Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 27.6°C  81.68°F at Taegu     

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

August 10, 1950 (Thursday)

 

 

Citations

 

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

 

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    Medals

Navy Cross

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Silver Star

 

Arie, John D. [Sgt SS 60mmD5thMR]

Backovich, Robert G. [PFC SS RecConCo1stPMB]

Clary, Lester O. [PFC SS HqServCo 3rdBn5thMR1stPMB]

Jones, Lowell E. [MSgt SS2 G19thIR]

Lindsey, Robert T. [1stLt SS E19thIR]

Little, James H. [PFC SS G19thIR]

Paige, Billy J. [PFC SS ReconCo HqBn1stPMB]

Phillips, Robert [Sgt SS D9thIR]

Schmitt, Edward [1stLt SS H9thIR]

Sharon, Donald W. [2ndLt SS1 PltCmdr ReconCoHqServBn1stPMB]

Tolar, William L. [PFC SS HqServCo 3rdBn5thMR]

 

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force mechanics and aircrews take up rifles and defend the P'ohang Airfield on the east coast. U.S. soldiers and tanks rush to bolster the defense, and the airfield is held. Fighter planes are flown out Aug. 13 to prevent them being destroyed in the continuing ground fighting around the field and the city of P'ohang.

[note]

 

Part of the 1st Marine Division sails from San Diego bound for Korea.

-- President Truman approves raising the authorized Army strength to 1,081,000 soldiers. Activation of organizations and troop recalls continue as more than 7,800 Army reserve lieutenants and captains are ordered to active duty in September. The Army's IX Corps is activated at Fort Sheridan, Ill., and ordered to Korea. The Air Force calls a bomber wing and a troop carrier wing to active duty. Four more Army Guard divisions and two regimental combat teams receive activation orders.

-- Moscow Radio charged Wall Street with whipping up a war-like attitude in the United States by promoting football games and women's wrestling matches. The program claims that players in Michigan football games "are often carried from the football field to the hospital or … cemetery.'

[note]

 

 

On the whole Truman felt reassured. Formosa excepted, he and the National Security Council now shared the General's conviction "that we should back anyone who will fight Communism," and since his Far East Commander had apparently agreed to toe the administration line, he told a press conference that he and MacArthur saw "eye-to-eye" on Formosa. The President "assumed," he later wrote, "that this would be the last of it." It wasn't; even cautioning the General, he would learn, was hazardous.

[note]

 

4 August 1950: During the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter, wounded soldiers were evacuated from the battlefield by helicopter for the first time when a Sikorsky H-5F of Detachment F, 3rd Air Rescue Squadron, United States Air Force, flew out Private 1st Class Claude C. Crest, Jr., U.S. Army, from the Sengdang-ni area to an Army hospital. By the end of combat in 1953, 21,212 soldiers had been med-evacuated by helicopters.

Only the second military helicopter, the H-5 was frequently flown overloaded and outside of its center of gravity limits. The helicopter was not armed, though the pilot normally carried an M1911 .45-caliber semi-automatic pistol, and the crewman, a .30-caliber M1 Carbine.

(Notes)

  

Aug. 10: The US Air Force called up two Reserve units, the 437th TCW and the 452nd Bombardment Wing (BW), for Korean War service.

Forty-six B-29s of the 22nd, 92nd, and 98th BGs hit an oil refinery and railroad shops at Wŏnsan, North Korea.

[note]

 

Task Force Kean AO

[note]

 

Citations

 

Medals   Medals

 

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19500810 0000 DSC SCHIERMAN

19500810 0000 Navy Cross WESTERM

 

 

[note]

 

The first Marine helicopter rescue of a downed pilot was successfully made by VMO6.

Date of Loss: 500810
Tail Number: 97435
Aircraft Type: F4U-4B
Wing or Group: USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116)
Squadron: VMF-323
Circumstances of Loss: Hit by AAA on CAS mission near Chin-dong-ni, Man Bay, 1 mi S of Che-do, oil loss, ditched
Crewmembers Associated With This Loss
Name(Last, First Middle) Rank Service Status Comments
MOSES, Vivian M. CAPT USMC RSC VMO-6 helo rescue (KIA on 500811)

 

 

[note]

 

  

US and Australian warplanes conducted large scale bombing missions on transportation and communications targets in North Korea. 

[note]

 

[note]

 

August

Triangulation Hill, near Waegwan in the 5th Cavalry section, under fire on 10 August.

[note]

 

South then North

 

 

Bio

General Kean pushed his unit commanders hard to make up for lost time, now that the attack had at last started. The pace was fast, the sun bright and hot. Casualties from heat exhaustion on 10 August again far exceeded those from enemy action. The rapid advance that day after the frustrations of the three preceding ones caused some Tokyo spokesman to speak of the "enemy's retreat" as being "in the nature of a rout," and correspondents wrote of the action as a "pursuit." And so it seemed for a time. [16-23]

[note]

 

On 10 August, as the combat team moved toward Pongam-ni, aerial observation failed to sight enemy troop concentrations or installations ahead of it. Naval aircraft, however, did attack the enemy north of Pongam-ni and bombed and strafed Tundŏk still farther north in the Sobuk-san mining region.

The 1st Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. John P. Jones, attacked down the right (north) side of the road and the 2nd Battalion, under Colonel Throckmorton, down the left (south) side. The 1st Battalion on its side encountered the enemy on the hills near Pongam-ni, but was able to enter the town and establish its command post there.

The village of Pongam-ni was a nondescript collection of perhaps twenty mud-walled and thatch-roofed huts clustered around a road junction. It and Taejŏng-ni were small villages only a few hundred yards apart on the east side of the pass. The main east-west road was hardly more than a country lane by American standards. About 400 yards northeast of Pongam-ni rose a steep, barren hill, the west end of a long ridge that paralleled the main east-west road on the north side at a distance of about 800 yards. The enemy occupied this ridge. Northward from Pongam-ni extended a 500-yard-wide valley. A narrow dirt trail came down it to Pongam-ni from the Sobuk-san mining area of Tundŏk to the north. The stream flowing southward through this valley joined another flowing east at the western edge of Pongam-ni. There a modern concrete bridge, in sharp contrast to the other structures, spanned the south-flowing stream. West of the villages, two parallel ridges came together about 1,000 yards away, like the two sides of an inverted V. The southern ridge rose sharply from the western edge of the village. The main road ran westward along its base and climbed out of the valley at a pass where this ridge joined the other slanting in from the north. Immediately west of Pongam-ni the two ridges were separated by a 300-yard-wide valley. The northern ridge was the higher.

On 10 August the 2nd Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, held the southern of these two ridges at Pongam-ni and B and C Companies of the 1st Battalion held the eastern part of the northern one. The enemy held the remainder of this ridge and contested control of the pass.

During the day the regimental support artillery came up and went into positions in the stream bed and low ground at Pongam-ni and Taejŏng-ni. A Battery of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion emplaced under the concrete bridge at Pongam-ni, and B Battery went into position along the stream bank at the edge of the village. Headquarters Battery established itself in the village. The 90th Field Artillery Battalion, less one battery, had emplaced on the west side of the south-flowing stream. All the artillery pieces were on the north side of the east-west road. The 5th Regimental Combat Team headquarters and C Battery of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion were eastward in a rear position. [16-27]

[note]

 

  

On 10 August, at the critical battleground within the bulge, the North Koreans on Cloverleaf Hill launched an attack which met head-on one by the 9th Infantry. Officer losses had been severe in the 2nd Battalion on 8 and 9 August. On the 10th, F was the only rifle company in the battalion with more than one officer.

