Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 27.5°C 81.5°F at Taegu

Fair weather

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

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July 23
The Department of Defense reports that 14,000 North Koreans have been killed, wounded or captured since they invaded.

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When did he leave?

MacArthur's first words on landing at Haneda after a tour of the front were always: "Where's Jean?" She was always on the tarmac, bounding up and down for a glimpse of him.

She wanted his family to be, so to speak, a . privileged sanctuary. At home she hid newspapers and magazines criticizing his conduct of the war, though she knew it was pointless-others mailed clippings to his office from the States-and she watched over him anxiously, more like a mother than a wife. She insisted he slip between the sheets at bedtime before she opened his window.

"But, Jean, I can open windows!"

he would protest. Ignoring his objections, she would finish the job and retire to her own bedroom, though not to sleep; in ten minutes or so she would peek in to be sure he had drifted off. Despite his remonstrance's, his need for her attentions grew as the peninsular conflict grew.

He seemed to sense whether or not she was nearby in the night. Once, when he returned from Korea fighting a cold, she put him to bed early; after he had dropped off, she tiptoed downstairs to read to Arthur.

Ten minutes later they heard him shuffling down in his slippers. Entering in his old robe, he grinned sheepishly and said to them: "Where is everybody? It's lonesome up there." [62]

In the morning he would be the five-star General again, however, pacing about briskly and dictating crisp memoranda while she typed. Other thoughts he jotted on the backs of envelopes or any other scrap of paper handy; these would be crammed into his pocket and transcribed in the Dai Ichi.

Revising and editing typescripts, he was polishing his plans for his great end-run around the enemy. Bluehearts had been revived and rechristened "CHROMITE." He had told Harriman that the North Koreans were "as capable and tough" a foe as he had ever faced, but that they were vulnerable because the best of them were concentrated in the southeast tip of the peninsula, hammering at "Johnnie" Walker's Eighth Army perimeter.

Now he meant to exploit that vulnerability. Earlier, he had reported to the Pentagon that an attempted UN breakout on the Pusan front would be costly and indecisive, redolent of World War I siege warfare, impaling UN troops on the In Min Gun's spearhead instead of moving against its exposed sides and rump. Therefore he had radioed the Joint Chiefs on July 23:

"Operation planned mid-September, is amphibious landing of a two division corps in rear of enemy lines.... The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted - and expensive campaign."

Afterward he would write in his Reminiscences:

"I was now finally ready for the last great stroke to bring my plan into fruition. My Han River dream as a possibility had begun to assume the certainties of reality-a turning movement deep into the flank and rear of the enemy that would sever his supply lines and encircle all his forces south of Sŏul." [63]

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3rd Rescue Sq.

Korean War Operations
23 July 1950

Four SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. Total flying time for these missions was twenty seven hours and forty-five minutes (27:45)

Flight "D's" C-47 departed Ashiya Air Base this date for Taegu, Korea and return. The Commanding Officer Air Rescue Service and the Commanding Officer, 3rd Rescue Squadron, made the trip. The mission was to establish an advance base of operations for rescue activities.

Lts. Blurton and Halpin, both H-5 pilots, and members of the pararescue team were assigned to this detachment.

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One (1) H-5 was assigned to the unit.

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July 23: The 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group (Provisional) established a Tactical Air Control Center adjacent to the Joint Operations Center at Taegu.

At the beginning of the Korean War, the U. S. Air Force's only tactical control group was the 502nd at Pope AFB, NC. To meet the emergency in the theater, the Fifth Air Force organized the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Squadron (later, Group), which established a full-scale Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Taegu, South Korea, on July 23, 1950.

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Army Policy

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Replying immediately, General MacArthur said that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, when it arrived on about 1 August, would be kept in Japan as GHQ Reserve,

"To be used in Korea only in event of a critical situation."

Meanwhile, he would train, outfit, and prepare the brigade for major amphibious operations in September. [09-22]

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Army officials in Washington asked General MacArthur to recheck his figures on 23 July. Perhaps the actual casualties were fewer than the number forecast. Maj. Gen. William A. Beiderlinden, the FEC G-1, informed Washington that the actual number of men and officers lost in Korea closely approximated his earlier educated guess. The only discrepancy was an excessive missing-in-action rate, which reflected the ability of the North Koreans to envelop the under-strength American units almost at will. Beiderlinden promised to readajust FEC requirements downward whenever this action became possible. [05-26]

[05-26]
(1) Rad. W 87678, DA to CINCFE, 23 Jul. 50.
(2) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 62, 23 Jul. 50.
(3) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS, 24 Jul. 50, sub: Casualty Analysis.
(4) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 37, 24 Jul. 50.

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The commitment of the 25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division against the North Koreans had slowed, but not stopped, the enemy's drive, and did not come in time to prevent the fall of Taejŏn to the enemy on 20 July. The loss of all Korea loomed as a very real possibility.

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Nevertheless, by that date General MacArthur had discussed his idea with General Almond and General Wright and had ordered detailed plans drawn Up for an amphibious envelopment.

Primary emphasis, he directed, was to be on Inch'ŏn as the assault site, but he also specified that alternate plans be prepared. Wright's planning officers at once began to ready the basic framework of a plan for an amphibious assault landing at Inch'ŏn during September and to draw up several alternate plans as well.

On 23 July all these plans went to GHQ staff officers most directly concerned with the proposed operations. [08-7]

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General MacArthur confirmed the message which General Collins had carried back to Washington on 23 July, when he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he meant to use the 5th Marine RCT and the 2nd Division for "major amphibious operations" in mid-September.

An airborne RCT would drop into the objective area soon after D-day to seize key communications centers immediately ahead of the advancing assault forces.

MacArthur did not pinpoint his objective area, but he described in broad terms how the assault would go. After the beachhead had been seized, Eighth Army, by that time augmented by the additional infantry, artillery, and tank battalions, would attack from the south and destroy the North Koreans.

"Although the exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during the month of August," MacArthur reported to Washington:
I am firmly convinced that an early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main line of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th Parallel. [08-8]

[08-8] Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 23 Jul. 50.

General MacArthur's proposals for a September landing reached Washington at a bad time. They came on the heels of the grim news that Taejŏn had fallen and while the North Koreans were obviously preparing a double envelopment of Walker's defenses. MacArthur's term, "enemy reaction during . . . August," probably struck the Joint Chiefs of Staff as euphemistic.

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The brief description presented orally to General Collins during his visit apparently had not justified sufficiently the need for immediate deployment of the RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked General MacArthur for a more detailed explanation of the mission he would give the airborne RCT in the landing operation. On 23 July, General MacArthur replied that he planned to mount an airdrop from Japan, landing the airborne troops in the Inch'ŏn objective area as soon after D-day as the situation warranted. They were to seize a key communication center immediately ahead of troops advancing out of the beachhead area. At this time, when it was not at all certain that sufficient amphibious forces could be sent to MacArthur or that the landing at Inch'ŏn would even be made, MacArthur's requirement for airborne troops appeared, to Army officials, secondary.

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The condition of the 11th Airborne Division, moreover, remained such that the Department of the Army deemed it impractical to send any of the division's regiments into combat in September. Army authorities informed General MacArthur in teleconference that the RCT would be operational in Japan by 23 October, but that he could not count upon using it in his landing operations. In turn, MacArthur remonstrated once again, asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff expedite the arrival of the unit. [09-45]

[09-45] ( 1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA with CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.

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Supporting Artillery

Emergency Conditions, Emergency Measures

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Lacking non-divisional artillery, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs on 19 July to send him light, medium, and heavy artillery battalions. He asked for six 155-mm. howitzer Battalions, self-propelled, as the first shipment. He also asked for an artillery group headquarters and a field artillery observation battalion. He pointed out that his division commanders in Korea would be forced, by the extensive frontages, broken terrain, and the limited road nets, to employ their divisions by separate RCT's. With a projected American force in Korea, based upon JCS approved deployments as of that date, of 4 Army divisions and 1 Marine RCT, there would be 13 American regiments available in Korea.

At least ten of these regiments could normally be expected to be in the front lines at any given time. Since only four battalions of 155-mm. howitzers would be present with division artillery units, six more battalions would be required if each of the ten regiments was to have a medium artillery battalion when it was used as an RCT.

Two 8-inch howitzer battalions and the 155-mm. guns would be required for general support along the whole front. Light battalions could either reinforce division artillery units, or, if desirable, be committed in support of South Korean units. General MacArthur noted that the profitable extent to which American artillery should be used in support of South Korean forces was under study by his staff.

