Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 29°C 84.2 °F at Taegu     

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

week 009

Today begins the sixth week of the Korean war. 4,608 American Servicemen will have be killed by the end of this week Saturday August 26, 1950 (Day - 63)

[note]

     

In savage fighting, ROK 3rd and 8th Divisions stopped three N.K. divisions, N.K.-8, N.K.-12 and N.K.-5. in their assault down the eastern Kyŏngju Corridor to Pusan.

 

[note]

18, 19, 20, 21, 22

August 18 to 22 - The battle of "the Bowling Alley" north of Tabu-dong. U.S. forces hold back North Korean offensive.

[note]

 

 

biography   biography

Gen. MacArthur warns North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung that he will be held responsible for further atrocities committed against UN troops.

-- The 1st Cavalry Division sets up radio stations in Taegu, Pusan and Masan to play "news, hillbilly and swing music." The stations are meant to compete against music and propaganda from "Sŏul City Sue," this war's version of Tokyo Rose.

[note]

 

 

American Ceaser

 

Def   Koread-War

On Sunday, August 20, the Joint Chiefs, thoroughly alarmed now that they knew CINCFE's target, sent two of their members, Collins and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, to Japan "to find out," in Collins's later words, "exactly what the plans were." MacArthur met their plane and, at 5:30 P.M. on Wednesday August 23rd, convened a major strategic conference in the Dai Ichi to thrash the matter out.

[note]

 

 

biography   biography

To be sure, as early as August 20, nearly a month before Inch'ŏn, Mao's foreign minister, Chou Enlai, had telegraphed UN Secretary General Lie that "the Chinese people cannot but be most concerned about the solution of the Korean question."

 

[note]

 


At 1245/K. Hq, 3rd ARS, called and alerted Flight "A" for an air evacuation of Sgt. Rivera aboard LST #Q-017. The LST enroute for Yokohama, altered course and headed for Shimizu, the port nearest the airstrip at Yaizu, Japan 1st Lt. Vincent H. McGovern in a helicopter planned to land near the LST, take on the ailing Sgt. then fly him to Yaizu where Capt. F. L. Svore and 1st Lt. H. L. Naylor in the C-47 could fly the patient to Haneda. This plan could not be accomplished due to extremely adverse weather conditions which forced the helicopter to return after reaching a point halfway to his destination.

The C-47 fared better and after making an actual instrument letdown off the Yaizu homer, Capt. Svore and Lt. Naylor were able to land at the Yaizu strip. Sgt. Rivera was transported from the dock at Shimizu to Yaizu in a jeep and from there he was transferred to the C-47 and flown to Haneda. The entire mission was accomplished in three hours and forty five minutes after the initial notification.

Two SA-16s and two SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. The SA-16s flew 11:25 and the SB-17s flew 10:50 making a total of 22:15 flying time on orbit missions.

Ay 1045/K, Flight "D" received a call from ADCC that an F-51 pilot was in trouble and was going to bail out. The bail out area was established at 34° 12' N - 131° 05' E. One SA-16 was airborne for the bail out and commenced his search. At 1245/K ADCC advised the Flight that the F-51 pilot had been picked up by the Japanese and taken to a hospital at Kogushi, Honshu, Japan.

The SA-16 diverted from this search as another bail out had been reported near the Island of Tsu Shima. It was decided that H-5 type aircraft would be more practical for this mission as the pilot of the F-51 was suffering from a broken leg and needed to be evacuated immediately. One H-5 was airborne immediately for Kogushi to pick up the pilot. The H-5 landed in a school yard at Kogushi, Japan, picked up the pilot and returned him to Ashiya AB. At Ashiya he was transferred to an ambulance for further evacuation to the 118th Station Hospital at Fukuoka. Mission completed.

[note]

 

A few good men

 

 

The 5th Marines was detached from the 24th Division's operational control on the twentieth. The Marine Brigade then returned to a reserve position in the agricultural flatland near Masan known as the "Bean Patch." Accolades soon came pouring in from the 24th Division commander and Eighth Army headquarters.

