Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24.9°C 76.82°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

US and ROK troops fall further back, but establish a 'Pusan Perimeter' defense line anchored in the west along the Naktong river.

[note]

U.S. Eighth Army and Republic of Korea troops establish defensive position at the Naktong.

[note]

Russia, whose boycott of the UN allowed the Security Council to back South Korea, now returns to the world body. Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob A. Malik assumes the chairmanship for August. He tries to make up for lost time with moves designed to stall deliberations on the Korean War. On August 1 he rules that communist China will replace Taiwan in the UN. The U.S. ambassador objects, saying that a chairman cannot make rulings without a Security Council vote. Membership for communist China is defeated 8-3 following a debate.

The U.S. also leads a defeat of Malik's insistence on settling the question of Mainland China's membership Aug. 2.

[note]

Russia, whose boycott of the UN allowed the Security Council to back South Korea, now returns to the world body. Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob A. Malik assumes the chairmanship for August. He tries to make up for lost time with moves designed to stall deliberations on the Korean War. On August 1 he rules that communist China will replace Taiwan in the UN. The U.S. ambassador objects, saying that a chairman cannot make rulings without a Security Council vote. Membership for communist China is defeated 8-3 following a debate.

The U.S. also leads a defeat of Malik's insistence on settling the question of Mainland China's membership Aug. 2.

[note]

August

The date for his journey was fixed: July 31. Then the picture blurs. The Pentagon advised the Dai Ichi that "certain policy matters" relevant to Formosa were being discussed with the State Department; pending their outcome, the Chiefs intimated, MacArthur might "desire to send a senior officer to Formosa with the group on July 31 and go yourself later." However, the message concluded: "Please feel free to go, since the responsibility is yours." Evidently no copy of this telecon reached the State Department.

Acheson was later under the impression that the MacArthur-Chiang meeting was the General's idea. He writes:

"Instinct told us what experience later proved-to fear General MacArthur bearing explanations. Furthermore, better uses for the theater commander at this juncture came to mind, so a State Department officer was sent from Tokyo to Formosa with the explanation."

But that cannot be the story. The senior U.S. diplomat in Tokyo was Sebald, and he received no such instructions. Instead, two C-54s took off bearing sixteen officers, including Willoughby, Almond, Stratemeyer, and Whitney.

MacArthur had told Sebald that he wouldn't be a member of the party. Sebald sent word of this to Dean Rusk, then assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, and Rusk routinely filed the report.

"I expected to play no role in the affair," Sebald recalls.

He was satisfied with the General's explanation, which was that since only military matters would be discussed, he wanted to avoid any suggestion of political implications. But Acheson, unhappy over Truman's pledge to defend Formosa, would see this as subterfuge to exclude a State representative from the group. He was as suspicious of MacArthur as MacArthur was of him, and, at times, as paranoid.

Bad weather kept the C-54s circling over Taipei for an hour and a half.

Bounding down the ramp at last, the General gave Chiang what his staff called his "number one" handshake-right hands clasped, his left hand gripping Chiang's right elbow. "How do you do, Generalissimo?" he boomed. "It was nice of you to come down and meet me."

The Gimo didn't understand a word of this, but interpreters were everywhere, and the American staff officers plunged into a busy day with their KMT counterparts, studying maps and examining beach obstacles while their commander conferred with Chiang.

At the end of the day MacArthur said he believed he had a I "feel" of the island's defensive plans and a grasp of the KMT intelligence net on the mainland.

At a formal dinner, Madame Chiang, who spoke fluent English,

"personally greeted by name every guest as he arrived," Whitney recalls, "though she had never met most of us and probably had only heard of us through an official briefing for the occasion; how she did it I do not know."

[note]

Improvements in facilities for Flight "B" at Yokota were suspended pending movement. 3rd Air Rescue Squadron was advised this date that confirmation from FEAF would be forth coming.

Four (4) SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. A total of twenty four hours (24:00) was flown on these missions.

At 1312/K, H-5 #1997 arrived from Johnson Air Base.

At 1335/K Flight "D" received a call from Headquarters, FAF, to dispatch the H-5 immediately to Taegu, Korea.

At 1522/K the H-5, Lt. Clapsaddle, pilot, took off from Flight "D" for Taegu, Korea, to deliver the H-5 to that station.

At Flight "C" one dependent wife with childbirth complications was given air evacuation to Matsushima. Mission was successful and completed without incident.

[note]

The 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne) was established at Taegu for forward air control operations with T-6 aircraft. Forty-six B-29s of the 22nd and 92nd BGs bombed the Chosen nitrogen fertilizer factory at Hungnam, the largest chemical plant in the Far East.

[note]

Distinguished Service Cross

HURR, DAVID A. [Pvt. E5thCR]

Moore, Ned Dalton [Col. CO 19thIR]

August August August

At the beginning of August, the 24th Division deployed behind the Naktong River on a 40-mile front, with the 34th, 21st and ROK (Republic of Korea) 17th Infantry regiments on line from south to north.

The 34th's sector was some 34,000 yards, along which were deployed the 493 remaining troops of the 3rd Battalion.

The 515 troops of the 1/34th waited in reserve at Kang-ni, about two miles from the river. The 34th numbered 1,402 men, less than half the authorized regimental strength.

All three rifle companies of the 3/34th were scattered in small enclaves and outposts along the river. The regiment was critically short of vehicles, 4.2-inch mortars and Browning automatic rifles, the mainstays of Korean War­era rifle squads.

[note]

August

Three BD-110A switchboards on left and one BD-96 on extreme right being operated by Private First Class James Grahn of Company B, 71st Signal Service Battalion, Pusan, Korea. 08/01/1950 Photographer, Crowe. Corporal, War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

[note]

August

[note]

August

(Notes)

Shipments of winter clothing and equipment to the Far East Command began.

[note]

"Yakov Malik, Soviet delegate to the UN, ended Moscow’s boycott of the organization and took over the presidency of the Security Council."

[note]

On August 1, 1950 , the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (TCS), Airborne, was established at Taegu under the operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced, to operate the T–6s.

[note]

August

[note]

South then North


After our initial disasters at the Kum River Line and Taejŏn, 8th Army continued to fall back into a defendable perimeter around the vital port city of Pusan. There, although suffering other defeats and losing ground in the Northern section, the Army was reinforced, the Marine Brigade landed and kept the N.K. from advancing across the Naktong in the west, and the perimeter was held.

[note]

The battle for Andong lasted five days. [from 7/27] The river town finally fell on 1 August.

[note]

Railroad flatcars brought them A company 8072nd MTB to Masan the morning of 1 August. [see 1800]

Medium Tank Battalion, which was to receive fifty-four old World War II medium tanks rebuilt in Japan. ] [Detachment A (A Company) of the tank battalion, under the command of Capt. James H. Harvey, arrived at Pusan on 31 July. ] [Railroad flatcars brought them to Masan the morning of 1 August.] From there, Lt. Donald E. Barnard took the first platoon to the 19th Infantry position near Chungam-ni, and 1st Lt. Herman D. Norrell took the second platoon to the 27th Infantry at Chindong-ni.

