Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.9°C 76.82°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

Korean_War

Tropical Storm Helene

Duration July 24 – August 3
Peak intensity 95 km/h (60 mph) (1-min) 991 mbar (hPa)

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Korean_War

July 24 - Arrival of 29th RCT in Korea from Okinawa.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

July 24-25 N.K.-3 defeats 8th and 5th Cavalry Regiments, and captures Yŏngdong, but halts its attack after taking 2,000 casualties, mostly from artillery

Korean_War Korean_War

N.K.-2 defeats 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division, in their first action

[note]

July 24-25

Korean_War

An announcement from MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters says that claims that 250 North Korean tanks have been destroyed is completely inaccurate.

The announcement faults reporting errors and duplication.

Korean_War

-- Truman asks Congress for $10.5 billion to raise American armed force strength to 2.1 million members. The increase is "to meet the immediate situation in Korea" and "to deter further acts of aggression."

The next day he requests a $5 billion tax increase. Individuals will see a 10-20 percent increase in their taxes.

-- The Vatican reports that the North Koreans have interned Msgr. [Monsignor] Patrick Byrne, Apostolic Delegate to Korea, an American, in Sŏul.

[note]

Korean_War

July 24
Far East Air Force headquarters moves from Tokyo to Korea to provide better support to ground forces.

Headquarters Squadron, Fifth Air Force (Advance)

[note]

Korean_War3rd Rescue Squadron

Four SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. A total of twenty seven hours and twenty five minutes (27:25) were flown.

At 0820/K, Colonel Kight and Lt. Colonel Nolan departed Ashiya Air Base by C-47 for Iwakuni Air Base. From Iwakuni they will continue to Johnson Air Base where Colonel Kight will [make] his return trip to the US.

At 1855/K the Flight was alerted on a C-54 which made a forced landing at 37° 10' N - 129° E. The report came from a B-29 who was over this area at the time of the call.

At 2030/K the Flight was notified that ADCC had made a complete check and no aircraft were overdue. One false alert was recorded this date.

[note]

Korean_War

July 24: Fifth Air Force moved its advance headquarters from Japan to Taegu, locating it next to Eighth Army headquarters in Korea for ease of communication and coordination.

Korean_War

FEAF established the advance headquarters as 5th Air Force in Korea.

Korean_War

The UN Command was formally established in Tokyo, commanded by MacArthur, who assigned responsibility for ground action in Korea to Eighth Army commander Walker; naval action to Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, commander, Naval Forces, Far East; and air action to Stratemeyer, commander, FEAF.

[note]

Army Policy

Korean_War Korean_War

Army officials in Washington asked General MacArthur to recheck his figures on 23 July. Perhaps the actual casualties were fewer than the number forecast.

Maj. Gen. William A. Beiderlinden, the FEC G-1, informed Washington that the actual number of men and officers lost in Korea closely approximated his earlier educated guess. The only discrepancy was an excessive missing-in-action rate, which reflected the ability of the North Koreans to envelop the under-strength American units almost at will.

Beiderlinden promised to readjust FEC requirements downward whenever this action became possible. [05-26]

[note]

Korean_War

Two days later General MacArthur reaffirmed his confidence that he could hold the invading communist armies.

Korean_War

Called to a teleconference by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 July and questioned on an enemy move around the left end of his line which resembled the start of a double envelopment, General MacArthur admitted that he lacked the strength to prevent it, but saw it as no serious threat. So long as the North Koreans outnumbered the South Koreans and Americans at a particular location they would always be able to mount enveloping attacks.

But their main effort continued to be in the center of the line, and the basic question was whether they had sufficient strength to force withdrawals there. If his own forces could hold the center, General MacArthur would have no special worry about the incipient envelopment. "If our center is unable to hold," he said, "our perimeter will have to be contracted." Referring to his recent statements to President Truman which had predicted losses as well as successes, General MacArthur pointed out that the situation was developing in accordance with that estimate. [06-34]

General MacArthur's piecemeal commitment in early July 1950 of inadequate American forces weak in firepower, mobility, and reserves against a disciplined, determined, and numerically superior enemy constituted a basic violation of U. S. military doctrine. The violation could not be avoided and the consequences had to be accepted.

Had General MacArthur waited until his ground units were completely combat-ready before sending them against the North Koreans, the entire peninsula would probably have fallen to the communists. But his mission was to assist the Republic of Korea and to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. He parceled out his available means deliberately and in full knowledge of the risk. At the end of July the situation of American forces in Korea remained precarious.

By breaking off with the enemy and retreating swiftly, the battered ground units could have evacuated from Pusan with a good deal of their equipment. Once back in Japan, reconstituted and re-supplied, these forces could have joined other units in a later concerted amphibious assault on Korea at a place of the American commander's choosing.

But never did General MacArthur seriously consider a course other than a fighting withdrawal to a beachhead perimeter around Pusan, with his men delaying the enemy to the limit of their abilities until reinforcement arrived. Costly though it proved, this course avoided the loss of prestige and political ill effects of voluntary evacuation, at the same time providing a build-up area on the peninsula for later exploitation. [06-35]

The extraordinary efforts in Washington and Tokyo during July succeeded in strengthening the unified command in Korea and staving off its complete collapse. The full effects of these efforts, because of distances involved, did not become apparent in Korea until July was nearly over. But with the arrival of new men and new equipment, late in the month, backed by the assured arrival of even greater combat strength in the near future, the odds in favor of ultimate North Korean victory dropped sharply.

[06-34] Telecon, TT 3573, Gens. Bradley, Collins, Norstad, and Adm. Sherman in Washington with Gen. MacArthur in Tokyo, 24 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA files.

[06-35] The North Korean Premier, Kim Il Sung, later remarked on this American tactic as if it were unfair, He said also, in a last appeal to his faltering forces in October 1950,

"The first error we committed was, instead of making a complete siege and annihilating the enemy, we gave them enough lime to regroup and increase their strength while retreating."

See Order from Supreme Commander, NKA, to All Forces, 15 Oct. 50, in ATIS Enemy Docs., Korean Opns, Issue 19, 30 Jan 51, Item 1.

[note]

Korean_War

At any rate, they called General MacArthur to a teleconference on 24 July and asked pointedly whether, in the face of increasing enemy pressure and the stepped-up tempo of the fighting all along the front, he still believed it wise to schedule an amphibious landing for mid-September. Confidently, General MacArthur assured them that,

"barring unforeseen circumstances, and with complete provision of requested replacements, if the full Marine division is provided, the chances to launch the movement in September would be excellent."

Complete tactical surprise was essential to the success of the amphibious operation, he declared, and warned Washington not to give away his intentions, saying

"I cannot emphasize too strongly the necessity for complete secrecy with reference to this matter. The spokesman for the Department of the Army should not reveal our grand strategy in the slightest degree."

Korean_War

The Joint Chiefs of Staff derived little assurance from their exchange with MacArthur. They could only watch and wait for new developments. [08-9]

Korean_War

The predicament of Walker's divisions in Korea concerned General MacArthur far more than was apparent in his reassuring words to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Walker's slowing but continued withdrawal before the North Koreans threatened to render plans for an amphibious operation in September purely academic.

Walker himself was worried and disappointed because his divisions were not stopping the North Koreans. troops often came close to panic and commanders sometimes nearly lost control. Walker was particularly disappointed over the failure to check the enemy advance down the Taejŏn-Taegu axis in late July and early August.

Korean_War Korean_War

Because of the Eighth Army's precarious position, MacArthur took a drastic step which, seemingly, negated his plans for a mid-September landing. He ordered the 2nd Division and the 5th Marine RCT, both on the high seas and both scheduled for his amphibious assault, to sail directly to Korea where they entered combat almost at once.

This move by MacArthur caused his own planning staff to urge a reconsideration of the timing of the proposed operation. To launch an attack by mid September, with his entire assault force now committed in the Pusan Perimeter, seemed to them almost impossible.

Korean_War

If the attack was to be made in September, both the 2nd Division and the Marines would have to be taken away from Walker, or only the Marines withdrawn and teamed with the 7th Division for the amphibious landing.

Korean_War

Officers of JSPOG pointed out to General Almond that if General Walker needed the 2nd Division in August, he would most certainly need it in September.

Also, pulling a division out through the cluttered port at Pusan would tie up supplies and seriously hamper support of Walker's forces remaining on the line. these officers believed that any plan based on use of the 7th Division would be "visionary and impracticable." That division, still in Japan, was at less than half strength, and was not expected to reach full strength before s October or to be ready for amphibious operations before 1951.

They recommended that General MacArthur postpone the target date for the amphibious operation until 15 October. [08-10]

One of General MacArthur's outstanding attributes, demonstrated quite often in World War II, was a keen sense of timing. He had not hesitated in the past to override the recommendations of his staff whenever he felt his judgment was more correct than its counsel. Nor did he hesitate in this case. Apparently, he not only believed that forces for the operation would materialize in time for the landing in September, but also, that he could not afford to wait beyond that date.

General MacArthur's refusal to abandon his mid-September date was influenced by his knowledge of the Inch'ŏn area as well as by his desire to relieve the pressure on the Pusan Perimeter as quickly as he could. October might well be too late. Low seas were common in the Inch'ŏn area from May through August, with September a month of transition to the high seas which prevailed from October through March.

This left September as the only autumn month when conditions were suitable for landing troops and equipment under fire. During only three days, even in September, would the tidal conditions favor a landing. From 15 to 18 September the tidal surges would be high enough to cover the extensive mud flats that fronted Inch'ŏn Harbor and landing craft could be brought in.

The next opportunity would not come until mid-October. By that time seas might be too heavy, and there would be little good weather left for the pursuit and breakout phase of the operation. [08-11]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, meanwhile, been weighing General MacArthur's need for a full Marine division by 10 September against the dangers in cutting Marine strength in other parts of the world. Admiral Sherman proposed and the other Joint Chiefs approved a compromise by which the Marine strength in the Far East Command would be built up to two war-strength RCT's by mid-September.

Even this solution, which would put only two-thirds of a Marine division in Korea by 15 September, would greatly reduce Marine security forces in the United States and cause an extensive call-up of Reserves.

The Joint Chiefs, in a teleconference on 24 July, told MacArthur that,

"We have now determined it is practicable to further augment the Marine Brigade after its arrival in Japan and bring it to division war strength less one RCT by mid-September. We have directed that this be done. The third RCT cannot be furnished until winter."

General MacArthur did not care for this compromise and remonstrated at once.

"Subtraction of an RCT from the Marine division," he contended, "tends to jeopardize the entire conception and would involve risks that cannot be determined finally at this time. I regard the third RCT as essential."

Korean_War

But Washington officials stood firm. They explained, with forbearance, that the only trained Marine battalions left after sending two regiments to the Far East Command would be one battalion in the 2nd Marine Division, one afloat in the Mediterranean, and a battalion of school troops at Quantico, Virginia. These they considered the minimum for absolutely essential needs in the Atlantic. [09-23]

[09-23] (1) Memo, CNO for JCS, 24 Jul. 50, sub: Deployment of Fleet Marine Forces to the fec, cited in Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. V, ch. IV, p. 14. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS and CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

The brief description presented orally to General Collins during his visit apparently had not justified sufficiently the need for immediate deployment of the RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked General MacArthur for a more detailed explanation of the mission he would give the airborne RCT in the landing operation. On 23 July, General MacArthur replied that he planned to mount an airdrop from Japan, landing the airborne troops in the Inch'ŏn objective area as soon after D-day as the situation warranted. They were to seize a key communication center immediately ahead of troops advancing out of the beachhead area.

