Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 25.3°C 77.54 °F at Taegu

Rainy, windy [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

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July 27
Gen. MacArthur confers with Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, 8th Army commander, in Korea. It's his second visit since the war began. He says UN forces "will have new heartaches and new setbacks," but "I was never more confident of victory."

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-- The French government reports that Foreign Legionnaires, with air and naval support, has scattered 11,000 Viet Minh guerrillas 100 miles south of Saigon. [note]

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Korean War Operations
27 July 1950

27 July 1950
Four SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. A total of twenty five hours and twenty minutes (25:20) were logged on this mission.


At 1145/K this Flight received a call from ADCC that a pilot had bailed out at 36° 30' N 129° 25' E. The type and number of the aircraft unknown. The pilot's name was unknown. It was later determined that the aircraft was an Air Force F-51.

At 1635/K the Flight received a call from ADCC that the pilot had been picked up by a Navy destroyer, but it was not confirmed.

At 1635/K the SB-17 had contact with the destroyer and he confirmed the report that the pilot had been picked up by the destroyer at 1130/K.


At 1930/K ADCC alerted this Flight it received another message that a C-47 was in trouble over Tsu Shima with severe vibration.

At 2027/K the alert was called off as the C-47 was going to land at Itazuke.

A total of two (2) false alerts were recorded this date.


This information taken from the official 3rd Rescue Squadron history archived at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base. [note]

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Special Evaluation No. 39, 27 July 1950, Possibility of Soviet Aggression Against Iran [Note]

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Walker’s famous “stand or die” pronouncement to the Eighth Army had followed a private conference with MacArthur (Almond was the only other person in attendance) on 27 July, during which CINCFE had upbraided him. MacArthur’s confidence in Walker had not improved since that discussion, and he was contemplating relieving him. It seemed unlikely, therefore, that the amphibious end-around would be placed under Walker’s command. Who, then? [note]

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on 27 July, Congress authorized extending all Marine enlistments expiring prior to July 1951; and authority was granted to redeploy units of the 2nd Marine Division to the 1st Marine Division. The latter was to sail for the Far East between 10 and 15 August, incorporating the 1st Provisional Brigade on its arrival.

Ultimately, the division would comprise about fifteen thousand officers and men. In building up the new division, the new commanding general, Major General Oliver P. Smith, gave initial priority to divisional units over attached supporting elements, and within the division, to combat units.

The provisional brigade had taken most of the division’s standard thirty days’ worth of stores and equipment when it sailed. The requisite additional supplies were delivered under urgent deadlines from a variety of sources, including the Barstow, California, supply facility and Camp Lejeune, in North Carolina.[cmdctl-26]

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The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was to be pulled out of the Pusan perimeter prior to the Inch'ŏn operation and revert to its prior identity as the 5th Marines.

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The 1st Marine Regiment would make it to Japan in time for the operation;

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the 7th Marines, being assembled from units scattered across the planet, would not. Thus, the Marines would land two regiments in the assault at Inch'ŏn. Who would make the follow-on landings?

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Only the 7th Infantry Division remained in Japan. It would come in the second and third–echelon shipping.


Who would command the troops for Inch'ŏn? MacArthur did not like the Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, nor was he even remotely satisfied with his performance to date. It seems likely that MacArthur’s sentiments were reciprocated by Walker, exacerbated by a standing antipathy between Walker and Almond, MacArthur’s chief of staff.[cmdctl-27] [note]

Distinguished Service Cross

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Bernard B. Bragg (RA35204557), Master Sergeant, U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with Company M, 3rd Battalion, 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division. Master Sergeant Bragg distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces near Yŏngdong, Korea, on 27 July 1950.


When the 3rd Battalion was subjected to devastating mortar, artillery and automatic-weapons fire from a numerically superior, well-concealed enemy force, Sergeant Bragg directed the fire of his 81-mm. mortar platoon on the enemy positions until the supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted. Exposing himself to the intense enemy fire, he made his way to the ammunition supply point and returned with all available 81-mm. mortar ammunition. As he was preparing to unload the ammunition, an enemy mortar shell burst nearby, knocking him to the ground and setting his vehicle on fire. Regaining his feet, he extinguished the flames with his jacket, then unloaded the ammunition and distributed it among his mortar crews. After this supply was exhausted, he deployed his platoon as riflemen and engaged the enemy until displacement was ordered. Assembling his platoon with the 60-mm. mortar section of another company, he directed the fire of that section on enemy positions until all ammunition was expended. As Sergeant Bragg organized the men for redeployment, they were pinned down by fire from two enemy machine-gun positions. Directing his men to take cover, he moved forward alone, threw two grenades into one of the machine-gun nests, killing the crew; then he made his way toward the other machine-gun and destroyed it with another well-placed grenade. Rejoining his men, he led them to a road where he found an abandoned vehicle and trailer and made two trips in transporting them to safety. As he was returning for the third time, his vehicle was completely disabled by enemy fire. After making his way to the group he had driven to safety and reorganizing them, he was seriously wounded by enemy shell fire. [note]

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Roey E. Limbock (RA38079505), Sergeant, U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with Company B, 1st Battalion, 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division. Sergeant Limbock distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity of Sangju, Korea on 27 July 1950.


On this date, Company B was attacked and surrounded by an overwhelming enemy force. The aggressiveness of the assault, superior numbers and superior numbers and fire superiority disorganized the company into isolated small groups, each vainly trying to fight a withdrawing action to escape the trap. Sergeant Limbock led a group of nineteen men through enemy lines to the hills south of Anui. He did so while wounded and with complete disregard for personal safety in the interest of saving his detachment. Sergeant Limbock was wounded so severely that he was unable to walk and had to be carried by his men. He continued to lead and direct his men in this fashion for three days. He directed their route of march, instructed them in providing security along the route, and maintained battle discipline. On one occasion he further risked his life to prevent a grenade from injuring men of his group. Sergeant Limbock, although very weak, encouraged his detachment to keep going in spite of hunger and fatigue. By so doing the men reached a point where a patrol was sent for assistance which arrived and took the group to safety. [note]

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Alfred K. McIlquham (O-1540949), First Lieutenant (Infantry), U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with Company B, 1st Battalion, 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division. First Lieutenant McIlquham distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity of Sangju, Korea on 27 July 1950.


On that date, Company B was attacked by an enemy force of overwhelming numerical superiority. Faced with the certainty of being overrun, the company was ordered to withdraw while the 1st platoon, commanded by Lieutenant McIlquham remained in position and furnished covering fire for the withdrawal. Heedless of the deadly enemy fire, Lieutenant McIlquham repeatedly moved about the exposed terrain to deploy his men and effectively direct their fire. When two men were wounded by enemy machine-gun fire, Lieutenant McIlquham single-handedly charged the machine-gun, silenced it, and then carried the two wounded men to a less exposed position. By his aggressive leadership and courageous example throughout the protracted engagement, he inspired his men to hold their positions despite the overwhelming odds against them, thereby enabling the remainder of the company to reach safety. Later, while reconnoitering an escape route for his encircled platoon, the position was overrun by the numerically superior hostile force and Lieutenant McIlquham was killed. [note]

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Emery Northcutt (RA17265927), Private, U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with Company B, 1st Battalion, 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division. Private Northcutt distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity of Sangju, Korea on 27 July 1950.

On that date, Company B was in a defensive position when numerically superior enemy forces launched an attack supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire. The position soon became untenable and the order to withdraw was given. Without regard for his own personal safety, Private Northcutt voluntarily remained at his position on the flank, firing his light machine-gun and enabling the rest of the company to withdraw. When last seen, he was firing into the advancing enemy as they overran his position. [note]

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Edward E. Roslof (RA32368709), Sergeant, U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with Company B, 1st Battalion, 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division. Sergeant Roslof distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity of Sangju, Korea on 27 July 1950.


On that date, Company B was surrounded and the enemy established roadblocks to the rear of the company's position. With complete disregard for his life and in the face of heavy enemy fire, Sergeant Roslof attacked a roadblock in an effort to keep open the only route to friendly forces. When overwhelming odds forced the unit to withdraw, he volunteered to remain behind and destroy all equipment which could not be carried to prevent its seizure by the enemy. In delaying his departure to perform this heroic deed, he was not able to escape and was missing in action. [note]

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AIR FORCE B-29s Strike RAILROAD BRIDGES.

[Drop 30+ bombs, get 6 direct possible hits - golly the USAF is proud of this, what a class act. - Why not have two passes, parallel with the track, and take out both bridges for the entire width of the river?] [Oh you say they were aiming at the right shore>>>> Well that answers that.

