Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 28.6°C 83.48°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

 

The first time black servicemen were integrated as individuals in significant numbers under combat conditions was in the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade during the fighting in the Pusan Perimeter in August 1950.

[note]

August

Subsequently, the 24th Regimental Combat Team:

Held the most vital part of the Pusan Perimeter Aug/Sep, taking and retaking Battle Mountain 19 times in 30 days

[note]

August

During early Aug 1950, the 9th Infantry Regiment's black 3rd Bn and the black 503rd Field Arty Bn arrived in Korea with other 2nd Division elements. Initially, the black bn, a black arty battery, a tank company, and a company of engineers were detached and withheld front frontline action and assigned to guard an airfield near P'ohang.

[note]

 

Integration

When the quota was lifted in April 1950, Negroes accounted for 10.2 percent of the total enlisted strength; by August this figure reached 11.4 percent.

[note]

The percentage of Negroes among those enlisting in the Army for the first time jumped from 8.2 in March 1950 to 25.2 in August, averaging 18 percent of all first-term enlistments during the first nine months of the war. Black reenlistment increased from 8.5 to 12.9 percent of the total reenlistment during the same period, and the percentage of black draftees in the total number of draftees supplied by Selective Service averaged 13 percent.[17-5]

[note]

The Chief of Staff's concern with the Army's segregation policy went beyond immediate problems connected with the sudden manpower increases. Speaking to Maj. Gen. Lewis A. Craig, the Inspector General, in August 1950, Collins declared that the Army's social policy was unrealistic and did not represent the views of younger Americans whose attitudes were much more relaxed than (p. 432) those of the senior officers who established policy. Reporting Collins's comment to the staff, Craig went on to say the situation in Korea confirmed his own observations that mixing whites and blacks "in reasonable proportions" did not cause friction. Continued segregation, on the other hand, would force the Army to reinstate the old division-size black unit, with its ineffectiveness and frustrations, to answer the Negro's demand for equitable promotions and job opportunities. In short, both Collins and Craig agreed that the Army must eventually integrate, and they wanted the use of black servicemen restudied.[17-7]

[note]

August

Men of Battery A,
159th Field Artillery Battalion, fire 105-mm. howitzer, Korea, August 1950.

[note]

August August

In August 1950, for example, initial replacements for battle (p. 434) casualties in the 9th Infantry of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division included two black officers and eighty-nine black enlisted men. The commander assigned them to units in his severely undermanned all-white 1st and 2nd Battalions.

[note]

August

Then, as July melted into August, the long retreat ended. Infantrymen of the 27th Regiment and their ROK buddies dug in their heels and stopped the Red tide at the walls of Taegu. MacArthur had been vindicated. The New York Times observed editorially that welcome as the news from the battlefront was, the chief

"cause for satisfaction and assurance surely to be found is the fact that it is Douglas MacArthur who directs this effort in the field. Fate could not have chosen a man better qualified to command the unreserved confidence of the people of this country. Here is a superb strategist and an inspired leader; a man of infinite patience and quiet stability under adverse pressure; a man equally capable of bold and decisive action. . . . In every home in the United States today there must be a sure conviction that if any man can carry out successfully the task which Truman and the Security Council of the United Nations have given him . . . that man is the good soldier in Tokyo who has long since proved to the hilt his ability to serve his country well."

MacArthur reported that he believed that

"the enemy's plan and great opportunity depended on the speed with which he could overrun South Korea, once he had breached the Han and with overwhelming numbers and with superior weapons shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush."

Late in August nine North Korean infantry divisions and one armored division staged a massive attack in an attempt to overpower the defenders, but by now the General had U.S. tanks and heavy artillery ashore, and the In Min Gun, weakened by casualties, its supply lines mercilessly savaged by Stratemeyer's bombers, was losing some of its vim. MacArthur's troops held on a 145-mile arc where, as summer waned, the lines of opposing trenches steadily grew stronger.

[note]

Korean Pictures

 

August

CAMERA TRI-POD, JET PROPELLED. Cameramen mount a giant aerial camera in the nose of a speedy but otherwise unarmed U.S. Air Force jet fighter for a reconnaissance mission over communist North Korea. T/Sgt. Harry M. Hanst, 29, of 6512 Ventnor Avenue, Ventnor City, New Jersey and Cpl. Peter E. Grant, 21, 130 South First Street, Perth Amboy, New Jersey are the technicians installing the important "weapon."

