Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.6°C 76.28°F at Taegu [note]

Rainy, windy weather [note] [note]

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Taegu)


Overview

 

week 006

Today begins the sixth week of the Korean war. 3,157 American Servicemen will have be killed by the end of this week  Saturday August 5, 1950 (Day 042)

[note]

 

Interesting but not real accurate [note]

More of the same [note]

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FEAFBC


July 30: Forty-seven B-29s bombed the Chosen nitrogen explosives factory at Hungnam on the east coast of North Korea. [note]

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Department of Army officials showed General MacArthur the bottom of the replacement barrel on 30 July. All the men and officers eligible for overseas assignment were being shipped to the Far East Command, except for slightly more than a thousand to other joint commands.

Despite Presidential approval for the recall of 25,000 enlisted Reservists, a severe shortage of replacements still existed. Individual replacements from the Enlisted Reserve Corps would not be available in quantity for at least two months. All of these men would have to go to General Reserve units. The extensive levies placed upon the General Reserve to furnish FEC replacements had cut the operating capabilities of the emergency force to a dangerous level.

For the immediate future, at least, the Army had done about as much as it could do. It could promise only the most austere replacement support to General MacArthur. [05-28]


Bringing Divisions to Strength


Another significant effort involved the build-up of MacArthur's divisions from under-strength, unbalanced peacetime divisions to fully manned, properly constituted fighting divisions. With only two battalions in each regiment, American forces in Korea could not employ normal tactical maneuvers based on the full firepower and the flexibility of a triangular organization. Nor could they guarantee flank protection. As General Dean [some time ago] said:


The two battalion regimental organization with which we are operating
does not lend itself to effective combat. The same is true, though
possibly to a lesser degree of our two battery artillery battalions.
Recommend that infantry battalions be sent us to bring all regiments
of the 24th Division up to regular triangular organization. [05-29]

[note]

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On 30 July the V Corps was redesignated as the I Corps and began to prepare for movement, less certain cadre personnel, to the Far East Command in early August. The 4th Signal Battalion was to accompany the new corps headquarters. [note]

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MacArthur chose to make the initial Formosa visit in person so that he could resolve uncertainties arising out of conflicting reports from the island about the status of Chiang's government and its armed forces. [20-12] [note]

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On 30 July Doyle closed TF 90 operations at P'ohang-Dong. The operation had gone perfectly, excepting only that the second echelon of shipping had been delayed by two days by Typhoon Grace.


In the event, little air support had been required. However, that outcome had not been (and could not have been) known prior to the landing, and the back-and-forth among senior naval commanders had revealed an underlying theme in amphibious operations. It demonstrated the same conflicting imperatives that had characterized amphibious operations since Guadalcanal—the fast-carrier admirals were reluctant to tie down their forces to amphibious objective areas or to take direction from amphibious commanders (escort carriers to supply air support would not be available until later).

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Admiral Doyle, the amphibious commander in the P'ohang-Dong case, found no problems in the command relationships established for it; Struble, however, the carrier admiral, intended to see that things were different for the next amphibious operation. [note]

DSC

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Leroy L. Moore (RA17200878), Corporal, U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with 8066th Mechanized Reconnaissance Platoon attached to the 1st Battalion, 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Infantry Division. Corporal Moore distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces near Chinju, Korea, on 30 July 1950.


On that date, Corporal Moore was a gunner on an M-8 Reconnaissance Car in support of an infantry company which was pinned down by heavy enemy machine-gun fire. Without regard for his own personal safety, Corporal Moore moved to an exposed position on a river bank, and with accurate fire from his machine-gun knocked out three enemy machine-guns, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy This action enabled the infantry company to withdraw to new positions.

In a later action, on 2 August 1950, when his car was put out of action, Corporal Moore dismounted a 30 caliber machine-gun and attempted to move to the flank of an enemy machine-gun which was hampering the evacuation of wounded men. During this action Corporal Moore was killed by mortar fire. [note]

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ES71-19-1 (SC345736) Army Engineers place satchel charges and promer cord, preparatory to blowing up a railway bridge somewhere in Korea. 30 Jul 1950.

[note]

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United Nations flag waves over crowd waiting to hear Dr. Syngman Rhee speak to the United Nations Council in Taegu, Korea. 07/30/1950 Photographer, Girard. Sergeant, War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

[note]

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"The US 2nd Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, began debarking at Pusan." [note]

South then North

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By 30 July, the 24th Infantry had withdrawn to the last defensible high ground west of Sangju, three miles from the town.

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The regiment had deteriorated so badly by this time that General Kean recalled the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, and placed it in blocking positions behind the 24th Infantry. [note]

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The Chirye action made clear that a strong enemy force was approaching the rear of, or passing behind, the 1st Cavalry Division positions at Kumch'ŏn.

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The next day, 30 July, General Gay ordered the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry; the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry; and the 99th Field Artillery Battalion to Chirye.

This strong force was able to enter the town, but the enemy held the hills around it.

The next day North Koreans shelled Chirye, forcing the Americans to withdraw to a position northeast of the town. [12-60]

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The enemy 8th Regiment together with its artillery now joined the other North Koreans already at Chirye. This meant that the bulk of the division was engaged in the enveloping move. [note]

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On 30 July General Walker softened somewhat the impact of his recent order and statements by expressing confidence that the United States would hold "until reinforcements arrive" and that "ultimate victory will be ours." But, he added, the simple truth was that the "war had reached its critical stage." [12-74]

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A few days later, Hanson W. Baldwin, the military critic of the New York Times, referred to Walker's "stand or die" order as a

"well merited rebuke to the Pentagon, which has too often disseminated a soothing syrup of cheer and sweetness and light since the fighting began."

[12-75] It is clear that by the end of July the reading public in the United States should have realized that the country was in a real war, that the outcome was in doubt, and that many uncertainties lay ahead. [note]

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On 27 July, Colonel Moore sent Colonel Wilson with the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, north from Chinju to relieve Colonel Rhea in the Anui area. Colonel Rhea was then to bring his battalion south to Chinju, where Colonel Moore planned to concentrate the 19th Infantry. The relief took place at Umyong-ni in the early afternoon of 27 July. Wilson's battalion had no artillery, armor, or air support. A platoon of 4.2 mortars had only two rounds of white phosphorous shells for ammunition. Mounted messengers traveling over thirty-five miles of road were the only means of communication between Wilson and Colonel Moore's command post. [38]

In the early afternoon, Colonel Rhea and their weapons from the Heavy Weapons Company, from Umyong-ni to relieve A Company, 19th Infantry, at Anui. A Company was engaged in a small arms fight and its relief could not be accomplished at once. Colonel Rhea returned to Umyong-ni, leaving instructions that the company should follow him as soon as possible, which he expected would be shortly.

