Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 27.7°C 81.86°F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast with rain

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Aug. 14

  

Second Lt. Howell G. Thomas Jr., 24, of Washington, is the first American killed in Korea to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery,

-- Soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division, beefed up by Marines from the Chinju fighting, attack a strong enemy bridgehead at Ch'angnyŏng, which is south of Taegu. The battle will rage for three more days before the Americans drive the enemy out.

[note]

 

biography

On the whole Truman felt reassured. Formosa excepted, he and the National Security Council now shared the General's conviction "that we should back anyone who will fight Communism," and since his Far East commander had apparently agreed to toe the administration line, he told a press conference that he and MacArthur saw "eye-to-eye" on Formosa. The President "assumed," he later wrote, "that this would be the last of it." It wasn't; even cautioning the General, he would learn, was hazardous.

 Three days
after Harriman's departure SCAP issued a new statement excoriating those who had interpreted his trip to Formosa as a political move. The visit, he said, had been "maliciously represented to the public by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific." Since "defeatism" and "appeasement" were precisely the words Republican critics were using to describe administration courses of action -in Asia, MacArthur appeared to be back in the fray. Sebald expressed "deep distress" over this new incident. "These public statements," he wrote, gave "aid and comfort to the enemy by demonstrating divisions in our leadership and weaknesses in our national purpose." During World War II, he later noted, the General had presided over the victorious alliance which had defeated Japan. Now "the alliance itself became the second front in MacArthur's constant skirmishing with the outside world." 52

Thursday 10

Friday 11

Saturday 12

Sunday 13

Monday 14

That was on a Thursday. On Monday the 14th Secretary of Defense Johnson sent SCAP fresh instructions, once more forbidding any KMT sallies across Formosa Strait on the ground that "the most vital national interest requires that no action of ours precipitates general war or gives excuse to others to do so." The General tartly replied that he fully understood the presidential determination "to protect the Communist mainland." That was insolent.

If Washington meant to take a hard line with him, this was the time to do it. Instead Truman encouraged him by altering his stand on Formosa. MacArthur had recommended a military mission for Formosa. The President now approved it, ordering a survey by MacArthur's staff of Chiang's army's needs, reconnaissance flights along the Chinese coast, and "extensive military aid to Nationalist China."

Actually these were political, not military, actions: stratagems designed to relieve GOP and China Lobby pressure on the White House. But the General could not have been expected to know that. He was, as Clark Lee put it, "jubilant over the apparent reversal of American policy of abandoning Chiang Kai-shek." That same week Clyde A. Lewis, the leader of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, invited him to send. a message to be read at the forthcoming VFW annual encampment. Whitney tells us: "MacArthur decided that this was an excellent opportunity to place himself on record as being squarely behind the President." [53]

[note]

 

t was an excellent opportunity to remain silent. U.S. policy in his theater was changing so swiftly that even those close to the oval office had trouble keeping up with it, and a General halfway around the globe, anxious to see in it what he wanted to see, had no business interpreting it for veterans or anybody else. But MacArthur plunged ahead. He wrote Lewis that "in view of misconceptions being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific," he deemed it wise to set forth his own opinions on it. "Nothing," he said, "could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument" that "if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia." Those who spoke thus "do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership--to turn quickly from a leadership characterized by, timidity or vacillation and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position." Chief among these was Formosa, which he described as an "unsinkable carrier-tender." He said: "The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center" of America's strategic dispositions in the Pacific, and he noted that "historically, Formosa has been a springboard" for aggressive powers, "the most recent example" of this being "the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II," when, at the outbreak of hostilities, "it played an important part as the staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys." It was essential, he continued, to counter "the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery as against liberty, for atheism against God." He concluded that the President's decision to stand fast against North Korean aggression had "lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly towards extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one stroke all the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene." [54]

[note]

 

14 August 1950
Flight "C" was alerted this date to evacuate a patient from Camp Haugen who was suffering from acute appendicitis. Due to below marginal weather the H-5H was utilized to evacuate the patient to Sendai. Mission was successful.

SA-16 #8607, was on orbit over Tsu Shima Island when he picked up a call on "D" channel that a B-26 was in trouble and needed rescue assistance. The SA-16 maintained contact with the B-26 until he crashed on the beach at 34° 58' N 132° 11' E. The SA-16 landed in the water and anchored about two hundred yards from shore. Using a five man life raft, members of the SA-16 crew went ashore and picked up the crew of the B-26. The three crew members were uninjured. The SA-16 returned them to Iwakuni Air Base. A total of 5:00 hours flying time was logged on this mission.

At 1443/K, ADCC notified Flight "D" that a flight of four (4) aircraft inbound to Itazuke AB, were badly shot up. ADCC later notified Flight "D" that the flight had landed safely. One (1) false alert this date.

[note]

 

Koread-War

POW

(H) OTHER EXAMPLES OF SHOOTINGS OF AMERICAN PRISONERS

An American lieutenant who was captured by North Koreans on September 10, 1950, was tied to a tree and shot 4 times, 3 of the bullets entering his head and neck. 16


1st Lt. Henry J. McNichols, formerly with Company E, 5th Cavalry
Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, testified:

Lieutenant McNICHOLS. * * * He [a North Korean officer] pulled out some cloth, rice linen * * * and took it and tore it into small strips and tied my hands behind my back and he told me to sit down and he further tied me to a tree.

Senator Potter. In other words, he tied your hands behind your back first and then tied you to a tree?

Lieutenant McNicHOLS. Yes. About that time this American unit started up the hill * * * just a straight infantry attack. Immediately all the enemy soldiers ran out with the exception of this lieutenant.. As he reached this tree he reached into his pocket, grabbed his pistol, cocked it and I remember it going off once. However, later I found out that I was shot four times that time * * *.

Senator Potter. Where were you hit, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant McNicHOLs: One of them through the mouth, two of them in the neck, one through the shoulder.

[note]

 

   9th RCT

During this period of grim combat, a desperate effort was made to prevent collapse of the Naktong line, while North Koreans fought back with equal determination. Task Force Hill, now comprising three infantry regiments, launched a full-scale attack again on 14 August. It failed once more.

[note]

 

biography    biography   biography

The Eighth Army, however, was still fighting hard to keep the key city of Taegu, and an enemy force was believed to be building up just across the Naktong River. MacArthur called in Stratemeyer and O'Donnell on 14 August and gave the entire B-29 force to the Eighth Army for a carpet-bombing mission. According to O'Donnell, MacArthur went to his situation map, laid his hand flat--covering terrain behind the Naktong--and said, "Rosie, I want you to make a wilderness of this area."

[note]

 

note

On August 4, elements of the North Korean 16th Infantry Regiment staged an assault across the Naktong between Companies I and L, 3/34 Infantry, and overwhelmed most of their positions. NKPA troops drove about five miles into the 24th Division sector, precipitating the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, [5-19 Aug] which eventually involved the entire 24th Division, (19, 21,34th regiments) the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the newly arrived 9th Infantry Regiment and 1/23rd Infantry (both from the 2nd Infantry Division) and the 2/27th Infantry. The struggle lasted until August 19.