He received no immediate reply and asked again, only four days later [23rd], for early arrival of the artillery urgently needed in Korea. [05-59]

The General Reserve, weak in all its components, was particularly deficient in non-divisional field artillery. Only eleven battalions were in the United States and all were below war strength.

could be expected to be partially effective. But Washington Army officials ordered three of the 155-mm. howitzer battalions, the 8-inch howitzer battalion, an observation battalion, and the 5th Field Artillery Group headquarters to Korea. [05-60]

[05-60] (1) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Strength and training Status, FA Units, in G-3, DA files. Blue Book, vol. II, Status of Units and Equipment. (2) Rad, WAR 86427, DA to Continental Army Comdrs, Info to CINCFE, 18 Jul. 50. (3) Rad, WAR 86558. DA to CINCFE, 20 Jul. 50.

19500723 0500 ap 20 July 1950

General MacArthur protested vigorously upon being told that only five artillery battalions of the fifteen he had requested could be furnished him. He pointed out that fifteen battalions were an essential minimum based on ten infantry regiments fighting on the line at any given time.

He had now decided that there should be twelve U.S. regiments in action at all times. "Beyond doubt," he predicted, "the destruction of the North Korean forces will require the employment of a force equivalent at least to six United States infantry divisions in addition to ROK ground forces."

Fighting in World War II had proven conclusively, according to him, that a field army could sustain a successful offensive against a determined enemy, particularly over difficult terrain, only if it had non-divisional artillery in the ratio of at least one for one as compared to division artillery.

While General MacArthur did not spell out these latest requirements, he implied that twenty-four battalions of non-divisional artillery would be needed. He recommended that, since the necessary battalions were not available, they be activated and "an intensive training program of appropriate scale be set in motion at once." [05-61]

[05-61] Rad, CX 58750, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul. 50.

Service troops

Without an adequate support base behind the battle line in Korea and in the larger service area in Japan, the fighting units could not sustain their desperate defense, much less attack.

Although the greatest emphasis was placed on infantry, artillery, armored, and other combat-type units and soldiers during July, the demand for service units and troops increased steadily.

Technical service units to supply front-line soldiers, to repair damaged weapons and equipment, to keep communications in operation, and to perform the hundreds of vital support operations required by a modern army, had been at a premium in the FEC when the war broke out.

Japanese specialists and workmen performed in large part the peacetime version of service support for the Far East Command. The few available service units had been depleted when specialists and other trained men had been handed rifles and sent to fight as infantry.

Some types of combat and non-combat support were needed more immediately than other types. In view, for instance, of the hundreds of tons of ammunition of all types on its way to the Far East Command for the Korean fighting, ordnance specialists qualified to handle ammunition were needed at once.

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By 23 July, by pulling together available operational, intelligence, and logistic data, MacArthur’s assistant chief of staff for operations, Brigadier General Edwin K. “Pinky” Wright, and his staff in what was known as the Strategic Planning and Operations Group within Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) headquarters, “had worked up three possible variants for a September landing which, in the form of draft plans, he circulated to the Far East Command staff.”[cmdctl-25] One plan contemplated Inch'ŏn, one Kunsan, and the third Chumunjin (on the east coast).

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Awards and Decorations

Brig. Gen. Venard Wilson ADC 25th Infantry Division

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"The carrier USS Boxer (CV-21) made history with a record-breaking Pacific crossing of eight days and sixteen hours while transporting 145 F51 Mustangs, 1,000 US Air Force personnel, and several hundred tons of cargo."

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Nogŭn-Ri

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One of the first policy documents to discuss controlling refugee movement was issued by Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), on July 23,1950 .

The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highway and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel, including an attached Korean CIC Team, would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening. 22

22
Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.

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IX. Initial Confusion and the Soldier's View of the Refugee Problem

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The average soldier arriving in Korea knew little about the country's people, culture, or beliefs. Rumors about North Korean tactics and problems with refugees undoubtedly fueled the soldiers' imaginations long before their first contact with the enemy and the populace. Likewise, many U.S. officers arrived in Korea lacking insight into the country and the situation at hand.

Harold J. Noble, the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Korea, wrote in his book Embassy at War that newly arriving American officers displayed an

"astonishing amount of contempt for the ROK Army."

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Noble claimed Major General Hobart Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division commander, newly arrived in Korea, told a press conference that

"he did not intend to take the ROK Army into consideration at all in making his estimates and dispositions and that his solution for the Communist's infiltration tactics was to force every Korean out of the division's area of responsibility, on the theory that once they were removed, any Korean caught in the area would be an enemy agent."

Noble also said Gay's "order included the Korean National police, whom he sent back to Taegu." Whatever General Gay might have said when he first arrived in Korea, there is no evidence that he put any of these ideas into practice. His official policy on handling refugees dated July 23, 1950 (described earlier) made the National Police the responsible authority for handling refugees. 29

29
Noble, Harold Joyce, Embassy at War, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975, pp. 152-153.

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The EUSAK War Diary for July 23, 1950 , which provides material from the interrogation of four American officers of the 24th Infantry Division -- "All agree this is a problem of major proportions. They strongly suspect North Koreans soldiers of coming through the lines as refugees, securing arms and uniforms behind our lines and operating against our rear." 58

58
War Diary, Headquarters EUSAK, 23 July 1950 , sub: Interrogation Report, North Korean Methods of Operation. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, Entry 429, Box 1084, RG 407, NARA.

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Probably the most important achievement of Eighth Army's intelligence staff during this period was its warning on July 23 that one course of action open to the NKPA included a deep envelopment of the Eighth Army's left flank in southwestern Korea, an area covered at this time by only a few hundred South Korean troops and local police.

This warning led to increased aerial reconnaissance of southwestern Korea that detected the NKPA's deep envelopment, although Eighth Army's intelligence staff erroneously identified the unit conducting the maneuver as the 4th Division (in truth the 6th Division).

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Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army's commander, could then move the 24th Infantry Division, recently relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division at Yŏngdong, into position to delay the NKPA's advance and to prevent the North Koreans from enveloping Eighth Army's flank. 14

14
Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 210-213.

The focus then shifted to the 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. unit that would undergo a baptism of fire during that last critical week of July 1950 .

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XI. July 23, 1950
On the morning of July 23, the 1st Cavalry Division moved its forward command post from Kŭmch'ŏn [Kimch'ŏn, South Korea] to Hwanggan to more effectively direct operations in the Yŏngdong area.

see Kimch'ŏn, Hwanggan and Yŏngdong area

Tactical Situation at Yŏngdong, July 23, 1950

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The Eighth Army authorized the division to commit the 5th Cavalry at its discretion, and the remainder of the regiment moved forward from Hwanggan to defensive positions east of Yŏngdong with the Regimental Command Post established in Kwan-ni. 34

34
War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

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The 8th Cavalry's baptism of fire began in the 1st Battalion's sector northwest of Yŏngdong. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the day, and reports of enemy tanks surfaced for the first time.

Southwest of town, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, area remained quiet.

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Artillery fire from the 11th, 77th, and 99th Field Artillery Battalions accounted for five enemy tanks and 15 other vehicles. The threat of envelopment became a real concern to the 8th Cavalry as an aerial observer saw groups of what appeared to be NKPA soldiers dressed in white southwest of Yŏngdong. 35

35
War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 18-30 July 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

Civilian refugees remained a constant problem. Artillery units were particularly concerned that refugees sympathetic to North Korea or North Korean agents could transmit battery locations to the NKPA for use in targeting. The artillery proved particularly vulnerable to sniping and attack from infiltrators since the soldiers had to man their guns continually.

To prevent these attacks from happening, a patrol from the division artillery cleared civilians from a town southwest of Yŏngdong on July 23. This action, a necessary precaution, ran contrary to the 1st Cavalry Division and Eighth Army's policy of encouraging villagers in the countryside to stay in their homes. This incident represents the only recorded instance of such an event in the last week of July 1950 . 36

36
Periodic operations report, 1st Cavalry Division, 23 July 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

To assist in the screening of these refugees, the 1st Cavalry Division received a Republic of Korea Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment assigned to work with its U.S. counterpart. 37

37
Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

The 545th Military Police Company also handled refugees in the Yŏngdong area with assistance from the Korean National Police. These military policemen and their Korean augmentees shouldered the Herculean task of keeping the roads open for vital military movements while trying to prevent disguised enemy soldiers or sympathizers from crossing the lines. While performing this mission on July 23, a military policeman and his Korean National Police partner were killed when their jeep inadvertently drove over a friendly mine on the outskirts of Yŏngdong. 38

38
Activities report, Headquarters 545 Military Police Company, 5 August 1950 . In the records of Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4406, RG 407, NARA.

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Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, moved from Itazuke to Taegu on July 23 and set up headquarters adjacent to Headquarters, Eighth Army. 84

84
Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, pp. 18-28;
Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50, pp. 6-7;
5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, extract, Document 13. Msg, COMAF 5 to ADV HQ FAF, OPR 1831, 12/1056Z Jul 50;
Msg, Mississippi to Tailboard. 18/0530Z, Jul 50.

This arrangement allowed Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker (Eighth Army) and Major General Earl E. Partridge (Fifth Air Force), and their respective staffs, to communicate target requests and generally manage the air campaign better. This arrangement permitted face-to-face discussions of sensitive matters instead of communicating via paper.