Both platoons entered action the next day. [14-15]

[note]

August August

The next day, 1 August, North Koreans attacked both flanks. The ROK's repulsed them. General Church initially had intended that the ROK 17th Regiment would pass through the mountains around the flank of the North Koreans and attack from their rear while the 34th and 21st Regiments held them in front. But the army order for withdrawal came before this could be done. The ROK 17th Regiment at this time had a high reputation. Colonel Kim, the commander, a small man of twenty-eight years, commanded the respect of his officers and men. In a conference at this time, General Church asked Colonel Kim if his ROK's would hold their part of the line. He answered, "We will stay as long as the Americans." He was believed implicitly by those present. [15-9]

On 1 August Eighth Army issued an operational directive to all United Nations ground forces in Korea for their planned withdrawal behind the Naktong. It confirmed oral and fragmentary orders already issued to units on their redeployment to the main defensive positions of the Pusan Perimeter. [15-10]

[note]

By 1 August the ROK National Police was responsible for protecting all rail bridges and tunnels. Armed guards, their number varying with the importance of the structures, were stationed at each of them. [15-49]

The re-equipping of the ROK Army constituted in itself a large logistical problem in July. To meet part of the requirements, Japanese manufacturers contracted in August to produce for the ROK Army 68,000 vehicles, mostly cargo and dump trucks, with first deliveries to be made in September. Another matter of importance concerned replacing artillery losses in the early weeks of the war with World War II 105-mm. howitzers rebuilt in Japan. [15-50]

[note]

ROK Army losses during the first six weeks of the war were very heavy, but the precise number is unknown. Probably the killed, wounded, and missing reached 70,000. Most ROK units were in almost continuous action during July. In the United States, where the press emphasized American battle action, the part of ROK units in checking the North Korean advance was generally underestimated and little understood. ROK Army losses were normally far greater than those of Eighth Army.

On 1 August, for example, ROK casualties were 812 (84 KIA, 512 WIA, 216 MIA) in comparison with U.S. Army losses of 285, (24 KIA) and on 3 August they were 1,133 (128 KIA, 414 WIA, 591 MIA) in comparison with U.S. Army losses of 76 (37 KIA)

[note]

August

The division [7th Division] departed Sŏul on 1 August, the men wading the neck-deep Han River while their vehicles and heavy weapons crossed on the pontoon bridge, except for the division artillery which was left behind. The 7th Division marched south through Taejŏn, Chŏnju, and Namwŏn.

[note]

The Far East Command's "Operation Rebuild" by August had assumed the proportions of a gigantic production of ordnance materiel. Before the end of 1950 it had expanded to employ 19,908 people in eight Japanese shops.

[note]

Before the augmentation program began there had been a few cases in which American unit commanders had used volunteer South Koreans unofficially to strengthen their forces. One of the first of these officers, if not the first, was Colonel Clainos, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. About the first of August, just after Eighth Army had retired behind the Naktong River, four Korean officers and 133 men from the South Korean police at Taegu voluntarily joined Clainos' battalion on the unofficial basis that they would receive arms and food to the best of Colonel Clainos' ability. A Lieutenant Chung, a Tokyo-trained Korean wearing a Japanese samurai sword, marched his unit to the 1st Battalion. Colonel Clainos attached Lieutenant Chung to his staff and the other three officers to A, B and C Companies, respectively. He then attached two Korean policemen to each rifle squad in the companies.

[note]

On 29 June, the Australian Ambassador called on Secretary of State Dean Acheson and said that his country would make available for use in Korea a destroyer and a frigate based in Japan, and that a squadron of short-range Mustang fighter planes (77th Squadron Royal Australian Air Force) also based in Japan would be available. [42] Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands said they were dispatching naval units. [from 6/29 - Only Nationalist China offered ground troops-three divisions totaling 33,000 men, together with twenty transport planes and some naval escort. General MacArthur eventually turned down this offer on 1 August because the Nationalist Chinese troops were considered to be untrained and had no artillery or motor transport. ]

[note]

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

 

19500801 0000 DSC HURR

19500801 0000 DSC MOORE

Silver Star

 

Smith, Thomas Archie [Pvt SS A3rdECB]

 

[note]

The Forgotten War

On August 1 Eighth Army ordered this conglomeration of units** to pull back behind the Naktong River into defensive positions.[6-78]

This withdrawal left Ned Moore's Chicks, positioned farther south at Sanch'ong and Chinju, perilously overextended and exposed on the right (or north) flank. Accordingly that same day Eighth Army ordered Moore and his Chicks to abandon Sanch'ong and Chinju and withdraw east toward Masan. Moore complied, fighting a skilled and brave withdrawal (for which he won a DSC), but at Sanch'ong Wesley Wilson, commanding the attached 1/29 (from Okinawa), failed to get the word. As a result, he was cut off north of Chinju and had to withdraw through the mountains, a rugged and dangerous maneuver which fortunately was carried out without a single loss.

It was soon evident to Walker that the shattered 24th "Division" was not nearly strong enough to block the drive of the NKPA 4th and 6th divisions on Pusan. Substantial reinforcements were en route by sea to Pusan (the full 2nd Infantry Division; the Marine RCT; the Army's 5th RCT), but they might not arrive in time. This tight situation led Walker to take what would be described as a great gamble": He would secretly and temporarily shift Bill Kean's 25th Division from the Taegu front to the southwest front to reinforce the 24th Division.

A number of factors influenced Walker's decision to take this gamble:

first, his knowledge that the NKPA had egregiously erred in splitting and diluting its forces on the Taegu front to threaten Pusan;

secondly, perhaps as a consequence, the noticeable lessening in the NKPA pressure on Taegu;

thirdly, the possibility of constructing and strengthening the Taegu front by simultaneously withdrawing the 1st Cav behind the Naktong River;

fourthly, the increasing valor and success of the ROK forces;

fifthly, the mobility of American forces.

The fifth factor was by no means last or least. The Taegu - Pusan road was in good shape. It was also paralleled by a railway. The distance between the fronts was less than 100 miles. With optimum and efficient utilization of the road and railroad, Kean could shift the entire 25th Division within a day or so. If a sudden crisis developed on the Taegu front, Kean could quickly shift the division back to Taegu. In military parlance, the "interior lines of communication" favored Walker.

[note]

In arriving at the Pusan Perimeter, the Americans and ROKs had paid a ghastly price. By August 1 the American ground forces had incurred a total of 6,003 casualties, the majority (3,610) in the 24th Division. In all, 1,884 Americans were dead, 2,695 were wounded, 523 were missing, and 901 were POWs. This carnage was nearly three times that incurred in World War II on D day at bloody Omaha Beach (2,000) and nearly double the American casualties at Pearl Harbor (3,600) and twice those at Tarawa (3,000). To the Army's amazement, it was later confirmed that on this same date, August 1, ROK Army casualties stood at an appalling 70,000.

No one in Taegu, Tokyo, or Washington yet knew it, but the NKPA had also sustained appalling casualties. On August 1 GHQ and the Pentagon estimated NKPA losses at 31,000 and 37,500 respectively. Later the Army discovered (also to its amazement) that the true figure was closer to 58,000. One reason for the gross underestimate was the tendency in Eighth Army to disbelieve or discount ROK Army estimates of casualties inflicted on the NKPA. Because of these heavy losses, by early August the ten combat divisions of the NKPA had been reduced to a total strength of but 70,000 men. The vaunted NKPA armored force had diminished from 150 to 40-odd T-34 tanks. Owing to complete, uncontested American air and sea supremacy and the NKPA's ever-lengthening and complex lines of communications, it could only barely supply its dwindling forces.

Fed by the American intelligence underestimations of NKPA losses, press reports continued to describe the enemy in terms of "hordes" and "wave after wave" of men, who outnumbered the UN forces "four to one" or more. In actuality, on August 1 Eighth Army, with 45,000 men in the six ROK combat divisions and 30,000 men in the three American combat divisions, slightly outnumbered the NKPA combatant forces.

August August August

Moreover, on that date long-awaited American reinforcements (the Army's 5th RCT, the Marine RCT, and the 2nd Infantry Division) were beginning to arrive in Pusan. By August 4 Eighth Army frontline forces outnumbered NKPA frontline forces 92,000 to 70,000. Although as yet unperceived, this numerical advantage on the battlefield greatly strengthened the odds for a successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter.