The 34th Infantry gave its all. Company K stayed on its 7,500-yard front along the Naktong alone until ordered out on about August 14. At the outset, the 1/34th launched a counterattack, but part of Company C was trapped in a grist mill, where the men valiantly held out until rescued. Captain Albert F. Alfonso, with remnants of Companies A, C and L, held a small perimeter at the nose of the bulge until ordered out on the night of August 8-9. Elements of the regiment took part in a number of counterattacks between August 6 and 18.

[note]

 

Hoskins, John Madison[VAdm CO CarDivThree]

 

[note]

 

August

[note]

 

 

 

Citations

 

Silver Star

Gardenier, Charles K. [Capt SS MedCo7thCR]

Hunter, Arthur H. [Cpl SS G7thCR]

 

 

[note]

 

South then North

 

 

Task Force Kean Ended

Bio

On 14 August, after a week of fighting, Task Force Kean was back approximately in the positions from which it had started its attack. The 35th Regiment held the northern part of the 25th Division line west of Masan, the 24th Regiment the center, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team the southern part. The Marine brigade was on its way to another part of the Eighth Army line.

In the week of constant fighting in the Chinju corridor, from 7 to 13 August, the units of Task Force Kean learned that the front was the four points of the compass, and that it was necessary to climb, climb, climb. The saffron-colored hills were beautiful to gaze upon at dusk, but they were brutal to the legs climbing them, and out of them at night came the enemy.

While Task Force Kean drove westward toward Chinju, enemy mines and small arms fire daily cut the supply roads behind it in the vicinity of Chindong-ni. For ten successive days, tanks and armored cars had to open a road so that food supplies might reach a battalion of the 24th Infantry in the Sobuk-san area. The old abandoned coal mines of the Tundŏk region on Sobuk-san were alive with enemy troops. The 24th Infantry and ROK troops had been unable to clear this mountainous region. [16-48]

[note]

 

    

The heavy equipment at Yŏnil was taken to the beach and loaded on LST's. The bomb supply followed, and finally Fifth Air Force personnel at the base embarked on LST's and left the next day, 14 August. A considerable supply of aviation gasoline and petroleum products remained at Yŏnil.

[note]

 

By 14 August the Capital Division, on Eighth Army order, had moved about twenty-five miles, from near Andong to the An'gang-ni-Kigye area, where it went into the line east of the ROK 8th Division. The ROK I Corps now established its headquarters at Yŏngch'ŏn.

[note]

 

In the midst of this seesaw battle in the east-which also was the period of the successful enemy crossing of the Naktong River into the zone of the U.S. 24th Division at the bulge - Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korean broadcast from P'yŏngyang an order calling on his army to drive the United States and ROK forces from Korea by the end of the month. He correctly predicted that the longer they remained the stronger they would become. He exhorted his Communist troops to "destroy the South Korean and United States [18-troops] to the last man." [18-30]

[18-30] New York Times, August 15, 1950, P'yŏngyang broadcast monitored in
Tokyo. [assume it was monitored the previous day]

[note]

 

In its first combat mission, the crossing of the Naktong on 12-14 August, the 10th Division, according to prisoners, suffered 2,500 casualties, some units losing as much as 50 percent of their troops. [19-35]

[note]

 

      Unit Info  

Bowling Alley-The Sangju-Taegu Corridor

The 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division had just completed its mission of clearing the North Koreans from the southern part of the Naktong Bulge area in the 24th Division sector when the enemy pressure north of Taegu caused new alarm in Eighth Army headquarters. Acting on the threat from this quarter, Eighth Army on 14 August relieved the regiment from attachment to the 24th Division

[note]

 

 

The Forgotten War

 

 

When the 10th Division crossed the Naktong River, it confronted first Gil Huff, next Billy Harris, and then Pete Clainos, who came up with his Clouters on August 14.

These three tough, canny leaders inflicted yet another terrible slaughter on the NKPA. In its baptism of fire the 10th Division suffered 2,500 casualties. Its survivors were apparently so demoralized or so ineptly led that the division could not be used again in the attacks on Taegu. It would remain in defensive positions at Koryong.[8-17]

[note]

 

biography

August 14, 1940

These two victories were impressive achievements for the 1st Cav Division, but they were soon overshadowed by a serious setback in Crombez's 5th Cav sector. On August 14, a battalion of the NKPA 3rd Division, supported by a few tanks and men of the NKPA 105th Armored Division, crossed the Naktong several miles north of Waegwan, then unexpectedly turned south and assaulted Hill 303, which dominated Waegwan.

Hill 303 was occupied by Crombez's 2/5. It was commanded by West Pointer (1937) Paul T. Clifford, thirty-six, who had commanded a battalion in the ETO. He was an ambitious and able field commander in the Palmer-Crombez mold: tough and demanding and, many believed, "rash and insensitive to his losses. The NKPA attack caught the 2/5 napping.

[note]

 

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

 

On the 21st of July I wrote a letter to COMNAVFE expressing my appreciation as to the marked success of the carrier air strikes on 18 and 19 July against North Korean targets and also commented that it was gratifying to hear that 47 enemy aircraft had been destroyed - indication of resurgent North Korean air power and the warning furnished us by that attack will be instrumental in avoiding losses to friendly forces. Asked that this appreciation on behalf of the Air Force be extended to Admiral Struble.

Following is a memo dated 10 Aug from COMNAVFE to me:

(1) Your letter of 21 Jul 50 is acknowledged with pleasure and appreciation. I know it will be received with pride by Vice Admiral Struble and the personnel of his fleet when it is delivered to them. (2) Your head- quarters furnished most of the target information, coordination effort, and photographic data which markedly assisted in the success of the 18-19 July strikes. (3) The spirit of willing and energetic cooperation exhibited by your staff, and key members of the Far East Air Forces with whom they deal, has brought forth much favorable comment from officers of my command. This fine spirit continues to build a high mutual regard and firm bond of understanding between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force in this theater. signed C. T. Joy.

 

Rcvd [received] following letter from O'Donnell dated 12 Aug:

I certainly appreciate your comprehensive letter of the 10th on support of the B-29s. You can fully depend upon my staff to work together with your own, and that of FEAMCOM, in resolving the difficult logistic problems with which you are faced. You can, of course, readily under- stand my own concern over anything that might prevent us from giving you the maximum possible tonnage of bombs on North Korean targets. I have been so concerned with the many B-29 supply and further maintenance difficulties since I assumed command of the Fifteenth [Air Force] that is difficult to suddenly divorce myself from such problems and think only of operational matters. My small materiel staff here is comprised of individuals who have, through early appreciation of B-29, B-50 and B-36 deficiencies in the past, earned the respect of all in SAC and AMC. They are sometimes overzealous and I have tried to direct their enthusiasm in the proper channels - so far to good effect. You can depend upon them to keep your materiel command well-informed on anticipated troubles, and to assist in their solution in every possible way.
s/ E. O'Donnell

 

In answer to my "Stratline"ť dated 8 Aug 50, to Partridge re stepping up night bombing sorties to 50 per night, received the following letter from Partridge dtd 11 Aug 50:

According to my original understanding it was a straightforward directive to use all the type of aircraft available to me for night bombing with the objective set at not less than 50 sorties per night. Accordingly, a plan was set up by which all the B-26 effort would be used at night with an expectation of 36 sorties daily. There are three F-82 aircraft not equipped with radar which have been employed as night intruders. We estimated that by a full-scale effort, we could get 5 sorties per night out of these 3 air- planes. As for F-80s, our experience has not yet been too satisfactory and in view of this and the fact that we are yet unable to carry bombs we decided not to use F-80s, on a continuing basis. The F-51 is not a satisfactory night intruder, but can be effective in good weather under optimum visibility conditions. One of the major objections to this type aircraft is its lack of radio compass. By utilizing all our B-26 effort, all the F-82 effort not reserved for the air defense of Japan and a full squadron of F-51s we might be able to achieve 50 sorties nightly when weather permits. Before discussing it with Craigie and before Timberlake talked to you, this is the plan which we adopted as the only one which would achieve the desired number of sorties. The 162d Night Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with photographic B-26s should be in operation within the not too distant future.[192-The 162d had been alerted at Langley AFB, Va. on July 5. Brought up to near-wartime strength by fillers who knew nothing about RB-26s, the squadron was shipped overseas. Flash cartridge equipment had been fitted on 10 of the squadron's 16 planes (the other planes could not be modified), but it was then discovered that this equipment made the RB-26s too heavy for the overwater flight to Japan. The flash units were removed for air shipment, but this was somehow changed to water shipment. It would not be until August 26, 53 days after it was alerted, that the 162d was ready for its first mission. (Futrell No. 71, p 100.)]
 Initially, they will have 16 aircraft. This squadron is able to bomb and can be diverted from its primary role of night photographic work if the priority to be accorded night bombing is sufficiently high. If the 162d is used, it might be possible to run 50 intruder sorties per night, using B-26s alone. In addition to the Fifth Air Force effort, we can anticipate that some sorties will be available each night from the Marine night fighter squadron which is based at Itami and staged out of Itazuke. We have not included the Marines in our estimates. Following your talk with Timberlake, we have relieved the one F-51 squadron from its requirement to put out night intruder aircraft, and as the situation now stands, we expect to fly 2 squadrons of B-26s, a few F-82 and a few Marine night fighters whenever the weather permits. No one knows better than I the pressing need for a better night bomber and intruder effort. Nevertheless, I am reluctant to continue employing all our light bombers for night work. Accordingly, I should like to make the following suggestions to secure a more effective distribution for the night effort now available to the Fifth Air Force, and to augment that effort. Continue to employ one B-26 squadron full-time for night intruder work; concentrate at Itazuke all the night fighter aircraft in this theater regardless of their condition as to oper- ational radar. Employ these aircraft full out on a night intruder effort until such time as more suitable aircraft can be secured; continue to employ Marine night fighters over Korea as can be made available by them; employ the 162d Night Reconnaissance Squadron for both photographic and night intruder work; these airplanes can drop bombs in an emergency; initiate a firm request to the United States for them to reconstitute night light bomber squadrons in such number as the equipment now on hand will support. Action by your headquarters to this end is requested; secure from the ZI a nucleus of a night bombing section for Fifth Air Force headquarters. I am not personally acquainted with any officers whose previous experience qualifies them for this position, but I do know that there was a light bomber group which specialized in night operations, and I should like to have the benefit of their experience. Action by your headquarters is requested; if the United Nations wants to support the war effort in this theater by supplying aircraft squadrons from the RAF [Royal Air Force], RCAF [Royal Cana- dian Air Force], or elsewhere, I should like to suggest that night bomber squadrons would constitute the greatest contribution which they could make; even a meager number of Lancasters or Mosquitos operated from bases in Japan would be most welcome. If you think the idea has merit, please pick up the ball from here.
Lastly, I feel certain from my previous experience in England and Africa that there exist munitions and techniques which would assist us in carrying on our night bomber effort. I believe we should explore the possibility of securing, probably from the RAF, a few experts together with samples of their munitions and proposed standard operating procedures. Perhaps you would like to discuss this matter with the recently arrived Air Vice Marshal Bouchier[193-With the British considering what role their forces might play in Korea, the government recalled Air Vice Marshal (later, Sir) Cecil Bouchier to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Japan. Bouchier served with the BCOF from 1945-1948 and had developed a great rapport with MacArthur. He arrived on August 8.] from the RAF. As a general thought, I do not believe that we are getting over-all effectiveness by trading good day sorties for questionable night missions, particularly when the number of day sorties is roughly twice that we can fly at night. For that reason, my suggestions above have run toward the objective of increasing our night potential rather than toward the diversion of day effort for night purposes. s/ E.E. Partridge.

 


 

In answer to above received ltr from Partridge, sent him following:

 

Upon receipt of your letter of 11 August, I reviewed my message A
392906, dated 8 August, and find that it conveys a more firm and rigid meaning than I had intended. Therefore, please consider that directive rescinded. What I had intended to convey, and what I still desire, is for you to step up night intruder operations as much as possible with units now available and to become available, while maintaining an optimum balance between day and night operations. I leave to your judgment and on-the-spot knowledge of conditions, the determination of the best way and rate of augmenting your night operations to achieve optimum overall results. With the foregoing in mind, I want to say that I concur, in general with most of your suggestions in paragraphs a to h, inclusive, of your let- ter. I do not, however, concur in your suggestion to employ all [emphasis in original] F-82s on night intruder work, and I want you to retain not less than a flight of night fighters in each air defense area. With reference to assisting you in getting qualified personnel for a night bombing section in your headquarters, I have initiated action to obtain Colonel F. R. Terrell[194-Terrell commanded the 47th BG from January 1942 to June 1943. This group later became the premier USAAF night intruder unit in the Mediterranean and was, until converting to a jet bomber unsuited for the role, the only such outfit in the USAF prior to the Korean War. After Terrell was assigned to the War Department General Staff in April 1944, he was (according to his official USAF biography) "instrumental in establishing night tactical bombing operations as U.S. air doctrine."ť] for you, and also to get an RAF officer experienced in night bombing and intruder work. Other suggestions involving action by my headquarters will be investigated and followed up as circumstances dictate. I want to tell you again that I am proud of the magnificent work being done by the Fifth Air Force, and am especially appreciative of your own personal contributions.


The United Press staff correspondent, Robert Miller, under dateline
14 August with the Marines, published one of the most reprehensible pieces of carefully contrived propaganda and untruths that I have read in my military career. It is my opinion and that of my PIO that this was not only stimulated by Navy sources, but was even prepared by them in detail. This article is filled with innuendoes and make odious comparison between the Marines on the ground and the Army units, interspersed with similarly odious comparisons between Marine aviation and the USAF. It is my opinion that this will result only in fanning the fires of dissention between the services here under MacArthur where, to date, we have had great team play. I consider it a blatant, service-inspired series of mis-statements.[195-Miller's article grossly misrepresented the differences between the Air Force and Marine systems of close support. While effective for short periods and with small numbers of troops, the Marine system of having aircraft either attached to or operating closely with specific ground units was very inefficient and a costly use of air power when done with a large ground force or over longer periods. Additionally, there was a point that seemed to have escaped most of the ground commanders but not Stratemeyer; that FEAF had established complete air superiority over the enemy. The Marine system relied upon other air power assets to provide the key prerequisite to effective close air support.

