures showing the destructive effect of the FEAF Bomber Command strike yesterday on Seoul - 1,504 x five hundred pound bombs were dropped - or 376 tons.


92d flew all thirty of its bombers and the 19th flew seventeen. The Doolittle's and General Banfill had dinner with us. Fighters of the Fifth Air Force shot down two Yaks.

[note]

 

 

Korean_War

Air Organization for Tactical Operations - Bomber Issues

At this juncture, FEAF was additionally alarmed by the sweeping authority given to the GHQ Target Group. On 17 July General Stratemeyer formally proposed methods for fulfilling EUSAK's air support requirements:

General Walker was to make his requirements directly to General Partridge , who would honor those requirements within his available means, reporting requirements in excess of his means to Stratemeyer along with an information copy of the message specifying targets to Bomber Command.

General Stratemeyer was then to direct O'Donnell's Bomber Command to furnish the required support within its capabilities, while details as to time of attack, target identification, and battlefield control were to be arranged by direct coordination between Partridge and O'Donnell . Stratemeyer argued that this procedure would permit maximum utilization of all combat aircraft and provide the most effective ground support. In his reply, General Almond, quoting the JCS definition for "Close Air Support," approved the recommended technique with several qualifications:

EUSAK requests for general air support - that is, air support operations conducted in enemy rear areas usually beyond friendly artillery range - were to be processed in the same manner as that recommended by Stratemeyer for close support, but when such requests conflicted with pre-planned FEAF missions, the matter of priority would be referred to MacArthur for decision.

Almond also did not mean to abdicate MacArthur's right to issue directives to FEAF for the employment of medium bombers against either general air support targets or strategic targets.

Until otherwise notified, General Almond desired FEAF to continue the majority of medium bomber strikes into the area between the front lines and the 38th parallel; targets north of the 38th parallel might be bombed as secondary objectives.

General Stratemeyer issued the approved support plan on 18 July, and complying with CINCFE's wishes, he revised Bomber Command's mission by specifying the following priorities of effort:

1. close support operations directed by FEAF and beyond Fifth Air Force capability; http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/korea/no71-29.htm (1 of 2)9/6/2004 9:08:38 AM USAF Historical Study No. 71 - USAF Museum

2. enemy air-bases and aircraft on them when intelligence indicated a profitable target;

3. interdiction of the battlefield by destroying and maintaining destruction of highway and railway bridges between 37° and 38° from coast to coast;

4. destruction of petroleum refineries and storage;

5. destruction of enemy industrial targets including electric power plants.

He ordered O'Donnell to meet the first priority to the exclusion of all others. All three medium bombardment groups were to be used each day at the rate of seven sorties per aircraft each month, a rate to be raised to ten sorties when logistics permitted. The three medium groups were to continue in close support until 25 July, at which time GHQ would release two of them for a coordinated interdiction campaign. On 4 August all B-29 groups were to be released from close support targets, but they would be required for special ground cooperation missions later in the month.

[note]

16, 17, 18, 19

Korean_War

Because of enemy pressure against Taejŏn, some of the personnel moved back to Taegu on 16 July and began to set up for operations there, while the Taejŏn section continued to operate, using radio jeeps for communications, until 19 July, when the remainder of the JOC moved back to Taegu.

[note]

Korean_War

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26

Despite the dubious results of medium bombers in close support, General O'Donnell was required to reserve 15 aircraft each day for primary effort against tactical targets along the battle line, and between 10 and 26 July he used 130 B-29 sorties in such activity.

7.64 planes per day (17 days total).

Note above General Stratemeyer order: seven sorties per aircraft each month - Reserved 15 and used 1/2 of them?

Why issue an order on he 17th, if he as been doing it since the 10th?