At Umyong-ni Rhea waited about five hours for A Company. Then, when reconnaissance toward Anui showed that an enemy force had cut the road, he started just before dusk with the rest of the battalion for Chinju as ordered. [39]

Meanwhile, Colonel Wilson had sent 2nd Lt. Frank Iwanczyk, Assistant S-3, with two jeeps from Umyong ni to make contact with the 34th Infantry at Kŏch'ang; 1st Lt. Sam C. Holliday, S-2, went to make contact with the ROK troops at Hamyang.

Iwanczyk set off northward. At the Anui crossroads he checked his map and then led off toward Kŏch'ang, waving the other jeep to follow. Because of the heavy dust the second jeep kept well behind the first. A mile north of the crossroads, an enemy machine gun, hidden in a native hut on a turn of the road, suddenly poured devastating fire into the lead jeep. The bodies of all four men fell from the wrecked vehicle into a rice field.

The second jeep stopped with a jerk and the men jumped into the ditch by the road. After three or four minutes of silence, seven or eight North Korean soldiers started down the road. They passed the first jeep and, when nearing the second, they shouted and started to run toward it. Pvt. Sidney D. Talley stood up and fired his M1 at the North Koreans. He killed two of them. His three companions now joined in firing. The surviving North Koreans turned and ran back. One of the Americans scrambled up the bank, turned the jeep around, the others jumped in, and the driver raced back to the Anui crossroads. There, they excitedly told members of B Company about the roadblock. At the battalion command post they repeated their story. [40]

By this time, Lieutenant Holliday had returned from Hamyang. There he had found somewhat less than 600 men of the ROK 7th Division and 150 fresh South Korean marines from Mokp'o. Holliday with three men now set off for Anui. Two and a half miles short of the town, enemy fire from a roadblock destroyed their jeep and wounded one man in the chest. Holliday covered the withdrawal of his three men with BAR fire, and then followed them. Relieved finally at Anui about 1600, A Company, 19th Infantry, loaded into trucks and started south to join Rhea's battalion. A mile below the town the company ran into a fire fight between North and South Korean troops and was stopped. After enemy fire wrecked six of its vehicles, the company destroyed the others, abandoned its heavy equipment, and started on foot through the hills toward the 34th Infantry positions at Kŏch'ang.

July 28th

The next morning 64 Ameri-can and 60 ROK soldiers came in to Colonel Beauchamp's positions there. Why this force did not return to Anui and join Lieutenant Hughes is not known. [41] Meanwhile at Anui, Lieutenant Hughes' B Company, 28th Infantry, was under attack from superior numbers closing in from three sides, and by nightfall it had been forced back into the town.

Hughes made plans to withdraw across the upper Nam River to a high hill east of the town. Two officers and sixteen men got across before enemy automatic fire cut off the rest. After vainly trying to help the rest of the company to break out eastward, the eighteen men went over the hills to the 34th Infantry position at Kŏch'ang. In Anui the cutoff troops engaged in street fighting until midnight. Those who escaped walked out through the hills during the next several days. Approximately half of the 215 men of B and D Companies, 29th Infantry, taking part in the Anui battle, were either killed or listed as missing in action. [42]

Colonel Wilson and the rest of the battalion at Umyong-ni meanwhile knew nothing of the fate of B Company at Anui except that enemy forces had engaged it, and that roadblocks were above and below it. Wilson made two unsuccessful attempts to send help to B Company. The enemy troops that had closed on Anui were advanced units of the N.K. 4th Division. They were well aware that a mixed force of American and South Korean troops was only a few miles below them.

To deal with this force, elements of the division turned south from Anui early on 28 July. In defensive positions about Umyong-ni and Hamyang, Colonel Wilson's men were on the east side of the Nam River. Col. Min Ki Sik's remnants of the ROK 7th Division and a small force of South Korean marines were on the west side. American mortar fire turned back the small enemy force that approached Umyong-ni. On the west side of the river near Hamyang a hard fight developed. There, the South Koreans seemed about to lose the battle until their reserve marines fought through to the enemy's flank. This caused the North Koreans to withdraw northward. From prisoners captured in this battle Wilson learned of the American defeat at Anui the day before. [43] Learning that evening that the enemy was moving around his battalion on back trails in the direction of Chinju, Colonel Wilson began, after dark, the first of a series of withdrawals.

July 29th??????

On 30 July the battalion reached the vicinity of Sanch'ong, twenty miles north of Chinju, and went into defensive positions there on orders from Colonel Moore. Colonel Min's ROK troops also withdrew southward, passed through Wilson's positions, and continued on into Chinju. [13-44] [note]

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and 600 [13-replacements arrived at Chinju for the 19th Infantry] on 30 July-but it is doubtful if they contributed much to the combat effectiveness of the regiment in the Chinju battle. Of the 600 that arrived on 30 July, 500 went to the 19th Infantry and most of the remainder to the 13th Field Artillery Battalion. [note]

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United Nations Forces Withdraw Behind the Naktong


By the end of July, the enemy pressure that forced General Walker to move the 25th Division from the central to the southern front forced on him also, partly as a consequence of that move, the decision to withdraw Eighth Army across the Naktong. The withdrawal was planned to start the night of 1 August. [15-7]

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On 30 July the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, driven from Kŏch'ang, was in a defensive position near Sanje-ri astride the road to Hyŏpch'ŏn and the Naktong River.

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That day, the 21st Infantry Regiment-except for 'C' Company and a section of 81-m.m. mortars, still at Yŏngdök on the east coast, and the 3rd Battalion, just attached to the 1st Cavalry Division-crossed the Naktong and took a position behind the 34th Infantry.

