Overview

Weather

Mean Temp 26.4C 79.52F at Taegu

Heavy overcast.

MacArthur makes third request for a Marine Division.

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Category 1 typhoon (SSHS)
Duration July 16 – July 21
Peak intensity
130 km/h (80 mph) (1 -min), Unknown

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July 16 to 21 Typhoon Grace


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20 21
On 7-20 the 24th's 3rd Bn, reinforced by a battery of the 159th and a platoon of the 77th, was the 1st 25th Division element to go into action at Yech'ŏn. In an extraordinary 2-day action hailed around the world as the US' initial Korean War victory, the reinforced bn drove the enemy from the town and recaptured it at a cost of 2 Americans killed and 10 wounded in action to at least 258 enemy dead.

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19, 20, 21, 22

July 19 to 22 - Battle for Taejŏn. U.S. troops retreat. Major General William F. Dean captured by North Koreans.

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34th Inf Reg., 24th Div., 8th Army reduced to paper status and it's few remaining troops and equipment went to the 19th Inf Reg. There were not enough men left in the 34th to make a full size Company.

[note]

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July 21-26
More UN members volunteer to send soldiers to fight in South Korea.

Korean_War Bolivia offered 30 Army officers,

Korean_War Thailand, 4,000 soldiers and

Korean_War Turkey, 4,500.

Korean_War Great Britain is expected to send about 5,000 and

Korean_War Australia's contingent will be about 10,000.

Korean_War New Zealand also says it will send troops.

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July 21

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The NKPA's main body swings to the southeast toward Pusan, the port through which nearly all supplies to the U.S. and South Korean defenders are delivered.

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-- The all-Black 24th Infantry Regiment, of the 25th ID, recaptures the north-central town of Yech'ŏn after a 16-hour battle.

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-- Other 25th ID troops retake Yŏngdök on the east coast, with artillery support from U.S. and British warships.

-- North Korean radio from Sŏul announces that Russia was "our only benefactor" and "has been giving us consistent assistance."

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KPA commences "Fourth (Naktong) Phase"

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Army Policy

12 July 1950

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When the Chief of Staff, GHQ, and the Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, reached agreement in a telephone conversation on 12 July that two battalions of the 29th Infantry on Okinawa should be sent to Korea as soon as possible, General MacArthur ordered the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, General Beightler, to build these battalions to war strength and send them to Japan without delay. [05-37]

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General Walker asked that the two battalions be sent directly to the battle area, bypassing Japan. He said he would give them any training they needed.

This request was granted, and on 21 July the two battalions sailed from Okinawa for Pusan, arriving four days later. [05-38]

[note]

[Third request for a Marine Division]

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This threat to his plans drew fire from MacArthur, and he urgently requested the Joint Chiefs to reconsider. Provision of the full division by xx September he saw as an absolutely vital element of his entire plan.

"There can be," he charged, "no demand for its use elsewhere which can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it." [09-18]

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Unknown to MacArthur, an influential ally had already come to his support. Admiral Radford, before meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations, had sought the advice of General Shepherd. The Marine general spoke out strongly for General MacArthur and recommended that his request for Marine forces be met in the manner desired.

General Shepherd believed that the Fleet Marine Force

"as a whole" could provide the amphibious striking force and that it could do so without a serious or lasting impact on the Marine force's readiness to meet other commitments. "I feel," he told Admiral Radford, "that there is a serious war in progress in Korea and employment of amphibious forces will prove the key of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our arms."

He held that the Fleet Marine Force was ready

"at this moment" to send to Korea a force strong enough to lead the counteroffensive amphibious movement, "the task for which Marines are trained and constituted." [09-19]

Back in Washington, General Bolté [G-3] added his support to General MacArthur's plea for early arrival of the Marines. He recommended to General Collins that the latter use his influence with the Joint Chiefs to support MacArthur in his call for a full Marine division in the theater by 10 September. [09-20]

The intervention of Generals Shepherd and Bolté prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider.

[09-18] (1) Rad, CX 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul. 50. (2) This statement reflects General MacArthur's conviction that "Washington" followed a policy of slighting his command in favor of the western European area. General Whitney's account of this transaction is interesting, if abbreviated. ". . . on July 10," Whitney says, "MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the 1st Marine Division. Profiting by his experience with Washington's penchant for skeletonizing his forces, he carefully stipulated a division at full strength. He was turned down flat. He patiently tried again five days later, saying: 'I cannot emphasize too strongly my belief in the complete urgency of my request.' He was turned down again." See Whitney, MacArthur; His Rendezvous With History, p. 343.

[09-19] Memo, Gen. Shepherd, CC FMPAC, for Adm. Radford, CINCPAC, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.

[09-20] Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 21 Jul. 50, sub: Augmentation of Provisional Marine Brigade, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 24.

[note]

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Department of the Army officials told the Far East commander on 21 July that they were in no position even to consider his request [of the 9th] for another army of four divisions for the present. Before any decision could be made on that request, American defense officials would have to determine just how far they were going in rebuilding the General Reserve. Then they would have to see if sending additional forces to Korea was as important to national security as having them available for deployment elsewhere in the world. [05-67]

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The question of which National Guard divisions should be called up had been under study for some time. General Collins had, on 21 July, asked the Chief, Army Field Forces, for recommendations.

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The FEAF commander called on General MacArthur and the latter's chief of staff, General Almond, on 19 July to complain of this procedure.


Stratemeyer followed this visit with a memorandum on 21 July in which he recommended the creation of a target selection committee which would include

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General Hickey, the FEC GHQ deputy chief of staff,

General Willoughby, the G-2,

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Lt. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, the vice commander for operations of FEAF,

and a Navy representative to be named by Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy.

MacArthur approved this recommendation immediately, and FEAF, using the new method, took over the actual selection of targets for interdiction. [06-30]

Interesting From July 21 (today) to August 20, a month from today, they still screwed up!!!!! Rather badly.

Of 220 targets selected by the group between 17 July and 2 August, 20 percent did not exist on the ground.[The group was reformed as of July 21st according to Stratemeyer's wishes]


The Withdrawal Continues


Meanwhile, the North Korean Army drove hard, aiming to destroy the Republic of Korea and to throw the 24th Division out of Korea before ground reinforcements arrived. At the Kum River line the enemy units again outflanked the 24th Division.

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Awards and Decorations

Pvt. James H. Jefferson

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MGen William F. Dean

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Captain Charles Bussey

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"General William F. Dean was reported missing in action as his 24th Infantry Division fought its way out of Taejŏn'

During that action, he set the example by single-handedly attacking a T34 tank with a grenade and directing the fire of others from an exposed position. As his division withdrew, he remained with the rearguard, rounding up stragglers and aiding the wounded.

It was learned later that he had been captured about 35 miles south of Taejŏn' on 25 August. Since the Communists kept his capture a secret, he was presumed dead.

In early 1951, President Truman presented the Medal of Honor to his wife in a White House ceremony. He was the only general officer and, at fifty-one, the oldest man to receive the Medal of Honor during the Korean War."