In this fighting the North Koreans regained all the ground they had lost earlier at Cloverleaf. But north of Cloverleaf, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry[???who 9th???], succeeded in capturing several hills along the Naktong, the most important being Ohang Hill. The enemy repulsed all its efforts to advance south from Ohang. The fighting on 10 August in the vicinity of Ohang Hill reduced the 2nd Battalion, 79th? [19th] Infantry, to about 100 effective men in the rifle companies. [17-35]

[note]

 

(Map 11: THE THREAT TO THE EASTERN CORRIDOR, 10 August 1950.)

Eighth Army on 10 August organized Task Force P'ohang, consisting of the ROK 17th and 25th Regiments, the ROK 1st Anti-Guerrilla Battalion, the ROK P'ohang Marine Battalion, and C Battery of the U.S. 18th Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm.). The next day the ROK Army activated the 26th Regiment at Taegu and hurried it east to join Task Force P'ohang at An'gang-ni. Of these units, only the ROK 17th Regiment was battle tested. The mission of Task Force P'ohang was to attack north from the An'gang-ni - P'ohang-dong area and clear enemy forces from the mountains near the coast. [18-7]

The events around Kigye and in the mountains to the west of P'ohang-dong from this point on can be understood in their true light only if one knows what was taking place simultaneously on the east coast, only a few miles away. To bring those events into their proper perspective it is necessary now to review them.

A previous chapter recounted the series of bloody battles on the coastal road between the N.K. 5th Division and the ROK 3rd Division through the first days of August. The fighting seesawed around Yŏngdök [20 miles north of P'ohang-dong] for two weeks, with first one side and then the other holding the town. This action. had ended with the ROK's temporarily regaining Yŏngdök. But they held it only briefly.

(Notes)

 

  

On 10 August N.K. 5th Division soldiers infiltrated around the ROK 3rd Division and cut the coastal road below it at Hunghae, five miles north of P'ohang-dong. The ROK 3rd Division was virtually surrounded on that date. [18-10]

   Bio   Bio   Bio

As soon as Eighth Army learned that enemy forces had cut off the ROK 3rd Division above P'ohang-dong, General Walker instructed Colonel Emmerich to meet him at Yŏnil Airfield. Emmerich radioed to the American cruiser USS Helena (CA-75), offshore, for a helicopter to fly him to the airstrip, where he met General Walker, General Partridge, and Brig. Gen. Francis W. Farrell, Chief of KMAG.

General Walker instructed Emmerich to have the ROK 3rd Division hold in place around Changsa-dong, twenty miles north of P'ohang-dong, and to prevent the enemy 5th Division from moving its tanks and artillery down the road to the P'ohang area. If enemy tanks and artillery got through on the coastal road they would render Yŏnil Airfield untenable. Emmerich returned at once to Changsa-dong and relayed the orders to Brig. Gen. Kim Suk Won, the ROK 3rd Division's new commander. The division then went into a perimeter defense extending along the coast from a point four miles north of Changsa-dong to a point seven miles south of the town. [18-11]

The sudden appearance of strong enemy army units near P'ohang-dong on 10 August surprised many American officers, including General Walker. He had just asked General Farrell if the ROK troops in the east would need American help to assure the defense of P'ohang-dong and Yŏnil Airfield. Farrell had advised Walker that the ROK troops would be able to protect these places. This opinion reflected that prevailing at the time-that the North Koreans would not be able to move through the mountains in sufficient strength to make an effective attack on P'ohang-dong from the rear. [18-12]

[note]

 

Enemy forces first entered P'ohang-dong on 10 or 11 August.

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)   Koread-War

Eighth Army on 10 August organized KMAG Task Force P'ohang, consisting of the ROK 17th and 25th Regiments, the ROK 1st Anti-Guerrilla Battalion, the ROK P'ohang Marine Battalion, and C Battery of the U.S. 18th Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm.).

The next day the ROK Army activated the 26th Regiment at Taegu and hurried it east to join Task Force P'ohang at An'gang-ni. Of these units, only the ROK 17th Regiment was battle tested. The mission of Task Force P'ohang was to attack north from the An'gang-ni - P'ohang-dong area and clear enemy forces from the mountains near the coast. [18-7]

The events around Kigye and in the mountains to the west of P'ohang-dong from this point on can be understood in their true light only if one knows what was taking place simultaneously on the east coast, only a few miles away. To bring those events into their proper perspective it is necessary now to review them. See Battle of Yŏngdök.

A previous chapter recounted the series of bloody battles on the coastal road between the N.K. 5th Division and the ROK 3rd Division through the first days of August. The fighting seesawed around Yŏngdök [20 miles north of P'ohang-dong] for two weeks, with first one side and then the other holding the town. This action. had ended with the ROK's temporarily regaining Yŏngdök. But they held it only briefly.

[note]

 

The Enemy 10th Division's Crossing at Yongp'o

The North Korean plan for the attack against Taegu from the west and southwest had called for the N.K. 10th Division  to make a co-ordinated attack with the N.K. 3d Division. The 10th Division so far had not been in combat.

July 25, 1950

 It had started from Sukch'on for the front by rail about 25 July.

August 8, 1950

At Ch'ŏnan it left the trains and continued southward on foot, passing through Taejon and arriving at the Naktong opposite Waegwan on or about 8 August.

August 10, 1950

There it received its combat orders two days later. Its mission was to cross the Naktong River in the vicinity of Tŭksŏng-dong, penetrate east, and cut the Taegu-Pusan main supply road.

The division assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August.

[note]

 

Koread-War

On 7, 9, and 10 August they [FEAFBC] bombed and completely destroyed the large Chosen petroleum refinery at Wŏnsan. This plant, with its estimated capacity of 250,000 tons, annually produced approximately 93 percent of the North Korean petroleum products.

[note]

 

   Bio  CG FarEastAirForces

The drop in air delivery to Korea caused General Partridge, [should be Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer] commanding the Far East Air Forces, to complain on 10 August that the Army was not fully using the airlift's 200-ton daily capacity.

Def

 

That day, Eighth Army ordered curtailment of delivery by the Red Ball Express and increased use of the airlift to its maximum capacity. The reason given for this action was a sudden apprehension that the port of Pusan could not process promptly the flow of water-borne supplies.

[crap]

Any other reference to the "Red Ball"?

[note]

 

On 10 August, General MacArthur, having received the necessary authority from the Department of the Army, authorized General Walker to increase the strength of the ROK Army to any practicable number. [21-23]

[note]

 

Korean Augmentation to the United States Army

Concurrent with the steps taken in August to rebuild the ROK Army, the Far East Command planned to incorporate 30,000 to 40,000 ROK recruits in the four American divisions in Korea and the one still in Japan but scheduled to go to Korea. This was admittedly a drastic expedient to meet the replacement requirement in the depleted American ground forces. As early as 10 August, Eighth Army began planning for the Korean augmentation,

[note]

 

Before the augmentation program began there had been a few cases in which American unit commanders had used volunteer South Koreans unofficially to strengthen their forces. One of the first of these officers, if not the first, was Colonel Clainos, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. About the first of August, just after Eighth Army had retired behind the Naktong River, four Korean officers and 133 men from the South Korean police at Taegu voluntarily joined Clainos' battalion on the unofficial basis that they would receive arms and food to the best of Colonel Clainos' ability. A Lieutenant Chung, a Tokyo-trained Korean wearing a Japanese samurai sword, marched his unit to the 1st Battalion. Colonel Clainos attached Lieutenant Chung to his staff and the other three
officers to A, B and C Companies, respectively. He then attached two Korean policemen to each rifle squad in the companies.