[note]

August

F-80 JET ENGINE CHECKED FOR INSTALLATION. S/Sgt. Roy James, 32, of Grenada Mississippi, left front; PFC Calvin Chaney, 20, of Scottsboro, Alabama, rear; and Cpl. Talmon R. Morris, 20, of Sylacuga, Alabama, front right, give this U.S. Air Force F-80 Shooting Star engine a final check prior to installation.

[note]

August

Marine Stretcher Bearers Carry a wounded Marine from the front lines to a forward aid station, in Korea, circa August 1950.

[note]

August

Marines sharing candy with South Korean children at a small village, while en route to the front by rail. Photographed in the Pusan Perimeter area. Note: This image is slightly disfigured by small chemical spots in its center area.

[note]

August

Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen, USN, Commander Carrier Division One, (left), Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN, Commander Seventh Fleet, (center) and Rear Admiral John M. Hoskins, USN, Commander Carrier Division Three pose with a World globe, while conferring aboard a Seventh Fleet ship, circa August-December 1950.

[note]

August

Corporal John Simms of Bradbury Heights, Maryland, is shown bidding his wife, Ann, and their 8 month old son, John Jr., goodbye as he leaves for Korea, 1950. Washington, DC. Washington Post.

[note]

August

San Diego, California. A young officer and his wife sitting in their car at the dock and staring quietly at the waiting aircraft carrier before he leaves for Korea, 1950. Black Star.

[note]

The month of August in Korea witnessed repeated and savage attacks on our forces. But the South Koreans had now been rallied and reorganized, and five small R.O.K. divisions—the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and Capital—were with General Walker. A brigade of the 1st United States Marine Division had also joined the Eighth Army. Our forces made a planned withdrawal from Taejŏn and accepted battle along the Naktong River. At Yŏngdong, after a bitter four-day struggle, the enemy overwhelmed our position and forced our withdrawal further south to what amounted to an extended beachhead around Pusan .

The North Koreans now had thirteen divisions at the front. They were fighting not on a continuous line of deployment, but in a series of columns of battalion and regimental size, probing roads and mountain trails in a continuous effort to penetrate and outflank our position. For a time, it was touch and go. The Cassandras of the world gloomily speculated on a vast Asiatic Dunkirk.

The pattern and density of the enemy's supply and reinforcement movement showed that heavy tonnage was coming from Chinese Manchuria and Russian Siberia, through Sŏul , in spite of our bombing and strafing. It moved habitually by night. The ingenuity and tenacity in repair of bridges and tracks was of the highest order. Fresh divisions and tank brigades from North Korea arrived constantly. Supply, food, and ammunition went forward without a letup, by train, by truck and motor, by oxcart, and cargadores. But Walker , his back to the sea, with great skill and courage by all commands and ranks, slowed the enemy to a walk, and by the end of the month had established a fairly stable line of defense. The order was "to stand or die."

At the age of seventy, General Douglas MacArthur was commissioned by the UN to command armed forces on behalf of South Korea. Arriving at the battle front, he ordered his Eighth Army field commander, General Walton Walker, to maintain a tight perimeter in the Pusan-Taegu region in southeast Korea. US. troops were told to “stand or die.”

Saturday, 29 July, General Walker visited the 25th Division command post at Sangju. There he conferred with General Kean and afterward spoke to the division staff and issued his order to hold the line. The press widely reported this as a "stand or die" order to Eighth Army.

[note]

Marine Rifle Platoon from E-2-5, 1st Marine Division, 8/50
This rifle platoon fought throughout the Pusan Perimeter battles, Inch'ŏn, across the Han River to help recapture Sŏul, and their survivors went on to fight their way out of the Chosin Reservoir in a series of savage tactical victories in the midst of overwhelming strategic defeat.

 

South Then North


August

[note]

During July and August 1950 an average of 4,000 automotive vehicles a month cleared through the ordnance repair shops; in the year after the outbreak of the Korean War more than 46,000 automotive vehicles were repaired or rebuilt in Japan.

The Tokyo Ordnance Depot, in addition to repairing and renovating World War II equipment for use in Korea, instituted a program of modifying certain weapons and vehicles to make them more effective in combat. For instance, M4A3 tanks were modified for the replacement of the 75-mm gun with the high velocity 76-mm gun, and the motor carriage of the 105-mm. gun was modified so that it could reach a maximum elevation of 67 degrees to permit high-angle fire over the steep Korean mountains. Another change was in the half-track M15-A1, which was converted to a T19 mounting a 40-mm gun instead of the old model 37-mm weapon. [09-15]

[note]

The daily rail and water Red Ball Express from Yokohama to Sasebo to Pusan, beginning on 23 July, operated with increased efficiency in August and demonstrated that it could deliver promptly to Korea any supplies available in Japan.