[note]

Nogun-ri


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On or about the 21st [July 1950 ,] the 1st Cavalry Division moved over through Yomgchu through Teague up to Yŏngdong. All along this route fleeing refugees interfered with our move. In some instances refugees were hit and killed by our vehicles. It seemed as though the countryside was alive and on the move in all directions. Communists in Allied territory were giving false information to villagers to start them on their way along the narrow rocky roads causing the retarding of all Allied movement of vehicles.

Combat Phase

Once the Division was in the lines and readying for their first battle civilians came pouring through the battle positions. At this time, this officer was assigned as liaison with two of our regiments with headquarters in Yŏngdong. Arriving at this town I immediately contacted the police chief -- the only city official remaining in town. I asked him how many police he had. He informed me [that he had] ninety. I told him to divide them and disperse them in the areas of our battalions in the line. He promised to do so. He was instructed to get his police to move the refugees down trails, off highways, onto a rail bed and direct them to Kŭmch'ŏn where we would arrange for their screening and evacuation. Later the police chief was to meet me in a village on our left flank for control of refugees there. This plan was temporary and it was about fifty percent effective.

The masses of refugees straining through and pouring down the highways into our positions caused grave concern to everyone in the Division. It was obviously a civil affairs problem but our Division staff was not augmented by a civil affairs section.

Due to my World War II training and experiences I sat down and drew up a plan for controlling civilian circulation. After a study by my section chief, the G2 and Chief of Staff, the plan was approved and in addition to my other duties I was given the responsibility of refugee control. All steps outlined were immediately put into effect. The machinery outlined screened some 50,000 refugees in about a week. 31

31
Monograph, "Civilian Control in South Korea," by LTCOL J.P. Powhida. In Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General; Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 19511952, Entry 433B, Box 221, RG 389, NARA.

The introduction to this same monograph serves as an excellent summary of refugee control issues during the early days of the war:

Under present conditions of war in South Korea, especially in the combat zone, the civilian control is a paramount problem to the fighting forces.

32
Ibid.

This refugee problem profoundly affected the U.S. Army's behavior in the early weeks of the Korean War. In fact, the first few weeks of the Korean War exposed the U.S. Army to a number of its own shortcomings as discussed earlier in this chapter. But one factor that truly caught the U.S. troops by surprise early in the war was the stark reality of dealing with refugees who clogged and complicated the battlefield to a hitherto unknown, and unexpected, degree.

[note]

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As a member of the 1st Cavalry Division's G-3 (Operations) section and liaison officer to two of the infantry regiments in mid-July 1950 , Lieutenant Colonel Powhida described how he arrived in Yŏngdong on or about July 21 and directed the Korean police chief to use his 90-man police force to move the teeming refugee columns down trails and off of the highways.

The police then directed the refugees to Kŭmch'ŏn for screening and subsequent evacuation. Even though Lieutenant Colonel Powhida rated the effectiveness of this hasty operation at 50 percent, the presence of the ROK National police certainly brought greater order to the chaos and helped the ground forces keep the lines of communication open.

Most veterans from the 7th Cavalry Regiment interviewed by the U.S. Review Team were enlisted men during the Korean War. They did not receive copies of policies from higher headquarters. In general, the U.S. veterans' recollection of refugee control policies was they should be careful with refugees. These soldiers received instructions and orders from their sergeants and platoon leaders.

Many U.S. veterans remember receiving warnings that there were North Korean infiltrators among the refugees. A few soldiers do not remember hearing that there were infiltrators among the refugees.

The veterans who remembered more specific details about refugee control remembered specific actions to be taken; for example, keep refugees off the roads, do not let refugees pass, or search refugees and let them pass.

One veteran, when asked about refugees, said they were supposed get them off the road, keep them off the road, and send them south.

The policy not to let refugees cross battle lines was designed to protect U.S. forces in light of the infiltration tactics used by the North Koreans and the congestion on the roads.

Finding: From its study of the refugee control policies in effect during the last week of July 1950 , the U.S. Review Team found that the Eighth U.S. Army published, in coordination with the ROK government, refugee control policies that reflected two predominant concerns:

(1) protecting U.S. and ROK troops from the danger of NKPA soldiers infiltrating U.S. -ROK lines, and

(2) precluding uncontrolled refugee movements from impeding flows of supplies and troops.

The published 1st Cavalry Division refugee control policy dated July 23, 1950 , reflected the same two concerns. The task of keeping innocent civilians out of harm's way was left to ROK authorities. By implication, these policies also protected refugees by attempting to ensure they were not in harm's way.

[note]

South then North


CONCLUSION

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Taejŏn' must be considered a major victory for the North Koreans, even though two divisions with T34 tanks were operating against only about 4,000 men of the U.S. 24th Division in and around the city.

It appears that credit should go to the N.K. 4th Division for carrying out the envelopment of Taejŏn from the west and south by strong elements of its 16th and 18th Regiments and imposing the disastrous roadblock on the Okch'ŏn highway east of Taejŏn'. These elements had no tanks or artillery with them; theirs was a light infantry maneuver and tactic. Whether they came around by road through Kŭmsan from Nonsan or marched across country over the mountains south and southwest of Taejŏn' from the Nonsan-Taejŏn' road is not definitely known. There is some evidence that at least part of the enveloping force came through Kŭmsan.

The N.K. 3rd Division joined the 5th Regiment of the N.K. 4th Division in maintaining frontal pressure against Taejŏn' in the afternoon of the 20th and enveloped it on the north and northeast. The 3rd infiltrated the city heavily in the latter part of the afternoon. The enemy tanks that penetrated Taejŏn' in the morning apparently belonged to the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, attached to the N.K. 4th Division ever since the crossing of the 38th Parallel. Some of the tanks that entered the city later in the day were probably from the 203rd Tank Regiment attached to the N.K. 3rd Division. [11-77]

The N.K. 2nd Division, which was supposed to have joined the 3rd and 4th in the attack on Taejŏn, failed to come up in time. This all but exhausted division did not leave Ch'ŏngju until on or about the 18th. It then moved through Pugang-ni southwest toward Taejŏn', apparently intending to cross the Kum River in the vicinity of the railroad bridge. It had yet to cross the Kum when it received word on 21 July that Taejŏn' had fallen. The 2nd Division thereupon altered its course and turned southeast through Poŭn, headed for Kŭmch'ŏn. [11-78]

It is difficult to estimate enemy losses at Taejŏn'. The North Korean infantry losses apparently were light. Their losses in armor and artillery were considerable. The N. K. 4th Division, according to prisoner reports later, lost 15 76-mm. guns and 6 122-mm. mortars, together with 200 artillerymen. The tank losses were relatively heavy; at least 15 of them were destroyed, and possibly the number may have been 20 or more.

Within five days the enemy, employing numerically superior forces, had executed two highly successful envelopments of American positions at the Kum River and at Taejŏn'. In each case the North Koreans moved around the left flank to impose roadblocks covering the rear routes of escape. In each instance the result was catastrophic for the units cut off. These enemy operations must stand as excellent examples of this type of military tactic.

On the American side, the lack of information of the true state of affairs caused by the almost complete breakdown in all forms of communication was the major factor leading to the disaster. In battle, communication is all important.