[note]

The first policy document to address controlling of refugee movement, titled “Control of Refugee Movement”, was issued by Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), on July 23,1950 . The movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 AM to 12:00 noon only; no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways; no fields could be worked; no school, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war effort; and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive. The policy makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highways, and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the 1st Cavalry Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening. 5
5
Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA; see Chapter 2 of this report for a more detailed discussion of the refugee control policies.

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South then North

American gunners blasting Yŏngdök, northeast of Pusan, with their 105-mm howitzer.
23 July 1950.

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All night long the several hundred men caught in the roadblock walked south and east through the mountains. During the night the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, aid station near Okch'ŏn exhausted its medical supplies in treating wounded men arriving from the Taejŏn area.

Many [from the road block] finally reached safety at the 24th Division lines twenty miles farther east near Yŏngdong on 22 and 23 July.

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At Taegu on 23 July Colonel Wadlington had assembled approximately 300 men who had escaped through the hills from Taejŏn. [11-73]

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He [Clarke ] eventually led his party to safety through the lines of the 1st Cavalry Division at Yŏngdong on 23 July. [11-74]

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A word needs to be said about the men of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, who were driven from or left their positions west of Taejŏn during the morning of 20 July and climbed into the hills south of the Nonsan road. Most of them escaped. These men traveled all night. One large party of 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, troops, which included Captain Barszcz' G Company, 19th Infantry, was led by Captain Marks.

It passed through Kŭmsan, where a few small parties turned east toward Yŏngdong. But the main party continued south, believing the enemy might have cut the road eastward.
On the 23rd this group [of the men of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry] encountered some ROK trucks and shuttled south in them until they broke down.

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Lt. Col. Peter D. Clainos' 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had orders to support the ROK troops with fire only. But on 23 July, North Koreans surrounded the 81-mm. mortar platoon of D Company, forcing it to fight at close range.

That same day, C Company on Round Top (Hill 181), at the southern outskirts of Yŏngdök, watched in silence as North Korean and ROK troops fought a seesaw battle in its vicinity.

That night North Koreans surrounded the hill and C Company troops spent a sleepless night

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The 27th Infantry's Baptism of Fire

En route to that place it received still other orders to change its destination to Hwanggan, and it closed there in an assembly area the night of 22-23 July. General Walker had begun the quick and improvised shifting of troops to meet emergencies that was to characterize his defense of the Pusan Perimeter. The 27th Infantry's mission at Hwanggan was to relieve the decimated ROK troops retreating down the Poŭn road. [12-45]

In carrying out Eighth Army's orders to block the Poŭn road, Colonel Michaelis assigned the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry the task of making contact with the enemy.

On the morning of 23 July, Lt. Col. Gilbert J. Check moved the 1st Battalion northward toward Poŭn from the Hwanggan assembly area.

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On the first and main road, the 35th Infantry, held a blocking position northwest of Hamch'ang, supported by a platoon of tanks from A Company, A Company, 78th Tank Battalion, and A Battery, 90th Field Artillery Battalion. Colonel Fisher was unable to concentrate his two-battalion regiment here for the defense of on 25 July from P'ohang-dong than it was sent posthaste the next day to reinforce the 27th Infantry Regiment on the next north-south line of communications westward. Thus, in effect, one battalion of U.S. troops stood behind ROK units on the Hamch'ang approach.

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On the second road, that leading into Sangju 24th Infantry Regiment assembled two, and later all three, of its battalions. The 2nd Battalion of the 35th Infantry took up a hill position northwest of Hamch'ang and south of Mun'gyŏng on the south side of a stream that flowed past On the north side of the stream a ROK battalion held the front line. Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, Assistant Division Commander, insisted that F Company of the battalion should be inserted in the center of the ROK line north of the stream, and this was done over the strong protests of Colonel Fisher and the battalion commander, Lt. Col. John L. Wilkins. Wilson thought the American troops would strengthen the ROK defense; Fisher and Wilkins did not want the untried company to be dependent upon ROK stability in its first engagement. Behind the ROK and F Company positions the ground rose in another hill within small arms range. Heavy rains had swollen the stream behind the ROK's and F Company to a torrent that was rolling large boulders along its channel.

On 22 July the North Koreans attacked. The ROK's withdrew from their positions on either side of F Company without informing that company of their intentions. Soon enemy troops were firing into the back of F Company from the hill behind it. This precipitated an unorganized withdrawal. The swollen stream prevented F Company from crossing to the south side and the sanctuary of the 2nd Battalion positions. Walking wounded crowded along the stream where an effort to get them across failed. Two officers and a noncommissioned officer tied a pair of twisted telephone wires about their bodies and tried to swim to the opposite bank and fasten a line, but each in turn was swept downstream where they floundered ashore a hundred yards away on the same bank from which they had started. Some men drowned in trying to cross the swollen river. The covering fire of a platoon of tanks on the south side held off the enemy and allowed most of the survivors eventually to escape. In this fiasco, F Company lost 6 men killed, 10 wounded, and 21 missing. [12-20]

The next morning [23] five enemy tanks crossed the river and moved toward Hamch'ang. Artillery fire from a battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out four of the tanks. The fifth turned back across the river, and there an air strike later destroyed it.

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The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, was still in its position when it received orders on 23 July to withdraw to a point 5 miles north of Sangju

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The enemy paused but briefly after the capture of Taejŏn. After a day's rest in that town, which it had helped to capture, the N.K. 3rd Division departed the city on 22 July, advancing down the main highway toward Taegu. The next morning, 23 July, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, in front of Yŏngdong, reported it had destroyed three enemy T34 tanks with 3.5-inch rocket launchers in its first use of that weapon. [12-38] The enemy division was closing with the 1st Cavalry Division for the battle for Yŏngdong.

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[12-Caption] CAVALRYMEN PREPARING FOR ACTION in the bitter fighting at Yŏngdong. Artillery bursts on enemy positions are visible in the background.

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During 23 July the 7th and 9th Regiments of the N.K. 3rd Division began their attack on the Yŏngdong positions. The enemy made his first penetration southwest of Yŏngdong, establishing a roadblock a mile and a half behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, at the same time other units heavily engaged the 1st Battalion northwest of Yŏngdong in frontal attack.

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The next day the ROK 17th Regiment enveloped the enemy position that had caused the trouble and captured two light machine guns, one mortar, and about thirty enemy who appeared to be guerrillas. [12-24]

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At Kwang'ju on 23 July the three regiments of the division [the 6th] separated. The 13th went southwest to Mokp'o on the coast, the 14th south to Posŏng, and the 15th southeast through Sunch'ŏn to Yŏsu on the southern coast. The division encountered little resistance during this week of almost constant movement.

[note]

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Fair weather returned on 23 July, and General Walker requested the Fifth Air Force to fly an armed reconnaissance of the Kwang'ju-Nonsan area. [8]

See Kwang'ju-Nonsan area

[note]

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Fair weather returned on 23 July, and General Walker requested the Fifth Air Force to fly an armed reconnaissance of the Kwang'ju-Nonsan area. [8]

The air reconnaissance carried out on 23 July was revealing. It showed that enemy forces had indeed begun a drive south from the estuary of the Kum River and were swinging east behind the left (west) flank of Eighth Army. [10]

On the basis of the time and space estimate given him on the 23rd and the aerial reconnaissance of the same date, General Walker realized that a major crisis was developing in a section far behind the lines, and at a time when constant enemy attack was pushing his front back.

[note]

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General Church had assumed command of the 24th Division just the day before, on 23 July, after General Dean had been three days missing in action. The division had been out of the line and in army reserve just one day. It had not had time to re-equip and receive replacements for losses. The division supply officer estimated that 60 to 70 percent of the division's equipment would have to be replaced. All three regiments were far understrength. [13]

[note]

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The N.K. 4th Division Joins the Enveloping Move

After the fall of Taejŏn, the N.K. 4th Division rested in the city for two days and took in 1,000 untrained replacements. On the morning of 23 July, it started south from Taejŏn on the Kŭmsan road. It was joining the 6th Division in an envelopment of the United Nations' left flank. The N.K. 6th Division moved on an outer arc around the left of the U.N. position, the N.K. 4th Division on an inner arc. The two divisions were engaging in a co-ordinated movement on a theater scale. [35] (See Map III.)

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[note]

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After the first hectic weeks, steps were taken to reduce the necessity for the large number of airlifts to Korea from Japan. By 15 July, MacArthur's headquarters sent to Eighth Army a proposal to provide daily ferry service from the Hakata - Moji area to Pusan, and to provide this service with fast express trains from the Tokyo-Yokohama area. [15-45]

Accordingly, a Red Ball Express was organized. It had a capacity of 300 measurement tons daily of items and supplies critically needed in Korea. The Red Ball made the run from Yokohama to Sasebo in a little more than thirty hours, and to Pusan in a total of about fifty-three hours.