By the way, 1 B-29 carries, 10 Tons of bombs, it looks like at least three, perhaps 4 bombers were making this drop - so make it more like 30-40 Tons, to get 6 hits..... even more impressive]

Ten tons of bombs from Air Force B-29 Superforts of the FEAF Bomber Command sever these two important railroad bridges near Pakchon, 40 miles north of P'yŏngyang, in North Korea in an attack made on July 27, 1950. As Captain Meterio Montez of Gardner, Colorado, lead bombardier, released his bombs, the Superforts in the formation did likewise. Montez was in the B-29 piloted by Captain Leslie Westberg, Spokane, Washington. Military supply traffic from North Korea formerly routed over these rail lines to the battle zone will be affected by this phase of the U.S. Air Force's interdiction plan. [note]

Maps

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[note]

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[note]

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[note]

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"Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey all offered ground troops for Korea."

[note]

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"The 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, attached to the 19th Infantry Regiment, US 24th Infantry Division, was ambushed at Yŏngdong. One half of the battalion was reported killed or missing in action." [note]

U.S.A.

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On July 27, 1950 , Lieutenant General Walker’s Headquarters EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) G-2 (Intelligence Staff Section) issued Intelligence Instruction No. 4 describing actions CIC teams must take relative to the movement and interrogation of refugees:

To ensure compliance with South Korean Government regulations governing the flow of refugee travel and to assist in proper exploitation by this Division, CIC teams will:
a.
Maintain daily contact and coordinate with the South Korean Army and local Korean law enforcement agencies charged by the Korean Government with operation and control of refugee movements.
b.
Maintain surveillance and inspection of police and South Korean Army refugee check points determining and reporting on sufficiency and efficiency of manning personnel.
c.
Insure [sic] the normal flow of arrestees from police to South Korean Army control. Refugees of intelligence value must be made available for G-2 exploitation before local disposal.d.
Screen, check and interrogate detainees indicated by preliminary police and South Korean Army interrogations to be of counter intelligence value.
e.
Conduct spot checks to insure [sic] that all prisoners and detainees of counter intelligence value are made available to CIC interrogators by the police and / or South Korean Army.
f.
High level N.K. agents as discovered, will be made available to Army G-2 for further interrogation and CINCFE disposition.
g.
Check and report on curfew regulations and enforcement. [26]

[26] Intelligence Instruction No. 4, EUSAK, 27 Jul 50. In Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1951-1952, Korea, Entry 47G, Box 163, RG 319, NARA.

The refugee problem was clearly widespread and not restricted to any one division’s area of operations. For example, during the last week of July, the 25th Infantry Division, located north of the 1st Cavalry Division, was being strongly pressed by NKPA forces. The 25th Infantry Division Activities Report for July 27, 1950 , in a paragraph on civil affairs and military government, reiterates the refugee policy:

A message was sent to the Commanding Officers of all front line units concerning refugees and Korean civilians within the combat zone. In addition to the information and previous instructions in regards to this problem, the Commanding Officers were again told of the seriousness of this condition and that all levels would take drastic action to prevent movement of all Korean personnel into and within the combat zone. Civilians moving within the combat zone would be considered as enemy. [27]

[27] Activities Report, 25th ID G-1, 27 Jul 50. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Infantry Divisions, 25th ID, 1950 , Box 806, RG 338, NARA.

Leaflets provided one method of conveying the theater policy on refugee movement to civilians in or near the combat zone. An order issued sometime in 1950 for these leaflets from the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Branch stipulates that the leaflets would read as follows:


Effective immediately, civilians are forbidden to move through the battle lines. The aggressor has been taking advantage of such movement to smuggle soldiers through, disguised as civilians.
Civilian residents of some areas may be evacuated when the UN Commanding Officers consider it advisable. Any such evacuation will be under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs and the National Police.
When such an evacuation has been approved, you will be told which roads to follow and where to go. You will move only by daylight. No one will move at night.
These orders will be rigidly enforced by the National Police in order to protect the security of the armies of the Republic and of the United Nations.
If you are not told to evacuate by the authorities, be calm and remain in your
homes. Confusion helps only the Communist aggressors. [28]

[28] Order for Korean Leaflet, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC) Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Psychological Warfare Branch, circa 1950 . In Records of the Army Staff; Records of the Executive Office, Unclassified Decimal File 1949-1950 , Entry 260A, Box 17, RG 319, NARA. [note]

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While the full scope of NKPA infiltration and civilian exploitation remains difficult to determine it was clearly extensive. The U.S. Army in Korea clearly recognized the seriousness of this threat. The strongly worded directive issued by the 25th Infantry Division's commander further illustrates how serious this infiltration threat was taken. A memorandum dated July 27, 1950 , addressed to the

"Commanding Officers, all Regimental Combat Teams and Staff Sections, this Headquarters" stated:
"Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly." [69]

[69] Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

This area was not in the rear, but in front of U.S. positions: a distinct area within which the South Korean police had evacuated all South Korean civilians. The 25th Infantry Division War Diary for July 27, 1950 , recorded that General Kean ordered commanders at all levels to take drastic action to prevent the movement of any Korean civilians into their areas within the combat zone. U.S. soldiers were to consider all persons in civilian clothes moving within the combat zone as enemy. [70]

[70] War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

The combat zone was the area directly to the division's front where contact with the enemy was imminent or fighting was going on and not simply a forward position. Only by denying the NKPA the ability to infiltrate during combat operations could U.S. positions be protected. It should also be noted that the area described above in the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations was miles away from Nogŭn-ni. (See Plates 2 thru 11, Appendix E, for the location of units in the Nogŭn-ni area.) This policy in combat areas was no secret, for example on July 27 the Associated Press reported that:

"All Korean civilians have been ordered out of the fighting zone southeast of Taejŏn. In an area once cleared of civilians, anyone in civilian clothing may be shot." [71]

[71] News Bulletin, 25th Infantry Division troop Information & Education (TI&E) Section, 27 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division, G-4 Journals, Box 766, RG 338, NARA.
(See Plates 2 thru 11 Appendix E.) [note]

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On July 27, 1950 , Lieutenant General Walker’s Headquarters EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) G-2 (Intelligence Staff Section) issued Intelligence Instruction No. 4 describing actions Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) teams must take relative to the movement and interrogation of refugees. These instructions included maintaining daily contact with the South Korean Army and local Korean law enforcement agencies; conducting surveillance and inspections of police and South Korean Army refugee checkpoints; screening, checking, and interrogating detainees deemed to be of counter intelligence value; and checking and reporting on curfew regulations and enforcement. [8]

[8] Intelligence Instruction No. 4, EUSAK, 27 Jul 50. In Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1951-1952, Korea, Entry 47G, Box 163, RG 319, NARA.


Leaflets also provided a method of conveying the theater policy on refugee movement to civilians in or near the combat zone. An order issued sometime in 1950 for these leaflets from the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Branch stipulated that the leaflets would say that civilians are forbidden to move through the battle lines, that the civilian residents of some areas may be evacuated under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs and the National Police, and that refugees will move only by daylight. The leaflets also had to state that the National Police would rigidly enforce these orders to protect the ROK and UN forces. [9]

[9] Order for Korean Leaflet, General Headquarters (EUSAK), Far East Command (FEC) Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Psychological Warfare Branch, circa 1950 . In Records of the Army Staff; Records of the Executive Office, Unclassified Decimal File 1949-1950 , Entry 260A, Box 17, RG 319, NARA.


The UN forces and the Eighth Army relied heavily upon the ROK National Police's assistance in controlling the refugee problem and executing the joint Eighth Army and ROK refugee policy. An example of the ROK National Police's indispensable help appears in a monograph written by Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Powhida entitled "Civilian Control in South Korea." [10]

[10] Monograph, "Civilian Control in South Korea," by LTC J.P. Powhida. In Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General; Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1951-1952, Entry 433B, Box 221, RG 389, NARA. [note]

TF77 refueling, USS Toledo (CA-133) and DD's (Notes)

South then North

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At this time the KMAG advisers had serious trouble with "Tiger" Kim, the commander of the ROKA 23rd ROK Infantry Regiment. He was extremely brutal in his disciplinary methods. In the presence of several advisers he had his personal bodyguard shoot a young 1st lieutenant of his regiment whose unit had been surrounded for several days. This incident took place on 26 July.


The next day Kim used the butt of an M1 rifle on some of the enlisted men of this unit. The KMAG advisers remonstrated at this action, and in order to avoid possible personal trouble with Kim they asked for his removal. "Tiger" Kim was removed from command of the regiment and the commander of the 1st Separate Battalion, Colonel Kim, replaced him. [12-9] [note]

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[12-Caption] Strafing ATTACK by an F-80 fighter.


