Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 26.7°C  80.06°F at Taegu      

Early morning fog

Extremely hot in the afternoon

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

August 11, 1950 (Friday)

[note]

 

By the morning of August 11 the situation in the 24th Division sector was chaotic and desperate. Hundreds of the NKPA had swarmed through the southern sector to reinforce the earlier infiltrators near Yŏngsan-ni, and the roadblocks on the MSR south of the town. No area in the division rear was safe from enemy snipers or organized formations. Yŏngsan-ni, itself had come under heavy NKPA artillery fire. As a result,  John Church was finally compelled to cease offensive operations toward the Naktong River to deal with the enemy in his rear. Every available unit was thrown into the task: Brad Smiths 1/21; the division Recon Company; engineers; F Company of Joe Walkers 2/9; even the division band.

Meanwhile, Michaelis Fire Brigade 27th Infantry was mounting a rescue operation from the south. Wary of over committing this precious reserve, Johnnie Walker initially restricted Michaelis to one battalion combat team Michaelis gave the task to Gordon Murch's 2/27, supported by a battery of Gus Terry's 8th FAB. Hurrying north toward Yŏngsan-ni,, Murch plowed into the flanks of the NKPA and soon found himself in a terrific fight. As he slowly crawled north, his 2/27 pushed the NKPA against Yŏngsan-ni,, increasing the pressure on the disparate elements of the 24th Division, which were barely holding on.

[note]

 

On 11 August Marine air and artillery caught an enemy motorized column in the open and wiped it out in what became known as the Kosŏng Turkey Shoot.

[note]

 

The FBI arrests Mrs. Ethel Rosenberg in New York on suspicion that she helped her husband, Julius, already under arrest, pass atomic secrets to the Russians.

-- Pravda claims that captured documents show that South Korean intends to carry out germ warfare on North Korea. That followed reports from the previous week that communists had captured maps that showed how the South was going to invade North Korea with 10 divisions on June 25.

[note]

 

Two SA-16s and two SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. Twenty five hours and twenty minutes (25:20) was logged on these missions.

A total of ten (10) false alerts were recorded in the Fukuoka area this date.

[note]

Def

 

Yesterday, Eighth Army ordered curtailment of delivery by the Red Ball Express and increased use of the airlift to its maximum capacity. The reason given for this action was a sudden apprehension that the port of Pusan could not process promptly the flow of water-borne supplies.

[note]

Today C-119 Flying Boxcars began airlifting trucks from Tachikawa AB, Japan to Taegu.

[note]

 

  

Consolidating all troops in the southern part of his division zone under the command of Col. John G. Hill (whose 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, was attached to the 24th Division to help restore the Naktong line)  General Church ordered a counterattack on 11 August. [02-4]

Task Force Hill's attack ran squarely into strong enemy attacks, and the entire operation lost its direction and impetus in the resulting confusion. With communications lacking much of the time and enemy forces scattered throughout a large area, one regimental commander summed up the chaos by saying,

"There are dozens of enemy and American forces all over the area, and they are all surrounding each other." [02-5]

[note]

 

 

Citations

 

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

 

19500811 0000 DSC BATER

19500811 0000 DSC GUSTIN

19500811 0000 DSC NEVILLE

19500811 0000 DSC PRESSLER

19500811 0000 DSC ZANIN

Silver Star

Archuleta, Jose L. [Pvt SS B3rdECB]

Bohn, Robert Dewey [1stLt SS G5thMR]

Brady, Richard G. [Cpl SS G27thIR]

Bragg, Julius L. [2ndLt SS 24thReconCo]

Cole, Doyle H. [2ndLt SS (VMF-323)]

Corley, John Thomas [LtCol SS6 CO 3rdBn24thIR]

Duncan, Edward F. [2ndLt SS PltCmdr G5thMR]

Gresens, Rosslyn E. [Cpl SS B3rdECB]

Hyzer, Peter C. [LtCol SS 3rdECB]

King, Charley L. [PFC SS D21stIR]

Lund, Arnold A. [Maj SS VMF-323]

Pope, Eugene J. [Capt SS VMO-6]

Rogers, Ernest P. [SFC SS HqCo2ndBn7thCR]

Williamson, Harvey B. [Cpl SS 24thReconCo]

 

[note]

 

August

[note]

 

"Captain Vivian Moses became the first casualty of Marine Air Group 33. He crash-landed his F4U Corsair in a rice paddy after being hit with ground fire and was thrown from the cockpit. Knocked unconscious, Captain Vivian drowned minutes before an air rescue team could get to him."
[note]

 

South then North

 

 

August

Darrigo was the same officer who had escaped from Kaesŏng at dawn, 25 June, when the North Koreans began their attack across the 38th Parallel. One who saw this courageous 30-year-old soldier when he arrived at Yŏnil [on 8/11] said he looked to be fifty. [18-17]

[note]

 

Bio

In the meantime, and pursuant to General Walker's order on the 11th, Colonel Murch's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, had been engaged in helping to clear the enemy from the area south of Yŏngsan-ni,. On the 11th Murch's battalion departed from its assembly area near Masan and rolled north toward the Naktong River. A steady stream of Korean refugees clogged the road. As the battalion pushed its way through this traffic a refugee cart overturned, exposing about fifteen rifles and several bags of ammunition. Approximately twelve North Korean soldiers disguised as refugees accompanying it fled across an open field. Infantrymen near the scene killed eight of them. Continuing on, Murch's battalion engaged and dispersed an estimated 200 enemy troops near Iryong-ni, a few miles south of the Naktong River bridge.

[note]

 

The Enemy 10th Division's Crossing at Yongp'o

The North Korean plan for the attack against Taegu from the west and southwest had called for the N.K. 10th Division  to make a co-ordinated attack with the N.K. 3d Division. The 10th Division so far had not been in combat.

 It had started from Sukch'on for the front by rail about 25 July.

At Ch'ŏnan it left the trains and continued southward on foot, passing through Taejon and arriving at the Naktong opposite Waegwan on or about 8 August.

There it received its combat orders two days later 10 August. Its mission was to cross the Naktong River in the vicinity of Tŭksŏng-dong, penetrate east, and cut the Taegu-Pusan main supply road.

The division assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August.

 

Prisoners taken in the final action which cleared Hill 268 agreed substantially that about 1,000 men of the 7th Regiment had crossed the Naktong to Hill 268, and that about 700 of them became casualties. The prisoners also agreed that artillery and mortars had inflicted most of the crippling casualties on the regiment. After crossing to the east side of the Naktong, the enemy regiment had received no food or ammunition supply. An estimated 300 survivors re-crossed the river to the west side the night of 10-11 August. [19-24]

[note]

 

The division [N.K. 10th Division] assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August. There it was astride the main highway running northeast to Taegu over a partially destroyed Naktong bridge. [19-26]

Eighth Army purposely had not completely destroyed this bridge; it was passable for foot soldiers but not for vehicles. In its partially destroyed condition it provided something of a trap if used by an enemy crossing force, because the bridge and its approaches channeled any enemy movement over it and were completely covered by pre-registered mortar and artillery fire. To this was to be added the fire of infantry weapons located in good defensive positions on the hills near the river.

Two regiments of the N.K. 10th Division, the 29th  on the south and the 25th on the north, were to make the assault crossing with the 27th  Regiment in reserve. The commander of the 25th Regiment issued an order on the eve of the crossing, stating that the objective was to "destroy the enemy in Taegu City in coordination with the 3rd Infantry Division." [19-27]

[note]

 

The absurdity of the logistical situation was illustrated the next day, 11 August, when, upon General Partridge's suggestion, two 2 1/2-ton trucks were airlifted in a C-119 from Tachikawa Air Base in Japan to Taegu. The Air Force planned to airlift two trucks daily in this manner.

[note]

 

Bio   Bio

Army had prepared plans to meet all eventualities anticipated as probable. In early August, General MacArthur outlined to General Walker a defense line closer to Pusan than the Naktong River line. He wanted this line prepared for occupancy in the event Eighth Army could not stop the North Koreans at the Naktong.

On 11 August, General Walker verbally instructed Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, an Engineer officer, to lay out this secondary defense line. Davidson, after looking over the ground, recommended to General Walker that because of better defensive terrain the line should be somewhat farther back toward Pusan than General MacArthur had indicated. General Walker replied that the line would be constructed where General MacArthur had indicated it should go.

General Davidson began laying out the line with very few resources. He received some help from Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin and the 2nd Logistical Command at Pusan and from the 2nd and 25th Divisions. This line, known as the Davidson Line, began on the east coast at Sodong-ni, approximately eight miles north of Ulsan, and extended generally west along high ground to a point northeast of Miryang, then curved down the ridge east of Muan-ni, turned south across the Naktong River and anchored on the high ground northeast of Masan.