Thus, subtly and imperceptibly, the balance of power in South Korea was shifting to the battered Eighth Army. In splitting its forces for the wide flanking attack on Pusan in preference to a textbook massed attack on Taegu, the NKPA had seriously alarmed Eighth Army, but it had thrown away its best chance for a quick and decisive victory. In consolidating into what then (and later in many histories of the war) appeared to be a defensive, defeatist, and desperate "Custer's Last Stand" in the Pusan Perimeter, Johnnie Walker had in fact finally disposed Eighth Army in the most advantageous stance to defeat the NKPA ultimately.

[note]

In the early days of August the NKPA closed on the Pusan Perimeter with ten divisions. It mounted strong pressure on all fronts, but its main effort was directed in the southwest the flanking attack of the 4th and 6th divisions designed to capture Masan and Pusan. It reinforced those divisions with the 83rd Motorcycle Regiment, tanks, motorized artillery and other units, plus thousands of fillers. The goal was to capture Pusan by August 15 the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese. The NKPA 6th Division (10,000 men) staging out of Chinju would renew the drive along the Chŏnju Masan road. To its north the NKPA 4th Division (7,000 men) would cross the Naktong and attack in concert toward Yŏngsan-ni, and Miryang, then turn south and link with the 6th Division for a joint attack on Pusan.

The NKPA decision to concentrate major strength in this sector had initially caused Johnnie Walker deep concern and led him to the hurried transfer of Bill Kean's 25th Division to reinforce John Church's skeletal 24th. But it was soon apparent that the NKPA strategy played into Walker's hands. It temporarily but decisively reduced pressure in the northwest sector against Taegu; it directed the main NKPA effort at what would prove to be Walker's main strength.

Perhaps unknown to the NKPA, powerful American reinforcements were then arriving, or about to arrive, in Pusan. These were the Army's 2nd Infantry Division, the Army's 5th RCT, the Marine RCT, and the independent tank battalions. These forces comprised, in total, five regiments of infantry (fifteen battalions) at full or nearly full strength; six battalions of artillery; several tank battalions; an A/A battalion; combat engineers and other support units, numbering in total about 30,000 men. Added to the 24th and 25th Divisions, the reinforcements would bring the total American ground strength in the southwest.

[note]

August

[note]

August

The [89th Tank] battalion commander, Welborn G. ("Tom") Dolvin (West Point, 1939; ), thirty-four, who had fought in Italy and the ETO, remembered how his outfit was thrown together:

"On July twelfth, while on the golf course, I. got verbal word that my orders had been changed to Korea. I met a cadre of a hundred fifty-five men from the Second Armored Division in California on July seventeenth. We flew to Tokyo, arriving on July nineteenth, where we picked up another cadre of seventy men. My A Company left Tokyo by ship on July twenty-fourth and arrived in Pusan on July thirty-first. I flew over and met them on the dock at Pusan that day a mere fifteen days after activation of the outfit . We left Pusan for Masan, joining the Nineteenth and Twenty-seventh regiments on the following day."[7-3]

[note]

August August August

Mike Michaelis's Wolfhounds led the 25th Division redeployment, arriving at Masan on about August 1. There Michaelis joined his old 101st Airborne Division cohort Ned Moore and the 24th Division commander John Church to draw up a battle plan a blocking action designed to delay the NKPA until the 5th RCT and the Marine RCT arrived in the sector. Neither Moore nor Michaelis got much help or direction from Church or his ADC, Pearson Menoher, or anybody else on the 24th Division staff. Church was "a peculiar man," Moore remembered. He was "older, frail and sick a lot with arthritis." Michaelis wrote that Church "seemed lethargic" and that the 24th "was a whipped division with little initiative." His most "distinct impression" was the "inability of any of the division staff or command to issue a concise and positive order."[7-1]

The defense of Masan was complicated by a division in the Chinju - Masan road east of Chinju at Much'on. In effect, this division created two roads from Much'on to Masan, a "north road" and a "south road." Since the "north road" seemed the most likely route of the NKPA advance, Church had left Moore and his Chicks (2,335 men, including survivors in the 1/29 and 3/29 from Okinawa) astride it. Michaelis's vague instructions were to backstop Moore directly along the "north road." But Michaelis was deeply concerned about the south road"; should the NKPA elect to take that route, it could outflank not only the 19th and 27th regiments but the whole of Eighth Army.

From Moore or his staff Michaelis gained the impression that the Chicks were "beaten" and not likely to mount a strong defense of the "north road." Hence the Wolfhounds were urgently needed there to backstop the Chicks. Yet some sixth sense told Michaelis that the "south road" could not be left unblocked. He therefore made the decision, entirely on his own, to redeploy his Wolfhounds from the "north road" to the "south road." He attempted to reach Church or Menoher for approval of this change, but owing to the poor or nonexistent communications, he was not successful. It was a bold gamble for Michaelis: If the NKPA ignored the "south road" and concentrated all its force against the Chicks, it was likely that the Chicks would collapse and flee, leaving the Wolfhounds cut off and trapped on the "south road" and the route to Masan-Pusan wide open.[7-2]

In preparation for this battle both Moore and Michaelis received significant reinforcements: a platoon each of six Sherman medium tanks, mounting76mm guns. These tanks, salvaged from World War II battle fields during Operation Rollup and refurbished by the Japanese, comprised the advance elements of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, which Eighth Army had activated in mid-July and assigned initially to the 24th Division. ' The battalion commander, Welborn G. ("Tom") Dolvin (West Point, 1939; ), thirty-four, who had fought in Italy and the ETO, remembered how his outfit was thrown together: "On July twelfth, while on the golf course, I. got verbal word that my orders had been changed to Korea. I met a cadre of a hundred fifty-five men from the Second Armored Division in California on July seventeenth. We flew to Tokyo, arriving on July nineteenth, where we picked up another cadre of seventy men. My A Company left Tokyo by ship on July twenty-fourth and arrived in Pusan on July thirty-first. I flew over and met them on the dock at Pusan that day a mere fifteen days after activation of the outfit . We left Pusan for Masan, joining the Nineteenth and Twenty-seventh regiments on the following day.[[8/1] "[7-3]

[note]

US Air Force

 

 

First contingent of Marines to land at Pusan at 1700 hours.[163-These were men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and they actually landed the next day. When it took up positions in the southeast corner of what would become known as the Pusan Perimeter, the brigade was composed of the 5th Marines plus a battalion of the 11th Marines. (Montross and Canzona, pp 51, 90-91.)]
Original plans were for them to stage in Japan and then go to Korea - however, they are going direct. This group completely equipped with airplanes, etc.


Sent radio to CSAF, attention Twining, concur in choice of General Henebry for this command.


Weyland worked out verbally through Price obtaining Navy liaison for
Partridge. Three Navy men presently attached to Fifth Air Force air defense, who can be considered surplus at moment, to be directed by Morehouse to Korea for purposes of liaison.


Returned from Formosa 8:15 P.M.

One F-80 crashed near Choch'iwŏn area. No details; presumed to be from small arms fire.

[note]

August August

By 30 July this contingent had converted to F-51's at Johnson, and on 3 August it had reached Taegu, where, next day, the 51st Fighter Squadron (P) was returned to its old designation as the 12th Squadron.

With the arrival of a fighter group, the air base unit at Taegu was redesignated and expanded to become the 6002nd Fighter Wing, Single Engine, comprising temporary duty squadrons typical of a wing organization. Hardly had this new organization been set up on 1 August, than the threat of an enemy attack at Taegu forced the withdrawal of all heavy equipment and large portions of the personnel.

August August

The 67th Squadron went back to Ashiya and on 6-7 August the remainder of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group followed it there.