The 24th Division After Taejŏn'

When all the men who escaped from Taejŏn' had rejoined their units, a count showed 1,150 casualties out of 3,933 of the U.S. 24th Division forces engaged there on 19-20 July-nearly 30 percent. Of these casualties, 48 were known dead, 228 wounded, and 874 missing in action. Most of the last were presumed killed and this was borne out by subsequent information. Among the rifle companies, L Company, 34th Infantry, the rear guard unit, lost the most with 107 casualties out of 153 men (70 percent). [11-79]

Percentage Unit Casualties

% Unit Losses
41.5 Hq, 34th Inf 71 of 171
28.5 1st Bn, 34th Inf 203 of 712
38.4 3rd Bn, 34th Inf 256 of 666
29.5 2nd Bn, 19th Inf 211 of 713
53.0 C Co, 3rd Engr (C) Bn 85 of 161
31.7 A Btry, 11th FA Bn 39 of 123

Only B Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, B Battery, 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, and I Company, 34th Infantry, brought out their equipment substantially intact.

They escaped just before the enemy enforced the roadblock which caught everything behind them. Approximately only 35 regimental vehicles escaped from Taejŏn. The 24th Quartermaster Company lost 30 of 34 trucks; A Battery, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, lost all 5 of its 155-mm. howitzers.

[note]

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KMAG

On 10 July Colonel Emmerich went to Yŏnil Airfield to discuss with Col. Robert Witty, commanding the 35th Fighter-Interceptor Group, the co-ordination of air strikes at Yŏngdök. These promised to become more numerous, because on that day the 40th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron became operational at Yŏnil.

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General Walker and General Partridge flew to Yŏnil Airfield from Taegu to join in the discussions, and General Kean of the 25th Division also joined the group there.

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Emmerich briefed the commanders thoroughly on the situation. General Walker ordered that the 3rd ROK Division must retake Yŏngdök. When Colonel Emmerich relayed Walker's orders to General Lee of the ROK division the latter was upset, but he received instructions from higher ROK authority to obey the Eighth Army commander. [12- 5]

The second battle for Yŏngdök began on the morning of 21 July. This was a savage and bloody fight at close quarters.

Naval reinforcements had arrived off the coast during the night of 19 July, and Rear Adm. J. M. Higgins informed Emmerich that the destroyers USS Higbee (DDR-806), USS Mansfield (DD-728), USS De Haven (DD-727), and USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729), and the British cruiser HMS Belfast (C-35) would add their gunfire to the battle.

This naval gunfire, U.S. artillery and mortar fire, and air strikes enabled the ROK's to retake the town, only to be driven out again by nightfall.

In this action unusually accurate enemy mortar and artillery fire caused very heavy ROK casualties. The second battle of Yŏngdök left the area from Kanggu-dong to a point about two miles north of Yŏngdök a smoldering no man's land. The pounding of the artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes had stripped the hills of all vegetation and reduced to rubble all small villages in the area.

In the attack on the 21st, observers estimated that naval gunfire from the USS Juneau (CLAA-119) alone killed 400 North Korean soldiers.

Even though enemy troops again held Yŏngdök they were unable to exploit their success immediately because they were held under pulverizing artillery and mortar fire, naval gunfire, and almost continuous daylight air strikes. In their efforts to execute wide enveloping moves around the flank of the ROK troops over mountainous terrain, barren of trees and other cover, they came under decimating fire.

On 24 July alone the North Koreans lost 800 casualties to this gunfire, according to prisoners. One enemy battalion was virtually destroyed when naval gunfire from the east and air strikes from the west pocketed it and held it under exploding shells, bombs, and strafing fires. [12-6]

[note]

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During the last half of July 1950, this holding battle on the east coast by the ROK 3rd Division was the only one that succeeded in all Korea. It was made possible by American air, sea, and ground fire power and the physical features of the east coast, which hampered North Korean freedom of movement and aided effective employment of American fire power.

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Of particular note among the battles during the last part of July in the central mountains was the duel between the N.K. 12th Division and the ROK 8th Division for control of Andong and the upper Naktong River crossing there.

This series of battles was closely related to the fighting on the east coast and the North Korean efforts to gain control of P'ohang-dong and the east coast corridor to Pusan.

After crossing the upper Han River at Tanyang, South Korea, the N.K. 12th Division advanced on the road through Yŏngju to Andong.

The ROK 8th Division attacked the 12th on 21 July between the two towns. From then on to the end of the month these two divisions on the road to Andong engaged in one of the bloodiest fights of the first month of the war.

Just when it was encountering this stubborn resistance from the ROK 8th Division, the 12th received orders from the N.K. II Corps to capture P'ohang-dong by 26 July. This order doubtless was occasioned by the failure of the 5th Division to advance as rapidly along the east coast as had been expected. Ever since the invasion began, the N.K. Army Command had criticized its II Corps for failure to meet its schedule of advance.

[note]

Reorganization of the ROK Army

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To a considerable extent the reorganization of the ROK Army influenced the disposition of ROK troops and the U.S. 25th Division along the front.

Throughout the first part of July there had been a continuing effort by American commanders to assemble the surviving men and units of the ROK Army that had escaped south of the Han River and to reorganize them for combat operations. Generals Church, Dean, and Walker each took an active interest in this necessary objective.

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As a part of this reorganization, the ROK Army activated its I Corps and with it directed ROK operations on the right flank of the U.S. 24th Division in the first part of July.

The 1st, 2nd, and Capital Divisions had carried the fight for the ROK I Corps in the central mountains east of the Sŏul-Taejŏn highway.

By the time Taejŏn' fell, [7/20 2400] these ROK divisions were each reduced to a strength of between 3,000 and 3,500 men. The ROK I Corps at that time had only one 3-gun and two 4-gun batteries of artillery. The three divisions reportedly each had ten 81-mm. mortars without sights. [12-14]

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[12-Caption] NAKTONG RIVER AT ANDONG, showing the Andong bridge.

[note]

[see the 26th for 2/35 disposition]

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The 2nd Battalion of the 35th Infantry took up a hill position northwest of Hamch'ang and south of Mun'gyŏng on the south side of a stream that flowed past, Sangju to the Naktong

On the north side of the stream a ROK battalion held the front line.

Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, Assistant Division Commander, insisted that F Company of the battalion should be inserted in the center of the ROK line north of the stream, and this was done over the strong protests of Colonel Fisher and the battalion commander, Lt. Col. John L. Wilkin[s].

Wilson thought the American troops would strengthen the ROK defense; Fisher and Wilkins did not want the untried company to be dependent upon ROK stability in its first engagement. Behind the ROK and F Company positions the ground rose in another hill within small arms range.

Heavy rains had swollen the stream behind the ROK's and F Company to a torrent that was rolling large boulders along its channel.

[note]

Walker Acts

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During the battle for Taejŏn, U.N. aerial observers had reported enemy movements south of the Kum River near the west coast.

U.N. intelligence mistakenly concluded that these troops were elements of the N.K. 4th Division.

A report from the Far East Command to Washington on 21 July noted this enemy movement and attributed it to that division.

The next day a similar report from the Far East Command stated, "The 4th North Korean Division ... has been picked up in assemblies in the vicinity of Nonsan."

Enemy forces in battalion and regimental strength, the report said, were moving in a "southward trend, colliding with local police forces."