General Walker would not approve Davidson's recommendation to remove all houses from in front of the line to clear a field of fire. Davidson succeeded in laying a trace of the line on the ground, cleared fields of fire except for houses, ordered material for fortifications, and was able to have a few positions dug before he reported to the 24th Division as assistant division commander on the first of September. [21-46 ]

While General Walker had many capable staff officers at his Eighth Army headquarters at this time, perhaps none was more valuable to him than Col. John A. Dabney, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,[appointed 8/15] who had joined the Army in Korea during July. Dabney was quiet and unassuming, possessed of a good mind, sound professional knowledge, persistent in his search of facts, and blessed with a fine judgment in evaluating combat information. He showed common sense throughout the critical Naktong battles of the Perimeter, and was a trusted and valued adviser to General Walker and his chief of staff.

[note]

 

Bio    Bio  

In response to General MacArthur's instructions to General Walker on 11 and 13 August to send Koreans to augment the 7th Infantry Division, 8,637 of them arrived in Japan before the division embarked for Inch'ŏn. Their clothing on arrival ranged from business suits to shirts and shorts, or shorts only. The majority wore sandals or cloth shoes. They were civilians-stunned, confused, and exhausted. Only a few could speak English. Approximately 100 of the South Korean recruits were assigned to each rifle company and artillery battery; the buddy system was used for training and control. [25-13]

The quality of the artillery and infantry crew-served weapons troops received from the United States and assigned to the 7th Division during August and early September was high. The superior training provided by the old infantry and artillery noncommissioned officers who arrived from the Fort Benning Infantry and the Fort Sill Artillery Schools brought the 7th Division to a better condition as the invasion date approached than could have been reasonably expected a month earlier. The 7th Division strength on embarkation, including the attached South Koreans, was 24,845. [25-14]

[note]

 

[note]

 

The Forgotten War

 

   Unit Info

By August 11 Ordway was making progress up the Much'on road. His 3/5, commanded by West Pointer (1935) Benjamin W. Heckemeyer, thirty-nine, bypassing or ignoring the NKPA in the hills, reached Much'on and, as planned, linked with Fisher's 35th and advanced four miles west on the "north road" toward Chinju. There the combined units, as planned, dug in to await the advance of the Marines north through Sach'ŏn. Walker and Kean were pleased: The 5th RCT was at last demonstrating the kind of aggressive spirit that Walker believed ultimately necessary to destroy the NKPA.

The main body of the 5th RCT the 1/5 and 2/5 was advancing more slowly. By August 11 it had only reached the village of Pongam, four miles northwest of Kogan. It was supported by a formidable supply train and collection of artillery: twelve 105s of John H. Daly's 555th Field Artillery Battalion, (triple Nickles) FAB, which had come from Hawaii mated to the 5th RCT, and six 155s of James Sanden's 90th FAB.

[note]

 

That day the bypassed NKPA infiltrators in the hills fell on the main body of the 5th RCT and the artillery positions in a perfect fury. In a series of vicious tank led attacks the NKPA created chaos among the Americans and seized the high ground dominating the road at a pass just north of Pongam. In the confused melee which ensued, both John Jones, commanding the 1/5, and the triple Nickles' commander, John Daly, were wounded Jones seriously. Refusing medical evacuation, Daly assumed command of the 1/5 until Ordway's S2, Thomas B. Roelofs, forty-one, came up to replace Jones, who was evacuated.

By this time Bill Kean was under heavy pressure from Johnnie Walker to show some dramatic progress. The Marines were making the 5th RCT look like incompetent fools. Kean got on the radio and in no uncertain terms told Ordway to get cracking. But Ordway equivocated. The enemy had hit him in great strength; he dared not attempt the pass in daylight. Disbelieving Ordway's estimate of enemy strength (2,500 men), Kean, even though he was miles away, in effect assumed tactical control of operations.

He later sent Ordway written orders to move his 2/5, supported by an artillery battalion, through the pass in darkness to link with the 3/5 and 35th Regiment at Much'on; the rest of the 5th RCT would remain at Pongam until dawn. Kean would hurry John Corley's 3/24 westerly through the hills to attack the NKPA confronting Ordway from the rear; simultaneously Ordway would take the rest of the 5th RCT through the pass in daylight.

When he received these orders, Ordway was dismayed. To him it seemed possibly "catastrophic" to fragment the 5th RCT while it was under such heavy enemy pressure. He tried and failed to reach Kean to get the orders rescinded. Having no other choice, Ordway complied with the orders and sent the 2/5 and a battery of the triple Nickles led by Daly himself north through the pass in darkness.

The 2/5, believing it constituted the advance guard of the main body, which would follow on its heels, moved smartly northwest and beyond all communications with Ordway seeking a linkup with the 3/5 at Much'on. Daly, wounded for the second time (and later awarded a DSC), was evacuated, replaced by Clarence E. Stuart. (on the 13th)

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

 

At briefing this morning, brought out that 42 night intruder missions were flown night of 10-11 August. I informed General Partridge by telephone that his method of reporting damage, reference the signal for Vandenberg, would continue as he had been reporting in the past -that is, divide by three.


It is reported that fighting was going on in the P'ohang-dong, 6 miles from our K-3 Fighter Strip. Am very concerned about the loss of this as signal came in about 1020 hours that all cryptographic and security materials were destroyed at K-3. This message was addressed to Fifth Air Force Advance, information to me. In talking with General Timberlake, he informed me that Generals Partridge and Walker had gone to K-3 to get first-hand information. The loss of this air strip would mean the cutting-down of fighter-bomber sorties about one-half.

Sent a redline to Cabell:

"Have received another urgent request from Partridge for a 'superior quality intelligence officer to head up intelligence program and to organize it so that he may achieve full coverage of activities.' Request earliest possible solution."ť

 

Sent a Stratline message to Partridge telling him that [I] had reiterated your [sic, his] need for an intelligence officer.

 

Sent following memo to O'Donnell:

The Bomber Command has been plugging away at the west railroad bridge at Seoul from 28 June to date, and it still stands. I am confident that motor traffic is proceeding over it. Apparently 500, 1000 and 2000 pound bombs are ineffective. There are larger bombs available for the destruction of this target at Okinawa. I do not like to tell you how to do your job, but certainly B-29s with the proper bomb can take out this bridge. I still want it taken out and urge that it be a continuing target for the FEAF Bomber Command until it is destroyed. At this writing, nothing would please me more than to have a post-strike picture of a couple of the spans of this bridge in the river at Seoul.[186- Nicknamed the "elastic bridge"ť for its ability to not fall but bounce back after these attacks, the west railway bridge at Seoul underwent numerous bombings. The 19th BG went after the bridge day after day for almost a month without success. MacArthur finally offered to commend the unit that would drop the bridge into the river, and Stratemeyer offered a case of Scotch to the crew who destroyed it.

On August 19, nine B-29s of the 19th BG laid 54 tons of bombs on the bridge, reporting numerous hits, yet the bridge still stood. That afternoon, 37 Corsairs and Skyraiders from CAG-11 had a try at the bridge. The bridge was shaky but still not down following this attack. The following day, however, when the 19th returned to try again, two spans of the bridge were in the water. Bombs from the B-29s sent a third span crashing. A delighted MacArthur presented both the 19th BG and CAG-11 with trophies for their work. An equally delighted Stratemeyer managed to round up two cases of Scotch for the two groups. (Futrell, pp 130-131.)]

FEAF BOMCOM General Order No. 4, as dated 8 August 50, announced that Brigadier General James E. Briggs,[187- General Briggs had been commander of the 307th BW at MacDill AFB, Florida. When the 307th BG was sent to the Far East, Briggs was assigned as deputy commander of FEAF BOMCOM. In this capacity, he was given operational control of the 19th, 22d, and 307th groups at Kadena, and his headquarters was designated as the advanced echelon for FEAF BOMCOM.] announced as Commanding General, FEAF Bomber Command, ADVON, APO 239, Unit 1.


Nicknamed the "elastic"ť or "rubber bridge" for its ability to withstand bombings, the west railroad bridge at Seoul can be seen at the far right of the photo.

 

Rad[io] received from USAF dtd 9 Aug:

...Effective this date the Commanding General FEAF is delegated authority to make awards, to personnel of any foreign government which is a co-belligerent with the United States in the Korean theater and is co-participant in such operation, of the following decorations: Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal.


(For info: Medal of Honor and DSM [Distinguished Service Medal] reserved for Hq. USAF: DSC [Distinguished Service Cross] and LM [Legion of Merit] reserved for theater commander. Reserved for CO FEAF: Silver Star [underlining in original]; DFC [Distinguished Flying Cross], Soldier's Medal, the Air Medal, Commendation Ribbon, Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart given to our commanders of major general rank.)


Had conference with Generals Craigie and Turner reference our survey group for Formosa. I instructed General Turner, in his conversations with General Stearley, to utilize all possible help that can be made available from the 51st Fighter Wing for this survey group as well as people from Clark Air Force Base. The people at Naha and what is left of the people at Clark are in no way involved in the Korean situation, and, therefore, most of the survey group should come from Naha and Clark - exceptions being those individuals that Deputy for Materiel, Colonel Alkire, feels should come from here.

note]

 

 

    

Beginning on 11 August, ground crews worked on their aircraft by day and defended the airfield [P'ohang] from slit trenches by night with the assistance of the aviation engineers and a small infantry task force.

But by 13 August the enemy pressure was too heavy, and the fighter units were flown out to Tsuiki Air Base on Kyushu.