The first Red Ball Express train with high priority cargo left Yokohama at 1330 23 July. Regular daily runs became effective two days later. The schedule called for the Red Ball to depart Yokohama at 2330 nightly and arrive at Sasebo at 0542 the second morning thereafter, and for the cargo to be transferred directly from train to ship.

Ship departure was scheduled for 1330 daily and arrival at Pusan at 0400 the next morning. [15-46]

Army transportation men worked almost ceaselessly during July to bring order out of near chaos in the train movements from Pusan toward the rail-heads at the front.

By 18 July they had established a regular daily schedule of supply trains over two routes: (1) the main Pusan-Taegu-Kŭmch'ŏn line with a branch line from Kŭmch'ŏn to Hamch'ang; and (2) the Pusan-KYŏngju-Andong single track line up the east coast with a branch line from KYŏngju to P'ohang-dong.

As the battle front moved swiftly southward, trains after the end of July did not run beyond Taegu and P'ohang-dong. After the enemy threat developed in the southwest, a supply train ran daily from Pusan to Masan. On 1 July the U.N. Command controlled 1,404 miles of rail track in South Korea. By the end of the month this had shrunk to 431 miles of track, a loss of 973 miles, or more than two. thirds.

[note]


The first heavy lift cranes arrived on 23 July-a 60-ton crane and two crawler cranes, towed 900 miles from Yokohama. Not until the first week of August did a 100-ton crane reach Pusan. In the last half of July, Pusan was a busy port in-deed, 230 ships arriving and 214 departing during the final sixteen days of the month. During this period, 42,581 troops, 9,454 vehicles, and 88,888 long tons of supplies came ashore there. Subordinate ports of Ulsan and Suyŏng unloaded ammunition and petroleum products over the beaches from barges, tankers, and LCM's. [15-43]

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60 Ton Crane at Pusan

Pusan Pier 2

Short Ton = 2,000 pounds US
Long Ton - 2,240 pounds British
Measured Ton - ???
Metric Ton = 2,204.6 pounds

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Pier 2 at Pusan where the bulk of American supplies was landed.

[note]

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During the fourth [5th] week [7/23-7/29] of American intervention, certain formal procedures indicated, seemingly, that the U.N. Command expected the war to continue for some time. General MacArthur, on 23 July, announced that the U.N. Command had adopted the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. President Syngman Rhee in a proclamation likewise accepted the provisions of the Geneva Convention on behalf of the Republic of Korea.

[note]

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The daily rail and water Red Ball Express from Yokohama to Sasebo to Pusan, beginning on 23 July, operated with increased efficiency in August and demonstrated that it could deliver promptly to Korea any supplies available in Japan.

See Yokohama to Sasebo (Red Ball Express)

[note]

It alerted three medium tank battalions for immediate movement to Korea. These battalions were the 6th (M46), the 70th (M26 and M4A3), and the 73rd (M26).

Two of them were the school troop battalions of the Armored School at Fort Knox and of the Infantry School at Fort Benning;

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the third was the organic battalion of the 1st Armored Division.

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The Department of the Army notified General MacArthur on 10 July that it planned to ship these battalions to the Far East as the quickest way it could devise of getting medium tanks and trained crews to the battlefield.

Ships carrying these three tank battalions sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and arrived at Pusan on 7 August.

The tank battalions unloaded the next day [8/8].

[note]

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On 23 July, General Wright upon MacArthur's instructions circulated to the GHQ staff sections the outline of Operation CHROMITE. CHROMITE called for an amphibious operation in September and postulated three plans:
(1) Plan 100-B, landing at Inch'ŏn on the west coast;
(2) Plan 100-C, landing at Kunsan on the west coast;
(3) Plan 100-D, landing near Chumunjin-up on the east coast.
Plan 100-B, calling for a landing at Inch'ŏn with a simultaneous attack by Eighth Army, was favored. [25-3]

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This same day, 23 July, General MacArthur informed the Department of the Army that he had scheduled for mid-September an amphibious landing of the 5th Marines and the 2nd Infantry Division behind the enemy's lines in co-ordination with an attack by Eighth Army. [25-4]

[note]

  

July 10, 23, 28 Aug 7, 8, 16

After the Russian-built T34 tank appeared on the Korean battlefield, the Department of the Army acted as quickly as possible to correct the imbalance in armor. It alerted three medium tank battalions for immediate movement to Korea. These battalions were the 6th (M46), the 70th (M26 and M4A3), and the 73rd (M26).

Two of them were the school troop battalions of the Armored School at Fort Knox and of the Infantry School at Fort Benning; the third was the organic battalion of the 1st Armored Division.

The Department of the Army notified General MacArthur on 10 July that it planned to ship these battalions to the Far East as the quickest way it could devise of getting medium tanks and trained crews to the battlefield.

Ships carrying these three tank battalions sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and arrived at Pusan on 7 August.

The tank battalions unloaded the next day [8/8].

For further reinforcement of Eighth Army, the SS Luxembourg Victory departed San Francisco on 28 July with eighty medium tanks in its cargo.

Still more armor reinforcements arrived on 16 August, when the 72nd Medium Tank Battalion, organic to the 2nd Infantry Division, landed at Pusan.

The 2nd Division also had two regimental tank companies. [12]

Ships carrying these three tank battalions [6th (M46), the 70th (M26 and M4A3), and the 73rd (M26)] sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and

The Forgotten War

By the morning of July 23 the NKPA was again on the move. Its 3d' Division and armored elements, deploying on both roads leading eastward to, Taegu, simultaneously struck the widely separated 1/8 and 2/8.

Robert Kane's; 1/8, equipped with 3.5-inch bazookas and backed by the steady and skilled 77th FAB, commanded by West Pointer (1933) William A. ("Billy") Harris, and A/A weapons, held stoutly on the Taegu - Taejon road.

However, Eugene, Field's 2/8, backed by Alden Hatch's 61st FAB, was
promptly encircled and cut off.[6-44]

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All that day and the next Hap Gay made desperate efforts to block the oncoming NKPA and to extricate Field's isolated and besieged 2/8.

Rosie, Rohsenberger was willing - even eager - to do all in his power to help, but the sudden shock of battle and his serious hearing impairment rendered him all' but helpless.

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There was yet another problem: The leadership in Rohsenberger's 1/5 was chaotic, or worse. The outfit had been brought to Korea by West Pointer (1931) Glenn F. Rogers, forty-three, but Rogers left almost immediately for KMAG.

He was temporarily replaced by a 1/5 company commander, a former enlisted man who had won a battlefield commission in World War II. However, after merely two days he collapsed from heat and exhaustion, said: he "couldn't go on," and evacuated himself as an NBC.

He was replaced by the able regimental S-3, Charles J. Parziale, but he was wounded almost immediately and evacuated (he would return).

A cool, newly arrived, decorated (two Silver Stars, two Purple Hearts) veteran of World War II, James M. Gibson, twenty-nine, named S-3 of the battalion, attempted to hold the headquarters together.[6-45]

[Gibson not mentioned in July anyplace else]

[note]

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The next day, July 23, the NKPA infantry, led by five T-34 tanks, hit Fisher hard. However, in an astonishing display of marksmanship, the 155-mm batteries of James V. Sanden's 90th FAB knocked out four of the five tanks with HEAT shells. (A timely FEAF air strike got the fifth.)

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This feat gave the depleted 2/35 heart, and it held its ground until later in the day, when yet another collapse of the ROKs on the right and growing lack of confidence in the 24th Infantry induced Bill Kean to pull the 35th south to help the 24th defend Sangju. By then Teeters's 1/35, relieved at P'ohang, was en route to join Fisher, but Kean had to divert it to the left flank of the 24th Infantry, adjacent to the Wolfhounds, where the NKPA 2nd Division was threatening to force a breakthrough at Hwanggan.[6-62]

[note]

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Mike Michaelis's two-battalion 27th Infantry Wolfhounds, in position northwest of Hwanggan, encountered the NKPA 2nd Division's probing attacks on the night of July 23rd.

