Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.9°C 76.82°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

July 31 9th Infantry Regiment 2nd Infantry Division, lands at Pusan
31 July
5th Regimental Combat Team arrives in Korea from Hawaii. [note]

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[note]

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July 31 - Arrival of 5th RCT in Korea from Hawaii.

[note]


July 31- Aug. 2
On the northern front, six divisions of North Koreans drive American and South Korean soldiers out of Yech'ŏn and Andong in fighting July 31 and August 1.

On the east coast, South Korean units recapture Yŏngdök. [note]

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July 31-Aug. 1
MacArthur meets with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan to coordinate defense of the island against a communist China invasion. He told Chiang when he left for Tokyo, "Keep your chin up. We're going to win." [note]

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July 31


N.Y. Herald Tribune
reporter Homer Bigart interprets Gen. Walker's "stand and fight" order to mean that American units must make fighting withdrawals rather than running "like scared rabbits," which some green, untested troops have done. There are more retreats after that but American and South Korean forces say that in the process they are inflicting heavy casualties on the North Koreans.

-- Truman orders four more National Guard divisions and two Guard regimental combat teams to activate within 30 days. That means 14 of the Guard's 27 divisions have received activation orders.

-- North Korean troops capture Chinju, 30 miles west of the port of Pusan. Pusan is the only major seaport through which UN forces and supplies are brought into the country.

-- A report from MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters estimates that 37,500 North Koreans have been killed and wounded, and 204 of their tanks destroyed. The report does not say how many enemy soldiers have been captured, but say most of them are privates averaging 21 years old. Among the captured reds are 10 NCOs and four second lieutenants. Red officers above that rank "invariably kill themselves before we can grab them," the report says.

-- South Korea begins forming a 10,000-man anti-guerrilla force with civilian males as young as 14. The UN Command is to furnish arms.

-- The UN Security Council passes a resolution for UN agencies to provide relief to the one million refugees created by the fighting in South Korea. [note]




Within that [145 mile] arc, which was small enough to be quickly crossed by jeep, the stockpiles of UN men and steel around Pusan grew larger every week.

The 1st Cavalry Division arrived from Japan and the 2nd Infantry from home; then came two thousand Tommies from Hong Kong, the first of forty thousand Commonwealth soldiers,

followed by Frenchmen, Turks, Dutchmen, and Filipinos

-the van of supporting units from thirteen other UN members. A Times correspondent cabled home:

"The outskirts of Pusan to a depth of fifteen miles have become a vast arsenal and supply depot. Forty-five ton Pershing tanks with their 90-mm guns are arriving in quantity. So are the big 155-mm howitzers. There is plenty of oil, fuel, and motor transport. There are supplies for a winter campaign-tents, heaters, sleeping bags, and cold weather clothing."[35]


It was a draw, and newspapermen wondered how it could become anything else. The mood of the GIs was fatalistic. They sang: "The Dhow, the Gizee, and Rhee/ What do they want from me?"


Douglas MacArthur was too gifted a strategist to be bottled up indefinitely in a narrow enclave, however. Operation Bluehearts, originally scheduled for July 22, had been canceled because every available soldier had been needed in the southeastern tip of Korea that month, but soon he would have plenty of men.

The United States, led by its President, was thoroughly aroused. Selected National Guard units were being called up. Recruiting drives had been intensified and draft quotas increased, to put 600,000 men in uniform as quickly as possible. To be sure, many of the replacements were neither enthusiastic nor cheerful. No one called them gung ho; a a, ''

Stephen Zeg of Chicago doubtless spoke for thousands of others in the perimeter when he told a reporter:

"I'll fight for my country, but I'll be damned if I can see why shot fighting to save this hellhole."

Yet there were few organized protests against the war at home and fewer demonstrations. The new infantrymen were the younger brothers of the men who had fought in World War II. Patriotism was still strong, and the early rout of GIs by the In Min Gun had stung the country's pride [36] [note]

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The date for his journey was fixed: July 31. Then the picture blurs. The Pentagon advised the Dai Ichi that "certain policy matters" relevant to Formosa were being discussed with the State Department; pending their outcome, the Chiefs intimated, MacArthur might "desire to send a senior officer to Formosa with the group on July 31 and go yourself later." However, the message concluded: "Please feel free to go, since the responsibility is yours." Evidently no copy of this telecon reached the State Department. [note]

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3rd Rescue Squadron

Four SA-16s arrived at this station this date from Johnson Air Base. Twelve (12) officers and twenty-two (22) airmen accompanied the aircraft to form SA-16 detachment at Flight "D".


At month's end there were no casualties suffered by personnel of the 3rd Rescue Squadron. [note]


July 31: As North Korean troops continued to advance, Walker ordered UN forces to withdraw to a new defensive line along the Naktong River. [note]

DSC

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Citation:


The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to William R. Williams, Captain (Infantry), U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving with the United States Military Advisory Group, Korea, deployed as Advisor to the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Regiment, Republic of Korea Army. Captain Williams distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces near Yŏngdök, Korea, on 31 July 1950.


On that date, the attack of the 3rd Battalion had been stopped by a numerically superior enemy force and the battalion was disorganized and started falling back. At this critical time, Captain Williams, acting promptly and decisively, moved forward under heavy enemy fire, effected the rapid reorganization of the unit, and reestablished the lines. Calling for artillery fire, Captain Williams found that no observer was available. He then took a radio to the exposed crest of Hill 151, where he directed artillery fire on the enemy positions. Soon after establishing his observation post, Captain Williams was discovered by the enemy, who placed incessant artillery fire on his position. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Captain Williams remained at his position and continued to adjust fire in an artillery duel lasting for a period of one hour and fifteen minutes. During this time, he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy sniper and artillery fire while moving about for better observation. Through his efforts, he succeeded in eliminating the enemy forward observation post and in silencing the enemy artillery fire. As the attack resumed, Captain Williams then discovered an enemy group holding up the advance of a forward company of the Battalion. Because of the mountainous terrain, artillery fire could be placed on this strongpoint only by shifting battery positions. Realizing that immediate action was necessary, Captain Williams secured a .50 caliber machine-gun, and with two ammunition bearers, returned to Hill 151. Although observed and under intense small-arms and mortar fire, Captain Williams continued for forty-five minutes to attack the enemy group by machine-gun fire until it was dispersed and the Republic of Korea company was able to secure its objective. [note]

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[note]

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The 5th Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii arrived in Korea. [note]

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The 25th Infantry Division Historical Report for July 8-31, 1950 states that: "'People in white' -- or 'PIW's' as they were called [ -- ] were constantly infiltrating into and through our lines. To counter this threat, the Division commander was forced early in the engagement, to order that strong measures be taken by all commanders to stop this infiltration, since in many instances, the PIW's changed clothes, or still in white, turned on our forces, and attacked them in the rear and flanks. Such was the peculiar nature of the Korean war." [63] [note]

MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral Struble, flew to Taipei on 31 July where for two days he conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and his generals. But not until five days after his return (7 Aug 50) to Tokyo did MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [20-13]

[note]

South then North

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On the last day of July the 35th Infantry was ordered to a blocking position on a line of hills 8 miles south of front. In these movements it did little fighting, but executed a series of withdrawals on division orders as the front around it collapsed. [12-21] [note]

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The Chirye action made clear that a strong enemy force was approaching the rear of, or passing behind, the 1st Cavalry Division positions at Kumch'ŏn.

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The next day, 30 July, General Gay ordered the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry; the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry; and the 99th Field Artillery Battalion to Chirye.

This strong force was able to enter the town, but the enemy held the hills around it.

July 31

The next day North Koreans shelled Chirye, forcing the Americans to withdraw to a position northeast of the town. [12-60]

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The enemy 8th Regiment together with its artillery now joined the other North Koreans already at Chirye. This meant that the bulk of the division was engaged in the enveloping move. [note]

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From 26 July on to the end of the month [7/31] the enemy had almost constant contact with the 24th Infantry, which was supported by the 159th and 64th Field Artillery Battalions and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion. [12-26]

[note]

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Finally, during the night of 31 July the 24th Infantry Regiment withdrew through Sangju. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, covered the withdrawal. In eleven days of action in the Sangju area the regiment had suffered 323 battle casualties-27 killed, 293 wounded, 3 missing. [12-29]

In reaching the upper Naktong valley at the end of July, the enemy divisions engaged in this part of the North Korean drive southward had not gone unharmed. The N.K. 1st Division in battling across the Mun'gyŏng plateau against the ROK 6th Division not only suffered great losses in the ground battle but also took serious losses from U.N. aerial attack. Prisoners reported that by the time it reached Hamch'ang at the end of July it was down to 3,000 men.

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The N.K. 15th Division, according to prisoners, also lost heavily to artillery and mortar fire in its drive on Sangju against ROK troops and the U.S. 24th Infantry Regiment, and was down to about half strength, or approximately 5,000 men, at the end of July. In contrast, the N.K. 13th Division had bypassed Hamch'ang on the west and, save for minor skirmishes with ROK troops and the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, it had not been engaged and consequently had suffered relatively few casualties. [12-30] [note]

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Two days after Walker had spoken at the 25th Division ordered its troops to withdraw to positions three miles east of the town-another withdrawal. On the Kumch'ŏn front an observer saw elements of the 1st Cavalry Division come off their positions-leaving behind heavy equipment-load into trucks, and once again move to the rear. [12-72]


A New York Times article on General Walker's talk to the 25th Division staff commented that it apparently ruled out the possibility of a strategic withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter.

