Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 23.6°C 74.48°F at Taegu

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

First Battle of the Naktong Bulge. N.K.-4 forces three crossings of the Naktong against the 24th Division and ROK 17th Regiment. Heavily outnumbered, N.K.-4 still almost breaks through, but US and ROKs hold. The Marine Brigade is again brought into action, closely supported by two Carrier-based Corsair Squadrons from MAG33. They throw N.K.-4 back across the Naktong, eliminating them as a fighting force. N.K.-4 did not re-group until after the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) enter the war.

[note]

August

The next day, Mao ordered the NEBDA to complete preparations for war operations in early September.[76]

[note]

By early August, more than 250,000 troops of the former Fourth Field Army had taken positions on the Chinese-Korean border.[74]

[note]

August 5 to 19 - Battle of the Naktong Bulge. North Koreans make three crossings of the Naktong.

[note]

August

Communist troops cross the Naktong River southwest and northwest of Taegu and begin filtering troops to the rear of American lines. The 1st Cavalry Division wipes out one of the bridgeheads Aug. 9. There was a third crossing Aug. 5 near Sŏsan, but by Aug. 9 South Korean troops had backed the communist up to the Naktong.

[note]

August

It hadn't dawned on him, he said, that his visit to Taipei would be interpreted "as being sinister in any way." He still didn't see how it could be so construed. If he was wrong, he was sorry.

"It is," he told the press on August 5, "extraordinarily difficult for me at times to exercise that degree of patience which is unquestionably demanded if the longtime policies which have been decreed are to be successfully accomplished without repercussions which would be detrimental to the well-being of the world, but I am restraining myself to the best of my ability and am generally satisfied with the progress being made."

Thus far, one's sympathies are with MacArthur. The mission hadn't been his idea, he had behaved scrupulously, and his statement, if he had to issue one, had been discreet. His difficulty was that Chiang was then the Typhoid Mary of American diplomacy. Any contact with him was risky.[45]

[note]

August

5 August 1950
Two SB-17s and three SA-16s were used on orbit missions this date. A total of twenty five hours and forty minutes (25:40) was flown on these missions.

While on an orbit mission over the island of Tsu Shima an SA-16 piloted by Captain Schroder received a call that a man was in a life raft at 126° 24' E 35° 35' N. Although the VHF became inoperative, upon arrival in the area fresh dye marker was observed. A landing was effected and a navy pilot (Ens. Glen T. Farmorth) was taken aboard. This marked the first rescue by an SA-16 type aircraft in this theatre.

[note]

Aug. 5: Maj. Louis J. Sebille, commander, 67th FBS, dived his damaged F-51 into an enemy position. For this action he posthumously received the first Medal of Honor awarded to a USAF member in Korea. In the first SA-16 rescue operation of the war, Capt. Charles E. Schroder led a crew in saving a Navy pilot who had crashed into the sea off the Korean coast.

[note] [note]

USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) arrives on station

[note] [note]

Citations

Medals

Maj. Louis J. Sebille

biography

Kenneth L. Reusser

August

[note] [note] [note]

August

"North Korean snipers being searched and interrogated by American and South Korean troops somewhere in Korea."

[note]

August

On August 5, 1950 , the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron replaced the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) at Taegu. This organization supplied most of the pilots and aircraft deployed to Taegu in mid-July and became known as the Dallas Project. The Air Force History Team found two examples of how these F– 51 pilots felt about, and dealt with, the prospect of strafing civilians.

Lieutenant Duane E. Biteman patrolled the Naktong river line. He had very general instructions not to let refugees cross the river into the Pusan perimeter. For a “couple of hours,” he made low passes along the river, firing warning bursts into the river shallows to force the refugees away from the river and hoping that they would not cross and force him to shoot.

In another incident, a Forward Air Controller directed the squadron commander, Major Harry Moreland, and his wingman, Captain Daniel James, to a large number of enemy troops moving down the road. Upon inspecting this group, Moreland and James saw mostly women and children and did not attack.

August

In addition, some of the Australian pilots of No. 77 Squadron felt troubled at shooting people in white clothing. But when the Mosquito Forward Air Controllers assured the Australian pilots that the targets were legitimate and would blow up when hit, the pilots attacked. “It’s a gut wrenching business,” said Australian pilot John Flemming.

[note]

South then North

August August

The 23rd Infantry, 2nd Division, began arriving at Pusan on 5 August. That very morning its 1st Battalion received an alert to be ready to move on an hour's notice. [15-39]

[note]

August

If the estimate of 70,000 for ROK losses is approximately accurate, total U.N. losses up to 5 August 1950 would be about 76,000 men.

[note]

August

Underestimation of enemy losses in the first five weeks of the war led in turn to an exaggerated notion of the enemy forces facing the U.N. Command along the Pusan Perimeter. The enemy had probably no more than 70,000 men in his committed eleven divisions, one independent mechanized regiment, and one independent infantry regiment, as he began crossing the Naktong River on 4-5 August to assault the U.N. forces in the Pusan Perimeter.

A tabulation of estimated enemy strength by major units as of 5 August follows: [15-58]

Unit Strength
1st Division 5,000
2nd Division 7,500
3rd Division 6,000
4th Division 7,000
5th Division 6,000
6th Division 3,600
8th Division 8,000
12th Division 6,000
13th Division 9,500
15th Division 5,000
105th Armored Division (40 tanks) 3,000
83rd Motorized Regiment (detachedfrom 105th Armored Division) 1,000
766th Independent Infantry Regiment 1,500
69,100

No reliable figures are available for the number of enemy tanks destroyed and for tank troop casualties of the 105th Armored Division by 5 August, but certainly they were high. There were only a few tank replacements during July.

[note]

August

The North Koreans probably had no more than 3,000 armored personnel and forty tanks at the front on 5 August.

While no exact information is available as to the number of enemy artillery pieces and heavy mortars still in action by 5 August, it probably was about one-third the number with which the North Koreans started the war. The 4th Division artillery, for instance, reportedly had only twelve guns on 5 August when the division reached the Naktong. [15-60]

[note]

August August August

August

The enemy drive on Pusan from the west along the Chinju-Masan corridor compelled General Walker to concentrate there all the reinforcements then arriving in Korea. These included the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade-six battalions of infantry with supporting tanks and artillery. Eighth Army being stronger there than at any other part of the Pusan Perimeter, General Walker decided on a counterattack in this southernmost corridor of the Korean battlefront. It was to be the first American counterattack of the war.