[note]

Of all the North Korean divisions fighting in South Korea perhaps no other suffered destruction as complete as the 13th. Certainly no other yielded so many high-ranking officers as prisoners of war.

[note]

1950 Aug 01

After the surprise attack at Inch'ŏn [9/15] and the follow-up advance by the Eighth Army, the North Korean Army began to fall back. But large numbers of the enemy were taken prisoner in the swift maneuver and sent to the rear. The bag of prisoners rose from under a thousand in August 1950 to over 130,000 in November. Unfortunately, little provision had been made for so many prisoners and facilities to confine, clothe, and feed them were not available. In addition, there were not enough men on hand to guard the prisoners nor were the guards assigned adequately trained for their mission. #1

[note]

 

Citations

Silver Star

Fossum, Adoph C. [1stLt SS HqCo1stBn19thIR]

 

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

  

While FEAF directed all missions for Bomber Command and the Fifth Air Force, Bomber Command usually selected targets and dates of attack depending on weather and other conditions; its intentions were forwarded to FEAF where, if satisfactory, they were incorporated in FEAF operations orders. Bomber Command operations orders, in turn, were issued to the groups as far in advance as possible to expedite bomb loading and mission planning at group level. The location of command headquarters at Yokota greatly facilitated coordination with the two B-29 groups stationed there, but supervision of the three groups at Kadena was more difficult, especially since communications failures of 5 to 6 hours were not uncommon.

Concurrent with the arrival of the 307th Bombardment Group on [Kadena Air Base] Okinawa, however, a Bomber Command Advance Echelon headquarters was established at Kadena under Brig. Gen. James E. Briggs . This headquarters was given enough leeway in mission planning to greatly simplify the coordination of last minute changes in FEAF operations orders. On several occasions when changes were received late at night at Yokota (some of them came in as late as 2000 hours the night before scheduled missions) and communications with Okinawa were out, the burden of changing missions for the next day fell upon the two groups at Yokota. Whatever the last minute target might be, it was standing operating procedure that Bomber Command aircraft not make a change in the bomb load.

Second Air Force - Emblem (USAF).png         Koread-War

Problems of maintenance and supply were complicated by the fact that Bomber Command's groups came from three different Air Forces - the Second, Fifteenth, and Twentieth - and two major commands, SAC and FEAF, and were located at two widely separated bases. Units at Yokota were attached to the Fifth Air Force for administrative and logistical support, those at Kadena to the Twentieth. Emergence of Bomber Command headquarters as more than a purely operational agency settled many of the perplexities of disjointed logistics.

When Bomber Command's deputy for materiel received additional personnel, he was able to make command policies and assume logistical supervision for the units at Yokota, while the A-4 section of the command's advance echelon cooperated closely with the deputy for materiel, Twentieth Air Force. Although the Twentieth's 6332nd Air Base Wing gave logistical support to the units at Kadena and the 3rd Bombardment Wing (L) was available at Yokota, additional maintenance personnel, not included in the SAC 900-man mobility plan, was required to augment the base maintenance shops, group maintenance docks, and engine build-up sections. Eighteen officers and 269 airmen were obtained from SAC to bolster the 22nd and 92nd Groups.

[note]

Def

MOSQUITO aircraft initially carried eight-channel AN/ ARC-3 sets which remained the standard communications facility for fighter control, although SCR-300 sets were added in August to permit the airborne control ships to work tank columns and forward ground patrols. The radio procedures followed by MOSQUITO pilots made most use of the common "A" channel of the AN/ARC-3. They checked out of Taegu airstrip, reported to division and regiment control, reported to the airborne controller being relieved, requested fighter aircraft from MOSQUITO MELLOW (the airborne relay station between the battle area and Taegu), and received the fighter aircraft - all on the common "A" channel. If another frequency could not be established with the fighters, and such was frequently the case with the Mustangs and their four-channel SCR-522 sets, the MOSQUITO had to work the close support mission on "A" channel.

Navy and Marine aircraft, moreover, had only "A" and "H" channels in common with the MOSQUITO controllers and Army liaison planes possessed only "A" and "B" channels, thus making clutter inevitable on one or the other channel. During the Pusan perimeter fighting, MOSQUITO aircraft were assigned certain particular areas of operations, thus mitigating somewhat communications jamming from excessive transmissions in a restricted area. But when EUSAK began to break out of the perimeter on 16 September, the massing of ground units brought too many supporting airborne controllers into the same areas, greatly complicating radio reception by numerous transmissions on the same frequencies.