[note]

 

27th British Infantry Brigade

The British War Office announced that it was dispatching at once to Korea an infantry force of two Battalions, from Hong Kong. These were the the First Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, and the First Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Regiments, constituting the nucleus of the 27th British Infantry Brigade.

[note]

 

Koread-War

MacArthur issued orders for CHROMITE on 20 August.

[note]

 

Pravda

MacArthur, organizer of bloodthirsty crimes

(The following appeared in the August 20, 1950 edition of Pravda and has been translated and condensed from the Russian.)

Gen. MacArthur's name never leaves the pages of the Hearst press these days. The New York Journal-American calls him "the man of the hour" and "today's hero."

It is no accident that MacArthurs are so zealously extolled in present-day America! Colonizers with generals' insignia, like Douglas MacArthur, have the leading role in predatory adventures in Asia.

MacArthur is a hereditary colonizer in the Philippines. But everything went far from smoothly with MacArthur in Asia. The national liberation movement of the peoples of the East terrified the American colonizers. The existence of the Korean People's Democratic Republic gave the double-eyed colonizer and his masters no peace. The American imperialists wished to avenge their defeat in China by new annexations in Asia. Telegrams and memoranda flew from MacArthur to Washington demanding immediate establishment of a "defense line" from the Philippines through Korea and Formosa. Under pretext of "defense," the seizure of foreign lands and the enslavement of peoples was planned.

The American banks -- Morgan, National City and others -- took over the gold fields in South Korea from the Japanese monopolies. They coveted Korean oil deposits. Korea was necessary to them as an important military-strategic bridgehead in the Far East.

And then John Foster Dulles, envoy of Wall Street and an out-and-out warmonger, hurried from Washington to Tokyo.

Chiefs of American military staffs flew to Tokyo. Commenting on this trip, one American correspondent June 18 wrote significantly that the high-placed Washington guests at MacArthur's headquarters had heard "the point of view of headquarters not only concerning the military situation in Japan but also the strategic picture affecting a large area of Asia."

"Probably," the correspondent added, "the questions of Korea and Formosa will be discussed."

We had not long to wait for the result of the Tokyo conference. Korea was chosen as the current objective of American aggression, and MacArthur, who promised to bring to an end the "whole Korean operation" in one week, was appointed its organizer.

It is common knowledge, however, how seriously MacArthur miscalculated. American weapons and prolonged American training did not help. The Syngman Rhee forces were routed under the blows of the People's Army of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

MacArthur hurled thunder and lightning. He personally flew to Korea to introduce order into the disorganized Syngman Rhee bands. The general's loud basso could not change the situation, however: The Syngman Rhee forces continued to flee southward.

It became clear to MacArthur and his masters that it was impossible to conduct the Korean adventure through other people. They had to hurl into Korea American forces, the Air Force and Navy, and to shift to open military aggression against the Korean people. The same MacArthur, of course, became head of the American army of interventionists.

For almost two months now Korean patriots have been waging a heroic struggle against U.S. interventionist forces. Step by step, inch by inch, in severe conflict, they are purging their native land of the foreign usurpers. The American interventionists, armed to the teeth, have proved unable to stand up in open battle against the heroic Korean People's Army.

The land is on fire under the interventionists' feet. The valiant Korean guerrillas give them no rest by day or night. Gen. MacArthur is growing furious over this. He is taking vengeance on the Korean people by savage bombing of peaceful towns and villages and the slaughter of thousands of women, children and old men.

MacArthur hates the Korean people. He treats them as a "low, colored race." Like Truman, he calls the Koreans no better than "bandits." "When American soldiers meeting a Korean in the rear have doubts about him," American journalists write, "they fire at him." "Others," the correspondents cynically add, "first fire at a Korean and then ask questions."

The American interventionists burn down whole villages "on suspicion" that they conceal guerrillas. Captured partisans have their spines broken before they are shot.