[note]

16.17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23

Korean_War

By 16 July North Korean columns were aiming a pincers movement against Taejŏn, and when EUSAK held there temporarily, the North Korean command initiated a wide left-flank movement down through west Korean coastal routes, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July, Kwangju on 23 July, and capturing the major southwest port city of Mokp'o on 24 July. These movements, virtually unopposed except by a few ROK police, opened the way for a drive against the port cities of Masan and Pusan.

Meanwhile, on the central front EUSAK was flanked out of Taejŏn, forced to withdraw to Yŏngdong on 25 July, and gradually pressed back to Kŭmch'ŏn, where defensive positions were established on 31 July. That same day, on the southwestern front, the 24th Division was forced out of Chinju.

[note]

Korean_War


During the critical days of July when the 24th and 25th Divisions were being committed to action, the Fifth Air Force employed its full resources in close support. Tactical air control parties joined the 24th Division on 5 July,
[The day Task Force Smith got clobbered] and thereafter these parties shared the combat life of the infantrymen: two controllers and five airmen had been killed or were missing in action by 28 July. [when? as of today 39 Air Force people have been killed.]

Korean_War

The emergency action by which FEAF placed primary effort on the main battle line during July has been noted. An air strike along the road near Kiem Dong, reported EUSAK's headquarters diary on 17 July, caused considerable confusion and the retreat of the enemy forces. [They did not write about this confusion of the enemy anyplace except here.]

[note]

Korean_War

Command Relationships and Decisions - Problems

[General MacArthur approved the memorandum, and the GHQ Target Selection Committee was established on 22 July 1950.]

The GHQ Target Group held its first meeting on 16 July, seeking to define its responsibilities more exactly. At this session, Brig. Gen. J. V. Crabb , FEAF Deputy for Operations, flatly stated that FEAF could not accept any concept whereby the GHQ Target Group selected individual targets from the front lines deep into enemy territory. In its draft of responsibilities, written on 17 July, the group therefore agreed that selection of close support targets must become the task of the Commanding General, Eighth Army in Korea in coordination with the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force.

Air strikes against targets beyond the area of close support, however, were to be within priorities prescribed by the GHQ Target Group, in coordination with the FEAF Target Selection Committee. Before this draft of responsibilities could be acted upon within GHQ, General Almond had already approved a procedure recommended by General Stratemeyer for executing close support requirements of the Eighth Army.

General Almond nevertheless stated that he did not intend thereby to preclude issuance of CINCFE directives for medium bomber missions against targets of opportunity in either a general air support role or in attacks against specific strategic targets. The final paper defining GHQ Target Group duties was redrafted so as to incorporate the newly approved close support procedure and issued for GHQ staff information only. The finally matured directive for the GHQ Target Group was coordinated with neither FEAF nor NAVFE.

Unfortunately, the GHQ Target Group did not prove thoroughly conversant with the problems of target selection. Out of a total of 220 primary and secondary targets designated during the period 17 July through 2 August, some 20 percent of the targets did not actually exist. These mistakes came about in several ways. The principal reason was that the target group used the AMS 1:250,000 map of Korea which showed railroad lines in Korea which had been projected but never built.

Subsequent investigation revealed that correct maps had been available in G-2, GHQ FEC at the time of the erroneous selections. In another case the target group was guilty of faulty map reading, for it designated a river crossing for bombing which was marked as a ford on the map consulted.

Many bridge targets correctly designated were later shown to span small streams where a destroyed bridge could easily be bypassed, even in the normally rainy Korean summer. An Air Force evaluation board later commented that

"the GHQ Target Group was unfamiliar with the time-honored Intelligence principle of confirming reported information by checking several sources. It appears evident that the Group accepted the AMS 1:250,000 map as a complete and adequate basis from which to select targets for medium bombers."

It appears that invalid targets were included in the selections of the GHQ Target Group as late as 2 August 1950.

[note]

Korean_War

The trend of events in Tokyo also disturbed General Stratemeyer, so much so that on 17 July he prepared a letter defining the air-support procedures which would be employed in Korea.