In an October 2, 1950, memorandum on the subject of historical reporting of the war, Stratemeyer mentioned several times that if not careful, wrong conclusions could be drawn on the matter of close support. "There was no hostile interference from hostile air...,"ť he commented.

"If there had been an enemy air force, it is questionable - to my way of thinking - that the ground troops could ever have been supplied by long truck columns and train as they were from Pusan.

"The great proportion of our air effort would of necessity have been to knock out hostile air both on the ground and in the air."ť (Memo, Gen G. E. Stratemeyer to ?, subj: Final Reporting - Korean Conflict, Oct. 2, 1950.)]

 

Following memorandum given to General Crabb, Deputy for Operations, as a directive:

We can cover an area five (5) miles long by one (1) mile wide, dropping with seventy (70) B-29s, 2,520 x 500 pound bombs. FEAF Bomber Command will be loaded and ready to perform such a mission on Wednesday 16 August. We must have clear weather as the drop will be made from an altitude of 5,000 or 6,000 feet. There must be a definite ter- rain feature such as the Naktong River in order to prevent dropping on our own troops. It is believed that when the North Koreans commit them- selves to any mass attack east of the Naktong River, such a bomber strike would pay dividends. (Wednesday, 16 August weather permitting; maybe postponed until 17 August if weather bad.)[196-The buildup of North Korean forces in front of Taegu worried General Walker, particularly since his own troops were spread dangerously thin. The Waegwan area, where the main highway and railroad crossed the Naktong, appeared to be an especially critical sector. Though 5AF fighter-bombers and B-26s attacked an enemy bridgehead at Waegwan with some success, General MacArthur remained alarmed at this North Korean threat. He therefore desired that the entire FEAF B-29 force be used to "carpet bomb"ť those areas where large enemy forces appeared to be concentrated. On the 13th, General Partridge learned that the B-29s would be used on August 15 to bomb near Waegwan. (Futrell, pp 138-139.)]


8:30 A.M. Air Marshal Jones (RAAF) in; attended FEAF briefing with me.


12:30 P.M. Rear Admiral Alfred Carroll Richmond,[197-Adm Richmond was Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard.] of the United States Coast Guard. Interested in LORAN stations throughout the Pacific and west coast of P.I.[Philippine Islands].


2:00 P.M. Lunch (stag) with General and Mrs. MacArthur honoring the
Prime Minister of Australia, Rt. Hon. Menzies.[198-Sir Robert Menzies had been Prime Minister of Australia in 1939-1941. From 1943-1949, he was Leader of the Opposition before once again becoming Prime Minister, a post he then held for the next 17 years.]


8:30 P.M. Dinner (stag) at Commonwealth House, Embassy of Australia, honoring Rt. Hon. Menzies.

 

 

 

 

 

Beginning on 11 August, ground crews worked on their aircraft by day and defended the airfield [P'ohang] from slit trenches by night with the assistance of the aviation engineers and a small infantry task force. But by 13 August the enemy pressure was too heavy, and the fighter units were flown out to Tsuiki Air Base on Kyushu. Wing elements moved out by LST next day, joining the 35th Group at Tsuiki. "No equipment was left behind," reported the 40th Squadron; "this was due partly to the fact that we did not have much equipment anyhow."

[note]

 

Korean_War

elastic bridge

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week

30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks

20 - the Navy sink the bridge

[note]

 

biography   biography

By the middle of August MacArthur considered the Korean ground situation stabilized, but General Walker, his forces holding long sections of line in light strength, was still fighting to keep the key city of Taegu. Enemy troops appeared to be building up across the Naktong for a penetration. In the emergency MacArthur made the entire B-29 strength available to EUSAK and on 14 August he called in Stratemeyer to suggest that carpet bombing was in order. At a FEAF conference on the same day, O'Donnell laid out his requirements for such a mission as follows:

[note]

 

biography


*General Stratemeyer had issued positive orders cautioning against any violation of the Manchurian or Siberian borders on 3 July and again on 14 August 1950. Some errors nevertheless occurred, though not so many as the Communists alleged. Two American Mustang pilots apparently strayed across the border and strafed a Red Chinese airstrip near Antung on 27 August.

[note]

 

Bio

As Air Force and Marine pilots supported Task Force Kean on the Chinju front, the Army-Air Force system of close support came into comparison with that employed by the Marines. One newspaper correspondent with the Marines hailed them for their "deadly new battle tactic-close air support." This newsman said that the Marine brigade with Marine close support moved 27 miles in four days with light casualties, while Army units with the usual air coverage bogged down after suffering heavy casualties.#35

Although these facts were untrue, there was no doubt that the Marine fliers, operating from escort carriers close to their target areas, offered excellent close support to the Marine brigade. But their advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances which at this juncture exaggerated the positive advantages of the Marine system and minimized its disadvantages. Had the Communists possessed an air-attack potential they would have prevented the baby flattops from standing close inshore in Korean waters. Hostile fighter opposition would also have played havoc with the conventional Corsairs, in which Marine pilots orbited for long periods of time over the battle area before they were called down for support strikes. World War II had shown the gross waste of committing specific air units to the support of specific ground units, in this case a single brigade. "You hear and read much about the type of support furnished by the Marine air units," observed General Walker. "It's good, it's excellent, and I would like to have that kind of air support available, too-but if the people who advocate that would sit down and figure out the cost of supplying air units for close-support only, in that ratio to an army of the size we should have, they would be astounded." #36

A surprising number of Army officers, however, seemed willing to forget the lessons of World War II for the possession of their "own" close air support.

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

Although the Eighth Army counter-attack thwarted the Red drive at the southwestern end of the perimeter, the Communists took advantage of the Eighth Army's preoccupation with this sector to mount a more successful limited attack at the northeastern end of the defense line. In the latter part of July Col. Robert W. Witty, commander of 6131st Fighter Wing at P'ohang Airfield, had been warning that his installation and forces were endangered by North Korean troops who were filtering through the mountains between the ROK 3rd and Capital Divisions.#37

Although the commanders in Taegu were supposed to be "keeping close watch on the situation," neither the Fifth Air Force nor the Eighth Army was as well versed as to what was happening on the east coast as was Colonel Witty. Early in August elements of the North Korean 12th Division worked through the mountains, struck the coastal route south of ROK defenses at Yŏngdök, and headed southward for P'ohang. An American infantry-tank task force went to meet the North Koreans, but it was too little and too late and was soon scattered by enemy fire.#38

[note]

 

Koread-War

12 13, 14,15,16,17, 18, 19, 20

FEAFBC

Effective on 12 August, the normal daily effort of three B-29 groups was directed at bridges.