In an effort to meet the deadline given it for the capture of P'ohang-dong, the N.K. 12th Division resumed daylight marches. U.N. aerial attacks struck it daily. The ROK 8th Division at the same time fought it almost to a halt. But, despite these difficulties the enemy division pressed slowly on toward Andong. At the end of the month it was engaged in a hard battle with the ROK 8th Division for the control of that key town and the upper Naktong River crossing site. [note]

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Three days later the ROK 1st Division, now relieved northwest of Sangju by the U.S. 24th Infantry and redeployed on the Hamch'ang front, reportedly destroyed 4 more tanks there with 2.36-inch bazookas and captured 1 tank intact. The decimated remnants of the ROK 2nd Division, relieved by the 27th Infantry Regiment on the Hwanggan - Poŭn road, were incorporated into the ROK 1st Division. [note]

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By 27 July all the Mun'gyŏng divide was in North Korean possession and enemy units were moving into the valley of the upper Naktong in the vicinity of Hamch'ang. Prisoners taken at the time and others captured later said that the N.K. 1st Division lost 5,000 casualties in the struggle for control of the divide, including the division commander who was wounded and replaced. The 13th Division, following the 1st, suffered about 500 casualties below Mun'gyŏng, but otherwise it was not engaged during this period. [12-23] [note]

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But the following day the regimental left flank came under attack where a large gap existed between C Company, the left-hand (west) unit of the 27th Infantry, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the nearest unit of the 1st Cavalry Division. C Company lost and regained a peak three times during the day. More than 40 casualties reduced its strength to approximately 60 men. B Company also lost heavily in action, falling to a strength of about 85 men. [note]

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Before daybreak the 1st Cavalry Division had repulsed the attack. [12-56] [note]

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The 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, defending the Kŏch'ang approach to the Naktong, had a regimental strength at this time of about 1,150 men, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions averaging approximately 350 men each. It was in position at Kŏch'ang on 27 July.

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MAP_14_and_Map_17_Chinju_to_Kumch'ŏn

[yellow-dashed-line Chinan to Hyŏpch'ŏn - I can't make that leap.]


Kŏch'ang is about midway on the main road between Kumch'ŏn and Chinju and is strategically located near the point where two lateral east-west roads, one from Namwŏn and Hamyang and the other from Chinan, cross the Kumch'ŏn-Chinju road and continue eastward through Hyŏpch'ŏn and Ch'ogye to the Naktong River. Chinju is thirty-five air miles south of Kŏch'ang.

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Colonel Rhea 1/19 Colonel Wilson 1/29 Harold W. Mott 3/29


On 27 July, Colonel Moore sent Colonel Wilson with the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, north from Chinju to relieve Colonel Rhea in the Anŭi area. Colonel Rhea was then to bring his battalion south to Chinju, where Colonel Moore planned to concentrate the 19th Infantry. [note]

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The N.K. 4th Division Seizes the Kŏch'ang Approach to the Naktong
Having brushed aside the American and ROK force at Anui, in what it called a "small engagement," the N.K. 4th Division turned northeast toward Kŏch'ang.

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A patrol from the 34th Infantry on 27 July had, from a distance, seen and heard the fighting in progress at Anui. Its report alerted Colonel Beauchamp to the possibility of an early attack. [13-45]

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Colonel Beauchamp had disposed the 34th Infantry in a three-quarter circle around Kŏch'ang, which lay in the middle of a two-and-a-half-mile-wide oval-shaped basin in a north-south mountain valley.

The 3rd Battalion was on high ground astride the Anui road two miles west of the town, the 71st [13-1st???] Battalion about the same distance east of it on the Hyŏpch'ŏn road, a reinforced platoon of I Company at a roadblock across the Kumch'ŏn road four miles north of the town, while the Heavy Mortar Company was at its northern edge.

Artillery support consisted of A Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, which had five 105-mm. howitzers in position two miles southeast of the town. [13-46]


The 34th Infantry, not having been able to reequip since Taejŏn, did not have a regimental switchboard. There were only a few radios. The regiment was short of mortars, bazookas, and machine guns. Some of the men did not have complete uniforms, many had no helmets, most did not have entrenching tools. Every man, however, did have his individual weapon. [note]

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By 27 July, the FEAF Bomber Command had a comprehensive rail interdiction plan ready. This plan sought to interdict the flow of enemy troops and materiel from North Korea to the combat area. Korean_War

Two cut points-(1) the P'yŏngyang railroad bridge and marshaling yards and (2) the Hamhung bridge and Hamhung and Wŏnsan marshaling yards -would sever rail communications with North Korea. Destruction of the rail bridges over the Han near Sŏul would cut rail communication to the battle area. [note] [note]

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Bringing the 7th Infantry Division up to war strength posed an even more difficult problem. During July, FEC had taken 140 officers and 1,500 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men from the division to augment the strength of the 24th and 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Divisions as they in turn had mounted out for Korea.

At the end of July the division was at less than half-strength, but in noncommissioned officer weapons leaders and critical specialists the shortage was far greater than that proportion. On 27 July, the 7th Infantry Division was 9,117 men understrength-290 officers, 126 warrant officers, and 8,701 enlisted men.
[note]

Citation

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500727 0000 DSC BRAGG, BERNARD B.

19500727 0000 DSC LIMBOCK, ROEY E.

19500727 0000 DSC McILQUHAM, ALFRED K.*

19500727 0000 DSC NORTHCUTT, EMERY*

19500727 0000 DSC ROSLOF, EDWARD E. (MIA)*

 

 

[note]

 

 

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The next day the NKPA 6th Division fell on the 3/29 in full fury and virtually inflicted a massacre.

In all, the battalion suffered about 50 percent casualties; 403, including 349 missing (of whom 313 were later found dead).

Chae and 3/29 company commanders Joseph K. Donahue and Hugh P. Milleson were killed;

Mott, Raibl, the S-1, and William Mitchell, the S-2, were wounded; company commander Alexander E. Makarounis was captured.

The senior surviving and unwounded officer, George F. Sharra, the combat-experienced commander of L Company (mostly comprised of raw recruits), took command and led the 3/29's fleeing survivors to safety. All of the battalion's weapons, vehicles, and other gear were lost.[6-69]

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That same day, July 27, Moore sent the other Okinawa battalion, Wilson's 1/29, north out of Chinju toward Anŭi to replace Robert Rhea's 1/19, which was positioned at Anui to block the southerly movement of the NKPA's 4th Division and to link with the 34th Regiment at Kŏch'ang.

The relief, carried out in the midst of a NKPA probing attack, was a shambles. Rhea's A Company, caught in a roadblock and not able to withdraw as planned, had to destroy its vehicles and flee into the hills.

Wilson's ill-prepared B and D companies, entering combat for the first time, were cut off and riddled (215 casualties) and followed Rhea's men into the hills.

After mounting several futile attempts to rescue his B Company, Wilson ordered a hurried withdrawal to Sanchong [Sinchong] that night, thereby sparing his remaining two companies the total disaster that befell the 1/29.[6-70]


John Church and Ned Moore had displayed laudable aggressiveness in advancing to meet the enemy. However, the decision to commit the two, utterly green Okinawa battalions for this purpose was unfortunate, even callous. Serving almost as cannon fodder, the two units had incurred a shocking 618 casualties in a single day to little purpose.


* * *


Even though the NKPA had unwisely split off two fresh divisions from the drive on Taegu to make the flanking attack on Pusan, the gravity of the mistake was not yet apparent at Eighth Army headquarters. As a result, there was still utmost concern that Taegu might fall.

The fresh NKPA 2nd Division had joined the battered 3rd Division in the advance on the Taegu - Taejŏn road. Six full-strength NKPA divisions were attacking the five depleted ROK divisions on the north, central, and east fronts. Although the ROK Army continued to show improvement, it was steadily giving ground. [note]

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In Washington the JCS continued to view the NKPA invasion of South Korea as a possible military feint in a larger Kremlin design.

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It kept a close watch on Western Europe, the Middle East, and particularly Communist China, which, notwithstanding the difficulties of consolidating a new government, had invaded Tibet and was supporting Ho Chi Minh in Indochina.

The big concern was that Moscow might order Peking to intervene in the Korean War to assist the NKPA or that Peking, having assembled 200,000 troops opposite Formosa, might invade that island, as it had vowed to do, with or without encouragement from Moscow.