Nine days after these Koreans joined the 1st Battalion they took part in the battle at triangulation Hill, after the North Korean crossing of the Naktong in the 1st Cavalry Division sector. Two of them were killed in this action, and seven wounded. Of the wounded, all refused evacuation except one who could not walk. [21-29]  

[note]

 

  

On 10 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to add the third regiment to the division, and the 7th Marines was activated. It was scheduled to sail for the Far East by 1 September. The difficulty of obtaining troops to fill the division was so great that a battalion of marines on duty with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was ordered to join the division in the Far East. [7th Marines as its 3rd Battalion] [25-9]

[note]

 

The IX Corps was activated on 10 August at Fort Sheridan, Ill., with Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn in command.

[note]

 

August

[note]

 

The Forgotten War

 

   Bio   Bio

During the night of August 9 - 10, the NKPA continued to exploit the penetration in the division's left (or south) sector. Scores, then hundreds of NKPA poured across the river, rushing eastward. Learning of this massive penetration, Beauchamp and Moore warned  John Church and the division staff. To Beauchamp and Moore it appeared possible that the individual regiments, and even the 24th Division, might be encircled and lost.

 However, Church and his harassed staff, still in the process of moving the division CP rearward and therefore operating with limited communications, either did not get the word or chose to ignore it.

By the morning of August 9 John Church was exhausted and nearly at wits' end. The heretofore ignored NKPA infiltrators closed in on the 24th Division CP at Ch'angnyŏng, forcing it to displace fifteen miles to the rear, to KYungyo.

[note]

 

Bio        

Church, meanwhile, had ordered yet another "all-out attack in the division center. Essentially a duplication of the previous day's attack, it was mounted on August 10 by the survivors of the 9th, 19th, and 34th regiments. Again Hill's 9th carried the burden of the attack. Again Hill's casualties were frightful, especially in Walker's 2/9, where only one of his four companies had more than one officer left. Again results were disappointing. The 2/9, hit by a severe NKPA counterattack, was thrown back one mile.

That same morning, August 10, the NKPA, exploiting the penetration in the divisions southern sector, closed in around the village of Yŏngsan-ni,, eight miles east of the Naktong. Below the village the NKPA established a roadblock which cut the division's main supply route (MSR) from the south. This dire circumstance finally compelled Church and the exhausted division staff to focus on this serious NKPA penetration.

Bio   Bio  

Since the NKPA was still not a serious threat in the divisions northern sector, Church ordered Dick Stephens to send Brad Smiths 1/21 (less its C Company) and Peter Hyzer to send the division Recon Company to Yŏngsan-ni, to break the block. Meanwhile, Church also urgently requested that Johnnie Walker give him additional major reinforcements from the Fire Brigade, Michaelis' 27th Infantry Wolfhounds.

[note]

 

  

But on August 10 the NKPA 5th Division, linking with the NKPA 12th Division, had cut behind the ROK 3rd Division and isolated it on the coast above Yŏngdök. Continuing this combined attack, the NKPA 12th Division had captured P'ohang, thereby posing a threat to Taegu through the "back door."

Believing Taegu to be gravely threatened, Walker ordered emergency measures to save the city.

Bio    

 

[note]

 

Bio  

As Michaelis and Freeman were moving their regiments north to Tabu to backstop the ROK 1st Division holding the Sangju–Taegu road the NKPA made another baffling move, possibly a grave tactical error.

It withdrew its depleted 15th Division (about 5,000 men) from the Tabu sector and sent it eastward to reinforce the desultory NKPA 8th Division, which was directly north of Taegu, blocked by the ROK 6th Division, also fighting valiantly. This new dispersion of forces left only the half strength NKPA 1st Division and the hard-hit NKPA 13th Division (about 13,000 men in total) plus a few tanks to continue the assault on Taegu from the northwest.

Walker was well prepared to meet this diluted NKPA attack. The Wolfhounds, commingling with ROK 1st Division troops, who held the surrounding ridges, dug astride the road near Tabu.

     

Paul Freemans as yet unbloodied 2/23 and 3/23 went into position behind the Wolfhounds, both to backstop the Wolfhounds and to protect Terry's 8th and Richardson's 37th FABs.

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

 

General Turner arrives at Haneda, 1230 hours accompanied by Colonel Wimsatt.[183-Col Robert W.C. Wimsatt, commander of the 6208th Depot Wing.]


At 1510, Mr. Charles Corrdry[184-Corrdry later became The Baltimore Sun's military editor.] of United Press called with Colonel Nuckols.


Dispatched a "Stratline" to Partridge and O'Donnell with info to the Bomb Groups on Guam and Okinawa, and info to CSAF - necessity of prompt receipt in this hqrs of certain info which we consolidate and forward to USAF. This info in turn is used to brief Bradley[185-Gen Omar N. Bradley, a West Point classmate of Stratemeyer, was Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this time, the chairman had no vote on JCS deliberations. He presided over the JCS meetings, provided an agenda for these meetings, helped steer the JCS toward the right decisions in the most timely fashion, and attempted to resolve disputes.] who briefs the President. To insure prompt receipt, such info to be sent in clear as per my outline; only when material assembled would it be classified. Gave addresses outline to be used in my message. All received and acknowledged message within four hours - except Partridge, which denotes wire troubles somewhere along the line.


Turner and Weyland our guests to dinner at Mayeda House.

[note]

 

 

 

 

USN_Units

On 10 August, however, Task Force 77 observed that there was apparently no further need for carrier aircraft in close support. The naval pilots had reported controllers to be constantly overcrowded; many Navy planes had to wait excessive periods of time for target assignment or else were given no targets. This was undoubtedly true, but FEAF explained that it had already furnished the Navy more than a hundred interdiction targets south of the 38th parallel in order to give carrier aircraft secondary targets in case they could not work a controller. Fifth Air Force planes, failing to get a close support target, were briefed to try for an interdiction objective.

[note]

 

    

To meet this bifurcated mission of offense and defense, General Partridge divided his Fifth Air Force headquarters and command. He, together with Brig. Gen. Edward J. Timberlake , Fifth Air Force vice-commander, took to the field with an advance echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters (designated Fifth Air Force in Korea after 24 July) and assumed the tactical mission outlined.

A rear echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters, under Brig. Gen. Delmar T. Spivey, also designated Fifth Air Force vice-commander, remained behind in Nagoya; General Spivey, who assumed the duty on 10 August, was to supervise the air defense of Japan, logistical and administrative support of the advance headquarters and its units, replacement training, personnel processing, air-sea rescue for Japan and Korea, maintenance and operation of Japanese airdromes, and operational control of antiaircraft artillery in Japan.

In short, the Fifth Air Force in Korea fought the tactical air war while Fifth Air Force Rear maintained occupational and air defense responsibilities in Japan. Unable to break off completely from its old duties in Japan, the Fifth Air Force was forced to divide its headquarters staff just as it had already divided its tactical units.

[note]

 

Elastic West bridge at Seoul 19th BG(M)

July 23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week

30,31, August 01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks

20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

 

Koread-War

The forward elements of the tactical control system are the Tactical Aircraft Control Parties (TACP), which are teams specially organized to control close air support strikes in the vicinity of forward ground elements. Two TACP's were being formed in Japan for an amphibious maneuver at the outbreak of hostilities, and, equipped with AN/ARC-1 radio jeeps, they were flown to Korea, where they were on hand when General Dean's 24th Division command post opened at Taejon on 4 July.

The first teams went into operation on 5 July at Ch'ŏnan, and two other teams, formed from fighter squadron personnel, went into action on 7 July at Ch'ŏnui, just south of Ch'ŏnan; the fighter pilots, detached for duty as forward air controllers, normally served on three weeks temporary duty.
By 10 August, 18 TACP's were in the field, and the Fifth Air Force undertook to provide 4 to each Army division, a number higher than World War II experience had indicated necessary. This number permitted a TACP with each regiment, one with each division headquarters, and additional parties were provided for each ROK division and corps.