[note]

19500801 0000 usaf0 - elastic bridge 19th BG(M)

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week July

30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks Aug

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks Aug

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks Aug

20 - the Navy sink the bridge Aug

[note]

With the arrival of a fighter group, the air base unit at Taegu was redesignated and expanded to become the 6002nd Fighter Wing, Single Engine, comprising temporary duty squadrons typical of a wing organization. Hardly had this new organization been set up on 1 August, than the threat of an enemy attack at Taegu forced the withdrawal of all heavy equipment and large portions of the personnel. The 67th Squadron went back to Ashiya and on 6-7 August the remainder of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group followed it there.

[note]

August

Marine aircraft furnished a third agency of air support in the campaign for South Korea. A forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Tokyo on 19 July, and the remainder of this organization reached Japan on small carriers about 1 August. After a short period of orientation at Itami, the wing moved its squadrons to offshore Korea on two escort carriers to support the Marine brigade which went into the Eight Army line on 5 August.

[note]

The proposition having been accepted by MacArthur, General LeMay alerted the 98th and 307th Bombardment Groups on 29 July for a minimum of 30 days temporary duty in the Far East. The 98th Group left Spokane for Yokota between 2 and 4 August, and the 307th departed from its home base at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, on 1-3 August, headed for Kadena. Although the experiences of these units in preparing for short notice departures were similar to those of the first two groups, the actual movement benefited from the earlier example. The historical officer of the 98th Group stated that "completion of preparation for the move, personnel-wise, was expeditiously accomplished."

[note]

August

On 13 July the airborne control organization moved back to Taegu, where it became known as the MOSQUITO squadron, an appropriate name which appears to have come from an early radio call sign for the unit. After three weeks of informal existence, the MOSQUITO squadron was officially organized as the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron Airborne, effective on 1 August.

[note]

August August

The warning alert, followed by appropriate operations orders, went out to the 22nd and 92nd Groups on or soon after 1 July. Officers and airmen who had been planning Fourth of July holidays found themselves packing crates, loading cargo planes, or standing in line before the boarding ramps of planes bound for the Far East. After hurried hours of packing and preparation, the deployment airlift got under way. The two groups scheduled flights of ten B-29's each day, departing their home bases on 5 through 7 July.

The 22nd left March Air Force Base, California, stopped off at Hickam for a rest period, then flew on to Kadena, with stops at Kwajalein and Guam.

The 92nd Group took off from Spokane Air Force Base, Washington, and followed a similar flight plan, with a final destination of Yokota Air Base.

August August

The 98th and 307th Groups were equally well prepared for short-notice departures.

The 98th departed Spokane Air Force Base for Yokota between 2 and 4 August, and the 307th left MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, between 1 and 3 August, headed for Kadena.#128

[note]

August

Even more serious was the Eighth Army's inability to provide the special communications required by the air-ground operations system. In the official delineation of service responsibilities for air-ground operations the Army was obliged to establish three communications nets:

Of these networks the tactical air request net was the most vital, for over it, in orderly fashion, were supposed to flow the requests for support air strikes from needing battalions to the JOC. The approved procedure for handling requests for immediate air-support missions was as follows:

But the Eighth Army, in the summer of 1950, was unable to establish such a communications net which would permit an orderly passing and evaluation of immediate air-support requests. "The Army had no equipment available," explained the G-3 Air officer at the JOC. "We had no strike-request nets. Everything was in the United States ."#133

Lacking the properly constituted tactical air-request net, Eighth Army battalion commanders at first attempted regimental command post and went to forward requests for supporting forward to a battalion to direct a close they depended upon a TACP for communications, ground commanders came to believe that they could not obtain air support unless they had a TACP Regimental commanders began to insist that these parties remain in the immediate vicinity of their command posts. This was not an entirely disadvantageous position for the TACP, for in. the area was normally located the regimental artillery-fire direction post, and the forward air controller and the artillery liaison officer were prepared jointly to advise the regimental commander on the support that could be given to him. But the regimental command post was normally some distance from the front lines, and the TACP was unable visually to control an air strike from such a rearward location. Sometimes the TACP left the strikes over organic communications lines. This, however, did not work too well, for the Eighth Army's land lines were generally "busy" with administrative traffic, if, indeed, they were operating at all.#134

August

Regimental commanders soon learned that the TACP's could pass a mission request to the Mosquito which hovered over their division and that the Mosquito could relay the request to the TACC with a minimum of delay. This soon became the accepted communications route whereby air-support requests passed from front-line Army units to the JOC.#135

[note]

Partly in response to the Burns board [see 3/26] suggestions and partly as the result of independent study, the Fifth Air Force soon undertook a general reorganization of the Mosquito and tactical air-control party functions. Since 1 August 1950 the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne) had provided the Mosquito controllers, and since 25 December 1950 the 6164th Tactical Control Squadron had provided the enlisted members and equipment for tactical air-control parties.

[note]

Unlike the radars and fighter-interceptors, which belonged to the Air Force, the third member of the air-defense team-antiaircraft artillery-was manned and equipped by the Army. How much control the Air Force was to exercise over Army antiaircraft artillery had been a question in the years after World War II, but on l August 1950 Generals Vandenberg and Collins formally agreed that an Air Force air-defense commander would exercise operational control over antiaircraft artillery "insofar as engagement and disengagement of fire is concerned." #129

[note]

In response to immediate requirements, the 1809th AACS Group drew upon men and equipment in Japan to establish AACS detachments at Pusan, Taegu, and P'ohang early in July 1950. Meanwhile, the AACS rushed ten air-transportable AACS detachments to the Far East from the United States. At first the AACS detachments in Korea operated under the 1955th AACS Squadron at Itazuke, but on 1 August 1950 the 1973rd AACS Squadron was organized at Taegu. Within a few days the force of North Korean ground assault compelled the AACS detachment to fight its way out of P'ohang, but the 1973rd Squadron held its position at Taegu. #133

August

A3C Nick Psairas of the 502nd Tactical Control Group adjusts a hilltop radio relay directional antenna to the proper channel.

[note]


In response to immediate requirements, the 1809th AACS Group drew upon men and equipment in Japan to establish AACS detachments at Pusan, Taegu, and P'ohang early in July 1950.

Meanwhile, the AACS rushed ten air-transportable AACS detachments to the Far East from the United States.

At first the AACS detachments in Korea operated under the 1955th AACS Squadron at Itazuke, but on 1 August 1950 the 1973rd AACS Squadron was organized at Taegu. Within a few days the force of North Korean ground assault compelled the AACS detachment to fight its way out of P'ohang, but the 1973rd Squadron held its position at Taegu. #133

[note]

US Marine Corps

August August August

When the 5th RCT debarked at Pusan on 1 August, it was earmarked for the 25th Division and placed in Eighth Army reserve.[5] Also debarking on the 1st was the Army’s skeletonized 2nd Division. This unit cleared Pusan and hurried to the hard-pressed Taegu area where it also passed into Eighth Army reserve.[6]

During the last hours before the Brigade’s arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Chidester was diligently engaged in the task—or art—of procurement. It has already been explained why the Marine ground force would debark for combat with little more than what its troops could carry on their backs. In order to offset partially the deficiencies, the G-4 successfully negotiated with Army authorities for 50 cargo trucks, several jeeps, some radio vans, and various other items of equipment. Officers of the Pusan Base Command reacted to all of Chidester’s requests with as much generosity as their meager stocks of materiel would allow.[7]

[note]

The Marine Corps was as lenient as could reasonably be expected when it came to granting delays and deferments. On 1 August a board of eight officers at Marine Corps Headquarters initiated daily meetings to consider such requests emanating from the various Reserve districts. Two weeks later the Commandant gave Reserve District directors the authority to grant delays for periods up to six months after judging each case on its individual merits. But even after every concession had been made that could be reconciled with the national interest, it was a wrench for hundreds of reservists to make the sudden plunge from civil into military life. There were instances of men seeking deferment by using political influence or pleading physical disability. But such cases were rare as compared to the great majority who reported promptly and declared themselves combat-ready.

