Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 25.3°C 77.54 °F at Taegu

Rainy, windy [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

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Korean War Operations
28 July 1950

28 July 1950
Four SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. Twenty seven hours and thirty five minutes (27:35) were logged on these missions.


This information taken from the official 3rd Rescue Squadron history archived at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base.

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July 28: The first amphibious SA-16 Albatross aircraft arrived in Japan for air rescue service off the Korean coast.

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[note]


-- The president signs a bill that allows the Coast Guard to search foreign ships and control their entry into U.S. ports. Since the Senate approved the bill July 28, the Coast Guard has already stopped and searched a Soviet ship and two Finnish vessels.

USAF B-29 1 x Seafire Mistaken identity

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General MacArthur had intended to place these men in the 7th Division, but changed his mind. On 28 July he directed that they be assigned to the 2nd Division upon reaching Korea. [05-54]

In the early stages of the division's preparations, General MacArthur had asked that it be shipped to Korea combat-loaded. Each increment would thus land in Korea with its weapons ready to go, with organic vehicles and supporting artillery on the same or accompanying ships, and with each shipload able to operate independently in combat for a reasonable period of time.

While Washington recognized some advantages in combat-loading, there were compelling reasons why it was not practical. The ships being used were not designed for combat-loading. Furthermore, combat-loading would have delayed the division's arrival in Korea by at least two weeks because it was slower than ordinary unit-loading. The procedure also took nearly twice as much shipping space. Since convoys were not being used, unit-loaded shipments would depart as soon as they were loaded. troops would travel on the same ship as their own equipment insofar as possible. The rest of their equipment and supplies would arrive on cargo shipping loaded for selective discharge to match the unit. [05-55]

When the assistant division commander of the 2nd Division arrived in Tokyo late in July with the advance party, he reported that almost 1,800 enlisted men had been released from the division at Fort Lewis because they were due to be discharged within three months. This information nettled MacArthur and he asked that these men be retrieved and sent to him as replacements. He would see that they rejoined the 2nd Division after its arrival. [05-56]

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General MacArthur's concern was allayed when he was told that the United States Department of the Army had already decreed that men having thirty days' service remaining were eligible for shipment to the Far East Command.

[note]

Army Policy

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July 28

The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Wade V. Haislip, disagreed vehemently. In his opinion, a second corps headquarters could most certainly be formed insofar as the staff personnel were concerned. Nor did he accept the G-3's position that it would take six months to train a signal battalion. He pointed out that the signal battalion to be used in defensive operations need not be so highly trained as one slated for offensive amphibious operations and directed G-3 to restudy the problem. [07-55]

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The Joint Chiefs on 28 July 1950 informed MacArthur that the Chinese Communists had announced their intention of capturing Formosa and would probably succeed unless the Chinese Nationalists made timely efforts to defend the island. They had recommended to the Secretary of Defense, they stated, that the Nationalists be permitted to break up hostile concentrations through military action, even if it meant attacks on the mainland. [20-9]

MacArthur gave full concurrence to this proposal, and informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he and a selected staff would visit Formosa about 31 July to survey the situation. [20-10] In reply the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that, pending new instructions on certain policy matters being considered by the Departments of State and Defense, MacArthur might prefer to send a senior officer to Formosa on 31 July, and to proceed later himself. They added, however, that if he felt it necessary, he should feel free to go since the responsibility was his own. [20-11]

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Weekly Summary Excerpt, 28 July 1950, Soviet/Satellite Intentions

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DSC

19500728 0000 DSC HARRIS, JAMES A., JR.*

19500728 0000 DSC VANGSNESS, RALPH J.*


BACK FROM THE FIGHTING FRONT. A group of war-weary wounded soldiers stand by while one of their number is lifted from the Air Force C-47 which brought him to this field in Japan from a forward airstrip in Korea. Speedy air evacuation of casualties in the Korean fighting has proved to be a great morale booster as well as a practical means of saving lives in many instances.

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07/28/1950 Department of the Air Force

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Maps

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Tactical Situation for the 7th Cavalry

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The front moves south

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Tactical situation for the 5th & 8th Cavalry and the 27th Infantry Regiments

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Nogŭn-ri

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Three days later the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) Operations Report noted that, as on previous days, pilots saw groups of people in white shirts, apparently working in the fields, but paying no attention to the planes. [130]

[130] Ibid.

Pilots deemed these groups as civilian and not openly hostile. The pilots did not attack. Both the interim evaluation report and the Valley Forge Operations Report contain observations on weapons loading for specific aircraft. From the operations report, the most practical close support load for the ADs was 1-500# GP, 1-220# fragmentation bomb and 1 napalm bomb plus a maximum number of HVAR's or 100# GP.

The F4Us carried a 500# bomb or napalm and maximum HVAR's [High-Velocity Air Rockets] or 100# GP. All aircraft carried a maximum load [sic] of 20mm ammunition at a ratio of 1 HEI, 1 AP and 1 incendiary. The ADs were loaded with 2000# GP and 1000# GP on occasions when specific targets called for those types of explosives. [131]

[131] Ibid.

Expanding on that general description, the interim evaluation provided further details on ordnance loading: [132]

[132] Interim Evaluation Report, 235.
Ordnance/Aircraft 20mm Bombs Rockets
cannon
F4U
Load Able 800 rds. 1x1000# 8-5HVAR
Load Baker 800 rds. 2x150gals 8-5 HVAR
(Napalm)
AD
Load Able 400 rds. 3x500# 12-5 HVAR
Load Baker 400 rds. 3x150 gals 12-250#
(Napalm) Frags
Load Charlie 400 rds. 2x1000# 12-250#
Frags

As far as ship positioning, the Valley Forge Report of Operations describes air wing operations on July 25 and 26 from a position about 30 miles southeast of P'ohang. On July 28 and 29, the air wing operated off the west coast of Korea from an unspecified location. [133]

[133]

Report of Operations, 2.

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As a part of the working solution documented in the CINCPACFLT [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet] Interim Report of Korean No. 1 on July 28, 1950 , the Navy sent a liaison officer to JOC [Joint Operations Center], 5th AF [Air Force] to arrange assignment of naval aircraft to specified forward air controllers (airborne). [126]

[126] Interim Evaluation Report, 224.
The stated purpose of the liaison was to develop joint command-and-control procedures for the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

[note]

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USS Valley Forge (CV-45)

From the action summary for July 28, the report details a close air support mission in which four ADs reported to TAC and Yŏngdong, where he (the pilot) explained that the first tunnel north of the city was occupied by enemy troops, the second one north by friendlies. Four napalm hits were put into the tunnel, after which large quantities of black smoke issued from the ends. This target is evaluated as damaged with countless loss of lives. [138]

[138] Ibid.

The operations report further details attacks on other villages near Yŏngdong but without sufficient detail to determine the exact location.

A thorough analysis of the available Navy air activity documentation yields a picture of competent Navy air planners working closely with their Army and Air Force counterparts to fight the war as efficiently and effectively as possible. The military leadership, down to the individual pilot, recognized fully the presence of civilians in the war zone, and leaders at each level of command acted to avoid engaging these non-combatants. No evidence exists that shows that Navy aircraft willfully attacked civilian targets.