The American imperialists want to make Korea their colony and Koreans servile slaves of Wall Street. The proud, freedom-loving Korean people will never kneel before the American dollar or the executioner MacArthur, however. They will fight for the freedom and independence of their country to final victory.

[note]

 

General MacArthur repeated his July 4th warning to North Korean leader Kim Il Sung concerning the treatment of prisoners of war as a result of the Hill 303 (Waegwan) murder of thirty-six American soldiers.

[note]

 

biography

On August 20th, the atrocities being committed by the North Koreans on prisoners caused me to advise the enemy's commander-in-chief that unless immediate orders were given for the cessation of such brutality, I would hold each and every enemy commander criminally accountable under the rules and precedents of war.

From this time on there was a marked decrease in such atrocities and a noteworthy improvement in the enemy's handling of prisoners.

[note]

 

 

The next day the [ROK] 3rd Infantry Division relieved Task Force Min and attacked to selected positions five and a half miles north of P'ohang-dong. The Capital Division also made additional gains north of Kigye. That day, 20 August, Eighth Army by radio order dissolved Task Force Bradley and re-designated the force at Yŏnil Airfield the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, Reinforced. This same day, with the emergency in the east temporarily ended, Task Force P'ohang was dissolved, and Task Force Min moved west to a position between the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions. [18-33]

A ROK Army dispatch on 20 August claimed that its forces in the P'ohang area from 17 August on had killed 3,800 and captured 181 North Koreans. It also claimed the capture of 20 artillery pieces, 11 light mortars, 21 82-mm. mortars, 160 machine guns, 557 U.S. M1 rifles and 381 Japanese rifles. [18-34]

[18-34] New York Times, August 21, 1950.

 

Since about the end of July, the greater part of the N.K. 12th Division had been armed with the U.S. M1 rifle and the U.S. carbine. There was an adequate supply of ammunition for these weapons, but not always available at the front. The Japanese 99 rifles and ammunition with which the division was originally armed were turned in to the division supply dump at the end of July, when the supply of American arms captured from ROK units enabled the division to substitute them.

Not the least important of the factors that brought about the defeat of the North Koreans at P'ohang-dong and in the Kigye area in mid-August was the near exhaustion of the 12th Division after its passage through the mountains south of Andong, and its lack of artillery and food supply. One captured officer of the division said his unit received no food after 12 August, and for five days thereafter up to the time of his capture had only eaten what the men could forage at night in the villages. His men, he said, became physically so exhausted that they were no longer combat effective. A captured sergeant of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, said that of 630 men in his battalion only 20 survived on 18 August. In the 2nd Regiment, according to a captured captain, no battalion averaged more than 250 men on 17 August. He said there was no resupply of ammunition from the rear. [18-35]

When the N.K. 12th Division reached P'ohang-dong it was like a rubber band stretched to its uttermost limit. It must either break or rebound. The North Korean system of logistics simply could not supply these troops in the Kigye-P'ohang-dong area.  

[note]

 

Korean_War Korean_War

These incidents on Hill 303 and vicinity caused General MacArthur on 20 August to broadcast an announcement to the North Korean Army and address a leaflet to the Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces of North Korea, denouncing the atrocities. The Air Force dropped the leaflets over North Korea in large numbers. General MacArthur closed his message by saving:

biography

Paik_Sun Yup [MGen CG ROK1stID]

[19-Caption] MAJ. GEN. PAIK SUN YUP

Inertia on your part and on the part of your senior field commanders in the discharge of this grave and universally recognized command responsibility may only be construed as a condonation and encouragement of such outrage, for which if not promptly corrected I shall hold you and your commanders criminally accountable under the rules and precedents of war." [19-46]

There is no evidence that the North Korean High Command sanctioned the shooting of prisoners during this phase of the war. What took place on Hill 303 and elsewhere in the first months of the war appears to have been perpetrated by uncontrolled small units, by vindictive individuals, or because of unfavorable and increasingly desperate situations confronting the captors.