William H. Lawrence of the New York Times asked General Walker if he thought the battle had reached a critical point. General Walker replied, "very certainly, very definitely."

The next day the Times ran an editorial headed,

"Crisis in Korea." It said the "critical point in the defense of Korea has already been reached or will shortly be upon us. For five weeks we have been trading space for time. The space is running out for us. The time is running out for our enemies." [12-73]

[note]

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Only after the Kŏch'ang action did Eighth Army finally, on 31 July, identify the enemy unit in this area as the 4th Division. This led it to conclude in turn that the enemy force in the Chinju area was the 6th Division. Eighth Army then decided that the enemy effort against the United Nations' left flank was in reality being carried out by two widely separated forces: the N.K. 4th Division from the Anui-Kŏch'ang area, to envelop the main battle positions on Eighth Army's left flank, and the N.K. 6th Division from the Chinju area, to cut lines of communication in the rear, drive through Masan, and capture the port of Pusan. [13-53] [note]

About mid-July, Eighth Army activated the 8072nd Medium Tank Battalion, which was to receive fifty-four old World War II medium tanks rebuilt in Japan.


Detachment A (A Company) of the tank battalion, under the command of Capt. James H. Harvey, arrived at Pusan on 31 July. [note]

Into Pusan harbor on the same day, 31 July, came the first ground troops from the United States, the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division. Known as the Manchu Regiment because of its part in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, the 9th Infantry was one of the oldest regiments in the United States Army.

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The 2nd Battalion [9th IR] of the regiment sailed from Tacoma, Washington, 17[Fort Lewis] July, the first Army infantry troops to depart continental United States for Korea.

[note]

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By the end of July, the Far East Air Forces had flown as many as 400 sorties in a day. Altogether, it had flown a total of 8,600 sorties-

4,300 in close support missions,

2,550 in close interdiction,

57 in two strategic bombing strikes, and

1,600 in reconnaissance and cargo sorties. [15-33]

8,507 - about 220 flights per day [note]

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The 5th Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii, commanded by Col. Godwin L. Ordway, arrived first, on 31 July, after nine days at sea, with all three battalions. With the regiment came fourteen M26 Pershing tanks and the 555th (triple Nickel) Field Artillery Battalion. Orders from Eighth Army awaited the regiment upon its arrival at Pusan to proceed at once to Masan where it was to be attached to the 24th Division. [note]

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July 31, 1950
[The 2nd Battalion of the regiment sailed from Tacoma, Washington, 17 July, the first Army infantry troops to depart continental United States for Korea.] The 9th Infantry, commanded by Col. John G. Hill, proceeded immediately to Kyŏngsan, ten miles southeast of Taegu, and was placed in army reserve. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion accompanied the regiment as its artillery support unit. [note]

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As the battle front moved swiftly southward, trains after the end of July did not run beyond Taegu and P'ohang-dong. After the enemy threat developed in the southwest, a supply train ran daily from Pusan to Masan.


On 1 July the U.N. Command controlled 1,404 miles of rail track in South Korea. By the end of the month this had shrunk to 431 miles of track, a loss of 973 miles, or more than two. thirds. [15-47]

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[15-Caption] 60-TON CRANE AT PUSAN

In July, 350 mixed trains moved from Pusan toward the front. These included 2,313 freight cars loaded with 69,390 short tons of supplies. Also leaving Pusan for the front were 71 personnel trains carrying military units and replacements. Among the trains returning to Pusan from the forward area were 38 hospital trains carrying 2,581 patients, and 158 freight cars loaded largely with personal belongings taken by unit commanders from their men in trying to strip them down to only combat needs. [15-48]


Since the Korean railroads had been built by Japan, repair and replacement items could be borrowed from the Japanese National Railways and airlifted to Korea within a very short time after the need for them became known. One of the largest and most important of rail purchases in Japan for use in Korea was twenty-five standard-gauge locomotives. [note]

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Strength of the Opposing Forces at the Pusan Perimeter


Although American losses were heavy in the first month of the war, the build-up of U.S. men and weapons in Korea had gone steadily forward. Initially, Americans lost as many men from heat exhaustion as from gunfire. The temperature reached 110 degrees, the Naktong hills had little vegetation, and good water was scarce. There was little shade in southern Korea. The blazing sun together with the exertion required to climb the steep slopes caused frequent throbbing headaches. The men's legs lacked the power to climb the steeply pitched mountains and buckled under the unaccustomed ordeal. [15-52]


The preponderance of American battle casualties was in the Army ground forces. The Navy and Air Force had few battle casualties at this time. [15-53]

American Army casualties in Korea through 31 July 1950 totaled 6,003 men: 1,884 killed, 2,695 wounded, 523 missing, and 901 reported captured. Almost 80 percent of these casualties occurred in the last half of the month. [15-54] [note]

On 30 July the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, driven from Kŏch'ang, was in a defensive position near Sanje-ri astride the road to Hyŏpch'ŏn and the Naktong River. That day, the 21st Infantry Regiment except for C Company and a section of 81-mm. mortars, still at Yŏngdök on the east coast, and the 3rd Battalion, just attached to the 1st Cavalry Division-crossed the Naktong and took a position behind the 34th Infantry. The ROK 17th Regiment also arrived and occupied the high ground on the right (north) of the 34th Infantry.

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The next morning [31st] the 34th Infantry withdrew behind the 21st Infantry. Colonel Stephens then assumed command of both the 21st and the 34th Regiments on oral orders from General Church. [15-8]

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After the 34th Infantry withdrew through the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, Colonel Stephens moved the ROK 17th Regiment back abreast of his troops, with one battalion on either flank and one in reserve. [note]

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The success of the Red Ball Express cut down the amount of airlift tonnage. This fell from 85 tons on 31 July to 49 tons on 6 August. The express eliminated the need for nearly all airlift of supplies to Korea from Japan. It delivered supplies to Korea in an average time of 60-70 hours, [3-days max] while the airlift delivery varied from 12 hours to 5 days. The Red Ball delivery was not only far cheaper, it was more consistent and reliable. [21-10] [note]

Citations

 

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross
19500731 0000 DSC WILLIAMS

 

Silver Star

Awtrey, Billy W. [PFC SS A3rdECB]

Burton, Carl E. [Sgt SS HqCo1stBn35thIR]

Cody, Raymond J. [2ndLt SS B13thFAB]

Estavillo, Peter A. [PFC SS A3rdECB]

Estes, Bennie H. [SFC SS A6thTB]

Risk, Edward [MSgt SS D5thCR]

Simpson, Ray A. [PFC SS D5thCR]

Sorick, John Oscar [SFC SS MedCo8thCR]

Tincher, Harry R. [2ndLt SS B11thFAB]

Toothill, William K. [1stLt SS D5thCR]

Vrbosky, Steve [SFC SS D5thCR]

Watson, James R. [Lt SS2 1stCD]

 

 

[note]

The Forgotten War

Walker issued orders for the 25th Division redeployment on July 31.

[note]

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The chiefs were not political babes in the woods. They recognized, as MacArthur surely did, that a personal visit by him to Formosa could be - or would be - construed as a drastic shift in policy. Perhaps believing that the repercussions of the visit would build support for its own recommendations, the JCS followed up this exchange of cables with an equivocal suggestion.

On the one hand, the JCS stated, inasmuch as its recommendations had not yet been approved, MacArthur might desire to send a "senior officer" to Formosa at this time, "proceeding later himself."

On the other hand, the JCS stated, since the responsibility was MacArthur's, "he should feel free to go" himself.[6-94]

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When Dean Acheson learned what the JCS had proposed and that Louis Johnson had approved, he raised "grave objections" to the main thrust: a preemptive Nationalist bombing attack on the Chinese mainland. That was simply "out of the question," Acheson declared.

Even though the proposed attack was to be carried out solely by the Nationalists, the "responsibility of the United States would be manifest," and the result would be "at best a danger of estrangement of friendly governments and at worst war with Communist China." He still believed that a conciliatory policy toward Peking might someday swing China back into the American orbit.[6-95]


Truman was in a tight spot. Although he agreed with Acheson that bombing the Chinese mainland was out of the question, he could not stand idly by in the face of a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa. He therefore authorized the military survey of the island, together with reconnaissance flights by Nationalist planes along the coast of China to find out the "imminence of any attack that might be launched against Formosa."[6-96]


MacArthur and the survey party enplaned at Tokyo on July 31.

It was a massive group, requiring two C-54 aircraft. It included, in addition to Ned Almond, MacArthur's air chief, Stratemeyer, and his Seventh Fleet commander, Arthur D. Struble.