The initial control system made no use of Tactical Air Direction Centers (TADC), two of which are usually allocated to each TACC. By doctrine the TADC is a subordinate air operations installation from which aircraft and air warning operations are directed within a restricted area. These centers were not used at first in Korea because of the lack of air opposition, the restricted area of the front, and primarily because of the over-all shortage of tactical air direction equipment and personnel. The Fifth Air Force also assigned an air liaison officer (ALO) to each U. S. division and each ROK corps. This officer is a personal representative of the air force commander, charged with advising the ground unit commander on air matters, such as the suitability of targets for attack by tactical aviation. 

[note]

 

Flying from Itazuke, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group had been the first organization to fight in Korea, and during July it continued maximum effort, with many pilots flying three missions each day. The 35th and 36th Squadrons of this group, were nevertheless slated for conversion to Mustangs, and on 10 & 11 August they undertook something new in USAF experience, movement to a new base and conversion to different type aircraft, at the same time. On 10 August the group departed Itazuke and arrived at Tsuiki early next morning. Pilots bade their "beloved" F-80's goodbye on the morning of 11 August, climbed into F-51's for a mission to Korea, and returned to land at Tsuiki.

[note]

 

  

On 10 August F-80 's strafed elements of the American 19th Regiment, causing three casualties; a newspaper reporter claimed that the strafing forced a withdrawal of the unit, but this was denied by the 24th Division and EUSAK.

[note]

 

Koread-War

Destruction of their aircraft in the air and on the ground, with some inevitable operational attrition, reduced the North Korean air units nearly to impotence during the first month of hostilities. By 10 August U. N. pilots claimed 110 enemy planes destroyed, leaving perhaps 35 planes of the original North Korean Air Force.

[note]

 

      

On 7 August the 22nd and 92nd Groups, joined by planes of the 98th Group which had left the United States five days earlier, plastered the marshaling yards and adjacent arsenal at P'yŏngyang.

 Aircraft of the newly arriving 307th Group hit P'yŏngyang's yards on 8 August, and a major effort flown by the 22nd, 92nd, and 98th Groups struck the oil refinery and marshaling yards at Wŏnsan on 10 August.#59

[note]

 

Koread-War FEAFBC

Many of the politico-military restrictions which stemmed from United Nations' humanitarian motives were not precisely defined but were usually manifest by some higher authority's disapproval of suggested operations. Early in August 1950 FEAF planners calculated that the B-29's could most efficiently destroy North Korean industrial targets with incendiary bombs. Use of incendiaries, coupled with radar aiming, would permit day or night attacks in any weather, and the destruction of urban areas adjoining industrial plants would erode the morale of the North Korean people and undermine their obedience to the Communist government.#19

Washington, however, desired no unnecessary civilian casualties which might come from fire attacks and was unwilling to sanction an "indiscriminate" use of incendiaries.#20

[note]

 

  

When the two wings were designated for mobilization and assignment to FEAF in July, no one expected that the 437th troop Carrier and 452nd Bombardment Wings would soon see service in Korea. But the mobilization and preparation of the two wings for overseas service went rapidly. Both were better-than-average reserve wings. The 452nd, for example, had been the first air-reserve wing to attain its full authorized reserve strength. Both of the wings were recalled to active duty on 10 August 1950. The 437th entered active service at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, and promptly moved to Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, where it trained with the C-46 aircraft which it would operate over-seas. The 452nd Wing was mobilized at Long Beach Airport, California, and at once began intensive B-26 training at nearby George Air Force Base.

[note]

 

Koread-War

When FEAF intelligence officers recapitulated North Korean aircraft losses on 10 August, they credited American air attack with the destruction of 110 enemy planes and figured that the North Koreans must still possess 35 of their original air order of battle aircraft. Photo reconnaissance of North Korean fields actually showed more aircraft than this, but the Communists were known to be employing dummy planes, to be propping up previously destroyed planes, and to be moving their few remaining aircraft from field to field.#104

Under these circumstances photo interpreters could not exactly determine how many operational aircraft the North Koreans possessed, and FEAF credited the North Korean Air Force with a capability for making sneak attacks against United Nations forces. Such a capability, however, was slight.

[note]

 

   Bio  

On 10 August General Walker acknowledged his appreciation for the close support that the Fifth Air Force was giving his troops. "The Fifth Air Force," said Walker, "has given all-out support of our efforts, and all of our troops...are high in their regard for the close-support sorties, which have averaged 175 sorties a day in the past ten days. They have destroyed enemy tanks that have penetrated our lines. They not only attack targets given them by the ground commanders but prevent any enemy movement during daylight hours. Their effort has been of tremendous value to our forces and has saved many, many lives of our infantry troops. "#28

USN_Units

Having completed its replenishment, Task Force 77 returned to the support of the Eighth Army early in August, but almost at once its pilots found fault with the tactical air-control system. Some part of this dissatisfaction was understandable. Another fast carrier-the Philippine Sea-had joined the task force on 31 July, doubling its force of strike aircraft. The Navy maintained that these two fast carriers had to operate together for mutual protection, and both of them customarily launched their strike aircraft by the deck-load. The Navy pilots complained that they had to stack up awaiting contact with "Mellow" control station, which they said frequently had no targets for them once they did contact it. The carrier airmen also reported that the Mosquito air controllers they contacted along the front lines almost always had more aircraft on hand than they could successfully place on targets.

Since a permanent naval liaison officer-Lieutenant Commander James A. Murch had joined the combat operations section early in August, the Fifth Air Force could understand the Navy's problem. Recognizing that the large flights of Navy planes tended to swamp its control system, the Fifth Air Force attempted to hold its planes on the ground during those intervals at which the aircraft carriers were launching their strikes.

The trouble with this, however, was the lack of direct communications between the Joint Operations Center and Task Force 77, which did not permit the control agency to know when naval planes were going to report to "Mellow" control.#29

[note]

 

  

With the situation on the Chinju front approaching a stalemate, the North Korean high command evidently decided to make its next major assault against the bend in the United Nations' line in front of Taegu which was defended by the U.S. 1st Cavalry and the ROK 1st Divisions. On 10 August Eighth Army intelligence expressed apprehension about a build-up in front of these two divisions. The enemy's activity seemed to be centering in the vicinity of the town of Waegwan, where the main highway and railroad crossed the Naktong. In this vicinity the Reds built underwater bridges, established small bridgeheads, and sought to bring tanks into action. Everyone at Taegu watched this area closely as the Reds brought three divisions to probe the Naktong defenses and held two more divisions echeloned in depth to exploit any weakness. General Partridge kept the enemy's bridgeheads under constant air attack. Night-flying B-26's attacked enemy troops attempting to bring heavy equipment across the river.

[note]

 

Bio   Bio

At the Target Selection Committee meeting General Weyland pointed out that someone would have to decide whether or not the B-29's could use incendiary munitions, and within a few days FEAF got the answer to this question-in the negative. Washington was very hesitant about any air action which might be exploited by Communist propaganda and desired no unnecessary civilian casualties which might result from fire raids. General Stratemeyer consequently directed General O'Donnell not to employ incendiaries without specific approval. #12

[note]

 

Bio

The operational precedents of the Hungnam strategic strikes became a part of routine operational planning as the FEAF Bomber Command began its sustained strategic attacks with an all-out mission against Wŏnsan's railway shops and oil refinery on 10 August. While the prohibition on incendiaries necessitated additional sorties, General O'Donnell privately hoped to improve on the seven missions per B-29 per month which MacArthur had said would satisfy him.