General MacArthur's headquarters considered this

"a very bold movement, evidently predicated on the conviction of the enemy high command that the Allied units are potentially bottled up in the mountainous areas northeast of the headwaters of the Kum River. ... The potential of the advance of the enemy 4th Division to the south is altogether uncomfortable, since at the moment, except for air strikes, there is no organized force capable of firm resistance except local police units." [6]

General Walker knew enemy units were moving south of the Kum River into southwest Korea and maintained aerial observation of the roads there when flying weather conditions permitted. His intelligence section wanted distant armored reconnaissance of this region, but the armored vehicles and personnel to carry it out were not available. In addition to aerial reconnaissance, however, there were the many reports from local South Korean police units. These often were vague, conflicting, and, it was thought, exaggerated. [7] [How do you EXAGGERATE a division?]

[note]

On 21-22 July, heavy overcast prevented aerial reconnaissance and permitted the enemy to put his columns on the road during daylight and to move rapidly without fear of aerial attack.

Alarm at Eighth

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see Itazuke to Ashiya, Japan

Army headquarters began to grow. The Fifth Air Force had moved its advance headquarters from Itazuke, Japan, to Taegu on 16 July. The most advanced air bases in Japan-Itazuke and Ashiya-were hardly close enough to the battle area of early and middle July to allow more than fifteen to twenty minutes of support by jet fighters.

When weather was bad the F-80 jets could scarcely fly a mission at the front and get back to Itazuke.

Effective 24 July, the advance group of the Air Force was designated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea. Fair weather returned on 23 July, and General Walker requested the Fifth Air Force to fly an armed reconnaissance of the Kwangju-Nonsan area. [8]

[note]

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About the middle of July, Maj. Tony J. Raibl, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, learned in Tokyo that the Far East Command expected that the regiment would have at least six weeks' training before being sent to Korea. [18]

Yet, immediately after making that estimate, the Far East Command issued orders to the regiment on 15July to prepare for movement.

All troops were placed in two battalions, the 1st and 3rd. Lt. Col. Wesley C. Wilson commanded the 1st Battalion and Lt. Col. Harold W. Mott, the 3rd Battalion. The regimental headquarters was to remain behind as a nucleus for a new regiment that would assume responsibility for the ground defense of Okinawa.

The USNS General Nelson M. Walker (T-AP-125) arrived at Okinawa on the 20th with about 400 recruits. They were hastily disembarked and allowed to take with them only their toilet articles, driven to the battalion areas, assigned to companies, issued arms and field equipment, and moved back to the Naha docks.

On 21 July the two battalions, [1st and 3rd] now at full strength, loaded on board the USNS Fentress (T-AK-180) and Takasago Maru during a heavy rain and sailed for Pusan.

[note]

 

Citations

Medals       

Medal of Honor
DEAN, WILLIAM F.

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500721 0000 DSC JEFFERSON

19500721 00mhDEAN, WILLIAM F.

 

Silver Star

Ayers, Harold B. [LtCol SS 1stBn34thIR]

 

[note]

 

 

The Forgotten War

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The hundreds of men of the 34th Regiment and McGrail's 2/19 who were cut off or trapped in Taejŏn' and withdrew or escaped to the hills southward all had hair-raising adventures as well. Many senior officers, including Ayres, McGrail, and Jack Smith, made it out, but others did not.

Ayres's 1/34 exec, Leland Dunham, was shot in the neck and killed on the Kŭmsan road. The 34th's new S3, William McDaniel, was captured and probably murdered in captivity for his defiance to torture and brainwashing.[5-70]

Probably the largest 34th Regiment group was led out by the 1/34 platoon leader William Caldwell and the 1/34 S3, Sidney M. Marks, a tough World War II paratrooper. Caldwell remembered:

"The first battalion was decimated. I ended up on the high ground south of Taejŏn with Marks and three other officers and about two hundred men, many of them wounded. We had no maps, no communications, no ammo, except that on our backs, no food, no water, no vehicles. We headed south, then west, moving rather ponderously because of the injured and wounded. On the third day without food, men went into the fields and dug up potatoes and vegetables and ate them raw, a distressing sight.

[note]

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Deploying his three rifle companies (I, K, L) to the south and west of Yech'ŏn, and backed by the heavy weapons company (M), Pierce bivouacked for the night, and planned a textbook assault on Yech'ŏn on the following day.[6-23]

He chose L Company to lead the assault. It was commanded by a black paratrooper, Bradley Biggs, who was an alumnus of the elite triple Nickles. Biggs remembered that his outfit deployed smartly by the book.

During the assault, it encountered NKPA machinegun and mortar fire, which was answered in kind, but within an hour and a half "at most" his troops (and others) had recaptured Yech'ŏn.

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The town, blazing with fires, was shortly turned over to troops of the ROK Capital Division.[6-24]

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The 77th ECC [77th Engineer Combat Company] commander, Charles Bussey, had jeeped forward to bring mail to the engineers of his 3rd Platoon, commanded by Chester J. Lenon, who were supporting the 3/24.

Approaching Yech'ŏn, Bussey suddenly encountered a formation of several hundred NKPA troops, who were apparently attempting to outflank the 3/24. Rounding up some nearby engineers and infantry, Bussey set up two machine guns, and laid down a withering fire. Manning the weapons himself and ignoring two minor wounds, Bussey personally inflicted an awesome and ghastly slaughter on the advancing NKPA. Later Bussey and the men counted and buried 258 dead enemy.[6-25]

Bussey's extraordinary feat deserved a high award. Visiting the regiment, an immensely pleased Bill Kean gave him a Silver Star (and a Purple Heart for his wound) remarking at the ceremony that it was merely a "down payment" on a "bigger medal" to follow. The 77th's first sergeant, Roscoe C. Dudley, interviewed witnesses to confirm the facts of the fight and then recommended Bussey for the Medal of Honor, as apparently Kean had intended. But somewhere up the line the medal was killed. Believing Army racism was the main reason, David Carlisle subsequently mounted a campaign through official channels in Washington to "upgrade" Bussey's Silver Star to the Medal of Honor, but he met with a cool reception.[6-26]

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[There is a record of the Silver Star (see my citations binder)]

A war correspondent with the Associated Press and later with Time magazine, Tom Lambert, accompanied the 3/24 BCT assault on Yech'ŏn. His vivid dispatch, widely published in the States, rightly claimed that the fight at Yech'ŏn was the "first sizable American ground victory in the Korean War" and "a far different story" from the performance of Bill Dean's 24th Division.

The 25th Division historian put it this way: "It was the first South Korean city restored to friendly hands by American troops. Although it was not a tremendous victory, many believed it symbolic of the liberation of South Korea." Two congressmen rose on the House floor to note the action and laud the 24th Infantry.[6-27]

The victory was reason for blacks to celebrate, but Yech'ŏn was not long remembered. Moreover, the Army later attempted to obliterate it from the official record.