En route to Formosa MacArthur, perhaps feeling the need for some dramatic military gesture, ill-advisedly and needlessly radioed the Pentagon that should the Communists launch an invasion of Formosa, he planned to send three FEAF F-80 squadrons to Formosa to destroy the invasion armada. Since this proposed action flagrantly exceeded MacArthur's existing authority, the JCS became alarmed. When another report asserting that the FEAF F-80s were already on Formosa and virtually in action arrived at the Pentagon, the chiefs were aghast. Although the latter report proved to be erroneous, the suspicion that MacArthur had made a "secret deal" with Chiang Kai-shek and could not be trusted persisted.[6-97]*


*In his memoirs, published in 1969, Acheson still insisted that MacArthur "had ordered three squadrons of jet fighters to Formosa without knowledge of the Pentagon."[6-98]


When the survey party landed in Formosa, MacArthur was greeted and treated like a visiting head of state. Chiang, his world-famous wife, and a phalanx of Nationalist brass met the planes with appropriate pomp. MacArthur figuratively embraced the Nationalist regime for the news cameras by gallantly kissing Madame Chiang's hand. For the next two days MacArthur studied the Communist threat and Nationalist capabilities to repel it.[6-99] [note]


Curiously, the immediate cause of the crisis and visit, the 4,000-vessel Communist armada, evaporated. MacArthur reported that the Pentagon-approved reconnaissance flights over the Chinese mainland showed no "undue concentration of forces," and on the basis of this intelligence MacArthur became satisfied

"that Chinese Communists will not attempt an invasion of Formosa at the present time."

The mystery was never solved. There are two likely possibilities: The Nationalists fabricated the crisis to encourage a change in American policy, or the Chinese Communists circulated disinformation in order to divert American attention from the NKPA at this critical time.[6-100]


The Nationalists reaped a rich propaganda harvest from MacArthur's visit. The net impression was that contrary to statements from Washington, the United States was, or was going to be, far more closely allied with the Nationalists militarily, in the struggle against communism in the Far East. Chiang himself publicly spoke of a "common cause" and of Taiwan and Washington's working "closely together," suggesting a significant change in policy. Wittingly or unwittingly MacArthur enhanced the Nationalist propaganda effort with a statement praising "my old comrade in arms" Chiang Kai-shek.[6-101]


The Pentagon, perhaps deliberately, did not inform Truman or Acheson that MacArthur had decided to go immediately to Formosa.

First learning of it from press reports, Truman and Acheson were livid. MacArthur, in turn, professed to be absolutely astonished by all the "furor." He issued a statement declaring disingenuously that "this visit has been maliciously misrepresented to the public by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific."

Truman was placed in the embarrassing position of having to say in response to questions at a press conference that "General MacArthur and I are in perfect agreement," as though MacArthur were an equal.[6-102] [note]

In preparation for this battle both Moore and Michaelis received significant reinforcements: a platoon each of six Sherman medium tanks, mounting 76mm guns. These tanks, salvaged from World War II battle fields during Operation Rollup and refurbished by the Japanese, comprised the advance elements of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, which Eighth Army had activated in mid-July and assigned initially to the 24th Division. '

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The [89th Tank] battalion commander, Welborn G. ("Tom") Dolvin (West Point, 1939; ), thirty-four, who had fought in Italy and the ETO, remembered how his outfit was thrown together:

"On July twelfth, while on the golf course, I. got verbal word that my orders had been changed to Korea. I met a cadre of a hundred fifty-five men from the Second Armored Division in California on July seventeenth. We flew to Tokyo, arriving on July nineteenth, where we picked up another cadre of seventy men. My A Company left Tokyo by ship on July twenty-fourth and arrived in Pusan on July thirty-first. I flew over and met them on the dock at Pusan that day a mere fifteen days after activation of the outfit . We left Pusan for Masan, joining the Nineteenth and Twenty-seventh regiments on the following day [August 1st]."[7-3]

[note]

U.S. Air Force

 

Took off at 0600 hours, aboard the Bataan with CINCFE for Formosa.[158-

MacArthur had already planned to visit Formosa, but the supposed seriousness of the situation on that island gave added impetus to the trip. Although the JCS did not tell MacArthur he could not go, the Joint Chiefs did suggest he send a senior officer in his place. Thus they were not too pleased when they learned that MacArthur intended to lead the survey party. Their concern about MacArthur seemed valid when word reached them that he planned to base 3 F-80 squadrons on Formosa, a decision he had no authority to make. Neither the JCS nor the State Department knew of such a plan. As it turned out, MacArthur did not intend to transfer the aircraft to Formosa. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. VI [Washington, 1976], pp 410-411, 412-413, 439.)

Nevertheless, public statements by MacArthur and Chiang Kai-shek after the trip seemed to indicate that a "deal" had been sealed between the U.S. and the Nationalists. President Truman and his advisors were furious over these statements and about the survey trip as a whole. The outcome was Truman's deepening dis- trust of MacArthur, a distrust that eventually led to MacArthur's removal from command.

And what of the invasion force that triggered the entire affair? It seemingly disappeared without a trace. (Blair, pp 173-176; Alexander, pp 164-165; Schnabel, pp 368-369.)] Those accompanying us: Joy, Struble, Ho, Almond, Whitney, Canada[159-Col Charles F. Canada had been MacArthur's physician since 1949.]


(CINCFE's physician) and an orderly. The others left in the
standby C-54 (FEAF flagship out of commission because of faulty engine): Marquat,[160-Maj Gen William F. Marquat, Chief, SCAP Economic and Scientific Section.] Willoughby, Wright, Eberle, Navy member, my Materiel (Alkire), 7th Fleet member, and an orderly left in GHQ C-54. Plan is to remain through Monday, returning Tuesday, 1 August.

 

Radio received from USAF stating that Brigadier General Spivey[161- Brig Gen Delmar T. Spivey had been chief of the Plans Division in the office of the DCS/Ops at USAF Headquarters since August 1949. In August 1950, he was assigned to 5AF and assumed command of 5AF
Rear. The following December, he became commanding general of the 314th Air Division.
] enroute 4 August from Fairfield-Suisun, via MATS. He will head up the Fifth Air Force Hq rear echelon.


F–51 crashed at Kŏch'ang, 30 July. No details.


Partridge reports first replacement Mustangs from States started to arrive at forward fields 30 July. Build up promises to be rapid. Weather caused the loss of a T-6; crew returned uninjured. He also reported strong need for Navy representative with Fifth AF. Only one Navy representative and he [is] assigned to Eighth Army.
5th Combat Team landed 1700 hours in Korea.[162-On July 13, the JCS authorized the Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, to send the the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), then based in Hawaii, to Korea. The RCT sailed for Korea on July 25, arrived at Pusan on the 31st, and was engaged in combat almost immediately afterwards. (Schnabel, pp 90-92.)]

 

[note]

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Air transport in Korea - Problems

While the Combat Cargo Command was an operational headquarters, problems of organizational manning and aircraft maintenance and supply inevitably affected its functions. Of all aircraft on hand, the new C-119 's of the 314th troop Carrier Group presented the greatest mechanical problems.

The group had been given these aircraft only 7 months prior to overseas movement, and during that time they had revealed an almost chronic propeller malfunction. A high supply priority had reduced the group AOCP rate from 12 percent in July to 4 percent at the end of August, and the intrinsic deficiencies of the propeller units were believed to have been corrected before the C-119's left Smyrna Air Force Base, Tennessee.

After much scrounging for supplies, the group had also been provided three flyaway kits, each containing a pre-packed 30-day supply level for 16 C-119's.

Originally intended to operate on a temporary and limited schedule primarily with airborne troops, the C-119's, once they reached Japan, were instead consigned to maximum cargo effort, with the result that requirements for spare parts far exceeded resupply phasing established by the Air Materiel Command. Chiefly because of control assembly and propeller shortages, the daily percentage of C-119 type aircraft in commission speedily declined from a high of 92 percent on 15 September to a low of 41 percent on 18 November.

In recognition of the supply problem, the use of C-119's was first limited to three hours daily and soon declined to two. Operating eight hours a day with adequate supply and the necessary aircrews, General Tunner figured that the great bulk of the work done with approximately 90 C-119's (with the exception of airborne operations) could have been done with about 30 C-119's. [note]

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23

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By 16 July columns were aiming a pincers movement against Taejŏn, and when EUSAK held there temporarily, the North Korean command initiated a wide left-flank movement down through west Korean coastal routes, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July, Kwangju on 23 July, and capturing the major southwest port city of Mokp'o on 24 July.

These movements, virtually unopposed except by a few ROK police, opened the way for a drive against the port cities of Masan and Pusan.

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Meanwhile, on the central front EUSAK was flanked out of Taejŏn, forced to withdraw to Yŏngdong on 25 July, and gradually pressed back to Kŭmch'ŏn, where defensive positions were established on 31 July.

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That same day, on the southwestern front, the 24th Division was forced out of Chinju. [note]

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19th BG(M)

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week

30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks

20 - the Navy sink the bridge [note]

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Strategic Air Operations - Targets
As it had promised, on 31 July the JCS specified strategic targets which, except for emergencies, were to be attacked by the 98th and 307th Groups. These were


(1) the two munitions plants and the railway shops and yards at P'yŏngyang;
(2) the three chemical plants at Hungnam;
(3) the oil refinery, railway shops, and railway yards at Wŏnsan; and
(4) the petroleum storage plant at Najin.