[note]

 

      Bio      548th ISR Group.PNG

Good target research and analysis insured that Bomber Command's ordnance was not wasted. When the headquarters of Bomber Command were established, everyone had thought that the FEAF Target Section would provide most information needed by the bomber crews, and the Bomber Command intelligence function had comprised a section under the operations division with two officers.

As a result of additional targeting duties thrust upon Bomber Command, General O'Donnell established intelligence as a separate division, coequal with operations and materiel, and by 10 August the intelligence division reached a strength of seven officers and eleven airmen. Working in close coordination with the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron and the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, the Bomber Command intelligence division accumulated the minimum target materials needed by B-29 crews. In the course of 46 strategic target attacks, only one group failed to receive adequate photography and radar-scope target materials. In this instance the courier to Okinawa was delayed, but the group concerned found visual conditions and bombed its target with excellent results.#26

[note]

 

Def

In the Joint Action Armed Forces agreements of 1948 USAF was assigned a primary responsibility for providing air transportation and airlift support to the United States Army. Throughout the Korean war the Eighth Army always received the largest portion of the theater airlift. Very early in the Korean war, however, it was evident that helicopter aircraft would be of great importance in the front-lines area. Thus on 10 August the USAF Tactical Air Command moved to meet the need for helicopters by drafting requirements for an assault transport wing, which would possess one group of conventional assault transports and one group of rotary-wing aircraft. USAF approved this proposal and placed orders for cargo helicopters. #62

[note]

 

    

Because he remained responsible for the air defense of Japan and for the logistical support of Air Force units in Japan, General Partridge had no choice but to divide his head-quarters into two echelons.

On 14 July he activated Headquarters and Head-quarters Squadron, Fifth Air Force (Advance) at Itazuke. At this time Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fifth Air Force (Rear), continued to function at the old station in Nagoya.' #117

In an official delineation of mission responsibilities, the Taegu headquarters was charged with the direction of the tactical air war in Korea. The Nagoya headquarters, soon to be commanded by Brig. Gen. Delmar T. Spivey, who assumed the duty as a Fifth Air Force vice-commander on 10 August, supervised the air defense of Japan and attended to air logistical and administrative matters in Japan. "1188

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

First Marine helicopter rescue made by VMO-6 to recover downed pilot.

1st MarDiv units embark for Korea.

[note]

 

[note]

 

Def  

The In Min Gun units pulled back eight miles with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 5th Marines, in hot pursuit on the tenth. This was an important milestone, the first significant retreat by the enemy thus far in the Korean War.

[note]

 

The 1 Marines did not reach full strength until August 10, the date that the division began loading cargo onto ships in San Diego. Two days in an effort to get specialists into correct billets. 

[note]

 

Bio

As far back as 14 July, the Commandant had ordered activation of the First Replacement Draft, fixing its departure for Korea at 10 August.[15] Thus Craig could be assured of early reinforcement by more than 800 officers and men if the course of the war necessitated a premature commitment of his Brigade. 

[note]

 

  

Wading through chest-deep water by night, pulling crude rafts loaded with vehicles, heavy weapons and supplies, the North Koreans placed an entire reinforced regiment on the east bank by 8 August. Termite tactics during the next 2 days broadened their foothold until the Naktong Bulge was overrun by most of the NKPA 4th Division.

Consisting of the 5th, 16th, and 18th Infantry Regiments and strongly supported by artillery and armor, the 4th Division was among the most distinguished of the major Communist units. With the 107th Tank Regiment attached at the outset of the invasion, it had breezed through Uijŏngbu before sharing in the capture of Sŏul.

On 5 July 1950, the 4th became the first NKPA outfit to tangle with the newly arrived United States Army forces.

Task Force Smith delayed it a few hours near Osan, despite the Reds’ great advantage in numbers and armor. Later, after capturing Nonsan and aiding in the reduction of Taejŏn, the unit was selected to spearhead the assault over the Naktong.

In an effort to plug the hole in the Pusan Perimeter, General Walker attached the 9th Infantry (2nd Infantry Division) commanded by Colonel John G. Hill, to the 24th Division. In turn,  General Church placed Colonel Hill in control of all units in his southern zone and ordered a counterstroke against the Naktong Bulge.

[note]

 

Def

By 10 August, all Organized Reserve ground units had been activated, standing at a combined strength of 33,527, or approximately 77 percent of their authorized strength, 43,471.

That a higher strength was not achieved at this time is explainable by the Marine Corps policy of constantly sifting out personnel that did not meet the high established standards of the Organized Reserve to ensure the services of ready-to-serve and best-fitted reservists.

traditionally, when Marines were required, they were needed without delay, and they had to be of high caliber; therefore, the Marine Corps emphasis on the training and quality of its Organized Reserve could hardly be labeled an exaggeration. When their services were needed, Organized Reservists were ready, and the Marine Corps had the comforting knowledge that they would not be found wanting.

[note]

 

Meanwhile, the 1st Division, less the 7th Marines, sailed for the Far East. The first cargo vessels weighed anchor on10 August, followed on 14 August by the first attack transport. Loading was completed on 21 August, and the last ship sailed on the 24th; and a week later, on 1 September, the 7th Marines (Reinforced), less one infantry battalion, shipped out, close on the heels of its parent organization.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 


On 10 August another heavy raid was made by B-29s, after which a FEAF communiqué claimed total destruction of the refinery, which had been attacked on the basis of "reconnaissance photographs [which showed] that only a small portion... had been damaged in the previous small air strikes."

[note]

 

What remained of the plant had been flattened by the bombing of 10 August, and in early October, as ROK forces approached Wŏnsan, the Russian supervisors had headed north for the border.

[note]

 

Elsewhere, however, things were more ominous: on the 8th, during the fighting at Chindong-ni, the North Koreans built up their Naktong bridgehead to regimental strength, and by the 10th the enemy 4th Division was across the river.

[note]

 

USN_Units

On the 10th, operations continued in the same pattern, with continued emphasis on interdiction of the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul complex. This was USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) day in close support, and 4 six-plane flights were sent in at three-hour intervals. But all were forced to attack targets of opportunity, none was used in support of troops, and two failed entirely to contact a controller owing to overloaded radio channels.

[note]

 

Elsewhere, however, things were more ominous: on the 8th, during the fighting at Chindong-ni, the North Koreans built up their Naktong bridgehead to regimental strength, and by the 10th the enemy 4th Division was across the river.

[note]

 

  

By 10 August the ROK 3rd Division, outflanked on its landward side, had been forced to hole up at Ch'ongha, ten miles north of P'ohang, where it was surrounded. Having bypassed the South Koreans, the enemy advance now gained momentum, and

[note]

 

        

Up to this time the division promised General MacArthur consisted merely of a second RCT, the 1st Marines, plus supporting and headquarters troops and the balance of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. But on 10 August, as the brigade was attacking through Taedabok Pass and as the second embarkation was beginning at San Diego, the third RCT was provided and a third mobilization begun by orders to activate the 7th Marines.

[note]

 

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August 10, 1950 0115

Two hours later the unit marched southward on the new MSR to make the night attack on Paedun-ni. Passing through 1/5’s lines at 0115, 10 August, the weary Marines pressed on toward their target against no resistance.

The point of the column included three M–26’s of First Lieutenant William D. Pomeroy’s 2nd tank platoon.

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At 0500, with the advance elements only a short distance from Paedun-ni, the lead tank crashed through a concrete bridge. The badly damaged vehicle proved to be wedged immovably between the two abutments. The second tank, while attempting to negotiate a narrow bypass next to the bridge, threw a track in the center of the stream and stalled the long column behind.