The plan for a counterattack grew out of a number of factors-studies by the Planning Section, G-3, Eighth Army; the arrival of reinforcements; and intelligence that the North Koreans were massing north of Taegu. Although army intelligence in the first days of August seemed to veer toward the opinion that the enemy was shifting troops from the central to the southern front, perhaps as much as two divisions, it soon changed to the belief that the enemy was massing in the area above Taegu. [16-1]

The Army G-3 Planning Section at this time proposed two offensive actions in the near future. First, Eighth Army would mount an attack in the Masan-Chinju area between 5-10 August. Secondly, about the middle of the month, the army would strike in a general offensive through the same corridor, drive on west as far as Yŏsu, and there wheel north along the Sunch'ŏn-Chonju-Nonsan axis toward the Kum River-the route of the N.K. 6th Division in reverse. This general offensive plan was based on the expected arrival of the ad Infantry Division and three tank battalions by 15 August. The planning study for the first attack stated that the counterattack force

"should experience no difficulty in securing Chinju." [16-2]

[16-1] EUSAK WD, PIR 21, 2 Aug 50 and 23, 4 Aug 50.

[16-2] 2 EUSAK WD, 4 Aug 50, Stf Study, G-3 Sec to the G-3.

General Walker and the Eighth Army General Staff studied the proposals and, in a conference on the subject, decided the Army could not support logistically a general offensive and that there would be insufficient troops to carry it out. The conference, however, approved the proposal for a counterattack by Eighth Army reserve toward Chinju. One of the principal purposes of the counterattack was to relieve enemy pressure against the perimeter in the Taegu area by forcing the diversion of some North Korean units southwards. [16-3]

August

The attack decided upon, General Walker at once requested the Fifth Air Force to use its main strength from the evening of 5 August through 6 August in an effort to isolate the battlefield and to destroy the enemy behind the front lines between Masan and the Nam River. He particularly enjoined the commanding general of the Fifth Air Force to prevent the movement of hostile forces from the north and northwest across the Nam into the chosen battle sector. [16-4] [5 Aug 50]

[note]

August

The dog days of August were at hand. The men in Eighth Army who survived that period spoke afterward of it as "the days along the Naktong." The Eighth Army no longer could withdraw when enemy pressure became oppressive. It had to stand and fight and hold, or be driven out of Korea.

August

General Walker's defense plan centered on holding the road and rail lines running in a large oval east of the Naktong, from Pusan north through Miryang to Taegu, and hence east through Yŏngch'ŏn to KYŏngju, where they turned back south to Pusan. Any further withdrawal and loss of these lines of communication would render difficult any later U.N. attempt at a counteroffensive.

The North Koreans, in preparing to attack the Pusan Perimeter and its communication system, had available four lines of advance toward Pusan:

August

They tried them all simultaneously in August, apparently believing that if they did not succeed at one place they would at another.

Along the Perimeter, the most important terrain feature for both the United Nations and the North Koreans-helping the former and hindering the latter-was the Naktong River, the second largest river in Korea. It formed a huge moat in front of almost three-fourths of the Perimeter. Its numerous great folds and bends resembled a huge snake contracting its length before coiling. Along its lower course, the river is generally from one-quarter to half a mile wide and more than six feet deep. Great sand beaches appear at many places when the river is not swollen by rain. Hills come down close to the water's edge on either bank, and rice paddy valleys of varying sizes finger their way among the hills.

In Korea, the term hill came to mean to the soldiers anything from a knoll to a towering mountain. A few of the hills bordering the lower Naktong below Taegu on the east side rise to 1,200 feet elevation; three or four miles back from the river they climb to 2,500 feet. On the west, or enemy, side of the Naktong, the hills bordering the river are higher than on the east, reaching 2,000 feet in many instances. North of Taegu, along the upper reaches of the river, from Waegwan in a semicircle east to Andong, the hills rise still higher, many of them to elevations of 2,000 and 3,000 feet.

The line of the Naktong as organized by the American forces was a series of strongpoints on the highest hills, affording views of both the river and the natural avenues of travel from it. During the day, these points were hardly more than observation posts. At night they became listening posts and tight little defense perimeters. Some of the posts were manned only in the daytime. Others were held by no more than half a squad of men. No one expected these soldiers to fight in position; they were a form of intelligence screen, their duty being to observe and report. Jeep patrols during the daytime ran along the river road. Quite obviously, the river line was thinly held. Reserve troops some miles back from the river were ready to counterattack against any enemy crossing.

Artillery and mortars were in positions back of the river. They were laid to fire on known ferry and other probable crossing sites. The role of the artillery and the mortars was to be a vital one in the Perimeter fighting; their fire could be massed, within limits, against any major enemy effort. The infantry and the artillery together were disposed so as to hold the commanding ground and control the meager road net. The roads necessarily were all-important.

No one doubted that the North Koreans intended to force a crossing of the Naktong without delay. Time was against them. Every passing week brought closer the prospect of more American reinforcements troops, tanks, artillery, and planes. North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung had set 15 August as the date for final victory and the liberation of all Korea. This date marked the fifth anniversary of freedom from Japanese rule. [17-1]

The Naktong Bulge

Seven air miles north of the point where the Naktong turns east and the Nam enters it, the Naktong curves westward opposite Yŏngsan-ni, in a wide semicircular loop. The bulge of land formed by this river loop measures four miles east-west and five miles north-south. This particular loop of the river and the land it enclosed on three sides became known to the American troops as the Naktong Bulge during the heavy fighting there in August and September. (See Map IV.)

August

Northward from the confluence of the Nam with the Naktong, the 24th Division held the line of the lower Naktong for a distance of sixteen air miles, or a river front of about thirty-four miles. The 34th Infantry was on the lower, southern part; the 21st Infantry was on the upper part together with the ROK 17th Regiment. The 19th Infantry, just arrived from Masan, was re-equipping in the rear. In general terms, the 34th Infantry held the area west of Yŏngsan-ni, in the Naktong Bulge, while north of it the 21st Infantry held the area west of Ch'angnyŏng.

The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry, held the river line in its regimental front, while the 1st Battalion was in a reserve assembly area about four miles back from the river near Yŏngsan-ni,. (Map 9)

August

The 3rd Battalion front was about nine miles, or 15,000 yards long. [17-2] One may contrast this battalion frontage of 15,000 yards with one of 10,000 yards for a division at full strength, which U.S. Army doctrine considered normal.