[note]

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This focused discussion on the intelligence, ground combat, and air operations of late July 1950 outlines the events based upon all currently available archival and secondary-source evidence. The battlefield between Yŏngdong and Hwanggan remained a very fluid place from July 25 to July 29. Unfortunately, both sides met on a complex battlefield rife with the natural obstacles of war: civilians, villages, and road and rail networks. The U.S. maintained a reasonably accurate and informed intelligence picture of the enemy, but the NKPA tactic of infiltrating enemy soldiers dressed as civilian refugees behind U.S. lines truly challenged the soldiers' ability to distinguish friend from foe. U.S. soldiers new to combat and to the country encountered a war unlike the one fought barely five years earlier in World War II. Guerilla-type tactics reigned, and the threat existed everywhere, even behind friendly lines. Rumors carried great weight among the Soldiers, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, showed the effects of such hearsay when they withdrew on the night of July 25 in disarray and not in enemy contact.

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The air war over Korea played an important role in the Eighth Army's daily operations. However, the only documented air strike in the immediate vicinity of Hwanggan area occurred northeast of Nogŭn-ni on July 27 and damaged the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment's command post but wounded no one. The Navy discovered no evidence of naval aircraft operating in the vicinity of Nogŭn-ni on July 26 or 27. On July 28, Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy forces and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yŏngdong with bombs and machine guns. These available facts help to paint a clearer, more informed picture of the events in those crucial first days of the U.S. military's involvement in the Korean War.

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On July 28, the situation on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry 's right flank turned critical. The NKPA 4th Division launched an all-out attack against the 27th Infantry, forcing that regiment to tighten and contract its front-line positions.

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This movement opened a gap between the two divisions and offered the 3rd NKPA Division advancing from Yŏngdong an opportunity to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Cavalry, then in division reserve, counterattacked to restore the divisional boundary. The 27th Infantry also counterattacked and regained contact with the right flank of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. [26]

[26] War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950 . In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.

The risk of the NKPA cutting off the American troops was not over, however. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 's Commanding Officer reported NKPA attempts to penetrate both the right and left flanks of the regiment's position throughout the day. Reports suggested that the NKPA pushed civilians, as human shields, ahead of them during their attacks. The NKPA attacked the regiment frontally, but American artillery drove the North Koreans back with great success.

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On July 28, Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yŏngdong with bombs and machine guns.

[note]

South then North

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On the 28th the battalion [2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry,] fell back 2 miles more, and the next day it moved to a position south of Sangju.

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The next day, 26 July, the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, on the 27th Infantry's right flank eased the precarious situation.

But the following day [27th] the regimental left flank came under attack where a large gap existed between C Company, the left-hand (west) unit of the 27th Infantry, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the nearest unit of the 1st Cavalry Division.

C Company lost and regained a peak three times during the day. More than 40 casualties reduced its strength to approximately 60 men. B Company also
lost heavily in action, falling to a strength of about 85 men.

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By the morning of 28 July the enemy had penetrated the 1st Battalion's line, forcing C Company to withdraw. [12-51]

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At this point Colonel Michaelis went to the 1st Cavalry Division command post in Hwanggan and asked General Gay for permission to withdraw his hard-pressed regiment through that division.

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General Gay telephoned Colonel Landrum, Eighth Army Chief of Staff, and described the situation. He asked if he should attack in an effort to relieve the enemy pressure on the 27th Infantry, or if that regiment should withdraw into the 1st Cavalry Division's area, move south to Kŭmch'ŏn, and then turn toward 25th Division.

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Colonel Landrum called back later and said, "Let Mike withdraw through you." Colonel Collier drove from Taegu to Hwanggan to discuss the situation with General Gay who said,

"We are in what they call a military mousetrap." [12-52]

[note]

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At first, Colonel Moore had thought that the Hadong fight was going well. Major Raibl arrived at Chinju with the first wounded in the early afternoon of 27 July, and reported that the 3rd Battalion was fighting well and that he thought it would win the battle.

But, when other survivors came in later, the real outcome of the engagement became clear. News of the disaster at Hadong reached higher headquarters with unexpected and startling impact.

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A message from Major Logan, 19th Infantry, to General Church that night reporting on the condition of the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, said, "No estimate on total number of casualties. Over 100 WIA now in aid station" [31]

A count the next day of the assembled 3rd Battalion showed there were 354 officers and men, including some walking wounded, able for duty. When all the stragglers had come in, casualties were listed as 2 killed, 52 wounded, and 349 missing. An enemy soldier captured later said the North Koreans took approximately 100 American prisoners at Hadong. When American forces re-won the Yŏngdong area in late September a search uncovered 313 American bodies, most of them along the river and in the rice paddies. [32]

The loss of key officers in the battalion was severe. It included the battalion executive officer, the S-1 the S-2, and the Assistant S-3. The company commanders of Headquarters, I, K, and M Companies were lost, Donahue of K and Capt. Hugh P. Milleson of M were killed, Makarounis of I was captured. (He escaped from the North Koreans in October near P'yŏngyang.)

Approximately thirty vehicles and practically all the crew-served weapons, communication equipment, and even most of the individual weapons were lost. [33]

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On 28 July, the day after Yŏngdong, the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, was reorganized, all remaining personnel being grouped in K and L Companies.

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On 28 July the first indication appeared in American intelligence estimates that elements of the N.K. 6th Division might have moved south.

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By this time, Lieutenant Holliday had returned from Hamyang. There he had found somewhat less than 600 men of the ROK 7th Division and 150 fresh South Korean marines from Mokp'o.

Holliday with three men now set off for Anŭi.

Two and a half miles short of the town, enemy fire from a roadblock destroyed their jeep and wounded one man in the chest. Holliday covered the withdrawal of his three men with BAR fire, and then followed them.

Relieved finally at Anŭi about 1600, A Company, 19th Infantry, loaded into trucks and started south to join Rhea's battalion. A mile below the town the company ran into a fire fight between North and South Korean troops and was stopped. After enemy fire wrecked six of its vehicles, the company destroyed the others, abandoned its heavy equipment, and started on foot through the hills toward the 34th Infantry positions at Kŏch'ang.

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The next morning 64 American and 60 ROK soldiers came in to Colonel Beauchamp's positions there. Why this force did not return to Anŭi and join Lieutenant Hughes is not known. [41]

[note]

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The enemy troops that had closed on Anŭi were advanced units of the N.K. 4th Division. They were well aware that a mixed force of American and South Korean troops was only a few miles below them. To deal with this force, elements of the division turned south from Anŭi early on 28 July.

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In defensive positions about Umyong-ni and Hamyang, Colonel Wilson's men were on the east side of the Nam River.

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Col. Min Ki Sik's remnants of the ROK 7th Division and a small force of South Korean marines were on the west side.

American mortar fire turned back the small enemy force that approached Umyong-ni. On the west side of the river near Hamyang a hard fight developed. There, the South Koreans seemed about to lose the battle until their reserve marines fought through to the enemy's flank. This caused the North Koreans to withdraw northward. From prisoners captured in this battle Wilson learned of the American defeat at Anŭi the day before. [43]

[note]

Chinju Falls to the Enemy-31 July

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On 28 July, Colonel Rhea arrived at Chinju from Anŭi with the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, less A Company. He passed through the town with orders to take up blocking positions ten miles south. Rhea proceeded to the vicinity of Kuho-ri, about two miles west of the Sach'ŏn Airfield. There his battalion of only 200 riflemen went into position to block a secondary road approach to Chinju along the coast from Hadong. [13-54]

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Colonel McGrail's 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, that same morning occupied defensive positions on high ground astride the Chinju-Yŏngdong road just west of the Nam River.

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Remnants of the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, that had escaped from the Yŏngdong fight and numerous ROK troops were in and around Chinju.