In the selection of reservists for the division, two categories were recognized—combat-ready and noncombat-ready. The first applied to men whose records proved that they had been members of the Organized Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and 72 drills or two summer camps and 32 drills. Veterans of more than 90 days’ service in the Marine Corps also qualified. All other reservists were classified as noncombat-ready.

When lost or incomplete records complicated the equation, a reservist’s own opinion could not be accepted as proof of his fitness for combat. This ruling had to be made because so many men were found to have more spunk than training. Officers of a reservist’s unit were questioned before a decision was reached, and any man feeling the need of further training could be removed without prejudice from immediate consideration for combat.

Standards were so strictly observed that only about half of the reservists qualified as being combat-ready. This group broke down into the 15 per cent accepted for the 1st Marine Division and the 35 per cent assigned to posts and stations to relieve regulars who joined the division. The remaining 50 per cent consisted of men placed in the noncombat-ready or recruit class.[16]

The emergency found the Organized Aviation Reserve with 30 VMF and 12 GCI squadrons generally up to peacetime strength. Of the 1,588 officers, about 95 per cent were combat-experienced, and only about 10 per cent of the enlisted men stood in need of basic training. It was a comparatively simple task, therefore, to comply with the order of 23 July calling for six VMF and three GCI squadrons to report to El Toro. Their mission was to build up to war strength the units of the 1st MAW which had been stripped to mount out MAG–33.

[note]

On 23 July the first demand came; three Reserve VMF and six MCGI squadrons received orders to active duty in order to provide trained Marines for the 1st Wing, which had furnished the units and personnel of MAG-33; of the total 1,474 reservists ordered to extended active duty, approximately l,400 actually reported at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, on 1 August.

The arrival date of these personnel initiated a month of feverish but efficient activity at El Toro. In rapid succession, a new tactical air control squadron and a new ground control intercept squadron were activated, orders were received to move the rear echelon of the 1st Wing to the Far East, and MAG-15, including VMF-212, was transferred from Cherry Point to El Toro.

[note]

At Camp Lejeune, the trail was blazed by

all of which arrived on 1 August.

Thereafter, units continued to arrive in a steady stream.

[note]

Of the 1,474 aviation reservists affected by these orders, 1,392 actually reported on 1 August.

Meanwhile, by the end of July, Marine Aviation had been authorized an increase of one tactical air control squadron (TACS), one MGCIS, and two VMS's in its regular units.

[note]

At about this time, [8/1] a Board to Consider Requests for Delay in Assignment to Active Duty, composed of eight field grade Marine officers, was created. This Board, meeting daily, considered all requests forwarded by the Inspector-Instructors of the various reserve districts. Fully cognizant of the delay policies of the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps implementation of these policies, the members of the Board applied the established eligibility criteria to these requests, weighing each case in terms of hardship or the national interest against the immediate requirements of the Marine Corps.

[note]

US Navy

August
NS023732
354k "Gunner's Mate Second Class W.F. Patton gives the 'OK' signal after inspecting one of USS Princeton's (CV-37) 5"/38 twin gun mounts, as she is being prepared for return to service from the Pacific Reserve Fleet. Standing on the deck nearby are Commander C.S. Judson, Jr., (left) and Chief Gunner's Mate L.W. Brugler. All three men had served in Princeton's Gunnery Department prior to her decommissioning in 1949."Photograph was released by the 13th Naval District Headquarters, Seattle, Washington, on 1 August 1950.Official U.S. Navy Photograph, from the All Hands collection at the Naval History & Heritage Command (# NH 97007). Courtesy of Scott Koen &ussnewyork.com

August

2nd Infantry Division landed at Pusan.

COMNAVFE ordered two CVE's, USS Sicily (CVE 118) and USS Badoeng Strait (CVE 116), with assigned DD types to provide close air support to UN land forces in Korea.

USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) reported to COM7THFLT for duty.

[note]

19500801 0000 Belfast and Bataan, Toledo and DD's

August

[note]

August

[NOTE]

USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) arrived at Yokosuka, Japan, with elements MAW-1 on board. Four days later, USS Sicily (CVE-118) arrived at the same port with a load of ammunition, and on 1 August, USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) reported to Commander, Seventh Fleet in Buckner Bay, Okinawa. These were the first carrier reinforcements to arrive in the Far East and the beginning of carrier deployment to the combat area that, by the war’s end, totaled 11 attack, one light and five escort carriers sent into action — some for two or three tours.

[note]

The increased strength of the West Coast Support Element now permitted more ambitious efforts. On 1 August Admiral Andrewes took HMS Belfast (C-35) and USS Bataan (CVL-29) into the Haeju Man approaches to bombard the shore batteries guarding this potential source of enemy seaborne supply. And by this time ComNavFE had ordered a bombardment of the Mokp'o area by British warships, with patrol plane spot from Naval Air Japan.

Such a bombardment is no child’s play, for it involves a 30-mile approach through a constricted and tortuous channel where the currents at ebb and flood exceed ten knots. But on the 1st a promise of big business arrived, with a report from FEAF of large ships and many small craft in Mokp'o harbor, and

[note]

The carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) had left San Diego on the 6th; after ten days concentrated training in the Hawaiian area she had steamed westward at speed to reach Buckner Bay on 1 August. Admiral Hartman’s cruisers and destroyers had reported in to ComNavFE, and although USS Helena (CA-75) and the destroyer division had been sent to Formosa, this detachment was only temporary. Since 8-inch guns were more useful in action in Korea than on patrol in Formosa Strait, Admiral Struble formed Task Group 77.3, composed of USS Juneau (CLAA-119), the destroyers USS SAMUEL N. MOORE (DD-747) and USS Maddox (DD-731), and the oiler USS Cimarron (AO-22), and sent it south to relieve the Helena group. On 1 August, after five days in the Formosa area, Admiral Hartman headed north again, and on the 7th was bombarding the North Korean coast.

[note]

In still other categories the situation was improving. As an offshoot of Captain Austin’s Service Squadron 3, a second logistic command had been created in Service Division 31, which opened for business at Sasebo on 1 August and which would steadily grow in strength. And other United Nations ships were coming in; in addition to those incorporated in Admiral Andrewes’ west coast element, one French (FMS LA GRANDIÈRE (F731) and two New Zealand frigates (Tutira and Pukaki ) arrived on 1 August to reinforce the escort group.

By now, too, the air and ground components of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade were approaching the theater of action. The ships of Task Group 53.7, which had been assembled by the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force to lift this contingent, had sailed from southern California ports on 12 and 14 July. During the following two weeks, as fighting in Korea increased in intensity, the task group had steamed steadily westward across the Pacific. Steadily, that is, except for a pair of near-serious mishaps.

[note]

On 1 August, after five days in the Formosa area, Admiral Hartman headed north again, and on the 7th was bombarding the North Korean coast.

[note]

On 1 August the task group was dissolved, Admiral Hartman headed his ships back northward, and after three days at Sasebo for logistics sailed once again for the northeastern coast of Korea, where air sightings had reported a thousand railroad cars in the region between 40° and 42° N. This time he got there.

[note]

On 1 August, in consequence of the enemy advance and the defeat at Yŏngdong, ComNavFE had instructed Admiral Higgins’ task element and Commander Luosey’s ROKN units to harass and disrupt land and water movement in the neighborhood of Namhae Island.