At this time, when it was not at all certain that sufficient amphibious forces could be sent to MacArthur or that the landing at Inch'ŏn would even be made, MacArthur's requirement for airborne troops appeared, to Army officials, secondary.

Korean_War

The condition of the 11th Airborne Division, moreover, remained such that the Department of the Army deemed it impractical to send any of the division's regiments into combat in September. Army authorities informed General MacArthur in teleconference that the RCT would be operational in Japan by 23 October, but that he could not count upon using it in his landing operations.

24th

In turn, MacArthur remonstrated once again, asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff expedite the arrival of the unit. [09-45]

[09-45] (
1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50.
(2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA with CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.

[note]

Korean_War

On 24 July, Weyland persuaded the FEC staff to accept a general scheme whereby two B-29 groups would attack deep communications, and one would provide close support.

Korean_War

Since this plan meant that no B-29s would be available to bomb war-supporting industrial targets in North Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that they were prepared to dispatch two additional B-29 groups on temporary duty to be used against targets they would name in North Korea.

Korean_War Korean_War

General MacArthur accepted, and the 98th and 307th Groups commenced moving across the Pacific.

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The 98th joined the 92nd Group at Yokota, and the 307th joined the 19th and 22nd Groups at Kadena.

A Bomber Command Advance Echelon was opened at Kadena to handle any last-minute changes in mission orders issued by FEAF.

Logistic support for the B-29s was scarce; accordingly, it became standing procedure that there would be no changes in bomb loadings at Kadena.

The FEAF Bomber Command had no difficulty handling the industrial targets in North Korea, but its major task was in cutting bridges and knocking out marshaling yards ranging roughly from the Han River toward the Yalu.

Enjoying control of the air and operating without meeting much ground fire, the B-29s cut concrete-span bridges rather easily with 500-pound general-purpose (GP) bombs--admittedly not the best choice in armament but versatile enough to be used despite frequent last minute changes in targets.

The Japanese had previously spanned major streams with heavy steel bridges, and these were more difficult to drop. No bridge was so perverse as the steel-cantilever, west railway bridge across the Han at Sŏul.

Only the 19th Group had racks for large bombs, so its planes attacked the bridge almost daily with 1,000-pound, 2,000-pound, and 4,000-pound GP bombs.

[note]

Korean_War

[note]


Korean_War

Railroad cars loaded with barbed wire at Taegu RTO [Railway transportation Office], Korea. 07/24/1950 Photographer, Riley. Sergeant War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

[note]

Korean_War


ES92-52-1 (SC344020) American Army Engineers use a native two-wheeled cart to remove large boulders from a river bed as they clear a route for the advance of American motor vehicles. 24 Jul 1950.

[note]

Nogun-ri


Korean_War Korean_War

On July, 24,1950 , when refugees appeared in the Division Command Post area,1st Cavalry Division personnel loaded refugees on trains headed for Kŭmch'ŏn. Upon arrival, the CIC interrogated the refugees and detained the suspicious ones. The remaining refugees were told to continue south. The 1st Cavalry Division dropped leaflets on small villages in the area, telling the people to move north because the U.S. forces would treat them as the enemy if refugees occupied the combat area. 23

[note]


Korean_War

The situation is best summed up in the 1st Cavalry Division War Diary entry for July 24, 1950 :

"The control of refugees presented a difficult problem. No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all." 72

72
War Diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 Jul 50. In Box 42, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian’s Office Organizational History Files, Entry 34407, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

The U.S. Army developed a good understanding of the NKPA's tactics soon after entering combat in Korea. However, personnel shortages, pre-war cuts to the force structure, and little experience in earlier wars with an enemy willing to exploit civilians on the battlefield handicapped the Eighth Army's efforts in July 1950 to use American doctrine effectively when dealing with such tactics as practiced by a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated enemy. Determining with certainty how this knowledge of North Korean tactics may have influenced 1st Cavalry Division soldiers' actions, and the actions of all U.S. soldiers, in the early days of combat is impossible. However, the soldiers were wary, and even prudently apprehensive, of the Korean civilian populace.

To behave otherwise would have exposed soldiers to grave risks.

The first few weeks of the Korean War severely exposed the U.S. Army to a number of its own shortcomings as discussed in this chapter. These shortcomings, which were the result of peacetime readiness issues, training shortfalls, complex refugee problems, and ignorance of the NKPA's tactics, painted a bleak and daunting picture for the U.S. Army's continued prosecution of the war.

This myriad of problems and challenges, both on and off the battlefield, represented the conditions that would define all units fighting in Korea in the first few weeks of the conflict. An appreciation and understanding of these factors help to clarify, and explain, the circumstances faced by the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea, one of the first U.S. units to clash with the NKPA in July 1950 .

[note]

Korean_War

25th Infantry Division War Diary dated July 24, 1950 --

"Continued use was made by the enemy of troops infiltrated into our rear for additional support. The white-clad soldiers continued to appear. Native personnel in the combat zone must be considered hostile until proven friendly." 59

59
War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

[note]


Photograph 2
July 24,1950

Korean_War


"Fire in a section of Yŏngdong which was started by enemy artillery caused no appreciable damage to either American personnel or equipment."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 1088.
49

[note]

XII. July 24, 1950

Korean_War

The battle on July 24 continued with artillery and mortar fire and increased enemy infiltration. The enemy initiated a series of ambushes behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on the battalion's main supply route. Attacks made by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, supported by tanks from Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, to clear this obstacle proved unsuccessful.

The battalion commander was wounded and subsequently evacuated.

The 8th Cavalry realized that they needed better defensive positions or the NKPA would trap the regiment in Yŏngdong just like the 34th Infantry at Taejŏn.

Korean_War Korean_War

The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry attached, and the 77th Field Artillery Battalion in support, shifted from its positions east of Yŏngdong to the high ground southwest of town to meet this threat while the remainder of 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry remained in position east of Yŏngdong.

Korean_War Korean_War

The purpose of this maneuver was to defend the area west of Yŏngdong, thus preventing the 3rd NKPA Division from outflanking the 1st Cavalry Division or penetrating the undefended American rear area.

[note]

Korean_War

By the evening of July 24, both threats became serious enough to require a withdrawal from Yŏngdong. 41

41 War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

Korean_War

Realizing the serious danger to the 8th Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry Division issued Operations Plan 10-50, calling for a disengagement and withdrawal of the 8th Cavalry to keep the NKPA from outflanking the regiment and decisively engaging the cavalrymen in Yŏngdong. 42

42 Operations plan, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 July 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army commands, 1st Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

Korean_War

The Eighth Army's strategy did not include fighting for every town and village. The Eighth Army lacked the necessary strength for that purpose. Instead, the Eighth Army opted to withdraw behind the last major defensible terrain feature, the Naktong River.

Korean_War

The division's withdrawal became part of this army-level strategy. The plan called for the 5th Cavalry to support the 8th Cavalry's disengagement from the NKPA and rearward movement out of Yŏngdong toward Hwanggan, where the 8th Cavalry would assume the role of the division's reserve.

[note]

Korean_War

With the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, employed on the east coast, the already under-strength 7th Cavalry lacked a reserve force. Ordered to reorganize the regiment to create a reserve (called a "provisional force" in the quotation below), Colonel Nist, the regimental commander, made his estimate of the situation very clear in a conversation with the division operations officer on July 24:

I have no wish to "fight the problem"[;] however I feel that I must point out the following simple facts:
a. That if this force is employed there will be no Headquarters Company, 7th Cavalry (Inf) since I have taken every available man including communications personnel in order to give the maximum firepower to my provisional force.
b. That I have irreparably crippled the 2nd Battalion because I have stripped their motor section of drivers, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and ammunition in forming the provisional force. 44
44 War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

Despite the regimental commander's reservations, he had no alternative. Fortunately, this provisional force was never committed and the 7th Cavalry, less its 1st Battalion, went forward as originally organized.

[note]

Korean_War

On July 24, the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group (re-designated from squadron status two days earlier) assumed control of the Tactical Air Control Center; the Tactical Air Control Parties; and, for a short period, the airborne controllers, who, beginning on July 15, were called Mosquitoes. 85

85 Hist 5AF, Vol. I, Chap. III, p. 25;
Hist 6147 TCS (A), Jul 50, p. 7;
5AF Combat Operations History, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The remainder of the 7th Cavalry moved forward to the Yŏngdong area, arriving in its designated assembly area near the village Sot Anmak in the late afternoon of July 24. The 7th Cavalry's mission was to prevent enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry in the event the 8th Cavalry could not break contact and move east from Yŏngdong. 15

15 Ibid and Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

[note]

South then North

Korean_War Korean_War

A word needs to be said about the men of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, who were driven from or left their positions west of Taejŏn during the morning of 20 July and climbed into the hills south of the Nonsan road. Most of them escaped. These men traveled all night. One large party of 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, troops, which included Captain Barszcz' G Company, 19th Infantry, was led by Captain Marks. It passed through Kŭmsan, where a few small parties turned east toward Yŏngdong. But the main party continued south, believing the enemy might have cut the road eastward. On the 23rd this group encountered some ROK trucks and shuttled south in them until they broke down.

The next day the entire party [of the men of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry] loaded into a boxcar train it met and rode the last 50 miles into the south coast port of Yŏsu, 110 air miles south of Taejŏn and 80 air miles west of Pusan.

[note]

In the attack on the 21st, observers estimated that naval gunfire from the Juneau alone killed 400 North Korean soldiers. Even though enemy troops again held Yŏngdök they were unable to exploit their success immediately because they were held under pulverizing artillery and mortar fire, naval gunfire, and almost continuous daylight air strikes. In their efforts to execute wide enveloping moves around the flank of the ROK troops over mountainous terrain, barren of trees and other cover, they came under decimating fire.

On 24 July alone the North Koreans lost 800 casualties to this gunfire, according to prisoners. One enemy battalion was virtually destroyed when naval gunfire from the east and air strikes from the west pocketed it and held it under exploding shells, bombs, and strafing fires. [12-6]

Korean_War

The reconstituted ROK 22nd Regiment arrived from Taegu, and about 500 men of the ROK naval combat team and its engineer battalion were sent to buttress the east coast force. [12-7]

All the troops on the east coast were now reorganized into a new ROK 3rd Division.

[note]

Beginning on 9 July a succession of American units had performed security missions at Yŏnil Airfield below P'ohang-dong; first the 3d battalion of the 19th Infantry, then the 2d Battalion of the 27th Infantry,
next the 1st Battalion of the 35th Infantry, and that in turn gave way to the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Thus, in the course of two weeks, battalion-size units of all three United States divisions then
in Korea had constituted a security force in the P'ohang-dong area behind the ROK 23d Regiment.

Lt. Col. Peter D. Clainos' 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had orders to support the ROK troops with fire only. But on 23 July, North Koreans surrounded the 81-mm. mortar platoon of D Company, forcing it to fight at close range. That same day, C Company on Round Top (Hill 181), at the southern outskirts of Yŏngdök, watched in silence as North Korean and ROK troops fought a seesaw battle in its vicinity. That night North Koreans surrounded the hill and C Company troops spent a sleepless night.

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The next day when the ROK's regained temporary possession of Yŏngdök the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division replaced Colonel Clainos' battalion in the, blocking mission behind the ROK's at Yŏngdök. [12-8]

Despite the savage pounding it received from naval, artillery, and mortar fire and aerial bombardments, the N.K. 5th Division held on to the hills two miles south of Yŏngdök. The ROK's adopted a plan of making counter and probing attacks during the day and withdrawing to prepared positions in an all-around perimeter for the night. The saturation support fires delivered by the United States Navy, Air Force, and Army day and night outside this perimeter caused many enemy casualties.