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The ROK 17th Regiment also arrived and occupied the high ground on the right (north) of the 34th Infantry. [note]

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It was evident in the last days of July and the first of August that General Walker was concerned about the failure of his troops to carry out orders to maintain contact with the enemy. In preparing for the withdrawal to the Perimeter position, on 30 July he had ordered all units to maintain such contact. [note]

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The next day, forty-seven B-29's bombed the Chosen Nitrogen Plant at Hungnam on the northeast coast. [15-30] [note]

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[On 28 July the Far East Air Forces gave to the Bomber Command a list of targets in the rail interdiction program, and] two days later a similar plan was ready for interdiction of highways. [note]

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On 30 July, the Far East Air Forces had 890 planes-

626 F-80's and

264 F-51's-but

only 525 of them were in units and available and ready for combat. [15-35]


Rockets, napalm, and .50-caliber machine gun fire in strafing were the effective weapons used by the close support fighter planes. Napalm, the jellied gasoline carried in wing tanks, generated a searing heat when ignited by a contact fuze upon striking the ground. The splashing, flaming liquid is a two-edged weapon: it burns and consumes, and it strikes men with terror when it bursts on or near their positions. No one who has seen the huge, pod like tanks hurtle to the ground and burst into orange balls of flame, quickly followed by billowing clouds of dense, black smoke, would care to withstand this form of attack.


The consumption of aviation gasoline was so great in the early phase of the war, as compared to the available supply in the Far East, that it became one of the serious logistical problems. Ocean tankers could scarcely keep pace with the rate of consumption. The situation never got to the point where air operations stopped, but it came near to that. There were times when the gas terminals in Japan were empty-all the fuel was in the stations. [15-36]


Just as Eighth Army prepared to fall back behind the Naktong River, important ground reinforcements from Hawaii and the United States arrived in Korea. The United States had barely won the race against space and time. [note]

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As a part of the enemy build-up in the south, another division now arrived there-the 7th Division. This division was activated on 3 July 1950; its troops included 2,000 recruits and the 7th Border Constabulary Brigade of 4,000 men. An artillery regiment had joined this division at Kaesŏng near the
end of July.


In Sŏul on 30 July, 2,000 more recruits conscripted from South Korea brought the 7th Division's strength to 10,000. [note]

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross
19500730 0000 DSC MOORE

 

Silver Star

Alfe, Norman N. [1stLt SS K38thIR]

Brown, William [SFC SS H7thCR]

Smythe, Jack M. [PFC SS HqCo3rdBn34thIR]

Vernon, George E. [Pvt SS H7thCR]

Warren, Guy G., Sr. [SFC SS E7thCR]

 

 

[note]

USAF

 

B-29s struck with 23 aircraft the Chosen Nitrogen Chemical Company plant at Konan (Hungnam) which is 50 miles north of Wonsan.[155-Actually, 47 aircraft struck the target. (Futrell, p 190.)]
Explosions rocked planes which were above 15,000 feet. Initial strike with radar; overcast cleared away, presumably by heat generated by ground fires, remainder bombing visual. Raid highly successful.


1220 hours conferred with CINCFE. Took with me the plans for FEAF support of Formosa should that island be attacked by the Chinese Communists. He approved the plan as drawn for planning purposes. Copies of same, after approval, dispatched to Turner and Stearley, cautioning them to limit the knowledge of this plan to certain few of their staff and also to bear in mind that it was for planning purposes only.

Partridge called; on his behalf sent the following personal redline to Vandenberg:

Partridge's headquarters with Timberlake now permanently in Korea. His rear echelon at Nagoya still has the job of air defense of the islands of Japan and the other necessary duties required of a rear echelon. He needs and has urged me to secure for him a good brigadier general to take on the job at Nagoya. At one time, as you remember, we had two air divisions in Japan to run the air defense set-up. Because of shortage of both officers and enlisted personnel, I eliminated the two air divisions and set up three air defense areas with wing commanders in charge of air defense. It is noted that an air division was recently activated in Europe headed up by a general officer. I feel that since we are at war our genuine need for a general officer at Nagoya is greater than that of Europe. As you know, General Weyland did not replace General Crabb. Crabb cannot be released for Nagoya assignment. Partridge feels and I agree with him that we need a general officer to command his rear echelon. Colonel Edwin L. Tucker, who has been here two and one-half years, is the commander there now but he must be sent home for compassionate reasons. I urge the immediate dispatch of a young and up and at 'em general.


Radio received from USAF from Twining stating that Brig General Theron B. Henebry (Reserve) being recalled to active duty to command Reserve light bomb wing being activated and deployed as unit to my command.[156-

This Air Reserve unit was the 452d BW(L), which had less than two weeks notice before being recalled on August 10. Considered to be the most ready of the Air Force Reserve wings, the Long Beach-based 452d
had a great deal of talented personnel, with many of its members working for the various aircraft plants in the area.

On October 25, the first B–26 of the 452d arrived in Japan, and the first wing mission was flown two days later. From recall to combat took exactly 77 days. (Gerald T. Cantwell, The Evolution and Employment of the Air Force Reserve as a Mobilization Force, 1946-1980 [Robins AFB, Ga., 1981], pp 20-25.)


Thereon B. Henebry should not be confused with Brig Gen John B. Henebry, who took command of the 315th Air Division on February 8, 1951.

]
Mr. Akabane[157-Unable to identify this individual.] was in briefly at 1530 hours. Have him settled with a yen salary acceptable to him out at FEAMCOM. Gave him a letter of introduction to Doyle.

[note]

     

Prospective airfield sites were lost to the enemy at P'yŏngt'aek and Taejŏn, so that by early July only the site at Taegu remained practicable as an air base in central Korea. FEAF therefore decided to concentrate the full 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, plus the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company, at Taegu.

Orders were issued to the units on Okinawa on 8 July, and by 16 July the first elements were unloading at Pusan; on 30 July the last of the battalion had moved northward into Taegu by train from the South Korean port. Here the aviation engineers hurriedly laid down a new PSP runway, seemingly without much attention to the sub-grade, and started renovation of the old strip which had been in use during the month.

On 16 August, just as the battalion was returning to work on the old strip and necessary taxiways, word was received that enemy pressure demanded evacuation of all engineer troops except a small maintenance detachment. Some 4,300 feet of the new runway, however, was in use by tactical units.

August

The engineer units thus labored to meet short deadlines with worn equipment and confused logistical support. Heavier construction equipment had to be left at the Pusan harbor because of the impracticability of moving it forward. The age of other equipment caused numerous breakdowns, and, with almost no flow of spare parts, the engineers cannibalized some items to keep like items running.