August

Because of the loss of Yŏngdong and the loss of "The 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, attached to the 19th Infantry Regiment, US 24th Infantry Division, was ambushed at Yŏngdong. One half of the battalion was reported killed or missing in action. “

[note]

the carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) arrived from the United States,

[The carrier Philippine Sea had left San Diego on the 6th; after ten days concentrated training in the Hawaiian area she had steamed westward at speed to reach Buckner Bay on 1 August. ]

[note]

During this interval Admiral Struble visited Formosa, in company with General MacArthur, to perfect planning and liaison against the chance of a Communist invasion;

[MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral Struble, flew to Taipei on 31 July where for two days[8/1-2] he conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and his generals. But not until five days [8/7] after his return to Tokyo did MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [13]

[note]

As early as 10 July shipments of mines were rolling southward down the east coast railway from the Vladivostok region. One week later Soviet naval personnel had reached Wŏnsan and Chinnamp'o and were holding mine school for their North Korean friends. This reaction, which wholly justified Admiral Joy’s concern with the northeastern railroad route, was sufficiently rapid to get the mines through before the limited Seventh Fleet and NavFE forces could be brought to bear. Some 4,000 mines were quickly passed through Wŏnsan, and by 1 August mining had been begun at that port and at Chinnamp'o. In time Russian naval officers ventured as far south as Inch'ŏn, shipments of mines were trucked down from Chinnamp'o to Haeju, and before the bridges were knocked down consignments had reached Inch'ŏn, Kunsan, and Mokp'o by train.

[note]

That same day the Strategic Air Command alerted the Fifteenth Air Force's 98th Bombardment Group (M) and the Second Air Force's 307th Bombardment Group (M). General MacArthur found the proposal "highly desirable," and on 1 August the two medium bomber groups got their movement orders.#116

[note]

August

(Notes)

The warning alert, followed by appropriate operations orders, went out to the 22nd and 92nd Groups on or soon after 1 July. Officers and airmen who had been planning Fourth of July holidays found themselves packing crates, loading cargo planes, or standing in line before the boarding ramps of planes bound for the Far East. After hurried hours of packing and preparation, the deployment airlift got under way. The two groups scheduled flights of ten B-29's each day, departing their home bases on 5 through 7 July. The 22nd left March Air Force Base, California, stopped off at Hickam for a rest period, then flew on to Kadena, with stops at Kwajalein and Guam. The 92nd Group took off from Spokane Air Force Base, Washington, and followed a similar flight plan, with a final destination of Yokota Air Base. The 98th and 307th Groups were equally well prepared for short-notice departures. The 98th departed Spokane Air Force Base for Yokota between 2 and 4 August, and the 307th left MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, between 1 and 3 August, headed for Kadena.#128

[note]

The primary duty of the 6147th Squadron was to control air strikes against enemy targets, but the T-6 Mosquitoes continued to serve as the "eyes of the JOC." From the outset of their operations the Mosquitoes remained on station over the battle area for nearly three hours at a time, and in the course of their patrols they messaged current observations to the TACC over their very high-frequency communications. When the areas that the Mosquitoes reconnoitered were so far distant from Taegu as 'to prevent direct line-of-sight VHF communications, the 6147th Squadron kept aloft a plane called "Mosquito Mellow," which stood orbit at some intermediate point and relayed the messages of the airborne controllers into the TACC.#127

[note]

August

27,28,29,30,31,01,02,03,04,05,06 July-August

01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as USS Toledo (CA-133) fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell.

By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable.

Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins’ element found their days full.

[note]

27,28,29,30,31,01,02 July-August

August

The preparatory barrages began at 0830. Then came the air strikes. The battle that then opened lasted until 2 August without letup.

[It has already been going on for a week, 7/17. Should go on until the 9th]

[note]

 

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

 

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Thinking both in terms of the cold war and the hot war in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur on 31 July [1552] that mass air operations against industrial targets in North Korea were "highly desirable." To get the air campaign under way without more delay, the Joint Chiefs directed General Vandenberg to make available to MacArthur two more medium-bomber groups for a period of thirty days. Although they said that they did not intend to preclude MacArthur from employing the extra medium-bombers on other overriding missions, the Joint Chiefs desired the B-29's to destroy the two munitions plants and railway yards and shops at P'yŏngyang, the three chemical plants at Hŭngnam (Konan), the oil refinery and railway yards and shops at Wŏnsan, and the naval oil-storage tank farm at Rashin (Najin).#9

[note]

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August Attached to the 19th August on July 24

Colonel Wilson (1/29) Escapes With the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry

On the morning of 31 July, the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was at Sanch'ong. It was unaware that Chinju, twenty air miles to the southeast, had fallen and that the 19th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn eastward.

August

Sanch'ong Chinju Tansŏng

MAP 17 Chŏnju Region L552-NI52-2a

The mess trucks that went to Chinju the day before from the battalion had not returned. During the morning local villagers suddenly disappeared, a sure sign that enemy forces were approaching. Colonel Wilson drove south to Tansŏng, ten air miles from Chinju, where he had a roadblock. While he talked with Lieutenant Griffin, who was in command of a platoon there, about 700 refugees streamed through the roadblock. All agreed that enemy troops were behind them. [76]

August

Sanch'ong Chinju Uiryŏng

Colonel Wilson now decided to send the battalion's heavy vehicles out eastward before the roads were cut. His executive officer, Maj. Charles E. Arnold, brought the vehicular convoy to Tansŏng and there it turned east over a trail through the mountains in the direction of Uiryŏng. The trail was passable only to jeeps. But by the labors of his own men and all the Koreans he could assemble, Arnold improved it to the extent that all vehicles got through and reached Chungam-ni, except one that broke through an improvised bridge and was abandoned.

At 1700, Colonel Wilson and the battalion troops started withdrawing southward from Sanch'ong. They had marched about an hour when a liaison plane flew over the column and dropped a message.

August

Sanch'ong Tansŏng Uiryŏng Haman

Opening it, Colonel Wilson was astonished to read, "Yesterday you were ordered to report to the concentration area of Haman. . What are you doing here?" Haman was thirty-five miles away as the crow flies and much farther by the roads and mountain trails.

Wilson led his battalion on down to Tansŏng. There, a South Korean naval lieutenant detached himself from a group of refugees and came over to Wilson with a map. He said he had been at Chinju and that the American troops had left there, retreating eastward. He continued, "The Reds are just seven miles behind us and will get here tonight." Wilson talked to him at length and became convinced that his story was reliable. After consulting some of the battalion staff, Wilson decided to leave the Chinju road and head for Haman across the mountains. The men discarded all personal effects. Three or four sick and injured soldiers rode in the few jeeps, which also carried the radios, mortars, and machine guns. The battalion late in the evening headed east over the Uiryŏng trail.

August At 0200 the men [13-Col Wilson] reached Massang-ni, where the last north-south road that the enemy from the Chŏnju area could use to cut them off intersected the lateral trail they were following. Once east of this crossroad point, Wilson halted the battalion and, after security guards were posted, the men lay down to rest. During their night march, many refugees had joined them.

[note]

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August August

After the meeting, Moore returned to his command post while Michaelis waited for his regiment, which arrived about 0300 (1 August), tired and wet. Michaelis instructed it to continue on and dig in on the high ground beyond Chungam-ni, fifteen miles westward.