The JCS promised to name additional targets and suggested that MacArthur direct other similar targets to be hit if he believed they warranted bombing. For large-scale operations Bomber Command recognized that target priorities should be established strictly in accordance with the principles of target selection for strategic air war. Normally, assuming air superiority, direct war-supporting industries would be given first priority in the order of their importance, end products or general industries second priority, and basic processes industries third priority.

Because of the relative smallness of the five main industrial complexes in North Korea, however, General O'Donnell recommended attack by areas rather than target systems. Priority targets in these areas were so close together that a minimum number of area raids would eliminate all targets more quickly than more specialized and scattered attacks upon targets of industrial similarity.



The FEAF plan for medium bomber employment against industrial targets thus recommended five major urban areas for attack:


1. P'yŏngyang:
Army arsenals.*
Railway shops and yards.*
Railroad bridges.



2. Ch'ŏngjin:
Harbor and submarine base. **
West harbor.
Mitsubishi iron works.
Japan iron works.
RRailway yards. **



3. Wŏnsan:
Oil refinery.
Railway yards.*
PPort and naval base.



4. Hungnam:
Chosen nitrogen and explosives plant.*
Nitrogen and fertilizer plant.*
Chemical plant.*



5. Rashin:
Marshalling yards.
Port and naval base.
Oil storage areas.*



*Indicates JCS targets specified on 31 July 1950.

**Indicates JCS targets specified on 15 August 1950.

TThese were the important industrial areas of North Korea. P'yŏngyang, the capital of North Korea, was a key choke point on the main west coast railway, and its arsenals, well exploited by the Japanese, were now in Communist use.


Ch'ŏngjin, whose harbor had been leased to the USSR for 30 years, was the center of North Korean iron and steel production.


Wŏnsan was the center of petroleum refining as well as possessing one of the best harbors on the east coast, and Hungnam was a chemical center of large magnitude.


Rashin,, on the east coast near the Siberian border, was an important rail center and an oil, gasoline, and explosives area.


If weather permitted visual bombing, FEAF believed that two medium bombardment groups could destroy the five complexes in about 30 days, but additional groups would be required to do the job in a similar length of time with radar bombing. Other scattered objectives, not suited for incendiary attacks, included:

I'd like to know where these places are located????.


Petroleum facilities:
Yongan coal liquefaction plant.
Aoji-dong coal liquefaction plant.



transportation targets:
Chinnamp'o port and submarine base.
Chinnampo railway terminal. **



Electric power facilities:
Changjingang hydroelectric plant #1.
Changjingang hydroelectric plant #2.
Pujon (Fusen) hydroelectric plant.



FEAF estimated that these targets would require some 845 tons of high explosives. The destruction of these key industrial targets would undoubtedly strip North Korea of the domestic potential for supporting Communist armies in the field, but it was still recognized by FEAF intelligence that much of the Red Korean war materiel came from areas beyond the Yalu.


This well thought out and comprehensive plan for attacking North Korea's strategic industries met approval in all but one important aspect: Washington was very hesitant about any air action which might be used for Communist propaganda and desired no unnecessary civilian casualties which might come from fire attacks in North Korea. Indiscriminate use of incendiaries was therefore not sanctioned. High-explosive raids would take longer, but the SAC groups proved so adept with radar bombing techniques that weather was not as much of a deterrent as FEAF planners had expected.

BULL SHIT

[note]


By 16 July North Korean columns were aiming a pincers movement against Taejŏn, and when EUSAK held there temporarily, the North Korean command initiated a wide left-flank movement down through west Korean coastal routes, reaching Chŏnju and Iri on 20 July, Kwangju on 23 July, and capturing the major southwest port city of Mokp'o on 24 July. These movements, virtually unopposed except by a few ROK police, opened the way for a drive against the port cities of Masan and Pusan. Meanwhile, on the central front EUSAK was flanked out of Taejŏn, forced to withdraw to Yŏngdong on 25 July,

and gradually pressed back to Kŭmch'ŏn, where defensive positions were established on 31 July. That same day, on the southwestern front, the 24th Division was forced out of Chinju. [note]

Korean_War

Throughout the battle for South Korea, FEAF gave top priority to the close support of the out-numbered U. N. ground forces, and without this close support the Eighth Army would surely have been driven from the Korean peninsula. table 1 reveals the predominance of close support missions in FEAF's total air effort during the time of the defensive in South Korea:

table 1

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TYPES OF SORTIES FLOWN BY FEAF AIRCRAFT 25 JUNE-30 SEPTEMBER 1950

* This category covers all types of reconnaissance, transport, air rescue, and miscellaneous operational flying.


Most of the close support sorties were flown by Fifth Air Force fighters under the direction of a MOSQUITO controller or a TACP on the ground. These missions are most difficult to describe in any detail. Very often the fighter pilot was routed to a forward area by the control system and there directed to bomb and strafe a target which he frequently did not actually see because of covering vegetation; consequently, he knew little of his mission accomplishment. The form of intelligence report required for missions over Korea, moreover, was little more than a, statistical recapitulation of the mission. Such a report furnished little information from which higher headquarters could determine operational conditions, pilot problems, tactics and technique found profitable, and the many other valuable details incorporated in the narrative missions reports of World War II .

Yet in the final analysis, all interpretation of the effect of close support air action must be in terms of its relationship to the friendly ground campaign and to its destruction of the enemy. The South Korean campaign permits such an analysis.

Period Duration Close Support Sorties per Day Interdiction Sorties per Day Strategic Sorties per Day Other Sorties per Day Total Sorties per Day
25-30 June 6 408 68.00 59 9.83 0 0.00 100 16.67 94.50
1-31 July 31 4635 149.52 1023 33.00 56 1.81 1827 58.94 243.26
1-30 August 30 7397 246.57 2963 98.77 539 17.97 1582 52.73 416.03
1-30 September 30 5969 198.97 3818 127.27 158 5.27 5382 179.40 510.90

This is an excel spread sheet - 4,635 @ 149.52 really? [note]

In July 1950 only four Japanese airfields had the 7,000-foot runways which met the operational requirements of combat-loaded jet fighters.#74

See where the F-80's were based at

#74
Msg. AX-3553, CG FEAF to CofS USAF, 31 July 1950.

The Shooting Star fighters were new in the Far East, but they were the oldest of USAF operational jets. They had been designed as counter-air interceptors. As interceptors, their primary weapons were six .#50-caliber machine guns. FEAF's F-80's also had mid-wing rocket posts, which permitted them to carry up to 16 5-inch high velocity aircraft rockets (HVAR's), but none of them were equipped with pylon bomb racks. With its internal fuel, an F-80C had a radius of action of approximately 100 miles, but each plane was provided with two 165-gallon external fuel tanks which it carried on wing-tip shackles. Loaded with rockets and two 165-gallon tip tanks, an F-80C had an operational radius of approximately 225 miles.

Instead of fuel tanks, the plane could carry two 1,000-pound bombs on its shackles, but its operational radius in this configuration was the 100 miles possible with internal fuel. All of these ranges were not only quite short, but they also assumed that the F-80 jet would, for the most part, fly at the high altitudes (above 15,000 feet) where it attained its most favorable rate of fuel consumption. Any length of time spent at low altitudes, either en route to a target or seeking an objective for attack, rapidly exhausted an F-80's fuel and decreased its radius of flight.#75

#75
Msg. OPS-1878, CG FAF to CG FEAF, 16 July 1950; FEAF Rpt., I, 15.

USAF planners were completely aware of the operational limitations of the F-80 aircraft, but these planes were designed as short-range interceptors and were not meant to be used for ground attack. Specifically adapted for air-ground operations was the Republic F-84E "Thunderjet.# FEAF had been scheduled to get some of these more modern F-84's beginning in 1949, but because of the inadequate Japanese airfields General Stratemeyer had been compelled to ask, instead, for nothing "hotter" than F-80C's.#76

#76
Ltr., Stratemeyer to CINCFE, subj: Airfield Program for Japan, 17 June 1949.

But General Partridge had not been content to let the matter rest, for he maintained that he had to get the longest range aerodynamically possible from his F-80's. He had therefore assigned the problem to the 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing, and at Misawa Lieutenants Edward R. Johnston and Robert Eckman had devised an improvisation. Two center sections of a Fletcher tank could he inserted in the middle of the standard Lockheed tank, thus making a modified tank which could hold 265 gallons of fuel. These big "Misawa" tanks provided enough fuel for an extra hour of flight and increased the radius of action of an F-80C to approximately 350 miles, depending on the type of combat mission flown.#77

#77
Ltr., Partridge to Stratemeyer, 10 Apr. 1950;
memo. for Brig. Gen. J. H. Doyle, CG FEAMCom from Maj. H. H. Hower, 7 July 1950.

So how many were used???? [note]

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Next day Walker recommended that first priority for air strikes be given to the Kŏch'ang sector of the central front. #17

While the groundwork for air-ground cooperation against the common enemy was being laid at Taegu, General Timberlake could not help noticing that the Eighth Army staff "didn't exactly go along with the idea that we were on a parity with them and we were their opposite numbers." From the start of the Korean operations the Eighth Army had made plans without coordinating them with the Fifth Air Force, with the result that the Air Force had been caught off balance by unexpected ground actions. [note]

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Having completed its replenishment, Task Force 77 returned to the support of the Eighth Army early in August, but almost at once its pilots found fault with the tactical air-control system. Some part of this dissatisfaction was understandable.