Such a scale of effort continued until 20 August,

What about the Carpet Bombing just ordered up?  It will occur on the 16th

[note]

 

   biography   biography

In a conference at the Meiji building on 14 August FEAF officers discussed the proposed "carpet-bombing" mission. General O'Donnell was not at all adverse to the planned employment, provided someone could assure him that it would accomplish positive results. If a significant number of Communist troops were concentrated in a bridgehead, said O'Donnell, "We would like to take a crack at them, declare a dividend." With his available force, General O'Donnell figured that he could saturate a three-square-mile area with 500-pound bombs. Fragmentation bombs would be better for the purpose, but the B-29's were already loaded with general-purpose bombs and could not be reloaded on such short notice. General O'Donnell specified requirements for the mission:

Some of the officers at the conference wondered why the medium bombers were expected to provide ground support when the aircraft carriers were not supporting the Eighth Army, but no one opposed the B-29 operation under conditions such as those outlined by General O'Donnell.#104

[note]

 

August

*General Stratemeyer had issued positive orders cautioning against any violation of the Manchurian or Siberian borders on 3 July and again on 14 August 1950.

Some errors nevertheless occurred, though not so many as the Communists alleged. Two American Mustang pilots apparently strayed across the border and strafed a Red Chinese airstrip near Antung on 27 August.

[note]

 

9th Attack Squadron - Emblem.png   7th Fighter Squadron.jpg

*The 9th Squadron had seen service over Korea in the first days of hostilities, but on 14 August it had traded duties and stations with the 49th Group's 7th Squadron, a transfer designed to give the squadron some rest at Misawa after strenuous operations.

[note]

 

The four-plane formation with 1,000-or 2,000-pound bombs became the standard means of destroying bridges, [in March 1951] but Bomber Command had long hoped that radio-controlled bombs would add precision to its bridge attacks.

 

Especially designated for the work and assisted by an Air Proving Ground technical team, the 19th Bombardment Group had tested 1,000-pound razon bombs in the autumn of 1950.

This World War II bomb had remotely controlled tail fins which responded to a bombardier's radio signals and permitted its guidance to a target with range and azimuth corrections. At first the 19th Group met many malfunctions, but out of a total of 489 razon bombs dropped 331 (67 percent) responded to control. The last 150 razon missiles had a control reliability of 96 percent, and razon bombing destroyed 15 bridges.

The razon bomb was performing well, but about four of these 1,000-pound bombs were required to take out an average bridge.

 

Def

 

In December 1950 the 19th Group accordingly deemphasized razon in favor of the newly developed 12,000-pound Tarzon bomb, which had a similar guidance system but much greater destructive capabilities.

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea   

While the Eighth Army was initially lukewarm toward the evacuation of its casualties by Air Force transports, the Eighth Army's surgeon eagerly exploited the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron's helicopter detachment for the evacuation of front-line casualties to mobile army surgical hospitals. As has been seen, General Stratemeyer asked USAF on 14 August 1950 to organize and dispatch to him an "evacuation and utility squadron" with 25 H-5 helicopters and the trained medical personnel required to handle front-line evacuation work.

Later on USAF would perceive that such a function as this was a logical and desirable extension of its assault troop-carrier effort, but in August 1950 some USAF officers in Washington observed that their planning for aeromedical evacuation "has not included the U.S. Army function of evacuation from front-line battle stations" and hesitated to set a precedent.

 The USAF Surgeon General nevertheless urged that Stratemeyer's request should be met, and USAF on 21 August agreed to send FEAF 14 H-5's and to raise the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron's allocation to 23 helicopters.

USAF ruled at this time that the Air Rescue Service must have first claim on all helicopters, and it refused to allow Stratemeyer to form a special evacuation squadron. #97

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

   9th RCT

Task Force Hill attacked on 11 August but lost its momentum in a confused situation which found the enemy attacking at the same time. Reinforced to a strength of three infantry regiments, Hill’s provisional unit again struck out against the bridgehead on 14 and 15 August.

[note]

 

biography   biography  

Generals Shepherd and Cates arrived for the main embarkation on the 13th and 14th respectively, accompanied by Major General Franklin A. Hart (Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia) and Brigadier General Edwin A. Pollock. While these general officers were being acquainted with the progress made so far, the AKA Titania blew out two boilers after being about 20 percent loaded. Since the repairs would require about ten days, a commercial freighter was provided as a last-minute replacement.

Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment

One of the purposes of General Shepherd’s visit was to discuss with General Cates the problems of organizing and embarking the 7th Marines (Reinf.). The activation of this unit had been directed on 10 August 1950, when an officer of the G–1 Section, Headquarters FMFPac, delivered orders to Camp Pendleton.[27]

This was the result of a change of mind on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After reconsideration, they decided that it would be feasible to raise a third RCT much sooner than had at first seemed possible, though not in time for MacArthur’s assault landing. Arrival in Japan about 20 September seemed to be the earliest date that could be managed.

 

 

Of the 17,162 eligible Marines at Camp Pendleton at that time, the regulars in excess of those required to mount out between the 10th and 15th were placed in the rear echelon of the division as a cadre for the third infantry regiment.[28] The following troops were made available to draw upon for the formation of the 7th Marines:

Officers and men from 2nd Marine Division = 1,822
Officers and men of 3rd Bn, 6th Marines in the Mediterranean = 735 Officers and men of Marine Corps Reserve selected as combat-ready = 1,972
Officers and men of rear echelon of Division, and from posts and stations = 1,109
TOTAL = 5, 638[29]

[note]

 

Def

The Marine Corps was as lenient as could reasonably be expected when it came to granting delays and deferments. On 1 August a board of eight officers at Marine Corps Headquarters initiated daily meetings to consider such requests emanating from the various Reserve districts. Two weeks later (8/14) the Commandant gave Reserve District directors the authority to grant delays for periods up to six months after judging each case on its individual merits. But even after every concession had been made that could be reconciled with the national interest, it was a wrench for hundreds of reservists to make the sudden plunge from civil into military life. There were instances of men seeking deferment by using political influence or pleading physical disability. But such cases were rare as compared to the great majority who reported promptly and declared themselves combat-ready.

In the selection of reservists for the division, two categories were recognized—combat-ready and noncombat-ready. The first applied to men whose records proved that they had been members of the Organized Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and 72 drills or two summer camps and 32 drills. Veterans of more than 90 days’ service in the Marine Corps also qualified. All other reservists were classified as noncombat-ready.

When lost or incomplete records complicated the equation, a reservist’s own opinion could not be accepted as proof of his fitness for combat. This ruling had to be made because so many men were found to have more spunk than training. Officers of a reservist’s unit were questioned before a decision was reached, and any man feeling the need of further training could be removed without prejudice from immediate consideration for combat.

Standards were so strictly observed that only about half of the reservists qualified as being combat-ready. This group broke down into the 15 per cent accepted for the 1st Marine Division and the 35 per cent assigned to posts and stations to relieve regulars who joined the division. The remaining 50 per cent consisted of men placed in the noncombat-ready or recruit class.[16]

The emergency found the Organized Aviation Reserve with 30 VMF and 12 GCI squadrons generally up to peacetime strength. Of the 1,588 officers, about 95 per cent were combat-experienced, and only about 10 per cent of the enlisted men stood in need of basic training. It was a comparatively simple task, therefore, to comply with the order of 23 July calling for six VMF and three GCI squadrons to report to El Toro. Their mission was to build up to war strength the units of the 1st MAW which had been stripped to mount out MAG–33.