Certain key pieces of terrain, such as Round Top (Hill 181), often changed hands several times in one day. Unfortunately, many civilians were killed in this area as they tried to move through the lines and were caught by the supporting fires.

Just south of Hill 181 and its surrounding rough ground, a small river, the Osip-ch'ŏn, descends the coastal range to the Sea of Japan. South of it, sheer mountain walls press the coastal road against the shoreline for ten miles in the direction of P'ohang-dong, twenty-five miles away. If the ROK's lost control of the Yŏngdök area, this bottleneck on the coastal road would be the scene of the next effort to stop the North Koreans.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

The 24th Infantry Division had completed its movement to Korea by 6 July. Hard on its heels the 25th Division began to move, its first elements loading at Moji on Shimonoseki Strait on the 8th, and subsequent echelons at Inland Sea ports and at Sasebo; for this movement Japanese time-chartered ships were extensively used.

Korean_War

The third major Army unit to be lifted from Japan was the 1st Cavalry Division, and this, since handling facilities at Pusan were clogging from overload, was put in over the beaches.

This movement was accomplished by Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group, temporarily augmented by the loan from MSTS of two AKAs, three T-APs, one ocean tug, five LSTs, and four time-chartered Japanese Marus.

Korean_War

Late in July the final intra-theater movement of the initial phase brought in two battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment from Okinawa. On the 16th MSTS assigned two Japanese passenger vessels and a cargo ship to this lift, and on the 24th these troops were landed at Pusan.

[note]

Korean_War

On 14 July the ROK Army activated its II Corps with headquarters at Hamch'ang. It was composed of the 6th and 8th Divisions and the 23rd Regiment. This corps controlled ROK operations in the eastern mountains and, to the extent that it could, it tried to control the 23rd Regiment on the east coast. [12-15] But this latter effort never amounted to very much.

It looks like this actually occurred on the 24th and was made up of the 1st and 6th IDs - as per Order of Battle,....

The 23rd IR was in the 3rd ID

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Finally, on 24 July, the ROK Army reorganized itself with two corps and five divisions. ROK I Corps controlled the 8th and Capital Divisions; ROK II Corps controlled the 1st and 6th Divisions. The 2nd Division was inactivated and its surviving elements were integrated into the 1st Division.

A reconstituted ROK 3rd Division was placed under direct ROK Army control. The principal reason for doing this was the division's isolated position on the east coast, away from effective co-ordinated control by I Corps with the 8th and Capital Divisions westward across the main Taebaek Range.

The ROK divisions held the east central and eastern parts of the United Nations line.


To the right (east) of the American troops was,

This ROK Army organization and position on line remained relatively stable for the next two months. [12-16]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

The ROK 6th Division continued its hard-fought action on the road through the mountains from Mun'gyŏng, but gradually it fell back from in front of the N.K. 1st Division. In the mountains above Hamch'ang the ROK 6th Division on 24 July destroyed 7 enemy T34 tanks.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

Thus, by 24 July the U.S. 25th Division had taken over from the ROK 1st and 2nd Divisions the sector from ,Sangju westward to the Seoul-
Taegu highway, and these ROK troops were moving into the line eastward and northward from, Sangju on the Hamch'ang front. [12-22]

[note]

During 23 July the 7th and 9th Regiments of the N.K. 3rd Division began their attack on the Yŏngdong positions. The enemy made his first penetration southwest of Yŏngdong, establishing a roadblock a mile and a half behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, at the same time other units heavily engaged the 1st Battalion northwest of Yŏngdong in frontal attack.

Korean_War

The next day [24th] four different attempts by three American light tanks failed to dislodge the enemy behind the 2nd Battalion, and Lt. Col. Eugene J. Field, the 2nd Battalion commander, was wounded at the roadblock.

Korean_War

General Palmer sent the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and the 16th Reconnaissance Company toward the cutoff battalion. By noon, enemy troops were attacking the 99th and 61st Field Artillery Battalions which were supporting the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, indicating that the infiltration had been extensive. [12-39]

On the other approach road, northwest of Yŏngdong, heavy automatic fire from quad-50's, 37-mm. fire from A Battery of the 92nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and artillery fire from the 77th Field Artillery Battalion helped the 1st Battalion there to repel enemy attacks.

The large numbers of Korean refugees crowding the Yŏngdong area undoubtedly helped the enemy infiltrate the 1st Cavalry Division positions.

On 24 July, for example, a man dressed in white carrying a heavy pack, and accompanied by a woman appearing to be pregnant, came under suspicion. The couple was searched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions.

Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police, permitting it only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes. [12-40]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

The ROK 17th Regiment fought in the hills for the next two days [24,25] , making some limited gains, and then it moved back to Sangju in the ROK Army reorganization in progress. This left only the U.S. 24th Infantry Regiment guarding the west approach to Sangju from the
Mun'gyŏng plateau.

The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operations west of Sangju. Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. They abandoned weapons on positions.

On one occasion the 3d Battalion withdrew from a hill and left behind 12 .30-caliber and 3 .50-caliber machine guns, 8 60-mm. mortars, 3 81-mm. mortars, 4 3.5-inch rocket launchers, and 102 rifles.

On another occasion, L Company took into position 4 officers and 105 enlisted men; a few days later, when the company was relieved in its position, there were only 17 men in the foxholes. The number of casualties and men evacuated for other reasons in the interval had been 1 officer and 17 enlisted men, leaving 3 officers and 88 enlisted men unaccounted for. As the relieved unit of 17 men moved down off the mountain it swelled in numbers to 1 officer and 35 enlisted men by the time it reached the bottom. [12-25]

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Effective 24 July, [because the back dated it] the advance group of the Air Force was designated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea.

[note]

Korean_War

When General Walker asked for aerial reconnaissance of southwest Korea on 23 July, he had at hand a G-2 estimate of the enemy situation in the west below the Kum, just provided at his request. This estimate postulated that elements of one division were in the southwest. It estimated the rate of progress at two miles an hour and calculated that if the enemy turned east he could reach the Anŭi-Chinju line in the Chiri Mountains by 25 July. [9] This proved to be an accurate forecast.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

On 20 July at Yokohama, Major Raibl learned that the two battalions would not come to Japan but would sail directly for Korea, where they would receive at least ten days of intensive field training in the vicinity of Pusan before they would be committed.

When Major Raibl arrived at Taegu on 22 July, he found Col. Allan D. MacLean, Eighth Army Assistant G-3, in no mood to listen to or discuss the lack of combat readiness of the 29th Infantry. Raibl talked at length with General Walker, who was sympathetic but indicated that the situation was urgent.

When he left Taegu, Raibl understood that the two battalions would have a minimum of three days at Pusan to draw equipment and zero-in and test fire their weapons. [19]

Korean_War

Instead, when the two battalions disembarked at Pusan the morning of 24 July orders from Eighth Army awaited them to proceed to Chinju. There they would be attached to the 19th Infantry Regiment.

[note]

Korean_War

Then, on 24 July, General MacArthur established a formal United Nations Command with headquarters in Tokyo.

[note]

Korean_War

Among the alternate proposals to Inch'ŏn, in addition to the Kunsan plan favored by the Navy, was one for a landing in the P'osŭng-myŏn area thirty miles south of Inch'ŏn and opposite Osan. On the 23rd, Admiral Doyle had proposed a landing there with the purpose of striking inland to Osan and there severing the communications south of Sŏul.

Korean_War

On the 24th, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (USMC), called on General MacArthur and asked him to change the landing site to this area-all to no avail. MacArthur remained resolute on Inch'ŏn.

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

Upon their return to Washington, Collins and Sherman went over the whole matter of the Inch'ŏn landing with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[note]

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500724 0000 DSC DUBINSKY

19500724 0000 DSC DUBINSKY, STEPHEN*

19500724 0000 DSC JUNG

19500724 0000 DSC JUNG, GORDON C.

19500724 0000 DSC LOVISKA

19500724 0000 DSC LOVISKA, FRANCIS

 

Silver Star

Caro, Lonial W. [SFC SS B11thFAB]

Dworshak, Michael A. [PFC SS B5thCR]

Feinberg, Irwin [1stLt G11FAB]

Grigsby, Claron [Cpl SS B27thIR]

Halstead, Thomas F. [PFC SS B27thIR]

Hayes, Robert L., Jr. [2ndLt SS HMCo27thIR]

Kirchner, Charles A. [PFC SS HvyMortarCo27thIR]

Perry, Trevor J. [2ndLt SS MedCo27thIR]

Powell, John S. [SFC HvyMtrCo27thIR]

Reffner, Emerson Luther [1stLt SS A99thFAB]

Watson, James R. [Lt SS1 1stCD]

Weston, Logan E. [Capt SS A27thIR]

Wilder, Raymond L. [PFC SS MG G1stMR]

 

[note]

 

The Forgotten War

Korean_War

By the morning of July 23 the NKPA was again on the move. Its 3rd Division and armored elements, deploying on both roads leading eastward to Taegu, simultaneously struck the widely separated 1/8 and 2/8.

Korean_War Korean_War

Robert Kane's; 1/8, equipped with 3.5-inch bazookas and backed by the steady and skilled 77th FAB, commanded by West Pointer (1933) William A. ("Billy") Harris, and A/A weapons, held stoutly on the Taegu - Taejŏn road.

However, Eugene J. Field's 2/8, backed by Alden Hatch's 61st FAB, was promptly encircled and cut off.[6-44]

Korean_War

All that day and the next Hap Gay made desperate efforts to block the oncoming NKPA and to extricate Field's isolated and besieged 2/8.

Korean_War

Rosie Rohsenberger was willing - even eager - to do all in his power to help, but the sudden shock of battle and his serious hearing impairment rendered him all but helpless.

There was yet another problem: The leadership in Rohsenberger's 1/5 was chaotic, or worse. The outfit had been brought to Korea by West Pointer (1931) Glenn F. Rogers, forty-three, but Rogers left almost immediately for KMAG.

He was temporarily replaced by a 1/5 company commander, a former enlisted man who had won a battlefield commission in World War II. However, after merely two days he collapsed from heat and exhaustion, said: he "couldn't go on," and evacuated himself as an NBC.

He was replaced by the able regimental S-3, Charles J. Parziale, but he was wounded almost immediately and evacuated (he would return).

A cool, newly arrived, decorated (two Silver Stars, two Purple Hearts) veteran of World War II, James M. Gibson, twenty-nine, named S-3 of the battalion, attempted to hold the headquarters together.[6-45]

[note]

Korean_War

In the fighting on July 24 Gene Field, the commander of the surrounded and besieged 2/8, wounded twice in World War II, was wounded again - this, time very seriously - and his exec, Gerald Robbins, thirty-three, replaced him.

[note]

Korean_War

The full force of the NKPA 2nd Division attack came upon the Wolf-hounds in a ground fog early on July 24, led by six T-34 tanks.

Korean_War

Gilbert Check's 1/27 was deployed forward to receive it, holding the high ground flanking the Poŭn road.

Several tanks crashed through to Check's CP, raising Cain with 85-mm guns, but Check's men grabbed 3.5-inch bazookas and stalked at close range, knocking out three.

When the fog cleared, Check called for an air strike.

The three F-80 jets which responded each got a tank, for a grand total of six.

Meanwhile, the Wolfhounds holding the high ground on the flanks repulsed the NKPA infantry in ferocious close combat.