"war warning"

In late July an urgent intelligence report seemed to indicate that a Red Chinese invasion of Formosa was more than a mere possibility. The report stated that the Red Chinese had assembled a fleet of "4,000 vessels" on the mainland opposite Formosa. On July 27, believing an invasion could be imminent, the JCS sent MacArthur what amounted to a "war warning."[6-92]

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The Truman administration policy toward Formosa was still to "neutralize" it: prevent a Communist invasion of Formosa or a Nationalist invasion of the Chinese mainland. In view of the apparent mounting Chinese Communist threat to the island, the JCS informed MacArthur, it had recommended drastic new steps: that the Nationalist Air Force be permitted to launch preemptive air strikes on the troop and ship concentrations and to mine the coastal waters on the mainland and that following a "survey" of the island, the administration provide the Nationalists such military aid as was necessary to repel a Communist invasion. The recommendations had not yet been approved; the JCS sought MacArthur's opinions.

MacArthur's views on Formosa were identical to those of Louis Johnson and Truman's right-wing critics. He believed that anyone in the Far East who was anti-Communist should be supported to the hilt by the Americans. The existing neutralization of Formosa placed a "restriction" on Chiang Kai-shek that was an "injustice" for which America might have to pay "a heavy military price" in the long run.

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He therefore concurred in the JCS recommendations to permit the Nationalist Air Force to attack the Communist troop concentrations and naval vessels on the mainland. He welcomed the idea of conducting a "survey" of the island and providing aid. He himself would lead the survey team.[6-93] [note]

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Earlier the President had told the press on 27 July that he was not even considering the use of atomic bombs in Korea.#19

#19 New York Times, July 28, 1950. [note]

U.S.A.F.

 

 

0630 takeoff from Haneda with General MacArthur aboard the Bataan. We visited Korea - General Walker's headquarters, General Partridge's headquarters; had lunch with Partridge and Weyland and then discussed the airdrome construction program with Colonel Mount.[148] I was greatly impressed with the intelligence and ability of Colonel Mount. Our airdrome program in Korea is in good hands.


Returned from Korea approximately 1930 hours.


B-29 on recon mission reported back apparent activity around Wonsan air
strip. GHQ Intelligence reports an enemy aircraft dropped 1 incendiary bomb on Fifth Air Force Hqrs., no damage done.


A B-29, scheduled to attack front-line precision targets, due to weather,
changed its course for P'yŏnggang; however, due to poor navigation and non- alertness, the pilot discovered he was right over Dairen, at which place, he was intercepted by two Russian fighters, but they did not fire. The pilot pulled away, dropped his bombs on P'yŏnggang marshaling yards and beat it for home.[149]

[note]

 

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The Fifth Air Force redesignated the squadron [The 6002nd Air Base Squadron] as the 6002nd Air Base Unit on 12 July, but the unit did not learn of its new name until 27 July because communications back to Itazuke were uncertain during the month. [note]

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19th BG(M)

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week
30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks
06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks
13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks
20 - the Navy sink the bridge [note]

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Movement of additional tactical organizations to Korea awaited the re-equipment of those units with F-51's from the United States. The aircraft carrier Boxer, which managed an eight-day crossing of the Pacific, brought 145 F-51's which had been assembled for delivery by 27 July.

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General Stratemeyer had already prepared to use these F-51's when on 11 July he had approved a plan to move the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group with its 12th and 67th Squadrons from the Philippines for temporary duty with the Fifth Air Force.

[note]

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The 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron had similarly hectic experiences at the beginning of hostilities[ as did the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron ]. At first two electronics countermeasures (ECM) crews were sent to Yokota on temporary duty and the rest of the squadron started combat missions by flying from Okinawa to Japan via Korea; photos were processed at Yokota and the aircraft then returned to Okinawa via Korea. This system not only delayed the delivery of information to the tactical units but made the maintenance of aircraft flying from two bases difficult. The squadron therefore started moving to Yokota, on 12 July and by 27 July opened headquarters there. [note]

U.S.M.C.

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Admiral Cassady , DCNO (Air), acted promptly on the request, forwarding it to BuAer. The admiral's directive instructed the Bureau of Aeronautics to procure 40 H04S—1 for equipping the two 15-plane squadrons.
"The H04S—1," Admiral Cassady erroneously indicated, "is capable of transporting 10 troops (225 [pounds] per man) for a distance of 150 miles.... Procurement is predicated on deliver y commencing in six months after notification t o the company ." [2]

2. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 27Ju150, Subj : Marine Corps Assault Helicopter Program, with copy to CMC .

In addition to the Marine Corps ' immediate needs, Cassady stressed the point that the time-table should be rearranged and accelerated for future procurement of the 20- t o 26-man ultimate assault transport helicopter defined in operational requirement AO-17501.[3]
3. Ibid

"The program," he said, "should be aimed at production commencing in 18 to 24 months fro m its initiation ."

He urged further that immediate action be taken by BuAer to initiate the program , which meant the solicitation of design proposals from the manufacturers. The initial purchase o f no less than 40 new helicopters was considered to be minimum by the CNO after the design had been selected.[4]
4. Ibid . [note]

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Before the first reserve units arrived at their initial stations of deployment, however, four important events occurreds

1. On 25 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Marine Corps to - build the 1st Marine Division, less one RCT, to war strength. On - the same day, a 10-15 August date of departure for the Far East was set.

2. On 25 July, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized a 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within the continental limits of the United States, making additional regular Marines available for the 1st Marine Division.

3. Two days later, [7/27] Congress passed legislation authorizing the President to extend for one year all enlistments, regular and reserve, that were t o expire prior to 9 July 1951. This law made it possible for the Marine Corps to rely on a stable body of regulars and reservists.

4.On 31 July, even as the first reservists were arriving at 'Camp Pendleton and approximately 6,800 regular Marines of the 2nd Marine Division were mounting out of Camp Lejeune to join the 1st Division, the Joint Chiefs directed the Marine Corps to expand the 2nd Division to war strength and increase the number of Marine tactical squadrons from 16 to 18. [note]

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The President, in turn, lost no time in acting upon this new authority. He ordered immediately an extension of 12 months for

"all enlistments in the Army, the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corps, including the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve, and any component of the Air Force of the United States which shall expire at any time after the date of this order and prior to July 9, 1951."

[note]

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The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at the objective.[29] [note]

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Congress passed legislation on 27 July authorizing the President to extend for one year all enlistments in the armed forces, both regular and reserve, which were due to expire before 9 July 1951. This gave the assurance of a stable body of troops. [note]

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Meanwhile, orders to Organized Reserve units were being issued at established intervals.
On 22 July, 25 units were ordered to active duty;
on 24 July, 23 units;
on 25 July, 18 units;
on 26 July, 13 units;
on 27 July, 6 units;
on 3-August s 5 units; and
on 4 August, 25 units.

[note]

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Four days before the first Organized Reserve units reported for active duty, however, Congress passed Public Law 624 giving the President authority to extend the enlistments of all military personnel in the Armed Forces. This new and important legislation, like the one that had authorized the calling of reservists to active duty, was a reflection of the gravity with which the leaders of the nation viewed the Korean crisis.

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[note Accordingly, on 28 July, which was three days prior to the reporting date of the first reservists, the Commandant authorized all Inspector-Instructors to defer from call to active duty cases involving extreme hardship and to await instructions from Marine Corps Headquarters. ] [note]

U.S.N.

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27 July
COMNAVFE directed harassing and demolition raids by CTF 90 utilizing UDT and marine reconnaissance personnel against selected North Korean east coast military objectives. [note]

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The HMS Triumph (R16) operated with us at all times,[ July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.] except July 22, providing CAP and ASP. [note]

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Due to expected deterioration in weather conditions on the east coast of Korea, the task force spent the 27th refueling from the USNS Navasota (T-AO-106) and on route to the west coast [note]

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25, 26,27,28,29
The HMS Triumph (R16) again furnished Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Submarine Petrol for the period 25 through 29 July augmented by one ADW type aircraft from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45). [note]


27 July
To meet the requirements of supporting combat forces in Korea, Fleet Logistic Air Wing, Pacific, was established as a unit of the Pacific Fleet and independent from the existing Fleet Logistic Air Wing. [note]

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On 19 July the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) was back with orders to support the ground troops, a matter of some surprise to Partridge and Walker since GHQ had arranged it without consulting them.

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General Partridge insisted that the carrier pilots must follow the same operating procedure as Fifth Air Force flyers, and despite early complaints by Navy pilots that they could not raise MELLOW control, better liaison produced satisfactory strikes on 25 July and more were scheduled for the following two days.

[So what happened on the 19 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24th? then 25, 26 and 27th] [note]

19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

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At noon on the 19th General Gay assumed command ashore. In the afternoon, with unloading completed, ships of the Attack Force shifted to heavy weather anchorages as Grace[Duration July 16 – July 21], the first typhoon of the season, was reported heading for Korea Strait.