[note]

 

0542 Sunrise

[note]

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The next morning, 10 August, air strikes and artillery preparations blasted Hill 268. According to prisoners, these fires caused extremely heavy losses and created chaos in the enemy regiment.

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Korean_War

Since officers, particularly in company-grade and combat arms, were needed badly, the Department of the Army, on 22 July 1950, appealed to Reserve officers to volunteer for active duty.

So few responded that, on 10 August 1950, empowered by the Congressional authority, the Department of the Army recalled involuntarily 7,862 male Reserve captains and lieutenants of both the Volunteer and Inactive Reserves. On the same date it announced a program for recalling 1,063 Army Medical Service officers. These first involuntary recalls of Reserve officers were followed several months later by a larger program affecting almost 10,000 company-grade officers of the combat arms. [07-20]

The shortage of trained enlisted specialists prompted the Department of the Army to recall, also involuntarily, 109,000 enlisted men from the Reserves during August. All of these men were specialists, slated to fill critical positions. [07-21]

[note]

 

Two hours elapsed before the advance could be resumed.

South Korean laborers constructed a bypass for light vehicles next to the bridge, and an engineer tractor-dozer arrived to build a detour for heavy trucks and tanks.

[note]

 

Def

On 10 August, the Army received word of approval. President Truman authorized calling into federal service on or about 1 September four National Guard divisions and two National Guard RCT's. These units would be brought to full strength through Selective Service by November 1950 and would be ready for operational employment by 14 April 1951. [07-27]

The National Guard divisions finally called into service as of 1 September 1950 were the 28th, the 40th, the 43rd (Rhode Island and Connecticut), and the 45th. Also called were the 196th RCT (South Dakota) and the 278th RCT (Tennessee).

[note]

 

  

On 10 August, General MacArthur learned that the 3rd Division, less one regiment, was being ordered to his command. A supplementary message, explaining that the 65th Infantry from Puerto Rico had been ordered to the FEC, where it would join the 3rd Division as its third regiment, followed a few minutes later, but not quickly enough apparently. Before receiving the information on the 65th Infantry, MacArthur fired back a radio objecting to the dispatch of a 2-regiment division and pointing out, ". . . experience indicates the ineffectiveness of a two unit organization whether in battalions, regiments, or divisions." No answer to this {reclama} was necessary, of course. [07-48]

Fearful, also, that press reports of the planned movement of the 3rd Division might tip his hand and warn the North Koreans of his future plans, General MacArthur asked that no press release be made until the division was actually engaged in combat. "Information of this sort," General MacArthur warned Washington, "practically reveals our strategic concepts to an alert enemy." [07-49]

Unfortunately, General Ridgway had already alerted the Army Chief of Information, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, to release the information on the 3rd Division to the press. But the information had not yet gone out when MacArthur's warning was received. General Ridgway was opposed to withholding any such news from the public. "I saw no possibility short of instituting a strict censorship," he said, "of concealing the fact and if we acted otherwise, press reaction would be violent and prompt." When he went to General Collins and expressed this opinion, Collins considered a few moments, then decided to go along with MacArthur anyhow. Ridgway was obliged to notify Parks to make no official release on the 3rd Division even though both men knew that the news would leak out at once. [07-50]

General Collins was determined that there should be no misunderstanding as to the great significance of removing the 3rd Division from the United States or to certain restrictions on its combat employment. He sent a personal reminder to General MacArthur underscoring both the risk taken by the Army in sending out the division and the need for special handling of the unit on arrival. "In withdrawing this division from the General Reserve," General Collins pointed out, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have accepted for the next few months a further serious reduction in the United States capabilities to meet other possible demands for combat ground forces, as well as a further serious reduction, during the same period, in the Army's capability to train additional forces for your theater." The Joint Chiefs were sending the 3rd Division with the understanding that it would serve for the time being in Japan, as a theater reserve. They were assuming also that General MacArthur would, because of the division's very low combat effectiveness level, permit it "sufficient training time to reach a minimum acceptance training level" before committing it to battle. [07-51]

[note]

 

Meanwhile, in response to a request from General MacArthur that the corps commander and his planning staff come by air to Tokyo to plan the details of the forthcoming amphibious operation, General Coulter, the commanding general, and selected members of his staff landed at Tokyo on 10 August. [07-57]

The IX Corps, activated by Fifth Army, was to be prepared to move by 15 September. No training time was allowed.

[note]

 

 

 

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Reaching Paedun-ni at 0800, 2/5 reconnoitered the town and found it clear of enemy.

[note]

 

Bio

On the 10th General Craig pushed his brigade down the road to the southwest. USS Sicily (CVE-118) had retired to Sasebo for two days, but USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) did the work of two with 44 sorties. Paedun-ni was seized early in the morning, and indications of enemy confusion brought orders to press on with all speed.

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Bio   Def

 

August 10, 1950

MacArthur planned his bold amphibious venture at Inch'ŏn sustained only by hope, credit, and promises. At no time during his planning did he have the men and guns he would need. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, moreover, frequently told MacArthur that, with the military resources of the United States at rock bottom and because of the short-fused target date on which MacArthur adamantly insisted, the needed men and guns might not arrive on time. The disagreements over time, place, and method of landing stemmed in part from this fact and were certainly of less significance.

MacArthur well knew that even with the fullest support by Washington he might not have by his chosen D-day enough trained men and equipment to breach enemy defenses and to exploit a penetration. Trained men, especially those with amphibious training, were at a premium in the United States as well as in the Far East. To assemble, equip, and move these men secretly and swiftly to the battle area by 15 September would require an enormous, finely coordinated effort by all involved. The difficulties were appalling, and to surmount them called for extraordinary energy and ingenuity.

   Bio

The nature and location of the planned landing dictated that it be directed by a tactical headquarters separate from the Eighth Army. General Walker had his hands full in the Pusan Perimeter and could not easily divide his attention, effort, or staff. The size of the landing force, initially set at about two divisions, indicated a need for a corps command.

It was for this reason that MacArthur, concurrently with his efforts to bring the two corps headquarters to his theater in late July, had asked that the commander and planning staff of the I Corps be flown to Tokyo. [09-1]

 But by the time General Coulter and his skeleton staff reached Japan, a need for the I Corps in the Pusan Perimeter forced MacArthur to send Coulter on to Korea.

Since the amphibious operation could not be made without a corps headquarters, members of JSPOG recommended that their chief, General Wright, ask MacArthur either to organize a   provisional corps headquarters locally or to bring from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) headquarters, commanded by General Shepherd.

General Wright chose the latter course and suggested to General Almond that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, be asked if the Marine headquarters could be moved.

"There is urgent need" General Wright argued, "to get a headquarters in being for the GHQ Reserve operation. This headquarters must be one that can operate in the field as a going concern with such things as situation reports, operations reports, communications, etc., happening automatically."

 Forming a provisional headquarters from theater officers did not appeal to Wright.

"A provisional command group selected from GHQ officers will not be a going concern unless it has time to get together and train in the field," he pointed out. "This is true no matter how efficient the individual officers are."

Too little time remained to form and train such a group since, Wright warned,

"With the target date of 15 September, only thirty days remain in which to complete the landing plan, embarkation plan and the embarkation of the assault element."