Aerial reconnaissance during that day [13-and the next showed heavy enemy traffic entering Hadong from all roads and noted movement northeast on the Chinju road. American intelligence estimated that two enemy regiments with tanks were in the Hadong area. [13-55] ]

[note]

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Several hundred replacements arrived at Chinju for the 19th Infantry at this time-175 on 28 July

That afternoon, 30 July, E and F Companies of the 19th Infantry fell back across the Nam River to the hills two miles west of Chinju. Just before evening, G Company crossed the river from its isolated position. Once on the east side it took up a defensive position in the flat ground near the river bank, with the mission of preventing enemy infiltration into Chinju between the road and the river. The hill positions of the rest of the battalion were beyond the road to its right (north). There was no physical contact between G Company and these troops. [58]

The 19th Infantry faced the critical test of the defense of Chinju pitifully understrength. Its unit report for 30 July gives the regiment a strength of 1,895, with 300 men in the 1st Battalion and 290 men in the 2nd Battalion Colonel Moore, however, states that the strength of the 19th Infantry on 30 July, including the replacements that arrived that afternoon, was 1,544 The 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, still disorganized as a result of the Hadong battle, had a reported strength that day of 396 men. On 30 July, all ROK forces in the Chinju area came under Colonel Moore's command, including the remnants of the 7th Division, now known as Task Force Min, which during the day arrived at Chinju from the Hamyang area with 1,249 men. [59]

Several hundred replacements arrived at Chinju for the 19th Infantry at this time-175 on 28 July and 600 on 30 July-but it is doubtful if they contributed much to the combat effectiveness of the regiment in the Chinju battle. Of the 600 that arrived on 30 July, 500 went to the 19th Infantry and most of the remainder to the 13th Field Artillery Battalion. About 1600 these replacements started forward from the regimental command post in Chinju for distribution by the battalions to the rifle companies that evening. Although the rifle companies were then engaged with the enemy, Colonel Moore decided that they needed replacements at the front to help in the fighting, and that it would be best to send them forward at once rather than to wait for an opportunity to integrate them into the units during a lull in the battle. [60]

[note]

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On 28 July the Far East Air Forces gave to the Bomber Command a list of targets in the rail interdiction program, and [two days later a similar plan was ready for interdiction of highways].

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On 28 July 1950, General Lee Yong Ho, commanding the N.K. 3rd Division, transmitted an order pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed by Kim Chaek, Commander-in-Chief, and Kang Kon, Commanding General Staff, Advanced General Headquarters of the North Korean Army, which stated:

1. The unnecessary killing of enemy personnel when they could be taken as PsW shall be strictly prohibited as of now. Those who surrender will be taken as PsW, and all efforts will be made to destroy the enemy in thought and politically.

2. treatment of PsW shall be according to the regulations issued by the Supreme Hq, as attached herein, pertaining to the regulation and order of PW camps.

3. This directive will be explained to and understood by all military personnel immediately, and staff members of the Cultural Section will be responsible for seeing that this is carried out. [19-47]

Another document captured in September shows that the North Korean Army was aware of the conduct of some of its soldiers and was somewhat concerned about it. An order issued by the Cultural Section of the N.K. 2nd Division, 16 August 1950, said in part,

"Some of us are still slaughtering enemy troops that come to surrender. Therefore, the responsibility of teaching the soldiers to take prisoners of war and to treat them kindly rests on the Political Section of each unit." [19-48]

[note]

July 10, 23, 28 Aug 7, 8, 16

After the Russian-built T34 tank appeared on the Korean battlefield, the Department of the Army acted as quickly as possible to correct the imbalance in armor

It alerted three medium tank battalions for immediate movement to Korea. These battalions were the 6th (M46), the 70th (M26 and M4A3), and the 73rd (M26).

Two of them were the school troop battalions of the Armored School at Fort Knox and of the Infantry School at Fort Benning;

the third was the organic battalion of the 1st Armored Division.

The Department of the Army notified General MacArthur on 10 July that it planned to ship these battalions to the Far East as the quickest way it could devise of getting medium tanks and trained crews to the battlefield.

Ships carrying these three tank battalions sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and arrived at Pusan on 7 August.

The tank battalions unloaded the next day [8/8].

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For further reinforcement of Eighth Army, the SS Luxembourg Victory departed San Francisco on 28 July with eighty medium tanks in its cargo.

Still more armor reinforcements arrived on 16 August, when the 72nd Medium Tank Battalion, organic to the 2d Infantry Division, landed at Pusan.

The 2nd Division also had two regimental tank companies. [12]

Ships carrying these three tank battalions [6th, 70th & 73rd] sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and

and arrived at Pusan on 7 August.

The tank battalions unloaded the next day. The 6th Medium Tank Battalion served as Eighth Army reserve near Taegu in August; the 70th joined the 1st Cavalry Division on 12 August; and the 73d on army orders sent its companies to support various ground operations around the Pusan Perimeter-A Company to Ulsan guarding the eastern main supply route, B Company to Task Force Bradley at Kyongju and Kigye, and C Company to the 27th Infantry in the Bowling Alley north of Taegu.

For further reinforcement of Eighth Army, the SS Luxembourg Victory departed San Francisco on 28 July with eighty medium tanks in its cargo. Still more armor reinforcements arrived on 16 August, when the 72d Medium Tank Battalion, organic to the 2d Infantry Division, landed at Pusan. The 2d Division also had two regimental tank companies.

[note]

  

July 10, 23, 28 Aug 7, 8, 16

After the Russian-built T34 tank appeared on the Korean battlefield, the Department of the Army acted as quickly as possible to correct the imbalance in armor. It alerted three medium tank battalions for immediate movement to Korea. These battalions were the 6th (M46), the 70th (M26 and M4A3), and the 73rd (M26).

Two of them were the school troop battalions of the Armored School at Fort Knox and of the Infantry School at Fort Benning; the third was the organic battalion of the 1st Armored Division.

The Department of the Army notified General MacArthur on 10 July that it planned to ship these battalions to the Far East as the quickest way it could devise of getting medium tanks and trained crews to the battlefield.

Ships carrying these three tank battalions sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and arrived at Pusan on 7 August.

The tank battalions unloaded the next day [8/8].

For further reinforcement of Eighth Army, the SS Luxembourg Victory departed San Francisco on 28 July with eighty medium tanks in its cargo.

Still more armor reinforcements arrived on 16 August, when the 72nd Medium Tank Battalion, organic to the 2nd Infantry Division, landed at Pusan.

The 2nd Division also had two regimental tank companies. [12]

Ships carrying these three tank battalions [6th (M46), the 70th (M26 and M4A3), and the 73rd (M26)] sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500728 0000 DSC HARRIS

19500728 0000 DSC VANGSNESS

 

Silver Star

Haggerty, Leroy L. [Pvt SS HqHqCo1stBn2thIR]

Johnson, Junior [MSgt SS E27thIR]

Quails, Paul D. [Pvt SS D19thIR]

VanderVliet, Anthony [MSgt SS HqHqCo27thIR]

 

 

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The Forgotten War

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[By an agreement signed on 28 July 1950 ]
It may be remembered that the UNC control over the ROK armed forces rested upon Rhee's July 1950 letter to MacArthur assigning command to the latter and anyone he delegated for the duration of the hostilities only.

[note]

By an agreement signed on 28 July 1950 the ROK Government had pledged itself to supply the currency needed by the UNC and to defer the settlement of claims arising from this procedure until a time satisfactory to both parties.

[note]

US Air Force

 

 

General Partridge telephoned early this morning and stated that movements in the south by North Koreans was not good. He further stated that he had used F-82s last night with napalm as harassment. He is evacuating the Korean Air Force from the airport at Sach'ŏn; he definitely stated that the bridges at Seoul were out and that he had pictures to prove it.[150-Sach'ŏn is about 60 miles west of Pusan and was the the site of a small sod strip. The village fell on July 31.]