The three rifle companies of the 3rd Battalion-I, L, and K, in that order from north to south-were on high hills overlooking the Naktong River. An unoccupied gap of more than two miles lay between I and L Companies, and another of more than three miles lay between L and K Companies. Because of the river's course around the bulge, the three company positions resembled the points of a broad triangle; I and K were the two extremities at the eastern base and L the apex at the bulge of high ground extending westward in the big fold of the river. Along this stretch of river there were at least six ferry crossing sites. [17-3]

For almost the entire regimental front, hills 500 to 600 feet high rose from the narrow river valley, in some instances abruptly from the water's edge. In this nine miles of front two valleys formed entrances from the river into the hill masses stretching eastward. The northern entrance was at the Ohang village ferry crossing This crossing lay in the gap between I and L Companies at the northern edge of the bulge. The other natural entrance into the regimental zone lay four air miles south at the under side of the bulge.

The 4.2-inch mortars supporting the 3rd Battalion were about a mile and a quarter back of the river in the draw that penetrated the hills from the Ohang ferry site. The 3rd Battalion command post was half a mile farther, southeast in this same draw, at the village of Soesil. Commanding the battalion was Lt. Col. Gines Perez, just arrived from the United States. At Yŏngsan-ni, six miles east of the river, Colonel Beauchamp had his regimental command post.

General Church ordered all civilians in the 24th Division zone to evacuate from an area five miles deep east of the river. He warned them that if they failed to do so, his troops might shoot them on sight as possible enemy agents. He said he could take no more chances with civilians; "If we are going to hold here, we cannot have any enemy behind us." [17-4]

The N.K. 4th Division Attacks Into the Naktong Bulge

The first enemy crossings of the Naktong River, west of the Andong mountain barrier, other than reconnaissance patrols, came on 5 August at three different places. Two were north of Waegwan in the ROK Army sector. The third was thirty miles south of Waegwan opposite Yŏngsan-ni,, in the 24th Division sector, in the big bulge of the Naktong. This third crossing of the river was made by the N.K. 4th Division and was the one to have consequences which first threatened the Perimeter.

August

(Map 9: NORTH KOREAN FORCES ENTER THE NAKTONG BULGE, 5-6 August, 1950)

Maj. Gen. Lee Kwon Mu commanded the N.K. 4th Division. Already he had received the highest honors, the "Hero of the Korean Democratic People's Republic" and the "Order of the National Flag, 1st Class," for achievements with his division. Forty years old, Lee had been born in Manchuria, had served in the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, and, according to some reports, he had been a lieutenant in the Soviet Army in World War II. After attending a school in the Soviet Union in 1948 he returned to Korea where he became Chief of Staff of the N.K. Army. Eventually he was relieved of this post. Shortly before the invasion he was recalled by Premier Kim Il Sung's personal order and given command of the 4th Division. The division itself in August 1950 held the honorary name of "The 4th Sŏul Division," "Sŏul" indicating recognition of the division's part in the capture of that city. [17-5]

[note]

August August

1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, had arrived from the United States on 5 August and had gone to an assembly area near Taegu

[note]

August August

On 5 August the North Koreans attacked again and drove the ROK's south of the town [Yŏngdök] to Hill 181. General Walker sent a personal message to Colonel Emmerich, the KMAG adviser with the ROK 3rd Division, saying that the lost ground must be regained. Plans were made for a counterattack the next night.

[note]

August

South of the N.K. 1st Division, the 13th Division had started crossing the Naktong during the night of 4-5 August. On the 5th the main part of its 21st Regiment crossed at Naktong-ni, forty air miles northwest of Taegu on the Sangju road. After the crossing was discovered, some of the enemy soldiers came under aerial strafing attacks while they were still in the water and ROK artillery and mortar fire was directed at the crossing site.

On the south bank the regiment came under continuing aerial and artillery fire, but with unknown casualties. That night the 19th Regiment crossed the river in the path of the 21st the men holding their weapons over their heads and wading in neck deep water. They left behind their heavy weapons and vehicles.

[note]

August

The N.K. 15th Division, next of the enemy divisions in line southward, received approximately 1,500 replacements at Kŭmch'ŏn on 5 August, which brought its strength to about 6,500 men.

[note]

August

On 5 August, for instance, The daily rail and water Red Ball Express from Yokohama to Sasebo to Pusan delivered 308 measurement tons;

[note]

August

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

Citations

 

        Medals

Medal of Honor

 

19500805 0000 mh usaf Sebille*


Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

 

19500805 00mh SEBILLE, LOUIS J.

19500805 0000 moh Sebille usaf50

19500805 0000 Navy Cross REUSSER

    Medals

Navy Cross

19500805 0000 Navy Cross REUSSER

Silver Star

Crain, John [PFC SS 1stBn27thIR]

Curtin, Francis A. [2ndLt SS MedCo 34thIR]

 

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

 

[There was no 5 August diary entry.]

 

[note]

 

 

August

The Reds gave every indication that they hoped to use their remaining planes and such additional aircraft as they might be able to secure from the Soviet and Chinese supporters. Early in August, for example, the Korean Reds repaired the runways and built protective revetments at Kimp'o and Suwŏn. Probably they hoped to use these forward airfields for staging attacks against United Nations' ground troops, but FEAF airmen were too alert to permit this. On 4 August B-29 crews attacking the Sŏul marshaling yard observed enemy fighters taking off from Kimp'o. Next day Fifth Air Force fighter pilots strafed and bombed the airfield, reporting nine enemy aircraft destroyed and an equal number probably destroyed.#102

[note]

AugustAugustAugust

Marine aircraft furnished a third agency of air support in the campaign for South Korea. A forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Tokyo on 19 July, and the remainder of this organization reached Japan on small carriers about 1 August. After a short period of orientation at Itami, the wing moved its squadrons to offshore Korea on two escort carriers to support the Marine brigade which went into the Eight Army line on 5 August. The wing possessed its own organic ground-control-intercept (GCI) and tactical air control squadrons, and while the ground Marines were in combat, it used its 72 F4U's to maintain a relatively constant rate of about 45 sorties until 10 September, when the Marines were withdrawn to make a landing at Inch'ŏn. At times during the period when the Marine brigade was not in combat, the 1st Marine Air Wing furnished a smaller number of air sorties along the general battle line.