[note]

 

Meanwhile, the 1st Division, less the 7th Marines, sailed for the Far East. The first cargo vessels weighed anchor on10 August, followed on 14 August by the first attack transport.

 

Loading was completed on 21 August, and the last ship sailed on the 24th; and a week later, on 1 September, the 7th Marines (Reinforced), less one infantry battalion, shipped out, close on the heels of its parent organization.

[note]

 

Def

By the middle of August, however, plans had been made to call to active duty in the near future approximately 2,650 Volunteer Reserve officers. The Secretary of the Navy's letter of 14 August directed the Commandant to disapprove resignations submitted by inactive: reserve officers except in specific cases where it was determined that the services of the officer concerned would not be necessary to meet mobilization requirements. Accordingly, the Marine Corps, in conformance with the policies of the Department of Defense and the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy, revamped its existing policy and procedure for processing resignations submitted by inactive reserve officers, and the Commandant approved the new policy on 9 September.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 

 

 

14 August

Marine Brigade moved into assembly area at Miryang.

[note]

 

Counterattacks on the 11th and on the 14th and 15th had failed to dislodge the three North Korean infantry regiments which, with artillery and tank support, now held the eastern ridges and were debouching onto the Yŏngsan-ni, road.

[note]

 

USN_Units   USN_Units

On the 14th, as USS Perch (ASSP-313) and her Royal Marines began their training program, the submarine USS Pickerel (SS-524)was sailed to procure periscope photographs of selected objectives.

 

But while these preparations and efforts to saw up the coastal supply line were being made, a crisis had developed at P'ohang. There the ROK 3rd Division had done well. With its KMAG liaison group, with artillery and fire control personnel from the 24th Division, and with the support of naval gunfire and the P'ohang - based F-51s, it had held the road longer than might have been expected, and long after the cavalry division had landed and moved inland. But by now the fire control party had been transferred to another sector, while to the westward the enemy advance had uncovered lateral communications between the North Korean 5th Division and units on the inland front on line.

Such an eventuality had been foreseen, and preliminary planning for a water evacuation of P'ohang was underway. Three LSTs were ordered up to take out Air Force ground personnel, and on the 8th the removal of heavy equipment from the P'ohang airstrip was begun.

[note]

 

        biography  

rounds of 5-inch by USS Helena (CA-75) and USS Theodore E. Chandler (DD-717) destroyed a train and damaged two bridges. But further word on conditions at P'ohang, and rumors of an enemy landing at Kuryongp'o, brought Admiral Hartman back at 25 knots.

[note]

 

Place_Names/Army_Map_Service/usn_navy_map09.pdf

[note]

 

biography    biography  

To this planned schedule of raiding activity Admiral Joy now added carrier strikes. On 7 August he had noted that reports of enemy rail traffic promised useful employment for Task Force 77 in Area F; a week later [14TH?], as the task force was returning to Sasebo, the continued influx of such intelligence brought similar recommendations from Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Korea.

Pressure on the northern front, naval and Air Force intelligence which emphasized the importance of the east coast route, and the suggestions of the naval liaison officer led on the 13th to a request from FAFIK for carrier interdiction of Area C on the 16th, to be followed by attacks on rail and other transport facilities in Area F, between Wŏnsan and Ch'ŏngjin.

[note]

 

USN_Units

On the 13th, in response to reports of enemy shipping at Wŏnsan, Admiral Hartman established blockading stations in 39° 50' and 40° 50'.  Enemy movement on shore was also receiving attention: between 13 and 16 August, while the ship employed the daylight hours in bombardment of rail targets, the raiders from USS Horace A. Bass (APD-124)carried out three night landings between 41° 28' and 38° 35' which resulted in the destruction of three tunnels and two bridges.

USN_Units

In anticipation of future attacks by USS Perch (ASSP-313), ComNavFE had by this time established a joint zone for surface and submarine operations, Area 7, between 40° and 41° on the Korean east coast.

[note]

 

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But there was a change in plans, [Military police from the 25th Division were supposed to guide its units to assigned assembly areas] and in the end confusion prevailed as most of the units were led in the darkness of 13-14 August to a dry stream bed just east of Chindong-ni. The troops were badly mixed there and until daylight no one knew where anyone else was. [16-47]

  

The next morning the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regimental Combat Team moved around west to Kogan-ni, where it relieved the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

[note]

 

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   biography 9th RCT

Enemy action in the southern part of the 24th Division sector from 10 to 13 August convinced Colonel Hill that K and L Companies were doing no good in their isolated hill positions near the Naktong. Accordingly, he issued orders-received by the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry, at 0200, 14 August-for these companies to abandon their positions and assemble in the rear of the 1st Battalion as regimental reserve. They carried out this movement without incident.

[note]

 

Unit Info  

Hill 303 at Waegwan

Almost simultaneously with the major enemy crossing effort in the southern part of the 1st Cavalry Division sector at Tŭksŏng-dong and Yongp'o, another was taking place northward above Waegwan near the boundary between the division and the ROK 1st Division. The northernmost unit of the 1st Cavalry Division was G Company of the 5th Cavalry Regiment. It held Hill 303, the right-flank anchor of the U.S. Eighth Army.

Hill 303 is an elongated oval more than two miles long on a northeast-southwest axis with an extreme elevation of about 1,000 feet. It is the first hill mass north of Waegwan. Its southern slope comes down to the edge of the town; its crest, a little more than a mile to the northeast, towers nearly 950 feet above the river. It gives observation of Waegwan, the road net running out of the town, the railroad and highway bridges across the river at that point, and of long stretches of the river valley to the north and to the south. Its western slope terminates at the east bank of the Naktong.

 From Waegwan a road ran north and south along the east bank of the Naktong, another northeast through the mountains toward Tabu-dong, and still another southeast toward Taegu. Hill 303 was a critical terrain feature in control of the main Pusan-Sŏul railroad and highway crossing of the Naktong, as well as of Waegwan itself.

August

[19-Caption] WAEGWAN BRIDGE over the Naktong River. Hill 303 is below the river at lower right.

For several days intelligence sources had reported heavy enemy concentrations across the Naktong opposite the ROK 1st Division. In the first hours of 14 August, an enemy regiment crossed the Naktong six miles north of Waegwan into the ROK 1st Division sector, over the second underwater bridge there. Shortly after midnight, ROK forces on the high ground just north of the U.S.-ROK Army boundary were under attack.

[note]

 

 

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 Monday, 14 August, dawned over the bulge area with a heavy overcast of clouds. Rain had been falling since 0300. This prevented the planned air strike.

At 0300 Colonel Hill ordered Smith to withdraw. The battalion fought its way out of encirclement before dawn and took up a new defensive position. It held this new position at the south end of the main battle line with the help of a counterattack by the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been strengthened that morning by the return of K and L Companies from their river hill positions. [17-54]

 

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A more determined enemy crossing of the Naktong in the vicinity of the blown bridge between Tŭksŏng-dong and Yongp'o began about dawn, 14 August. Men in the outposts of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, at 0520 heard voices in the pea patches and rice paddies to their front.