Bombs from FEAF Bomber Command B-29s smother a pair of railroad bridges north of P'yŏngyang on July 27.


While I was in Korea, General Partridge told me of the following two incidents: one where operations between Colonel Witty,[151-Col Robert W. Witty commanded the 6131st FW at P'ohang (K-3).] base commander at K-3, and the South Koreans operating south of Yŏngdk, were of the very closest cooperation. Two days ago, an air-controller airplane, after securing information from the South Koreans, directed an F-51 into a town and instructed the pilot to fire through a certain second-story window of a building in which there were many Communists. This was done successfully. Another incident was where the mayor of a town south of Yŏngdk had informed our flying coordinator that at a certain time all the inhabitants of the town would evacuate and that because of the large number of communists present, they wanted the town fired. This also was done successfully.


Because of this close relationship between Colonel Witty and the South Koreans, he was informed that the Government of South Korea intended to decorate him.


1530 hours with Colonel Nuckols saw Mr. John Osborne, one of the senior editors of Time magazine.


At 1615, with Colonel Nuckols, saw Mr. Frank Tremaine, the United Press correspondent.

General Picher gave me the following memorandum, dated 27 July 50:

Your question on the return of dependents to the U.S.:

a. Dependents whose principal has completed his normal overseas tour may go home at government expense, including crating and shipping of household goods.

 b. The same is true of officers and airmen who are actually in combat.

c. It is not true for you or me or the PX officer at Itazuke.

This should give you enough latitude to send any obnoxious wives home. I feel that system should be the one used, rather than a mass movement of all dependents, as many of them are probably dependable and a help to the fighting warrior and not a burden on the phone to the Operations Office.

NEW SUBJECT (phrased carefully).

 I don't agree with General Eubank's suggestion that special emissaries from here be sent to the south country to harangue the wives. I fear the feeling in the hinterland would be that the "fat cats" from Tokyo are far from the war, are in no danger, and what are they doing down here giving us good advice on a subject on which they are not competent.

 

 

[note]

 

 

 


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In its work the 3rd Squadron [ 3rd Air Rescue Squadron] employed SB-17 , SB-29 , SA-16 , C-47 , H-5, and L-5 type aircraft. So many different types caused maintenance difficulties, and the newly arrived SA-16's (the first four reached Misawa on 28 July) suffered from supply problems as well. At one time all four of the amphibians were grounded for want of parts, but improved supplies lowered the SA-16 AOCP rate from 60 percent in September to 25 percent during October.

[note]


19th BG(M)

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23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week
30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks
06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks
13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks
20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

When no enemy aircraft were present he directed that B-29's bomb individually and continue dropping single bombs until the assigned target was destroyed. Yet FEAF was not permitted to effect any coordinated and comprehensive program for interdiction until 28 July, more than a month after the beginning of Korean hostilities. This delay was due to CINCFE staff insistence that all types of air effort available be devoted primarily to close support, that such interdiction as was undertaken be in an area so adjacent to the battle area as to be little more than close support, and that targets for air attack be selected by a GHQ target group.

[note]

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Operation SNOOPER was inaugurated on 28 July, a procedure whereby a weather forecaster was placed aboard bombers and reconnaissance aircraft of other organizations to observe weather data in areas where such data was not otherwise available. Some 100 of these missions were flown between 9 August and 24 November 1950.

[note]

[The day Task Force Smith got clobbered]

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During the critical days of July when the 24th and 25th Divisions were being committed to action, the Fifth Air Force employed its full resources in close support. Tactical air control parties joined the 24th Division on 5 July, and thereafter these parties shared the combat life of the infantrymen: two controllers and five airmen had been killed or were missing in action by 28 July. [out of 2,555]

The emergency action by which FEAF placed primary effort on the main battle line during July has been noted. An air strike along the road near Kiem Dong, reported EUSAK's headquarters diary on 17 July, caused considerable confusion and the retreat of the enemy forces.

[note]

Korean_War

FEAF listed targets to Bomber Command on 28 July designed to effect the rail interdiction. A second plan of similar scope designed to institute highway interdiction was drawn up on 30 July, and the FEAF Bomber Command interdiction list was accordingly revised on 2 August.

[note]


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General Stratemeyer declared on 8 July that isolation of North Korean forces on the battlefield by the destruction of key bridges was the paramount objective of FEAF at that time. [The only reference to this declaration on the 8th, is my own - cutting this text and sending it there]

When no enemy aircraft were present he directed that B-29 's bomb individually and continue dropping single bombs until the assigned target was destroyed. Yet FEAF was not permitted to effect any coordinated and comprehensive program for interdiction until 28 July, more than a month [3-weeks! 20 days!] after the beginning of Korean hostilities. This delay was due to CINCFE staff insistence that all types of air effort available be devoted primarily to close support, that such interdiction as was undertaken be in an area so adjacent to the battle area as to be little more than close support, and that targets for air attack be selected by a GHQ target group.

[note]

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

By 18 July General Partridge saw that the Fifth Air Force could not perform its mission in Korea if it depended upon improvised communications and control facilities. He requested USAF to send to the theater the 502nd Tactical Control Group, the 2nd Radio Relay Squadron, the 934th Signal Battalion.

Separate. and three electronics bombing director detachments of the 3903rd Radar Bomb Scoring Squadron. USAF approved this request on 28 July. #l15

[note]

Korean_War

In a regrettable incident on 28 July Superfortress turret-men again demonstrated their prowess, this time against a friendly plane. The 22nd Group target on this day was the Sŏul marshaling yard, and, since enemy fighters had frequently intercepted the bombers in this area, Colonel James V. Edmundson, the group commander, had instructed his gunners to fire at any unidentified fighter within range which pointed its nose at one of the bombers.

When four strange planes suddenly broke out of rain clouds and headed toward the tail of a 22nd Group B-29, first the tail gunner and then the central fire-control gunner blazed away at them. One of the fighters was hit and its pilot parachuted from it.

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All members of the bomber crew who saw the unidentified plane identified it as a Yak, but unfortunately it was a British Seafire from HMS Triumph (R16).#100

[note shot down west of Anma Do in the Yellow Sea.]

On 28 July, an almost tragic event occurred, when a flight of Seafires were deployed to an area to investigate possible enemy air activity. They discovered that the activity was a flight of American B-29 bombers. One of the Seafires was hit by one of the bombers in its fuel tank forcing the pilot to bail out and land in terrible sea conditions. Rescue by Sea Otter was impossible due to the appalling conditions. The pilot was forced to wait about an hour until he was rescued by the American destroyer USS Eversole (DD-789).

[note]

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On 26 July General MacArthur approved the recommendation and ordered that two medium-bomber groups would be used to destroy key communications centers, rail and highway bridges, and supply depots north of a line connecting the towns of Suwŏn and Kangnung.44

Since General Weyland had gotten agreement that FEAF target experts would select medium-bomber interdiction targets, the FEAF Target Committee promptly examined the concept for an air campaign designed to disrupt the enemy's use of North Korean communications.

Establishment of primary cut points at P'yŏngyang, Hamhŭng, Wŏnsan, and Sŏul would prevent rail movements through North Korea to the battle front.