Without question, the flying Marines, operating from "jeep" carriers close to their concentrated target areas, offered excellent close support, but their advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances of the situation. Small carriers so close inshore had been demonstrated to be exceedingly vulnerable to enemy air attacks during World War II , and had the North Koreans been able to muster an appreciable air effort, such close support would have been impossible. [Isn't air superiority the USAF's job?] World War II experience had similarly shown the gross waste of committing specific air units to the support of particular ground units, in this case a brigade. Yet a surprising number of Army commanders seemed willing to unlearn these lessons for the possession of their own support. One reporter hailed the "flying Marines" for the discovery of close air support:

"We want no more of those jet jockeys," said Wayne Thomis, purporting to speak for the ground soldiers; "Give us Flying Marines."

AugustAugustAugust

Marine aircraft furnished a third agency of air support in the campaign for South Korea. A forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Tokyo on 19 July, and the remainder of this organization reached Japan on small carriers about 1 August. After a short period of orientation at Itami, the wing moved its squadrons to offshore Korea on two escort carriers to support the Marine brigade which went into the Eight Army line on 5 August. The wing possessed its own organic ground-control-intercept (GCI) and tactical air control squadrons, and while the ground Marines were in combat, it used its 72 F4U's to maintain a relatively constant rate of about 45 sorties until 10 September, when the Marines were withdrawn to make a landing at Inch'ŏn. At times during the period when the Marine brigade was not in combat, the 1st Marine Air Wing furnished a smaller number of air sorties along the general battle line.

Without question, the flying Marines, operating from "jeep" carriers close to their concentrated target areas, offered excellent close support, but their advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances of the situation. Small carriers so close inshore had been demonstrated to be exceedingly vulnerable to enemy air attacks during World War II , and had the North Koreans been able to muster an appreciable air effort, such close support would have been impossible. [Isn't air superiority the USAF's job?] World War II experience had similarly shown the gross waste of committing specific air units to the support of particular ground units, in this case a brigade. Yet a surprising number of Army commanders seemed willing to unlearn these lessons for the possession of their own support. One reporter hailed the "flying Marines" for the discovery of close air support:

"We want no more of those jet jockeys," said Wayne Thomis, purporting to speak for the ground soldiers; "Give us Flying Marines."

AugustAugustAugust

Marine aircraft furnished a third agency of air support in the campaign for South Korea. A forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Tokyo on 19 July, and the remainder of this organization reached Japan on small carriers about 1 August. After a short period of orientation at Itami, the wing moved its squadrons to offshore Korea on two escort carriers to support the Marine brigade which went into the Eight Army line on 5 August. The wing possessed its own organic ground-control-intercept (GCI) and tactical air control squadrons, and while the ground Marines were in combat, it used its 72 F4U's to maintain a relatively constant rate of about 45 sorties until 10 September, when the Marines were withdrawn to make a landing at Inch'ŏn. At times during the period when the Marine brigade was not in combat, the 1st Marine Air Wing furnished a smaller number of air sorties along the general battle line.

Without question, the flying Marines, operating from "jeep" carriers close to their concentrated target areas, offered excellent close support, but their advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances of the situation. Small carriers so close inshore had been demonstrated to be exceedingly vulnerable to enemy air attacks during World War II , and had the North Koreans been able to muster an appreciable air effort, such close support would have been impossible. [Isn't air superiority the USAF's job?] World War II experience had similarly shown the gross waste of committing specific air units to the support of particular ground units, in this case a brigade. Yet a surprising number of Army commanders seemed willing to unlearn these lessons for the possession of their own support. One reporter hailed the "flying Marines" for the discovery of close air support:

"We want no more of those jet jockeys," said Wayne Thomis, purporting to speak for the ground soldiers; "Give us Flying Marines."

AugustAugustAugust

Marine aircraft furnished a third agency of air support in the campaign for South Korea. A forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Tokyo on 19 July, and the remainder of this organization reached Japan on small carriers about 1 August. After a short period of orientation at Itami, the wing moved its squadrons to offshore Korea on two escort carriers to support the Marine brigade which went into the Eight Army line on 5 August. The wing possessed its own organic ground-control-intercept (GCI) and tactical air control squadrons, and while the ground Marines were in combat, it used its 72 F4U's to maintain a relatively constant rate of about 45 sorties until 10 September, when the Marines were withdrawn to make a landing at Inch'ŏn. At times during the period when the Marine brigade was not in combat, the 1st Marine Air Wing furnished a smaller number of air sorties along the general battle line.

Without question, the flying Marines, operating from "jeep" carriers close to their concentrated target areas, offered excellent close support, but their advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances of the situation. Small carriers so close inshore had been demonstrated to be exceedingly vulnerable to enemy air attacks during World War II , and had the North Koreans been able to muster an appreciable air effort, such close support would have been impossible. [Isn't air superiority the USAF's job?] World War II experience had similarly shown the gross waste of committing specific air units to the support of particular ground units, in this case a brigade. Yet a surprising number of Army commanders seemed willing to unlearn these lessons for the possession of their own support. One reporter hailed the "flying Marines" for the discovery of close air support:

"We want no more of those jet jockeys," said Wayne Thomis, purporting to speak for the ground soldiers; "Give us Flying Marines."

August August August August

Because of MacArthur's particular interest in the rolling stock and supplies which had accumulated in Sŏul's marshaling yards, General O'Donnell sent the 19th Group there on 4 August and followed up this smashing attack with another mission flown by the 22nd and 92nd Groups on the next day. After these two missions Bomber Command reported that Sŏul's transportation facilities would be "inoperative for a considerable period of time. "#58

[note]

Seven [Nine] days after their arrival an SA-16 piloted by Captain Charles E. Schroder picked up Ensign Glenn T. Farmworth [Farnsworth] , a Navy pilot who had been in the water off Korea less than two hours.

[Not in the Korea Air Loss Database under that name]

FARNWORTH, Glen T. 500805 ENS USN F4U-4B 63018 USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) VF-113 Details

KORWALD Loss Incident Summary

Date of Loss: 500805
Tail Number: 63018
Aircraft Type: F4U-4B
Wing or Group: USS Philippine Sea (CV-47)
Squadron: VF-113
Circumstances of Loss: Mid-air collision with a/c 62938. Ditched at sea 15 mi S of Kunsan

Crewmembers Associated With This Loss
Name
(Last, First Middle)
Rank Service Status Comments
FARNWORTH, Glen T. ENS USN RSC SA-16 rescue

[note]

August

Hardly had the squadron [31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron] settled down, however, than the assignment of another B-29 group to Yokota displaced it. Misawa was designated as the new station, but the squadron commander, arguing the difficulty of delivering photography from this base, succeeded in obtaining a place at Johnson Air Base. This movement was completed on 5 August. With 9 assigned B-29's the squadron flew 382:40 hours in July, and with 13 planes in August it flew 779:45 hours, most of the missions for pin-point photographs of bridges, industrial targets, and airfields desired by Bomber Command.