Korean_War

General Walker would make his requests for support directly to General Partridge, who would honor these requirements within the capabilities of his aircraft.

Korean_War

General Partridge would forward such requests as were in excess of his capabilities to General Stratemeyer, who would direct General O'Donnell to accomplish them. Specific details as to target identification, time of attack, and control procedures would be arranged directly between General Partridge and General O'Donnell.#50

Bet that saved a lot of time. I guess O'Donnell would not take an order from Partridge who was 4 years his senior at the USMA, I guess this is just more "command problems" in the Air Force. I don't know today when they made MGen, perhaps this why.

[note]

Six B-29's of the 92nd Group reported to "Angelo" on 17 July, and these crews destroyed two bridges and bombed the railway marshaling yards at Chech'on, Ansŏng, and Wŏnju." #63 [four targets]

The employment of B-29 strategic bombers [I thought these were medium bombers?] in visual attacks against ground support targets of opportunity was a novel and wasteful usage of airpower. Bombing from 10,000 feet, with no target information other than the oral directions provided by "Angelo" and such other data as they could glean from aerial maps while in flight, the B-29 crews had very little expectations for successful attacks against poorly distinguished targets. In several discussions with General Stratemeyer and with General Vandenberg, who was in the theater for a firsthand view of the conflict, General MacArthur stated that he knew that the B-29's were improperly used but he argued that the ground emergency justified emergency procedures.

Besides the Air Force demoted the B-29 Heavy Bombwer to a Medimum Bomber, so what were they complaining about?

94 U.S. Air Force in Korea

[note]

Korean_War

Red air actions also indicated that they had discovered the length of time that the Fifth Air Force's jets were able to remain in the battle area before exhausting their fuel.#90

#90 Msg. AX-2846, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 17 July 1950.

An attempt to "prove" they need to do "strategic bombing" instead of CAS.

[note]

Korean_War

During the second week of July the Reds had evidently diagnosed the situation well enough to devise a course of action which allowed them some advantages. Having restored the runways at Kimp'o, the North Koreans based some seven camouflaged and dispersed Yaks at this airfield, thus obtaining an ability to stage short-range sneak attacks against United Nations ground troops.#89

#80 DA-TT-3529, 16 July 1950.

[note]

Korean_War

On 12 July Communist pilots were extremely active. Enemy fighters shot down a single 19th Group B-29 which was attacking targets in the vicinity of Sŏul. In midafternoon two Yaks jumped a flight of F-80's while the latter were strafing in the frontlines near Choch'iwŏn. Once again the jet pilots evaded and escaped damage but they were unable to pursue their attackers. Later in the afternoon two other Yaks shot down an L-4 liaison plane.92

On 15 July two Yaks attacked a formation of four B-26's while the bombers were attacking a target. One of the B-26's was damaged so badly that its crew had to make an emergency landing at Taejŏn.93 Bothered by the "reappearance" of the North Korean Air Force, General MacArthur gave Stratemeyer oral instructions to devote a part of his air effort to counter air purposes. Since MacArthur was particularly concerned about the seven camouflaged Yaks reported to be at Kimp'o, General Partridge sent strafers there which destroyed two or three of these widely dispersed planes on 15 July. That same day General O'Donnell diverted three B-29's and used them to crater the runways at Kimp'o.94 In two strikes against P'yŏngyang airfields on 18 July pilots from the aircraft carriers of Task Force 77 destroyed 14 more enemy aircraft and damaged the 13 other planes which were dispersed and camouflaged in the vicinity of these fields. Moving their attention to east coast airfields on 19 July, the carrier pilots strafed and destroyed 15 enemy planes at Yŏnp'o and three others at a dispersal airfield near Sondok.95