Colonel Michaelis with a few staff officers left Chung-ni while it was still dark and drove to the Notch, a pass southwest of Chungam-ni, arriving there shortly after daybreak. Colonel Michaelis, Captain Buchanan, Colonel Check, and Lt. Col. Gordon E. Murch were studying the ground there and planning to occupy the position, when Capt. Elliott C. Cutler, Acting S-3, 19th Infantry, arrived. He was reconnoitering the ground for defensive positions and had selected four possible sites between the Much'on-ni crossroads and the Notch. He told Michaelis the Notch was the best site and, when he left to return to his command post, he understood that Michaelis still expected to put the 27th Infantry into the Notch position. [14-6]

August

The conversation with Capt. Elliott C. Cutler apparently convinced Michaelis that the 18th [there is no 18th s/b 19th] Infantry was on the verge of another withdrawal which would uncover the Much'on-ni road fork. After Cutler departed, Michaelis remarked to his battalion commanders, Check and Lt. Col. Gordon E. Murch, "The 19th Infantry has been overrun and won't be able to do much. They are beaten. I think I will go back and cover the other road. I can't do much here." [14-6] Michaelis went back a mile or so to the 13th Field Artillery Battalion [of the 24 division] command post which had just been established west of Chungam-ni. There he telephoned Colonel Moore at the 19th Infantry command post.

August August

In the conversation that followed, according to Michaelis, Moore told him the 19th Infantry could not hold the crossroads and would fall back to the Notch. Michaelis said it seemed to him imperative in that event that some force block the southern road into Masan, otherwise the North Koreans could move through Masan on Pusan and flank the entire Eighth Army.

Michaelis proposed that the 19th Infantry endeavor to hold the northern road at the Chungam-ni Notch and that he take the 27th Infantry back through Masan to the vicinity of Chindong-ni to block the southern road to Masan. [14-7] Michaelis states that Moore concurred. Michaelis then tried, but failed, to establish communication with both the 24th Division and Eighth Army to obtain approval of this plan.

[note]

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0534 Sunrise

[note]

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August Attached to the 19th August on July 24

At 0600 the next morning, 1 August, the battalion [13-Col Wilson] took up the march eastward. It forded a stream and, half a mile beyond, the footsore men came on a gladsome sight: Major Arnold awaited them with a convoy of the battalion's trucks that he had led out the day before. [13-77]

[note]

The 25th Division Moves South

August

Dawn of 1 August found the U.S. 25th Division moving to new defensive positions south of Sangju on the central front.

[note]

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Between 1 and 4 August, U.S. and ROK units withdrew behind this line and prepared for a last-ditch stand. Most of the western edge of the perimeter was traced by the Naktong River with the exception of about fifteen miles at the southern end of this line. The northern border ran through the mountains above Waegwan and Uisŏng to the sea, with the town of Yŏngdök forming the eastern anchor. ROK troops held this portion of the line.

[note]

August

This chiding did not deter GHQ section chiefs. General Beiderlinden told the chief of staff, GHQ, in early August that he was still worried by the continuing trend toward empire-building in the GHQ staff. He felt that, instead of looking for more people, the GHQ staff sections should get more mileage out of those they already had. He hesitated to charge the other staff heads with wasting their resources, but he believed that they could, if they tried, achieve greater efficiency without strength increases. At General Beiderlinden's request, the chief of staff talked with section chiefs, stressing the importance of keeping GHQ manpower requirements at as low a level as possible. [07-38]

So urgent was the need for front-line soldiers in August that General MacArthur cut out the short, intensive training course which had been set up on 4 July for replacements at Camp Drake. He ordered replacements kept at Drake only long enough to receive their individual equipment. As a result of this ruling, replacements were given no chance to fire their individual weapons. Many men went into the front lines in Korea without having determined the characteristics and proper setting of their rifles or carbines. [07-39]

August

General Collins sent General Ridgway to Korea in early August to find out from MacArthur what specific requirements had developed since General Collins' July visit. General Collins gave Ridgway a personal letter to be handed to MacArthur which, he hoped, would serve to explain the Army's situation and to reassure MacArthur that everything possible was being done on his behalf.

   In order to meet your requirements for four divisions with supporting
   units [07-Collins wrote] we decided to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of
   Staff calling for four National Guard divisions to active duty on or
   about 1 September 195O.... On 1 August I recommended the Joint Chiefs
   call up those units. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, but reserved
   judgment as to definite commitment of all four divisions to your
   theater at this time. This was based on the fact that no one can
   definitely foresee the exact developments of the Korea fighting.

   I have felt all along that once the weather clears up and we are able 
   to get effective results from our air attacks, the logistic support 
   of the North Korean forces will rapidly dry up. This might result in 
   your being able to pass to the counteroffensive more nearly according 
   to your original time schedule and your original plans.

   You will recall that we agreed that this might be possible with  
   troops already definitely allotted to you which, including the full  
   Marine division, and an airborne combat team would aggregate almost  
   seven divisions. On the other hand, if the North Koreans are  
   continually reinforced from the North you may well require the full  
   strength of units requested....

   I am confident that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be willing to 
   accede to a definite request for these troops when the situation has 
   stabilized and you are able to make more definite plans than is 
   possible now. Meanwhile we will proceed with the training of the 
   divisions quickly. They will be permitted to accept volunteers up 
   until the time of actual induction.... Here again I think we must 
   wait and see how the North Koreans react during the next couple of 
   months. I think it is wholly possible that once they begin to fold, 
   and I am sure they will under the pressure of your counteroffensive, 
   that they may go very fast....

   Let me assure you again of my warmest support. If there is anything 
   we are doing now that should de changed or anything further that we could do to 
   back you up in this critical struggle please don't hesitate to call 
   on me. [07-40] 

General MacArthur made his needs known to General Ridgway at once. He repeated the call already made by his staff for 8,000 replacements by 20 August. When Ridgway passed this information to General Collins, he expressed the belief that the Department of the Army could meet the full requirement. The enlisted Reserve specialists, particularly those with prior service, could, with a minimum period of three weeks for processing and training, be sent to the FEC by September and would help cut down the shortages significantly. General MacArthur had suggested that the United States triple its transpacific shipping by using commercial shipping lines. [07-41]

August

The principal request which the Far East commander placed upon the Department of the Army through General Ridgway was for the 3rd Division. In the relatively near future, Japan would be completely stripped of American combat troops. So that the Japanese islands, doubly vital now as a support base for Korean operations, might not be completely defenseless against a possible Soviet attack, General MacArthur felt that the 3rd Division should be sent to Japan by mid-September. [07-42]

[note]

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On 1 August General Walker had ordered his entire force to break contact with the enemy and to pull back behind the Naktong River, there to make a final stand.

[note]

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Within three hours debarkation had been completed and unloading was in full swing. A waiting LST took on Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two and the ground personnel and equipment of VMO-6

By the next morning it was steaming toward Pusan, carrying the vital link in General Craig’s air-ground team. Cushman and Weir were making good their promises.[10]

Since harbor facilities at Kobe were unsuitable for offloading aircraft, the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) stood out to sea on 1 August and catapulted 44 of its Marine fighter planes into the air. The aircraft sped to the field at Itami, where they were quickly checked by pilots and crews for their imminent role in combat.

[note]

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August August August

His mind made up, however, Michaelis at once gave orders to turn the 27th Regiment around and head for Chindong-ni. It was about noon. [14-8]

In Masan, Michaelis found the newly arrived advance command post of the 25th Division, and from it he tried to telephone General Church at the 24th Division. Unable to get the division, he then tried to reach Eighth Army. Succeeding, he talked with Colonel Landrum, Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, and explained the situation. Landrum approved Michaelis' move to the southern road in the vicinity of Chindong-ni, and instructed him to continue efforts to communicate with General Church.

Later in the day, when General Walker returned to the army command post, Landrum informed him of his conversation with Michaelis. Meanwhile during the day, the Eighth Army G-3 Section succeeded in getting a message to General Church informing him of Colonel Michaelis' move and the new troop dispositions west of Masan. [14-9]

[note]

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On the next day a USS Valley Forge (CV-45) flight passing in the neighborhood observed the refinery still burning vigorously, while the smoke, rising to 5,000, was visible to the force at sea.