Notwithstanding Lambert's dispatch and the division history, Army historian Roy Appleman, in his account of the Korean War, sneered at the Yech'ŏn fight, expressing doubt there had been any action "at all" and suggesting that the NKPA had withdrawn from the town before the BCT got there. [see STN above]

Believing this sneering account also arose from Army racism, David Carlisle (joined by other blacks) produced overwhelming evidence to substantiate the "victory" in an effort to persuade the Army to revise the official history, but again Carlisle met with a cool reception.[6-28]

[note]

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The battalions [6-1/29 & 2/29] strengthened by the addition of 400 draftees who had arrived in Okinawa from the States only the day before, [20 July] had departed Okinawa on July 21 by ship. As Wilson and Mott understood the plan, the battalions would go first to Japan for six weeks of field training, then to Korea. But the urgency of the situation dictated direct movement to Korea - without field training.

[29th or 19th]

The 3/29's exec, Tony J. Raibl, thirty-nine, who acted as advance man for both battalions, protested these orders directly to Walker in Taegu, but to no avail. Upon landing at Pusan on July 24, both battalions were trucked to the 19th Regiment at Chinju so quickly that the men did not even have time to calibrate rifles, test-fire mortars, or clean the Cosmoline from the machine guns.

[note]

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During the chaotic night of July 20-21, as the 34th and 2/19 were fleeing Taejŏn, Dick Stephens, still at Okch'ŏn with his 21st Infantry, became increasingly uneasy. His standing orders were "to hold at all costs." But with the NKPA in control of Taejŏn and blocking the Okch'ŏn road and without doubt making plans to encircle and overrun his thin position, these orders now seemed suicidal.

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The 24th's ADC, Pearson Menoher, temporarily commanding the division, agreed, and he authorized Stephens to pull out.

[note]

US Air Force

 

General Robertson posed the question if the 77th RAAF Squadron moves to Korea, as suggested by General Partridge, how is it to be maintained - down to and including food and PX [Post Exchange] supplies for the personnel. Operations has been delegated to come up with a solution.


Robertson also requested help so that he can advise Air Marshal Jones,[139-Air Marshal Sir George Jones, Chief of Air Staff, RAAF.] C of S, RAAF, whether to buy jet close support-type equipment or reciprocal engine-type equipment, based on our experience. Operations to prepare the study for me.


Relieved Picher from duty with operations; he will function as IG and will report directly to me and will be my roving trouble-shooter.


Sent memorandum to CINCFE suggesting that a target selection group be set up of general officers. Suggested Hickey, Willoughby, Weyland and a Navy representative. Present target groups in each of our headquarters could continue to function and can do spade work for this final group.


Generals Ankenbrandt and Maude in. Stressed importance of communications and cited the incident where O'Donnell's sigtot[140-Sigtot was the name given certain two-way transmission equipment often used for the transmission and reception of classified material.] broke down on 19 July (1500 hours) and took until 20 July (0500 hours) to get through to 22d and 19th on Okinawa. Stated that "flash" and "operational immediate" orders must get through as required from the Bomber Command to Okinawa.


Press reports indicate that Taejon has fallen; that Major General Dean reported as missing in action. Both are unconfirmed.


Put the gist of my conversation with O'Donnell in writing, in the form of an endorsement (Top Secret - Eyes Only).


Called on General MacArthur at 1815 hours and took over what we considered a good press release and the reaction by CINCFE was not good. He stated we should in no way discuss the ground situation but should stick strictly to air matter, and that the ground situation is a matter for CINCFE. I am inclined to agree and feel that our interim report on our operations was a wrong approach. I left the paper with him and he promised to read it and I will receive the results during my meeting with him tomorrow, 22 July, at 1130 hours.


Constellation being sent me for CINCFE's use.


Mission report discloses 2 F-80s lost; on one, the tip tank pulled out, causing it to crash; on the other, crash landed at Itazuke.

[note]

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23

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By 16 July North Korean columns were aiming a pincers movement against Taejŏn, and when EUSAK held there temporarily, the North Korean command initiated a wide left-flank movement down through west Korean coastal routes, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July, Kwang'ju on 23 July, and capturing the major southwest port city of Mokp'o on 24 July. These movements, virtually unopposed except by a few ROK police, opened the way for a drive against the port cities of Masan and Pusan.

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Meanwhile, on the central front EUSAK was flanked out of Taejŏn', forced to withdraw to Yŏngdong on 25 July, and gradually pressed back to Kŭmch'ŏn, where defensive positions were established on 31 July. That same day, on the southwestern front, the 24th Division was forced out of Chinju.

[note]

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According to General Stratemeyer , if the aviation engineer units with FEAF at the beginning of hostilities had been anywhere near full strength and proper specialty training, Air Force units could have begun operating from Taegu and Pusan as early as 7 July, two weeks before [7/21] they were able to make a rather hesitant entry into bases in the zone of battle.

Though FEAF had laid plans for building six airfields in South Korea by the aviation engineers and by Korean and Japanese contractors, work could be started on only three of these fields, and their completion was delayed. This constructional delay, compounded by ground reverses in Korea early in August, caused a severe backlog of tactical units on Kyushu air bases, thereby negating a part of the tactical air strength which the Fifth Air Force was accumulating during July and early August.

[note]

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On 19 July the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) was back with orders to support the ground troops, a matter of some surprise to Partridge and Walker since GHQ had arranged it without consulting them.

General Partridge insisted that the carrier pilots must follow the same operating procedure as Fifth Air Force flyers, and despite early complaints by Navy pilots that they could not raise MELLOW control, better liaison produced satisfactory strikes on 25 July and more were scheduled for the following two days.

[So what happened on the 19 20, 21, 22, 23 ad 24th? then 25, 26 and 27th]

[They have been buttoned up because of Grace, and today 21st while it was overcast, they were moving to the Yellow Sea]

[note]

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10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 17, 18.,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26

Despite the dubious results of medium bombers in close support, General O'Donnell was required to reserve 15 aircraft each day for primary effort against tactical targets along the battle line, and between 10 and 26 July he used 130 B-29 sorties in such activity.

I'd like to know the truth

17 days x 15 planes = 255 total sorties

17 days x 7.64 planes = 130 sorties

15 planes into 130 sorties = 8.6 days not 17

[note]

Korean_War

Despite the concentration of all of FEAF's air capabilities in the front-line areas, General Dean's forces were unable to hold the key city of Taejŏn', which fell to the Red Koreans on 20 July. On this same day Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland arrived in Tokyo to assume the duties of FEAF vice-commander for operations.

During World War II General Weyland had commanded the XIX Tactical Air Command which, in cooperation with the U.S. Third Army, had set new standards for joint-service teamwork. His experience in tactical air warfare permitted him to make a penetrating diagnosis of FEAF's troubles.

Basic to all of FEAF's problems was the fact that GHQ was "essentially an Army staff." Lacking joint representation of air, naval, and ground officers, the GHQ staff was unable to accomplish the most efficient and timely employment of airpower in Korea.56

The GHQ Target Group did not have sufficient experience or stature to perform the important duties which had been assigned to it. To give him the advice he needed, General MacArthur required a "senior target committee" which would be composed of officers of wide military experience. Weyland was also critical of the GHQ ordered interdiction efforts, which were seeking to disrupt enemy communications immediately behind the battleline. This, he said, "was like trying to dam a stream at the bottom of a waterfall. "57

Recognizing the wisdom of Weyland's diagnosis, General Stratemeyer on 21 July sent a memorandum to General MacArthur which strongly recommended the establishment of a GHQ target selection committee, to be comprised of such senior officers as

Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff of fec,

Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of fec,

General Weyland, and a NavFE representative to be designated by Admiral Joy.