Wing elements moved out by LST next day [14 August], joining the 35th Group at Tsuiki. "No equipment was left behind," reported the 40th Squadron; "this was due partly to the fact that we did not have much equipment anyhow."

[note]

 

Elastic West bridge at Seoul 19th BG(M)

July 23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week

30,31, August 01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks

20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

 

Flying from Itazuke, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group had been the first organization to fight in Korea, and during July it continued maximum effort, with many pilots flying three missions each day. The 35th and 36th Squadrons of this group, were nevertheless slated for conversion to Mustangs, and on 10 & 11 August they undertook something new in USAF experience, movement to a new base and conversion to different type aircraft, at the same time.

On 10 August the group departed Itazuke and arrived at Tsuiki early next morning. Pilots bade their "beloved" F-80's goodbye on the morning of 11 August, climbed into F-51's for a mission to Korea, and returned to land at Tsuiki. As a base, Tsuiki had little more than runways and a parking area, for it was an old Japanese naval air base which had been bombed out during World War II and used for nothing more than maneuvers during the occupation.

 

 With the arrival of the 35th Group, four fighter squadrons had to fly from a field previously considered suitable for nothing more than emergency landings. Until late September, however, the pilots would fly out of Tsuiki before dawn, make as many as five missions out of Taegu during the day, and return home after dark. What seems to have bothered 8th Group pilots was not the move from the comforts of Itazuke to the field conditions at Tsuiki, but the loss of their F-80 fighters.

They were told that the F-51 was a better ground support fighter than the F-80, but

"unfortunately," recorded the group historian, "this idea was not shared by the pilots who had been flying F-80's. A lot of pilots had seen vivid demonstrations of why the F-51 was not a ground support fighter in the last war, and weren't exactly intrigued by the thought of playing guinea pig to prove the same thing over again.

[note]

 

   Bio

During July the North Koreans made no serious offensive in the mountains of the east coast front, where ROK troops managed to contain the NKPA 5th Division. Early in August, however, the enemy began massing north of Yŏngdök, while guerrillas formed in the mountains inland from P'ohang. By 11 August these irregular troops were down upon the town and airfield at P'ohang, objectives of great importance but inadequately defended by Task Force Bradley, a holding force of an infantry battalion, an artillery battery, and a company of tanks. While the North Koreans never managed to secure control in this vicinity, General Partridge had no choice but to withdraw air units from the new base at P'ohang, thus reducing his Korean-based air force by half. General Partridge had cautioned EUSAK on 4 August that loss of P'ohang would adversely affect air support, but EUSAK, threatened on the Naktong, could respond but feebly to the danger.

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

[note]

 

August August

At Kosŏng, MAG-33 pilots broke the back of the enemy defenders with a punishing attack that sent North Korean soldiers fleeing in disarray from the key ridge below the town. The echoes of that encounter had hardly faded away when a division of Corsairs from VMF-323 caught a column of more than 100 North Korean vehicles on the road. What followed came to be known as the "Kosŏng Turkey Shoot," resulting in the complete destruction of the NKPA 83rd Mechanized Regiment, leaving nothing but shattered, burning vehicles and blood-soaked corpses to mark the event.

That was also the day that First Lieutenant Doyle Cole met his brigade commander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig. With his Corsair shaking and stuttering from multiple hits by ground fire, Cole was forced to ditch at sea just offshore at the very moment BGen Craig was making an inspection tour by helicopter. Pulled dripping wet from the ocean, Cole was dumbfounded to see BGen Craig operating the hoist.

August    August

The 1stProvMarBrig, with its integral aviation combat element, quickly became known as one of the most powerful, friendly combat formations in Korea, packing a punch far out of proportion to its relatively small size. The responsiveness, accuracy and ready availability of Marine aviation combat elements, coupled with their ability to spend much more time over the target than Japan-based U.S. Air Force planes, was the envy of Army commanders operating adjacent to the Marines.

[note]

 

[note]

 

   9th RCT

Task Force Hill attacked on 11 August but lost its momentum in a confused situation which found the enemy attacking at the same time. Reinforced to a strength of three infantry regiments, Hill’s provisional unit again struck out against the bridgehead on 14 and 15 August.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 

HMS Warrior (R31) and HMS Ocean (CVL) joined British and American Forces in Korea.

[note]

 

USN_Units

on the 11th heavy demands were made upon the fire support ships south of Yŏngdök. USS Helena (CA-75) got four tanks this day, as her helicopter was flying KMAG personnel to P'ohang to confer with General Walker, but naval gunfire was not enough.

[note]

 

Counterattacks on the 11th and on the 14th and 15th had failed to dislodge the three North Korean infantry regiments which, with artillery and tank support, now held the eastern ridges and were debouching onto the Yŏngsan-ni, road.

[note]

 

0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/10/50
9:00 AM
08/10/50
10:00 AM
08/10/50
3:00 PM
08/11/50
12:00 AM

 

 

 

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/10/50
10:00 AM
08/10/50
11:00 AM
08/10/50
4:00 PM
08/11/50
1:00 AM

Ten miles north of Kyŏngju and at a point about a mile east of An'gang-ni, the road bent sharply right [East] in the Hyŏngsan-ni,-gang valley toward P'ohang-dong, seven miles eastward. Just after making this turn the road swung around the base of a steep mountain which crowded it close against the river near the village of Tongnam-ni.

Company K and four vehicles of C Battery, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, were ambushed at this point at 0120, 11 August. Enemy fire suddenly hit the driver of the leading truck and his vehicle swerved, blocking the road. Automatic weapons fire swept over the column, bringing death and destruction. The K Company convoy fell into confusion. As many men as could fled back toward Kyŏngju; approximately 120 members of the company, including two officers, reached the town. [18-14]

August 8  Johnnie Walker decided not to commit it directly into hard combat. Instead, he ordered that the 3/9, plus one of Keith's 15th FAB batteries, a company of Shermans of the 72nd Tank Battalion, engineers of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, and other forces, be sent to guard the FEAF airfield at Yŏnil, near P'ohang. This task force was commanded by the ADC, Sladen Bradley, and Chin Sloane. "Called Task Force Bradley"

 

Learning of the ambush, Sladen Bradley at Yŏnil Airfield ordered I Company to return to An'gang-ni, to K Company's rescue. West of P'ohang-dong it, too, was ambushed. Informed by radio of this second ambush, Bradley sent two MPG vehicles, with their heavy armament of four .50-caliber machine guns each, to the scene. All but about twenty-five men of I Company got back to the airfield during the day.[18-15]

At the K Company ambush casualties were greater. By afternoon, 7 dead and at least 40 wounded were reported. About 25 members of C Battery, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, were also lost in this ambush.

The enemy soldiers who had cut the road west of P'ohang-dong the night of 10-11 August and staged these ambushes apparently were from the 766th Independent Regiment. This regiment, leaving the 5th Division in the vicinity of Yŏngdök, had come in behind P'ohang-dong by way of mountain trails.

   Bio

 

In the early afternoon, 11 August, Johnnie Walker ordered the Tank Company, 9th Infantry, which had stopped at Kyŏngju to wait upon repair of a damaged bridge, to proceed to the Yŏnil Airfield. He also ordered the ROK 17th Regiment released from Task Force P'ohang and to proceed from An'gang-ni, to the airstrip. [18-16]

Aerial reconnaissance showed the K Company ambush site was still held by enemy troops. Well aware of this, Captain Darrigo, KMAG adviser with the ROK 17th Regiment at An'gang-ni, volunteered to lead an armored patrol through to P'ohang-dong and Yŏnil. Darrigo rode the first of five tanks. Four F-51 fighter planes took off from Yŏnil Airfield and delivered a strike on the enemy positions at the ambush site just as the tanks arrived there. This air strike flushed enemy troops from concealment at just the right moment. Tank machine gun fire killed many of them; in one group about seventy North Koreans were caught in the open. This tank column arrived at Yŏnil Airfield about 2030, 11 August, and were the first tanks to reach the airstrip. They were immediately placed in the perimeter defense. Darrigo was the same officer who had escaped from Kaesong at dawn, 25 June, when the North Koreans began their attack across the 38th Parallel. One who saw this courageous 30-year-old soldier when he arrived at Yŏnil said he looked to be fifty. [18-17]

 

While these events were taking place behind and to the east of it, Task Force P'ohang attacked north from the An'gang-ni area the morning of 11 August.

 (Map 12) It came to grief almost at once. At one place the enemy annihilated two companies of the ROK 25th Regiment. The task force, and also the ROK Capital Division, lost ground. The day was blazing hot. Great dust clouds hung over the roads. Fighter planes shuttled constantly from Yŏnil Airfield to the numerous nearby points where enemy troops were active, trying to stabilize the situation. One pilot, speaking of that day, said, "I barely had my wheels up before I started my strafing runs." But it was not all one-sided for the fighter planes.

The day before, enemy small arms and machine gun fire had shot down four of them. By evening of 11 August, North Korean patrols reportedly were operating three miles south of P'ohang-dong.