Believing the NKPA might remount the attack that night in an effort to encircle the 1/27, Michaelis ordered Check to withdraw quietly through Gordon Murch's 2/27.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War to the Korean_War on 24 July

The battalions [6-1/29 & 3/29] strengthened by the addition of 400 draftees who had arrived in Okinawa from the States only the day before, had departed Okinawa on July 21 by ship.

As Wilson and Mott understood the plan, the battalions would go first to Japan for six weeks of field training, then to Korea. But the urgency of the situation dictated direct movement to Korea - without field training.

The 3/29's exec, Tony J. Raibl, thirty-nine, who acted as advance man for both battalions, protested these orders directly to Walker in Taegu, but to no avail. Upon landing at Pusan on July 24, both battalions were trucked to the 19th Regiment at Chinju so quickly that the men did not even have time to calibrate rifles, test-fire mortars, or clean the Cosmoline from the machine guns.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

In preparation for this battle both Moore and Michaelis received significant reinforcements: a platoon each of six Sherman medium tanks, mounting 76mm guns. These tanks, salvaged from World War II battle fields during Operation Rollup and refurbished by the Japanese, comprised the advance elements of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, which Eighth Army had activated in mid-July and assigned initially to the 24th Division.

Korean_War

The battalion commander, Welborn G. ("Tom") Dolvin (West Point, 1939; ), thirty-four, who had fought in Italy and the ETO, remembered how his outfit was thrown together:

"On July twelfth, while on the golf course, I. got verbal word that my orders had been changed to Korea. I met a cadre of a hundred fifty-five men from the Second Armored Division in California on July seventeenth. We flew to Tokyo, arriving on July nineteenth, where we picked up another cadre of seventy men. My A Company [1st Bn] left Tokyo by ship on July twenty-fourth and arrived in Pusan on July thirty-first. I flew over and met them on the dock at Pusan that day a mere fifteen days after activation of the outfit . We left Pusan for Masan, joining the Nineteenth and Twenty-seventh regiments on the following day."[7-3]

[note]

Korean_War

MacArthur and Almond conducted all Inch'ŏn planning behind an elaborate wall of secrecy. Even so, the North Koreans probably knew in advance that an amphibious envelopment on the west coast of Korea was in the works. Reporters accredited to GHQ, Tokyo, and the Pentagon were briefed off the record well in advance and informed their home offices for planning purposes.

In its July 24, 1950, issue Time magazine speculated that an Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter "could be supported by Allied amphibious attacks behind the North Korean lines on either coast." See Focus of Hope.

In Tokyo the war correspondents freely discussed Inch'ŏn, ridiculing the security measures as "Operation Common Knowledge." Tokyo and Japanese seaports, where the ships were loading out for Inch'ŏn were no doubt infiltrated by communist spies. Two Soviet spies, Guy Burgess and H. A. R. ("Kim") Philby, then working in the British Embassy in Washington, had access to private discussions and secret documents relating to the Korean War.

The rumors or hard information received in P'yŏngyang presented the NKPA with vexing questions. Was the information true or a deception planted by the Americans? If true, exactly where would the amphibious force strike? Owing to the hazards entailed, Inch'ŏn seemed unlikely. The invasion could come at any place on the west coast from Chinnamp'o, near P'yŏngyang, to Kunsan. Or it might come on the east coast, at Wŏnsan or elsewhere. Having committed most of its forces to the Pusan Perimeter, the NKPA lacked resources to mount effective defenses at one possibility, let alone several.

The best NKPA defense to an amphibious envelopment in its rear indeed, the only feasible defense was to make one last do-or-die attempt to crack the Pusan Perimeter and overrun Eighth Army. A decisive NKPA victory in the perimeter would almost certainly force a cancellation of the amphibious invasion.

[note]

Korean_War

In any case, the situation the NKPA faced at the Pusan Perimeter demanded a do-or-die offensive. The invasion of South Korea had been postulated on a quick, easy victory over the ROKs.

Owing to the American intervention, the once fast-moving and victorious NKPA troops were now virtually stalemated in costly, indecisive, and discouraging positional warfare. The NKPA was losing the logistical and manpower battles. Inevitably it would lose the war.

[note]

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

The fact that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb in [on 8/29/49] 1949 and broken the U.S. monopoly may have had some influence upon this decision, but it is just as possible that the fluid nature of the war and the moral implications of using the terrible weapon again may also have served as deterrents.#20

#20 The influential Bulletin of Atomic Scientists maintained in an editorial on 24 July 1950 that the atom bomb would be utterly useless in Korea since the destruction of the North Korean capital, for example, would not destroy the fighting capacity of the enemy's army.

[The killing of the leadership would sure slow it down a lot]

[note]

US Air Force

 

General Eubank departs for the ZI from Haneda. At 1145 hours Air Vice Marshal Ragg, the senior air staff officer to Air Vice Marshal Fogarty, and Air Commodore Davies, Air Officer Commanding Hong Kong, Wing Commander Barclay, the air liaison attached to the British Embassy here in Tokyo, and Squadron Leader Sach, who is attached to FEAF on an exchange basis, called.[145-AVM Robert L. Ragg; AVM Sir Francis J. Fogarty, Commander in Chief, British Far East Air Force; Air Commodore A.D. Davies; Wg Cdr Ronald A.C. Barclay; Sqdn Ldr John F. Sach. British Far East Air Forces (BFEAF) was headquartered in Singapore.] Took them all to lunch at the Union Club.


Annalee and I had a few members of FEAF call at the house at 1800 hours to have cocktails with us and to honor General and Mrs. Doolittle.


Weather very favorable. B-29s report best visibility since they began their interdiction campaign.


Fifth AF Advance Hqs now set up along side Eighth Army Advance Hqs.[146-Just after midnight, 5AF Headquarters (Advanced) became operational at Taegu. Later that day it was renamed Headquarters, 5th Air Force in Korea. Located next to Walker’s Eighth Army headquarters, this headquarters (commanded by General Partridge personally) directed the tactical air war in Korea. This arrangement helped shorten the time between when air support requests were received and when they were accomplished. In Japan, 5AF Headquarters (Rear) continued to function from Nagoya for air defense of the country and for logistical and administrative matters. From August 10, it was commanded by Brig Gen Delmar T. Spivey, who became a 5AF vice commander that day. (Futrell, p 104.)]


Sent radio to Partridge asking to be kept fully informed re:


Is he able to meet Walker's requirements on threatened left flanking movement around 8th Army? Request number of sorties devoted to area between Taejon and 1st Cav front lines subsequent to evac[uation] of Taejon; and what effort devoted to enemy activities in Yongdok area. Also, is there sufficiency of AT-6s and/or liaison a/c for control purposes? Again he is to keep me posted. [Underlining in original.]

 

[note]

 

Korean_War later Korean_War

On 16 July the first echelon of Fifth Air Force Advance headquarters was flown from Itazuke to new quarters in the city of Taegu, and by 24 July the whole body was located at that forward area.** Effective on 24 July the advance echelon was redesignated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea. [latter in the month is happens, and is set to be retro-active]

[note]

elastic bridge

Korean_War

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week
30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks
06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks
13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks
20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

Korean_War

By 24 July FEAF figured that its bombers had destroyed 58 bridges and had damaged 31 others during the period in which MacArthur had held all bombers to close and general support of ground troops.

"Effectiveness of FEAF Interdiction Plan," Stratemeyer cabled USAF, "is hampered by close and general support requirements necessarily imposed by CINCFE."

A contradictory opinion was expressed by the chairman of the GHQ Target Group, who forwarded his superior a map of bridges destroyed ( see fig. 6 ) and concluded his report as follows:

It is very evident from a study of this map and the road and rail lines, that the operations of the enemy have been seriously impeded by the bombing operations and that his concentration of troops and supplies, had we not hit these centers, would have been so much more easily accomplished that our forces certainly would not have been able to withstand the continued assaults as effectively as has been the case.

Korean_War

[note]

Korean_War

On 19 July the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) was back with orders to support the ground troops, a matter of some surprise to Partridge and Walker since GHQ had arranged it without consulting them. General Partridge insisted that the carrier pilots must follow the same operating procedure as Fifth Air Force flyers, and despite early complaints by Navy pilots that they could not raise MELLOW control, better liaison produced satisfactory strikes on 25 July and more were scheduled for the following two days.

[So what happened on the 19 20, 21, 22, 23 ad 24th? then 25, 26 and 27th]

[note]

Air Organization for Tactical Operations

Korean_War

To meet this bifurcated mission of offense and defense, General Partridge divided his Fifth Air Force headquarters and command. He, together with Brig. Gen. Edward J. Timberlake , Fifth Air Force vice-commander, took to the field with an advance echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters (designated Fifth Air Force in Korea after 24 July) and assumed the tactical mission outlined.

Korean_War

A rear echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters, under Brig. Gen. Delmar T. Spivey , also designated Fifth Air Force vice-commander, remained behind in Nagoya; General Spivey, who assumed the duty on 10 August, was to supervise the air defense of Japan, logistical and administrative support of the advance headquarters and its units, replacement training, personnel processing, air-sea rescue for Japan and Korea, maintenance and operation of Japanese airdromes, and operational control of antiaircraft artillery in Japan.

In short, the Fifth Air Force in Korea fought the tactical air war while Fifth Air Force Rear maintained occupational and air defense responsibilities in Japan. Unable to break off completely from its old duties in Japan, the Fifth Air Force was forced to divide its headquarters staff just as it had already divided its tactical units.

[note]

Korean_War

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 17, 18.,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26

Despite the dubious results of medium bombers in close support, General O'Donnell was required to reserve 15 aircraft each day for primary effort against tactical targets along the battle line, and between 10 and 26 July he used 130 B-29 sorties in such activity.

[note]

Tactical Build-up in Korea and Kyushu

5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27, 30 aug 3,4

Korean_War

Although the airfields were barely of minimum standard, the Fifth Air Force rushed temporarily designated units into Korea with a speed confusing to participants. The 6002nd Air Base Squadron was organized at Sasebo effective 6 July, with directions to proceed to Pusan on or about the same day and establish a base there. At Pusan the squadron was directed on to Taegu where it took over establishment of an operational air base. One officer has left a vivid description of the first days at Taegu:

It may be stated without equivocation that many "lost souls" were located at Taegu. Morale was beginning to be a problem for personnel did not know what their mission was and many men skilled in technical specialties in the maintenance of aircraft and equipment found that there were few aircraft to be maintained and many ditches to be dug. We were in an area of filth, amidst rice paddies filled with water and human excreta. We were sleeping and living in pup tents, under shelter halves, in the paddies and on the hillsides. During the rains the hillsides became torrents and the paddies became even more full of filth.

The Fifth Air Force redesignated the squadron as the 6002nd Air Base Unit on 12 July, but the unit did not learn of its new name until 27 July because communications back to Itazuke were uncertain during the month. A provisional fighter unit hurried into Taegu after a brief formative period in Japan. The Fifth Air Force established Detachment 1 of the 36th Fighter- Bomber Squadron at Itazuke on 27 June, equipped the detachment-better known by its code name of BOUT-ONE - with F-51's, and moved it to Taegu.

6, 12, 27

Korean_War

At the same time the Thirteenth Air Force was forming another F-51 squadron, utilizing the personnel of the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron. This so-called DALLAS squadron left Clark on 10 July, was flown to Johnson where it picked up F-51's, and by 15 July it had flown its first missions in combat. These two provisional units were combined at Taegu on 10 July as the 51st Fighter Squadron, Single Engine (Provisional).