On 19 July Fifth Air Force pilots also hit hard at North Korea's elusive air strength. Photographic reconnaissance had discovered a small grass strip immediately north of the 38th parallel near P'yŏnggang, and some 25 planes were camouflaged under tree branches along the west edge of this field. The enemy was obviously not expecting an air attack when seven F-80's of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group, led by Lt. Col. William T. Samways, the group's commander, dropped in at low level over P'yŏnggang during the midafternoon of 19 July. Making pass after pass over the airfield, the F-80 pilots destroyed 14 enemy fighters and one twin-engine bomber on the ground. The jet pilots also strafed seven other planes, but because they did not burn, these planes could be counted only as "damaged. "96

Wishing to clean up the task which had been so well begun by Task Force 77, General Stratemeyer diverted 14 B-29's from ground support on 20 July and sent them to crater the runways and dispersal areas at P'yŏngyang's Heijo Airfield and at Onjong-ni Airfield.97

Alerted to the tactics of the North Korean fighter pilots, who seemed to be timing their attacks along the frontlines to catch American jets when they were low on fuel, Fifth Air Force forward air controllers and fighter pilots began to work together to break up the Communist scheme of operations.

Along the battleline jet pilots of the 8th Group shot down one Yak on 17 July, three on 19 July, and two more on 20 July.

[note]

[The day Task Force Smith get clobbered]

Korean_War

During the critical days of July when the 24th and 25th Divisions were being committed to action, the Fifth Air Force employed its full resources in close support. Tactical air control parties joined the 24th Division on 5 July, and thereafter these parties shared the combat life of the infantrymen: two controllers and five airmen had been killed or were missing in action by 28 July. The emergency action by which FEAF placed primary effort on the main battle line during July has been noted.

An air strike along the road near Kiem Dong, reported EUSAK's headquarters diary on 17 July, caused considerable confusion and the retreat of the enemy forces. [They did not write about this confusion of the enemy anyplace except here.]

Where where they on the 5th? in Taegu, not Osan.

There is nothing from the Air Force about what they actually did on the 17th.

[note]

US Marine Corps

Korean_War

Admiral McMorris asked Mrs. Puller privately if she wanted the orders held up for a few days until the family was ready --- but they went off by plane on Monday morning.

The Corps would allow him transportation for the family only to Camp Pendleton, his new post, and he would have to pay their fare cross-country to Virginia himself. He told a friend: “This damned war has already cost me $1,019, and I’m not even in an outfit --- much less on the scene.”

[The did not get the San Francisco until 7/20?]

[note]

Korean_War

On the nights of the 16th and 17th, they sat on deck and gazed longingly at the beckoning lights of San Francisco.

[note]

US Navy

Korean_War

Cruiser Division 5, Task Group 96.5

The 17th found USS Juneau (CLAA-119) fueling at Pusan while Admiral Higgins conferred with representatives of the Korean Navy.

In the absence of the flagship, USS Mansfield (DD-728) and USS De Haven (DD-727) fired more than 400 rounds at miscellaneous targets in the same coastal area, and the British returned to the business of coastal bombardment with the cruiser HMS Belfast (C35) and the destroyer HMS Cossack (D-57).

All this was useful, but the next day brought wholly unprecedented activity along the east coast in the form of an amphibious landing and a strike by the Seventh Fleet carrier force.

[note]

The USS Rochester (CA-124) supported landings at Pohang Dong. and would continue to operate with Task Force 77 until 25 Aug. 1950, as an escort ship for the Fast Carrier Task Force of the 7th Fleet, or as a gunfire support ship. She would sail up and down the coast of Korea supplying the U. N. Forces with the fire support they had requested and also fire on targets in areas occupied by the North Korean Army.

Korean_War Korean_War

on the next day VP 28 began daily patrols of the China coast and northern Formosa Strait; by 17 July VP 46 was flying searches in the southern sector.

[note]

Korean_War

On 9 July, with Lieutenant David C. Holly and five enlisted men, Luosey arrived at Pusan and assumed operational control of the Korean Navy. Six days later President Rhee formally turned over command of the ROK armed forces to General MacArthur, and on 17 July Admiral Sohn arrived with the other two PCs.
Luosey’s first days were spent in extemporizing logistic support at Pusan for U.N. ships, in establishing liaison with the Army, and in gaining the confidence of the Koreans.