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Another fast carrier-the USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)-had [will join on 5 August] joined the task force on 31 July, doubling its force of strike aircraft. [note]

U.S. Marine Corps

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On the 31st, with the first reservists arriving at Camp Pendleton and the first contingents leaving Camp Lejeune for the West Coast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CNO to expand the 2nd Marine Division to war strength while increasing the number of Marine tactical air squadrons from 16 to 18.[13]

Korean_War Korean_War

Obviously, the 1st and 2nd Divisions could not be built up simultaneously without serious delays, and priority must be given to the 1st. It was equally obvious, moreover, that this expansion must be largely accomplished during the first week of August if the troops were to be made ready for embarkation between the 10th and 15th.

The first build-up troops to reach Camp Pendleton were three Organized Reserve units which arrived on 31 July—

the 13th Infantry Company, of Los Angeles;

the 12th Amphibian tractor Company, of San Francisco; and

the 3rd Engineer Company, of Phoenix, Arizona.

This was the beginning of an inundation which kept the camp keyed to a 24-hour day and a 7-day week. A torrent of troops poured into the vast military reservation by bus, train, and plane at all hours of the day and night.

Confusion seemed to reign from the tawny California hills to the blue Pacific; and yet this seeming chaos was under the control of veteran officers and NCOs who had mounted out before. Accommodations for the newcomers were not deluxe, but men were being processed, assigned, fed, and equipped as rapidly as they arrived. The tramp of feet could be heard all night long as details of troops drew clothing and equipment or reported for medical examinations. A total of 13,703 Marines reached Camp Pendleton during this busy week. Counting the personnel already on hand, troops of four categories were represented:


1. Officers and men remaining in 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton after dispatch of the Brigade = 3,459

2. Officers and men reporting from posts and stations up to 4 August = 3,630

3. Officers and men reporting from the 2nd Marine Division from 3 to 6 August = 7,182

4. Officers and men selected as combat-ready out of the total of about 10,000 reservists reporting by 7 August = 2,891


TOTAL = 17,162


The expansion took place in two phases. First, of course, came the bringing of the 1st Marine Division (less one RCT) up to war strength, including augmentation personnel and supplies for the units of the Brigade.

Next, the organization of a third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines, was directed by a letter from CMC to CG 1st Marine Division on 4 August.[14]

[note]

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Driving eastward as well as southward, the enemy made such progress during the next ten days that on 31 July the UN forces were pushed back into a chain of defensive positions in southeast Korea. This was the Pusan Perimeter, which must be held if the vital line of communications from the supply port to Taegu was to be maintained. [note]

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4. On 31 July, even as the first reservists were arriving at 'Camp Pendleton and approximately 6,800 regular Marines of the 2nd Marine Division were mounting out of Camp Lejeune to join the 1st Division, the Joint Chiefs directed the Marine Corps to expand the 2nd Division to war strength and increase the number of Marine tactical squadrons from 16 to 18.

The problem posed is at once apparent. Obviously, both divisions could not be built up simultaneously, and in view of the pending commitment of the 1st Division,. it was mandatory that this unit receive top priority. It was in the building up of the 1st Marine Division that reservists made their first important direct contribution.

On 31 July, the first Organized Ground Reserve units began to stream into Camp Pendleton. That day saw the arrival of

the13th Infantry Battalion of Los Angeles,
the 12th Amphibian tractor Battalion of San Francisco,
the 12th Signal Company of Oakland, and
the 3rd Engineer Company of Phoenix. [note]

Korean_War


Meanwhile, orders to Organized Reserve units were being issued at established intervals.
On 22 July, 25 units were ordered to active duty;
on 24 July, 23 units;
on 25 July, 18 units;
on 26 July, 13 units;
on 27 July, 6 units;
on 3-August s 5 units; and
on 4 August, 25 units.


Delay for these units varied from 10 days to a month. In all, orders were issued to 138 separate units with a combined 30 June strength of 1,880 officers and 31,648 enlisted, or a total officer and enlisted strength of 33,528.


Ten days before the last remaining Organized Reserve ground unit was ordered to active duty on 10 August, the first ordered units began flowing into camp. This flow had its beginning at Camp Pendleton with the arrival, on 31 July, of
the 13th Infantry Battalion of Los Angeles,
the 12th Amphibian tractor Battalion of San Francisco,
the 12th Signal Company of Oakland, California, and
the 3rd Engineer Company of Phoenix, Arizona. [note]

Korean_War

On 31 July, the first Organized Marine Reservists reported to their initial station of deployment.


A happy feature of the Marine Corps experience with its preliminary mobilization of the reserve was the high availability of Organized Reserve officers. No problem was anticipated in the utilization of Organized Reserve officers and none developed. The number of Organized Reserve officers that submitted resignations for consideration was so small that one is justified in terming it insignificant.

[note]

U.S. Navy

19500731 0000 Toledo and DD's


19500801 0000 Belfast and Bataan, Toledo and DD's
---
19500724 0000 FIS by DD's
19500725 0000 TF77, FIS by DD's
19500726 0000 TF77, FIS by DD's
19500727 0000 ROKN, TF77 refueling, Toledo and DD's
19500728 0000 TF77, Toledo and DD's
19500729 0000 TF77, Toledo and DD's
19500730 0000 ROKN, Toledo and DD's, 1st CAV Land

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[note]

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On [Saturday] 8 July activation of facilities at Fallbrook and Seal Beach, California, was begun, and Bangor Annex, at Keyport in Puget Sound, was made available for the outloading of Army and Air Force ammunition.
For all services requirements skyrocketed. The planned overseas movement of Army ammunition alone was to rise from zero to 77,000 tons for the month of August [8/31], a growth paralleled by increased calls for general stores, refrigerated provisions, and for personnel. The Military Sea transportation Service had prepared for a predicted movement of 66,000 tons of cargo to the Far East in July [7/31]; in fact it ended up moving 312,000 tons and 30,000 passengers. More tonnage was urgently required and was being hastily assembled by Captain William R. Thayer, Deputy Commander MSTS Pacific; by the third week in July [7/16] the transports under his control had increased from 20 to 31, and 12 commercial vessels had been taken on under time charter [note]

Korean_War

Apart from the question of who hit what, the strikes of 18 and 19 July raise questions as to target selection in a police action. The objectives were, of course, in accordance with the desires expressed by FEAF concerning attacks by Seventh Fleet aircraft on North Korean targets. But the aspect of strategic air warfare which emphasizes attack on industrial plant is slow to have effect at the battleline; the real strategic targets were outside Korea, and destruction of North Korean facilities as of this date would seem merely to have promised difficulties in reconstruction, assuming U.N. success in the campaign. Overshadowed though it was by the refinery quarrel, it seems probable that the destruction of grounded aircraft by the Valley Forge air group was the most important result of the two-day operation; together with some similarly successful sorties by Air Force jets on the 19th, this pretty well liquidated the North Korean Air Force.

But habits are hard to break, and just as the carrier commanders were reluctant to undertake continuous operations in the same area, so others found it difficult to divest themselves of strongly held notions on air warfare; on 31 July a message from the Joint Chiefs urged the strategic bombing of North Korean industrial targets.

It may be conceded, in this context, that the case of the Wŏnsan refinery is not entirely clear-cut. Despite the hand-carrying nature of the North Korean army the destruction of 12,000 tons of petroleum products may have had valuable consequences, so great is the importance of oil to modern war.

And inevitably, the course of the Korean conflict being what it was, the policeman’s attitude developed into that of the warrior. But in these early weeks, at least, it would seem that the police action should have been conducted as such.

Rioters are quelled with nightsticks, not by turning off the gas and water at their homes. Had it been possible in the early days to deliver, in accordance with Army desires and naval capabilities, well-controlled and well-coordinated close air support at the front, the effect on the ground situation would have been more immediate.

It was on the ground that the emergency lay. [note]

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USS Sicily (CVE-118) reached Guam on 20 July; as the submarine menace had not materialized she there disembarked her squadron and sailed for Yokosuka, where she arrived on the 27th.

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Four days later, on 31 July, USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) and the transports entered Kobe.


With the arrival of his carriers Rear Admiral Ruble was relieved of his temporary chores as Commander Naval Air Japan and began a fancy juggling act.

On the 31st he put his staff aboard Sicily at Yokosuka and sailed her for Kobe to rejoin her consort. There she loaded ground personnel, spare parts, and ammunition for VMF 214, and [note]

While this southern counterattack was in preparation, U.N. naval and air forces pressed their efforts against the enemy’s lengthening lines of communication. Carried on by coastal patrol and blockade, by bombardment from the sea, and by air attack, this work would continue in increasing strength. Air Force as well as naval reinforcements were coming in, and FEAF’s daily sorties were rapidly increasing in number.

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In the last days of July General Stratemeyer persuaded CinCFE to release some of his bombers from work below the parallel, and the B-29s were preparing to strike north against the enemy’s urban complexes and against his transportation net.

Korean_War


As July ended Task Force 77 retired to Okinawa for logistics, and naval responsibility for air support of the perimeter devolved upon the escort carriers.