[Recall on 28 July 1950, General Lee Yong Ho, commanding the N.K. 3rd Division, transmitted an order pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed by Kim Chaek, Commander-in-Chief, and Kang Kon, Commanding General Staff, Advanced General Headquarters of the North Korean Army,  prohibited the unnecessary killing of enemy personnel, etc.]

[note]

 

The 15th left the Yuhak-san area on or about 20 August. Meanwhile, the N.K. 1st Division on the left, or east, of the 13th advanced to the Kunwi area, twenty-five miles north of Taegu. The North Korean command now ordered it to proceed to the Tabu-dong area and come up abreast of the 13th Division for the attack on Taegu down the Tabu-dong corridor.

[note]

 

 

On the morning of 19 August, the ROK 11th and 13th Regiments launched counterattacks along the ridges with some gains. General Walker ordered another reserve unit, a battalion of the ROK 10th Regiment, to the Taegu front to close a gap that had developed between the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions.

        

In the afternoon he ordered still another unit, the U.S. 23d Infantry, to move up and establish a defense perimeter around the  8th and 37th  Field Artillery Battalions eight miles north of Taegu. The 3d Battalion took up a defensive position around the artillery while the 2d Battalion
occupied a defensive position astride the road behind the 27th Infantry.

The next day the two battalions [2nd and 3rd of the 23rd IR] exchanged places. [19-66]

August

[19-Caption] TANK ACTION IN THE BOWLING ALLEY, 21 August.

Sunday, 20 August, was a day of relative quiet on the Taegu front. Even so, United States aircraft attacked North Korean positions there repeatedly during the day. The planes began their strafing runs so close in front of the American infantry that their machine gun fire dotted the identification panels, and expended .50-caliber cartridges fell into friendly foxholes. General Walker visited the Taegu front during the day, and later made the statement that enemy fire had decreased and that Taegu "certainly is saved." [19-66]

[note]

 

Unit Info  Unit Info

In the pre-dawn hours of 17 August an enemy attack got under way against the 35th Regiment. North Korean artillery fire began falling on the 1st Battalion command post in Komam-ni at 0300, and an hour
later enemy infantry attacked A Company, forcing two of its platoons from their positions, and overrunning a mortar position. After daylight, a counterattack by B Company regained the lost ground.


This was the beginning of a 5-day battle by Colonel Teeter's 1st Battalion along the southern spurs of Sibidang, two miles west of Komam-ni. The North Koreans endeavored there to turn the left flank of the
35th Regiment and split the 25th Division line.

On the morning of 18 August, A Company again lost its position to enemy attack and again regained it by counterattack. Two companies of South Korean police arrived to reinforce the battalion right flank. Against the continuing North Korean attack, artillery supporting the 1st Battalion fired an average of 200 rounds an hour during the night of 19-20 August. [20-11]

[note]

 

Unit Info     

When Colonel Champeny on 15 August established his line there was a 4,000-yard gap in the P'il-bong area between the 24th Infantry and the 5th Infantry southward. The 24th Infantry had not performed well during the Task Force Kean action and this fact made a big gap adjacent to it a matter of serious concern. General Kean sent 432 ROK National Police to Champeny the next day and the latter placed them in this gap. [19]


The first attack against the mountain line of the 24th Infantry came on the morning of 18 August, when the enemy partly overran E Company on the northern spur of Battle Mountain and killed the company commander. During the day, Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts succeeded Lt. Col. George R. Cole in command of the 2d Battalion there. The next day, the enemy attacked C Company on Battle Mountain and routed it.