On the 22nd Grace came up the coast, bringing gusts of 50 knots to Yŏngil Man and delaying the arrival of the second echelon of shipping. This had been scheduled to come in on the 21st, but the MSTS units reached P'ohang only on the 23rd, and the chartered Japanese freighters the next day. The LSTs of the third echelon arrived on the 26th and 29th.

For a variety of reasons, unloading of the follow-up shipping was somewhat slow.

The MSTS transports suffered from their shortages of personnel;

the Japanese freighters lacked trained hatch crews and unloading gear, and the ever-present language problem complicated supervision;

after two days of continuous labor the shore party was getting tired.

Nonetheless the work proceeded. On the 23rd the commanding officer of a Navy LST was directed by Admiral Doyle to take over the duties of senior officer present, and late in the evening the force commander sailed inUSS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), with USS Union (AKA-106), USS JAMES E. KYES (DD-787), and USS Diachenko (APD-123), for Tokyo.

A week later it was all over, and CTF 90 was able to report the completion of operations at P'ohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from Yŏngil Man. But this report was by way of formality, for the strategic rewards of the operation had long since been apparent. On 22 July, four days after the initial landing, the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the battered 24th Division southeast of Taejŏn.
22 June [note]

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on the 27th the Fifth Air Force JOC after politely describing the attacks of the 26th as "invaluable and much appreciated," inquired as to their results, requested information as to future operations, and stated it could handle as many flights as could be provided. But a report from Admiral Doyle on the state of Army and Air Force control of tactical air seemed to indicate a need for basic reorganization and training before adequate standards could be obtained, while the Seventh Fleet, despite the compliments, remained unsatisfied with the results of its work. [note]


From the 27th to the 30th, in rainy, windy weather, USS Toledo (CA-133), USS Mansfield (DD-728), and USS Collett (DD-730) operated off the battle line. troops and other targets made for good shooting, and both shore and air spot were available; star-shell illumination by the ships aided the artillery ashore; the destroyers continued to alternate days’ duty in running north along the shoreline to bombard targets between Yŏngdök and the parallel. By month’s end the pressure was diminishing. [note]

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On the 27th a more important encounter took place to the northward as the newly acquired PCs 702 and 703 bombarded Palmi Do and Wŏlmi-do in Inch'ŏn harbor, and then, during their retirement, encountered a flotilla of southbound sampans loaded with ammunition and proceeded to sink 12 of them. [note]


USS Sicily (CVE-118) reached Guam on 20 July; as the submarine menace had not materialized she there disembarked her squadron and sailed for Yokosuka, where she arrived on the 27th. Four days later, on 31 July, Badoeng Strait and the transports entered Kobe. [note]

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27,28,29,30,31,01,02,03,04,05,06 July-August

01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as Toledo fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell.

By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable.

Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins’ element found their days full. [note]

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17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

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On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

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[note]


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[note]

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The Final Mission Summary Reports for July 27, indicated that

Mission 35-1, Contour George, flew in the Yŏngdong-Hwanggan area while 35-2, Contour Roger, and 35-3, Contour William, flew elsewhere.

The four F-80s of Mission 35-1 departed Itazuke at 0600K. They contacted Mellow over Taejŏn and destroyed a flak emplacement hidden in a damaged C-47 sitting on the Taejŏn airfield. Pineapple Control (an Army L-5 or L-17 from the 1st Cavalry Division) then directed Mission 35-1 to Yŏngdong, and the four planes flew up the road northeast toward Hwanggan without incident. [109]

[109] "Fighter-Bomber Final Mission Summary (FEAF Intel Form #5) for 27 Jul 50 missions 35-1, 35-2, 35-3, 36-1, 39-1, and 39-2.

OOPS

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The pilots reported seeing U.S. artillery firing into Hwanggan, but they were mistaken because the town remained in U.S. hands for a few more days. At least one F-80 strafed a "wooden area into which many vehicle tracks were leading", probably the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's command post. The strafing destroyed two trucks but claimed no lives. [110]

[110] Ibid; 7th Cavalry War Diary. [note]

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The question of which National Guard divisions should be called up had been under study for some time. General Collins had, on 21 July, asked the Chief, Army Field Forces, for recommendations.

[27 July]

Less than a week later General Bolte asked General Clark for an expanded study of the same problem.


In considering the problem, General Clark leaned heavily upon the continental Army commanders, soliciting their recommendations as to which divisions within their areas were best trained, best equipped, and most ready to go. After careful study, General Clark submitted to the Department of the Army his recommendations of six divisions most appropriate to be called on the grounds of training, manning, equipment status, and general fitness. The divisions recommended in order of priority of selection were the

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28th Division (Pennsylvania); the

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29th Division (Virginia and Maryland); the

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31st Division (Mississippi and Alabama); the

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37th Division (Ohio); the

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45th Division (Oklahoma); and the

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50th Armored Division (New Jersey). [07-28] [note]

0715 Korean Time

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An event that might bear on the alleged incident in the vicinity of Nogŭn-ni concerns a friendly fire incident that occurred in the Hwanggan area on July 27; an F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 AM, prompting the regimental commander to request that a TACP be assigned immediately. [104]

[104] HQ, 7th Cavalry (Infantry) War Diary, June-July 1950 , in the records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949 -1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

This location is approximately 500 meters east of the double railroad overpass and 100 meters south-southeast of the single railroad overpass.

A Fifth Air Force ADVON message acknowledged that the plane was an F-80 from one of the 35th FBS's first three missions of the day (call sign Contour). [105]

[105] MSG, COMAF 5 ADVON to COMFtrBMRWG 8, AOC B211, 27 / 0546Z July 1950 . [1446 Korea Time - 28th] [note]

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27,28,29
During the next three days Task Force 77 continued to support the Eighth Army, and it effected a workable solution to the front-line control problem which helped the Mosquitoes.


Navy controllers, flying AD dive-bombers, joined the Mosquitoes and remained on station with them for three to four hours. As Navy attack planes came in, they were controlled by either the Air Force or the Navy controller, whichever was available and not already working other aircraft. At the conclusion of their strikes the Navy pilots checked out with "Mellow" control and made an oral report of their mission accomplishments. [note]

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B Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, started for Yŏngdong on Colonel Moore's orders at 0800 that morning. [note]

0830 Korean Time

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17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

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ROK troops regrouped for another desperate counterattack, to be supported by all available U.N. sea, air, and ground weapons, in an effort to hurl the North Koreans back to the north of Yŏngdök. At this time General Walker required hourly reports sent to his headquarters at Taegu. In action preliminary to the main attack, planned for the morning of 27 July, ROK troops during the night of the 26th captured seventeen machine guns, but took only eight prisoners.

27,28,29,30,31,01,02 July-August

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The preparatory barrages began at 0830. Then came the air strikes. The battle that then opened lasted until 2 August without letup.

[It has already been going on for a week, 7/17. Should go on until the 9th][note]

0845 Korean Time

Korean_WarI, K, L, M companies


The battalion [3rd] moved out from Hoengch'on-ni at approximately 0845, 27 July. Capt. George F. Sharra and L Company, with a platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company, were in the lead, followed by the battalion command group and K, M, and I Companies, in that order. Sharra was an experienced rifle company commander, having seen action in Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany in World War II.


When he was about 1,000 yards from the top of the Hadong pass, Sharra saw a patrol of ten or twelve enemy soldiers come through the pass and start down toward him. The Heavy Weapons platoon fired their two 75-mm. recoilless rifles at the patrol but the rounds passed harmlessly overhead. The enemy patrol turned and ran back over the pass.

Captain Sharra ordered L Company to dash to the top of the pass and secure it. His men reached the top and deployed on either side of the pass. [note]

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XV. July 27, 1950
The division now occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry to the west of town near Nogŭn-ni. The 7th Cavalry was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry still on the regiment's right and the 5th Cavalry to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry was not in direct contact with the enemy but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yŏngdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yŏngdong on the railroad tracks. [note]

0930 Korean Time

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It was now about 0930. Sharra received orders for L Company to dig in and wait for an air strike on Hadong scheduled for 0944. [23]


The road climbed to the top of the pass along the southern shoulder of a high mountain in a series of snakelike turns, and then started downward to Hadong a mile and a half westward. A high peak on the right (north) towered over the road at the pass; to the left the ground dropped away rapidly to flat paddy land along the Sumjin River.