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Of these USS Sicily (CVE-118) was first in action. [note]

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During this interval Admiral Struble visited Formosa, in company with General MacArthur, to perfect planning and liaison against the chance of a Communist invasion;


[MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral Struble, flew to Taipei on 31 July where for two days he conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and his generals. But not until five days after his return to Tokyo did MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [13]] [note]

Korean_War

The minesweeping force available to ComNavFE on the outbreak of war in Korea consisted of the six wooden-hulled AMS of Mindiv 31 and of the four steel-hulled AMs, one in commission and three in reserve, of Mindiv 32.

These ships were grouped in Minron 3, Lieutenant Commander D’Arcy Shouldice, a unit which enjoyed a high state of training and readiness as a consequence of the mine situation in Japanese waters. Other than these units the Pacific Fleet contained a dozen active minesweepers, of which the two AMS of Mindiv 52 were stationed at Guam and the remainder were divided between Pearl Harbor and the west coast

Activation of the AMs in reserve in Japan had been approved early in the conflict. Nothing could be done about USS Mainstay (AM-261), owing to unavailability of replacement parts, but by mid-August USS Pirate (AM-275) and USS Incredible (AM-249) were in operating condition. Ordered out from the west coast, the destroyer mine-sweepers USS Endicott (DMS-35) and USS Doyle (DMS-34) had reached Far Eastern waters in late July, but in the absence of enemy mining they had been diverted to other duties, in the first instance as screen for CarDiv 15 and subsequently in fire support. In August Admiral Joy had asked for a further increase in minesweepers, but the request was denied on the ground that other types had higher priority [note]

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27,28,29,30,31,01,02,03,04,05,06 July-August

01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as Toledo fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell.

By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable.

Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins’ element found their days full. [note]

27,28,29,30,31,01,02 July-August

Korean_War
The preparatory barrages began at 0830. Then came the air strikes. The battle that then opened lasted until 2 August without letup.

[It has already been going on for a week, 7/17. Should go on until the 9th]

[note]

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

Miscellaneous

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[note]

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[note]


0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
9:00 AM
07/30/50
10:00 AM
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/31/50
12:00 AM

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
10:00 AM
07/30/50
11:00 AM
07/30/50
4:00 PM
07/31/50
1:00 AM

0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
11:00 AM
07/30/50
12:00 PM
07/30/50
5:00 PM
07/31/50
2:00 AM

0215 Korean Time

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After dark the enemy moved in for close-quarter attack. Before midnight, G Company killed several North Korean soldiers inside its perimeter. Out of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery fire falling near, Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his right, but he found North Koreans on the road in strength and had to move around them. About midnight he crossed the road to the north side. There he and his men lay hidden in bushes for two or three hours. During this time several enemy tanks loaded with infantry passed along the road headed in the direction of Chinju. [62]

The North Koreans directed their main attack against E and F Companies in front of Chinju. This began about 0215, 31 July, with artillery barrages. [note]

0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
12:00 PM
07/30/50
1:00 PM
07/30/50
6:00 PM
07/31/50
3:00 AM

Korean_War

After dark the enemy moved in for close-quarter attack. Before midnight, G Company killed several North Korean soldiers inside its perimeter. Out of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery fire falling near, Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his right, but he found North Koreans on the road in strength and had to move around them.

About midnight he crossed the road to the north side. There he and his men lay hidden in bushes for two or three hours. During this time several enemy tanks loaded with infantry passed along the road headed in the direction of Chinju. [13-62] [note]


Forty-five minutes later whistles signaled the infantry attack and enemy soldiers closed in, delivering small arms fire. The main effort was against F Company on the hill overlooking the river. [note]

Korean_War

After dark [7/30] the enemy moved in for close-quarter attack. Before midnight, G Company killed several North Korean soldiers inside its perimeter. Out of communication with battalion headquarters, and with friendly artillery fire falling near, Barszcz tried to join the other rifle companies on his right, but he found North Koreans on the road in strength and had to move around them.

About midnight he crossed the road to the north side. There he and his men lay hidden in bushes for two or three hours. During this time several enemy tanks loaded with infantry passed along the road headed in the direction of Chinju. [13-62] [note]

0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
1:00 PM
07/30/50
2:00 PM
07/30/50
7:00 PM
07/31/50
4:00 AM

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
2:00 PM
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/31/50
5:00 AM

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11 July 1950 Ten days later, when General Collins paused in Hawaii on his way to visit the Far East Command, he looked into the matter. In a teleconference with Ridgway in Washington, Collins asked him to query key staff officers on whether it would be better to send the 5th RCT as a unit or break it down into battalions and battalion cadres to bring other FEC regiments up to war strength. His own feeling was that the 5th RCT should be employed as a regiment; not cannibalized. Ridgway and other staff officers agreed, recommending that the regiment be sent to Korea at its existing strength with all possible speed.

On 13 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the commanding general, U.S. Army Pacific, to send the regiment to Pusan at once.

The regiment sailed for Korea on 25 July with 178 officers and 3,319 men,

entered Korea on 31 July, and went into combat immediately. [05-40] [note]

[!!!they may be off shore about to land!!!!!]

Korean_War

There a crisis developed about 0500. [13-63]

Back of the F Company hill, members of the Heavy Weapons Company watched the battle as it developed in front of them. One of the youngsters in H Company said, "Here comes the cavalry just like in the movies," as a platoon of F Company came off the hill followed by North Koreans. Other members of F Company ran toward E Company's position. At least one platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company opened fire on the intermingled American and North Korean soldiers. Within a few minutes, however, this platoon withdrew toward Chinju.

At the edge of the town, Colonel McGrail met H Company and put it in a defensive position around the battalion command post. The organized parts of E and F Companies also fell back on Chinju about daylight. [13-64]


While this battle was in progress, Captain Barszcz received radio orders to move to Chinju. He took his company north over high ground and then circled eastward. On the way he picked up stragglers and wounded men from E, F, and H Companies, 19th Infantry, and K Company, 19th Infantry. By daylight his group was two or three miles northeast of Chinju. [note]

Korean_War


The first regiment of the [2nd] division unloaded in Korea on 31 July, while another regiment was still being loaded on troop transports in the United States.
[!!!they may be off shore about to land!!!!!] [note]

0525 Korean Time

Korean_War Korean_War



The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 31 PIR reported intermittent mortar and artillery fire, some direct fire from tanks, and some patrol action. The NKPA made only one significant attack in company strength at dawn against the 7th Cavalry Regiment. The division intelligence staff noted that the enemy's infantry activity indicated "that they still [relied] predominantly on infiltration, surprise and light automatic weapons and do not press determined attacks against our strong points." The PIR continued to rate the enemy's combat efficiency and morale as good. As for NKPA intentions, the PIR reported that the enemy intended to envelop the division's northern flank and break through the 5th Cavalry Regiment on the division's southern flank to drive toward the Naktong River crossing site near Waegwan. 77 [note]

0530 Sunrise

[note]

There a crisis developed about 0500. [13-63]


Back of the F Company hill, members of the Heavy Weapons Company watched the battle as it developed in front of them. One of the youngsters in H Company said, "Here comes the cavalry just like in the movies," as a platoon of F Company came off the hill followed by North Koreans. Other members of F Company ran toward E Company's position. At least one platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company opened fire on the intermingled American and North Korean soldiers. Within a few minutes, however, this platoon withdrew toward Chinju. At the edge of the town, Colonel McGrail met H Company and put it in a defensive position around the battalion command post. The organized parts of E and F Companies also fell back on Chinju about daylight. [13-64]


While this battle was in progress, Captain Barszcz received radio orders to move to Chinju. He took his company north over high ground and then circled eastward. On the way he picked up stragglers and wounded men from E, F, and H Companies, 19th Infantry, and K Company, 19th Infantry. By daylight his group was two or three miles northeast of Chinju. [note]

0545 Korean Time

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North Korean drive in the southwest. It sent them by rail to Chinju where they arrived at 0300, 28 July. They were unloaded at the Rail Transportation Office on the south side of the Nam River where the rail line terminated. There they awaited new belts.


When the N.K. 6th Division entered Chinju on the morning of 31 July, these tanks took no part in the battle.


Flatcars from Pusan to evacuate the tanks passed through Masan the morning of 31 July but never got beyond Chungam-ni, about twenty-five miles short of Chinju. Snarled rail traffic caused by evacuation of the 19th Infantry supplies blocked the way.