Eighth Army during the day ordered the ROK forces in the east to fall back to new positions during the nights of 12 and 13 August. [18-18]

The main enemy force encountered by Task Force P'ohang on 11 August seems to have been advance elements of the 12th Division. This division had now crossed the mountains from Andong and was debouching at Kigye into the valley west of P'ohang-dong. There, in a series of battles, fought by the North Koreans almost entirely with automatic weapons and small arms, the 12th Division drove back the ROK Capital Division and Task Force P'ohang. In this series of action the 12th lost about 800 casualties, according to prisoner reports. [18-19]

That night, 11 August, the fighter planes at Yŏnil flew to another airfield for security, but returned the next day. From hills to the south and southwest of the airstrip enemy troops delivered long-range, ineffective fire against it. Even though this fire did no damage, it created a state of alarm. The next day, 12 August, 28-year-old Colonel Kim Hi Chun, acting on General Walker's orders, in a successful attack eastward from An'gang-ni, led his ROK 17th Regiment into Yŏnil, greatly to the relief of everyone there. Enemy forces first entered P'ohang-dong on 10 or 11 August. ROK sources reported on the 11th that an estimated 300 enemy soldiers from the 766th Independent Regiment and the 5th Division had entered the town and seized the railroad station. But they did not remain there more than a few hours. Naval gunfire and aerial strikes drove them out to seek comparative safety in the nearby hills. The town of P'ohang-dong now became a no man's land. Patrols from ROK and North Korean units entered the town at night but neither side held it. The battle swirled around it on the adjacent hills. [18-20]

 

[note]

 

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Occasionally, guerrillas would attack trains in rear areas of the Pusan Perimeter, usually in the Yŏngch'ŏn-Kyŏngju area in the east or along the lower Naktong in the Samnangjin area. These attacks generally resulted in only a few persons wounded and minor damage to rail equipment. The most successful guerrilla attack behind the lines of the Pusan Perimeter occurred on 11 August against a VHF radio relay station on Hill 915, eight miles south of Taegu. A guerrilla force, estimated at 100 men, at 0515 attacked the 70 ROK police guarding the station and its American operators. They drove off the ROK police and set fire to the buildings. American casualties were 2 killed, 2 wounded, and 3 missing. When a ROK police force reoccupied the area later in the day the guerrillas had disappeared. [21-21]

[note]

 

0542 Sunrise

[note]

 

Bio

The night passed quietly except for scattered rifle fire along the 3d Battalion’s 700-yard front. To carry out General Craig’s orders for 11 August, the two rifle companies prepared to continue the attack on Kosŏng at first light.[42]

The enemy had different plans. At the crack of dawn a small force of North Koreans emerged from the fog and charged recklessly into Company G’s front. There was a furious hand-to-hand clash as the attackers converged on Bohn’s OP in the center of the line. The company commander directed the defense amid grenade explosions, one of which drove a fragment into his shoulder. At his side Staff Sergeant Charles F. Kurtz, Jr., called down effective 60-mm. mortar fire on the Reds while throwing grenades and ducking sub machinegun bursts.

[note]

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That night, 10-11 August, North Koreans attacked the 1st Battalion and the artillery positions at Pongam-ni. The action continued after daylight. During this fight, Lt. Col. John H. Daly, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion commander, lost communication with his A Battery. With the help of some infantry, he and Colonel Jones, the 1st Battalion commander, tried to reach the battery. Both Daly and Jones were wounded, the latter seriously. Daly then assumed temporary command of the infantry battalion. As the day progressed the enemy attacks at Pongam-ni dwindled and finally ceased.

When the 3rd Battalion had continued on westward the previous afternoon the 5th Regimental Combat Team headquarters and C Battery, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, east of Pongam-ni, had been left without protecting infantry close at hand. North Koreans attacked them during the night at the same time Pongam-ni came under attack. The Regimental Headquarters and C Battery personnel defended themselves successfully.

[note]

 

  

By the morning of 11 August, therefore, five days after the initial crossing, the North Koreans had heavy weapons and equipment across into their bridgehead.

The North Koreans built many underwater bridges across the Naktong during August, 1950. They consisted of sandbags, logs, and rocks to a point about one foot below the surface of the water. In effect, they constituted shallow fords. In muddy water they were hard to detect from the air. Underwater bridges similar to them had been built, and used extensively, by the Russians in World War II, often as a surprise factor in battles on the Eastern Front. They played an important part, for instance, in the crucial battle of Stalingrad.

  

The attack on 11 August; intended to push the enemy into the river, failed completely. The N.K. 4th Division fought the 9th and 19th Regiments to a standstill at their lines of departure and in their positions. Furthermore, the enemy drove the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, from its assembly area before it could start its part of the attack. During the morning a new feature appeared in the bulge battle-North Korean use of artillery in three groups of 6, 4, and 4 pieces, all emplaced near Kogong-ni, about a mile behind the enemy positions on Cloverleaf and Obong-ni. In the afternoon General Church found it necessary to change the order for Task Force Hill from attack to one of dig in and hold. The greater part of the N.K. 4th Division had now crossed into the bulge area. That night the division completed its crossing of the river. [17-39]

Yŏngsan-ni, Under Attack

During 10-11 August, when the North Korean build-up on Obong-ni and Cloverleaf was increasingly apparent, enemy groups also began to appear in the extreme southern part of the 24th sector. [17-40]

By 11 August there was unmistakable indication that enemy forces in some strength had moved around the main battle positions at Cloverleaf and Obong-ni and were behind Task Force Hill.

On that day enemy artillery fire brought Yŏngsan-ni, under fire for the first time. East of the town, enemy sniper fire harassed traffic on the road to Miryang. South of Yŏngsan-ni,, an enemy force drove back a patrol of the 24th Reconnaissance Company. And during the morning, North Koreans surprised and killed a squad of K Company, 34th Infantry, guarding the bridge over the Naktong at Namji-ri. Enemy control of this bridge cut the Yŏngsan-ni,-Masan road and broke the only direct vehicular communication link between the 24th and 25th Divisions. The situation was confused south of Yŏngsan-ni, on 11 August, at the very moment Task Force Hill's attack was being thrown back a few miles westward. In this emergency, General Church dispatched the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion [there is a 14rh IR in the 25th ID] to Yŏngsan-ni,, and General Walker ordered the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, in army reserve at Masan behind Task Force Kean, to attack north across the Naktong River over the Namji-ri bridge into the southern part of the 24th Division zone. [17-41]

[17-41]

That night, 11-12 August, North Koreans built up their roadblock east of Yŏngsan-ni, to greater strength and extended it to a point three miles east of the town.

[note]

 

The melee ended after a half hour with Company G driving the battered remnants of the NKPA platoon back down the hill. Despite his wound, Bohn stayed with his company and reorganized it for the attack on Kosŏng. He also had the satisfaction of overseeing the evacuation of the two wounded survivors of McNeely’s ill-fated patrol.

[note]

 

 

 

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8 August 1950 When General Ridgway returned to Washington, he met with the Army Policy Council and, at the request of the Secretary of the Army, reported his observations on the combat situation. Ridgway had come away from Korea convinced that Walker would hold the Pusan Perimeter. Enemy pressure was still great enough to force limited tactical withdrawals from the edges of the perimeter and the actual final line had not yet been developed, but the defensive line would be held successfully and the beachhead kept intact. Regardless of his favorable prognosis, General Ridgway was quick to point out that General Walker had a serious problem. His forces still faced a ruthless and savage foe.

Any idea that the North Koreans would weaken or fall back was faulty and dangerous. As an example, General Ridgway cited enemy reaction to the strongest offensive thrust yet made by Walker's forces. Eight American battalions had attacked in the southern sector to stop an enemy move at Pusan. Within an hour after the attack jumped off, the enemy counterattacked fiercely and effectively. [07- 43]

United Nations forces were still too few in number to carry on a defense according to the book. One division held a 21,000-yard front with six battalions. The enemy could infiltrate the thinly defended front at night and attack from the rear the next morning. General Walker had not had time to organize the ground effectively. General MacArthur had told Ridgway that he was pleased with the support given him by Washington, but had asked for more. After Ridgway reported to the council, General Collins told Secretary Pace that the request for more men and units was already being studied by his staff, but that he was gravely concerned by the demands. [07-44]

At a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held later the same day to hear General Ridgway's formal report and to consider the Far East commander's needs, General MacArthur's request for another division occasioned a debate. Some members of the Joint Chiefs wanted to send the 82nd Airborne or a National Guard division instead of the understrength 3rd Division.

General Ridgway recommended that the 3rd Division be sent since he felt that the combat-ready airborne division must stay in the United States for use in a general emergency. After a 15-minute discussion, the tenor of thought among the Joint Chiefs inclined toward the same view-namely, to send the 3rd Division and to fill it up from any and every source. No final decision was made at this time, but (General Collins and Admiral Sherman were charged with examining the matter urgently and reaching a recommendation by 10 August. [07-45]

General Bolté, Army G-3, did not believe that the 3rd Division could be filled and sent to (General MacArthur without seriously delaying the Army's plans for rapid expansion of training activities in the United States. He told General Collins that the 3rd Division could reach the Far East by 15 September, untrained and worthless for combat, but that the training and mobilization base in the United States would suffer as a result. If General Collins could see his way clear to delay the division until December, it could be built up with National Guard and Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) fillers without ruining the ZI training base and could arrive in the Far East as a reasonably well-trained division. If General Collins considered it absolutely necessary to give General MacArthur another division by 15 September, the 82nd Airborne could be sent. According to General Bolté, the 82nd, already at about 85 percent strength, would not need many fillers. Furthermore, it would be ready to fight on arrival. Its departure, of course, would leave the continental United States without a combat-ready division. [07-46] General Bolté's views did not prevail. The JCS decided to send the 3rd Division to FECOM.