The command group, including Colonel Mott, Captain Flynn, and most of the battalion staff, now hurried forward to the pass. General Chae and his party accompanied Colonel Mott. Captain Sharra pointed out to Colonel Mott unidentified people moving about on the higher ground some distance to the north. Mott looked and replied, "Yes, I have K Company moving up there." Raibl, at the rear of the column, received orders from Mott to join him at the pass, and he hurried forward.


As the battalion command group gathered in the pass, Captain Sharra, thinking that it made an unusually attractive target, walked over to the left and dropped to the ground beside the gunner of a light machine gun.
Raibl arrived at the pass. He saw that L Company was deployed with two platoons on the left of the pass and one platoon on the right, and that K Company was climbing toward higher ground farther to the north.


Colonel Mott directed Raibl's attention down the road toward Hadong. Around a curve came a column of enemy soldiers marching on either side of the road. Sharra also saw it. He directed his machine gunner to withhold fire until the column was closer and he gave the word. The enemy soldiers seemed unaware that American troops were occupying the pass.


Standing beside Raibl in the pass, General Chae watched the approaching soldiers, apparently trying to determine their identity. Some appeared to be wearing American green fatigue uniforms and others the mustard brown of the North Korean Army. When the approaching men were about 100 yards away, General Chae shouted to them in Korean, apparently asking their identity. At this, they scampered to the ditches without answering. The machine guns of L Company then opened fire. Sharra, who had the column in clear view, estimates it comprised a company. [24]


Almost simultaneously with the opening of American fire, enemy machine gun, mortar, and small arms fire swept over the pass from the high ground to the north. The first burst of enemy machine gun fire struck General Chae in the head and a great stream of blood spurted from the wound. He died instantly. Korean aides carried his body back to a vehicle. The same machine gun fire hit Major Raibl. He rolled down the incline to get out of the line of fire. Colonel Mott, the S-2, and the Assistant S-2 were also wounded by this initial enemy fire into the pass. Enemy mortars apparently had been registered on the pass, for their first rounds fell on the road and knocked out parked vehicles, including the TACP radio jeep. Captain Flynn, unhurt, dropped to the ground and rolled down from the pass. In the first minute of enemy fire the 3rd Battalion staff was almost wiped out.


Just after the fight opened, Major Raibl saw two flights of two planes each fly back and forth over the area, apparently trying vainly to contact the TACP below. They finally flew off without making any strikes. Raibl was wounded again by mortar fragments and went down the hill seeking a medical aid man. Meanwhile, Colonel Mott, wounded only slightly by a bullet crease across the back, got out of the line of fire. He was just below the pass helping to unload ammunition when a box dropped, breaking his foot. A soldier dug him a foxhole. As the fighting developed, everyone in Mott's vicinity was either killed or wounded, or had withdrawn down the hill. Very soon, it appears, no one knew where Mott was. [25]

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[Caption] Hadong


In the pass a hard fight flared between L Company and the North Koreans higher up the hill. On the right-hand (north) side of the road, 2nd Lt. J. Morrissey and his 1st Platoon bore the brunt of this fight. The enemy was just above them and the machine gun that had all but wiped out the battalion group in the road was only 200 yards from the pass. Enemy soldiers immediately came in between them and elements of K Company that were trying to climb the hill higher up. These North Koreans attacked Morrissey's men in their foxholes, bayoneting two of them. Morrissey proved a capable leader, however, and his men held their position despite numerous casualties.


Across the road on the south side of the pass, Captain Sharra and the 2nd Platoon gave supporting fire to Morrissey's men. Sharra had only voice communication with his three platoons. It is a tribute to the officers, the noncommissioned officers, and the rank and file, half of them young recruits freshly arrived from the United States, that L Company held steadfast in its positions on both sides of the pass against enemy fire and attack from commanding terrain. The North Korean soldiers exposed themselves recklessly and many must have been killed or wounded.


Captain Flynn hastened down from the pass at the beginning of the fight to hurry up the supporting elements of the battalion. Down the road he found part of the Heavy Weapons Company and part of K Company. He ordered a platoon of K Company to attack up the hill, and talked by radio with the company commander, Capt. Joseph K. Donahue, who was killed later in the day.

Flynn continued on down the road looking for I Company.


Coming to the battalion trains, Flynn had the wounded, including Major Raibl, loaded on the trucks and started them back to Chinju. Farther in the rear, Flynn found 1st Lt. Alexander G. [E.] Makarounis and I Company. He ordered Makarounis to move the company into the gap between L and K Companies. Flynn started one of its platoons under MSgt. James A. Applegate into the rice paddies on the left of the road, where he thought it could get cover from the dikes in crossing a large, horseshoe-shaped bowl in its advance toward the enemy-held hill mass. [26]

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[Caption]Hadong PASS where men of the 29th Regiment were ambushed. [note]

Korean_War ABCD EFGH IKLM


The morning that Mott's battalion approached Hadong, 27 July, Captain Barszcz received orders to take his G Company, 19th Infantry, from Chinju on a motorized patrol along secondary roads northeast of Hadong. He mounted his seventy-eight men in vehicles and conducted the patrol about fourteen miles northeast of Hadong without encountering the enemy. [note]

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The second reference was a 25th Infantry Division Commander's memorandum to commanders, issued on July 27, 1950 . On the 25th of July, 1950 , the 25th ID Activities Report stated:

"Refugees and Korean Civilians were ordered out of the combat zone in order to eliminate possible serious traffic problems and to aid in blocking the infiltration of North Korean Forces through the lines. These instructions were passed to the civilians through the Korean Police." 51

The July 27, 1950 memo to Commanders reads:

"Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly." 52

The area "between the blue lines" was in front of the 25th Infantry Division's main line of defense -- no-man's-land at best -- an area about to be occupied by the enemy. Two things are clear: actions had been taken in conjunction with the Korean National Police to clear the civilians out of the danger area; and, those actions were intended to ensure that noncombatants would not find themselves in harms way when the advancing NKPA subsequently made contact along the Division's front. After the area was deemed to be cleared, anyone caught in civilian clothes and suspected of being an enemy agent was to be turned over to the Counter Intelligence Corps, and not to the Korean Police immediately.

There is nothing to suggest any summary measures were considered against refugees, or people dressed like them. The 25th Infantry Division was not in the vicinity of Nogŭn-ni. [note]

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Thursday morning early, 27 July, the Bataan departed Haneda Airfield and landed at Taegu about 1000. A small group of officers, including General Almond, accompanied MacArthur. Met by Generals Walker and Partridge and Colonel Landrum, the party went directly to Eighth Army headquarters.


During a ninety-minute conference between General MacArthur and General Walker only one other person was present-General Almond.

In this lengthy conversation General MacArthur never mentioned Walker's request of the day before, nor did he in any way criticize Walker. But he did emphasize the necessity of Eighth Army standing its ground. He said withdrawals must cease.

Later, after lunch and in the presence of several members of the army staff, MacArthur said there would be no evacuation from Korea-that there would be no Korean Dunkerque.

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He praised the 24th Division and the ROK Capital Division. [12-68] [note]

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After hanging up, Almond went immediately to see MacArthur. He relayed Walker's gloomy news and plans and urged MacArthur to go at once to Korea and put some ginger in Eighth Army.

(1000+30+90+60)=1300

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MacArthur agreed, and at about ten o'clock the next morning, July 27 (the day the Okinawa battalions were being slaughtered), MacArthur, Almond, some GHQ staffers, and selected news correspondents arrived in Taegu aboard MacArthur's plane, the Bataan.[6-73]

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MacArthur, Almond, and Walker conferred in private for an hour and a half.

As usual, MacArthur did most of the talking, speaking as much to the "unseen audience" and history as to Walker. He did not once allude directly to Walker's withdrawal plans. He spoke grandly and loftily of Eighth Army's role in history and the defeat of communism. Ultimate victory was near at hand.

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The 2nd Infantry Division, the Marine RCT, and the Army's 5th RCT from Hawaii would be landing at Pusan soon, to reinforce Eighth Army. Yet another plan for an Inch'ŏn amphibious landing was taking shape, utilizing the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division. Eighth Army must hold so that the larger schemes could unfold as designed. Eighth Army withdrawals must cease. There would be no Dunkirk in Korea.[6-74]

[1200]

19500727 1200 167tfw0 MacArthur lunches

Lunch

19500727 1300 167tfw0 MacArthur leaves


When he returned to the airport to enplane for Japan, MacArthur was "smiling and exuding confidence." He boasted to disbelieving reporters: "The enemy has lost his great chance for victory in the last three weeks. . . . This does not mean that victory passes to us instantly or without a long hard row and the most difficult struggle. That we will have new heartaches and new setbacks is inherent in the situation, but I have never been more confident in victory - in ultimate victory - in my life than I am now."[6-75]

(1000+30+90+30)=1230

[note]


1000
On 27 July, MacArthur, with a staff including General Almond, landed in Taegu about 1000. This time, MacArthur did not visit the front line, contenting himself with conferences in Taegu. The most significant conference took place between MacArthur and Walker. Only one other person, General Almond, sat in on this 90-minute meeting.