[note]

 

 

0545 Sunrise

[note]

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Unit Info  Unit Info  

On the 14th, a reinforced company of the 35th Infantry, 25th Division, took up a defensive position south of the Naktong River at Namji-ri bridge, relieving units of the 27th Infantry there. Responsibility for protecting the bridge passed from the 24th to the 25th Division. [17-48]

[note]

 

Koread-War

Monday, 14 August, dawned over the bulge area with a heavy overcast of clouds. Rain had been falling since 0300. This prevented the planned [100 plane] air strike (Carpet bombing). The 24th Division artillery, down to an estimated 40 percent combat effectiveness at this time, had massed most of its guns in the low ground just west of Yŏngsan-ni,, under the command of Lt. Col. Charles W. Stratton, Commanding Officer, 13th Field Artillery Battalion. These guns delivered a 10-minute preparation. Then the infantry moved out.

[note]

 

After daylight an air strike partially destroyed the underwater bridge.

[note]

 

biography   biography 9th RCT

August 14, 1950

The attack went off, per schedule, at dawn on August 14. It was raining hard. Because of that, no FEAF aircraft appeared, but the artillery laid down a ten-minute barrage.

Again carrying the burden of the attack, John Hill's 9th Infantry occupied the center. Beauchamp's 34th and Brad Smith's 1/21 were on the left; Ned Moore's 19th was on the right. Joe Walker's 2/9 smartly took its first objective; but thereafter everything went wrong, and the attack fizzled out all across the front.

The shattered 19th and 34th regiments were simply physically and mentally incapable of further offensive action. After an average gain of 500 yards against fierce NKPA resistance, Task Force Hill ground to a halt.

biography   biography

That day Johnnie Walker again flew in to see John Church. By that time John Hill had recommended to Church that his forces break off the attack and go over to the defensive.

Inasmuch as Claire Hutchin's 1/23 had been sent north to reinforce Dick Stephens's weakened 21st Infantry and Task Force Hyzer, there were no other division reserves to commit to the battle. Walker, disgusted and furious, reached a drastic and, for the Army, a humiliating decision: He would commit Eddie Craig's Marine RCT to restore the 24th Division's front.

 To Church he delivered a scathing rebuke: "I want this situation cleaned up, and quick." Later that day Walker's senior field assistant and gofer (who held the title "Tactical Chief of Staff"), William A. Collier, fifty-four, flew down and gave the Marines marching orders, which, in effect, canceled the offensive of Task Force Kean toward Chinju.

[note]

 

By 0620, an estimated 500 enemy soldiers had penetrated as far as Yongp'o. Fifteen minutes later, close combat was in progress in the 2nd Battalion positions near Wich'on-dong, a mile east of the crossing site. [19-31]

When word of the enemy crossing reached the 1st Cavalry Division command post before daylight, General Gay alerted his division reserve, Colonel Clainos' 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, to move on an hour's notice.

[note]

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During the enemy infiltration around Yŏngsan, fighting continued at Cloverleaf, Obong-ni, and northward. There, the 9th Regimental Combat Team, the 19th Infantry, and elements of the 34th Infantry succeeded in denying gains to the enemy division, and so tied down its main force that the N.K. 4th Division could not exploit its penetrations southward.

Task Force Hill still had its mission of driving the enemy out of the bulge and back across the Naktong. With the North Korean penetration south and east of Yŏngsan eliminated on 13 August, Colonel Hill planned an attack the next day with his entire force against the Cloverleaf-Obong-ni positions.

Bomber Command

One hundred aircraft were to deliver a strike on these positions. Artillery was to follow the strike with a concentrated barrage. The attacking ground formations were essentially the same, and held the same relative positions, as during their abortive attack three days earlier.

The enemy division apparently had its 5th Regiment on the north in front of the 19th Infantry, the 16th Regiment on Cloverleaf and Obong-ni, part of the 18th Regiment back of the 16th, and the remainder of it scattered throughout the bulge area, but mostly in the south and east. [17-50]

Task Force Hill was far from strong for this attack. The two battalions of the 9th Infantry were down to approximately two-thirds strength, the 19th Infantry was very low in combat-effective troops, and the three rifle companies of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had a combined strength of less than that of one full strength rifle company. [17-51]

Monday, 14 August, dawned over the bulge area with a heavy overcast of clouds. Rain had been falling since 0300. This prevented the planned air strike.

     

The 24th Division artillery, down to an estimated 40 percent combat effectiveness at this time, had massed most of its guns in the low ground just west of Yŏngsan under the command of Lt. Col. Charles W. Stratton, Commanding Officer, 13th Field Artillery Battalion. These guns delivered a 10-minute preparation. Then the infantry moved out.

        

The two battalions of the 9th Regimental Combat Team, the 1st on the right and the 2nd on the left, started up the slopes of Cloverleaf,

while B Company, 34th Infantry, began a holding attack against Obong-ni south of the road. Although it almost reached the top of Obong-ni early in the morning, B Company was driven back by 0800.

The main battle took place northward across the road on Cloverleaf. There the American and North Korean troops locked in a close battle of attack and counterattack. The 1st Battalion lost sixty men killed or wounded in one hour of fighting. Both battalions of the [4th] (should be 9th) Regimental Combat Team gained parts of the high ground but could not control the hill mass.

 Northward, the 19th Infantry made no gain. [17-52]

 

 That night on Cloverleaf was one of continuing combat. The North Koreans attacked and infiltrated into the 8th [Should be 9th] Infantry's dug-in defensive positions. The case of MSgt. Warren H. Jordan of E Company reflects the severity of the fighting on Cloverleaf. From 10 to 17 August, he was forced on five different occasions to take command of the company because all company officers had been killed or wounded, or had suffered heat exhaustion. [17-53]

The enemy attack on the night of the 14th was not confined to Cloverleaf. South of Obong-ni enemy troops virtually surrounded the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and inflicted numerous casualties on it.

 At 0300 Colonel Hill ordered Smith, Charles Brad [Lt. Col. CO 1bn21stIR] to withdraw. The battalion fought its way out of encirclement before dawn and took up a new defensive position. It held this new position at the south end of the main battle line with the help of a counterattack by the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been strengthened that morning by the return of K and L Companies from their river hill positions. [17-54]

[note]

 

biography   biography

0800 General Gay ordered Colonel Clainos' battalion, already loaded into trucks, to move to the Yongp'o area to support the 2nd Battalion.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography

On 14 August, General MacArthur summoned to his Tokyo office General Stratemeyer, commanding general of the Far East Air Forces, and told him he wanted a carpet bombing of the North Korean concentrations threatening the Pusan Perimeter. [19-52]

General Stratemeyer talked with Maj. Gen. Emmett (Rosie) O'Donnell, Jr., commanding general of the Far East Bomber Command, who said a relatively good job of bombing could be done on a 3-by-5 mile area. General MacArthur's headquarters selected a 27-square-mile rectangular area 3 1/2 miles east to west by 71/2 miles north to south on the west side of the Naktong River opposite the ROK 1st Division. The southeast corner of this rectangle was just north of Waegwan. Intelligence estimates placed the greatest concentrations of enemy troops in this area, some estimates being as high as four enemy divisions and several armored regiments, totaling approximately 40,000 men. [19-53]

General Gay, commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, repeatedly requested that the bombing include the area northeast of Waegwan, between the Naktong River and the Waegwan - Tabu-dong road. This request was denied because of fear that bombing there might cause casualties among the 1st Cavalry and ROK 1st Division troops, even though General Gay pointed out that terrain features sharply defined the area he recommended. General Gay also offered to have 1st Cavalry Division L-19 planes lead the bombers to this target. [19-54]

FEAF ordered a five-group mission of B-29's from Japan and Okinawa for 16 August. Since there was no indication of enemy groupings in the target area, the bomber command divided it into twelve equal squares with an aiming point in the center of each square. One squadron of B-29's was to attack each square.