Large stocks of construction material were on hand in ECA dumps, and these stocks were drawn upon until Army supplies could begin to arrive from Japan. Pierced-steel planking assumed particular importance because of its world-wide shortage and handling difficulty. Frequently classified as a "portable" surfacing, it was shipped in bundles of 30 planks which would cover 375 square feet but which weighed approximately a ton. Thus a standard runway of 150 by 5,000 feet required 1,928 tons of PSP. The metal planking, moreover, was stored and controlled by the Pusan Logistical Command, and, being of use to non-aviation activities, some of the PSP was diverted to the construction of an ammunition unloading beach at Pusan and an ordnance service station at Taegu.

[note]

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Prospective airfield sites were lost to the enemy at P'yŏngt'aek and Taejŏn, so that by early July only the site at Taegu remained practicable as an air base in central Korea.

FEAF therefore decided to concentrate the full 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, plus the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company, at Taegu. Orders were issued to the units on Okinawa on 8 July, and by 16 July the first elements were unloading at Pusan; on 30 July the last of the battalion had moved northward into Taegu by train from the South Korean port.

Here the aviation engineers hurriedly laid down a new PSP runway, seemingly without much attention to the sub-grade, and started renovation of the old strip which had been in use during the month.

On 16 August, just as the battalion was returning to work on the old strip and necessary taxiways, word was received that enemy pressure demanded evacuation of all engineer troops except a small maintenance detachment. Some 4,300 feet of the new runway, however, was in use by tactical units. [note]

Prospective airfield sites were lost to the enemy at P'yŏngt'aek and Taejŏn, so that by early July only the site at Taegu remained practicable as an air base in central Korea.

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FEAF therefore decided to concentrate the full 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion, plus the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company, at Taegu.

Orders were issued to the units on Okinawa on 8 July, and by 16 July the first elements were unloading at Pusan; on 30 July the last of the battalion had moved northward into Taegu by train from the South Korean port. Here the aviation engineers hurriedly laid down a new PSP runway, seemingly without much attention to the sub-grade, and started renovation of the old strip which had been in use during the month.

On 16 August, just as the battalion was returning to work on the old strip and necessary taxiways, word was received that enemy pressure demanded evacuation of all engineer troops except a small maintenance detachment. Some 4,300 feet of the new runway, however, was in use by tactical units. [note]

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elastic bridge 19th BG(M)

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week
30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks
06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks
13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks
20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

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On 30 July a flight of F-80's with rockets and machine guns blazing, destroyed eight artillery pieces and a number of vehicles two miles northeast of Hwanggan, and when, on this same mission, a MOSQUITO spotted some 2,000 enemy troops southeast of Yŏngdong, other fighters were called in to work them over.

In managing his retreat southward, General Walker relied heavily upon the maneuverability of air power. He commonly outlined the next day's work at either an evening or early morning staff conference which was attended by Fifth Air Force commanders. If the tide of battle changed during the day, air power moved to some other spot where it was needed. [note]

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Movement of additional tactical organizations to Korea awaited the reequipment of those units with F-51's from the United States. The aircraft carrier USS Boxer (CV-21), which managed an eight-day crossing of the Pacific, brought 145 F-51's which had been assembled for delivery by 27 July.

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General Stratemeyer had already prepared to use these F-51's when on 11 July he had approved a plan to move the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group with its 12th and 67th Squadrons from the Philippines for temporary duty with the Fifth Air Force.

By 30 July this contingent had converted to F-51's at Johnson,

and on 3 August it had reached Taegu, where, next day, the 51st Fighter Squadron (P) was returned to its old designation as the 12th Squadron. With the arrival of a fighter group, the air base unit at Taegu was redesignated and expanded to become the 6002nd Fighter Wing, Single Engine, comprising temporary duty squadrons typical of a wing organization. [note]

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FEAF listed targets to Bomber Command on 28 July designed to effect the rail interdiction. A second plan of similar scope designed to institute highway interdiction was drawn up on 30 July, and the FEAF Bomber Command interdiction list was accordingly revised on 2 August. [note]

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At Taejŏn a detachment of the 620th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron extemporized a TACC, while the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Squadron was being organized back at Itazuke, effective 14 July. This squadron, later redesignated as the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group, moved almost immediately to Taegu where it established a full scale TACC, with AN/TTQ-1 plotting equipment and VHF radio.

Since no radar equipment was in use in the field, the principal duty of the TACC was fighter direction control for close support. Enemy pressure forced the withdrawal of the heavy TACC equipment from Taegu to Pusan on 30 July, but a small scale TACC remained operational at Taegu. [note]

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By noon on 13 July the 822nd loaded the majority of its personnel aboard a Baltic Coastal steamship, and the last of three smaller vessels which carried equipment sailed from Okinawa on 22 July.

13-16=3 days, 22-30=8 days

On 16 July the first company of the 822nd unloaded at Pusan, and on 30 July the last of the battalion moved northward by train from the South Korean port.

At Taegu the 822nd commander had received instructions to repair the existing sod-and-gravel runway so that it could handle "moderate traffic for a minimum time," this without halting air operations. After these repairs were made the battalion was to construct a 5,000-foot pierced steel plank (PSP) runway alongside the existing strip.#143 [note]

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Recognizing that effective air-ground operations against the Communist enemy depended upon the establishment of mutual trust between the tactical air force and the field army, General Partridge made conscientious efforts to cultivate close relations with the Eighth Army.

Partridge and his key staff members attended the morning staff meetings which General Walker held at eight o'clock. At these morning conferences Walker explained what his forces were expected to do during the day, and Partridge issued such additional orders for immediate air missions as were necessary to support the ground actions.

General Partridge invited Walker and his key officers to attend the Fifth Air Force planning session which met each evening at six o'clock. At this meeting Partridge customarily ordered the air missions which would be written up on operations orders for execution the following day.

While the Joint Operations Center continued to handle immediate changes in the allocation of airpower, the headquarters relationships insured that airpower operated as a unified force where it was most needed by the ground troops. Thus on 30 July General Walker asked Partridge to concentrate all available air strikes in the Chinju area. [note]

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At first General Stratemeyer specified that the

1. Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Company, the

2. Chosen Nitrogen Explosives Company, and the

3. Bogun (Motomiya) Chemical Plant

were to be attacked under visual conditions, each in two-group strength in three days as rapidly hand-running as possible in order to prevent the enemy from devising any protection for the plants. These conditions, however, were incompatible, especially the requirement for visual bombing.

During the summer monsoon in Korea Bomber Command was seldom able to obtain a weather forecast which would hold good three days in advance. if the targets were to be attacked in a short period of time, Bomber Command would have to target them for either radar or visual attack.