If communications were hardly able to cope with the control of supporting aircraft at the front, they were equally deficient between Taegu and tactical air bases in Japan. The Fifth Air Force had partial use of the submarine cable between Pusan and Japan, but there was no rapid means of certain contact between the JOC and Japanese bases. Aircraft from the tactical groups in southern Japan were commonly dispatched on a daily air-alert schedule (normally two planes at 15-minute intervals) to report to the TACC. Because of the inflexibility of the dispatching schedules, aircraft from Japan might stack up over Taegu when there were few missions or prove insufficient to the task when many support requests were on hand. The TACC, however, could scramble planes at Taegu, and for a time at P'ohang.

[note]

Def

The function of air rescue, like that of air evacuation, was not new in the Korean war, but its performance was aided by new plane types and efficient management. The 2d and 3d Air Rescue Squadrons had been assigned to FEAF during World War II, but on 1 May 1949 they had been transferred to the world-wide Air Rescue Service, a subordinate to MATS.

During the Korean conflict the 2nd Squadron's flights remained at Clark, Kadena, and Anderson, but the 3rd Squadron, participated more directly in the war. The latter was initially divided into four flights - based at

  1. Johnson, Flight A

  2. Yokota, Flight B

  3. Misawa, Flight C and

  4. Ashiya, Flight "D" -

Flight "E" to which another was added when part of the 5th was dispatched to the Far East on 7 July.

August

Flight "F" A sixth flight, called Detachment "F," was organized with H-5 helicopters during August. In Korea, this detachment provided normal air rescue service and also transported badly wounded ground troops from the front lines to base hospitals at Pusan. Assignment of additional personnel almost doubled the size of the 3rd Squadron between July and November 1950.

[note]

August August

On 30 July a flight of F-80's with rockets and machine guns blazing, destroyed eight artillery pieces and a number of vehicles two miles northeast of Hwanggan, and when, on this same mission, a MOSQUITO spotted some 2,000 enemy troops southeast of Yŏngdong, other fighters were called in to work them over.

In managing his retreat southward, General Walker relied heavily upon the maneuverability of air power. He commonly outlined the next day's work at either an evening or early morning staff conference which was attended by Fifth Air Force commanders. If the tide of battle changed during the day, air power moved to some other spot where it was needed.


Early in August, Walker wrote that Fifth Air Force pilots had:


given all-out support of our efforts and all of our troops including ROK forces are high in their regard for the support sorties, which have averaged 340 fighter bombers a day in the past 10 days . . . They have destroyed enemy tanks that had penetrated our lines . . . Their effort has been of tremendous value to our forces and has saved many, many lives of our infantry troops.

[note]

August

In August Mosquito controllers had begun to carry SCR-300 "walkie-talkie" radios in their cockpits which allowed them to talk directly with tank columns and forward ground patrols.#66

[note]

"When they take care of you like that, you don't mind fighting."

-Wounded Eighth Army soldier on his evacuation by air

The method of evacuating sick and wounded troops changed radically during the Korean War. Even though air transport of wounded was used in World War II, it had not been developed to the scale used in Korea. As a result of these changes, thousands of lives were saved.

Medical evacuation at the beginning of the Korean War was based on ground and sea transport. Upon his arrival in August 1950, Brigadier General Tunner [commander of the Military Air transport Service, MATS] directed his staff to study the possibility of aero-medical evacuation as a standard procedure for transporting wounded and sick troops. By October, Combat Cargo transports began returning injured personnel to Japan or airfields in South Korea according to a centralized control plan, and the Air Force's Military Air transport System (MATS) assumed responsibility for airlifting patients from Japan back to the United States. Along the way, the sick and wounded were cared for by in-flight Air Force nurses and medical specialists. By the end 1950, transport by air became the standard form of casualty movement.

The Air Force's aero-medical evacuation system, along with the use of antibiotics, helicopter evacuation, and new surgical techniques, cut the death rate from wounds to half the rate of World War II. These advances greatly improved the morale and lowered the suffering of wounded and sick soldiers.

[note]

Early in August 1950 General Partridge accordingly directed the 3rd Squadron to station six of its nine helicopters in Korea, and General Stratemeyer asked USAF to give him 25 H-5's to be used by a special evacuation and utility squadron. By stripping other commands, USAF started 14 H-5's to the Far East, but it ruled that the 3rd Squadron would continue to handle the mercy missions.

[note]

August

The newest developments in air rescue were taking place in the immediate area of the ground fighting in South Korea. On 7 July 1950 the 3rd Squadron sent two L-5 aircrews and aircraft to Korea. Called Mercy Mission No. 1, the L-5 pilots attempted several pickups without much luck, for the little liaison planes could not operate from the rice paddy lands of Korea.

