Probably the most important achievement of Eighth Army's intelligence staff during this period was its warning on July 23 that one course of action open to the NKPA included a deep envelopment of the Eighth Army's left flank in southwestern Korea, an area covered at this time by only a few hundred South Korean troops and local police.
This warning led to increased aerial reconnaissance of southwestern Korea that detected the NKPA's deep envelopment, although Eighth Army's intelligence staff erroneously identified the unit conducting the maneuver as the 4th Division (in truth the 6th Division).
Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army's commander, could then move the 24th Infantry Division, recently relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division at Yŏngdong, into position to delay the NKPA's advance and to prevent the North Koreans from enveloping Eighth Army's flank. 14
Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 210-213.
The focus then shifted to the 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. unit that would undergo a baptism of fire during that last critical week of July 1950 .