[note]

Korean_War

Heavily engaged on the 17th by an entire North Korean regiment, the 600-odd Marines were lifted out two days later to begin a minor epic of landings, forced marches, engagements, and retreats, which by the end of the month had brought the survivors to Chinju.

[note]

Korean_War

As early as 10 July shipments of mines were rolling southward down the east coast railway from the Vladivostok region. One week later [17 July] Soviet naval personnel had reached Wŏnsan and Chinnamp'o and were holding mine school for their North Korean friends.

This reaction, which wholly justified Admiral Joy’s concern with the northeastern railroad route, was sufficiently rapid to get the mines through before the limited Seventh Fleet and NavFE forces could be brought to bear.

Some 4,000 mines were quickly passed through Wŏnsan, and by 1 August mining had been begun at that port and at Chinnamp'o. In time Russian naval officers ventured as far south as Inch'ŏn, shipments of mines were trucked down from Chinnamp'o to Haeju, and before the bridges were knocked down consignments had reached Inch'ŏn, Kunsan, and Mokp'o by train.

[note]

 

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

 

Korean_War

[note]

Korean_War

[note]

Korean_War

See the article The Cat in the Kremlin (War)


0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
9:00 AM
07/16/50
10:00 AM
07/16/50
3:00 PM
07/17/50
12:00 AM

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
10:00 AM
07/16/50
11:00 AM
07/16/50
4:00 PM
07/17/50
1:00 AM


0130 Korean Time

Korean_War

via PanAm, General and Mrs. Doolittle arrive at Haneda. Billeted at the Imperial.

[note]

0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
11:00 AM
07/16/50
12:00 PM
07/16/50
5:00 PM
07/17/50
2:00 AM

0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
12:00 PM
07/16/50
1:00 PM
07/16/50
6:00 PM
07/17/50
3:00 AM

0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
1:00 PM
07/16/50
2:00 PM
07/16/50
7:00 PM
07/17/50
4:00 AM

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
2:00 PM
07/16/50
3:00 PM
07/16/50
8:00 PM
07/17/50
5:00 AM

0523 Sun Rise

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
3:00 PM
07/16/50
4:00 PM
07/16/50
9:00 PM
07/17/50
6:00 AM

0655 Korean Time

Korean_War

Departed Okinawa 0655 hours and arrived Haneda 1130 hours.

[note]

0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
4:00 PM
07/16/50
5:00 PM
07/16/50
10:00 PM
07/17/50
7:00 AM

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
5:00 PM
07/16/50
6:00 PM
07/16/50
11:00 PM
07/17/50
8:00 AM

0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
6:00 PM
07/16/50
7:00 PM
07/17/50
12:00 AM
07/17/50
9:00 AM

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
7:00 PM
07/16/50
8:00 PM
07/17/50
1:00 AM
07/17/50
10:00 AM

1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
8:00 PM
07/16/50
9:00 PM
07/16/50
2:00 AM
07/17/50
11:00 AM

1130 Korean Time

Korean_War

arrived Haneda, Came direct to the office where I had a sandwich
for lunch and read my personal mail. Signed a letter to General MacArthur on how we are to operate the ground support for General Walker.

128 General Eubank is taking this direct to General Hickey and General Almond along with a set of pictures showing the destructive effect of the FEAF Bomber Command strike yesterday on Seoul - 1,504 x five hundred pound bombs were dropped - or 376 tons. 92d flew all thirty of its bombers and the 19th flew seventeen.