[note]

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The 1st Marines' additional rifle companies and platoons to bring the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (5th Marines) up to war strength, and support and service units for the division had been building up at Camp Pendleton. These loaded at San Diego between 14 and 24 August and reached Japan between 28 August and 2 September.

[note]

 

Enemy artillery and tank fire from the west side of the river was supporting the crossing. At midmorning, large additional enemy forces just west of the river at Tŭksŏng-dong and Panjang apparently were about ready to attempt a crossing in support of the units already heavily engaged on the east side. Some enemy troops were crossing in barges near the bridge. Air strikes bombed the North Koreans on the west side and artillery then took them under heavy fire.

The 77th Field Artillery Battalion fired approximately 1,860 rounds into the enemy concentration. In delivering this heavy, rapid fire it damaged its gun tubes. [19-32]

In this attack the deepest North Korean penetration reached Samuni-dong, about a mile and a half beyond the blown bridge. There the combined fire of all infantry weapons, mortars, and artillery drove the enemy back toward the river.

[note]

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But this scheme of maneuver was canceled, and the 2nd Battalion of the 5th RCT relieved 3/5 on 14 August.

By that time, as will be related later, other elements of the Brigade were on the way to an assembly area at Miryang in preparation for an operation in another sector.

A plan for the Marines to advance to the west across the valley floor while the Army 5th RCT attacked rearward to meet them was considered by the 25th Division. Taplett’s battalion would have been accompanied by 2/5, then on the way to the Chindong-ni area.

At least the attack by 3/5 enabled elements of the 25th Division to rescue survivors of the artillery batteries who straggled back. Both Taplett and Stewart believed that enemy numbers in the area had been much smaller than the original Army estimate of 2,000 to 2,500 men. The 3/5 commander wanted to complete his mission by attacking to recover the howitzers and other lost equipment while the opportunity still existed. But he was unable to accomplish this aim because of orders for Brigade withdrawal, and the artillery pieces were never recaptured.

Air strikes were called to destroy them after the relief of the Marine battalion, and the area itself was abandoned a few days later when 25th Division units fell back before renewed NKPA attacks.

[note]

 

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By noon, large groups of North Koreans were trying to re-cross the river to the west side. Forward observers adjusted artillery [77th Field Artillery Battalion] and mortar fire on the retreating enemy, causing heavy casualties.

[note]

 

The North Korean attack spread south and by noon enemy small arms fire fell on G Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, on Hill 303. This crossing differed from earlier ones near the same place in that the enemy force instead of moving east into the mountains turned south and headed for Waegwan. [19-36]

[note]

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08/14/50
7:00 AM
08/14/50
4:00 PM

 

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
2:00 AM
08/14/50
3:00 AM
08/14/50
8:00 AM
08/14/50
5:00 PM

 

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
3:00 AM
08/14/50
4:00 AM
08/14/50
9:00 AM
08/14/50
6:00 PM

USN_Units

Not only did the carrier complete its assignment before the deadline, but the USS Bexar (APA-237) also arrived at Suda Bay on the evening of the 14th. Both ships had hardly dropped anchor when the LCVPs and LCMs were shuttling troops and cargo to the transport and the USS Montague (AKA-98), which was to accompany it to the Far East.[2]

[note]

 

August 14, 1950

By dusk, the 7th Cavalry had eliminated the enemy bridgehead at Yongp'o. In this battle, as in the one fought two days before, the 2nd Battalion distinguished itself. This was the same battalion that only three weeks earlier had performed in a highly unsatisfactory manner east of Yŏngdong.

In this river-crossing battle, the only major one to take place along the Naktong actually at a crossing site, the 25th and 27th Regiments of the N.K. [70th should be 10th] Division suffered crippling losses.

 The 7th Cavalry Regiment estimated that of 1,700 enemy who had succeeded in crossing the river, 1,500 were killed. Two days after the battle, H Company reported it had buried 267 enemy dead behind its lines, while those in the rice paddies to its front were not counted. In front of its position, G Company counted 150 enemy dead. In contrast, G Company lost only 2 men killed and 3 wounded during the battle. One of its members, Pfc. Robert D. Robertson, a machine gunner, twice had bullets pierce his helmet in the half-inch space above his scalp and tear through several letters and photographs he carried there, but leave him unhurt. [19-33]

[note]


 

1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
4:00 AM
08/14/50
5:00 AM
08/14/50
10:00 AM
08/14/50
7:00 PM

 

 

 

 

1924 Sunset

[note]


 

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
5:00 AM
08/14/50
6:00 AM
08/14/50
11:00 AM
08/14/50
8:00 PM

 

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
6:00 AM
08/14/50
7:00 AM
08/14/50
12:00 PM
08/14/50
9:00 PM

 

 

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
7:00 AM
08/14/50
8:00 AM
08/14/50
1:00 PM
08/14/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/14/50
8:00 AM
08/14/50
9:00 AM
08/14/50
2:00 PM
08/14/50
11:00 PM

  

On August 4, elements of the North Korean 16th Infantry Regiment staged an assault across the Naktong between Companies I and L, 3/34 Infantry, and overwhelmed most of their positions. NKPA troops drove about five miles into the 24th Division sector, precipitating the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, which eventually involved the entire 24th Division, the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the newly arrived 9th Infantry Regiment and 1/23rd Infantry (both from the 2nd Infantry Division) and the 2/27th Infantry. The struggle lasted until August 19.

 

The 34th Infantry gave its all. Company K stayed on its 7,500-yard front along the Naktong alone until ordered out on about August 14. At the outset, the 1/34th launched a counterattack, but part of Company C was trapped in a grist mill, where the men valiantly held out until rescued. Captain Albert F. Alfonso, with remnants of Companies A, C and L, held a small perimeter at the nose of the bulge until ordered out on the night of August 8-9. Elements of the regiment took part in a number of counterattacks between August 6 and 18.

[note]

 


Casualties

Monday August 14, 1950 (Day 51)

 

41 Casualties

8 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
9 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 40TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON
1 6406TH AVIATION CARGO UNIT
14 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
4 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
41 19500814 0000 Casualties by unit

As of August 14, 1950

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 67 3822 62 9 3960
Today 2 39     41
Total 69 3861 62 9 4001

Aircraft Losses Today 003

 

 

 

 

Notes for Sunday August 13 1950 (Day 50)