MacArthur did not mention Walker's request of the day before, nor did he criticize Walker for any of his actions He merely talked over the tactical situation, emphasizing that Eighth Army must hold its ground He told Walker that withdrawals would cease later, in the presence of several members of the Eighth Army staff, MacArthur said that there would be no evacuation from Korea-there would be no Dunkerque. [note]

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USAF F-51D pilot recovered by by a destroyer.

1143 Korean Time

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At 1145/K this Flight received a call from ADCC that a pilot had bailed out at 36° 30' N 129° 25' E. The type and number of the aircraft unknown. The pilot's name was unknown. It was later determined that the aircraft was an Air Force F-51. [note]

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About noon, 2nd Lt. Ernest Philips of L Company came to Captain Sharra in the pass and told him he had found Colonel Mott, wounded, a short distance away. Philips went back and carried Mott to Sharra's position. Mott told Sharra to take over command of the battalion and to get it out.
Sharra sent instructions to his three platoons to withdraw to the road at the foot of the pass. His runner to Lieutenant Morrissey and the 1st Platoon on the north side of the pass never reached them. [note]

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MacArthur lunches

Lunch

[note]

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The relief took place at Umyong-ni in the early afternoon of 27 July. Wilson's battalion [1st] had no artillery, armor, or air support. A platoon of 4.2 mortars had only two rounds of white phosphorous shells for ammunition. Mounted messengers traveling over thirty-five miles of road were the only means of communication between Wilson and Colonel Moore's command post. [38]


In the early afternoon, Colonel Rhea guided 1st Lt. John C. Hughes with B Company, 19th Infantry, reinforced by approximately thirty-five men and their weapons from the Heavy Weapons Company, from Umyong-ni to relieve A Company, 19th Infantry, at Anŭi.

A Company was engaged in a small arms fight and its relief could not be accomplished at once. Colonel Rhea returned to Umyong-ni, leaving instructions that the company should follow him as soon as possible, which he expected would be shortly.

At Umyong-ni Rhea waited about five hours for A Company. [note]

1230 Korean Time

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Meanwhile, Colonel Wilson had sent 2nd Lt. Frank Iwanczyk, Assistant S-3, with two jeeps from Umyong-ni to make contact with the 34th Infantry at Kŏch'ang; 1st Lt. Sam C. Holliday, S-2, went to make contact with the ROK troops at Hamyang.


Iwanczyk set off northward. At the Anŭi crossroads he checked his map and then led off toward Kŏch'ang, waving the other jeep to follow. Because of the heavy dust the second jeep kept well behind the first.


A mile north of the crossroads, an enemy machine gun, hidden in a native hut on a turn of the road, suddenly poured devastating fire into the lead jeep. The bodies of all four men fell from the wrecked vehicle into a rice field. The second jeep stopped with a jerk and the men jumped into the ditch by the road. After three or four minutes of silence, seven or eight North Korean soldiers started down the road. They passed the first jeep and, when nearing the second, they shouted and started to run toward it. Pvt. Sidney D. Talley stood up and fired his M1 at the North Koreans. He killed two of them. His three companions now joined in firing. The surviving North Koreans turned and ran back.


One of the Americans scrambled up the bank, turned the jeep around, the others jumped in, and the driver raced back to the Anui crossroads. There, they excitedly told members of B Company about the roadblock. At the battalion command post they repeated their story. [40]

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By this time, Lieutenant Holliday had returned from Hamyang. There he had found somewhat less than 600 men of the ROK 7th Division and 150 fresh South Korean marines from Mokp'o. Holliday with three men now set off for Anui. Two and a half miles short of the town, enemy fire from a roadblock destroyed their jeep and wounded one man in the chest. Holliday covered the withdrawal of his three men with BAR fire, and then followed them. [note]

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In the afternoon, the regiment took fire from tanks in the vicinity of Sot Anmak; timely mortar fire drove off the NKPA armor. However, apart from some artillery and mortar fire, the day proved relatively quiet. The 77th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 7th Cavalry, and the battalion commander visited the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to ensure that the unit received adequate fire support. [62]

[62] War diary summaries, Headquarters 77th Field Artillery Battalion, 27 July 1950 . In the records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Division 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA. [note]

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The commander of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion was not the only visitor on July 27. An observer team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces arrived to evaluate the state of Army units in Korea and spent the day with the 7th Cavalry. A group of seven journalists, including Tom Lambert of the Associated Press and Dennis Warner of the Daily Telegraph and London Herald of Melbourne, also toured the 7th Cavalry's front lines. [63]

[63] War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA;
Report, First OCAFF, 16 August 1950 . In the Records of Army Chief of Staff, Decimal Files, 1950 , Box 558, RG 319, NARA.


None of these visitors later reported observing that large numbers of refugees had been, or were being, killed or injured in the vicinity of Nogŭn-ni.

88


Press representatives

Tom Lambert of the Associated Press,

Davis Warner of the Daily Telegraph and London Herald in Melbourne,

Stanley Massey, of the Consolidated Press in Sidney,

Mr. Christopher Buckley of the London Daily Telegraph,

Alan Humphrey of the London Daily Mail,

Ian Morrison of the London Times, and

Bill Hudons of the Australian Associated Press, visited the regimental command post during the day. [note]

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By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3rd Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19] [note]

[note]

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At first, Colonel Moore had thought that the Hadong fight was going well. Major Raibl arrived at Chinju with the first wounded in the early afternoon of 27 July, and reported that the 3rd Battalion was fighting well and that he thought it would win the battle. But, when other survivors came in later, the real outcome of the engagement became clear.

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News of the disaster at Hadong reached higher headquarters with unexpected and startling impact. A message from Major Logan, 19th Infantry, to General Church that night reporting on the condition of the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, said, "No estimate on total number of casualties. Over 100 WIA now in aid station" [31]

[31] 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 159, 27 Jul 50. [note]


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When he returned to the airport to enplane for Japan, MacArthur was "smiling and exuding confidence." He boasted to disbelieving reporters: "The enemy has lost his great chance for victory in the last three weeks. . . . This does not mean that victory passes to us instantly or without a long hard row and the most difficult struggle. That we will have new heartaches and new setbacks is inherent in the situation, but I have never been more confident in victory - in ultimate victory - in my life than I am now."[6-75] [note]

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After MacArthur had departed Taegu, a chastened Walton Walker put on hold his plans for the withdrawal of the 1st Cav and 25th Divisions to the Naktong River; he did not follow up the earlier warning with a movement order. Nonetheless, withdrawals in that sector continued with tacit Eighth Army staff approval. [note]

1400 Korean Time

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An event that might bear on the alleged incident in the vicinity of Nogŭn-ni concerns a friendly fire incident that occurred in the Hwanggan area on July 27; an F-80 accidentally strafed the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post at 7:15 AM, prompting the regimental commander to request that a TACP be assigned immediately. [104]

[104] HQ, 7th Cavalry (Infantry) War Diary, June-July 1950 , in the records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949 -1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

This location is approximately 500 meters east of the double railroad overpass and 100 meters south-southeast of the single railroad overpass.

A Fifth Air Force ADVON message acknowledged that the plane was an F-80 from one of the 35th FBS's first three missions of the day (call sign Contour). [105]

[105] MSG, COMAF 5 ADVON to COMFtrBMRWG 8, AOC B211, 27 / 0546Z July 1950 . [1426 Korea Time - 28th] [note]


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As the L Company men arrived at the trucks they loaded on them, and at midafternoon started for Chinju.

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On the way back to Chinju this group met B Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, which had started for Hadong on Colonel Moore's orders at 0800 that morning. The artillery battery had moved slowly with many stops for reconnaissance. It now turned around and went back to Chinju, abandoning one 105-mm. howitzer and four 2 1/2-ton trucks that became bogged down in rice paddies. [27]

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Meanwhile, a radio message from Colonel Mott reached Flynn near the top of the pass, ordering all elements still on the hill to withdraw. Flynn climbed to a point where he could call to Lieutenant Morrissey, still holding out on the right of the pass, and told him to withdraw.