[note]

1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
9:00 PM
07/16/50
10:00 PM
07/17/50
3:00 AM
07/17/50
12:00 PM

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
10:00 PM
07/16/50
11:00 PM
07/17/50
4:00 AM
07/17/50
1:00 PM

Korean_War Korean_War

Early in the afternoon of the 17th the 34th Infantry took over the entire defensive line north and west of Taejon. Except for Dean, William Frishe (Bill) and three or four other officers, the 24th Division headquarters left for Yŏngdong, 28 miles southeast on the main highway and rail line. Remaining with Dean at Taejon were Lieutenant Clarke, an aide; Capt. Richard A. Rowlands, Assistant G-3; Capt. Raymond D. Hatfield, Transportation Officer and Assistant G-4; and two drivers.

Dean instructed Maj. David A. Bissett to establish an office for him at the 21st Infantry command post at Okch'ŏn so that he could from there more easily keep informed of affairs east of Taejon. Dean said that he would spend nights at Okch'ŏn.

"But," commented Bissett, "he never did, and indeed none of us there expected him to." [11-1]

Before the battle of the Kum, Dean had selected two regimental positions three miles west of Taejon for the close-in defense of the city. These positions were on a 500-foot high, 3-mile long ridge behind (east of) the Kap-ch'on River. Each extremity covered a bridge and a road immediately to its front. The position was a strong one and well suited to a two-regimental front. It was known as the Yusŏng position.

A village of that name lay across the Kap-ch'on River about a mile from the northern end of the ridge.

Korean_War

Dean's plan had been to place the 19th Infantry on the northern part of the line covering the main Seoul-Pusan highway where it curved around the northern end of the ridge and to place the 34th Infantry on the southern part to cover the Nonsan-Taejon road where it passed along a narrow strip of low ground at the southern end of the ridge. But with the 19th Infantry combat-ineffective after the ordeal of the 16th and at Yŏngdong for re-equipping, the defense of the entire line fell upon the 34th Infantry. [11-2]

General Dean had no intention of fighting a last-ditch battle for Taejon. He looked upon it as another in the series of delaying actions to which the 24th Division had been committed by General MacArthur to slow the North Korean advance, pending the arrival of sufficient reinforcements to halt and then turn back the enemy.

[note]

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/16/50
11:00 PM
07/17/50
12:00 AM
07/17/50
5:00 AM
07/17/50
2:00 PM

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
12:00 AM
07/17/50
1:00 AM
07/17/50
6:00 AM
07/17/50
3:00 PM

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
1:00 AM
07/17/50
2:00 AM
07/17/50
7:00 AM
07/17/50
4:00 PM

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
2:00 AM
07/17/50
3:00 AM
07/17/50
8:00 AM
07/17/50
5:00 PM

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
3:00 AM
07/17/50
4:00 AM
07/17/50
9:00 AM
07/17/50
6:00 PM

1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
4:00 AM
07/17/50
5:00 AM
07/17/50
10:00 AM
07/17/50
7:00 PM

1900 Korean Time

Korean_War


1900 The Doolittle's and General Banfill had dinner with us.
Fighters of the Fifth Air Force shot down two Yaks.[ooooops]

[note]

1949 Sun Set

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
5:00 AM
07/17/50
6:00 AM
07/17/50
11:00 AM
07/17/50
8:00 PM

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
6:00 AM
07/17/50
7:00 AM
07/17/50
12:00 PM
07/17/50
9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
7:00 AM
07/17/50
8:00 AM
07/17/50
1:00 PM
07/17/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/17/50
8:00 AM
07/17/50
9:00 AM
07/17/50
2:00 PM
07/17/50
11:00 PM


Casualties

Monday July 17, 1950 (Day 023)

Korean_War 14 Casualties

As of July 17, 1950

9 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT MEDICAL COMPANY
1 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 26TH ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AW BATTALION (SP)
1 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 78TH HEAVY TANK BATTALION
14 19500717 0000 Casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 39 1110 0 0 0 1149
Today 0 14 0 0 0 14
Total 39 1124 0 0 0 1163

Aircraft Losses Today 000

North Korean's Aircraft Losses Today 1

Notes for Monday July 17, 1950 - Day 023