[note]

on the afternoon of 1 August sailed for the southern tip of Kyushu to rendezvous with the destroyers USS Doyle (DMS-34) and USS JAMES E. KYES (DD-787). On the same afternoon USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) got underway from Kobe to fly off aircraft to the Itami airbase; this was completed the next day, whereupon the carrier returned to port to replenish.

[note]

August August August

During the afternoon, the 27th Regiment arrived at Chindong-ni. Michaelis halted the troops there while he went forward a few miles with his battalion commanders, Check and Murch, to an observation post where they conferred with General Church, who had just arrived. In the discussion there, General Church ordered Colonel Michaelis to put one battalion on the hills at the low pass where they were standing. Church decided that a reconnaissance in force should proceed westward the next morning to locate the enemy. Both the 27th Infantry and the 19th Infantry were to make this reconnaissance and the two forces were to meet at the Much'on-ni road fork. Michaelis telephoned Colonel Moore and relayed General Church's order for a reconnaissance in force with all available tanks toward Chinju at 0600 the next morning, 2 August. Moore did not favor making this attack; Michaelis did. [14-10]

Pursuant to General Church's instructions, Colonel Michaelis placed Murch's 2nd Battalion on the high ground at Kogan-ni, where the conversation with General Church had taken place, about seven miles west of Chindong-ni, with E Company in an advanced position astride the road three miles farther west just beyond Pongam-ni. To Colonel Check was given the task of making the reconnaissance attack the next morning with the 1st Battalion. Check placed the battalion in an assembly area back of the 2nd Battalion for the night. Colonel Michaelis established his command post in a schoolhouse under a high bluff in Chindong-ni. [14-11]

On the northern road, as Captain Cutler discovered when he returned to the 19th Infantry command post from his reconnaissance, Colonel Moore had ordered the 1st Battalion to move to the Notch in one jump instead of taking several successive delaying positions as Cutler had expected. Moore thought the one move would give the battalion more time to dig in against an expected enemy attack. [14-12]

[note]

At 1312/K, H-5 #1997 arrived from Johnson Air Base.

[note]

At 1335/K Flight "D" received a call from Headquarters, FAF, to dispatch the H-5 immediately to Taegu, Korea.

[note]

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The 1st Battalion left its positions at the Chinju pass and arrived at a designated assembly area two miles southwest of the Notch about 1400. Colonel Rhea remained behind at the pass with an M20 armored car to protect the rear of the battalion. An hour after the battalion had moved off eastward, an American jeep carrying two North Korean scouts came up the hill from the west and stopped just short of the crest. Using small arms fire, Colonel Rhea's party killed the two enemy soldiers and recovered the jeep. Rhea's rear guard party then followed the battalion toward the Notch. Below the Notch Rhea received orders to make a reconnaissance of the high ground there. It took him about two hours to do this.

[note]

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At 1500 that afternoon a telephone message from Eighth Army head-quarters to General Kean abruptly changed division plans. Eighth Army alerted the division for movement south to Samnangjin on the Naktong River. There it was to deny enemy movement eastward and prepare to attack westward. [15-1]

[note]

August August August


USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and her screen steamed south for Buckner Bay. There they anchored on the 31st and there, on the next day, Task Force 77 received a welcome accession of strength with the arrival of the carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47).

[note]

At 1522/K the H-5, Lt. Clapsaddle, pilot, took off from Flight "D" for Taegu, Korea, to deliver the H-5 to that station.

[note]

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August August

Not until about 1700, after he had returned from this reconnaissance, did he receive orders to place his battalion in the position. It was evening before the 1st Battalion started to occupy the Notch position. [14-13]

The regimental plan called for the 1st Battalion to hold the Notch and the high ground to the right (northwest), and the ROK troops, commanded by Colonel Min, the high ground to the left (southeast) of the Notch. [14-14] Colonel McGrail's battalion, which had withdrawn from Chinju by a route north of the Nam River, crossed to the south side near Uiryŏng and arrived at the Notch ahead of the 1st Battalion. When the 1st Battalion arrived, the 2nd withdrew to the northern base of the pass in regimental reserve. Late in the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 29th [now 3rd Battalion, 27 Infantry], also arrived at Chungam-ni.

[note]

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USS Valley Forge (CV-45) and her screen steamed south for Buckner Bay. There they anchored on the 31st and there, on the next day, Task Force 77 received a welcome accession of strength with the arrival of the carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)

[note]

August August

As the 19th and 27th Infantry Regiments made their preparations during the evening of 1 August for their reconnaissance the next morning, most welcome reinforcements arrived. They were the first medium tanks in Korea, if one excepts the three ill-fated Pershing's at Chinju.

[About mid-July, Eighth Army activated the 8072nd Medium Tank Battalion, which was to receive fifty-four old World War II medium tanks rebuilt in Japan. ] [Detachment A (A Company) of the tank battalion, under the command of Capt. James H. Harvey, arrived at Pusan on 31 July. ] [Railroad flatcars brought them to Masan the morning of 1 August.]

From there, Lt. Donald E. Barnard took the first platoon to the 19th Infantry position near Chungam-ni, and 1st Lt. Herman D. Norrell took the second platoon to the 27th Infantry at Chindong-ni.

Both platoons entered action the next day. [14-15]

[note]

The leading element of the regiment arrived at Masan the next evening, 1 August.

[note]

August August

Walker issued orders for the 25th Division redeployment on July 31. Kean and his men complied with astounding efficiency. While the 1st Cav held off the sluggish (and perhaps puzzled) NKPA west of the Naktong, the 25th Division withdrew into Taegu and boarded trucks and trains in great secrecy. By the evening of August 1 advance elements of the division (the Wolfhounds) were arriving in Masan. The 25th Division historian noted with pride and hyperbole that the secret shift of the division from the Taegu front to the southwest front was "one of the best executed and cleverest strategic moves in the history of the United States Army.

Following the withdrawal of the 25th Division, Hap Gay commenced the retrograde movement of the 1st Cav to the Naktong River, per plan. Simultaneously ROK forces on Gay's right pulled back on the Naktong, to tie in with the Americans, in effect filling the gap left by the 25th Division. Rohsenberger's 5th Cav ably served as rear guard for the 1st Cav. After most of the division had crossed the Naktong, Gay blew the main highway and railroad bridges, killing "hundreds of refugees who refused to obey his emphatic orders to stay clear.

[note]


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The Battle at the Notch

August

Colonel Moore selected Colonel Wilson's 1st Battalion, 29th, to make the reconnaissance westward from the Notch and issued his orders for it at 2000, 1 August. A platoon of five M4 medium tanks and four M8 armored cars and a platoon of engineers were to accompany the battalion. [14-16] Moore had available at this time a total of about 2,335 men in the 19th Infantry and attached 29th Infantry units, excluding the ROK soldiers under Colonel Min. [14-17]

The tanks were to lead the column.

[note]

2030 Sunset

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The NKPA’s exploitation of civilians on the battlefield greatly enhanced both the NKPA’s combined-arms envelopment attacks and infiltration efforts. Two major forms of this exploitation existed.

The U.S. Army had rarely faced such tactics during World War II and then usually in an environment where the civilians were of a different nationality from the enemy. Thus Eighth Army was not prepared psychologically for the NKPA's exploitation of Korean civilians; likewise, the army was unprepared to field the specialized military police, counter-intelligence, and civil affairs units required to counter this type of exploitation at the start of the war.

[note]


Casualties

Tuesday August 1, 1950 (Day 038)

August 24 Casualties

As of August 1, 1950

2 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
3 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
10 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
24 19500801 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 56 2878 0 2 0 2936
Today 1 23 0 0 0 24
Total 57 2901 0 2 0 2960

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Tuesday 1, 1950 - day 038


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