6, 10, 12, 15, 27

On 16 July the first echelon of Fifth Air Force Advance headquarters was flown from Itazuke to new quarters in the city of Taegu, and by 24 July the whole body was located at that forward area.**

**The Joint Operations Center had already opened at Taejŏn on 5 July and had moved back to Taegu on 16 July 1950.

5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27

Effective on 24 July the advance echelon was redesignated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea. Movement of additional tactical organizations to Korea awaited the re-equipment of those units with F-51's from the United States. The aircraft carrier USS Boxer (CV-21), which managed an eight day crossing of the Pacific, brought 145 F-51's which had been assembled for delivery by 27 July. General Stratemeyer had already prepared to use these F-51's when on 11 July he had approved a plan to move the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group with its 12th and 67th Squadrons from the Philippines for temporary duty with the Fifth Air Force. By 30 July this contingent had converted to F-51's at Johnson, and on 3 August it had reached Taegu, where, next day [4 August], the 51st Fighter Squadron (P) was returned to its old designation as the 12th Squadron.

5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27, 30 aug 3,4

With the arrival of a fighter group, the air base unit at Taegu was redesignated and expanded to become the 6002nd Fighter Wing, Single Engine, comprising temporary duty squadrons typical of a wing organization. Hardly had this new organization been set up on 1 August, than the threat of an enemy attack at Taegu forced the withdrawal of all heavy equipment and large portions of the personnel. The 67th Squadron went back to Ashiya and on 6-7 August the remainder of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group followed it there.

5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27, 30 aug 3,4, 6, 7, 8,

On 8 August the 6002nd Fighter Wing also moved back to Ashiya, leaving behind a newly activated 6149th Air Base Unit to serve 18th Group fighters as they staged through Taegu on combat missions. Other aircraft managed the same routine, and a total of 2,368 sorties were flown from Taegu during August and early September. (about 50 per 45 days)

* - United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict 25 June - 1 November 1950 was prepared 1 July 1952 as USAF Historical Study No. 71. The study was researched by Air Force Historian Dr. Albert Simpson and Dr. Robert Futrell. Dr. Futrell wrote the 115+ page report along with several follow-up studies leading to the comprehensive "The United States Air Force in Korea." originally published in 1961 and reprinted in 1996 (ISBN 912799-71-4).

[note]

On 16 July the first echelon of Fifth Air Force Advance headquarters was flown from Itazuke to new quarters in the city of Taegu, and by 24 July the whole body was located at that forward area.** Effective on 24 July the advance echelon was redesignated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea.

Korean_War

North American F-51D "Mustang"

**The Joint Operations Center had already opened at Taejŏn on 5 July and had moved back to Taegu on 16 July 1950.

[note]

On 8 July President Truman named General MacArthur "as commander of military forces assisting the Republic of Korea which are placed under the unified command of the United States by members of the United Nations."#3

Several days later, in deference to world-wide political reasons, Washington advised MacArthur that, whenever practicable, he should identify himself as "Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces."

On 24 July General MacArthur formally established the United Nations Command (UNC) and assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC).#4

[note]

On 16 July the first echelon of Fifth Air Force Advance headquarters was flown from Itazuke to new quarters in the city of Taegu, and by 24 July the whole body was located at that forward area.**

**The Joint Operations Center had already opened at Taejŏn on 5 July and had moved back to Taegu on 16 July 1950.

5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27

Effective on 24 July the advance echelon was redesignated as the Fifth Air Force in Korea. Movement of additional tactical organizations to Korea awaited the re-equipment of those units with F-51's from the United States. The aircraft carrier USS Boxer (CV-21), which managed an eight day crossing of the Pacific, brought 145 F-51's which had been assembled for delivery by 27 July. General Stratemeyer had already prepared to use these F-51's when on 11 July he had approved a plan to move the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group with its 12th and 67th Squadrons from the Philippines for temporary duty with the Fifth Air Force. By 30 July this contingent had converted to F-51's at Johnson, and on 3 August it had reached Taegu, where, next day [4 August], the 51st Fighter Squadron (P) was returned to its old designation as the 12th Squadron.

5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27, 30 Aug. 3,4

[note]

Korean_War


By 16 July North Korean columns were aiming a pincers movement against Taejŏn, and when EUSAK held there temporarily, the North Korean command initiated a wide left-flank movement down through west Korean coastal routes, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July, Kwangju on 23 July, and capturing the major southwest port city of Mokp'o on 24 July.

Korean_War

These movements, virtually unopposed except by a few ROK police, opened the way for a drive against the port cities of Masan and Pusan. Meanwhile, on the central front EUSAK was flanked out of Taejŏn, forced to withdraw to Yŏngdong on 25 July, and gradually pressed back to Kŭmch'ŏn, where defensive positions were established on 31 July. That same day, on the southwestern front, the 24th Division was forced out of Chinju.

[note]

[You tell me]
Chapter 8 A Preliminary Evaluation of Korean Experience

Korean_War

General Vandenberg stated that "the Air Force is on trial in Korea." To judge its effectiveness, the USAF instituted an air evaluation board at FEAF, composed of Air Force tactical specialists under the direction of Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus .

Korean_War

In November 1950 the Secretary of the Air Force sent Dr. Robert L. Stearns, President of the University of Colorado and a keen student of air affairs, together with Maj. Gen. Thomas D. White to the Far East to make a second on-the-spot evaluation of USAF effort in Korea..

Korean_War


In addition to these two major projects, the Fifth Air Force originated a Tactical Air Power Evaluation (TAPE) group, which was replaced by Tactical Air Research (TARS) investigation.

While the Barcus and Stearns reports and a part of the publications of the TAPE and TARS investigations have been valuable sources for portions of this historical study, a reader interested in a more detailed and technical treatment of the Korean experience must consult the reports themselves. This monograph, therefore, has made little effort toward anything beyond the presentation of the historical record, with no more interpretation than that inherent in statements and evaluations of responsible persons.

It is believed that the record reveals clearly that the Air Force acquitted itself well in the first phase of the Korean operation. Certainly the testimony of responsible commanders justifies this conclusion.


"The contribution of the Far East Air Forces in the Korean conflict has been magnificent,"

said General Douglas MacArthur on 24 July;
"they have performed their mission beyond all expectations."

On 7 November General Walton Walker wrote:
Throughout the trying days in Korea my confidence and the confidence of my troops has been greatly sustained by the knowledge that the Air Forces in Korea and those elsewhere in the Far East Command were giving us unstinted and skillful support . . . . Your officers and airmen have won and shall retain the affection and gratitude of all ranks in the Eighth Army.

Representing the views of the fighting men, Colonel George B. Peploe, commanding the 38th Regimental Combat Team, wrote as follows on 6 October:

Those of us most closely associated with and dependent upon this [tactical air] support should be best qualified to judge its effectiveness. I know that I speak for my entire command when I say that the attitude, willingness, and, most important; the effectiveness of your pilots and your Tactical Air Control Parties have been superb.

We have learned much in the use of this air support during the past month. The patience of your pilots while we endeavored to mark targets, their ability to discover, hit and report on targets unknown but of immediate concern to us, and willingness to comply with our desires even when from the air they felt there were no targets, all add up to perfect cooperation.

The high degree of competence of the Tactical Air Control officers assigned to duty with this combat team is difficult to describe. That they would establish reliable communication and be courageous was expected. Their willingness, zeal and above all their understanding of each problem presented, and their ability to describe the target and talk the fighter into perfect strikes was almost unbelievable. Every foot soldier soon learned what the presence of the Tactical Air Control jeep near the front line meant, and each face showed appreciation and reassurance.

This letter was forwarded through channels where General Walker indorsed it with the comment:

"This letter . . . sincerely expresses the feeling of the infantrymen fighting in Korea."

Korean_War

Lockheed F-80C of the 16th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 511st Fighter-Interceptor Wing.

[note]

Following the clarification of target selection and the appointment of a GHQ Target Selection Committee on 22 July, FEAF was quick to press for a settlement upon a proper interdiction program. On 23 July General Weyland sent forward a strong criticism of the existing interdiction effort which, he said, would not keep enemy reinforcements from the battle area, posed a number of targets greatly exceeding the capabilities of the medium bombers, and was characterized by many obscure targets. Following receipt of this memorandum, General Almond called the target selection committee (Generals Hickey, Willoughby, and Weyland) to his office on the evening of 24 July. As one report had it,

"The discussion became quite warm."

General Weyland emphasized that the target selection committee had been established in order to work out target selection on a mutually acceptable basis, an impossible mission if all decisions were to be dictated from above. As the meeting went on, Generals Hickey and Willoughby first argued that, all B-29 effort should be continued in battlefield support, but Hickey at last suggested that one B-29 group should remain on close support for the time being and that two groups should be released for an interdiction program. Willoughby then added that the B-29's so released should be used against interdiction targets primarily north of the 38th parallel. The whole committee accepted these views and incorporated them into a memorandum which was approved by General MacArthur on 25 July. **

[note]

Korean_War

Nevertheless, on 24 July, General Weyland persuaded the FEC staff that two medium groups could best be employed against communications, while one gave battlefield support. With only three groups in the theater, no force was immediately available for industrial attacks,

[note]

Korean_War

On 24 July General MacArthur formally established the United Nations Command (UNC) and assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC).#4

Establishment of the United Nations Command gave recognition to the fact that nations other than the United States were fighting to repel aggression in Korea. As a working organization, however, the United Nations Command lacked significance. General MacArthur merely assumed another title, becoming CINCUNC as well as CINCFE, and GHQFE General Headquarters, Far East Command, was additionally designated General Headquarters, United Nations Command, the whole establishment being neatly abbreviated as GHQ UNC/ fec.

The CINCUNC did not report directly to the United Nations but to the President of the United States, through the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MacArthur's instructions were issued by the Joint Chiefs, in coordination with the Department of State and subject to the approval of the President.*

United Nations troops or other military units were attached for operational control to appropriate United States military organizations in Korea. These arrangements were reasonable when viewed against the fact that the United States furnished a preponderant share of the military effort, but they had their drawbacks. Many members of the United Nations, observing that Washington was directing the military operations, were content to allow the United States to carry the burden of providing the forces needed by the United Nations cause#5

*Although they normally issued the directives to the Commander of the United Nations Command/Far East Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not necessarily originate the directives, nor did the directives necessarily represent the attitudes or actions of the Joint Chiefs. (Memo for Chief Air University Historical Liaison Office from Mr. Wilbur W. Hoare, Jr., historian, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: Comments on Manuscript: "The United States Air Force in Korea," 17 Nov. 1959.)

The National Security Council had been legally established in 1947 to serve as an advisory body to the President for the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security of the United States. Through the medium of the National Security Council and of intimate State-Defense consultations, the departments of State and Defense developed progressively closer cooperation and coordination as the Korean war continued. (See William R. Kintner, Joseph I. Coffey, and Raymond J. Albright, Forging a New Sword, A Study of the Department of Defense (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 24-93.)

40 U.S. Air Force in Korea

Before the Korean war was many months old the United States began to know some of the many problems inherent in its role as the executive agent of the United Nations. During the first several months of hostilities the only official guidance given by the United Nations to operations in Korea was the Security Council resolution of 27 June, which recommended that member nations "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the invasion and restore international peace and security within the area. Whether this resolution authorized United Nations forces to enter and liberate North Korea was uncertain.

[note]

Korean_War

On 24 July, when the members of the FEC Target Selection Committee met in General Almond's office for instructions, Weyland found that his memorandum had stirred up a tempest.