On 11 August President Truman approved its removal from the General Reserve. [07-47]

The 3rd Division, although it had three regiments, was very much understrength. Already it had furnished many men, officers, and units to the Far East Command. The division was short 2 infantry battalions, 1 tank battalion, and 2 field artillery battalions. Only drastic measures would place the division in a reasonably effective status, even for occupation duty. By reducing one regiment to zero strength and dividing its men and officers between the remaining two regiments, then assigning a separate regiment from Puerto Rico to the division, the Department of the Army succeeded in building up the division to a semblance of operational strength.

[note]

 

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At 0800, the Brigade moved out in a route column, with 3/5 as the advance guard and Company G in the role of advance party. Bohn’s point consisted of Second Lieutenant John D. Councilman's 3rd Platoon, whose leading element, under Corporal Raymond Giaquinto, was on the MSR with flank guards slightly withheld on each side.

The Brigade column moved swiftly. About a mile beyond the line of departure, Giaquinto braked his road-bound unit in the face of doubtful ground ahead. Simultaneously, the flank guards surged forward and wrapped around the suspected area. Then Giaquinto’s force raced down the road, and the 3 prongs of the point converged on an enemy machine-gun emplacement, killing the 5 occupants before they could fire a shot.

[note]

 

USN_Units

At 0800 on the morning of the 11th the advance on Kosŏng was resumed. A few shells lobbed into the town flushed an estimated hundred vehicles which headed westward out of town at high speed. Overhead a division of Corsairs from USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) observed trucks retreating so fast that some missed the turns and rolled down the embankments; making the most of this agreeable opportunity with rockets and 20-millimeter fire, the aviators piled up rolling stock in wholesale quantity.

[note]

 

 

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   Bio   Bio

Compensating, numerically at least, for this slight understrength of the 7th Division, MacArthur, after conceiving the idea that South Korea might be called on to provide soldiers for American units, attached more than 8,000 Koreans to the division. On 11 August he directed General Walker to procure, screen, and ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7th Division approximately 7,000 able-bodied male Koreans. Fortunately the ROK Government cooperated since no American commander had authority beyond merely requesting these men.

[note]

 

Bio

On the morning of the 11th, close-in air strikes helped turn the enemy back into the hills. Colonel Throckmorton's 2nd Battalion headquarters had also come under attack. He called E Company from its Pongam-ni position to help beat off the enemy. [16-28]

Colonel Ordway's plan for passing the regiment westward through Pongam-ni was for the 2nd Battalion to withdraw from the south ridge and start the movement, after the 1st Battalion had secured the north ridge and the pass. The regimental trains were to follow and next the artillery. The 1st Battalion was then to disengage and bring up the rear.

[note]

 

Bio

The 3rd Battalion of the 5th Regimental Combat Team, rolling westward from Pongam-ni on the morning of 11 August, had joined the 35th Infantry where the latter waited at the Much'on-ni crossroads. From there the two forces moved on to the Chinju pass. They now looked down on Chinju. But only their patrols went farther.  

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)   Koread-War

While these events were taking place behind and to the east of it, Task Force P'ohang attacked north from the An'gang-ni area the morning of 11 August.

(Map 12) It came to grief almost at once. At one place the enemy annihilated two companies of the ROK 25th Regiment. The task force, and also the ROK Capital Division, lost ground. The day was blazing hot. Great dust clouds hung over the roads. Fighter planes shuttled constantly from Yŏnil Airfield to the numerous nearby points where enemy troops were active, trying to stabilize the situation. One pilot, speaking of that day, said, "I barely had my wheels up before I started my strafing runs." But it was not all one-sided for the fighter planes. The day before, enemy small arms and machine gun fire had shot down four of them.

[note]

 

  Korean_War

Three days later, on August 11, Truman approved the transfer of the 3rd Division from the General Reserve to the Far East, with the understanding that it would not be sent to Korea but be based in Japan, in effect replacing the 7th Division.

[note]

 

   9th RCT


Task Force Hill was supposed to drive the enemy across the Naktong on the 11th by a general counterattack, driven ahead by the 9th and 19th regiments. But the enemy launched a surprise attack against the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, while in its assembly area at about 9 a.m. Although few casualties resulted, the attack was disconcerting. Task Force Hill's general attack failed.


The situation around Yŏngsan-ni, by now had so deteriorated that one regimental commander was moved to remark:

'There are dozens of enemy and American forces all over the area. And they are surrounding each other.'


In response to a call for help from Church, a composite company of men from A Company, 14th Engineers, plus cooks and staff from its headquarters, was sent to Yŏngsan-ni. Their force numbering fewer than 100 men, the engineers set up four separate positions at about 800-yard intervals along the road from Yŏngsan-ni,.

Another ad hoc force, under Captain George Hafeman (commander, 24th Division Headquarters Company), was deployed at the Simgong-ni and Wŏnjon passes, farther east. Known as Task Force Hafeman, it consisted of clerks and bakers from Hafeman's unit, military police personnel, men from the 24th Recon Company and others from eight different units, all supported by two tanks.

[note]

 

August

By this time both Harriman and Norstad had decided that Ridgway should replace Walker as commander of Eighth Army in Korea. On return to Washington Harriman would recommend that change to Truman, Johnson, Bradley, Pace, and Collins. On the plane Norstad privately broached the subject with Ridgway, saying,

"I think you ought to be in command here." Ridgway must have been flattered, but he replied: "Please don't mention that, it will look as though I was coming over here looking for a job and I'm not."

  

 

In Washington Harriman turned in his and Ridgway's reports to Truman, Johnson, Bradley, and others. The overall effect was to build considerable support at the White House for MacArthur and the Inch'ŏn landing. But the JCS remained skeptical about an amphibious landing at Inch'ŏn. When Ridgway appeared before the chiefs to deliver MacArthur's request for the 3rd Infantry Division to replace the 7th Division in Japan, he encountered doubt and debate. Subsequently it was decided that Collins and Forrest Sherman would go to Tokyo to examine the Inch'ŏn plan in greater detail before the JCS endorsed it. Owing to the deplorable state of the 3rd Division, the chiefs seriously but briefly considered sending MacArthur the 82nd Airborne Division. However, when Ridgway suggested the possibility of incorporating the Puerto Rican 65th Regiment into the 3rd Division and other measures to provide the division greater strength, the chiefs accepted his ideas. Three days later, on August 11, Truman approved the transfer of the 3rd Division from the General Reserve to the Far East, with the understanding that it would not be sent to Korea but be based in Japan, in effect replacing the 7th Division.

Still very much concerned over the "leadership, organization and planning" in Eighth Army, Ridgway, as Harriman had suggested, met individually with Pace, Collins, and other top-level Army officials to convey his misgivings about Walker. Ridgway expressed the belief that Walker could hold the Pusan Perimeter but that he should be replaced before Eighth Army went on the offensive. Pace (perhaps influenced by Harriman), according to Ridgway's notes,

"indicated his own conviction that a change ought to be made as early as possible but that he was uncertain as to the best method of making it."

Thinking out loud about a replacement for Walker, Pace mentioned both Ridgway and West Pointer (1919) Alfred M. ("Al") Gruenther, fifty-one, then serving in the Army's upper echelons as deputy chief of staff for plans. Gruenther, who had been chief of staff to Mark Clark in Italy during World War II, had never led troops in combat.

Joe Collins appeared less anxious to sack Walker. He told Ridgway that on his forthcoming visit to Tokyo to discuss Inch'ŏn with MacArthur, he would

"visit Korea and, based on [7-sic] his observations at the time, would take up with MacArthur the question of Eighth Army command, Organization and Staff."

Should a change be necessary, Collins thought that either Ridgway or West Pointer (1915) James A. Van Fleet could replace Walker. Collins preferred Van Fleet because Ridgway was slated to replace Haislip as vice chief and because Ridgway might become "so involved I couldn't get you out." When Collins asked Ridgway what his "preference" might be, Ridgway replied that if America was headed for World War III (as still seemed likely to him),

"I would prefer to fight in Europe."

[note]

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Bio

With Bohn calling the shots and Giaquinto setting the pace, the point swept aside three more enemy positions along the route. The effective combination of limited frontal attacks and envelopments brought the head of the column to the bridge north of Kosŏng at 1000. Here Company H passed through on the road and pushed into the town.

Using 1 rifle platoon and 2 tanks, Fegan easily cleared northern Kosŏng of light resistance. Then he gradually wheeled his force to the right, tracing the road to Sach'ŏn. His other two platoons continued southward with the mission of seizing a high hill below Sunam-dong.