 Wright cited amphibious doctrine which set from go to 150 days for planning. For this reason alone he felt that the trained headquarters from Hawaii should be used if available. General Hickey agreed with Wright. Hickey told General Almond:

Utilization of this headquarters and staff which is already organized and functioning offers many advantages over the hasty throwing together of a provisional Corps headquarters and staff from available personnel. The latter would be at best only a half-baked affair and would contribute to reducing the efficient functioning of GHQ because of the key personnel withdrawn. [09-2]

General MacArthur did not accept Wright's suggestion. First of all, after the amphibious landing at Inch'ŏn itself, CHROMITE would be an overland campaign. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, MacArthur wanted the detailed CHROMITE planning accomplished under his own close and constant supervision, and not by a group less subject to his direct view than his own GHQ staff. Wright therefore made no further attempt to bring in the outside headquarters.

[09-3]   General Wright's second attempt to arrange a headquarters proved more successful.

"As your advisor on tactical organization and operations for forces," he told Almond on 10 August, "I strongly recommend that we immediately activate a command for the GHQ Reserve."

This command, in Wright's concept, was to be very similar to a corps headquarters. Because of its specialized mission the command would not need an artillery headquarters, observation battalion, engineer brigade, or engineer topographical company. He recommended that this headquarters be moved to the field immediately since the target date of 15 September was fast approaching and the group would have to be ready to load aboard ship by 10 September. Only twenty-five days remained in which to complete corps-level plans, to condition units for the field, to develop standing operating procedures, and to give combat training to headquarters personnel. [09-4]

[note]

 

By 8 August North Koreans, totaling a reinforced regiment had waded the river and pulled raft loads of heavy equipment including trucks, across with them. Two days later they appeared to have two regiments in strong positions east of the Naktong. [02-3]

[note]

 

  

 The next morning, 10 August, air strikes and artillery preparations blasted Hill 268. According to prisoners, these fires caused extremely heavy losses and created chaos in the enemy regiment.

During the morning, the assistant division commander, the chief of staff, the G-2, and several military police were ambushed and nearly all wounded on the Waegwan road at Hill 268.

That afternoon, General Gay  and his aide stopped near Hill 268 to talk with the 1st Battalion executive officer and a small group of men. An enemy mortar shell made a direct hit on the group, killing or wounding everyone there except Gay and his aide.

[note]

 

        

And on August 10, Church created Task Force Hill, giving command of the 9th Regiment (less the 3rd Battalion), 19th and 34th regiments, and the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, to Colonel John G. Hill of the 9th.

But the 19th and 34th were mere shadows of regiments, both reduced by casualties to about 1,100 men each.

Bio    

The entire 24th Division now totaled 9,755 men, with 5,401 more being attached, including elements of the 2nd and 25th Infantry divisions. The addition of 247 replacements and weapons manned by the replacement crew helped minimally.

[note]

 

   Def

While hastily assembling another RCT in the United States for shipment to the Far East Command for use by 10 September, the Joint Chiefs on 10 August decided they need not wait until winter to send General MacArthur the third regiment of the Marine division. On that date, they authorized the formation of the final regiment, the unit to arrive in the Far East Command during September.

Bio

In order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the impact of their decision, Admiral Sherman sketched for them the drastic measures that the Marine Corps had to take to give MacArthur a full division. ". . . it will involve," he told them, "moving to the FEC the Marine battalion now in the Mediterranean, one battalion now at Camp Lejeune, and an RCT, less two battalions, to be formed at Camp Pendleton.

So doing will eliminate the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force in the Atlantic for several months." The battalion from the Mediterranean would have to come directly from Souda Bay through the Suez Canal and be hastily augmented with men sent directly to the Far East Command. [09-25]

[note]

 

Bio   Def  

Three days later, MacArthur informed the Department of the Army of the unusual steps he had taken to refurbish the 7th Division. He estimated that 30 percent of all replacements arriving in the theater before 10 September would be diverted to the 7th Division so that it would be only 1,800 men understrength by the CHROMITE target date. He had already exhausted all other sources of replacements. [09-35]

[note]

 

By 0930 the battalion column was reformed and pounding the dusty road south. Murray decided to shuttle troops by truck from Paedun-ni to Kosŏng, since the 8-mile stretch was believed to be free of enemy. The heavier vehicles being tied up at the collapsed bridge, some delay resulted in motorizing the first increment of 2/5.

Bio

General Craig arrived on the scene by helicopter in mid-morning. Not satisfied with the progress of the advance, he ordered Murray and Roise to march on Kosŏng with “all speed.” When the infantry column was a short distance out of Paedun-ni, the 5th Marines commander managed to get five 2 1/2-ton trucks forward to help transport the first serial to the target.

A motorized column was formed of 4 lead jeeps carrying a Reconnaissance Company detachment, followed by part of Company D aboard 6 more jeeps and the 5 trucks. Owing to the shortage of vehicles, Captain Zimmer’s first echelon included only the 1st and 2nd Platoons, the 60-mm. mortars, an assault squad, and one machinegun section.

Lacking either air or artillery support, the column rolled southward with orders to occupy Kosŏng and coordinate a defense of the city with its mayor. The remainder of 2/5 continued on foot until more vehicles could be provided.

The road makes a sharp turn 2 1/2 miles southwest of  Paedun-ni to climb through Taedabok Pass, a defile about 1,000 yards long. Just beyond, at the village of Pugok, a sharp turn to the left s

[note]

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At 1138/K, ADCC reported to Flight "D" that a man was in the water eight to ten miles east of Yŏngdök.

[note]

 

At 1145/K, Flight "D" was notified that H-5 had picked up the man reported in the water.

[note]

 

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Koread-War FEAFBC

On 10 August another heavy raid was made by B-29s, after which a FEAF communiqué claimed total destruction of the refinery, which had been attacked on the basis of "reconnaissance photographs [which showed] that only a small portion... had been damaged in the previous small air strikes."

Interrogation of supervisory personnel by Marine Corps officers in the autumn elicited the statement that although the early raids had had adverse effects on employee morale, and had stimulated the removal of bulk petroleum products, no bomb had hit in any vital area.

[note]

 

In early afternoon, a couple of miles beyond the town, the van entered an ambush at Taedabok Pass. Tanks were brought forward, the Corsairs reported in, and the pass was cleared; the force bivouacked for the night on the far side of the cut and two-thirds of the way to Kosŏng, the first major objective.

[note]

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The first jeep of the reconnaissance detachment was almost abreast of Pugok at 1500 when NKPA machineguns opened up from the big hill at the bend. Enemy automatic weapons on the high ground above the pass raked the vehicles filled with Dog Company men.

As the Marines were taking cover in roadside ditches, a Communist antitank gun opened fire from the large hill and hit one of the jeeps. The reconnaissance troops gradually withdrew from their exposed positions and fell back on Zimmer’s group. After sizing up the situation, the Company D commander ordered his 1st Platoon to seize the high ground on the right side of the road about midway through the pass. No resistance was met, so that the Marines set up their weapons quickly and returned the Communist fire. Meanwhile the 2nd Platoon moved up on the right after clearing small enemy groups from the high ground on both sides of the road at the entrance to the defile.

Zimmer had spotted the location of the enemy’s antitank gun, and Marine 60-mm. fire put an end to this nuisance. The effort used up all the mortar ammunition, and the Company D commander decided to wait in position for Brigade supporting arms.

[note]

 

     

Last of the Fifth Air Force units to convert to Mustangs was the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group, which had sent its F-80's into combat over Korea on the first day the United States participated in the hostilities. There was no airfield which could serve the group in Korea, but in order to clear Itazuke for other units which were arriving from the United States the 8th Group, together with its 35th and 36th Squadrons, was slated to convert to Mustangs and to move to an old Japanese naval airfield at Tsuiki, or "Sun Valley." This old airfield, on Kyushu and not far from Itazuke, had not been used for anything other than infrequent maneuvers since 1945, but on 10 August the 8th Group moved its ground echelons over there.