Moreover, as Bomber Command operations officers examined the FEAF target dossiers for the Hungnam targets they soon deter-mined that the lithographed target illustration sheets included in the dossiers "had almost no value to FEAF Bomber Command crews."

Operations officers were supposed to plot aiming points on these target illustration sheets and aircrews were expected to use them for familiarization, but the original photography was lacking in uniformity, the reproduction was poor, and the lithographs displayed little appreciation for the problems of target identification from the higher altitudes at which medium bombers would attack.

Fortunately, the Bomber Command intelligence officer had picked up a set of superseded target-illustration folders from storage on Guam, and these old folders contained annotated photographs of North Korean targets. Bomber Command used these photographs and other similar ones obtained by the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron for planning and briefing its strategic missions.

Arrangements were also made whereby the 31st Squadron would perform radar-scope photography and the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron would screen and catalogue the radar target materials.#18

#18 Hist. FEAF BomCom, July-Oct. 1950, I, 142-43; Barcus Bd. Rpt. bk. 2, vol. 4, pp. 14-15.

As a first step in planning the Hungnam missions, FEAF Bomber Command operations officers determined that all three of the plants were so situated that land and water contrasts on the radar scopes would make them good radar targets. In this respect the Chosen Nitrogen Explosives Factory was the best radar target of the three plants.

If at all possible the operations planners wanted the bomber crews to employ the more accurate visual bombing, but the planners knew that they had to count on the eventuality of radar attacks, for heavy cloud cover was usual along Korea's eastern coasts.

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The 19th Group had no AN/ APQ-13 bombing radar; therefore, the missions would have to be flown by the 22nd and 92nd Groups.

The operations planners finally specified three methods of attack for as many different sets of target conditions: squadrons in trail, bombing visually on squadron leaders; squadrons in trail, bombing by radar on squadron leaders; or a bomber stream of individual aircraft, bombing individually by radar. An airborne commander, who would reconnoiter the target area prior to the arrival of the bomber formations, would make the final decision as to the method of attack to be employed.#19

#19 FEAF BomCom Msn. Rpt. No. 19, 30 July 1950.

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All FEAF reconnaissance photography eventually arrives here at the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron for storage in the Photo Intelligence Section.

[note]

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The second airfield in Korea selected for development was the ROKAF facility at Taegu (K-2). FEAF decided to move the 822nd Engineer Aviation Battalion from Okinawa and concentrate it at Taegu.

Korean_War

With the 822nd, although not attached to it, would travel the contact platoon of the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company.

On 5 July the battalion commander and his operations officer flew to Tokyo, where they were oriented as to the prospective duty in Korea. These officers explained that half of their personnel were scheduled to return to the United States immediately, either because of the completion of their overseas tours or for discharge from the Army. Acquainted with the emergency, the Department of Army issued orders to prevent such an exodus, but these orders left the 822nd with a serious morale problem.

By noon on 13 July the 822nd loaded the majority of its personnel aboard a Baltic Coastal steamship, and the last of three smaller vessels which carried equipment sailed from Okinawa on 22 July.

On 16 July the first company of the 822nd unloaded at Pusan, and on 30 July the last of the battalion moved northward by train from the South Korean port.

At Taegu the 822nd commander had received instructions to repair the existing sod-and-gravel runway so that it could handle "moderate traffic for a minimum time," this without halting air operations. After these repairs were made the battalion was to construct a 5,000-foot pierced steel plank (PSP) runway alongside the existing strip.#143 [note]

Korean_War

By noon on 13 July the 822nd loaded the majority of its personnel aboard a Baltic Coastal steamship, and the last of three smaller vessels which carried equipment sailed from Okinawa on 22 July. On 16 July the first company of the 822nd unloaded at Pusan, and on 30 July the last of the battalion moved northward by train from the South Korean port.

At Taegu the 822nd commander had received instructions to repair the existing sod-and-gravel runway so that it could handle "moderate traffic for a minimum time," this without halting air operations. After these repairs were made the battalion was to construct a 5,000-foot pierced steel plank (PSP) runway alongside the existing strip.#143 [note]

USMC

Korean_War


General Craig and his ground officers remained at Taegu 4 days. Attending daily briefings of the Eighth Army staff, they acquired a sound knowledge of the tactical situation. At a conference with Major General Earle E. Partridge and his Fifth Air Force staff,[31] the Marines were brought up to date on the disposition of aviation and its policy for supporting UN ground forces.[32]

In the fight for time, ground force units in line were frequently withdrawn and shuttled to plug gaps in the sagging front. Reports from the battlefield more often were food for the imagination rather than fact for the planning room. All of this created confusion among Eighth Army staff officers.[33]

In the Taejŏn area the 24th Infantry Division had lost 770 officers and men during the single week of 15–22 July. Of these casualties, 61 were known dead, 203 wounded, and 506 missing in action.[34]

Among the missing was General Dean, and the wounded included a regimental commanding officer, a regimental executive officer, and a battalion commander.[35]

Following this ordeal, the 24th had been relieved by the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which went into line alongside the 25th Division in the Kŭmch'ŏn area. ROK divisions held to the north and east, where NKPA forces were driving toward P'ohang-dong.

The shape of strategic things to come was indicated late in July when two NKPA divisions completed a much publicized “end run” past the open UN left flank to the southwest tip of the peninsula, then wheeled eastward for a drive on Pusan.

General Walker reacted promptly to the danger by recalling the 24th Division from Eighth Army reserve and moving it southward from Kŭmch'ŏn to block the enemy near Yŏngdong. With the recently landed 29th Infantry attached, the division totaled only 13,351 officers and men.[36] Its front extended from the southern coast near Yŏngdong to the town of Kŏch'ang, 40 miles north.[37]

In addition to manning this mountainous line, the 24th had troops in action at P'ohang-dong, more than 100 miles away on the east coast. There some of its units fought as Task Force Perry, under direct control of Eighth Army headquarters.[38]

The 24th Division and 29th Infantry had no more than deployed when they found themselves plunged into a confused 5-day fight. Although they sold ground as dearly as possible, the Army units were compelled to give up Yŏngdong and fall back toward Chinju.[39]

As the threat to Pusan grew more serious, the Eighth Army commander shifted units. In order to protect the approaches from Chinju to Pusan, he pulled the 25th Infantry Division back across the river Naktong near Waegwan and moved it from the northern to the southern front in 48 hours. The next day saw the 1st Cavalry withdrawing across the Naktong in the Waegwan area and blowing the bridges.