[note]

19500805 0000 usaf0 - elastic bridge 19th BG(M)

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week

30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks

20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

AugustAugustAugust

Marine aircraft furnished a third agency of air support in the campaign for South Korea. A forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Tokyo on 19 July, and the remainder of this organization reached Japan on small carriers about 1 August. After a short period of orientation at Itami, the wing moved its squadrons to offshore Korea on two escort carriers to support the Marine brigade which went into the Eight Army line on 5 August. The wing possessed its own organic ground-control-intercept (GCI) and tactical air control squadrons, and while the ground Marines were in combat, it used its 72 F4U's to maintain a relatively constant rate of about 45 sorties until 10 September, when the Marines were withdrawn to make a landing at Inch'ŏn. At times during the period when the Marine brigade was not in combat, the 1st Marine Air Wing furnished a smaller number of air sorties along the general battle line.

Without question, the flying Marines, operating from "jeep" carriers close to their concentrated target areas, offered excellent close support, but their advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances of the situation. Small carriers so close inshore had been demonstrated to be exceedingly vulnerable to enemy air attacks during World War II , and had the North Koreans been able to muster an appreciable air effort, such close support would have been impossible. [Isn't air superiority the USAF's job?] World War II experience had similarly shown the gross waste of committing specific air units to the support of particular ground units, in this case a brigade. Yet a surprising number of Army commanders seemed willing to unlearn these lessons for the possession of their own support. One reporter hailed the "flying Marines" for the discovery of close air support:

"We want no more of those jet jockeys," said Wayne Thomis, purporting to speak for the ground soldiers; "Give us Flying Marines."

[note]

U.S. Marine Corps

August

The airplane and the pilot both were in their second war. The airplane, a Vought F4U-4B, was the latest and last model of the famous inverted gull-wing Corsair that had been the mainstay of Marine aviation units in the bitterly fought island campaigns of World War II.

Alongside their Navy brethren, Corsairs had lent a hand in sweeping the Japanese from the Pacific skies and had helped Marines on the ground blast Japanese defenders from islands with names such as Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The Japanese called them "Whispering Death." As airplanes go, the Corsair was getting old, destined to be the Marine Corps' last propeller-driven fighter. Sleek new jets were entering service; however, it wasn't time for the old warrior to go just yet. There was still work to be done.

To the pilot, Major Kenneth L. Reusser, the Corsair was an old friend. He had flown Corsairs in the Pacific—flown them so well and with such resolve and courage in the face of danger that his aerial exploits had brought him America's second-highest award for bravery: the Navy Cross. Now there was another war.

A scant six weeks earlier, in June 1950, North Korea's communist dictator, Kim Il Sung, had sent his so-called North Korean People's Army (NKPA) crashing deep into neighboring South Korea. Less than a month later the First Provisional Marine Brigade, with Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 33 as its aviation component, was activated and embarked for the war zone. Action on the ground and in the air was not long in coming, and Maj. Reusser would be in it from the start.

Saturday, 5 Aug. 1950 found Reusser leading a division of Corsairs from Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid's Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 214, the "Black Sheep," made famous by the legendary Gregory "Pappy" Boyington in WW II. Flying from the deck of USS Sicily (CVE-118), the division was seeking targets of opportunity in the vicinity of the South Korean port city of Inch'ŏn, now occupied by hostile forces. Despite intense and accurate antiaircraft fire, Reusser led his flight in a low-level strafing and rocket attack against a North Korean vehicle park and factory that resulted in a number of trucks destroyed and NKPA soldiers killed.

The ferocity with which the North Koreans defended the area aroused Reusser's suspicions. Ordering the rest of the division to orbit the target out of range, he set his Corsair snarling past the large factory building barely above the ground and close enough to actually look in the windows. What he saw explained the tenacity of the enemy defenses. The building was a tank maintenance facility, packed with Soviet-made T-34 tanks.

With both of the Corsair's wings damaged by heavy ground fire, Reusser flew to USS Sicily to rearm and refuel, then returned to the target, setting the factory ablaze with rockets and napalm, destroying every tank and truck in the area. Continuing on, Reusser led his division in a low-level attack against oil storage tanks in the Inch'ŏn harbor area, turning the tanks into fireballs.

With all of his rockets and napalm expended, Reusser then attacked a camouflaged oil tanker in the harbor, diving through murderous antiaircraft fire to mast height and raking the tanker with 20 mm gunfire. The tanker exploded, almost blowing Reusser's Corsair out of the air. For his daring attacks Maj. Reusser received a second award of the Navy Cross, becoming the first Marine to be decorated for bravery in the Korean War.

The courage and flying skill exhibited by Kenneth Reusser would set the tone for Marine air operations during that desperate summer when 11 NKPA divisions sought to land the knockout blow on the American and allied forces clinging grimly to the perimeter ringing the vital port city of Pusan. For the first time, the invader's front-line troops would find out what it was like to be subjected to deadly accurate air attacks. From the moment Marine ground units went into action, the constantly swarming Corsairs were a fixture in the skies overhead. Combining with the Black Sheep, the "Death Rattlers" of Maj. Arnold Lund's VMF-323, based aboard USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116), flew in daily support of their fellow Marines on the ground.

That support was of the first-rate, professional variety. Fully three-fourths of the pilots of both squadrons were experienced combat veterans of the war against Japan, men with more than 1,000 hours in the cockpit. They knew their business, frontwards, backwards, inside out and upside down.

Utilizing the air-ground tactics pioneered by Marine aviators in Nicaragua a quarter-century earlier, and honed to perfection in the Pacific, the Black Sheep and the Death Rattlers quickly taught the North Koreans that there was a dimension to warfare they had not considered. That dimension was that of fully integrated air-ground combat conducted by a truly combined-arms force, the only such force in Korea—or in the world, for that matter.

Racing in from the sea, the Corsairs plastered North Korean targets in front of advancing Marine ground units as the Marine brigade drove into the Sach'ŏn corridor in the first United Nations offensive action of the Korean War. Vectored to targets by the tactical air control parties (TACPs) of the battalions on the ground, Marine aviators ripped in, skimming the treetops to devastate North Korean units with bombs, rockets, napalm and gunfire, often no more than a few hundred feet in front of friendly lines.

