The brief description presented orally to General Collins during his visit apparently had not justified sufficiently the need for immediate deployment of the RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked General MacArthur for a more detailed explanation of the mission he would give the airborne RCT in the landing operation. On 23 July, General MacArthur replied that he planned to mount an airdrop from Japan, landing the airborne troops in the Inch'ŏn objective area as soon after D-day as the situation warranted. They were to seize a key communication center immediately ahead of troops advancing out of the beachhead area. At this time, when it was not at all certain that sufficient amphibious forces could be sent to MacArthur or that the landing at Inch'ŏn would even be made, MacArthur's requirement for airborne troops appeared, to Army officials, secondary.
The condition of the 11th Airborne Division, moreover, remained such that the Department of the Army deemed it impractical to send any of the division's regiments into combat in September. Army authorities informed General MacArthur in teleconference that the RCT would be operational in Japan by 23 October, but that he could not count upon using it in his landing operations. In turn, MacArthur remonstrated once again, asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff expedite the arrival of the unit. [09-45]
[09-45] ( 1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA with CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.