The Wolfhounds, supported by Gus Terry's superior 8th FAB, bit back with unusual, indeed even unprecedented, ferocity. Michaelis remembered his tactics:

"One thing I learned about the North Koreans: If things did not go exactly as they had planned, they had to stop everything and call back the company and battalion commanders, set up a new pattern, then come out again. So, if you could destroy their initial onslaught, you had them. I came up with what I called the `inverted snake procedure.' I would put one company astride the road leading into our positions, then take the high ground as far back as I could stretch, closing off the tail end. When the NKPA came down the road and bumped into the block, they'd start their usual probing on the flanks, forgetting [6-for the moment] the middle. I'd pull the middle back through and build up the flanks in the high ground. When finally you got down to the desperation point - in danger of losing your equipment and a lot of men - you broke contact and just hauled ass. That became our radio signal for withdrawal: How Able! How Able!"[6-52]

[note]

US Air Force

 

 

Stearleys depart 0900 for Okinawa. Eubank to depart 2300 hours today for the ZI. (Eubank departed 1000 hours, 24 July.) Sent a memo to C/S, GHQ, FEC, on our runway completion schedule; new runway surfaced with pierced-steel plank at K-2 (Taegu) to be completed 5 Aug; will be 6,000 ft in length and will be satisfactory for the operation of any of the a/c now available in FEAF. Secondary runway to be completed 4 days after the new runway, or 9 Aug. Re the K-3 runways and dispersal hardstands to be completed 25 July; the whole base will be rehabilitated so that we can operate F-51 fighters from K-3.


Sent a "Dear Van" letter re the outstanding work that Alkire has done and compared him with my other officers who are deserving of promotion to brigadier general.[144-Stratemeyer sent these letters on an occasional basis to promote (outside official channels) certain programs, ideas, or in this case, individuals. Alkire did receive his first star in August.] Stated that Alkire should be considered before the rest, which should in no way detract from those others.

Colonel Ganey, O'Donnell's liaison officer, in to see me to report for duty with FEAF. Answered CSAF redline T. S. [top secret] radio with a redline T. S. re his request for us to release an air evaluation. My answer to him was that situation still too critical from a ground viewpoint and because of that requested he wait for more opportune time. Told him we did have an evaluation prepared, but because of above, had been shelved. Suggested we wait until the tide turns.

 

[note]

 

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Air transport in Korea
As the war settled down slightly, the 374th Wing sent airhead teams to Korea for loading and unloading cargo. By 23 July the Fifth Air Force maintained airlift capabilities to land 150 tons of supply per day in Korea, enough for half a division; an estimated two additional battalions could be supported by air drop.

[note]

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23

By 16 July North Korean columns were aiming a pincers movement against Taejŏn, and when EUSAK held there temporarily, the North Korean command initiated a wide left-flank movement down through west Korean coastal routes, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July,

Kwangju on 23 July, and capturing the major southwest port city of Mokp'o on 24 July. These movements, virtually unopposed except by a few ROK police, opened the way for a drive against the port cities of Masan and Pusan. Meanwhile, on the central front EUSAK was flanked out of Taejŏn, forced to withdraw to Yŏngdong on 25 July, and gradually pressed back to Kŭmch'ŏn, where defensive positions were established on 31 July. That same day, on the southwestern front, the 24th Division was forced out of Chinju.

[note]

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week
30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks
06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks
13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks
20 - the Navy sinks the bridge



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19th BG(M) for Okinawa
28th BS(M)
30th BS(M)
93rd BS(M)

Of all targets assigned, none was so perverse as the steel cantilever west railway bridge at Sŏul, called by air crews -the "elastic bridge" because of its stubborn refusal to fall.

Since only the 19th Group possessed bomb racks for 2,000-pound bombs, it drew this critical target which, although no longer suitable for rail traffic, had been planked over for vehicles.

For nearly four weeks [7/23-8/19 4-weeks] the bridge was attacked almost daily by B-29 's with 1,000 pound, 2,000-pound, and 4,000-pound GP bombs.

Blueprints of the bridge were obtained from the Japanese who had designed it, fuse settings were varied to obtain damage to the superstructure as well as the abutments, but, despite numerous hits, the bridge still stood.

At last General Stratemeyer offered a case of Scotch to the crew who would take it down.


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The elastic bridge on 12 August.

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The elastic bridge on 20 August.

[note]

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On 19 July the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) was back with orders to support the ground troops, a matter of some surprise to Partridge and Walker since GHQ had arranged it without consulting them. General Partridge insisted that the carrier pilots must follow the same operating procedure as Fifth Air Force flyers, and despite early complaints by Navy pilots that they could not raise MELLOW control, better liaison produced satisfactory strikes on 25 July and more were scheduled for the following two days.

[So what happened on the 19 20, 21, 22, 23 ad 24th? then 25, 26 and 27th]

[note]

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10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 17, 18.,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
Despite the dubious results of medium bombers in close support, General O'Donnell was required to reserve 15 aircraft each day for primary effort against tactical targets along the battle line, and between 10 and 26 July he used 130 B-29 sorties in such activity.

[note]

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During the critical days of July when the 24th and 25th Divisions were being committed to action, the Fifth Air Force employed its full resources in close support.

Tactical air control parties joined the 24th Division on 5 July, and thereafter these parties shared the combat life of the infantrymen: two controllers and five airmen had been killed or were missing in action by 28 July.

The emergency action by which FEAF placed primary effort on the main battle line during July has been noted.

An air strike along the road near Kiem Dong, reported EUSAK's headquarters diary on 17 July, caused considerable confusion and the retreat of the enemy forces.

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Thirty F-80's, 13 F-51's, and 1 B-26 "greatly aided repelling of attack against 10th Regt. ROKA" on 23 July.

On 30 July a flight of F-80's with rockets and machine guns blazing, destroyed eight artillery pieces and a number of vehicles two miles northeast of Hwanggan, and when, on this same mission, a MOSQUITO spotted some 2,000 enemy troops southeast of Yŏngdong, other fighters were called in to work them over.

[note]

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Following the clarification of target selection and the appointment of a GHQ Target Selection Committee on 22 July, FEAF was quick to press for a settlement upon a proper interdiction program.

On 23 July General Weyland sent forward a strong criticism of the existing interdiction effort which, he said, would not keep enemy reinforcements from the battle area, posed a number of targets greatly exceeding the capabilities of the medium bombers, and was characterized by many obscure targets.

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Following receipt of this memorandum, General Almond called the target selection committee (Generals Hickey, Willoughby, and Weyland) to his office on the evening of 24 July.

[note]

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Preparatory to the first meeting of the FEC Target Selection Committee General Weyland made a careful analysis of currently ordered interdiction operations. His study of the CINCFE targets designated by the GHQ Target Group revealed several deficiencies:

Weyland noted that FEAF had skilled target officers, and he suggested that FEAF be heavily relied upon for target recommendations. He sent a memorandum setting out these findings to the FEC G-3.#61

#61 Memo. for Wright from Weyland, subj: Medium Bomber Targets, 23 July 1950.

[note]

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Thus far in the war Colonel Murphy's control function had possessed only the most rudimentary communications facilities.

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Back in the United States the USAF had alerted the 502nd Tactical Control Group for movement to Korea, but the war would not wait the many weeks that would be required to get this regular group into action. In an effort to make a provisional organization serve control and warning needs in Korea, General Partridge on 14 July organized the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group (Provisional), under the command of Colonel Joseph D. Lee.

Drawing personnel and equipment from the air-defense establishment in Japan, Colonel Lee formed the provisional control group at Itazuke and immediately began to move to Taegu. On 23 July the 6132nd Group established a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) adjacent to the JOC, and at this time took over the operation of control station "Mellow." Inasmuch as no radar equipment was deployed in Korea for control and warning purposes during the time that it functioned, the principal duty of the provisional TACC was to supply the tactical air-direction radio communications required by the combat operations section of the JOC.#123

Drawing the Battleline 105

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Lt. Gen. Earle E. Partridge (left) Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker (right)

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Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer (bottom)
106 U.S. Air Force in Korea

When it arrived in Taegu, the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group also absorbed the tactical air-control parties in Korea and assumed the responsibility for providing such additional parties as were required by the Eighth Army's expanding troop list. During the European campaigns of World War II the Army Air Forces had allocated air-support parties only to corps and divisions, except in the case of armored divisions, which were given an air-support party for each independently operating combat command, organizations which were comparable in size to regiments.#124

Existing air-ground doctrine specified no set number or allocation of tactical air-control parties and stated that their operations with a division, regiment, or battalion would be dependent upon the need for close air support on a particular front. From the beginning in Korea, however, General Partridge allocated one TACP to each United States infantry regiment and higher unit headquarters engaged in active combat operations and to each ROK division and corps. As quickly as the Far East Air Materiel Command could fabricate them, the 6132nd Group obtained additional AN/ARC-1 radio-control jeeps, and the group also provided the radio operators and mechanics requisite to each tactical air-control party. Some forward air controllers were apparently obtained from the United States, but most of these officers came from the Fifth Air Force's tactical groups, which were required to provide combat pilots for three weeks' temporary duty as forward air controllers.#125

From the first day they flew over Korea the "Mosquito" airborne controllers proved their worth, but the airborne control function continued in an anomalous organizational status during July. The commander of the 6132nd Group did not think that the airborne controllers had a place in his provisional tactical control group.