After being relieved in the south by the 25th Division, the 24th joined the 1st Cavalry withdrawal to hastily organized defensive positions east of the Naktong. ROK divisions continued to defend the northeast approaches, while the 25th Division stood guard to block any enemy move toward Chinju.[40]

At this juncture General Craig became increasingly concerned about prospects of maintaining the Brigade’s integrity as a Marine air-ground team. He and his staff were aware that elements of the 29th Infantry had been rushed from their ships directly into combat in the Chinju area, and some units were badly mauled. Craig took occasion, therefore, to remind Army leaders once more of the Marine tactical concept of the indivisible air-ground team.[41]

Korean_War


MAG–33, said Craig, would have to unload its planes and prepare them for action; and the control squadron would need an interval to set up co-ordinated tactical air support.[42]

As July drew to an end, the situation both on the northern and southwestern fronts was developing into a crisis. Hourly it grew apparent that the Eighth Army’s perimeter would have to shrink even more, so that defenses could assume some depth in sensitive areas. Landrum indicated for the first time that the Brigade was being considered primarily for a mission on the left flank.[43]

Guided by this possibility, Craig and his staff officers devoted a day to drawing up a flexible operation plan. The purpose of this directive was to advise the Brigade’s subordinate commanders of possible commitment in the Chinju, Kŏch'ang, or Kŭmch'ŏn areas, in that order of probability. Also included were detailed instructions for movement to forward assembly areas, broad missions for supporting units, security measures to be taken, and a general outline of the situation ashore.[44]

Korean_War xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Wŏnsan
P'yŏngyang
Sŏul
Osan
Ch'ungju
Hamch'ang
Andong
Yŏngdök
Taejŏn
Kumch'ŏn
Yŏngch'ŏn
Waegwan
P'ohang
Kŏch'ang
Taegu
Chinju
Masan
Haddong
Sunch'ŏn
Sach'ŏn
Kosŏng
Chinhae
Pusan
Mokp'o


The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning order suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to Eighth Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to the Brigade at sea.[45]

Korean_War Korean_War

Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray would have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.[46] [note]

On 30 July, General Craig had a final conference with Generals Walker and Partridge. This time, Walker himself told the Marine leader that the Brigade would be sent to the southwest; and that the unit, once committed, would be free to push forward without interference from Eighth Army.[49] Partridge interjected that his planes would be available to support Craig’s ground troops if Marine air did not arrive in time.[50]

Immediately after the conference, the Marine officers set out for Pusan by jeep. While their vehicles bounced southward on the ancient road, army headquarters in Taegu was sinking to new depths of dejection. Chinju had just fallen, and the Red column was pounding on toward Masan.[51] [note]

Korean_War

Up to that time the division’s total casualties had been remarkably few. Only 400 killed and wounded were reported from 25 June until after the capture of Kunsan, and the 6th had met scarcely any opposition since that action. It was just prior to the assault on Chinju, moreover, that the 83rd Motorcycle Regiment was attached to reinforce the drive toward Pusan.

This unit had been part of the 105th Armored Division until June 1950, when it was given a separate existence. Equipment consisted of motorcycles with sidecars and jeeps of Soviet manufacture. Fixed machineguns on both types of vehicles were operated by the crews in addition to submachineguns. Not much is known about the numbers of the 83rd at this time, but it had experienced little combat since the beginning of the invasion.[32]

During the advance on Chinju the NKPA column ran into elements of the United States 24th Infantry Division and was stopped by machinegun fire at Yŏngdong. All three regiments of the 6th Division had to be committed before this halfway point could be secured, and the 83rd Motorcycle Regiment was blooded in the attack. More hard fighting awaited on the road to Chinju, but the two NKPA outfits battled their way into the town on or about 30 July 1950.
These North Korean units were destined to become the opponents of the Brigade a few days later. Before the Marine ground forces could get into action, however, the air components struck the first blow. [note]

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23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30

The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at the objective.[29] [note]

The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at the objective.[29]

Viewed superficially, the uncontested P'ohang landing may have seemed a tame affair to stateside newspaper readers. Nevertheless, it was a timely demonstration of Navy and Marine Corps amphibious knowhow and Army energy, and it came at a critical moment. The important communications center of Taejŏn had to be abandoned by 24th Infantry Division units on 20 July, and it was growing apparent that the Eighth Army would be hard-pressed to retain a foothold in Korea until reinforcements from the States could give the United Nations a material equality. It was a time when every platoon counted, and the fresh regiments of General Gay’s division were rushed to the Yŏngdong area two days after their landing [7/18] to relieve weary and battered elements of the 24th Infantry Division. [note]

USN

30 July
CTF 90 completed P'ohang landing. [note]



En-route, the task force refueled from the USS NAVASOTA AO-106 on the 30th


Korean_War

USS Navasota (AO-106) refueling USS Valley Forge (CVA-45) off the coast of Korea during the Korean War in 1950.


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[note]

Toledo and DD's, 1st CAV Land
19500731 0000 Toledo and DD's
19500801 0000 Belfast and Bataan, Toledo and DD's
---
19500724 0000 FIS by DD's
19500725 0000 TF77, FIS by DD's
19500726 0000 TF77, FIS by DD's
19500727 0000 ROKN, TF77 refueling, Toledo and DD's
19500728 0000 TF77, Toledo and DD's
19500729 0000 TF77, Toledo and DD's [note]

Korean_War

On 30 July his command was further enlarged by the arrival of the three Canadian tribal class destroyers,
HMCS Cayuga (218), HMCS Athabaskan (219), and HMCS Sioux (225), and [note]

Korean_War

A week later it was all over, and CTF 90 was able to report the completion of operations at P'ohang and the withdrawal of all shipping from Yŏngil-man. But this report was by way of formality, for the strategic rewards of the operation had long since been apparent. On 22 July, four days after the initial landing, the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the battered 24th Division southeast of Taejŏn.

[note]

Korean_War

From the 27th to the 30th, in rainy, windy weather, USS Toledo (CA-133), USS Mansfield (DD-728), and USS Collett (DD-730) operated off the battle line. troops and other targets made for good shooting, and both shore and air spot were available; starshell illumination by the ships aided the artillery ashore; the destroyers continued to alternate days’ duty in running north along the shoreline to bombard targets between Yŏngdök and the parallel. By month’s end the pressure was diminishing.