Bio

General Craig reached Kosŏng by jeep just as Taplett was setting up his CP in a schoolyard north of the town. A small group of enemy snipers suddenly opened up from positions in and around the schoolhouse, and the Brigade commander observed sniper teams of 3/5’s headquarters spring into action and destroy the North Koreans.

Shortly after Fegan entered Kosŏng, Bohn swung his company to the southwest from above the town, drove through the western suburbs and launched an attack against Hill 88 below the Sach'ŏn road. Approaching the hill, Company G sustained a few casualties while eliminating a stubborn Communist pocket in the low ground on its right flank.

See map Road from Kosŏng to Sach'ŏn

[note]

 

Bio

By 1000 the town had been taken, a hill to the southward was shortly secured, and the Marines headed onward toward Sach'ŏn with their observation planes and Corsairs overhead and their tanks out front.

By this time things were going well for the brigade. The enemy roadblocks had been broken, momentum had been gained, enemy casualties were estimated as approaching the 2,000 mark, and the North Koreans appeared increasingly disorganized. Marine air and ground forces were working in harmony, and the advance was being paralleled in the third element.

A Scajap LST and some ROKN landing craft had been brought forward from Pusan to issue supplies and receive casualties, and General Craig had requested a destroyer to provide call fire in support of the coastal advance. But in other sectors the situation was degenerating. To the northward American counterattacks had failed to eliminate the Naktong bulge, while in the Marines’ rear the enemy had reemerged from the hills at Chindong-ni, and had cut the main supply route for Army troops advancing on Chinju.

[note]

 

ROK sources reported on the 11th that an estimated 300 enemy soldiers from the 766th Independent Regiment and the 5th Division had entered the town [P'ohang-dong] and seized the railroad station. But they did not remain there more than a few hours. Naval gunfire and aerial strikes drove them out to seek comparative safety in the nearby hills. The town of P'ohang-dong now became a no man's land.

[note]

 

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Just before noon on the 11th, after a fight on the hills bordering the road, the leading Marine battalion (3rd) neared the town of Kosŏng. Its supporting artillery from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, adjusting fire on a crossroads west of the town, chanced to drop shells near camouflaged enemy vehicles. Thinking its position had been discovered, the enemy force quickly entrucked and started down the road toward Sach'ŏn and Chinju. This force proved to be a major part of the 83rd Motorized Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, which had arrived in the Chinju area to support the N. K. 6th Division.

Just as the long column of approximately 200 vehicles, trucks, jeeps, and motorcycles loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies got on the road, a flight of four Corsairs from the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) came over on a routine reconnaissance mission ahead of the marines. They swung low over the enemy column, strafing the length of it. Vehicles crashed into each other, others ran into the ditches, some tried to get to the hills off the road. troops spilled out seeking cover and concealment. The planes turned for another run. The North Koreans fought back with small arms and automatic weapons and hit two of the planes, forcing one down and causing the other to crash. This air attack left about forty enemy vehicles wrecked and burning.

 Another flight of Marine Corsairs and Air Force F-51's arrived and continued the work of destruction. When the ground troops reached the scene later in the afternoon, they found 31 trucks, 24 jeeps, 45 motorcycles, and much ammunition and equipment destroyed or abandoned. The marine advance stopped that night four miles west of Kosŏng. [16-24]

[note]

 

           

MARINE AIR AND artillery had a field day on 11 August 1950 that the rifle companies will never forget. The occasion was known as “the Kosŏng Turkey Shoot,” and it was a victory won entirely by supporting arms.

It happened just as 3/5 was about to enter Kosŏng. As a preliminary, 1/11 was called upon just before noon for preparatory fires. Shells from the 105’s landed in the town, sending up geysers of rubble in the bright sunlight. Then, suddenly, the Marine artillery flushed out a column of enemy vehicles making a frantic dash for safety.

This flight explains the light resistance which the Marine infantry met in Kosŏng. But the enemy could hardly have chosen a less propitious moment, for he had merely escaped from the frying pan into the fire.

   USN_Units

Overhead, to his sorrow, was a division of VMF–323 planes from the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116), which the forward TACP had sent on a search and attack mission just beyond the town.[1] Major Lund and his pilots were thus presented with a fabulous target of opportunity—an estimated 100 vehicles of the NKPA 83rd Motorcycle Regiment, including jeeps, motorcycles and troop-carrying trucks.[2]

The Corsairs came screaming down in low-level strafing runs the entire length of the column for the purpose of bringing it to a halt. Vehicles crashed into one another or piled up in the ditch while enemy troops scrambled out for cover. The Soviet-made jeeps and motorcycles were now sitting ducks for F4U’s which worked over individual targets with rocket or 20-mm. fire. After the Marine planes had set about 40 vehicles on fire, they were relieved by another flight of VMF–323 machines and Air Force F–51’s which added the finishing touches to the picture of destruction.[3]

Under the circumstances the enemy put up a creditable fight. Lund and his low-flying pilots encountered fierce small arms and automatic weapons fire. Two of the four Corsairs in the first flight were badly damaged and had to try for emergency landings. Lieutenant Doyle Cole ditched into the bay just as General Craig was making a tour of inspection by helicopter; and the Brigade commander operated the hoist which pulled the dripping flier up to safety.

Captain Vivian Moses was not so fortunate. While putting his crippled plane down in enemy territory, he was thrown unconscious from the cockpit and drowned in a rice paddy a few minutes before a VMO–6 helicopter arrived. Only the day before, this gallant Marine pilot had been rescued by helicopter, after being shot down behind the NKPA lines, and flown back unhurt to his carrier. Despite this experience, Captain Moses volunteered for duty on 11 August, when he became the first death casualty of MAG–33.

On 11 Aug, VMF-323 Corsairs and USAF F-51 aircraft combined in what became as the “Kosŏng Turkey Shoot.” An estimated 100 vehicles of the 83 Motorcycle Regiment of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), including jeeps, motorcycles, and several troop-carrying trucks, were attacked. Virtually all the vehicles were destroyed or damaged. Captain Vivian M. Moses became the first combat fatality for the Death Rattlers in the Korean War. His Corsair was shot down by small-arms fire. Ironically, Captain Moses had been shot down the day before and was picked up by a Marine helicopter and retuned to the Badoeng Strait that morning. On 13 Aug the Badoeng Strait pulled into the harbor at Sasebo, Japan, for replenishment.

[note]

 

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Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

Eighth Army during the day ordered the ROK forces in the east to fall back to new positions during the nights of 12 and 13 August. [18-18]

[note]

 

 

 

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Overall control of tactical air operations in Korea was exercised by the Fifth Air Force. Marine aviation units, as components of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, operated in support of the Brigade as their highest priority, and in support of other UN forces as a lower priority. After checking in with Fifth AF TACC at the Joint Operations Center (JOC), Marine aviation units came under Marine operational control when supporting Brigade ground forces. When providing tactical air support for other UN forces, Marine air units operated under the Air Force-Army system for tactical air support.

The Brigade control organization included 3 battalion TACP’s and 1 regimental TACP, each consisting of an officer and 6 enlisted men, and each equipped with a radio jeep, portable radios and remote'ing equipment.

MAG–33 provided a Brigade control agency consisting of the Air Support Section of MTACS–2. Other Brigade units associated with control of aircraft were:

(1) The Air Section of the Brigade Staff, consisting of the Brigade Air officer and six enlisted men responsible for planning as well as tactical control and coordination of supporting aircraft;

(2) The Brigade observation section, consisting of the tactical air observer, three gunnery observers, and the OY and rotary-wing aircraft of VMO–6.

Carrier-based Marine aviation units maintained a TAC and one or more flights of aircraft on station during daylight hours. Night heckler and intruder missions of VMF(N)–513 from Itazuke reported to the Fifth AF TACC and were routed by that agency to the Air Support Section (MTACS–2) with the Brigade. During the early Brigade operations, with the Air Force TACC located at Taegu, delays of incoming flights reporting to JOC were caused by overloaded communications nets. An improvement resulted when such flights by-passed JOC and reported directly to the Air Support Section of Brigade. And when JOC moved back to Pusan, improved communications resulted in incoming flights reporting first to JOC again.

The Brigade control agency (Air Support Section) made use of the following communications for the control of tactical air operations:

(1) TAR net connecting battalion TACP’s, the regimental TACP, and the Air Support Section, and monitored by the Brigade Air Section. This was an HF net.

(2) TAD net connecting above-named agencies as well as TAC flights of support aircraft and on occasion the TAO. This was a VHF net of four frequencies used to brief and control aircraft reporting for support missions.

(3) TAO net connecting observation aircraft, the Brigade CP (Air Section) and the Air Support Section. This was an HF net.

(4) An administrative (HF) net connecting the Air Support Section and the carriers USS Sicily (CVE-118) and USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116).

The workings of the control organization of the Brigade air-ground team in the Pusan Perimeter have been described as follows in the survey of the Marine Corps Board Study:

“Battalion TACP’s made requests for air support missions direct by TAR net to the Air Support Section. The regimental TACP and Brigade Air Section monitored this net. The Brigade control agency having received a request for a mission, contacted the TAC and the Flight Leader (FL) of the aircraft orbiting on station awaiting a mission. The TAC and the FL were then directed to the vicinity of the TACP from whom the request had originated.