[note]

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After a record eight-day Pacific crossing, the fast carrier [USS Boxer (CV-21)] reached Tokyo on 23 July.#145

In Japan everything was in readiness to receive the Mustangs. The Far East Air Materiel Command assembled them at Kisarazu and flew them to Tachikawa to make them combat ready, a task which was completed for all planes in thirteen days. The 3rd Bombardment Wing operated an F-51 replacement training unit at Johnson Air Base, which transitioned pilots to the conventional planes as fast as the aircraft were delivered from the modification lines at Tachikawa. #146

See Tachikawa to Kisarazu, Japan

[note]

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Three weeks later, on 23 July, General MacArthur was confident that the Eighth Army would not be driven into the sea, and he was able to present his ultimate strategy to the Joint Chiefs in greater detail.

Sometime in the middle of September-the exact date to depend upon the enemy's actions during August and the arrival of additional forces from the United States-the United Nations Command would make a two-division corps landing in the rear of the Communist lines.

Acting in conjunction with an Eighth Army attack from the south, the amphibious corps would envelop and destroy Communist forces in South Korea. General MacArthur was completely convinced that the amphibious envelopment was the right strategy. An early and strong effort behind the enemy's front, he said, would "sever his main lines of communications and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow." The only alternative to amphibious encirclement was a "frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and extensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th parallel." #3

[note]

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On 23 July General Partridge was establishing the Advance Headquarters of the Fifth Air Force in Taegu, but the Joint Operations Center was in full operation, and the Air Force combat-operations section was working closely with Eighth Army representatives to meet General Walker's requirements for support.

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On this day, however, some member of General Walker's staff was so concerned by the enemy's end-around advance in southwestern Korea that he flashed a message directly to General MacArthur requesting that he order Task Force 77 to support the Eighth Army.

On that day and continuing on 24 July the carrier task force was re-supplying at sea, but Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander of NavFE, was receptive to the idea that naval air could be employed in close support of ground troops, if the emergency were great enough.#6

[note]


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Concerned about the Eighth Army's left flank and assuming that Partridge was "pretty much all out" with the forces he had available, General Stratemeyer was also in favor of the naval close support proposal.

General MacArthur understood that the strikes could not be controlled from the' ground, but he was willing to accept the calculated risk that the emergency naval strikes might hurt some friendly people.

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He accordingly issued instructions that Task Force 77, beginning on 25 July, would seek out and attack military targets in southwestern Korea within an area bounded by the towns of Kunsan, Chŏnju, Namwŏn, and Kwangju.

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Although the Navy was given this area for exclusive operations, and it was also agreed that Navy aircraft could operate in the area without contacting Fifth Air Force controllers, General Crabb told Partridge that he did not think that anyone would object very much if Air Force or Navy planes strayed slightly across the boundary.

[note]

US Marine Corps

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Jones made an instant decision to sign up as the Old Man’s driver, and the next day, after he had been accepted, went back to the beer hall:

“I mean they laid in the suds. That next night you could hardly walk for the cans tossed in the gutters of the company streets, and the men sat around on the hills, drinking their beers after chow. Work never stopped, and morale was humming.”

Puller enlisted the help of Jones in finding another important recruit --- “shotgun,” or bodyguard, to ride in the jeep with them in Korea. Jones found him quickly: Jan Bodey, a San Francisco iceman in civilian life who had spent years in the Corps, and had gone out after World War II, the result of a San Diego street fight in which he had allegedly tied tow sailors together by their arms. He was now back as a Frisco Reservist, and was reputed to be the strongest man in the Marines, as well as an expert with small arms.

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The Colonel found an old friend, Major W.C. Reeves, whom he had known in Nicaragua; this old-timer came in with the regulars from Lejeune, and was soon Puller’s adjutant. Most of the officers around Puller were new to him: Lieutenant Colonels Robert Rickert, his executive officer, and the battalion commanders, Thomas L. Ridge, Allan Sutter and Jack Hawkins.

Old and new, they seemed to blend into one happy team, as Puller saw them from the moment the First Marines were told that they were shipping out for Korea:

“I never saw a more contented bunch of men when they got the word, and knew this was it. All friction faded overnight, and with a real objective all were happy. There were no absences --- and, as usual when war comes, some of the best fighting people came out of the brig. For the last few days we were organizing, and the only missing people I had were those who had been hurt in traffic accidents.”

[note]

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Confident that the suggestion would be favorably considered, the advance party flew to Itami on 21 July and made a detailed reconnaissance of debarkation, billeting, and training sites. While Craig inspected the area and prepared a report, Cushman examined the air base facilities and established his headquarters according to the initial plan.

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The Marine officers then returned to Tokyo 2 days later to push the request for getting both air and ground forces located in the same area. To support his proposal, Craig submitted a complete “floor plan” not only for the Brigade but also for the entire 1st Marine Division. MacArthur’s staff promptly approved.[18]

[note]

23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30

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The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at the objective.[29]

[note]

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The emergency found the Organized Aviation Reserve with 30 VMF and 12 GCI squadrons generally up to peacetime strength. Of the 1,588 officers, about 95 per cent were combat-experienced, and only about 10 percent of the enlisted men stood in need of basic training

It was a comparatively simple task, therefore, to comply with the order of 23 July calling for six VMF and three GCI squadrons to report to El Toro. Their mission was to build up to war strength the units of the 1st MAW which had been stripped to mount out MAG–33.

[note]


The Organized Aviation Reserve

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The outbreak of hostilities in Korea found the Organized Aviation Reserve in a comparatively enviable. position in contrast with the Organized Ground Reserve. With 30 VMF and 12 MGCI Squadrons generally up to peacetime strength, the Aviation Reserve was ready to fill the gaps created by the sudden emergency to increase the strength of Marine air promptly. Seldom, if ever, has the mobilization of a reserve component functioned so smoothly or served to justify so well the expenditure of energy and funds inherent in the maintenance of reserve components.

The circumstances surrounding this mobilization were almost ideal. Approximately 95 percent of the 1, 589 officers were combat-experienced in their then current billets; of the 4,753 enlisted, virtually all staff noncommissioned officers were skilled technicians, and only approximately 10 percent of the personnel in the lower ranks were in need of basic training. In addition, the Organized Aviation Reserve was tapped over a comparatively long period of time to meet specific demands as the need for aviation personnel and units developed and increased.

The first demand arose when it became necessary to buildup to war strength the units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which had been partially stripped to furnish the best possible personnel for MAG-33. Accordingly, on 23 July, the Marine Corps ordered the personnel of six reserve fighter squadrons,


VMF-11,
VMF-123,
VMF-141,
VMF-213,
VMF-221, and
VMF-241,
and three Marine ground control intercept :squadrons,
MGCI-16,
MGCI-18, and
MGCI-22, to report for extended active duty at Marine Corps Air Station, E1 Toro, California.

None of these went to Korea, they completed 1st MAW units, the way the 2nd Marine Division, did the 1st.

[note]

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What the reservists in the 1st Marine Division probably did not know, however, was that a large fraction of the newly-arrived VMF's was composed of Organized Aviation reservists, who like themselves, had been plucked but seven weeks earlier from the normal civilian pursuits of young Americans.

Once more, the Marine Reserve had played a vital role in a noteworthy achievement of the Marine Corps. During this 7-week period, 937 aviation reservists had moved from civilian life in the United States to combat operations in Korea. Although this is by no means the end of the story of Marine aviation in the present emergency, neither is it the beginning, for the story goes at least as far back as the first days of the Korean conflict.

The outbreak of hostilities on 25 June, and the increased Marine Corps commitments, which soon followed, found Marine aviation in an enviable position as compared with Marine ground forces. Since the initial demands upon the 30 VMFs and 12 MGCISs of the Organized Aviation Reserve were comparatively small, the needs of Marine aviation were filled quickly and easily. Even when demands increased sharply, it never became necessary to drain completely the Organized Aviation Reserve pool.

On 23 July the first demand came; three Reserve VMF and six MCGI squadrons received orders to active duty in order to provide trained Marines for the 1st Wing, which had furnished the units and personnel of MAG-33; of the total 1,474 reservists ordered to extended active duty, approximately l,400 actually reported at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, on 1 August.

[note]

US Navy

23 July
USS Boxer (CV 21) arrived Yokosuka, following an eight day transit from Alameda, delivering a load of F-51 airplanes, equipment and personnel for the Air Force.

[note]

Korean_War

The HMS Triumph (R16) operated with us at all times,[ July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.] except July 22, providing CAP and ASP.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25

In general, the remainder of the flights and sweeps on the 18th, 19th, 22nd and 25th were "armed reconnaissance" in nature and covered an area inland from P'ohang to north of Hamhung on the east coast and on the west coast ranged from Kwangju north to Kaesŏng going inland as far as Namwŏn. Targets attacked and damaged were airfield installations, railroad facilities, locomotives and rolling stock, bridges, power stations, oil tanks , small boats, factories, troops and vehicles.

See P'ohang to Hamhung map.