For complete rail interdiction, however, additional rail cuts would be required on all main rail lines. Further committee study showed that the North Korean highway system followed the same general terrain pattern as the railways. Thus the destruction of key road bridges between the principal transportation centers-Sŏul, P'yŏngyang, and Hamhŭng-would hinder Communist motor transport in North Korea. 45

Given this concept for the interdiction of Communist transportation northward of Sŏul, the FEAF deputies for intelligence and operations worked closely to nominate specific interdiction targets. Intelligence established that the target did in fact exist and that its destruction would hamper enemy movement. Operations then established that the target fell logically into some phase of the interdiction program and that its destruction, together with the destruction of related targets, would materially increase the enemy's difficulties in moving supplies and equipment *See Chapter 2, pp. 54-55. through the interdiction zone.46

Such procedures were thorough and comprehensive, but they did not delay the medium-bomber strategic interdiction campaign. On 28 July-the date that MacArthur specified that the medium bombers would first be available for interdiction-FEAF issued an initial list of strategic interdiction targets.

[note]

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The Korean war offered the first test for search and rescue organizational tactics developed in World War II. For the performance of search and rescue functions in June 1950, FEAF possessed the 2nd and 3rd Air Rescue Squadrons.

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Administratively, these units were a part of the world-wide Air Rescue Service-a subordinate command of the Military Air transport Service-but their operations were controlled by FEAF and its subordinate commands.

Flights of the 2nd and 3rd Air Rescue Squadrons were located at various bases where they could best perform emergency search and rescue services.

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The 2nd Squadron served the Thirteenth and Twentieth Air Forces, while the 3rd Squadron was based in Japan and came under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force and later the 314th Air Division and its successor Japan Air Defense Force.

At the Korean war's beginning a search and rescue version of the Flying Fortress bomber-the SB-17-was the standard aircraft of the rescue squadrons, but the 3rd Rescue Squadron had a few Sikorsky H-5A helicopters-small, two-seat, rotary-wing aircraft which were used for short-range rescue pickups.

In the first month of the war, on 28 July 1950,, the 3rd Squadron received a detachment of Grumman SA-16 amphibian aircraft. If the seas were smooth enough, these "Albatross" SA-16's could land and retrieve downed airmen from the water. #76

#76 Hist. Br., MATS, Military Air transport Service Participation in the Korean Airlift, June-Dec. 1950, pp. 170-82; 3rd Air esc. Sq., Study of the Third Air Rescue Squadron in Relation to the Korean War, 1 May-31 Dec. 1950, p. 73.

[note]

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In an effort further to expand its weather collections on 28 July 1950, the 2143rd Wing had inaugurated a program whereby a weather forecaster was placed aboard combat aircraft to observe weather in areas from which such data were not other-wise available.

[note]

US Marine Corps

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Next [ after the 16th] came the end run, with 6th Division units racing toward the capture of Namwŏn, Kwangju, Yŏsu, and Mokp'o in the southwest corner of the peninsula. No opposition awaited except ineffectual delaying actions by ROK constabulary troops. After mopping up a few small pockets of resistance, the 6th Division pushed eastward to lead the North Korean drive toward Pusan.

The capture of Sunch'ŏn gave the division an assembly area for the attack on Chinju. And on 28 July the commander, Major General Pang, issued a message to his troops:

Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given to us is the liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants of the enemy. We have liberated Mokpu, Kwangju and Yŏsu and have thereby accelerated the liberation of all Korea. However, the liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the windpipe of the enemy. Comrades, this glorious task has fallen to our division! Men of the 6th Division, let us annihilate the enemy and distinguish ourselves![31]

[note]

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The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at the objective.[29]

[note]

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Four days before the first Organized Reserve units reported for active duty, however, Congress passed Public Law 624 July 27, 1950 giving the President authority to extend the enlistments of all military personnel in the Armed Forces.

This new and important legislation, like the one that had authorized the calling of reservists to active duty, was a reflection of the gravity with which the leaders of the nation viewed the Korean crisis.

The President, in turn, lost no time in acting upon this new authority. He ordered [EXECUTIVE ORDER 10164] executive order immediately an extension of 12 months for "all enlistments in the Army, the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corps, including the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve, and any component of the Air Force of the United States which shall expire at any time after the date of this order and prior to July 9, 1951."

And on the next day, 28 July, the Secretary of the Navy gave practical effect to the President's order by releasing ALNAV-72 in execution of the Chief Executive's will.

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps took another step in its effort to make the Marine Reserve a stable and easily employable organization when on 28 July, the Commandant ordered that the policy of accepting resignations and discharges in order to permit Marine reservists to enter another reserve or regular component of the Armed Forces be discontinued. At the same time, however, exception was made for doctors, dentists, applicants for entry into the Chaplains' Corps, and enlisted personnel that were to receive a commission or were to be assigned to a service school leading to a commission.

With the execution of this step, the most essential preliminary measures necessary to make the Organized Reserve a stable and easily employable body were accomplished facts. 46

[note]

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It was certain that for some, the mobilization of reserve components resulted in economic dislocation, personal in-convenience, and hardship. Although the Marine Corps expected that some sacrifice would necessarily be imposed upon a portion of the reservists called to active duty, it was not the intention of the Commandant that any reservist should endure an extreme hardship if it could be avoided.

Accordingly, on 28 July, which was three days prior to the reporting date of the first reservists, the Commandant authorized all Inspector-Instructors to defer from call to active duty cases involving extreme hardship and to await instructions from Marine Corps Headquarters.

[note]

US Navy

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The HMS Triumph (R16) operated with us at all times,[ July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.] except July 22, providing CAP and ASP.

[note]

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cv45
where close air support missions were launched from a position approximately 40 miles off the coast on the 28th and 29th.

[note]

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On 26, 28 and 29 of July close support operations were conducted under control of Air Force Tactical Air Coordinators TAC in an area along the front line from Yŏngdong north to Hamch'ang. Targets were mainly troops, armor, and transportation facilities.

[note]

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The HMS Triumph (R16) operated with us at all times,[ July: 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28 and 29.] except July 22, providing CAP and ASP.

[note]

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25, 26,27,28,29
The HMS Triumph (R16) again furnished Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Submarine Petrol for the period 25 through 29 July augmented by one ADW type aircraft from the VALLEY FORGE.

[note]

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USS Toledo (CA-133)

[note]

19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

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At noon on the 19th General Gay assumed command ashore. In the afternoon, with unloading completed, ships of the Attack Force shifted to heavy weather anchorages as Grace[Duration July 16 July 21], the first typhoon of the season, was reported heading for Korea Strait.

On the 22nd Grace came up the coast, bringing gusts of 50 knots to Yŏngil Man and delaying the arrival of the second echelon of shipping. This had been scheduled to come in on the 21st, but the MSTS units reached P'ohang only on the 23rd, and the chartered Japanese freighters the next day. The LSTs of the third echelon arrived on the 26th and 29th.

For a variety of reasons, unloading of the follow-up shipping was somewhat slow.

The MSTS transports suffered from their shortages of personnel;

the Japanese freighters lacked trained hatch crews and unloading gear, and the ever-present language problem complicated supervision;

after two days of continuous labor the shore party was getting tired.

Nonetheless the work proceeded. On the 23rd the commanding officer of a Navy LST was directed by Admiral Doyle to take over the duties of senior officer present, and late in the evening the force commander sailed in USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), with USS Union (AKA-106), USS JAMES E. KYES (DD-787), and USS Diachenko (APD-123), for Tokyo.