“The TACP controlled the execution of the mission in accordance with the wishes of the battalion commander. The TACP gave the location of the target to the TAC. The latter designated the target to the FL and his flight of supporting aircraft. The unit being supported marked its front lines. The TAC directed the attacking aircraft in making attacks on the target. His directions related to the technique of attacking specific targets with aircraft. Control of the attack was exercised by the ground unit being supported.

“In many instances the TAC or the TAO would locate targets not yet located by ground units. This was often done in response to a request from ground units. Both the TAC and TAO located targets beyond the vision of ground units, and both were capable of, and did, designate these targets to flights of supporting aircraft and directed attacks on such targets, when requested to do so by ground units. Conditions favored delegating control to forward TACP’s beyond convenient VHF range between them and the Brigade (Air Support Section). Brigade attack formations frequently consisted of battalions in column. The forward battalion was free to employ air support at a moment’s notice.”

This was the situation on the afternoon of 11 August 1950 as the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines attacked toward Sach'ŏn, followed by 2/5 in trace. Overhead a flight of VMF–323 Corsairs orbited on station, and OY observers reported the enemy to be pulling back rapidly toward Sach'ŏn.

[note]

 

 

At the K Company, 34th Infantry, ambush casualties were greater. By afternoon, 7 dead and at least 40 wounded were reported. About 25 members of C Battery, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, were also lost in this ambush.

August

[18-Caption] AERIAL VIEW OF P'OHANG-DONG

The enemy soldiers who had cut the road west of P'ohang-dong the night of 10-11 August and staged these ambushes apparently were from the 766th Independent Regiment. This regiment, leaving the 5th Division in the vicinity of Yŏngdök, had come in behind P'ohang-dong by way of mountain trails.

In the early afternoon, 11 August, General Walker ordered the Tank Company, 9th Infantry, which had stopped at Kongju to wait upon repair of a damaged bridge, to proceed to the Yŏnil Airfield.

He also ordered the ROK 17th Regiment released from Task Force P'ohang and to proceed from An'gang-ni to the airstrip. [18-16]

 

Aerial reconnaissance showed the K Company ambush site was still held by enemy troops. Well aware of this, Captain Darrigo, KMAG adviser with the ROK 17th Regiment at An'gang-ni, volunteered to lead an armored patrol through to P'ohang-dong and Yŏnil. Darrigo rode the first of five tanks. Four F-51 fighter planes took off from Yŏnil Airfield and delivered a strike on the enemy positions at the ambush site just as the tanks arrived there. This air strike flushed enemy troops from concealment at just the right moment. Tank machine gun fire killed many of them; in one group about seventy North Koreans were caught in the open.

[note]

 

     

MAG–33 preceded the attack on Hill 88  with a thundering air strike on 100 enemy entrenched along the crest. This attack coupled with a thorough shelling by 1/11, shattered the Reds’ will to fight, and Company G found only evidence of a hasty flight when it reached the summit at 1330.

General Craig ordered Taplett to cancel all further missions around the captured town and attack toward Sach'ŏn immediately. Company G was quickly recalled from Hill 88; the high ground above Sunam-dong was ignored, and Fegan assembled his unit at the western edge of Kosŏng preparatory to leading the attack.

Just as Company H was reforming, a jeep ambulance driven by Corpsman William H. Anderson raced into the area to pick up casualties from Bohn’s earlier skirmish below Hill 88. Passing through Fegan’s troops, the vehicle failed to make the turn southward and sped toward Sach'ŏn. Two enemy antitank guns lying in wait west of Kosŏng blasted the jeep as it rounded a bend, killing Anderson and spilling two passengers out of the wrecked vehicle. [no casualty named Anderson USN]

Fegan led two M–26 tanks to the bend, and Technical Sergeant Johnnie C. Cottrell quickly destroyed the North Korean position. Three rounds from his 90-mm. gun wiped out the last NKPA opposition in the area, and the 3rd Battalion moved out for the drive on Sach'ŏn.

[note]

 

 

1400 Korean Time

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Several hours later, after securing Kosŏng and resuming the attack toward Sach'ŏn, the Marine ground forces caught up with the scene of chaos left by the F4U’s. Among the twisted and charred vehicles were some that the enemy had abandoned in perfect condition. Tolerant NCO’s relaxed discipline for a moment while their men tried out the motorcycles with sidecars and the sleek, black Soviet jeeps, most of which had gone into the attack practically new. Almost identical in design to American jeeps, these vehicles were found to be powered by familiar Ford-type engines—a throwback to United States Lend Lease to Russia in World War II.

[note]

 

After Colonel Jones was evacuated, Colonel Ordway sent Lt. Col. T. B. Roelofs, regimental S-2 and formerly the battalion commander, to take command of the 1st Battalion. Roelofs arrived at Pongam-ni about 1400, 11 August, and assumed command of the 1st Battalion. 

Ordway had given him orders to clear the ridge north of the road west of Pongam-ni, secure the pass, protect the combat team as it moved west through the pass, and then follow it. Roelofs met Daly at Pongam-ni, consulted with him and the staff of the 1st Battalion, made a personal reconnaissance of the area, and then issued his attack order to clear the ridge and secure the pass.

Colonel Roelofs selected B Company to make the main effort. He brought it down from the north ridge to the valley floor, where it rested briefly and was resupplied with ammunition.

[note]

 

 

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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12:00 AM
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At Itazuke, on the morning of 11 August, pilots of the 35th and 36th Squadrons bade their "beloved" F-80's good-by, climbed into Mustangs for a mission to Korea, and returned to land at Tsuiki. This was something new in USAF experience: movement to a new airfield and conversion to a different-type aircraft at the same time, without the loss of any time from combat operations.#150

[note]

 

  

North American P-51D Mustang  Lockheed F-80C

On 11 August the Fifth Air Force thus completed a scheduled conversion of six of its fighter squadrons to conventional F-51 Mustang aircraft. Viewed in terms of tactical capabilities, the conversion held some benefit to the Fifth Air Force. The Mustang had range enough to go anywhere in Korea, and it could be based on crude airstrips in the combat zone. In token of the Mustangs' endurance and ordnance-carrying abilities, General Partridge ordered that they would be used primarily to provide close support for ground troops.

The F-80's of the 49th Fighter-Bomber Group and of the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron (8th Group), units which continued to fly from Itazuke, would be employed primarily in interdictory sweeps of hostile lines of communication leading into the battle area.#151

Many of the pilots who were forced to give up modern jet fighters apparently could not agree that the change was beneficial. Pilots of the 8th Group were told that the F-51 was a better ground-support fighter than the F-80, but the group's historian recorded that "this idea was not shared by the pilots who have been flying F-80's." "A lot of pilots," said this historian, "had seen vivid demonstrations of why the F-51 was not a ground-support fighter in the last war and weren't exactly intrigued by the thought of playing guinea pig to prove the same thing over again."#152

[note]

 

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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1:00 AM
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1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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2:00 AM
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Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)   Koread-War  

The main enemy force encountered by Task Force P'ohang on 11 August seems to have been advance elements of the 12th Division. This division had now crossed the mountains from Andong and was debouching at Kigye into the valley west of P'ohang-dong. There, in a series of battles, fought by the North Koreans almost entirely with automatic weapons and small arms, the 12th Division drove back the ROK Capital Division and Task Force P'ohang. In this series of action the 12th lost about 800 casualties, according to prisoner reports. [18-19]

[note]

 

 Bio     Unit Info attached as  Unit Info

Late in the day, when Murch bogged down, Walker authorize Michaelis to commit another battalion, the 3/27. Recently organized and attached, the 3/27 (formerly the 3/29 from Okinawa) was commanded by another of the newly arrived combat experienced battalion commanders, forty-one-year-old Lieutenant Colonel George H. DeChow.

[note]

At 1745/K, Lt. Reavis at the Rescue Control Center, notified the alert pilot of Flight "A" that a C-54 had requested an air to air interception due to the fact that he had discovered he had foreign matter in his outboard gasoline tanks and possibly some in hid inboard tanks. The aircraft was enroute from Haneda AB to Wake Island. Although visual contact was not made until the C-54 was over Haneda AB, a position report over Tateyama peninsula revealed three minutes separation. The plane landed safely at Haneda AB.

Two SA-16s and two SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. Twenty five hours and twenty minutes (25:20) was logged on these missions.

A total of ten (10) false alerts were recorded in the Fukuoka area this date.

[note]

 

 

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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3:00 AM
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How Company led the Marine attack, with lead tanks employing reconnaissance by fire. At 1800, after the column had covered several miles, a lone enemy machinegun in a valley on the left held up the advance by wounding three Marines. By the time the tanks silenced the weapon with .50-caliber fire, it was decided to halt.

Taplett deployed his battalion on two hills north of the road, and the infantrymen settled down for a quiet night. The gravel crunchers could thank air and other supporting arms for an impressive demonstration of power that day. There was even the suggestion of an amphibious operation in the Brigade advance, for an LST followed the column and anchored near the fishing village of Tanghong-ni after the securing of Kosŏng (PDF) Kosŏng.