Korean_War

The arrival of reinforcements and the reorganization of Task Group 96.5 greatly increased the strength available for operations in the Yellow Sea, where in the early days HMS Alacrity (U-60) had patrolled alone.

Although Admiral Andrewes had assumed command of the West Coast Support Group in early July, the greater needs and opportunities of the east coast situation had made heavy demands upon his ships. Now, however, he had under his control the

light cruisers

HMS Jamaica (44)

HMS Kenya, and

HMS Belfast (C-35)

the British destroyers

HMS Cossack (D-57),

HMS Cockade (D-34), and

HMS Charity (R-29),

the Australian

Korean_War

HMAS Bataan (D-191), and

the Netherlands

Korean_War

Hr.Ms. Evertsen (D-802)

On 30 July his command was further enlarged by the arrival of the three Canadian tribal class destroyers,

Korean_War

HMCS Cayuga (218),

HMCS Athabaskan (219), and

HMCS Sioux (225), and

[note]

Korean_War

Admiral Hartman’s Helena group had meanwhile been cruising Formosa Strait, where it was joined by Juneau on 30 July. Two cruisers and a destroyer division are a small force with which to prevent a large-scale invasion, especially one embarked in a fleet of almost unsinkable junks. But the issue did not arise, and in any case the Seventh Fleet Striking Force remained on call. [note]

Korean_War

27,28,29,30,31,01,02,03,04,05,06 July-August

01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11 days

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as Toledo fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell.

By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable.

Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins’ element found their days full. [note]

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

 

 

27,28,29,30,31,01,02 July-August

Korean_War
The preparatory barrages began at 0830. Then came the air strikes. The battle that then opened lasted until 2 August without letup.

[It has already been going on for a week, 7/17. Should go on until the 9th]

[note]


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The ROK 17th Regiment, 2,000 strong, arrived at the 34th Infantry position in the dead of night at 0200 30 July. It went at once into positions on the high ground on either flank. [13-52] [note]

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0533 Sunrise

[note]

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Three officers and forty-one enlisted men, abandoning their vehicles and heavier equipment, gained the nearest hill. They walked all night-an estimated thirty-five miles-and reached 1st Cavalry Division lines the next morning. The 16th Reconnaissance Company in this incident lost 2 killed, 3 wounded, and 11 missing. [note]

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Korean_War

Early the next morning an enemy unit moved around the right flank (north) of the 2nd Battalion and cut the road running northwest out of Chinju to the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. 1st Battalion, 29th [now 3rd Battalion, 27 Infantry],
Captain Barszcz, from G Company's position across the Nam River west of Chinju, saw and reported at least 800 enemy troops moving across his front Small arms fire did not disperse them. He called for an aerial observer, but the observer overhead reported he saw no enemy.

The reason was clear: the North Koreans were all wearing foliage camouflage and they squatted quietly on the ground while the plane was overhead. Captain Barszcz directed artillery fire on the column, but after about twenty rounds the artillery stopped firing because of ammunition shortage.

Rain and low overcasts during the day hampered efforts of aerial reconnaissance to report on enemy movements. [13-57] [note]

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0950 Korean Time

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Two SB-17s on search for F-80 crashed on Tsushima (09:50) negative results, A/C located by crash boat at Tsushima body removed and aircraft destroyed. Returned body to Fukuoka. [note]

0954 Korean Time

Korean_War

As a result of the careful planning and the superior skills of the Bomber Command crews, mission "Nannie Able" against the Chosen Nitrogen Explosives Factory went off smoothly on the morning of 30 July. Within four minutes, beginning at 0954 hours, 47 B-29's were over the Hungnam factory in squadron "vic" or "V" formations. Cloud cover underneath the bombers forced the lead squadrons to bomb by APQ-13 radar, but the large fires set in the center of the factory burned some of the clouds away and the trailing squadrons got some visual assistance for their radar bombing. All bombs fell into the target area, completely destroying 30 percent of the factory and heavily damaging 40 percent of it. The radar bombing was "superior" and attested the value of intensive radar- training programs of the Strategic Air Command .#20

#20 Ibid., Hist. 22nd Bomb. Gp., July 1950. [note]

1000 Korean Time

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A message from S-2, 35th RCT to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 301100 July 1950
- "Soldiers from 1/35 which has just returned from 27 RCT mentioned that two women had been caught in their area -- one woman carrying a bag of hand grenades, the other carrying a radio of the SCR 300 type." 61

61 Message from S-2, 35 Regimental Combat Team to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 301100 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-2 Journals, Box 634, RG 338, NARA. [note]

1200 Korean Time

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Korean_War


By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3rd Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19] [note]

Korean_War

That afternoon, 30 July, E and F Companies of the 19th Infantry fell back across the Nam River to the hills two miles west of Chinju.

Just before evening, G Company crossed the river from its isolated position. Once on the east side it took up a defensive position in the flat ground near the river bank, with the mission of preventing enemy infiltration into Chinju between the road and the river. The hill positions of the rest of the battalion were beyond the road to its right (north). There was no physical contact between G Company and these troops. [13-58]

The 19th Infantry faced the critical test of the defense of Chinju pitifully understrength. Its unit report for 30 July gives the regiment a strength of 1,895, with 300 men in the 1st Battalion and 290 men in the 2nd Battalion Colonel Moore, however, states that the strength of the 19th Infantry on 30 July, including the replacements that arrived that afternoon, was 1,544 The 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, still disorganized as a result of the Yŏngdong battle, had a reported strength that day of 396 men.

Korean_War

On 30 July, all ROK forces in the Chinju area came under Colonel Moore's command, including the remnants of the 7th Division, now known as Task Force Min, which during the day arrived at Chinju from the Hamyang area with 1,249 men. [13-59] [note]

1400 Korean Time

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At 1415 ADCC notified the Flight that a B-26 over Tsushima had one engine feathered, proceeding to Iwakuni, landed safely. One false alert this date. [note]

1500 Korean Time

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Korean_War

About 1600 these replacements started forward from the regimental command post in Chinju for distribution by the battalions to the rifle companies that evening. Although the rifle companies were then engaged with the enemy, Colonel Moore decided that they needed replacements at the front to help in the fighting, and that it would be best to send them forward at once rather than to wait for an opportunity to integrate them into the units during a lull in the battle. [13-60]

[note]

1700 Korean Time

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Korean_War

The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, also had come under attack during the night. It held a strong defensive position below the Nam River on high ground four miles south of Chinju, overlooking the Sach'ŏn-Chinju road near its juncture with the road east to Masan.