This target selection committee, said Stratemeyer, should make all target recommendations to CINCFE, but the GHQ Target Group and the FEAF Target Section would do the groundwork for the "senior" target committee.#58

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Plans, Preparations 53 54 U.S. Air Force in Korea

[note]

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Based upon the special information from Washington regarding the peculiar importance of the target, General Stratemeyer, on 21 July, instructed the FEAF Bomber Command to prepare plans for strikes against the Communist chemical combine at Hungnam, a mission which the command would be expected to accomplish with a total strength of two groups and with high-explosive bombs.#17

#17 Msg. A-3047, CG FEAF to CG FEAF BomCom, 21 July 1950.

The FEAF Bomber Command had already made one large-scale attack against the marshaling yards at Wŏnsan, but the Hungnam attacks were to be bigger-both in the number of planes required to do the task and in the size and importance of the target.

[In August the Joint Chiefs of Staff would forwarded instructions that Bomber Command must drop warning leaflets notifying civilians to leave the industrial areas before the factories were attacked]

[note]

US Marine Corps

Puller arrived [San Frisco on the 20th] in Southern California in the heat of late July [Friday 7/21/50] and found the San Diego area a bedlam. Marine Reservists thronged in from every corner of the nation; thousands of vehicles stored since World Ward II were being overhauled and driven to port; trains bore regulars from the East Coast. Unattached officers came from everywhere, without a call, volunteers for war. The 1st Marine Division was being created almost from scratch.

Puller went to the office of his division commander, the white-haired, soft-voiced Oliver P. Smith, with whom his friendship went back to student days at Fort Benning. He found even the clam Smith a bit unstrung:

“Lewie, you’ve what you want. The old First Marines again. But I don’t know if you can do it. You’ve got to activate your regiment and begin loading in about ten days, by our orders. What do you think?”

“Has your staff made plans for me?”

“Only to put you in Area 17, and we can move you to Tent Camp 2 later.”

“It would take two days for the shift. If you’ll approve it I’ll meet the Quartermaster at the tent in half an hour.”

“Go to it.”

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Area 17 was just inside the Main Side gate.

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It was not hard to see, from Smith’s reports and the wall maps, the urgency of affairs in the bustling camp. The struggle for Korea seemed almost over. The Eight Army had reeled back to the south and east and now defended itself against rising North Korean pressure from a perimeter around the port of Pusan. Marines’ already sent there seemed unlikely to change the course of the war.

General Smith knew only that General MacArthur desperately wanted the First Marine Division; he did not yet know where it was headed.

Puller soon walked the familiar old tenting area with a Quartermaster colonel; the place was a shambles. Nothing had been kept up since the end of the war, all was weed grown; even the stoves had been cannibalized to keep other area. Puller asked the supply officer to send him all possible equipment and before nightfall things would move.

When Puller went back to headquarters Smith hailed him happily:

“Good news, Lewie. They’re sending you three battalions of the Second Marines from Lejeune, already up to peacetime strength. You’ll need only forty or fifty percent reserves to fill up.”

[note]

Korean_War

United States military assistance to the Government of South Korea against invading Communist North Korean forces forced a change in Marine Corps helicopter development plans. The planned formation in 1953 and 1954 of two assault transport helicopter squadrons as authorized by the CNO was now unrealistic in view of the war.

Before that timetable could be revised to an earlier date, however, a suitable helicopter would have to be selected and be available in definite quantities within a reasonably short period of time.

The Division of Aviation took the initial action for accelerating the pace. On 21 July 1950, General Wallace addressed a memorandum to the CNO's Air Readiness Division requesting that "necessary steps be taken to immediately procure 40 [interim] transport helicopters, preferably of the Sikorsky H04S—1 type. " [1]

1. OP-52 memo to OP-55, dtd 21Ju150, Subj : transport Helicopter, immediate procurement of.

[note]

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The H05S—1 was used for observation in Korea (Marine Corps Photo A346328) .

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The Sikorsky HRS-1, also known as the H04S-1, at Quantico, Va.(Marine Corps Photo 530002) .

[note]

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Originally, the Army planned to base the Marine ground elements at Sasebo, Japan, and the air group 400 miles away at Itami Field, near Kobe.

Craig and Cushman realized that the resulting large gap would give rise to problems in liaison, training, and supply.

Hoping to change such an undesirable arrangement, the Brigade staff carefully studied the layout of available land and facilities. Armed with the results of this research, Craig proposed to General Headquarters that all Marines be based in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area. After he outlined the advantages of keeping the Brigade and its supporting aviation close together, Wright responded encouragingly to the recommendation.[17]

Confident that the suggestion would be favorably considered, the advance party flew to Itami on 21 July and made a detailed reconnaissance of debarkation, billeting, and training sites. While Craig inspected the area and prepared a report, Cushman examined the air base facilities and established his headquarters according to the initial plan.

[note]

Korean_War

4. To facilitate mobilization and to make the maximum possible number of reservists available for active duty, the Commandant on 19 July ordered the cancellation of active duty training for all Organized Reserve ground units and suspended active duty training for Volunteer Reserves (Ground). On 21 July, the Commandant also issued instructions transferring all" continuous active duty" personnel to "extended active duty" and ordered the suspension of active duty training for Volunteer Reserves (Aviation).

[note]

Korean_War



DELAY POLICY
(8)Evolution of Delay Policy

8. During the early days of the mobilization, the words DEFERMENT and DELAY were often used interchangeably. However, in November 1950 DEFERMENT was officially defined as "The authority granted to an individual not a member of the reserve forces of the armed services, postponing the reporting date from military service under existing Selective Service laws." DELAY was defined as. "The postponement of the reporting date specified in the initial orders to active duty for members of the reserve forces."

For the purposes of this project, the word DELAY will be used throughout, except in cases of quotations.

Beginning on 20 July, the ordering to active duty of Marine reservists entailed the promulgation of detailed instructions pertaining to personnel, supply, and administrative matters, These instructions, issued in conformance with established Marine Corps procedure, played an essential part in the execution of an orderly mobilization of the reserve and in ensuring that uniformly fair consideration would be given to the multitude of problems that inevitably arise in an operation of this nature.

Of particular concern to the purpose of this project was the problem encountered by the Marine Corps. in attempting to reconcile its pressing need for a maximum realizable availability of its reserve, the civilian requirements of the national interest, and the desire to prevent undue hardship from weighing upon those reservists called to active duty. Since the national interest was often served, and undue hard-ship forestalled, by the granting of delays, a close examination of the evolution of delay policy and its application by the Marine Corps is clearly in order.

Fortunately, the Korean crisis and the subsequent decision to call reservists to active duty found the Marine Corps ready to cope with the need for an equitable and readily employable delay policy. When, on 19 July, the Marine Corps received authorization to call its reserve to active duty, the Division of Plans and Policies immediately drafted a delay policy based on its mobilization plan, and on the next day this policy was dispatched as part of the administrative instructions to the first Organized Reserve ground units ordered on 20 and 21 July to active duty.