[note]

 

Bio

That afternoon, General Gay and his aide stopped near Hill 268 to talk with the 1st Battalion executive officer and a small group of men. An enemy mortar shell made a direct hit on the group, killing or wounding everyone there except Gay and his aide. Gay ordered five tanks to proceed along the Waegwan road until they could fire from the northwest into the reverse slope of the enemy-held hill. This tank fire caught the enemy soldiers there as they were seeking refuge from the artillery fire. trapped between the two fires they started to vacate their positions.

[note]

 

  

On August 10, the 9th Infantry lost 2,000 yards of critical terrain. The enemy also set up a roadblock on the Namji-ri-Yŏngsan-ni, road. Only along the Naktong were the Americans successful. The 19th took Ohang Hill, but its 2nd Battalion was reduced to about 100 effectives in each rifle company.

[note]

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An infantry attack then reached the top of the hill [Hill 268] without trouble and the battle was over by 1600. American artillery and mortar fire now shifted westward and cut off the enemy retreat. One time-on-target mission of white phosphorus fired by the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at this time caught a large number of enemy soldiers in a village where American ground troops later found 200 enemy dead. That evening the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reverted to division reserve, and elements of the 5th Cavalry finished mopping up on Hill 268 and vicinity. [19-22]

[note]

 

Bio

Two tanks arrived at 1630, and their 90-mm. guns drove the enemy into hiding.

While Marine tanks and air were working over the hill, 3/5 reached Paedun-ni after being relieved of its final security mission in the Chindong-ni area. Murray ordered Taplett to be prepared to pass through 2/5 and continue the attack.

The 3rd Battalion reached the entrance to Taedabok Pass in trucks shortly after the arrival of the 2nd Battalion troops who had followed their motorized column on foot. Some confusion resulted on the narrow road after Murray’s arrival while he waited to confer with Taplett. Unable to find Roise, the two officers climbed the high ground on the left. From this vantage point they could see Kosŏng, 5 miles away. The regimental commander ordered Taplett to pass through 2/5 immediately and continue the attack.

Company G had already crossed the line of departure and was deploying to assault the hill at the road bend when Murray located Roise in Zimmer’s area to the right of the road. The exact location of enemy positions remained in some doubt. In order to clear up the uncertainty, Major McNeely volunteered to lead out a patrol.

[note]

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Bio

About 1730, therefore, Roise’s S/3 took off in a jeep with a radio operator and a fire team from Dog Company.

By this time, Taplett had a fairly accurate picture of the situation in mind. From his OP on the high ground to the left of the road, he saw that McNeely was headed for danger. The 3/5 commander radioed Bohn to stop the jeep, but it was too late. McNeely and his men vanished from sight around the bend where the road skirted the large hill, and the Marines heard a furious clatter of machinegun and small arms fire.

The fate of the patrol remained in doubt as Company G moved out to the attack, with First Lieutenant Jack Westerman’s platoon in the lead. Communist fire held up the advance, but Bohn sent Second Lieutenant Edward F. Duncan’s platoon on a sweeping envelopment to the right which outflanked the enemy and drove him from the high ground. Westerman was then able to reach the crest with his platoon. From this position he could see McNeely’s bullet-riddled jeep, but that officer and his five men were stretched out motionless on the ground beneath and behind the vehicle.

[note]

 

Bio   Bio  

After his conference with Colonel Emmerich at Yŏnil Airfield, General Walker returned to Taegu. From there he sent an order by courier at 1735 to Maj. Gen. Lawrence B. Keiser, commanding the U.S. 2nd Division at Kyŏngsan-ni,, to move the remaining elements of the 8th Regiment from that point to Yŏnil Airfield at once. This task force was to be commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, Assistant Division Commander, 2nd Division. Task Force Bradley was to report directly to General Walker. [18-13]

[note]

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At great risk, Westerman made a dash to the jeep and brought back McNeely, mortally wounded. Enemy fire prevented further rescues, but it was ascertained that 3 men had been killed outright and 2 severely wounded. These survivors could only continue to take cover behind the wrecked vehicle until 3/5 troops advanced. When Company G jumped off again, the men were held up by two concealed machineguns at the far end of the road bend. Taplett committed How Company on the left side of the MSR, and Fegan seized the hill opposite Bohn’s position.

[note]

 

Bio

That evening  General Church placed Colonel Hill in command of all troops in the Naktong Bulge. The troops comprised the

This command was now designated Task Force Hill. [In effect the 9th Regimental Commander was given command of the 24th Division.]

General Church ordered Colonel Hill to attack the next morning and restore the Naktong River line. Hill and the other commanders involved worked out the attack plan during the night. It called for the 9th and 19th Regiments to drive southwest through the heart of the bulge. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was to move during the night from the northern part of the division zone to a point near the southern end of Obong-ni Ridge, and from there attack southwest on the left of the 9th Regimental Combat Team. Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry would protect the left flank of the combat team at Obong-ni. [17-37]

As it chanced, enemy reinforcements reached the east side of the river during the night and vastly increased the difficulty of this attack. [Colonel Hill had received reports as early as 8 August that the North Koreans were working at night on an underwater bridge across the Naktong at the Ki hang, or Paekchin, ferry site in the middle of the bulge.] The enemy 4th Division completed this underwater bridge during the night of 10 August, and before daylight had moved trucks, heavy mortars, and approximately twelve artillery pieces to the east side of the Naktong. Some of the equipment crossed on rafts. Additional infantry units of the enemy division also crossed the river during the night. A few tanks may have crossed at this time. [17-38]

[note]


 

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1929 Sunset

[note]


Bio

It was almost dark before the Marines could silence the 2 enemy machineguns around the bend, and at 2015 Murray ordered 3/5 to secure for the night and defend the 2 hills already occupied.

[note]

 

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On the premise that the enemy had prepared an ambush for rescue parties approaching the wrecked jeep, it was decided to wait until morning to bring back the wounded men.

[note]

 

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This task force [Task Force Bradley] moved toward P'ohang-dong and Yŏnil after dark, 10 August, over the main road through Kyŏngju.

[note]

 

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  Bio

The night passed quietly except for scattered rifle fire along the 3rd Battalion’s 700-yard front. To carry out General Craig’s orders for 11 August, the two rifle companies prepared to continue the attack on Kosŏng at first light.[42]

[note]

 

On the nights of August 6-7 and 7-8, the enemy reinforced their bridgehead. At least two battalions crossed on August 7-8, and the NKPA 4th Division completed its crossing on August 10, using an underwater bridge and rafts. Trucks, heavy mortars, about 12 artillery pieces and possibly some tanks were moved into the bulge.

[note]

 

This task force [Task Force Bradley] moved toward P'ohang-dong and Yŏnil after dark, 10 August, over the main road through KYŏngju.

The command group and the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, except K Company, reached Yŏnil Airfield shortly before midnight and General Bradley assumed responsibility for the ground defense of the airstrip.

[note]

 

 

 

 


Casualties

Thursday August 10, 1950 (Day 47)

 

91 Casualties

As of August 10, 1950

1 13TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
34 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 24TH REPLACEMENT COMPANY - DIVISION
5 26TH ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AW BATTALION (SP)
1 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
8 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 39TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON
1 555TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
2 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
3 5TH MARINE REGIMENT
7 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 6406TH AVIATION CARGO UNIT
1 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
21 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 VF-54 FIGHTER SQUADRON
91 19500810 0000 Casualties by unit
Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 65 3309 30 5 3409
Today 2 87 2   91
Total 67 3396 32 5 3500

Aircraft Losses Today 004

 

 

 

Notes for Thursday August 10, 1950 (Day 47)

 

 

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