A week later it was all over, and CTF 90 was able to report the completion of operations at P'ohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from Yŏngil Man. But this report was by way of formality, for the strategic rewards of the operation had long since been apparent. On 22 July, four days after the initial landing, the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the battered 24th Division southeast of Taejŏn.
22 June

[note]

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Struble recommended to ComNavFE that the Seventh Fleet move south to the Buckner-Formosa area for a possible sweep of the Strait. This proposal, however, was disapproved. The needs of Eighth Army remained paramount, other units were dispatched to the southward, and on 28 July Task Force 77 returned to the attack, operating in the area northwest of Mokp'o. The strikes of propeller-driven aircraft on the 28th were again concentrated around Yŏngdong, and in the neighborhood of Hamch'ang at the northwest corner of the perimeter. Attacks were made on troop concentrations, trucks, and tanks, and although one jet flight to the Naktong River front failed to contact a controller and returned without result, control arrangements were reported somewhat improved.

In an attempt to make them even better, by improvement of communications between the task force and the JOC and by simplification of the complicated control procedures then in effect, another mission was flown to Taegu.

This visit bore fruit in the establishment of a direct communications link, and helped to minimize some operating problems by making JOC personnel aware of what the carrier force could and could not do.

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The previous overloading of airborne controllers was partially rectified by the assignment, for the 29th, of a defined section of the front line and of specific Mosquito aircraft to the planes of Task Force 77.

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Within the force, with similar ends in view, another move to organize a tactical air control party with USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and HMS Triumph (R16) personnel had begun, but the early permanent detachment of the British carrier was to prevent fruition.

[note]

On the 5th, on instructions from ComNavFE, the British commander established three barrier stations off the western headlands, between 38 08' and 36 45', which were kept manned as availability of ships permitted. Inshore work steadily improved as cooperation with the reviving ROK Navy was developed, and the blockade became increasingly effective.

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In the south, however, new problems were arising. There on 28 July CinCFE had ordered a round-up of small craft to deny them to the invader, and

[note]

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From the 27th to the 30th, in rainy, windy weather, USS Toledo (CA-133), USS Mansfield (DD-728), and USS Collett (DD-730) operated off the battle line. troops and other targets made for good shooting, and both shore and air spot were available; star-shell illumination by the ships aided the artillery ashore; the destroyers continued to alternate days duty in running north along the shoreline to bombard targets between Yŏngdk and the parallel. By months end the pressure was diminishing.

[note]

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27,28,29,30,31,01,02,03,04,05,06 July-August

01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11 days

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as USS Toledo (CA-133) fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell.

By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable.

Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins element found their days full.

[note]

27,28,29,30,31,01,02 July-August

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The preparatory barrages began at 0830. Then came the air strikes. The battle that then opened lasted until 2 August without letup.

[It has already been going on for a week, 7/17. Should go on until the 9th]

[note]

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17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdk

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdk. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdk began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]


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One little drama was enacted in Chinju on 31 July after the 19th Infantry withdrew from the town that should be told. It is the story of the first three medium tanks in Korea and their brave commander. On 28 June, the fourth day of the war, Col. Olaf P. Winningstad, Eighth Army Ordnance chief, found three M26 Pershing medium tanks at the Tokyo Ordnance Depot in bad condition and needing extensive repairs, including rebuilt engines. The repair work began at once and was completed on 13 July. The three tanks were shipped to Pusan where they arrived on 16 July, the first American medium tanks in Korea. With them were Lieutenant Fowler and fourteen enlisted crew members. Trained to operate M24 light tanks, they were now expected to become familiar with the Pershing tank. The tanks gave trouble because of improper fan belts that would stretch and permit the motors to overheat. Belts made in Japan were either too short or too long despite emergency orders for corrections in them. [72]

Eighth Army hoped to use these tanks to help stop the North Korean drive in the southwest. It sent them by rail to Chinju where they arrived at 0300, 28 July. They were unloaded at the Rail transportation Office on the south side of the Nam River where the rail line terminated. There they awaited new belts.

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ABCD EFGH IKLM

Barszcz held his roadblock east of Hadong until 0400 the morning of 28 July, when Captain Montesclaros from the staff of 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry, arrived with orders and trucks to take G Company back to a line of hills just west of the Nam River, about four miles from Chinju. [30]

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CV45
After a day of mail and refueling the force returned to the Yellow Sea where planes were launched at 0745 to begin the day string of sorties in close support of ground troops. This first launch sent out 16 offensive sorties (7 AD, 9 F4U) 1 defensive sortie (1 AD3W ASP), and 2 napalm test sorties (AD-4).

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27,28,29

During the next three days Task Force 77 continued to support the Eighth Army, and it effected a workable solution to the front-line control problem which helped the Mosquitoes.

Navy controllers, flying AD dive-bombers, joined the Mosquitoes and remained on station with them for three to four hours. As Navy attack planes came in, they were controlled by either the Air Force or the Navy controller, whichever was available and not already working other aircraft. At the conclusion of their strikes the Navy pilots checked out with "Mellow" control and made an oral report of their mission accomplishments.

[note]

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CV-45
At 0815 8 more offensive sorties (8 F9F) headed east on a -sweep up the west coast to Kunsan. All other offensive sorties reported to controllers in close support missions.

One division of the jets checked Mokp'o Airfield, which was deserted, but they did see 5 locomotives. Although four were already knocked out, the 5th was strafed, with .some smoke observed. This locomotive was probably destroyed.

Near 35-25'N, 126-50'E five trucks were seen, only 2 of which were undamaged. These were strafed and probably destroyed. Nearby an observation post and foxholes were strafed with unobserved results. One truck in Mokp'o was seen and blown up in a strafing run. Ten miles NE of Mokp'o, a handcar was strafed and probably destroyed.

The other division of jets strafed some buildings at Kwangju Airfield and 1 camouflaged truck or tank, in the vicinity. Without positive identification it must be evaluated as 1 truck damaged. Kunsan Airfield appeared unused, but 3 boxcars and1 tank car were strafed nearby. Those unfortunately appeared previously damaged. A horse cart, 5 miles west of Yonggwang )35 -17'N, 126-27E), was destroyed with its load of supplies.

As on previous days, the pilots saw groups of people in white shirts, apparently working in the fields; but the people paid no attention to the planes. In one village almost every backyard appeared to have a group of people gathered around an unidentified object. Upon return to the ship, the outgoing, pilots were cautioned to investigate more fully and attack if these parties appeared to be enemy.

Four AD-4s reported to TAC and TACP over (36-34N, 128 -11'E) for close support. On this town they dropped 3 napalm and 2 250# fragmentary bombs end strafed in two runs. Fires were, reported, and it is evaluated as damaged.

Korean_War

Following the Noeson-chon River cast, they strafed what the controller designated as enemy trying to cross the river north to south. One pilot saw packs and rifles, and in strafing runs the pilots reported an undetermined number of animals in company and men killed.

Returning west to Yongam-ni (36-36 N, 128-00;E) they hit the town with all remaining bombs and rockets. Strafing runs followed after TAC explained that our troops had been bothered last night by fire from that town. Five buildings, barn-like in appearance, were seen burning well on retirement. Evaluation is probably destroyed. Following targets were observed on the return trip: thirteen trucks on the move headed NW from Taejŏn (showing panels), large RR installations, 14 warehouses 15 trucks moving north from the warehouses, and 2 diesel junks all at Yongdang, which is across from the port of Kunsan. Small arms fire was thrown at them on all three targets, on which they mode runs earlier.

Weather decreased to 3500' ceiling and rain at Taejŏn and eastward.