[note]

August

Two days later, on 5 August, Major Arnold Lund led his VMF-323 back to the Badoeng Strait.[12]

The squadron of night fighters, VMF(N)-513, was land-based. Having been assigned to the Fifth Air Force, it would be controlled by the Itazuke field for night heckler missions over Korea. This unit had time for only a few night training flights before being committed to combat.[13]

Kobe’s waterfront was the scene of feverish activity around the clock. The light observation planes and helicopters of VMO-6 were unloaded, assembled, and—to the amazement of local Japanese—flown from the very streets of the city to the base at Itami. There they were hurriedly checked by mechanics and prepared for the short ferry flight to Korea.[14]

Headquarters and Service Squadrons of MAG-33 were left with the task of unloading supplies and equipment from the USS Achernar (AKA-53) and USS General A. E. Anderson (APA-111). Since the three fighter squadrons were farmed out to the carriers and Air Force, Group headquarters turned its attention to administrative and maintenance matters. For the next month it would be hard-pressed to keep the carrier squadrons supplied with spare parts while providing replacement aircraft for the sea-borne units, handling a variety of airlift requests with its lone transport plane, and making arrangements for the support of VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke.[15]

[note]

August

By 5 August, MTACS-2 had established communications with the USS Sicily (CVE-118) and USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) and was ready for business.

The big picture, militarily speaking, was outlined in somber colors during the first few days of August 1950. Only the southeast corner of Korea was left to the Eighth Army and its battered ROK allies. Space had been traded for time until there remained in effect merely a UN beachhead about 90 miles long and 60 wide.

Unremitting enemy pressure throughout July had pushed the UN forces back to positions stretching raggedly from P'ohang-dong on the east coast to Masan on the south coast by way of Taegu in the center. The logistical lifeline extended from Pusan to Taegu both by road and rail, and some 300,000 tons of supplies were moved in July by the Pusan Logistical Command.

The vital seaport had to be held if the UN forces were to retain a foothold in the peninsula, and the enemy was already threatening both P'ohang-dong and Masan, each within 50 miles. Only by courtesy could the irregular chain of UN positions have been called a line. Gaps were the rule rather than exception, and an entire enemy corps might have driven through the mountainous area between Andong and Yŏngdök without meeting serious opposition. Nor was this the only spot where the dangerously stretched UN forces had to depend on the terrain for support. Yet the time had come to make a stand, and this final UN beachhead has gone down in history by the name of the Pusan Perimeter.

From Taegu in the center to the eastern coast, five depleted ROK divisions were arrayed during the first week in August. East of the Naktong, from the Taegu-Waegwan area southward, the 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Division held defensive positions. This left the southern sector to the 25th Division, reinforced by the Army 5th RCT and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

[note]

August

On 5 August Craig and Stewart flew to Masan for a final meeting with Walker and Kean. The Eighth Army commander outlined his plans for the first UN counteroffensive. In forceful terms, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the course of the war up to that time. He announced that the strategy of trading space for time had come to an end, and he did not mince words in referring to past UN defeats. With firm conviction in the cause, he had ordered all units to stand to the death. The Eighth Army could not and would not lose more ground or equipment.[40] Advances had been made by the enemy with such rapidity that he had extended his supply lines almost to the breaking point, concluded Walker. The time had come to strike back[41]

To the 25th Division, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and 5th RCT would go the honor of launching the counterattack from Chindong-ni, a small coastal village 8 miles southwest of Masan on the road to Chinju. In its effort to roll up the southern UN flank, the NKPA 6th Division was exerting heavy pressure on Chindong-ni from both the west and north.

August

A few miles west, the irregular coastline takes a sharp turn to the south to form a stubby peninsula about 25 miles wide and 15 miles long. Near the western base is the important town of Sach'ŏn. About 10 miles above this western junction of peninsula and coast lies Chinju. Both Sach'ŏn and Chinju were the targets of Walker’s counteroffensive.

Approximately 3 1/2 miles west of Chindong-ni is the tiny thatched–hut hamlet of Tosan, an unimpressive road junction which could be easily overlooked. The western fork is merely the continuation of the main route leading directly to Chinju, some 25 miles distant. The other fork branches south from Tosan and also goes to Chinju; but it skirts the coastline of the peninsula just described, passing through the communication hubs of Paedun-ni, Kosŏng, and Sach'ŏn. Thus, while both roads lead to Chinju, the southern or peninsular route is 17 miles longer.

Since it was known that enemy forces were present on the small peninsula, any UN thrust astride the main road to Chinju would be exposed to a constant flanking threat from the left. To eliminate this danger, Walker had decided to send the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade around the southern route from Tosan to Sach'ŏn. After the peninsula was secured, the 5th RCT would strike out for Chinju along the main road, while the 35th Infantry of the 25th Division guarded its right flank in the mountains to the north.[42]

Craig and Stewart opposed this plan, arguing that the Brigade itself would be exposed to flanking danger on the right, if it made the initial advance alone.[43]

After further discussion, it was decided that all three units would attack simultaneously along the routes already designated. However, the 5th RCT was given a preparatory mission of uncovering the Tosan junction before the Brigade began its advance.[44] D-day was scheduled for 7 August. All participating units were to be part of Task Force Kean, so named after the 25th Division commanding general who would exercise overall control.

Craig hurried from the conference to alert the Brigade. In a past military age a general might have sprung into the saddle, but the Brigade commander had discovered a steed that covered more ground. He and Stewart climbed into a [4-SEAT] HO3S-1

August

helicopter piloted by Lieutenant Gustave F. Lueddeke of VMO-6, and a few minutes later they landed at Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP to brief him on the forthcoming action.

[note]

On 5 August, the USS Sicily (CVE-118) steamed into the Yellow Sea. Marine planes descended on Inch'ŏn, Sŏul, and Mokp'o, battering airfields, factories, warehouses, railroads, bridges, and harbor facilities. The same pattern of destruction was repeated the following day.[35]

[note]

August

When, .in the first week of August, a review of Marine Corps-assigned and -projected commitments revealed that the number of immediately available Marines, including the total Organized Reserve (Ground), was inadequate to meet demands, plans were initiated to tap the Volunteer Reserve. On 5 August, the Commandant advised the Marine Corps reserve districts that approximately 60 percent of the Volunteer Reserve would shortly be called to active duty.