General Almond stated that General MacArthur had not approved an interdiction program, that the B-29's had to be used in the immediate battle area, that the Air Force had caused trouble and was uncooperative, and, finally, he asked whether or not General Weyland understood his directives.

Here, as Weyland noted in his daily journal,

"the discussion became quite warm.#

Without recalling more of what was said, it is sufficient to record that General Weyland emphasized that the FEC Target Selection Committee had been established to work out the best employment of airpower on a mutually acceptable basis, a mission which would be impossible if all decisions were to be dictated to it from above. General Almond thereupon agreed that the target committee should study the interdiction matter and come up with recommendations.#62

That evening the FEC Target Selection Committee met at the Dai Ichi building and worked far into the night. At first Generals Hickey and Willoughby argued that all B-29's were needed in the battle area, where three American divisions were opposing nine North Korean divisions in a bitterly fought ground battle.

Weyland agreed that the ground situation was critical, but he urged that it had been critical since the beginning of the hostilities. The "critical" situation was becoming the normal situation. The target committee, Weyland said, had to establish a comprehensive interdiction program which would reach into the Reds' rear areas and ensure that their nine divisions did not become twelve or fifteen divisions.

Weyland pointed out that neither General Walker nor General Partridge had asked for Superfortress support. [what the hell does that mean?]

He thought that the field commanders in Korea ought to be allowed to run their own show. General Hickey yielded to these arguments and suggested that two B-29 groups be put on interdiction and that the third remain temporarily on close support. General Willoughby then suggested that the B-29 interdiction program be centered north of the 38th parallel. All agreed to these recommendations, and the meeting broke up harmoniously.#63

Plans, Preparations 55

[note]

Korean_War

By 24 July General Stratemeyer figured that the bombers had destroyed 58 bridges and had damaged 31 others during the period in which MacArthur had held the medium bombers to close and general support of ground troops.#67

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Although General MacArthur expressed confidence that the Eighth Army would be able to hold a beach-head in southern Korea, General Walker's forces were less optimistic, and with good reason. Even before Taejŏn fell on 20 July the Communists had turned the Eighth Army's left flank.

Unopposed except for a few ROK policemen, two Red divisions raced southward, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July, Kwangju on 23 July, and the major southwestern port city of Mokp'o on 24 July.

This assault established the Reds in position for a turning thrust eastward against the unguarded coastal cities of Chinju, Masan, and Pusan. To meet the hostile thrust against Chinju, General Walker sent remnants of the 24th Division southward, but there was little good reason to hope that these combat-fatigued troops, could withstand the enemy's assault.#4

As the Eighth Army sought to establish positions at which it could form a perimeter and defend Pusan, it needed every assistance which the full strength of United Nations' airpower could give to it.

Unfortunately, however, during the crucial days in which every air sortie was of vital importance, General Partridge began to know the defects of the "coordination control" arrangement which had been handed down from Tokyo for the control of air operations over Korea.*

On 18 July General MacArthur had agreed that the Fifth Air Force would be responsible for supporting the Eighth Army. That same day General Stratemeyer had issued a directive defining the procedure through which the Eighth Army would secure the close support that it needed.

"All requests for close support of ground troops in Korea," stated Stratemeyer's directive, "will be made by Commanding General Eighth Army direct to Commanding General Fifth Air Force." #5

*See Chapter 2, pp. 49-50.

This order was clear as to the procedures which the Eighth Army would follow in obtaining close support from the Fifth Air Force or from the FEAF Bomber Command, but it failed to establish any channel whereby the Eighth Army might obtain close support from the carrier-based planes of Task Force 77.

Viewed after the event, General Stratemeyer's failure to specify procedures whereby the Eighth Army could get support from naval aircraft seems a glaring oversight, but it is only fair to observe that no one in Tokyo had discussed the proposition that carrier pilots might support ground troops in Korea. [What was he STUPID?]

[note]

Korean_War

On that day and continuing on 24 July the carrier task force was re-supplying at sea, but Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander of NavFE, was receptive to the idea that naval air could be employed in close support of ground troops, if the emergency were great enough.#6

[note]

Korean_War

On 23 July General Partridge was establishing the Advance Headquarters of the Fifth Air Force in Taegu, but the Joint Operations Center was in full operation, and the Air Force combat-operations section was working closely with Eighth Army representatives to meet General Walker's requirements for support. On this day, however, some member of General Walker's staff was so concerned by the enemy's end-around advance in southwestern Korea that he flashed a message directly to General MacArthur requesting that he order Task Force 77 to support the Eighth Army.

On that day and continuing on 24 July the carrier task force was re-supplying at sea, but Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander of NavFE, was receptive to the idea that naval air could be employed in close support of ground troops, if the emergency were great enough.#6

[note]

Korean_War

Using the telling argument that the Eighth Army would continue to find itself in a "critical" situation so long as the North Koreans continued to enjoy virtually uninterrupted routes back to their sources of supplies, General Weyland on the evening of 24 July persuaded the other members of the FEC Target Selection Committee to recommend that two B-29 groups should be freed from ground-support tasks and used to effect a steady and continuous interdiction program centered north of the 38th parallel.*

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

On the evening of 24 July General Partridge received a memorandum from General Crabb which described these emergency arrangements that had been worked out in Tokyo. Earlier in the day the Eighth Army had told Partridge that the Navy was going to operate over southwestern Korea on 25 and 26 July, so Crabb's memorandum was "not a complete surprise. "#7

General Stratemeyer and his staff had assumed that General Partridge must know all about the need for naval close support, and they had arranged the matter without consulting responsible air authorities in Korea. But
General Partridge had known very little about this need for naval support.

General Walker, moreover, told Partridge that he had not requested the additional air support. Walker thought that it must have been arranged by GHQ on its own initiative.

[note]

US Marine Corps

Korean_War

The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese freighters,

while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon.

These ships discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at the objective.[29]

[note]

22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 3, 4

Korean_War

Meanwhile, orders to Organized Reserve units were being issued at established intervals.
On 22 July, 25 units were ordered to active duty;
on 24 July, 23 units;
on 25 July, 18 units;
on 26 July, 13 units;
on 27 July, 6 units;
on 3-August s 5 units; and
on 4 August, 25 units.

[note]

US Navy

Korean_War Korean_War

24 July
COMNAVFE established Escort Element (CTE 96.50) under CAPT A. D.H. Jay, RN, consisting of HMS Black Swan (U-57), HMS Hart (M-55), and HMAS Shoalhaven (K535)

[note]

June 30

The total strength of the Pacific Fleet Service Force, as of the end of June, came to 91 auxiliaries of various types. The largest share of these mobile support units, 47 ships, was organized in Service Squadron 1, Captain Bernard L. Austin. This command was responsible for the logistic support of fleet units in the Eastern Pacific, including Alaska; most of its units were located in west coast ports. At Pearl Harbor, under the direct control of ComServPac, were the 26 auxiliaries of the Logistic Support Group, whose area of responsibility included fleet units and bases in the Western, Central, and South Pacific. The 18 remaining units were assigned to Service Division 51, a subordinate echelon of the Logistic Support Group, located at Guam and charged with the administration of Service Force responsibilities in the Marianas and Caroline's.

In the first days of hostilities uncertainty as to the identity of the enemy and the extent of the underwater threat had led ComNavFE to call for additional small craft for offshore patrol. In response to this request Admiral Denebrink recommended to CincPacFleet the reactivation of the three mine-sweepers in caretaker status at Yokosuka, and of five sub-chasers and three fleet tugs. At the same time the Service Force staff turned its attention to the urgent problems of logistic support for the forces going into action in the Far East.

Ammunition came first. At Yokosuka, under the control of Commander Fleet Activities Japan, there was a small stock of some two or three thousand tons of various types, but with one surprising deficiency: there was no antisubmarine ordnance in Japan. Ammunition in the Philippines was negligible; at Guam there were some 6,000 tons. Necessarily, therefore, the supply of items lacking at Yokosuka and Guam, and the replacement of expenditures from these stocks, had to be made from the Hawaiian Islands, more than 3,000 miles away, where there were wartime leftovers in massive quantities. To lift ammunition to the forward area, ComServPac had available a single ammunition ship, USS Mount Katmai (AE-16), at Port Chicago, and an assortment of cargo types which, with special sheathing of the holds, could be made to do.

Lacking word from Admiral Joy as to the pattern of anticipated needs, and lacking also a subordinate Service Force commander in the forward area to coordinate requirements, the staff at Pearl Harbor undertook at once, by deduction and by intuition, an estimate of what was required. This work was expeditiously done. The estimate was ready by the night of 26-27 June in the form of a revised loading plan for Mount Katmai, and was at once promulgated by dispatch for comment. Within two days the views of the operational commanders concerned had been received and integrated and a detailed loading list was on its way by air to the west coast.

But Mount Katmai’s arrival was weeks away, and in the next few days, as special requests came in from ComNavFE, ammunition was moved forward from Guam by cargo ship. In the absence of underwater ordnance in Japan, and with the submarine problem still un-clarified, depth charges were given priority: on 13 July a shipload reached Yokosuka, followed on the next day by another of 5-inch and 40-millimeter ammunition. By this time also a load of 8-inch cruiser ammunition was at sea en route from Guam to Sasebo, and another ship had been sailed for Buckner Bay with aircraft ordnance for Task Force 77.

The second problem of immediate and overriding importance was that of fuel. In the Pacific the responsibility for petroleum supply was a divided

one: Commander Service Force, as logistic agent for CinCPac, was responsible for the Pacific Area outside of General MacArthur’s command, while the

Area Petroleum Office at CincFE’s headquarters was charged with procurement for the forces of the Far East Command. Throughout the Pacific POL inventories were low, in consequence of directives based on budgetary restrictions; this situation was potentially most dangerous in aviation gasoline, production of which is inelastic and not susceptible to rapid expansion. Anticipating a rapid increase in consumption, ComServPac’s Petroleum Office made early requests for larger allocations, and fortunately so. The timely arrival of these from the continental United States would provide adequate stocks for the trans-Pacific pipeline, and make it possible to help out the Far East Command, where serious shortages developed owing to lack of similar foresight.

The need for aviation gasoline was matched by that for black oil for the naval forces moving westward. Of the ten fleet oilers assigned to the Service Force, two were on shuttle duty serving the Seventh Fleet and the mid-Pacific, eight were in west coast ports.

Four of these—USS Cimarron (AO-22), USS Cacapon (AO-52), USS Caliente (AO-53), and USS Platte (AO-24)—were immediately ordered forward and sailed in company with Admiral Hartman’s cruisers and destroyers [on July 6th]. Three were routed onward from Pearl to Okinawa and Japan, while Caliente, on 24 July, discharged 65,000 barrels of fuel oil at Midway Island to keep that newly reactivated base in business. [note]

Korean_War

The HMS Triumph (R16) operated with us at all times,[ July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.] except July 22, providing CAP and ASP.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

18, 19, 22, 25

In general, the remainder of the flights and sweeps on the 18th, 19th, 22nd and 25th were "armed reconnaissance" in nature and covered an area inland from P'ohang to north of Hamhung on the east coast and on the west coast ranged from Kwangju north to Kaesŏng going inland as far as Namwŏn. Targets attacked and damaged were airfield installations, railroad facilities, locomotives and rolling stock, bridges, power stations, oil tanks , small boats, factories, troops and vehicles.

See P'ohang to Hamhung map.

[note]

On the 23rd, as the southward retirement of friendly forces continued, the responsibility for fire support was turned over to the destroyers and Higgins sailed for Sasebo, where early on the 24th USS Juneau (CLAA-119) moored alongside a new arrival, the heavy cruiser USS Toledo (CA-133).