Officers could collect only forty men to bring them back into position. Many ROK police on P'il-bong also ran away-only fifty-six of them remained in their defensive positions. American officers used threats and physical force to get others back into position. A gap of nearly a mile in the line north of P'ilbong existed in the 24th Infantry lines at the close of the day, and an unknown number of North Koreans were moving into it. [20]

On to [20] August, all of C Company except the company commander and about twenty-five men abandoned their position on Battle Mountain. Upon reaching the bottom of the mountain those who had fled reported erroneously that the company commander had been killed and their position surrounded, then overrun by the enemy. On the basis of this misinformation, American artillery and mortars fired concentrations on C Company's former position, and fighter-bombers, in thirty-eight sorties, attacked the crest of Battle Mountain, using napalm, fragmentation bombs, rockets, and strafing. This friendly action, based upon completely erroneous reports, forced the company commander and his remnant of twenty-five men off Battle Mountain after they had held it for nearly twenty hours. A platoon of E Company, except for eight or ten men, also left its position on the mountain under similar circumstances.

On August 20, the regimental left, a ROK patrol from K Company's position on Sobuk-san had the luck to capture the commanding officer of the N.K. 15th Regiment but, unfortunately, he was killed a few minutes later while trying to escape. The patrol removed important documents from his body.

And on this day of general melee along Battle Mountain and P'il-bong, the North Koreans drove off the ROK police from the 24th Infantry's left flank on Sobuk-san. [20-21]

General Kean now alerted Colonel Throckmorton to prepare a force from the 5th Infantry [5th RCT] to attack Sobuk-san.

[note]

 

   27th British Infantry Brigade

The British War Office on 20 August announced that it was dispatching to Korea at once from Hong Kong an infantry force of two battalions. These were regular troops and comprised the 27th Infantry Brigade headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment. Both regimental organizations dated from the American Revolution-the Middlesex Battalion from 1775, the Argyll's from 1776. Since that time they had seen service in many parts of the world, including Wellington's Peninsular Campaign, India, and South Africa. Brigadier Basil A. Coad commanded the force.

[note]

 

The 2nd Replacement training Center at Pusan opened on 20 August. Its capacity was 500 daily, half that of the Taegu center [which opened on the 14th]..

[note]

 

Except for the first groups, the recruits received five days' training at the Kup'o-ri training Center near Pusan, which was opened 20 August. [21-31]

August

[21-Caption] SOUTH KOREAN RECRUIT with an American soldier.

Even though it initially had been the intention of the Far East Command to pair Korean augmentation recruits with American soldiers in a "buddy system," this did not work out uniformly in practice in the Eighth Army.

        

 

The 1st Cavalry and the 2nd Infantry Divisions used the buddy system, with the American responsible for the training of the recruit in use of weapons, drill, personal hygiene, and personal conduct. Two regiments of the 25th Division used the system, while the third placed the recruits in separate platoons commanded by American officers and noncommissioned officers.

General Church directed the 24th Division to place all its augmentation recruits in separate squads and platoons commanded by selected Korean officers and noncommissioned officers. These Korean squads and platoons were attached to American units. [21-32]

Capt. Robert K. Sawyer who, as a 2nd lieutenant, commanded a platoon of these new augmentation recruits in the Reconnaissance Company, 25th Division, has given a fair appraisal of the typical Korean recruit in the United States Army in August and September 1950:

When a fresh batch arrived our First Sergeant ran them through a brief schooling on methods of attack, and they were ready for us. Recon Company's ROK contingent ate with us (our menu plus a huge, steaming plate of rice), but otherwise was a force apart.

About sixty ROK's were assigned to each Recon platoon, under the command of an American Lieutenant, as support for the Recon platoon leader. In other words, each Recon platoon had two U.S. officers; one for the Americans, the other for the ROK's. I had the latter job for a few weeks. On some occasions I controlled forces consisting of nearly one hundred ROK's, plus ten or twelve GI's scattered throughout for control. At other times I had a fifty-fifty combination. Sometimes the Americans predominated.

It is difficult for me to evaluate the Koreans who augmented our ranks. All in all, however, I was not impressed by my charges and was happy to see the last of them. Mere recruits, they simply had not had time to become soldiers, and I used them for little more than carrying ammunition and rations. On the occasions I had to use them for fighting I spread my GI's around and prayed that nothing of consequence would happen.