The eight Corsairs were sent to Yŏngdong where the divisions split between two controllers. One division dropped 4 500# bombs on a camouflaged tank, one of which hit near enough to turn it 90. The TAC investigated, evaluated it destroyed, so directed the plane to another camouflaged tank 200 yards away, 8 100# bombs and 21 HVARs blew camouflage off target but damage was hard to observe due to steep valley. Evaluation damaged. One 100# bomb hit a row of undetermined camouflage mounds, but damage was undetermined. Warehouses at Monson (36 -12'N, 127.-05'E) and Kunsan were strafed with negative results. [Nonsan is at this coordinate, and Kŭmsan is 15 miles away]

The other division was directed to an apparently camouflaged tank, which was found to be a field piece when the camouflage was blown off near the and of the run. Previously 2 hits and near misses with rockets were scored through the camouflage. Destruction could not be determined, so it must be evaluated as damaged. At Nonsen a string of already strafed boxcars was seen.

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A VC-3 division of 1 F4U-5N and AD3Ns were also launched as a support group. Two of the ADs flew to Taegu, where they landed and left off a liaison officer from the Air Group FIVE staff.

The Corsairs and ADs were directed to a small canyon NW of Yŏngdong towards Simchon-ni supposedly containing troops and the tank which the other Corsairs damaged.

Two fragmentary bombs and 1 500# bomb were dropped, but the area was so difficult to navigate in that the pilots could not check on the damage done. Eight rockets and 20mm ammunition was thrown into the sane area with unobserved results.

This valley had a large cave at the end. Near the valley, the 2 ADs, which had gone to Taegu, joined the other planes over 2 small villages. Said to contain enemy troops, the 2 villages were hit with 20mm, 29 HVAR's, napalm, and 5 500# bombs; and they were left burning fiercely. The evaluation is 2 villages probably destroyed.

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XVI. July 28, 1950
On July 28, the situation on the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry's right flank turned critical. The NKPA launched an all-out attack against the 27th Infantry, forcing that regiment to tighten and contract its front-line positions.

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This movement opened a gap between the 1st Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Divisions and offered the 3rd NKPA Division advancing from Yŏngdong an opportunity to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Cavalry, then in division reserve, counterattacked to restore the divisional boundary. The 27th Infantry also counterattacked and regained contact with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. [66]

[66] War diary summary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950 . In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, 1950 , Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

The risk of the NKPA cutting off the American troops was not over. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 's Commanding Officer reported NKPA attempts to penetrate both the right and left flanks of the regiment's position throughout the day. [67]

[67] War diary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), 25 June-31 July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

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CV-45

At 1045, 14 more offensive sorties (6 AD, 8,F4U) and 1 defensive sortie (AD3W) were launched, with the same missions as in the first launch.

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CV-45

At 1045, 14 more offensive sorties (6 AD, 8,F4U) and 1 defensive sortie (AD3W) were launched, with the same missions as in the first launch.

CV-45

Then at 1230, 8 F9F sorties swept the rail lines and roads of the western seaboard again.

One division of jets strafed 20-30 loaded carts at Yŏngdong destroying 7. Wheels and other parts were seen to fly off during the run. Five oil cars, probably already hit were strafed with no apparent damage. At Hondok (35-31'N, 126-42'E) they strafed and destroyed 1 camouflaged truck and damaged 2 more.

The other division flew first to Chichon-ni (xxx38N, 126-58E) where they burned 1 truck and damaged 2 motor junks. At about 34-52N 127-44E they burned a truck, and at Sunch'ŏn destroyed 1 more. Here they further strafed 3 coal cars and 5 boxcars because for a possibility of hidden troops. Just north, they probably destroyed 1 truck.

Four F4Us were sent to Mokp'o (34,-45N; 126-23E) to hit shipping. Dropping 1 500#, several 100# bombs, and HVARs; they sank 2 freighters and 2 tugboats which were actually observed to sink beneath the surface. One 500# bomb hit, on the dock, but damage was unknown. Flying, north to Kunsan, the pilots saw 2 fighter air Strips about 6000' long, apparently built on red clay, 25 miles north of Mokp'o. No activity, planes or buildings were soon there.

The other four Corsairs and six Skyraiders flew to Nonsan where the flight leader acted as TAC. On the, way in the group assesses the following damage: burned 1 truck on the dike across a canal north of Nonsan, burned 1 truck in a small village 2 miles SW Nonsan, and probably destroyed a motorcycle and side car 1 mile SW of Nonsan. All these vehicles were camouflaged with matting or straw.

In and beyond Nonsan, they accomplished the following: damaged Nonsan with bombs (8 fires started) , burned 2 jeeps north-of the city, probably destroyed 1 truck in the city with napalm, burned 1 bus on the NE corner of town, end destroyed 1 tank (#315) 5 miles east of the town.

On the return, the Corsairs burned transformers, damaging a power station 2 miles south of Kanggyŏng. One pilot strafed a long building just SW of Nonsan where he observed tank tracks in the courtyard, he believes that troops were present, for he received 6 holes in his wings and tail surfaces from small arms fired

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Meeting at the battalion command post, the commanders of the various units planned a renewed assault for 0500 the next morning. Artillery and mortars zeroed in as scheduled, and soon the town was in flames.

By this time, however, Yech'ŏn may already have been abandoned by the enemy. At Hamch'ang, Col. Henry G. Fisher, commanding the 35th Infantry, received early that morning an erroneous message that the North Koreans had driven the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry from Yech'ŏn. He started for the place at once. He found the battalion commander about five miles west of the town, but was dissatisfied with the information that he received from him.

Korean_War

Fisher and a small party then drove on into Yech'ŏn, which was ablaze with fires started by American artillery shells. He encountered no enemy or civilians. The 3d Platoon, 77th Engineer Combat Company, attached to Company K, entered the town with the infantrymen and attempted to halt the spread of flames-unsuccessfully, because of high, shifting winds.

By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19]

[note]

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Flynn and three companions walked all night. The next afternoon his party, now numbering ten men, entered the lines of the 19th Infantry.

The largest single group of survivors escaped by going south to the seacoast, only a few miles distant. Sergeant Applegate of I Company led one group of ninety-seven men to the coast, where a Korean fishing vessel took them on board at Noryangjin, five miles south of Hadong. From there the vessel went west to a point near Yŏsu, where it transferred the men to a Korean naval patrol vessel which returned them to Pusan. [28]

[note]

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CV-45

At 1345, the third support group- of the day was launched , fielding 15 offensive sorties (4 AD, 2ADN, 8 F4U, 1 F4U-5N) and 1 defensive sortie (AD3W).

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CV-45

Then at 1530, the 8 F9F sweep was also launched.

[note]

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1545

One division hit the coast at Mokp'o and strafed a stationary train which has been evaluated as already damaged. However, subsequent strafing runs destroyed 1 large oil storage tank and damaged 3 sampans next to the quay wall. On the south edge of Kingjon (34-37N 126-16E) the pilots claimed 6 trucks burned, and 2 damaged. These targets were in a stockade. Pasong ???? What is this? found two trucks damaged by our pilots.

The other division want farther south to the Yangam area '(34-50N 126.43E) where they probably destroyed 3 trucks. Although moving when spotted, they stopped, and troops poured out from them. - At Simsong-ni ( 3451N' 126-56E) 2 trucks were damaged. Five trucks (probably ammunition) exploded, on road from Hadong to Chinju, just east of the former. At Kawa-do 25 junks were sighted; not action, because no ammunition.

Four ADs reported to TAC at Yŏngdong, where explained that the first tunnel north of the city was occupied by enemy troops, the second one north by friendlys. Four napalm hits were put into the tunnel, after which large quantities of black smoke issued from the ends. This target is evaluated as damaged with countless loss of lives. Pilots could see the front lines from their position a the tunnel, for many white and eerie panels where showing to the SE. Three villages were burning, evaluated as damaged. In one of the villages a napalm explosion sent a sea of fire the whole length of one of its streets. Okch'ŏn was strafed with no apparent damage. One bus was damaged between Kanggyŏng and Nosan. Crewman and pilot confirm two direct hits with 100# bombs on two warehouses at Yŏngdong. West of Yŏngdong a barge was burned on retirement.