Colonel Rhea and his men at dusk on 30 July could clearly see North Koreans out in the open going into position, but they were forbidden to fire because a ROK Marine battalion attack was scheduled to sweep across in front of them. But the ROK's never entered the fight there, and the enemy used this three-to-four-hour period unmolested for maneuvering against the 1st Battalion. [13-66]

Korean_War

That night, enemy mortars and self-propelled weapons supported efforts of the N.K. 15th Regiment to infiltrate the 1st Battalion's position. But it was on terrain hard to attack, and the enemy effort failed. The North Koreans in front of the 1st Battalion withdrew before dawn, apparently veering off to the northwest. [note]

1800 Korean Time

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1930 Korean Time

Korean_War


The 1st Battalion received about 150 of the replacements just before dark and Colonel Rhea immediately assigned them to companies. Some died without ever appearing on the company rosters.

The 2nd Battalion received an approximately equal number of replacements, and they, too, reached the rifle companies about dusk.

Of the sixty replacements assigned to G Company, four or five became casualties before they reached the company position.

Captain Barszcz had pleaded in vain with the battalion executive against sending replacements to him in the midst of action. He believed that they not only would be a burden to him but that many of them would be casualties. In the battle that night both fears became reality. [13-61] [note]

1935 Korean Time


That afternoon, 30 July, E and F Companies of the 19th Infantry fell back across the Nam River to the hills two miles west of Chinju.

Just before evening, G Company crossed the river from its isolated position. Once on the east side it took up a defensive position in the flat ground near the river bank, with the mission of preventing enemy infiltration into Chinju between the road and the river. The hill positions of the rest of the battalion were beyond the road to its right (north). There was no physical contact between G Company and these troops. [13-58]


The 19th Infantry faced the critical test of the defense of Chinju pitifully understrength. Its unit report for 30 July gives the regiment a strength of 1,895, with 300 men in the 1st Battalion and 290 men in the 2nd Battalion Colonel Moore, however, states that the strength of the 19th Infantry on 30 July, including the replacements that arrived that afternoon, was 1,544 The 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, still disorganized as a result of the Yŏngdong battle, had a reported strength that day of 396 men.

On 30 July, all ROK forces in the Chinju area came under Colonel Moore's command, including the remnants of the 7th Division, now known as Task Force Min, which during the day arrived at Chinju from the Hamyang area with 1,249 men. [13-59] [note]

1940 Sunset

[note]

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After dark [1940] the enemy moved in for close-quarter attack. [note]

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AFTER THE ADVANCE party reached Pusan, General Craig established a temporary command post in the headquarters building of General Garvin’s Base Command. Then the Marine officers plunged into the final phase of planning and preparation for the Brigade, although they were still handicapped by the undisclosed secret of the convoy’s arrival date. Staff gears were meshing smoothly by this time, with solutions being ground out for one problem after another.

Korean_War


On the night of 30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart and other staff officers were discussing whether MAG-33 would be able to get its planes airborne in time to support the Brigade in its initial combat. Acting on a hunch, Stewart picked up a telephone in the slim hope of placing a call through to Japan. The long shot paid off.

Korean_War


After some wrangling by startled operators, he managed to contact Itami Air Force Base and talk to Colonel Kenneth H. Weir, Cushman’s chief of staff.
Stewart briefed the Marine aviator on the latest developments, emphasizing that the Brigade would undoubtedly get into the fight soon after arrival. He asked Weir to send the Air Support Section and helicopters to Korea by LST as quickly as possible after unloading in Japan.[1]


Craig received a radio message that same night from FMFPac, informing him that the replacements for the Brigade would not be sent directly to Pusan, as requested. They were to be assembled at Camp Pendleton for travel with the 1st Marine Division, and this meant a delay which could be critical. Craig immediately insisted that the reinforcements be sent to Pusan to replace Brigade battle losses and form the third rifle companies.[2] The Marine leader’s determination in this instance proved to be a blessing a few weeks later. [note]

2200 Korean Time

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07/30/50
7:00 AM
07/30/50
8:00 AM
07/30/50
1:00 PM
07/30/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
8:00 AM
07/30/50
9:00 AM
07/30/50
2:00 PM
07/30/50
11:00 PM

Korean_War


Before midnight, G Company killed several North Korean soldiers inside its perimeter. Out of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery fire falling near, Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his right, but he found North Koreans on the road in strength and had to move around them. [note]

Korean_War

Eighth Army's PIR for midnight on July 30 noted that no "significant attacks" occurred in the Kŭmch'ŏn area in the previous 24 hours. While many believed that a regiment in the vicinity of Chirye was attempting to outflank the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army's intelligence staff felt that the NKPA had reduced its forces facing American and South Korean units in the Kŭmsŏng - Hamch'ang area and only intended to fix these units and not break through them.

Instead, the NKPA used the forces redeployed from the Kŭmsŏng -Hamch'ang area to reinforce units conducting the deep envelopment of Eighth Army south of Taejŏn along the Chinju-Masan axis and in the vicinity of Kŏch'ang.

The PIR warned that this effort to outflank Eighth Army, combined with continued pressure against South Korean units along the Yŏngju - Andong axis, "could provide the means for double envelopment of U.S. and ROK forces in the Yŏngdong-Hamch'ang area." 76

76 Headquarters EUSAK, Periodic Intelligence Report #18, 2400 30 July 1950 , File 319.1 (PIR July), Security Classified General Correspondence 1950 , Adjutant General Section, Eighth U.S. Army, Box 714, RG 338, NARA. [note]

Korean_War

After dark the enemy moved in for close-quarter attack. Before midnight, G Company killed several North Korean soldiers inside its perimeter. Out of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery fire falling near, Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his right, but he found North Koreans on the road in strength and had to move around them.

About midnight he crossed the road to the north side. There he and his men lay hidden in bushes for two or three hours. During this time several enemy tanks loaded with infantry passed along the road headed in the direction of Chinju. [13-62] [note]


Casualties

Sunday July 30, 1950 (Day 036)

Korean_War 080 Casualties

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 20 2,620 1 2 0 2,643
Losses 0 80 0 0 0 80
To Date 20 2,700 1 2 0 2,723

Aircraft Losses Today 002

Notes for Sunday July 30, 1950 - Day 036