My ROK's were always hungry, and never did understand that the cardboard box of C rations was meant for one day's subsistence. Often, an hour after doling out the one-box-per-man I have heard my interpreter ask me for more 'chop-chop.' The Koreans had already eaten their entire day's supply! Invariably they fell asleep when on guard, requiring constant checking by the Americans. And to make matters worse, most Koreans I have observed love to greet the morning sun with a song. This habit did not always fit into our security plan.

In one action I had spread my ROK's in a half circle position, with GI's posted here and there along the line for control. Late in the morning one lone sniper fired at us, and immediately my ROK's went to pieces. Hysterical, they lay on the ground with faces pressed into the earth, weapons pointed in the general direction of the enemy, firing madly, wasting ammunition, completely out of hand. There was only one way to straighten out the situation, so my GI's and I went from ROK to ROK, kicking them and dragging them bodily to where they could see. We eventually succeeded in quieting them down, and when the enemy attacked us later in the day my ROK's held pretty well. [21-33]

The buddy system of using the Korean augmentation recruits gradually broke down and was abandoned. Most American soldiers did not like the system. Most units found they could employ the recruits, organized in ROK squads and platoons with American officers and noncommissioned officers in charge, to best advantage as security guards, in scouting and patrolling, and in performing various labor details. They were particularly useful in heavy weapons companies where the hand-carrying of machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles and their ammunition over the rugged terrain was a grueling job. They also performed valuable work in digging and camouflaging defensive positions. [21-34]

There also began in August the extensive use of Korean civilians with A-frames as cargo carriers up the mountains to the front lines. This method of transport proved both cheaper and more efficient than using pack animals. American units obtained the civilian carriers through arrangements with the ROK Army. Soon the American divisions were using Korean labor for nearly all unskilled work, at an average of about 500 laborers and carriers to a division.

The U.S. divisions in Korea never received the number of Korean augmentation recruits planned for them.

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)        

The next day, 20 August, Eighth Army issued an operational directive ordering the 2nd Infantry Division to relieve the 24th Division as soon as the 38th Regiment closed on Miryang.

[note]

 

Planning for the massive attack was under way for at least the last ten days of August since the N.K. Army operational order for the I Corps attack was issued on or about 20 August. The enemy plan indicated five major groupings of assault units and objectives:

 

I Corps

1. 6th and 7th Divisions to break through the U.S. 25th Division to Masan in the south.

2. 9th, [there is no 9th ID]  4th, 2nd, and 10th Divisions to break through the U.S. 2nd Division to Miryang and the Pusan-Taegu railroad and highway by way of Ch'angnyŏng and Yŏngsan-ni,.

 

II Corps

3. 3rd, 13th, and 1st Divisions to break through the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st Division to Taegu.

4. 8th and 15th Divisions to break through the ROK 8th and 6th Divisions to Hayang and Yŏngch'ŏn in the lateral corridor east of Taegu.

5. 12th and 5th Divisions to break through the ROK Capital and 3rd Divisions to P'ohang-dong, Yŏnil Airfield, and the Yŏngju corridor to Pusan.

Assault groupings 1 and 2 of I Corps were to begin their co-ordinated attacks at 2330, 31 August;

assault groupings 3, 4, and 5 of II Corps were to attack at 1800, 2 September. [21-53]

[note]

 

  

In the southern part of its sector, where the U.S. 25th Division held the U.N. line, the N.K. I Corps planned a crushing blow, coordinating it with an attack against the 2nd Division just to the north.

The North Korean 6th and 7th Divisions prepared for the breakthrough effort against the 25th Division after receiving their attack orders about 20 August. The operation order called for the N.K. I Corps to assault all along the line at 2200, 31 August.

   Unit Info  Unit Info

 

[note]

 

 

Citations

No citations issued for this date.

[note]

 

The Forgotten War

The NKPA did not exploit the gap, but they attacked the 1/24th on the 20th, again driving Company C from its position. The 3rd Battalion counterattacked, regaining most of the lost ground. In that assault, 2nd Lt. Ted Swett served as the ninth platoon leader that the 3rd Platoon of Company L had had so far in the war.