Four corsairs reported to TAC at Hamch'ang (30[36]-33N, 128-12E) and made runs on 5 un-camouflaged tanks, two of which were already burned out. Two hits with HVAR on 1 tank knocked off the right tread. Moving south and 10 miles to the west of Sangju they bombed, staffed, and rocketed troop positions atop a mountain, by direction, but no activity was noted. Small arms fire was received over the tanks and at the troop positions, and 1 plane was hit with 1 shell.

The other four F4Us could not contact controller over Yŏngdong or Sangju, although the latter was seen to have numerous tracks and tanks spotted below him. Continuing north, they contacted TACP three miles south of Hamch'ang, who directed them to hill at 36-31N 128-01E , where many troops had been sighted. Here, they dropped 2 250# incendiaries and fired 20mm and 21 HVAR's. TACP said that the troops were getting out of their cover and running all over, so they staffed and rocketed the positions again.

Yŏngdong and Nogun-ni

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VC-3 flew 1 F4U-5N and 2 AD3N to Yŏngdong where they set fire to 3 villages within 3 miles of the city to the east. One napalm was put into a tunnel, which TAC reported as housing 400 troops, in the same locality.

[So how may tunnels are there between Yŏngdong and Nogŭn-ni]

These two targets were evaluated as the same which the 4ADs hit, and the tunnel as the same also. This would make 5 hits in all in the tunnel with napalm. In a valley to the east, many strafing runs were made, during which 20mm and 14 HVAR's were fired. TAC said 200 troops were located there. On the runs many personnel were seen to fall. Other strafing runs were made on camouflaged targets with undetermined results.

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CV-45

At 1630 the last launch for the day sent 14 offensive (8 F4U, 6 AD) and 1 defensive (AD3W) over the target area in their role as close support aircraft.

Six ADs reported to TAC at Hamch'ang, from there they were directed to a hillside about 5 miles SW of the town along a small stream which runs NE/SW. Having been told that there were troops who had been bothering our troops in the valley they dropped everything but their incendiaries on the hillside, following these runs with strafing runs using all their ammunition on the area. On the west side of a hill, they destroyed a small village with incendiaries.

The 8F4Us were directed to Namwŏn (3524N 12723E) were TAC directed them to burn a much as possible of the town, keeping a sharp lookout for parked vehicles. Two trucks were destroyed with 2 direct HVAR hits. One truck and 1 jeep were damaged in the town. The town was evaluated as damaged. Three miles east, runs with rockets on reported vehicles, unseen by pilots, greeted no visible damages. Small caliber machine gun fire came from Namwŏn. (p2-21)

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Reports suggested that the NKPA pushed civilians, as human shields, ahead of them during their attacks.

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The NKPA attacked the regiment frontally, but American artillery drove the North Koreans back with great success. Navy aircraft from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45) were directed into the area and attacked a railroad tunnel occupied by enemy forces and other targets forward of the 7th Cavalry in the direction of Yŏngdong with bombs and machine guns. [68]

[68] Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 1800 28 July 1950 , 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA; Valley Forge Report of Operations, 16 July to 31 July 1950

The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 28 PIR described the preceding 24 hours as "relatively quiet" with some infantry probes of U.S. positions and "intermittent artillery fire" in the division's forward areas. The division's
intelligence staff estimated three NKPA battalions to the division's front with "a concentration of unknown strength on our left flank."

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Enemy combat efficiency and morale remained good, and the PIR concluded that the "enemy's main effort apparently is north of our line in the 27th Infantry ZR [Zone of Responsibility]. Indications still point to a build up on our left flank." [69]

[69] Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #7, 1800 28 July 1950 , 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 55, RG 338, NARA.

[note]

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Before dusk of 28 July, forward observers could see a long line of enemy traffic piled up behind a roadblock that the 34th Infantry had constructed at a defile on the Anŭi road west of the town.

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A message from Recon troop (south) to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 281815 (TOR) July 1950 -- "We have pulled back to our original positions. The pass on the way to the 27 RCT is a regular mousetrap. Everyone should be cautioned about going thru towns and leaving these civilians behind them. LT Friant is in there now and I know he has the enemy behind him. That is what happened to Wozniack today also." [60]

[60] Messages to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 28 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division Periodic Intelligence Reports 1950 , Box 667, RG 338, NARA.

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1942 sun down

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When visited by General Collins in mid-July, General MacArthur had told the Army Chief of Staff that as soon as the Korean situation had become sufficiently stabilized he intended to visit Formosa for talks with Chiang Kai-shek.

The Joint Chiefs on 28 July 1950 informed MacArthur that the Chinese Communists had announced their intention of capturing Formosa and would probably succeed unless the Chinese Nationalists made timely efforts to defend the island.

They had recommended to the Secretary of Defense, they stated, that the Nationalists be permitted to break up hostile concentrations through military action, even if it meant attacks on the mainland. [20-9]

[note]

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To eliminate the growing threat of envelopment, the 7th Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM to withdraw to the southeast at first light on July 29. [70]

[70] War diary summary, Headquarters 7th Cavalry (Infantry), June-July 1950 . In the Records of the Adjutant Generals Office, AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 4431, RG 407, NARA.

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Learning that evening that the enemy was moving around his battalion on back trails in the direction of Chinju, Colonel Wilson began, after dark, the first of a series of withdrawals.

[note]

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They directed artillery fire on this column until darkness fell. [13-47] Colonel Beauchamp then brought his two infantry battalions closer to Kŏch'ang for a tighter defense.

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Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 28 noted several developments in enemy tactics reported by the 25th Infantry Division.

Overall, the PIR evaluated the situation in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone as "stable;" however, the 25th Infantry Division to the north of the 1st Cavalry faced "aggressive attack [sic] combined with infiltration tactics."

Eighth Army's estimate of the enemy's most likely course of action remained the same: the main effort moving along the Taejŏn-Kŭmch'ŏn axis, combined with a deep envelopment of the army's left flank and guerrilla action against the army's rear areas. [72]

[72]
Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #16, 2400 28 July 1950 , File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950 , Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

[note]


Casualties

Korean_War 54 Casualties

As of July 28, 1950

3 13TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON
3 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4 25TH ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
26 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 28TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON
1 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 49TH FIGHTER BOMBER GROUP
1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 6132ND TACTICAL CONTROL GROUP DETACHMENT A
3 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
5 90TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (155MM)
54 19500728 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 17 2,151 1 2 0 2,171
Losses 0 333 0 0 0 333
To Date 17 2484 1 2 0 2,504

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Friday July 28, 1950 - day 034

19500727 1300 03088nogunri0

Korean_War

XV. July 27, 1950
The division now occupied positions in the Hwanggan area with the 8th Cavalry in reserve, the 5th Cavalry southwest of the town, and the 7th Cavalry to the west of town near Nogŭn-ni. The 7th Cavalry was the farthest forward with the 25th Infantry Division's 27th Infantry still on the regiment's right and the 5th Cavalry to the left and rear. The 7th Cavalry was not in direct contact with the enemy but learned from the division that no friendly troops occupied the areas to their south and west in the direction of Yŏngdong. Throughout the day, patrols reported enemy forces nearby, including tanks spotted in the village of Sot Anmak in front of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and columns of enemy troops advancing from Yŏngdong on the railroad tracks.