Morrissey had twelve men left; he and one other were wounded. The unidentified Air Force captain with the TACP had fought all day as a rifleman with Morrissey's platoon and had distinguished himself by his bravery. Now he was either dead or missing. Captain Mitchell, the battalion S-2, likewise had fought all day as a rifleman but he lived to withdraw. Morrissey's riflemen fell back down the road to the waiting vehicles and wearily climbed in. When all were accounted for, Captain Flynn started them for Chinju. Then, getting into his own Jeep, he found it would not run.


Flynn clambered down to the low ground south of the road. In the rice paddies he saw many men of I Company. Looking back at the pass he saw enemy troops coming down off the hill, perhaps a battalion or more of them. Mortar and machine gun fire now swept the paddy area. The men caught there had to cross a deep, 20-foot-wide stream to escape, and many drowned in the attempt. Most men rid themselves of helmet, shoes, nearly all clothing, and even their weapons in trying to cross this stream.


Flynn got across and, in a little valley about a mile and a half away, he found perhaps sixty to seventy other American soldiers. While they rested briefly, enemy fire suddenly came in on them from pursuers and they scattered like quail seeking cover. [note]

1530Korean Time

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In the afternoon Barszcz returned to the main Hadong-Chinju road near the village of Sigum, about twelve miles east of Hadong.

While he stopped there, an officer with about fifty men came down the road from the direction of Hadong. They told him they were all that were left of L Company. Most of the men were without clothing except for their shorts and boots. One M1 rifle, which apparently had not been fired, and a .45-caliber pistol were their only weapons. The L Company group explained their condition by saying they had to swim a river and wade through rice paddies. Barszcz relieved the group of the weapons, put the men on two trucks, and sent them down the road to Chinju.

Expecting more American stragglers from Hadong, Barszcz put G Company astride the road in a defensive position to cover their withdrawal. He had sent a message with the Chinju-bound trucks explaining what he had done and asked for further orders. [29]

[note]

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Relieved finally at Anui about 1600, A Company, 19th Infantry, loaded into trucks and started south to join Rhea's battalion. A mile below the town the company ran into a fire fight between North and South Korean troops and was stopped.

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After enemy fire wrecked six of its vehicles, the company destroyed the others, abandoned its heavy equipment, and started on foot through the hills toward the 34th Infantry positions at Kŏch'ang. [note]

At 1145/K this Flight received a call from ADCC that a pilot had bailed out at 36° 30' N 129° 25' E. The type and number of the aircraft unknown. The pilot's name was unknown. It was later determined that the aircraft was an Air Force F-51.

At 1635/K the Flight received a call from ADCC that the pilot had been picked up by a Navy destroyer, but it was not confirmed.

At 1635/K the SB-17 had contact with the destroyer and he confirmed the report that the pilot had been picked up by the destroyer at 1130/K. [note]

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The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 27 PIR reported extensive NKPA patrolling to identify gaps in the division's new positions east of Yŏngdong. During the day on July 27, the division's artillery suffered "heavy counter battery fire." The division continued to evaluate the combat efficiency and morale of the opposing NKPA units as good. The PIR warned that the "enemy continues his standard tactic of infiltration, assembl[ing] and attack[ing] our flanks, gaps and rear areas with emphasis on dislodging the supporting artillery." The division intelligence staff evaluated this activity together with reports that enemy troops were moving out of Yŏngdong, suggesting that the enemy intended a double envelopment of the division. [64]

[64] Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #6, 1800 27 July 1950 , 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA. [note]


On the 27th a message from ComNavFE implicitly endorsed the procedure of coordinating operations with the JOC in Korea, and from this time on such coordination was increasingly attempted. [note]

Korean_War

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 27 Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR) [25]

[25] Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #5, 1800 26 July 1950 , Box 45, 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, RG 338, NARA.

reported extensive NKPA patrolling to identify gaps in the division's new positions east of Yŏngdong. During the day on July 27, the division's artillery suffered "heavy counter battery fire." The division continued to evaluate the combat efficiency and morale of the opposing NKPA units as good. The PIR warned that the "enemy continues his standard tactic of infiltration, assembl[ing] and attack[ing] our flanks, gaps and rear areas with emphasis on dislodging the supporting artillery." The division intelligence staff evaluated this activity together with reports that enemy troops were moving out of Yŏngdong, suggesting that the enemy intended a double envelopment of the division. [note]

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In the early afternoon, Colonel Rhea guided 1st Lt. John C. Hughes with B Company, 19th Infantry, reinforced by approximately thirty-five men and their weapons from the Heavy Weapons Company, from Umyong-ni to relieve A Company, 19th Infantry, at Anŭi.

A Company was engaged in a small arms fight and its relief could not be accomplished at once. Colonel Rhea returned to Umyong-ni, leaving instructions that the company should follow him as soon as possible, which he expected would be shortly.

At Umyong-ni Rhea waited about five hours for A Company.

Then, when reconnaissance toward Anui showed that an enemy force had cut the road, he started just before dusk [1927] with the rest of the battalion for Chinju as ordered. [39]

[39] Ltrs, Col Rhea to author, 9 Apr and 21 Sep 53. [note]

1900 Korean Time

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At 1930/K ADCC alerted this Flight it received another message that a C-47 was in trouble over Tsu Shima with severe vibration. [note]

1942 Sunset

[note]

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At 2027/K the alert was called off as the C-47 was going to land at Itazuke. [note]

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Meanwhile at Anŭi Lieutenant Hughes' B Company, 28th Infantry, was under attack from superior numbers closing in from three sides, and by nightfall it had been forced back into the town. Hughes made plans to withdraw across the upper Nam River to a high hill east of the town.

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[note]

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On July 27, 1950 , the division occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry Regiment southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment to the west of town. The 7th Cavalry Regiment was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry Regiment still on the 7th Cavalry's right and the 5th Cavalry Regiment to the left and rear.

The 7th Cavalry Regiment was not in immediate contact with the enemy, but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yŏngdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yŏngdong on the railroad tracks. In the afternoon, the regiment took fire from tanks in the vicinity of Sot Anmak; timely mortar fire drove off the NKPA armor. However, apart from some artillery and mortar fire, the day proved relatively quiet. [22]

[22] Activities report, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Inf), July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4405, RG 407, NARA.

The 77th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 7th Cavalry, and the battalion commander visited the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to ensure that the unit received adequate fire support. Additionally, an observer team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces arrived to evaluate the state of Army units in Korea and spent the day with the 7th Cavalry. [23]

[23] ”Report of the First OCAFF (Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces) Observer Team to the Far East Command”, 16 August 1950 , RG 387, entry 55, Box 171, NARA.

A group of seven journalists, including Tom Lambert of the Associated Press and Dennis Warner of the Daily Telegraph and London Herald of Melbourne, also toured the 7th Cavalry's front lines. [24]

[24] War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.


They would have been in position to hear about an event involving refugees taking place in the immediate area. They did not report an incident involving refugees. [note]

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Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 27 reported that the NKPA, during July 27, had mounted two strong drives: one against South Korean units in the Hamch'ang-Yŏngju area and a second, using two divisions supported by strong artillery fire and a small number of tanks, in the Yŏngdong-Sangju area against the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. Eighth Army's intelligence staff still believed that the enemy's main effort would follow along the Taejŏn-Kŭmch'ŏn axis together with a deep envelopment of Eighth Army's left flank. The PIR also warned that the enemy would "continue and increase guerrilla activity throughout EUSAK [Eighth U.S. Army - Korea] zone and sabotage rail, highway and other communication facilities." [65] [note]

In Anŭi the cutoff troops engaged in street fighting until midnight. Those who escaped walked out through the hills during the next several days.

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Approximately half of the 215 men of B and D Companies, 29th Infantry, taking part in the Anui battle, were either killed or listed as missing in action.
[42]

Colonel Wilson and the rest of the battalion at Umyong-ni meanwhile knew nothing of the fate of B Company at Anui except that enemy forces had engaged it, and that roadblocks were above and below it. Wilson made two unsuccessful attempts to send help to B Company. [note]


Casualties

Thursday July 27, 1950 (Day 033)

Korean_War 373 Casualties

As of July 27, 1950

3 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
8 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
10 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
321 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 304TH SIGNAL BATTALION - OPERATIONS
2 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
5 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
2 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
5 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
16 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION - UNKNOWN UNITS
373 19500727 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 17 2,151 1 2 0 2,171
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 373
To Date         0  

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Thursday July 27, 1950 - Day 033

19500727 1300 03088nogunri0

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XV. July 27, 1950
The division now occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry to the west of town near Nogŭn-ni. The 7th Cavalry was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry still on the regiment's right and the 5th Cavalry to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry was not in direct contact with the enemy but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yŏngdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yŏngdong on the railroad tracks.