At daybreak, Lieutenant Fowler went to Colonel Moore for instructions. Moore told him that if the enemy overran the 19th Infantry positions on the northwest side of Chinju and he could not evacuate the tanks under their own power, he was to destroy them and evacuate his tank crews by truck. Lieutenant Fowler telephoned Masan and apparently learned that the flatcars had departed there for Chinju to get the tanks. He decided to stay. [13-73] [note]

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On 31 July the N.K. 3rd Division was closing on Kumch'on. About daylight a squad of North Koreans infiltrated into the command post of the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1,000 yards from the 1st Cavalry Division command post, and killed four men and wounded six others. Among the latter was the battalion executive officer who died subsequently of his wounds. The 7th Cavalry also came under attack. But in pressing forward the North Koreans exposed their tanks. Air and ground fire power reportedly destroyed thirteen of them and set six more on fire. [12-61]


During its first ten days of action in Korea the 1st Cavalry Division had 916 battle casualties-78 killed, 419 wounded, and 419 missing. [12-62]


The N.K. 3rd Division in forcing the 1st Cavalry Division from Yŏngdong and back on Kumch'ŏn apparently suffered nearly 2,000 casualties, which reduced it to a strength of about 5,000 men. Nevertheless, it had effectively and quickly driven the 1st Cavalry Division toward the Naktong. For its operations in the Yŏngdong-Kumch'ŏn area the N.K. 3rd Division received the honorary title of Guards. [12-63]

[12-61] 1st Cav Div WD, 31 Jul 50; Ibid., G-2 Narr Rpt, 31 Jul 50.
[12-62] Ibid., Summ, Jul 50.
[12-63] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpt, Issue 96 (N.K. 3rd Div), p. 33; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army. p. 57. [note]

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After daylight, 31 July, Colonel Rhea, on orders from Colonel Moore, began moving his battalion ten miles eastward on the Masan road to occupy a defensive position at the Chinju pass.

Chinju Pass, South Korea

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[note]

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Within Chinju itself, Colonel Moore, shortly after daybreak, prepared to evacuate the town. By 0600 enemy small arms fire was striking in its western edge, and six North Korean armored vehicles, which Colonel Moore believed to be three tanks and three self-propelled guns, were in Chinju firing at American targets.

[note]

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Colonel Wilson Escapes With the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry

On the morning of 31 July, the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was at Sanch'ong. It was unaware that Chinju, twenty air miles to the southeast, had fallen and that the 19th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn eastward.

The mess trucks that went to Chinju the day before from the battalion had not returned. During the morning local villagers suddenly disappeared, a sure sign that enemy forces were approaching. Colonel Wilson drove south to Tansŏng, ten air miles from Chinju, where he had a roadblock. While he talked with Lieutenant Griffin, who was in command of a platoon there, about 700 refugees streamed through the roadblock. All agreed that enemy troops were behind them. [13-76]

Colonel Wilson now decided to send the battalion's heavy vehicles out eastward before the roads were cut. His executive officer, Maj. Charles E. Arnold, brought the vehicular convoy to Tansŏng and there it turned east over a trail through the mountains in the direction of Uiryŏng. The trail was passable only to jeeps. But by the labors of his own men and all the Koreans he could assemble, Arnold improved it to the extent that all vehicles got through and reached Chungam-ni, except one that broke through an improvised bridge and was abandoned. [note]

0640 Korean Time

At 0640 Moore ordered heavy equipment withdrawn from the town.

[note]

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31 July 1950
Elements of the 2nd Division arrived from the United States on 31 July, the 5th RCT reached Korea on the same day from Hawaii,

[What time and exactly where did the land]

[note]

0730 Korean Time

By 0600 enemy small arms fire was striking in its western edge, and six North Korean armored vehicles, which Colonel Moore believed to be three tanks and three self-propelled guns, were in Chinju firing at American
targets. At 0640 Moore ordered heavy equipment withdrawn from the town.

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Fifty minutes later the 13th Field Artillery Battalion (less A Battery) and B Battery, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, started to displace and move eastward. Enemy mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire fell in Chinju during the withdrawal. Enemy snipers were also inside the town. [13-68] [note]

0745 Korean Time

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By 0745, 31 July, Maj. Jack R. Emery, regimental S-4, had dispatched eastward out of Chinju the last of five trains totaling twenty-five cars evacuating the 19th Infantry supplies. [note]

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Colonel Moore and his command post stayed in Chinju until about 0800.
The withdrawal from Chinju was relatively orderly, although slow and laborious, with refugees, animal-drawn wagons, and American and ROK foot soldiers intermingled in the streets. There was some tendency to panic, however, and Colonel Moore himself had occasion to stop some cars that started to "take off" east of Chinju.[13-69]

[13-69] Interv, author with Moore, 20 Aug 52: Interv, Blumenson with
Szito, 25 Aug 51.

The main highway bridge over the Nam at the southern edge of Chinju was under enemy fire and considered unusable. In the withdrawal, therefore, the 2nd Battalion followed the road north of the Nam to Uiryŏng, where it assembled on the evening of 31 July. The regimental command post moved eastward out of Chinju, crossed the Nam about 3 miles northeast of the town, and then went east on the Masan road to Chiryong-ni, a small village 12 air miles east of Chinju and 1 mile beyond the Much'on-ni-Masan road fork. [note]

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On the morning of 31 July, Craig and Stewart set out by jeep to reconnoiter the rear areas of the crumbling southwestern sector.

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Kean’s 25th Division, having just replaced the 24th in line, was now blocking the threatened western approaches to Pusan. Since all indications pointed to the Brigade’s commitment in this area, Craig wanted to walk and ride over the terrain he had previously scouted from the air.[3]

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He returned to Pusan just in time to receive a telephone call from Colonel Landrum of Eighth Army Headquarters.

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The chief of staff told him of General Walker’s intention to attach the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team, newly arrived from Hawaii, to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. With two regiments under his command, Craig would be assigned a vital area of responsibility along the Nam River, near its confluence with the Naktong north of Masan.[4]

Unfortunately, the Brigade reached Korea 1 day too late. [note]


A ROK Army source reported that North Koreans had secured Chinju at 0900, 31 July. This may very well have been true for the main part of the town north of the Nam River, but it was not true for that part south of the Nam, where 1st Lt. Samuel R. Fowler and fourteen enlisted men still stayed by three M26 Pershing medium tanks.


Three Pershing Tanks at Chinju


One little drama was enacted in Chinju on 31 July after the 19th Infantry withdrew from the town that should be told. It is the story of the first three medium tanks in Korea and their brave commander. [note]

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CV-45

and conducted AA firing at sleeves towed by AD type aircraft furnished by UtrON 7 detachment based at Kadena, Okinawa, on the morning of the 3lst. [note]

0700 Washington D.C.

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31 July 1950
General Bolté nevertheless kept urging General Collins to call up National Guard divisions. At a meeting in his office on the morning of 31 July, General Collins decided to accept his G-3's recommendations. Later that day, [East Coast 7 PM] at a conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he forcefully proposed that four National Guard divisions and two RCT's be called to active duty. Collins said:


In view of the world-wide international situation and recent
developments in Korea, I have now concluded that we can no longer
delay in calling into Federal service certain major units of the
National Guard.... I had hoped that this step might prove
unnecessary, but it is my firm conviction that further delay may have
grave results on our ability to insure the security of the United
States. [07-26]

[07-26] (1) Memo, Bolté, ACofS G-3, DA, for Ridgway, DCofS for Admin., 7 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA files. (s) Memo, Ridgway for Bolté, 31 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2, sec. I, Case 15. (3) Memo, Collins for JCS, 31 Jul. 50, sub: Increased Augmentation of the Army (above 834,000), in G-3, DA file 320.2, sec. I-B, Book I, Case 8/1.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly agreed and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the National Guard units be called to active duty. This action meant lifting the Army's authorized strength from 834,000 to over 1,000,000. [note]

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Around noon, Barszcz joined Colonel Moore and elements of the 19th Infantry east of the town. During the night, G Company had suffered about 40 casualties, but of this number it brought approximately 20 wounded through the hills with it-10 were litter cases. [13-65] [note]

Gradually the firing in Chinju died down. A ROK soldier who passed the rail station about noon told Fowler [13-and his three tanks] that only a very few ROK soldiers were still in the town. [note]

1230 Korean Time

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The artillery, accompanied by the 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry

[3rd Battalion, 29th now 3rd Battalion, 35th Infantry????], , withdrew from Chinju north of the Nam River, crossing to the south side at Uiryŏng, and went into an assembly area at Komam-ni (Saga) shortly after noon.

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There it received an airdrop message from General Church ordering it to return to the vicinity of Chinju.

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During the afternoon the five 105-mm. howitzers of B Battery, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, and the eight 155-mm. howitzers of B Battery, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, rolled west and went into position at the Chinju pass in support of Colonel Rhea's 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. [13-70]

[13-70] Intervs, author with Moore, 20 Aug 52, and McGrail, 24 Oct
52; Ltr, Cutler to author, 9 Mar 53; 13th FA Bn WD, 31 Jul 50.


The 19th Infantry estimated enemy strength in the Chinju area, when the city fell on the morning of 31 July, as 2,000 troops, with an unknown number of tanks and artillery pieces. American aerial strikes on Chinju during the day left it in flames. Late that night a Korean source sent a message that 4,000 enemy troops were in Chinju setting up communications and weapons. [13-71]

[13-71] 19th Inf Unit Rpt 22, 31 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry
10, 010255 Aug 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, entry 421, 011800 Aug 50. [note]

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By 1300 Yech'ŏn was secured, [burnt down] and 3rd Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regiment of the Capital Division the task of holding the town.

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

The Capital Division now concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [12-19] [note]

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A little later, William R. Moore, an Associated Press correspondent, suddenly appeared and suggested to Fowler that he should check a body of men coming up the rail track. It was now perhaps an hour past noon. Fowler had an interpreter call to the approaching men. They were North Koreans. Fowler ordered his tank crews to open fire. In the fire fight that immediately flared between the tank .30- and .50-caliber machine guns and the enemy small arms fire, Fowler received a bullet in his left side. In this close-range fight the tank machine gun fire killed or wounded most of the enemy group, which was about platoon size. The tankers put Fowler into his tank and started the three tanks east [from Chinju ] on the road to Masan.