In the succeeding days, a group of officers representing the interested divisions and sections at Headquarters Marine Corps worked on a draft of the administrative instructions, which were vital to a wide scale mobilization of the Volunteer Reserve.

[note]

U.S. Navy

August

Aug. 5, 1950 - USS Valley Forge (CV 45) and USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) began what was to become almost three years of continuous carrier operation in Korea, with attacks on enemy lines of communication and close support missions

[note]

August August

On 4 August, the task element joined Air Force fighters in a combined air-sea strike on an enemy-held village near Yŏngdök.

The following day, her 8 inch guns, directed by airborne controllers, rendered call-fire for the front-line troops. USS Toledo (CA-133) then moved some 70 miles north to the area around Samch'ŏk where she cruised along a 25-mile stretch of coastline and shelled a number of targets. During that interdiction run, she demolished a bridge, chewed up highway intersections, and generally wreaked havoc on communist supply lines. On the 6th, USS Helena (CA-75) relieved Toledo, enabling her to return to Sasebo for upkeep.

[note]

By 5 August communications had been established between the brigade’s air support control personnel and the escort carriers at sea. On the 6th Sicily and Badoeng Strait rendezvoused off the southwestern tip of Korea, Admiral Ruble’s staff joined him by breeches buoy, and air and ground forces were ready to operate as a unit.

It was high time. Ch'angwŏn is less than 30 miles from Pusan. Six miles or so beyond Ch'angwŏn lies the town of Masan, and beyond Masan was the North Korean 6th Division. Distances in Korea, in early August, were very small.

[note] [note]

August

There on the 5th an international three-dimensional evolution took place. Screened by Charity and Cossack, the cruisers Belfast and Kenya steamed up the hazardous approaches to Inch'ŏn, where with spot provided by a Neptune from VP 6 they bombarded oil storage, factories, warehouses, and gun positions.

August

Fighter cover for the spotting plane was given by some of Sicily’s Corsairs, while others attacked transport and industrial facilities in the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul region.

The Marine Brigade was not yet in action and close support activity had not begun, but close reconnaissance was now put into practice. His suspicion aroused by the antiaircraft defenses of an Inch'ŏn factory, one pilot buzzed past at 50 feet, peered in the windows to observe a concentration of vehicles, and returned to deal with the situation by putting a napalm bomb into the building.

[note]

On the 5th, after shooting with air spot at enemy front line positions, gratifying compliments were received from both ground and airborne spotting personnel.

By this time, indeed, the situation seemed sufficiently stabilized so that Admiral Higgins, who felt 8-inch gunfire somewhat wasted in harassing troops, could request and receive permission to look for something better.

[note]

August Task Force 95

On the west coast of Korea Admiral Andrewes’ element, now divided into three rotating sections of a cruiser and two or more destroyers each, was carrying out its duties of bombardment and blockade. Here the land war had swept past and no fire support was required, but the numerous islands and the shoal waters which fringe the coast made the interdiction of communications a sufficient task. On the 5th, on instructions from ComNavFE, the British commander established three barrier stations off the western headlands, between 38° 08' and 36° 45', which were kept manned as availability of ships permitted. Inshore work steadily improved as cooperation with the reviving ROK Navy was developed, and the blockade became increasingly effective.

[note]

August

While the Seventh Fleet Striking Force was struggling with the problems of close support of the perimeter, the Marine Brigade had begun its first offensive. To contain the enemy’s south coast advance, General Walker had decided to attack westward from Masan, toward Chinju, some 30 miles beyond. Army forces were to move west along the main highway; the Marines were assigned the task of cleaning out the left flank along the coastal road through Kosŏng and Sach'ŏn. On the 5th, as aircraft from the fast carriers struck enemy forces near Chinju, orders were issued for an attack to begin on the 7th.

[note]

August

27,28,29,30,31,01,02,03,04,05,06 July-August

01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11

On 27 July 8-inch guns were used for the first time against the invading army, as USS Toledo (CA-133) fired on troop concentrations, supplies, and revetments by day, and by night illuminated the battleline with star shell.

By careful conservation of ammunition this support was continued for 11 days, and so effective was the shooting of the cruiser and the destroyers, assisted by a 24th Division fire control party and by air spot, that only here did the battleline remain stable.

Cruising generally some 7,000 yards offshore, exchanging liaison personnel with the forces ashore by whaleboat, covering the seaborne arrival of supplies for frontline troops, and making arrangements for possible evacuation, the ships of Higgins’ element found their days full.

[note]

Korean_War

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Week 1

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Week 2

31, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06 Week 3

07, 08, 09 The Red 5th Division retakes Yŏngdök

Korean_War

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized [ROK 23rd IR] regiment south of Yŏngdök. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, and Eighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the first United States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [12-3]

The enemy entry into Yŏngdök began three weeks of fighting for this key coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Two or three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churned up, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.

[note]

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August

By 5 August the Department of the Army had stepped up both air and water transportation to the Far East Command, using military and commercial planes and vessels. Most of the surface shipping space had been taken for units and equipment, but airlift brought 340 replacements each day. Still, the Eighth Army was receiving more casualties than replacements Losses by 5 August totaled 7,859, but only 7,711 individual replacements had reached the FEC and only part of these had arrived in Korea.

General Beiderlinden, MacArthur's personnel chief, took an optimistic view, believing that the near future would bring a marked improvement in the situation He expected casualties in Korea to decrease as the front stabilized and anticipated a great increase in replacements from the United States by the middle of August. He was counting also on returning to combat many soldiers who had recovered from wounds in FEC hospitals.

[note]

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August August

On the morning of the 5th the force launched from a position south of Korea. Pilots from USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) entering action for the first time, were assigned specific targets in southwestern Korea, with the emphasis on the rail and highway bridges at Iri, east of Kunsan, where cuts would hamper movement of supplies to the enemy’s southern flank. USS Valley Forge (CV-45) planes were sent off on close support missions, and while the weight of effort was concentrated on troops, supplies, and bridges in the dangerous northern sector, two Corsairs attacked enemy personnel west of Taegu and five ADs inflicted heavy casualties on troops behind the central front. But these Skyraiders reported poor control, and an eight-plane jet sweep never did succeed in reaching its assigned controller.