The growing strength of Naval Forces Japan had already brought changes in the organization of Task Force 96. ComNavFE’s operation order of early July had been modified by the addition of Task Group 96.7, the ROK Navy, and of Task Group 96.9, the submarines acquired from the Seventh Fleet.

With the arrival of Admiral Ruble all aviation activities had been consolidated into Naval Air Japan, Task Group 96.2.

Logistic support at Sasebo was shortly to be improved by the establishment of Service Division 31, Captain Joseph M. P. Wright, with the designation of Task Group 96.4.

But before this last event took place the arrival of new gunnery strength from the United States made possible a reorganization of the Support Groups.

[note]

Escort of shipping between Japan and Korea had so far been on a wholly catch-as-catch-can basis: USS Arikara (ATF-98) and HMAS Shoalhaven (K535) had been so used on 1 and 2 July, HMS Jamaica (C-44) and USS Collett (DD-730) on the 3rd.

July 24

But now provision was made for an Escort Group, Task Group 96.1, with a commander and units to be assigned when available. Shortly the job would be turned over to the frigates under Captain A. D. H. Jay, DSO, DSC, RN, commanding officer of HMS Black Swan (U-57).

Blockade and inshore work south of latitude 37°was assigned the ROK Navy, shortly to become Task Group 96.7, with such assistance as might become available from the Far East Air Forces and from any NavFE units that happened by.

For the coastline north of 37° separate East and West Coast Support Groups were established: in the east the job was entrusted to Admiral Higgins' Task Group 96.5, in the west to the Commonwealth units of Task Group 96.8.

The northern limits of the blockade were set at 41° on the east coast and at 39°30' in the west, well south of the northern frontiers, and the precaution implicit in these boundaries was emphasized by a specific admonition to all units to keep well clear of Manchurian and Russian waters.

Important though this statement of policy was, it remained for some time of purely academic importance, for emergency calls for gunfire support along the coast were such as to limit the blockading forces to only intermittent sweeps north of the 38th parallel.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The 24th Infantry Division had completed its movement to Korea by 6 July. Hard on its heels the 25th Division began to move, its first elements loading at Moji on Shimonoseki Strait on the 8th, and subsequent echelons at Inland Sea ports and at Sasebo; for this movement Japanese time-chartered ships were extensively used. The third major Army unit to be lifted from Japan was the 1st Cavalry Division, and this, since handling facilities at Pusan were clogging from overload, was put in over the beaches.

Korean_War

This movement was accomplished by Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group, temporarily augmented by the loan from MSTS of two AKAs, three T-APs, one ocean tug, five LSTs, and four time-chartered Japanese Marus.

Late in July the final intra-theater movement of the initial phase brought in two battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment from Okinawa. On the 16th MSTS assigned two Japanese passenger vessels and a cargo ship to this lift, and on the 24th these troops were landed at Pusan.

[note]

The second problem of immediate and overriding importance was that of fuel. In the Pacific the responsibility for petroleum supply was a divided one:

Commander Service Force, as logistic agent for CinCPac, was responsible for the Pacific Area outside of General MacArthur’s command,

while the Area Petroleum Office at CincFE’s headquarters was charged with procurement for the forces of the Far East Command.

Throughout the Pacific POL inventories were low, in consequence of directives based on budgetary restrictions; this situation was potentially most dangerous in aviation gasoline, production of which is inelastic and not susceptible to rapid expansion. Anticipating a rapid increase in consumption, ComServPac’s Petroleum Office made early requests for larger allocations, and fortunately so. The timely arrival of these from the continental United States would provide adequate stocks for the trans-Pacific pipeline, and make it possible to help out the Far East Command, where serious shortages developed owing to lack of similar foresight.

The need for aviation gasoline was matched by that for black oil for the naval forces moving westward.

Of the ten fleet oilers assigned to the Service Force, two were on shuttle duty serving the Seventh Fleet and the mid-Pacific, eight were in west coast ports

Here all the AO's I know about. Only the yellow ones are mentioned here, and two of them are not in the Order of Battle book:

USS Ashtabula (AO-51)
USS Chikaskia (AO-54)
USS Cimarron (AO-22)
USS Guadalupe (AO-32)
USS Kankakee (AO-39)
USS Mispillion (AO-105)
USS Navasota (AO-106)
USS Passumpsic (AO-107)
USS Platte (AO-24)
USS Taluga (AO-62)
USS Tolovana (AO-64)

USS Cacapon (AO-52), not in Order of Battle

USS Caliente (AO-53) not in Order of Battle

Four of these—

USS Cimarron (AO-22),

USS Cacapon (AO-52),

USS Caliente (AO-53) and

USS Platte (AO-24) —were immediately ordered forward and sailed in company with Admiral Haritman’s cruisers and destroyers.

Three were routed onward from Pearl to Okinawa and Japan, while Caliente, on 24 July, discharged 65,000 barrels of fuel oil at Midway Island to keep that newly reactivated base in business.

[note]

Korean_War

On the 23rd, as the southward retirement of friendly forces continued, the responsibility for fire support was turned over to the destroyers and Higgins [ Rear Adm. J. M. Higgins TG 96.5 ] sailed for Sasebo, where early on the 24th Juneau moored alongside a new arrival, the heavy cruiser USS Toledo (CA-133).

[note]

19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

Korean_War Korean_War

At noon on the 19th General Gay assumed command ashore. In the afternoon, with unloading completed, ships of the Attack Force shifted to heavy weather anchorages as Grace[Duration July 16 – July 21], the first typhoon of the season, was reported heading for Korea Strait.


On the 22nd Grace came up the coast, bringing gusts of 50 knots to Yŏngil Man and delaying the arrival of the second echelon of shipping. This had been scheduled to come in on the 21st, but the MSTS units reached P'ohang only on the 23rd, and the chartered Japanese freighters the next day. The LSTs of the third echelon arrived on the 26th and 29th.

For a variety of reasons, unloading of the follow-up shipping was somewhat slow.

The MSTS transports suffered from their shortages of personnel;

the Japanese freighters lacked trained hatch crews and unloading gear, and the ever-present language problem complicated supervision;

after two days of continuous labor the shore party was getting tired.

Nonetheless the work proceeded. On the 23rd the commanding officer of a Navy LST was directed by Admiral Doyle to take over the duties of senior officer present, and late in the evening the force commander sailed in USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), with USS Union (AKA-106), USS JAMES E. KYES (DD-787), and USS Diachenko (APD-123), for Tokyo.

A week later it was all over, and CTF 90 was able to report the completion of operations at P'ohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from Yŏngil Man. But this report was by way of formality, for the strategic rewards of the operation had long since been apparent. On 22 July, four days after the initial landing, the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the battered 24th Division southeast of Taejŏn.
22 June

[note]


On the 22nd Grace came up the coast, bringing gusts of 50 knots to Yŏngil Man and delaying the arrival of the second echelon of shipping. This had been scheduled to come in on the 21st, but the MSTS units reached P'ohang only on the 23rd, and the chartered Japanese freighters the next day. The LSTs of the third echelon arrived on the 26th and 29th.

[note]

Korean_War

[note]

Korean_War

Rendezvous with the tanker was made late in the morning of the 23rd to the southward of Cheju Do, but USS Grainger (AK-184) and the ammunition were not there. On completion of refueling, therefore, Task Force 77 headed for Sasebo where it arrived on the morning of the 24th. The delay in resuming operations, which Admiral Struble had feared, had been forced upon him.

[note]

Korean_War

At Sasebo rearming of USS Valley Forge (CV-45) had begun on the morning of the 24th. But replenishment was to be cut short by the rapid deterioration of the ground situation in the west. Early in the afternoon an emergency dispatch was received from ComNavFE, cancelling existing plans and assigning Task Force 77 the area south of the Kum and west of the line Kunsan-Chŏnju-Namwŏn-Kwangju.

Korean_War

This region was believed to contain a major concentration of North Korean forces; according to the dispatch the "total area is considered enemy."

Commander Task Force 77 was adjured to search carefully and to destroy all armor, bridges, traffic, troop concentrations, and barges up to the limit of his capabilities.

The only restrictions on his operations were to beware of Korean Navy YMS types operating inshore, and to "hit only military targets" at Kunsan, where preservation of port facilities seemed desirable in view of possible future amphibious operations. As the dispatch emphasized the critical situation of the ground forces and urged immediate efforts, Valley Forge broke off her rearming before completion,

Korean_War

and HMS Triumph (R16), whose yard period had barely begun, rejoined the force.

[note]

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

 

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War

Two days later [16th] the ROK 23rd Regiment gave way and streamed south. The KMAG advisers considered the situation grave. In response to an inquiry from Colonel Collier of Eighth Army, Colonel Emmerich sent the following message:

Situation deplorable, things are popping, trying to get something established across the front, 75% of the 23rd ROK Regiment is on the road moving south. Advisers threatening and shooting in the air trying to get them assembled, Commanding General forming a straggler line. If straggler line is successful we may be able to reorganize and re-establish the line. If this fails I am afraid that the whole thing will develop in complete disintegration. The Advisory Group needs food other than Korean or C rations and needs rest. [12-2]

Magazines

Korean_War

[note]

Korean_War

[note]


0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
9:00 AM
07/23/50
10:00 AM
07/23/50
3:00 PM
07/24/50
12:00 AM

Korean_War Korean_War


As soon as housing and communications were provided in the missionary school compound which would shelter it in Taegu City, Fifth Air Force (Advance) began to move to the forward location, and at 0001 hours on 24 July Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fifth Air Force (Advance), became operational in Taegu City.#119

Korean_War


In a subsequently issued re-designation [FEAF G.O. #46 9 Aug] which was made retroactive on 24 July, General Stratemeyer established the Fifth Air Force in Korea, and recognized it as a major command of the Far East Air Forces.#120


Several Fifth Air Force staff offices had begun to function in Taegu well before 24 July. Sometime after 12 July, when he realized that Taejŏn would be lost, Lt. Col. John R. Murphy began to move the heavier equipment and a part of the personnel of the Air Force combat operations section back to Taegu.

Korean_War

When he established EUSAK in Taegu, General Walker named officers to serve as G-2 and G-3 Air representatives in an air-ground operations section of a joint operations center, and thus, effective on 14 July, the Fifth Air Force-Eighth Army joint operations center began to function.#121 [note]

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
10:00 AM
07/23/50
11:00 AM
07/23/50
4:00 PM
07/24/50
1:00 AM

0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
11:00 AM
07/23/50
12:00 PM
07/23/50
5:00 PM
07/24/50
2:00 AM

0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
12:00 PM
07/23/50
1:00 PM
07/23/50
6:00 PM
07/24/50
3:00 AM

0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
1:00 PM
07/23/50
2:00 PM
07/23/50
7:00 PM
07/24/50
4:00 AM

Korean_War

Colonel Check was unable to obtain from the retreating ROK troops any information on the size of the North Korean force following them or how close it was.

That night he sent 1st Lt. John A. Buckley of A Company with a 30-man patrol northward to locate the enemy. Near Poun Buckley saw an enemy column approaching. He quickly disposed his patrol on hills bordering both sides of the road, and, when the column was nearly abreast, opened fire on it with all weapons. This fire apparently caused the enemy advanced unit to believe it had encountered a major position, for it held back until daylight.