August


On 22 July, however, the rescue flight at Ashiya sent an H-5 helicopter detachment to Taegu, which soon attracted General Partridge's notice. In a few days, moreover, the Eighth Army's surgeon called on the helicopters to help him evacuate critically wounded soldiers from front-line aid stations to the 8076th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital at Miryang and the 8054th Hospital in Pusan. The helicopter could operate in the mountainous and rice-paddy terrain where the liaison planes could not function.


Early in August 1950 General Partridge accordingly directed the 3rd Squadron to station six of its nine helicopters in Korea, and General Stratemeyer asked USAF to give him 25 H-5's to be used by a special evacuation and utility squadron. By stripping other commands, USAF started 14 H-5's to the Far East, but it ruled that the 3rd Squadron would continue to handle the mercy missions.

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

August

(Left, Robert C. Craig on KP duty. He served with the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, A troop, 8th Combat Engineers, Korea July 1950-August 1951.

[note]

August August

Archie Edwards of Arcola, IL (left) was with the 2nd Division, 38th Field Artillery, Charlie Battery. He was a POW in Korea from August 1950 to September 15, 1953 in Camps 5 and 4.

Merle Sims (right) of Decatur, IL served with D Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division at Freedom Bridge and Ascom City.

[note]

August

There was no time for combat loading; ammunition, supplies, vehicles and weapons went on the ships at San Diego piecemeal as they arrived.   There was a shortage of stevedores, as well.  The Division did not go out in convoy, but had been moving a ship or two at a time until August 8,

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 

The minesweeping force available to ComNavFE on the outbreak of war in Korea consisted of the six wooden-hulled AMS of Mindiv 31 and of the four steel-hulled AMS, one in commission and three in reserve, of Mindiv 32.

These ships were grouped in Minron 3, Lieutenant Commander D’Arcy Shouldice, a unit which enjoyed a high state of training and readiness as a consequence of the mine situation in Japanese waters. Other than these units the Pacific Fleet contained a dozen active minesweepers, of which the two AMS of Mindiv 52 were stationed at Guam and the remainder were divided between Pearl Harbor and the west coast

Activation of the AMS in reserve in Japan had been approved early in the conflict. Nothing could be done about USS Mainstay (AM-261), owing to unavailability of replacement parts, but by mid-August USS Pirate (AM-275) and USS Incredible (AM-249) were in operating condition. Ordered out from the west coast, the destroyer mine-sweepers USS Endicott (DMS-35) and USS Doyle (DMS-34) had reached Far Eastern waters in late July, but in the absence of enemy mining they had been diverted to other duties, in the first instance as screen for CarDiv 15 and subsequently in fire support. In August Admiral Joy had asked for a further increase in minesweepers, but the request was denied on the ground that other types had higher priority

[note]

For all services requirements skyrocketed. The planned overseas movement of Army ammunition alone was to rise from zero to 77,000 tons for the month of August, a growth paralleled by increased calls for general stores, refrigerated provisions, and for personnel.

[note]

For the first few days of August, while these coastal activities were in progress, the Seventh Fleet Striking Force lay at anchor in Buckner Bay. During this interval Admiral Struble visited Formosa, in company with General MacArthur, to perfect planning and liaison against the chance of a Communist invasion; the carrier Philippine Sea arrived from the United States, and Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen, Commander Carrier Division 1, flew in from Pearl and reported aboard. In Tokyo, in the meantime, further efforts were being made to accomplish a workable coordination of the Operations of the Air Force and of naval air.


The first step toward meshing naval and Air Force activities had been taken when FEAF requested strikes in northeastern Korea. A second shortly followed, with General Stratemeyer’s request for "operational control" of all aircraft in the theater and with CincFE’s letter delegating "coordination control" to the commanding general of FEAF; by early August further measures were in train.

[note]

The first step toward meshing naval and Air Force activities had been taken when FEAF requested strikes in northeastern Korea. A second shortly followed, with General Stratemeyer’s request for "operational control" of all aircraft in the theater and with CincFE’s letter delegating "coordination control" to the commanding general of FEAF; by early August further measures were in train.

General Stratemeyer’s letter of 8 July to CincFE (MacArthur) would be a reoccurring thorn in the side of everyone.

[note]

In August, the Peiping regime accused the United States of aggression against Formosa and asked the United Nations Security Council to order the withdrawal of ". . . all of the United States armed invading forces from Taiwan...." [20-20]

[note]

August 1950

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Casualties

Tuesday August 8, 1950 (Day 45)

August 70 Casualties

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