He was wounded on the 21st, and it took six hours to carry him down the mountain. That same morning, Companies I and L retook lost ground but were again driven off by an estimated two-battalion NKPA assault.

[note]

 

Def

On August 20 Johnnie Walker inspected the Wolfhound front. Surveying the NKPA carnage on the battlefield and the stout American positions, he declared grandly that Taegu certainly is saved." And so it was at least for the time being.[8-31]

[note]

 

biography   biography

Having failed to crack through frontally in the Bowling Alley, the NKPA sent its depleted 1st Division on a flanking movement to the east, down the Kunwi–Taegu road. Anticipating this attack, Walker had reinforced the road with a ROK task force. Nonetheless, the NKPA 1st Regiment overran the ROKs and broke into the rear, where Paul Freeman's 2/23 and 3/23 were guarding the 8th and 37th FABs. In a savage fight, led by the 2/23 commander, James W. Edwards, forty-one, a veteran of the ETO, and well supported by FEAF, one NKPA regiment was shattered and routed. In a skillful follow-up counterattack employing both his infantry battalions, Freeman trapped and decimated the regiment, thus ending all worries that either the NKPA 1st or the 13th Division could crack through to Taegu down the Bowling Alley without major reinforcements.

Diluted by the transfer of four divisions to the southwest sector and by the transfer of the 15th Division to the central sector, the NKPA offensive in the northwest sector against Taegu thus ended in failure. The 1st, 3rd, 10th, and 13th divisions had been severely shattered the 3rd almost beyond repair. Total NKPA casualties in this sector during August were probably close to 10,000.

These American victories in the northwest sector coincided with a ROK victory in the seesawing east coast sector. There the ROK Capital Division, supported by the relanded 3rd Division and several ROK task forces, drove the NKPA 12th Division out of P'ohang and "liberated" the port. Pursuing the retreating 12th Division northward into the mountains, the ROKs all but destroyed it, killing 3,800 men. The division was reorganized and remanned, utilizing several independent units as cadres, but it would not recover from this beating.[8-33]

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

August August August August

When the 98th and 307th Groups arrived in the theater, General Stratemeyer on 8 August ordered O'Donnell to put the strategic offensive into effect, using the maximum effort of two B-29 groups against industrial targets every third day.#14

#14 Daily diary D/Opns. FEAF, 8 Aug. 1950; msg. AX-4143; CG FEAF to CG FEAF BomCom, 12 Aug. 1950.

This allocation of effort continued in force until 20 August, when General Weyland, arguing the fact that several of the newly designated Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic objectives were actually interdiction targets, persuaded the FEC Target Selection Committee to commit three medium-bomber groups to strategic bombing.#15

[note]

 

 

 

August 20, 1950

0930 hours, Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes and Squadron Leader John F. Sach. Wykeham-Barnes arrived last evening; he is to be our "night-intruder"¯ specialist.

 

 

Sent the following letter to "Jack"¯ Slessor [214] (Marshal of the Royal Air Force):

Your night intruder specialist, Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes arrived last evening. I had a very pleasant conference with him at 0930 hours this morning. He is leaving immediately for Korea to confer with Major General Earle E. Partridge, Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, under whom our night intruder missions will be flown. I send my thanks to you for making him available - and so expeditiously. I am sure that the Far East Air Forces will benefit greatly by the information that he will pass on to us on night intruder operations. I would like to report direct to you also, that your Squadron Leader John F. Sach, who is the RAF liaison officer with my headquarters from the Far East Air Force (RAF), Singapore, is doing an outstanding job. He is treated by me and my staff as a member of our team. He is very popular and has the brain power that is so important in the position that he occupies. I commend him to you. Major General Laurence C. Craigie, who is my Vice Commander for Administration and Plans, and Major General Otto P. Weyland, who is my Vice Commander for Operations, both send warm personal regards to you. Again, many thanks for making Wing Commander Wykeham- Barnes available to us.