Dissatisfied with the operation of control procedures, Admiral Hoskins now sent four Valley Forge pilots to Taegu, for liaison purposes and to help in the direction of support aircraft. In the hope of reducing congestion the front was divided into four sectors, each of which was provided with both an Air Force and a Navy airborne controller. Although the original intention of having Navy controllers handle Navy flights gave way under pressure, and all hands took whatever came along, the sharing of the burden and the increased number of radio frequencies which resulted from the use of Navy planes led to considerable improvement. But periods of saturation continued, as incoming flights arrived in large batches instead of scheduled driblets, and while this congestion was particularly difficult in the case of Air Force planes, operating at maximum range from their Japanese bases, it affected the work of the carrier aircraft as well.

[note]

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August

The Communists customarily moved at night and dispersed and camouflaged their troops and equipment by day, but on numerous occasions early in August the Reds were unable to get completely under cover. When they located these partly concealed enemy targets, Fifth Air Force fighter pilots prosecuted vigorous attacks, for they were mindful that their ground comrades were facing overwhelming odds. Thus on 5 August Maj. Louis J. Sebille, commander of the 67th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (18th Group), led a flight of Mustangs against enemy artillery and troops hidden along the banks of a river near Hamch'ang. In the initial bombing attack, Major Sebille was unable to release one of his two 500-pounders, but he circled the target and returned with the other Mustangs for a strafing attack. On this pass the Mustangs drew ground fire, and Major Sebille's plane was hit. Disregarding advice to head south to safety at Taegu, Major Sebille again turned into the target and fired his six .50-caliber machine guns at point-blank range. Somewhere on this pass-which he made on his own volition-Major Sebille must have sustained additional damage, for he flew right into the enemy concentration and there met death. For this act of selfless devotion to duty against enemy forces threatening the security of friendly ground troops, Maj. Louis J. Sebille was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.#77

As August progressed, Fifth Air Force armed reconnaissance pilots found very little hostile traffic moving during daylight, but tightened procedures for reporting such enemy sightings as were made permitted some effective attacks. Medium-bomber crews or reconnaissance pilots who sighted enemy movements initiated voice calls on their radios and reported the targets to the first armed reconnaissance flight that an

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MacArthur replied the next day that he fully understood and was operating meticulously in accordance with the President's decision of 27 June.

[note]

August


On the night of August 5, L Company of the 34th's 3rd Battalion, about 50 men under Captain Douglas W. Syverson, and a 10-man platoon under Lieutenant Leonard Korgie were across from the Ohang ferry on a 300-yard front. About dark, the platoon was moved across the river as a listening post.

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August August

At about 10:30 that night, Corporal Ed Metowski and Korgie heard slight noises to their front. Frank Pollock and Eugene Singleton, on their left, were also alert. To their right was Alvin Ginn. The men opened fire. Almost at once, the five men were set upon from all sides by enemy soldiers, who quickly overwhelmed and disarmed the Americans. Determined not to be captured, Korgie threw his helmet into the midst of the North Koreans and yelled, 'Let's go, Ed!' Ed didn't escape, but Korgie did. He reached the platoon command post (CP) with the enemy now firing flares and noisily crossing the river. As platoon personnel called for mortar fire over their phone, figures were scrambling up the hill toward the CP. Korgie yelled, 'Halt!' and 15 or so North Koreans jumped up about 40 yards away, yelling, 'Manzai! Manzai!' and spraying the area with burp-gun fire. Korgie and a companion fired into them. When Korgie's rifle was empty, he fell back, fumbling for another clip. As he ran, he noted that he was running parallel to a group of North Koreans advancing in a skirmish line. He knew they were North Koreans, but they thought he was one of them. After running up and down two hills, Korgie collapsed at the top of the third (a victim of bloody dysentery, fatigue and heat), pitched head first over the crest, and rolled about 40 yards down the slope. Just then, the enemy realized who he was, and some began to fire at him. He was able to slip another clip into his rifle, figuring he would shoot as many as he could before they killed him. For some reason, they left. The next morning, Korgie joined about 40 other men of the 34th farther north along the riverbank.

Robert Bayless, a machine-gunner with L Company, had been on the extreme right of the company line. The enemy thrust behind L Company and cut it off. A lieutenant led Bayless and some others north to join I Company, but I Company, with the few men from L, lost its hill. A counterattack was unsuccessful. I Company's old position was then hit by friendly mortar fire. Bayless and his group wandered into the sector of the 21st Infantry. There, he and some of his comrades fell, exhausted, into a roadside ditch, and Bayless dozed off. He was awakened by a column of men coming up the road in the dark. They proved to be the 24th Reconnaissance Company, preparing to counterattack along the southern flank of the 21st Infantry.

Colonel Beauchamp of the 34th Infantry reported the situation in his front line 3rd Battalion to General Church and committed the regimental reserve to counterattack.

[note]

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9:00 AM
07/31/50
2:00 PM
07/31/50
11:00 PM

August

Red and yellow flares burst over the Naktong at midnight 5 August, as 800 North Koreans of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Regiment, [3/16 4th NKID] began the crossing. Most of the men stripped off their clothing, rolling it and their weapons into bundles to be carried on their heads, and stepped into the shoulder-deep water. Others made rafts to float their clothes and equipment across.

August

This crossing was at the Ohang ferry site, three and a half miles south of Pugong-ni [Masuwon] and due west of Yŏngsan-ni,. There is some evidence that the 1st Battalion of the regiment also crossed at this time. None of the units in this initial crossing brought along mortars or heavy weapons. After reaching the east side, the enemy soldiers dressed, and in a column of platoons, marched southeast up the draw leading into the American lines. Their objective was Yŏngsan-ni,. [17-8]

Simultaneously with this crossing, another enemy force tried to cross the river some miles farther north in the zone of the 21st Regiment, 24th Division. This force, after running into a mine field and being shelled by artillery, was machine-gunned by infantry and driven back across the river in confusion. [17-9]

The enemy force that crossed at Ohang penetrated the gap between I and L Companies of the 34th Infantry, and followed the draw leading southeast to a little valley through which the Yŏngsan-ni,-Naktong River road passed. The battalion command post and the mortar position were approximately two miles from the enemy crossing site and directly in the line of enemy advance. [17-10]

[note]


Casualties

Saturday August 5, 1950 (Day 042)

August 17 Casualties

As of August 5, 1950

1 13TH SIGNAL COMPANY - DIVISION
2 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 5TH MARINE REGIMENT
2 67TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
2 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 99TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 VF-113 FIGHTER SQUADRON
17 19500805 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 58 3079 1 2 3140
Today 2 13 1 1 17
Total 60 3092 2 3 3157

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes_for_Friday August 4, 1950 (Day 041)

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