This was LST QO119, a supply ship manned by Team No. 1 of Major William L. Batchelor’s Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion. Team No. 2 set up forward dumps along the MSR as the infantry advanced, while No. 3 unloaded supplies and equipment at the Masan railhead. Shore Party personnel also assisted in salvage operations, which were conducted mainly at Ch'angwŏn.[5]

LST QO119 was not only the workhorse of normal Shore Party missions; it served also as an improvised hospital ship. For the Medical Section and Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, had an extra responsibility these sweltering days in caring for victims of heat prostration as well as the wounded. Thus it may have set some sort of a record when casualties were evacuated at one time by land, sea and air—motor ambulance, LST and helicopter.

[note]

 

After Colonel Jones was evacuated, Colonel Ordway sent Lt. Col. T. B. Roelofs, regimental S-2 and formerly the battalion commander, to take command of the 1st Battalion. Roelofs arrived at Pongam-ni about 1400, 11 August, and assumed command of the 1st Battalion. Ordway had given him orders to clear the ridge north of the road west of Pongam-ni, secure the pass, protect the combat team as it moved west through the pass, and then follow it.

Roelofs met Daly at Pongam-ni, consulted with him and the staff of the 1st Battalion, made a personal reconnaissance of the area, and then issued his attack order to clear the ridge and secure the pass. Colonel Roelofs selected B Company to make the main effort. He brought it down from the north ridge to the valley floor, where it rested briefly and was resupplied with ammunition.

Just before dusk, it [B Company of 1st Battalion] moved to the head of the gulch and attacked the hill on the right commanding the north side of the pass. At the same time, C Company attacked west along the north ridge to effect a junction with B Company. The artillery and all available weapons of the 2nd Battalion supported the attack; the artillery fire was accurate and effective. Before dusk B Company had gained and occupied the commanding ground north of the pass. [16-29]

One platoon of A Company, reinforced with a section of tanks, remained in its position north of Pongam-ni on the Tundŏk road, to protect from that direction the road junction village and the artillery positions.

See Chindong-ni to Kosŏng they are almost 10 miles from where the Marines are.

[note]

 

By evening of 11 August, North Korean patrols reportedly were operating three miles south of P'ohang-dong.

[note]


 

1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/11/50
4:00 AM
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5:00 AM
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10:00 AM
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1927 Sunset

[note]

 

         

At sundown on 11 August, as Taplett’s battalion dug in for the night on the road to Sach'ŏn, the enemy seemed to be disorganized if not actually demoralized. For the first time since the invasion began, a sustained Eighth Army counterattack had not only stopped the Red Korean steamroller but sent it into reverse.

With the Marines a day’s march from Sach'ŏn, the Army 5th RCT was running a dead heat on the shorter Chinju route to the north, where opposition had been light the last 2 days. It might even have appeared on the evening of the 11th that the combined operation had turned into a friendly rivalry between two outfits racing toward their final objective by parallel roads.

Bio

But any such assumption would have been premature, as General Craig and his staff well realized. They looked for further resistance and were not disillusioned. Within the next 48 hours, in fact, Craig’s men were destined to carry out one of the most astonishing operations in the history of the Marine Corps—simultaneous BLT attacks in opposite directions on two fronts 25 miles apart.

[note]

 

 

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/11/50
5:00 AM
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Bio

This tank column arrived at Yŏnil Airfield about 2030, 11 August, and were the first tanks to reach the airstrip. They were immediately placed in the perimeter defense. Darrigo was the same officer who had escaped from Kaesŏng at dawn, 25 June, when the North Koreans began their attack across the 38th Parallel. One who saw this courageous 30-year-old soldier when he arrived at Yŏnil said he looked to be fifty. [18-17]

[note]

 

 

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/11/50
6:00 AM
08/11/50
7:00 AM
08/11/50
12:00 PM
08/11/50
9:00 PM

 

The remainder of A Company relieved the 2nd Battalion on the south ridge, when it withdrew from there at 2100 to lead the movement westward.

His battalion's attack apparently a success, Colonel Roelofs established his command post about 300 yards west of Pongam-ni in a dry stream bed south of the road, crawled under the trailer attached to his jeep, and went to sleep.

As a result of the considerable enemy action during the night of 10-11 August and during the day of the 11th, Colonel Ordway decided that he could not safely move the regimental trains and the artillery through the pass during daylight, and accordingly he had made plans to do it that night under cover of darkness.

That afternoon, however, Ordway was called to the radio to speak to General Kean. The 25th Division commander wanted him to move forward rapidly and said that a battalion of the 24th Infantry would come up and protect his right (north) flank. Ordway had a lengthy conversation with the division and task force commander before the latter approved the delay until after dark for the regimental movement. General Kean apparently did not believe any considerable force of enemy troops was in the vicinity of Pongam-ni, despite Ordway's representations to the contrary.

General Kean, on his part, was under pressure at this time because during the day Eighth Army had sent a radio message to him, later confirmed by an operational directive, to occupy and defend the Chinju pass line; to move Task Force Min, a regimental sized ROK unit, to Taegu for release to the ROK Army; and to be ready to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 5th Regimental Combat Team on army order. This clearly foreshadowed that Task Force Kean probably would not be able to hold its gains, as one or more of its major units apparently were urgently needed elsewhere.

     Bio    79th Field Artillery Regiment COA.svg

About 2100 hours, as Throckmorton's 2nd Battalion, C Battery of the 555th, and the trains were forming on the road, the regimental S-3 handed Colonel Ordway a typed radio order from the commanding general of the 25th Division. It ordered him to move the 2nd Battalion and one battery of artillery through the pass at once, but to hold the rest of the troops in place until daylight.

Ordway felt that to execute the order would have catastrophic effects. He tried to reach the division headquarters to protest it, but could not establish communication. On reflection, Ordway decided that some aspect of the "big picture" known only to the army and division commanders must have prompted the order. With this thought governing his actions he issued instructions implementing the division order. [16-30]

In the meantime the 2nd Battalion had moved through the pass, and once over its rim was out of communication with the regiment. Ordway tried and failed several times to reach it by radio during the night.

In effect, though Throckmorton thought he was the advance guard of a regimental advance, he was on his own. Ordway and the rest of the regiment could not help him if he ran into trouble nor could he be called back to help them.

In the movement of the 2nd Battalion and C and Headquarters Batteries,  John H. Daly  was wounded a second time and was evacuated. Colonel Throckmorton's 2nd Battalion cleared the pass before midnight. On the west side it came under light attack but was able to continue on for five miles to Taejŏng-ni, where it went into an assembly area for the rest of the night. About 5 miles south of the Much'on-ni junction and about a mile south of Pongam-ni .

While these events were taking place at Pongam-ni during daylight and the evening of the 11th, the main supply road back toward Chindong-ni was under sniper fire and various other forms of attack. Three tanks and an assault gun escorted supply convoys to the forward positions. [16-31]

[note]

 

That night, 11 August, the fighter planes at Yŏnil flew to another airfield for security,

[note]

 

From hills to the south and southwest of the [Yŏnil] airstrip enemy troops delivered long-range, ineffective fire against it. Even though this fire did no damage, it created a state of alarm.

[note]

 

Patrols from ROK and North Korean units entered the town [P'ohang-dong] at night but neither side held it. The battle swirled around it on the adjacent hills. [18-20]

[note]

 

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/11/50
7:00 AM
08/11/50
8:00 AM
08/11/50
1:00 PM
08/11/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/11/50
8:00 AM
08/11/50
9:00 AM
08/11/50
2:00 PM
08/11/50
11:00 PM

  

79th Field Artillery Regiment COA.svg     

By midnight of 11 August, the 555th (triple Nickel) Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers), less C Battery, and Headquarters and A Batteries, 90th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers) emplaced at Pongam-ni and Taejŏng-ni had near them only the 1st Battalion north of the road. The regimental headquarters and the guns of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion were emplaced a little more than a mile behind them (east) along the road. [16-32]

[note]

 

Bio

The battalion [Murch's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry crossed the river and by midnight had established a bridgehead on the north side against enemy small arms fire. [17-44]

[note]

 


Casualties

Tuesday August 11, 1950 (Day 48)

167 Casualties

As of August 11, 1950

15 15TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 1ST SERVICE BATTALION - MARINES
1 212TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY - CORPS
7 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 24TH ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
1 24TH ENGINEER GROUP
9 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 25TH ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
1 26TH ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AW BATTALION (SP)
10 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
13 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
15 3RD ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 539TH TRANSPORTATION TRUCK COMPANY
1 541ST TRANSPORTATION TRUCK COMPANY
4 555TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
9 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 724TH ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY
1 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
5 8036TH SIGNAL SERVICE COMPANY
1 89TH MEDIUM TANK BATTALION (8072)
2 8TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
5 90TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (155MM)
56 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 NAVY HOSPITAL CORPSMAN
1 VMF 323 - MARINE FIGHTER SQUADRON 323
167 19500811 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 67 3396 32 5 3500
Today   164 2 1 167
Total 67 3560 34 6 3667

Aircraft Losses Today 002

 

 

 

Notes for Friday August 11, 1950 (Day 48)

 

 

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