[note]

Korean_War

23 July
USS Boxer (CV-21) arrived in Yokosuka, Japan, with a load of

all urgently needed for operations in Korea. In making this delivery, Boxer broke all existing records for a Pacific crossing, steaming [on the 14th] from Alameda, Calif. to Yokosuka in 8 days and 16 hours.

[note]

Korean_War

Korean_War

Finally, the northern sector, so great in undisclosed potentialities, was also brought under surveillance. On 7 July the first patrol plane reinforcements reached the Far East, and the long range P2V Neptunes of VP 6 were at once assigned to search in the Sea of Japan.

On the 23rd the submarine USS Remora (SS 487), escorted by USS Greenlet (ASR-10), headed north from Yokosuka for a patrol of La Pe'rouse Strait.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

On the 23rd the submarine USS Remora (SS 487), escorted by USS Greenlet (ASR-10), headed north from Yokosuka for a patrol of La Pe'rouse Strait.

[note]

19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

Korean_War Korean_War

At noon on the 19th General Gay assumed command ashore. In the afternoon, with unloading completed, ships of the Attack Force shifted to heavy weather anchorages as Grace [Duration July 16 – July 21], the first typhoon of the season, was reported heading for Korea Strait.

On the 22nd Grace came up the coast, bringing gusts of 50 knots to Yŏngil Man and delaying the arrival of the second echelon of shipping. This had been scheduled to come in on the 21st, but the MSTS units reached P'ohang only on the 23rd, and the chartered Japanese freighters the next day. The LSTs of the third echelon arrived on the 26th and 29th.

For a variety of reasons, unloading of the follow-up shipping was somewhat slow.

The MSTS transports suffered from their shortages of personnel; the Japanese freighters lacked trained hatch crews and unloading gear, and the ever-present language problem complicated supervision; after two days of continuous labor the shore party was getting tired.

Nonetheless the work proceeded. On the 23rd the commanding officer of a Navy LST was directed by Admiral Doyle to take over the duties of senior officer present, and late in the evening the force commander sailed in USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), with USS Union (AKA-106), USS JAMES E. KYES (DD-787), and USS Diachenko (APD-123), for Tokyo.

A week later it was all over, and CTF 90 was able to report the completion of operations at P'ohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from Yŏngil Man. But this report was by way of formality, for the strategic rewards of the operation had long since been apparent. On 22 July, four days after the initial landing, the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the battered 24th Division southeast of Taejŏn.
22 June

[note]

Korean_War

On the 23rd, while USS Valley Forge (CV-45) was refueling, an emergency dispatch from Eighth Army advised all major commanders that an "urgent requirement" existed for the employment of naval air in the west coast area beginning that very day, and requested information as to naval capabilities in close and general support.

[note]

Korean_War

[On the 23rd] To fill this need Struble repeated his proposal of 10 July that either the Tactical Air Control Squadron from Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group be sent to Korea, or that the Seventh Fleet itself supply a small but experienced control team.

[note]

ComNavFE Korean_War

From both Joy and Struble this dispatch brought prompt reply. The former observed that subject to the primary mission of the neutralization of Formosa, and to the undesirability of protracted operations in one spot, no great difficulty was expected in coordinating Seventh Fleet and Air Force operations, provided only that successful joint communications were established. But to Commander Seventh Fleet the situation appeared more complicated.

While observing that Eighth Army’s urgent requirement could be met beginning on the 26th, he emphasized the fact that present methods of coordination were unsatisfactory, and that in addition to the communications problem there was an urgent requirement for personnel trained in the control of close support aircraft.

To fill this need Struble repeated his proposal of 10 July that either the Tactical Air Control Squadron from Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group be sent to Korea, or that the Seventh Fleet itself supply a small but experienced control team.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

On the 23rd, as the southward retirement of friendly forces continued, the responsibility for fire support was turned over to the destroyers and Higgins sailed for Sasebo, where early on the 24th USS Juneau (CLAA-119) moored alongside a new arrival, the heavy cruiser USS Toledo (CA-133).

[note]

The first of the units sailed from the west coast reached Japan on 23 July as Rear Admiral Hartman, Commander Cruiser Division 3, arrived at Yokosuka with USS Helena (CA-75) and Destroyer Division 111, while USS Toledo (CA-133), which had been ordered ahead, entered Sasebo.

On reporting to ComNavFE, Admiral Hartman was instructed to take over command of all naval forces engaged in escort, support, and blockade, with the exception of the ROK Navy.

Pursuant to these orders Helena and the destroyers sailed at once for Sasebo, where they arrived on the 25th and where not only Toledo, but HMS Belfast (C-35) with Admiral Andrewes and USS Juneau (CLAA-119) with Admiral Higgins were awaiting them.

[note]

Korean_War

Little by little order emerged from chaos. By late July coordination with the British west coast element had been established and the Korean Navy was back in effective action. On the 22nd YMS 513 repeated her earlier exploit by sinking three more enemy vessels off Chulp'o, and the next day YMS 301 had a brush with small craft in the same area.

[note]

Korean_War

Headquarters had intended to base the ground elements of the Marine Brigade at Sasebo, and the air echelon near Kobe, some 350 miles to the eastward on the Inland Sea. In his interview with the Supreme Commander, General Craig had placed special emphasis on the importance of maintaining the integrity of his air-ground team, and had secured the promise that it would remain intact.

To keep it so, and to avoid the administrative and training problems which dispersion would impose, the Marine generals proposed to base the entire force in the Kobe-Osaka area, and on the 23rd secured approval of this arrangement.

But the 23rd was also the day of EUSAK’s emergency call for carrier air support, and the developing crisis made it impossible to retain the brigade for the September landings. In the north the enemy was already inside the Naktong basin; the central front was under heavy pressure; on the west the North Korean flanking movement had reached Yŏngdong, only 75 miles from Pusan. Nothing could now be held back. All available force had to be committed.

[note]

Korean_War

Tactical Situation at Yŏngdong, July 23, 1950

 

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

 


0000 Korean Time

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0100 Korean Time

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0200 Korean Time

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0300 Korean Time

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0400 Korean Time

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0500 Korean Time

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0527 Sun Rise

[note]

0600 Korean Time

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0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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0800 Korean Time

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0900 Korean Time

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1000 Korean Time

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Korean_War

3rd Rescue Squadron
Korean War Operations
23 July 1950
At 1118/K the Flight received a call from ADCC that a Mayday was 30 miles out on a heading of 265°.

At 1126/K the Mayday faded and the SB-17 which was orbiting in the area was requested to investigate. The Mayday, a C-47, was reported to have landed at Pusan. Total false alerts for this date was two (2). The second alert occured during the first alert at 1120/K. Another Mayday about 2 miles out from Ashiya. This Mayday landed safely at 1140/K.

Meanwhile, Flight "C", was again alerted for another evacuation at 1000/K. A dependent wife, suffering from possible premature childbirth, needed evacuation to the Station Hospital at Sendai, (38° 20' N - 139° 55' E). An SB-17 was dispatched on this mission, being airborne at 1210/K and arriving at Matsushima at 1335/K. As there wasn't any addition to the passenger list the mission was deemed successful.

[note]

11001100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/22/50
8:00 PM
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Korean_War

Rendezvous with the tanker was made late in the morning [cv45 has it at 1100] of the 23rd to the southward of USS Grainger (AK-184) and the ammunition were not there. On completion of refueling, therefore, Task Force 77 headed for Sasebo where it arrived on the morning of the 24th.

[note]

Korean_War

The rendezvous with the USS Navasota (AO-106) was affected about 1100, 30 miles northeast of Danjo-Gunto, on the 23rd. Upon completion of refueling operations, the task force headed for the Port of Sasebo, Japan, to rearm from the USS Grainger (AK-184),

[note]

1118 Korean Time

Korean_War

At 1118/K the Flight received a call from ADCC that a Mayday was 30 miles out on a heading of 265°.

[note]

1120 Korean Time


Korean_War

The second alert occurred during the first alert at 1120/K. Another Mayday about 2 miles out from Ashiya.

[note]

1126 Korean Time

Korean_War

At 1126/K the Mayday faded and the SB-17 which was orbiting in the area was requested to investigate.

[note]

1140 Korean Time

Korean_War

Another Mayday about 2 miles out from Ashiya. This Mayday landed safely at 1140/K.

[note]

1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/22/50
9:00 PM
07/22/50
10:00 PM
07/23/50
3:00 AM
07/23/50
12:00 PM

Korean_War

A dependent wife, suffering from possible premature childbirth, needed evacuation to the Station Hospital at Sendai, (38° 20' N - 139° 55' E). An SB-17 was dispatched on this mission, being airborne at 1210/K and arriving at Matsushima at 1335/K. As there wasn't any addition to the passenger list the mission was deemed successful.