When the enemy turned back, Buckley and his patrol returned to the 1st Battalion lines, arriving there at 0400, 24 July. Six men were missing. [12-47] [note]

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
2:00 PM
07/23/50
3:00 PM
07/23/50
8:00 PM
07/24/50
5:00 AM

0528 Sun Rise

[note]

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
3:00 PM
07/23/50
4:00 PM
07/23/50
9:00 PM
07/24/50
6:00 AM

Korean_War

On 24 July 1950 General MacArthur issued orders establishing the United Nations Command (UNC) with general headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. With few exceptions, staff members of the Far East Command were assigned comparable duties on the UNC staff. In effect, the GHQ, United Nations Command, was the GHQ, Far East Command, with an expanded mission. [06-10]

At the central core of American direction of the operations in Korea on behalf of the United Nations lay the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As advisers to the President, the Joint Chiefs concerned themselves with every aspect of American military power and policy. They had to deal simultaneously with problems at home and abroad, in western Europe and in Korea.

They did not make the national military policy. Yet because they furnished the President, normally through the Secretary of Defense, information and advice to help him set this policy, what they did and what they thought held great importance for the nation and for the Korean War. By the very nature of their work, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to consider political factors in deliberating national military problems. So closely intertwined were military and political factors in the Korean War that they could not be isolated one from the other.

The mechanical process by which military policy recommendations evolved during the Korean War began with consideration of a particular problem within the military staffs, usually the Army staff, and within the joint staff of the JCS itself. The joint staff consisted of about two hundred officers selected from all the services. These officers developed and furnished recommended positions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once a final stand on a problem had been discussed and agreed upon by them, the JCS presented their views in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Any political aspects of the matter would be worked out at this level between the staffs of the Defense and State Departments or, on occasion, between the respective secretaries personally. The Secretary of Defense then presented the views and recommendations thus developed, with a clear statement of any divergencies, to the National Security Council or, if more appropriate, directly to the President. On occasion, the procedure varied but, normally, if there were time things were done in this fashion.

The issues raised by Korea could not be separated from those involved in planning for American defense on a worldwide scale. The withdrawal of men and units from the General Reserve for employment in Korea was incompatible with existing plans. If the Korean outbreak marked the initial stages of an all-out war, it was unsound to tie up large forces in an area of limited strategic significance. But the United States was committed, short of global war, to repelling armed aggression in South Korea. [note]

0630 Korean Time

Korean_War


Check's 1st Battalion prepared to receive an attack. It came at 0630, 24 July, shortly after daybreak in a heavy fog that enabled the North Koreans to approach very close to the battalion positions before they were observed. Two rifle companies, one on either side of the road on low ridges, held the forward positions. Enemy mortar and small arms fire fell on the men there, and then tanks appeared at the bend in the road and opened fire with cannon and machine guns as they approached. Enemy infantry followed the tanks. Although the two rifle companies stopped the North Korean infantry, the tanks penetrated their positions and fired into the battalion command post which was behind B Company. This tank fire destroyed several vehicles and killed the medical officer.

Capt. Logan E. Weston, A Company commander, armed himself with a bazooka and knocked out one of the tanks within the position. In this close action, tank fire killed a man near Weston and the concussion of the shell explosion damaged Weston's ears so that he could not hear. Weston refused to leave the fight, and Colonel Check later had to order him to the rear for medical treatment.


On the right (north) of the road the enemy overran the battalion observation post and B Company's outpost line. This high ground changed hands three times during the day. While the infantry fight was in progress, and shortly after the first tank penetration, five more T34's came around the road bend toward the 71st [1st] Battalion. When the first tanks appeared Colonel Check had called for an air strike. Now, at this propitious moment, three F-80 jet planes arrived and immediately dived on the approaching second group of tanks, destroying 3 of them with 5-inch rockets. Altogether, bazooka, artillery, and air strikes knocked out 6 enemy tanks during the morning, either within or on the edge of the 1st Battalion position. In this, its first engagement with American troops, the N.K. 2nd Division lost all but 2 of the 8 tanks that had been attached to it a few days earlier at Ch'ŏngju. [12-48]


Late in the evening after dark the 1st Battalion disengaged and withdrew through the 2nd Battalion immediately behind it. Both Check and the regimental commander, Colonel Michaelis, expected the enemy to encircle the 1st Battalion position during the night if it stayed where it was. [note]

0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
4:00 PM
07/23/50
5:00 PM
07/23/50
10:00 PM
07/24/50
7:00 AM

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
5:00 PM
07/23/50
6:00 PM
07/23/50
11:00 PM
07/24/50
8:00 AM

0820 Korean Time

Korean_War


At 0820/K, Colonel Kight and Lt. Colonel Nolan departed Ashiya Air Base by C-47 for Iwakuni Air Base. From Iwakuni they will continue to Johnson Air Base where Colonel Kight will [make] his return trip to the US.

0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
6:00 PM
07/23/50
7:00 PM
07/24/50
12:00 AM
07/24/50
9:00 AM

[CV-45] arriving at Sasobo at 0900 on the 24th. [note]

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
7:00 PM
07/23/50
8:00 PM
07/24/50
1:00 AM
07/24/50
10:00 AM

Korean_War

The 8th Cavalry Regiment War Diary contains an entry for 10:00 AM on July 24 that reads as follows:

"No refugees to cross the front lines. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children." 30

30
War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

Korean_War

The source of the message was a telephone call to the 8th Cavalry Regimental headquarters from an 8th Cavalry Regiment officer (staff officer, not a commander) working in the 1st Cavalry Division operations section as a liaison officer to the division headquarters from his regiment. A search of documents did not reveal a similar entry in the records of the other regiments (the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments) in the division. [note]

Korean_War

The first reference was an abbreviated message which appeared in the 8th Cavalry Regiment message log dated 10:00 AM on July 24, 1950 , that stated:

"No refugees to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross the lines. Use discretion in case of women and children."

This message did not constitute an order from the 1st Cavalry Division to fire upon Korean civilians at Nogŭn-ni. There is no evidence that this message was retransmitted to, or received by subordinate units within the 8th Cavalry Regiment.

Korean_War

The 35th Infantry was the unit in the vicinity of Nogŭn-ni on July 26. By July 26, 1950 , the last elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment were withdrawing from the vicinity of No Gun Ri to the division rear near Hwanggan.

The U.S. Review Team found no evidence that the 8th Cavalry message was transmitted to the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments or any other subordinate element of the division.

The policy set by the 1st Cavalry Division Commander in his order of July 23, 1950 , titled "Control of Refugee Movement" makes no mention of the use of force by soldiers. It stated:

"Municipal authorities, local police and the National Police will enforce this directive."

The U.S. Review Team concluded that the 8th Cavalry Regiment log entry did not constitute an order to fire upon Korean civilians at Nogŭn-ni. [note]

1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
8:00 PM
07/23/50
9:00 PM
07/23/50
2:00 AM
07/24/50
11:00 AM

1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
9:00 PM
07/23/50
10:00 PM
07/24/50
3:00 AM
07/24/50
12:00 PM

Korean_War

On 24 July, Eighth Army made its first move to counter the threatened enemy envelopment in the southwest. General Walker decided to send the 24th Division posthaste southward to block the enemy enveloping move. He also directed his chief of staff, Colonel Landrum, personally to make sure that the Fifth Air Force made a major effort against the enemy forces in southwest Korea. [11]

Korean_War

At noon on the 24th, General Walker asked General Church, the new commander of the 24th Division, to come to Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu. There Walker informed him of the threat in the southwest and told him that he would have to move the 24th Division to the sector.

"I am sorry to have to do this," he said, "but the whole left flank is open, and reports indicate the Koreans are moving in. I want you to cover the area from Chinju, up to near Kŭmch'ŏn." [12]

The two places General Walker mentioned are sixty-five air miles apart and separated by the wild Chiri Mountains. [note]

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
10:00 PM
07/23/50
11:00 PM
07/24/50
4:00 AM
07/24/50
1:00 PM

Korean_War


By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3rd Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19] [note]

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/23/50
11:00 PM
07/24/50
12:00 AM
07/24/50
5:00 AM
07/24/50
2:00 PM

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
12:00 AM
07/24/50
1:00 AM
07/24/50
6:00 AM
07/24/50
3:00 PM

1505 Moon Rise

Korean_War

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
1:00 AM
07/24/50
2:00 AM
07/24/50
7:00 AM
07/24/50
4:00 PM

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
2:00 AM
07/24/50
3:00 AM
07/24/50
8:00 AM
07/24/50
5:00 PM

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
3:00 AM
07/24/50
4:00 AM
07/24/50
9:00 AM
07/24/50
6:00 PM

Korean_War

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 24 PIR echoed Eighth Army's evaluation of NKPA effectiveness and morale and highlighted continual efforts by the enemy to infiltrate the division's zone and establish road blocks. The division estimated that it had inflicted 1,000 casualties on the enemy.

Korean_War

The PIR rated the enemy's most probable course of action as: "[C]ontinue pressure on front while developing our left flank and 27th Regiment's right flank." 46


46
Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #3, 1800 24 July 1950 , 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 45, RG 338, NARA. [note]

1855 Korean Time

Korean_War


At 1855/K the Flight was alerted on a C-54 which made a forced landing at 37° 10' N - 129° E. The report came from a B-29 who was over this area at the time of the call.

1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
4:00 AM
07/24/50
5:00 AM
07/24/50
10:00 AM
07/24/50
7:00 PM

1945 Sun Set

[note]

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
5:00 AM
07/24/50
6:00 AM
07/24/50
11:00 AM
07/24/50
8:00 PM

Korean_War

The 7th Cavalry joined the NKPA in combat, reporting its first enemy contact at 8:00 PM on July 24 when the North Koreans fired on an outpost. 45
45 Ibid. [note]

2030 Korean Time

Korean_War

At 2030/K the Flight was notified that ADCC had made a complete check and no aircraft were overdue. One false alert was recorded this date.

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
6:00 AM
07/24/50
7:00 AM
07/24/50
12:00 PM
07/24/50
9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
7:00 AM
07/24/50
8:00 AM
07/24/50
1:00 PM
07/24/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/24/50
8:00 AM
07/24/50
9:00 AM
07/24/50
2:00 PM
07/24/50
11:00 PM

Korean_War Korean_War


General Church immediately ordered the 19th Infantry to move to Chinju, and it started from Kŭmch'ŏn shortly before midnight, 24 July.

[60+ miles should take about 2-3 hours] [note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 24 reported increased pressure from the NKPA 2nd and 3rd Divisions against the 1st Cavalry Division and the 27th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).

Korean_War

Based on this activity, Eighth Army revised its estimate of the enemy's most probable course of action, now stating that the main effort would move along the Taejŏn-Kŭmch'ŏn axis together with a deep envelopment through Ch'ŏngjin and Namwŏn. 47

47
Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #12, 2400 24 July 1950 , File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950 , Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA. [note]

Korean_War

At midnight on the 24th Task Force 77 was again underway from Sasebo, headed north. [note]

Korean_War

After partially rearming, the task force left Sasebo about 2400 on the 24th in accordance with commander SEVENTH Fleet Secret OpOrder 11-50 and proceeded to a position about 30 miles southeast of P'ohang, Korea, [note]


Casualties

Monday July 24, 1950 (Day 030)

Korean_War 086 Casualties

As of July 24, 1950

1 16TH ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
1 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
1 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
28 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 27TH ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY
1 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
7 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
6 61ST FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
8 71ST HEAVY TANK BATTALION
1 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 82ND FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (155MM)
28 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
2 99TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
86 19500724 0000 casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 44 1845 0 1 0 1890
Today 0 86 0 0 0 86
Total 44 1931 0 1 0 1976



Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Monday July 24, 1950 - Day 030