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Two miles down the road the tanks came to a blown bridge. The men prepared to abandon the tanks and proceed on foot. They removed Fowler from his tank and made a litter for him. Fowler ordered the men to destroy the tanks by dropping grenades into them. Three men started for the tanks to do this. At this moment an enemy force lying in ambush opened fire. A number of men got under the bridge with Fowler. MSgt. Bryant E. W. Shrader was the only man on the tanks. He opened fire with the .50-caliber machine gun. A North Korean called out in English for the men to surrender.


Shrader left the machine gun, started the tank, and drove it close to one of the other tanks. He dropped the escape hatch and took in six men. He then drove back toward Chinju and stopped the tank a few feet short of the bridge over the Nam, undecided whether to cross to the other side. There the overheated engine stopped and would not start again. The seven men abandoned the tank and ran into the bamboo thickets fringing the river. After many close calls with enemy forces Shrader and his group finally reached safety and passed through the lines of the 25th Division west of Masan. [13-74]

[13-74] EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Capt John W. Coyle, Jr. (CO 8066th
Mech Rec Det), 2nd Lt Vincent P. Geske, Sgt Francis A. Hober, and MSgt
Bryant E. W. Shrader (C Co, 88th Tk Bn), Pfc Carl Anderson; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 1, Rpt 1, p. 119, Capt Pak Tong Huk.


The men back at the blown bridge had no chance. Some were killed or wounded at the first fire. Others were killed or wounded under the bridge. A few ran into nearby fields trying to escape but were killed or captured. One of those captured said later he saw several bodies floating in the stream and recognized two as Fowler and Moore. [13-75]

[13-75] EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Pfc Anderson [note]

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The regiment itself passed through Ch'angnyŏng in the early afternoon and continued on toward Chinju. [14-2]

[14-12] Ltr, Cutler to author, 9 Mar 53.


The Two Roads to Masan


That afternoon and evening as the 27th Infantry Regiment traveled south, the 19th Infantry sought a defense position between Chinju and Masan where it could reassemble its forces and block the enemy's advance eastward from Chinju.

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Colonel Rhea's 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, with supporting artillery, was in the naturally strong position at the Chinju pass.


Four miles east of the Chinju pass was the little village of Much'on. There the road to Masan forked. The northern route arched in a semicircle through Chungam-ni and Kŏmam-ni to enter Masan from the north. The southern route curved in a similar semicircle through Kogan-ni and Chindong-ni to enter Masan from the south. A high mountain mass, Sobuk-san, lay enclosed in this oval area circumscribed by the two roads. (Map IV 1 AUGUST 1950 ) [note]

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USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and her screen steamed south for Buckner Bay. There they anchored on the 31st and there, on the next day, Task Force 77 received a welcome accession of strength with the arrival of the carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47). [note]

The task force arrived at Buckner Bay, Okinawa, about 1500 the 31st of July.

[note]

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When Task Group 53.7 entered Far Eastern waters, the ships transporting the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing veered toward Japan, while the others continued to Korea. The Brigade’s air arm arrived at Kobe late in the afternoon of 31 July.


Within three hours debarkation had been completed and unloading was in full swing. A waiting LST took on Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two and the ground personnel and equipment of VMO-6. [note]

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At 1700, Colonel Wilson and the battalion troops started withdrawing southward from Sanch'ong. [Chinju is occupied] [note]

1800 Korean Time

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The 1st Cavalry Division's 6:00 PM July 31 PIR reported intermittent mortar and artillery fire, some direct fire from tanks, and some patrol action. The NKPA made only one significant attack in company strength at dawn against the 7th Cavalry Regiment. The division intelligence staff noted that the enemy's infantry activity indicated "that they still [relied] predominantly on infiltration, surprise and light automatic weapons and do not press determined attacks against our strong points." The PIR continued to rate the enemy's combat efficiency and morale as good. As for NKPA intentions, the PIR reported that the enemy intended to envelop the division's northern flank and break through the 5th Cavalry Regiment on the division's southern flank to drive toward the Naktong River crossing site near Waegwan. 77


77
Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), Periodic Intelligence Report #10, 1800 31 July 1950 , 1st Cavalry Division, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 56, RG 338, NARA.


The following days saw the continued, phased withdrawal of the entire Eighth Army back to the next defensible terrain: the Naktong River. The Eighth Army’s PIRs proved remarkably accurate in spite of the fluid and dynamic enemy situation. This intelligence success allowed the Eighth Army’s divisions to block efFECtively the threat of a NKPA flanking maneuver and therefore reach the Naktong to fight another day. [note]

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They [13-Col Wilson] had marched about an hour when a liaison plane flew over the column and dropped a message. Opening it, Colonel Wilson was astonished to read, "Yesterday you were ordered to report to the concentration area of Haman. What are you doing here?" Haman was thirty-five miles away as the crow flies and much farther by the roads and mountain trails.


Wilson led his battalion on down to Tansŏng. There, a South Korean naval lieutenant detached himself from a group of refugees and came over to Wilson with a map. He said he had been at Chinju and that the American troops had left there, retreating eastward. He continued, "The Reds are just seven miles behind us and will get here tonight." Wilson talked to him at length and became convinced that his story was reliable. After consulting some of the battalion staff, Wilson decided to leave the Chinju road and head for Haman across the mountains.


The men discarded all personal effects. Three or four sick and injured soldiers rode in the few jeeps, which also carried the radios, mortars, and machine guns. The battalion late in the evening headed east over the Uiryŏng trail.

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MAP_17_Chŏnju_Region_L552_NI52-2

[note]

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Four miles east of the Chinju pass was the little village of Much'on. There the road to Masan forked. The northern route arched in a semicircle through Chungam-ni and Kŏmam-ni to enter Masan from the north. The southern route curved in a similar semicircle through Kogan-ni and Chindong-ni to enter Masan from the south. A high mountain mass, Sobuk-san, lay enclosed in this oval area circumscribed by the two roads. (Map IV)

The evening of 31 July Colonel Moore established the 19th Infantry's command post one mile east of Much'on-ni on the northern road.

About 2000, a military police courier arrived at his command post with a message from General Church summoning Moore to a meeting with him and Michaelis at Chung-ni. [14-3]

Colonel Moore and his driver, guided by the courier, set out immediately and arrived at the appointed place before midnight.

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Church and Michaelis were already in the little railroad station. Colonel Moore gave a detailed account of the events of the day and the location of the 19th Infantry and attached troops. There is considerable confusion as to just what orders General Church issued to Colonel Moore and Colonel Michaelis at this meeting. Since they were verbal there has been no way to check them in the records. It would appear that Moore was to hold the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, in its blocking position west of the Much'on-ni road fork and Colonel Yŏngdök was to put the 27th Infantry in a reinforcing defensive position at the pass three miles west of Chungam-ni on the northern road to Masan. [14-4] [note]

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After daylight, 31 July, Colonel Rhea, on orders from Colonel Moore, began moving his battalion ten miles eastward on the Masan road to occupy a defensive position at the Chinju pass.


The 1st Battalion withdrew to this position [13-ten miles eastward on the Masan road to occupy a defensive position at the Chinju pass. ]without enemy contact and went into defensive perimeter there astride the road before nightfall. [13-67]
[note]


1939 Sunset

[note]

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The evening of 31 July Colonel Moore established the 19th Infantry's command post one mile east of Much'on-ni on the northern road.

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About 2000, a military police courier arrived at his command post with a message from General Church summoning Moore to a meeting with him and Michaelis at Chung-ni. [14-3] [note]

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- do not know what time he got there


31 July 1950
MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral Struble, flew to Taipeh on 31 July where for two days he conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and his generals. But not until five days after his return (7 Aug 50) to Tokyo did MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [20-13] [note]

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On the last day of July the North Koreans could look back on a spectacular triumph in their enveloping maneuver through southwest Korea. Chinju had fallen. Their troops were ready to march on Masan and, once past that place, to drive directly on Pusan. [note]

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Colonel Moore and his driver, guided by the courier, set out immediately and arrived at the appointed place before midnight.

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Church and Michaelis were already in the little railroad station. Colonel Moore gave a detailed account of the events of the day and the location of the 19th Infantry and attached troops. There is considerable confusion as to just what orders General Church issued to Colonel Moore and Colonel Michaelis at this meeting. Since they were verbal there has been no way to check them in the records. It would appear that Moore was to hold the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, in its blocking Michaelis was to put the 27th Infantry in a reinforcing defensive position at the pass three miles west of Chungam-ni on the northern road to Masan. [14-4] [note]


Casualties

Monday July 31, 1950 (Day 037)

Korean_War 139 Casualties

As of July 31, 1950

45 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
29 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
14 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
18 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 61ST FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
5 71ST HEAVY TANK BATTALION
1 724TH ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY
6 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8066TH RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
8 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
5 8TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
139 19500731 00000 Casualties by Unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 20 2,700 1 2 0 2,723
Losses 0 141 0 0 0 141
To Date 20 2,841 1 2 0 2,864

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Monday July 31, 1950 - day 037