These instructions, consolidated on 22 July, subsequently became the basic policy reference with regard to the mobilization of the Organized Marine Reserve.

[note]

US Navy

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The HMS Triumph (R16)operated with us at all times,[ July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.] except July 22, providing CAP and ASP.

[note]

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USS Valley Forge (CV-45)
Typhoon Condition I was secured during the afternoon of the 2lst and preparations were made for operations on the 22nd.

[note]

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On the 21st HMS Triumph (R16) was detached with HMS Comus (R-43) for a ten-day period of availability at Sasebo. [on the 8th Comus was hit by enemy fire]

[note]

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By now, too, there were signs that a crisis was making up in Formosa Strait. On the 21st a reported sighting of between 500 and 1,500 junks by the master of a British merchantman had led to special searches by Fleet Air Wing1.

Korean_War

These proved negative, but on the 26th a VP 28 patrol plane was attacked by two fighters in the northern part of the Strait.

[note]

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17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

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A little after midnight, at a time when he was leading the group, Lieutenant Clarke suddenly discovered that no one was following him. He turned back and found several men asleep.

He called for General Dean.

Someone replied that General Dean had gone for water. Clarke estimated that an unencumbered man could go to the bottom and back up to where they were in an hour. He decided to wait two hours. Dean did not return.

[note]

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Someone replied that General Dean had gone for water. Clarke estimated that an unencumbered man could go to the bottom and back up to where they were in an hour. He decided to wait two hours.

2 hours later

Dean did not return.

[note]

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A little earlier, at 0300, word had come in to Taejŏn' that a jeep had been ambushed on the Okch'ŏn road. [11-21]

It would seem clear from these incidents that enemy units were moving around to the rear of Taejŏn during the night-in just what strength might only be guessed. But for reasons that cannot now be determined these events were not so evaluated at the time of their occurrence. General Dean has stated that he did not know of the enemy roadblock on the Kumsan road-apparently it was not reported to him. He did learn of the jeep incident on the Okch'ŏn road but dismissed it as the work of a few infiltrators and of no special importance because the road subsequently seemed to be clear. [11-22]

[note]

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At 0315 Clarke awakened the sleeping men and the party climbed to the top of the mountain, arriving there just before dawn [0516].

[note]

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Artillery and mortars zeroed in as scheduled [7/21 0500], and soon the town was in flames. By this time, however, Yech'ŏn may already have been abandoned by the enemy. [?????? slight by Appleman?????]

At Hamch'ang, Col. Henry G. Fisher, commanding the35th Infantry, received early that morning an erroneous message that the North Koreans had driven the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry from Yech'ŏn.

He started for the place at once. He found the battalion commander about five miles west of the town, but was dissatisfied with the information that he received from him.

Fisher and a small party then drove on into Yech'ŏn, which was ablaze with fires started by American artillery shells. He encountered no enemy or civilians.

The 3rd Platoon, 77th Engineer Combat Company, attached to Company K, entered the town with the infantrymen and attempted to halt the spread of flames-unsuccessfully, because of high, shifting winds.

[note]

0515 Korean Time

Korean_War

At 0315 Clarke awakened the sleeping men and the party climbed to the top of the mountain, arriving there just before dawn [0515].


[note]

0525 Sun Rise

[note]


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At dawn on July 21 Stephens and surviving elements of Miller Perry's 52nd FAB pulled back fifteen miles to the division CP area at Yŏngdong, joining Glyn Pohl's 1/19.

[note]

0530 Korean Time

At daybreak, 21 July, engineer troops set off demolition charges at the railroad and highway tunnels just north of Okch'ŏn that only partially blocked them.

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When full light came, observers and patrols from the 21st Infantry reported enemy troops in estimated regimental strength moving south around their west flank at a distance of two miles. Before long, an automatic weapons and small arms fight was in progress on that flank. [11-71]

[note]

0545 Korean Time

Temporarily, at least, this operation was successful. At 0600 on the 21st, after a 15-minute bombardment of the town, two star shells from USS Juneau (CLAA-119) gave the signal for the attack,

[note]

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But at Yŏngdök, as all around the perimeter, pressure continued to be severe, information scanty, and communications inadequate. The forces defending the town had lost contact with General Walker’s headquarters: a EUSAK message advising that the general situation was critical and that the line had to be held reached the Army ashore only after relay by Juneau. Admiral Doyle, too, was in the dark, and on the 20th, with his second echelon scheduled to reachP'ohang the next day, asked for information on the situation and prospects at Yŏngdök. Again the whaleboat was called away, and information brought back from shore indicated that landing operations could be safely continued, and that the ROK forces were planning the recapture of Yŏngdök on the morrow.

Korean_War

Temporarily, at least, this operation was successful. At 0600 on the 21st, after a 15-minute bombardment of the town, two star shells from USS Juneau (CLAA-119) gave the signal for the attack, and by 0717 the South Koreans had overrun Yŏngdök.

[note]

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There they [Clarke's group] waited all day, four or five miles south of Taejŏn, hoping to see General Dean. [note]

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Temporarily, at least, this operation was successful. At 0600 on the 21st, after a 15-minute bombardment of the town, two star shells from USS Juneau (CLAA-119) gave the signal for the attack, and by 0717 the South Koreans had overrun Yŏngdök. Firing in support of the advance continued throughout the day, and Juneau, HMS Belfast (C-35), and the destroyers expended more than 800 rounds.

In the afternoon Belfast and USS Mansfield (DD-728) retired to Sasebo while Juneau, with USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729) and USS Higbee (DDR-806), continued close off Yŏngdök.

[note]

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The fireman, although wounded, took the train on into Okch'ŏn. Some American soldiers rode the train out of Taejŏn

According to 24th Division records, the time was 1645. Informed of this untoward incident, Dean again telephoned the division, and at 1700 he received a telephone call that it was sending another locomotive, this time under guard. Dean
informed Hatfield of this and the latter waited at the rail yard. Hatfield was killed by enemy soldiers there while waiting for the locomotive that never arrived.

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The next morning at 0830 a U.S. Air Force strike destroyed the train load of ammunition and supplies still standing in the Taejŏnrail yard. [11-55] [note]

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Meanwhile, the convoy hurried through the city, drawing enemy sniper fire all the way. One 2 1/2-ton truck in the convoy smashed into a building at an intersection and almost blocked the street for the rest of the vehicles. Then the first part of the convoy took a wrong turn through an underpass of the railroad and wound up in the same dead-end schoolyard as had Colonel Wadlington. There were approximately fifty vehicles in this part of the convoy. These men abandoned their vehicles. Led by an artillery major and other officers the group of about 125 started into the hills, first going north away from the sound of firing and later turning south.