[note]

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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10:00 PM
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11:00 PM
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4:00 AM
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Korean_War

By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3rd Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19]

[note]

Korean_War

The first Red Ball Express train with high priority cargo left Yokohama at 1330 23 July. Regular daily runs became effective two days later. The schedule called for the Red Ball to depart Yokohama at 2330 nightly and arrive at Sasebo at 0542 the second morning thereafter, and for the cargo to be transferred directly from train to ship.

Ship departure was scheduled for 1330 daily and arrival at Pusan at 0400 the next morning. [15-46]

Army transportation men worked almost ceaselessly during July to bring order out of near chaos in the train movements from Pusan toward the rail-heads at the front.

[note]

1335 Korean Time

Korean_War

Meanwhile, Flight "C", was again alerted for another evacuation at 1000/K. A dependent wife, suffering from possible premature childbirth, needed evacuation to the Station Hospital at Sendai, (38° 20' N - 139° 55' E). An SB-17 was dispatched on this mission, being airborne at 1210/K and arriving at Matsushima at 1335/K. As there wasn't any addition to the passenger list the mission was deemed successful.

[note]

1350 Moon Rise

Korean_War

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/22/50
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1500 Korean Time

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1:00 AM
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33:00 PM

ComNavFE

Admiral Joy, however, did not care to name a member to the committee. He explained that the Seventh Fleet would perform "hit-and-run" general and close air-support strikes in Korea under FEAF's coordination control, but the Seventh Fleet's primary mission was to defend Formosa.

Korean_War

Any decision to commit the Seventh Fleet's air-striking power to Korea was a matter which had to be carefully considered in the light of hostile threats to Formosa, and Admiral Joy thought that General MacArthur should make these decisions personally.#60

#60 Msg. ComNavFE to CINCFE, 230736Z July 1950 1536K

[note]

1600 Korean Time

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1700 Korean Time

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Korean_War

He [Lt. Col. Gilbert J. Check] took up defensive positions in the evening near the village of Sangyong-ni, south of Poŭn. The battalion assumed responsibility for that sector at 1700 after ROK troops fell back through its position. [12-46]

Colonel Check was unable to obtain from the retreating ROK troops any information on the size of the North Korean force following them or how close it was.

That night he sent 1st Lt. John A. Buckley of A Company with a 30-man patrol northward to locate the enemy. Near Poŭn Buckley saw an enemy column approaching. He quickly disposed his patrol on hills bordering both sides of the road, and, when the column was nearly abreast, opened fire on it with all weapons. This fire apparently caused the enemy advanced unit to believe it had encountered a major position, for it held back until daylight.

[note]

1730 Korean Time

Korean_War Korean_War

Then, on the afternoon of 23 July, a full briefing on the subject was scheduled in General MacArthur's conference room in the Dai Ichi Building. [25-16]

The conference began at 1730 in the afternoon. Among those present in addition to General MacArthur were General Collins, Admiral Sherman, Vice Admirals Joy and Struble, Generals Almond, Hickey, and Wright, some members of the latter's JSPOG group, and Rear Adm. James H. Doyle and some members of his staff who were to present the naval problems involved in a landing at Inch'ŏn.

After a short introduction by General MacArthur, General Wright briefed the group on the basic plan. Admiral Doyle then presented the naval considerations. His general tone was pessimistic, and he concluded with the remark,

"The operation is not impossible, but I do not recommend it."

The naval part of the briefings lasted more than an hour.
During the naval presentation MacArthur, who had heard the main arguments many times before, sat quietly smoking his pipe, asking only an occasional question. When the presentation ended, MacArthur began to speak.

He talked as though delivering a soliloquy for forty-five minutes, dwelling in a conversational tone on the reasons why the landing should be made at Inch'ŏn. He said that the enemy had neglected his rear and was dangling on a thin logistical rope that could be quickly cut in the Sŏul area, that the enemy had committed practically all his forces against Eighth Army in the south and had no trained reserves and little power of recuperation.

MacArthur stressed the strategical, political, and psychological reasons for the landing at Inch'ŏn and the quick capture of Sŏul, the capital of South Korea. He said it would hold the imagination of Asia and win support for the United Nations. Inch'ŏn, he said, pointing to the big map behind him, would be the anvil on which the hammer of Walker's Eighth Army from the south would crush the North Koreans.

General MacArthur then turned to a consideration of a landing at Kunsan, 100 air miles below Inch'ŏn, which General Collins and Admiral Sherman had favored.

MacArthur said the idea was good but the location wrong. He did not think a landing there would result in severing the North Korean supply lines and destroying the North Korean Army. He returned to his emphasis on Inch on, saying that the amphibious landing was tactically the most powerful military device available to the United Nations Command and that to employ it properly meant to strike deep and hard into enemy-held territory.

He dwelt on the bitter Korean winter campaign that would become necessary if Inch'ŏn was not undertaken. He said the North Koreans considered a landing at Inch'ŏn impossible because of the very great difficulties involved and, because of this, the landing force would achieve surprise. He touched on his operations in the Pacific in World War II and eulogized the Navy for its part in them. He concluded his long talk by declaring unequivocally for Inch'ŏn and saying,

"The Navy has never turned me down yet, and I know it will not now."

MacArthur seems to have convinced most of the doubters present. Admiral Sherman was won over to MacArthur's position. General Collins, however, seemed still to have reservations on Inch'ŏn. He subsequently asked General Wright if the Far East Command had firm plans for a Kunsan landing which could be used as an alternate plan if the Inch'ŏn operation either was not carried out or failed. Wright assured him that there were such plans and, moreover, that it was planned to stage a feint at Kunsan. [25-17]

Among the alternate proposals to Inch'ŏn, in addition to the Kunsan plan favored by the Navy, was one for a landing in the Posung-myon [P'osŭng-myŏn] area thirty miles south of Inch'ŏn and opposite Osan. On the 23rd, Admiral Doyle had proposed a landing there with the purpose of striking inland to Osan and there severing the communications south of Sŏul.

[note]

1800 Korean Time

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Korean_War

25th Infantry Division Periodic Report #11, 231800K to 241800K July 1950 -

"Use is made of troops infiltrated into our rear for additional support, the white clad farmers appearing on the high ground again today in the 27th RCT zone." 57

57
Periodic Report #11, 25th Infantry Division, 231800K to 241800K July 1950 . In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

[note]

Korean_War

The division's 6:00 PM July 23 PIR interpreted attacks on the 8th Cavalry Regiment during the morning and afternoon as NKPA reconnaissance efforts and warned that:

"[I]ndications of movement around our flanks bear out his [the NKPA's] continued use of the double or single envelopment."

The PIR reported that screening of refugees moving through the division's zone, conducted by American military police and intelligence personnel with South Korean soldiers and intelligence personnel, resulted in the detention of several individuals suspected as enemy agents. Furthermore, two persons claiming to be Red Cross personnel were apprehended with a map showing the locations of all the division's artillery battalions. The PIR concluded that the NKPA's possible and probable courses of action would not change. 39
39
Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #2, 1800 23 July 1950 , 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA.

[note]


Korean_War

The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery reported the only documented case of 1st Cavalry Division soldiers clearing civilians from a village. On July 23, southwest of xxxDivision Artillery soldiers told villagers to leave their homes, which were located close to the artillery positions. 30
30

Periodic Operations Report No. 13, 23 July 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.

If U.S. soldiers encountered a refugee group on the road at night, these soldiers may have tried to prevent the group from moving because they feared infiltrators. The soldiers may have also tried to prohibit movement at night because this movement violated the existing U.S. refugee control policy. Also, if soldiers directed refugees off the road, this action would have been consistent with refugee control policies designed to keep the roads clear for troop movement.

[note]

1900 Korean Time

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1945 Sun Set

[note]

2000 Korean Time

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2100 Korean Time

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Korean_War

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 23 noted that a refugee had reported 10,000 troops with 10 light artillery pieces located west of Taejŏn. The PIR again concluded that the NKPA's most likely course of action focused its main effort toward Hamch'ang and / or Andong, north of the 1st Cavalry Division's sector, but the PIR now modified this conclusion by stating that the NKPA would at the same time attempt a deep envelopment south of Eighth Army's left flank through Ch'ŏngju and Namwŏn.

The second most likely course of action focused the main effort against the 1st Cavalry Division along the Taejŏn-Kŭmch'ŏn axis together with the deep envelopment. The NKPA's combat effectiveness and morale rated as good. 40

40
Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #11, 2400 23 July 1950 , File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950 , Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

[note]


Casualties

Sunday July 23, 1950 (Day 029)

Korean_War 014 Casualties

As of July 23, 1950

1 13TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
4 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 545TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY
1 5TH ORDNANCE MEDIUM MAINTENANCE COMPANY
1 71ST HEAVY TANK BATTALION
5 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
14 19500723 0000 casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 44 1831 0 1 0 1876
Today 0 14 0 0 0 14
Total 44 1845 0 1 0 1890


Aircraft Losses Today 000

Notes for Sunday July 23, 1950 - day 029