During the night[7/20] the group became separated into several parts.[ Some of the men reached friendly lines the next morning [7/21/0900], others on 22 July; some just disappeared and were never heard of again]. [11-60]

[note]

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At daybreak, 21 July, engineer troops set off demolition charges at the railroad and highway tunnels just north of Okch'ŏn that only partially blocked them. When full light came, observers and patrols from the 21st Infantry reported enemy troops in estimated regimental strength moving south around their west flank at a distance of two miles. Before long, an automatic weapons and small arms fight was in progress on that flank. [11-71]

Korean_War

Colonel Stephens gave the order for the regiment to withdraw. The 21st Infantry and 52nd Field Artillery Battalion began leaving their Okch'ŏn positions shortly after 1100. Engineer troops destroyed the last bridge across the Kum River east of Okch'ŏn to give some temporary security to ROK forces on the east side of the river. The regiment successfully withdrew twenty miles to prepared positions on the east side of the Kum River, about four miles northwest of Yŏngdong . There it also established a strong roadblock on the road running southwest from Yŏngdong to Kumsan. [11-72]

[note]

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At Hamch'ang, Col. Henry G. Fisher, commanding the 35th Infantry, received early that morning an erroneous message that the North Koreans had driven the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry from Yech'ŏn. He started for the place at once.

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He found the battalion commander about five miles west of the town, but was dissatisfied with the information that he received from him. Fisher and a small party then drove on into Yech'ŏn, which was ablaze with fires started by American artillery shells. He encountered no enemy or civilians. The 3rd Platoon, 77th Engineer Combat Company, attached to Company K, entered the town with the infantrymen and attempted to halt the spread of flames-unsuccessfully, because of high, shifting winds.

Korean_War

By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3rd Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19]

[note]


Korean_War

Typhoon Condition I was secured during the afternoon of the 2lst and preparations were made for operations on the 22nd.

[note]

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/20/50
11:00 PM
07/21/50
12:00 AM
07/21/50
5:00 AM
07/21/50
2:00 PM

1415 Korean Time

Korean_War


3rd Rescue Squadron
Korean War Operations
21 July 1950
At 1415/K the Flight was notified that an F-80 was 20 miles out from Ashiya and would try to make the field. He was running low on fuel and ADCC notified the Flight to stand by for further instructions. The aircraft landed at Ashiya at 1423/K without incident.

[note]

1423 Korean Time

Korean_War


3rd Rescue Squadron
Korean War Operations
21 July 1950
At 1415/K the Flight was notified that an F-80 was 20 miles out from Ashiya and would try to make the field. He was running low on fuel and ADCC notified the Flight to stand by for further instructions. The aircraft landed at Ashiya at 1423/K without incident.

[note]

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
12:00 AM
07/21/50
1:00 AM
07/21/50
6:00 AM
07/21/50
3:00 PM

1525 Korean Time

1530 Korean Time

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
1:00 AM
07/21/50
2:00 AM
07/21/50
7:00 AM
07/21/50
4:00 PM

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
2:00 AM
07/21/50
3:00 AM
07/21/50
8:00 AM
07/21/50
5:00 PM

1745 Korean Time

Korean_War


3rd Rescue Squadron
Korean War Operations
21 July 1950
21 July 1950
At 1745/K Colonel Richard T. Kight, Commanding Officer, Air Rescue Service, and members of his staff arrived at Ashiya Air Base. They were met by Captain John E. McClure, Commanding Officer, Flight "D", 3rd Rescue Squadron. The party will continue to Itazuke Air Base tomorrow. The purpose of this visit is to coordinate Rescue activities with ADCC and tactical units operating in Korea.
Four SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. Twenty-one hours and ten minutes (21:10) were logged on these flights.

[note]

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
3:00 AM
07/21/50
4:00 AM
07/21/50
9:00 AM
07/21/50
6:00 PM

1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
4:00 AM
07/21/50
5:00 AM
07/21/50
10:00 AM
07/21/50
7:00 PM

1947 Sun Set

[note]

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
5:00 AM
07/21/50
6:00 AM
07/21/50
11:00 AM
07/21/50
8:00 PM

Korean_War

That night, Clarke led his party back down the mountain, re-crossed the Taejŏn River in a rainstorm near the village of Samhoe, climbed eastward into the mountains, and then turned south.

[note]

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
6:00 AM
07/21/50
7:00 AM
07/21/50
12:00 PM
07/21/50
9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
7:00 AM
07/21/50
8:00 AM
07/21/50
1:00 PM
07/21/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/21/50
8:00 AM
07/21/50
9:00 AM
07/21/50
2:00 PM
07/21/50
11:00 PM

Korean_War

Before midnight a report came in to the 34th Infantry command post that an enemy unit was six miles south of Taejŏn on the #3 Kŭmsan road.

With nine members of the 24th Reconnaissance Company 1st Lt. George W. Kristanoff started down the road on a jeep patrol to investigate. Six miles below Taejŏn an enemy roadblock stopped them. Kristanoff reported the beginning of the action by radio.

At 0300, 20 July, a platoon of the Reconnaissance Company drove cautiously out of Taejŏn down the same road to check on security. Enemy fire stopped the platoon at the same roadblock. There platoon members saw the bodies of several men of the earlier patrol and their four destroyed jeeps.

A little earlier, at 0300, word had come in to Taejŏn that a jeep had been ambushed on the Okch'ŏn road. [11-21]

It would seem clear from these incidents that enemy units were moving around to the rear of Taejŏn during the night-in just what strength might only be guessed. But for reasons that cannot now be determined these events were not so evaluated at the time of their occurrence. General Dean has stated that he did not know of the enemy roadblock on the Kumsan road-apparently it was not reported to him. He did learn of the jeep incident on the Okch'ŏn road but dismissed it as the work of a few infiltrators and of no special importance because the road subsequently seemed to be clear. [11-22]

[note]


Korean_War Korean_War

By the end of July 21, the 1st Cavalry Division, along with the 25th Infantry Division and elements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, faced elements of several NKPA divisions determined to win at all costs.

Immediately after the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked in Korea, the Eighth Army directed the division to move forward to the Yŏngdong -Kumch'on area. The 1st Cavalry Division quickly deployed both the 5th and 8th Cavalry to defend Yŏngdong. 26

26
War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950 , Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

Yŏngdong is about 10 miles across rugged, hilly countryside from Nogŭn-ni (See maps 3 -11 Appendix E for day-to-day positions).

[note]


Korean_War Korean_War

As the 1st Cavalry Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division around Yŏngdong, Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 21 described the enemy's combat efficiency as unchanged and morale among enemy troops as "excellent."

Korean_War

The PIR reported that the enemy's "continued attack in the Taejŏn area by elements of two or three divisions" and "increased enemy pressure along the left front of the ROK I Corp [sic]" indicated that the NKPA's main effort was along the Taejŏn-Kŭmch'ŏn axis -- in the 1st Cavalry Division's new sector. 27

27
Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #9, 2400 21 July 1950 , File 319.1 (PIR July) Security Classified General Correspondence 1950 , Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

[note]

2310 Moon Set


Casualties

Friday July 21, 1950 (Day 027)

Korean_War 020 Casualties

As of July 21, 1950

1 12TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
1 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
2 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 24TH MEDICAL BATTALION
7 24TH SIGNAL COMPANY - DIVISION
1 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 36TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
1 63RD FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 92ND ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AW BATTALION
20 19500721 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 42 1778 0 0 0 1820
Today 2 18 0 0 0 20
Total 44 1796 0 0 0 1840

Aircraft Losses Today 003

Notes for Friday 21, 1950 - day 027