Sent a redline personal to Norstad:

Reurad [regarding your radio message] cite 51762, 18 Aug. Desire immediate dispatch Colonel Ethelred L. Sykes, bringing with him a junior officer and one airman stenographer. Priority number for the party of three is NWUS-1D-0034-AF 8. This priority number must be utilized from Fair- field [-Suisun AFB, later Travis AFB] during the month of August, otherwise new priority number required.


(Colonel Sykes is Norstad's answer to my TS to him re obtaining the services of a top-flight interpretive analyst - had suggested a Brigadier General W. B. Leach,[215] USAFR, professor at Harvard. Norstad said Leach's services utilized in more of a consultive manner and suggested Sykes.)


General Partridge called mid-morning and stated that the JOC was running smoothly at Pusan.

123

PART ONE: THE BITTER DAYS

Ground situation much improved; he contemplated bringing some of the engineer effort back to Taegu from Pusan without interference at Pusan to complete the layout at Taegu.


General Walker was a bit put out because I gave the Bronze Star Medal to Colonel Witty. I told Partridge that this was none of Walker's business to which he agreed, but he said he gave me the information in case it was raised by General Walker.


Partridge stated that he was not too happy with the way Witty evacuated K-3. Apparently he was influenced greatly, so Partridge said, by his family troubles back home and did not return to K-3 as he had indicated to Partridge that he would.


Sent a letter to Colonel Kight,[216] with info copies to General Kuter and Major T. P. Tatum, the CO of the 3d Air Sea Rescue Sq. at Johnson AB, commending the performance of the Third Air Sea Rescue Squadron on its handling of its mission. [217]

 

Among the aircraft used by the 3d Air Rescue Squadron was the venerable Flying Fortress. Still armed but also fitted with a chin-mounted radar and often carrying a lifeboat under their bellies, SB-17s performed long-range search and rescue missions.

 

Sent the following letter to Partridge:

The Joint Intelligence Indications Committee (Washington) has just reported that North Korean air capabilities may be increased soon, and

124

THE THREE WARS OF LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER : HIS KOREAN WAR DIARY

other sources have given this same indication. The GHQ

G-2 Intelligence Summary of 20 August lists the following
known North Korean aircraft:

 

Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards , USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, is greeted by General Stratemeyer on August 21, following Edwards' arrival with the Collins-Sherman party.

Korea, the maintenance of that air superiority always stays in top priority and we must constantly guard against the possibility of a sacrificial strike against the base logistical at Pusan, our air bases or other targets. I want you to give this your personal attention and just as soon as your situation permits, take out those North Korean airplanes. I am deeply aware of your personal efforts - keep up the good work.


We are having dinner with the Craigie's tonight at 7:00 P.M.

[note]

 

23,24,25,26,27,28,29 1- week July

30,31,01,02,03,04,05, 2-weeks August

06,07,08,09,10,11,12, 3-weeks

13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 4-weeks

20 - the Navy sink the bridge


August

The elastic bridge on 12 August.

August

The elastic bridge on 20 August.

[note]

 

Already, on 20 August, General Stratemeyer had warned General Partridge that he must devote enough attention to the enemy's airfields to prevent him from making "any sacrificial strike" against United Nations forces.#106

[note]

 

Effective on 12 August, the normal daily effort of three B-29 groups was directed at bridges.

Such a scale of effort continued until 20 August, when General Weyland got approval from the FEC Target Selection Committee to employ the normal daily effort of only two groups against the remaining targets on the strategic interdiction list. By this time bridge targets were getting scarce. When assigned bridges were obscured by cloud cover, the medium- bomber crews attacked North Korean marshaling yards as secondary targets.

During August such secondary target attacks destroyed rolling stock and supplies in the yards at Chongung-ni, Chinnampo, Kilchu, Kowon, Oro-ri, Seishin (Ch'ŏngjin), Sigjin-ni, Sinanju, and Sariwŏn.#60

  1. Chongung-ni, North Korea
  2. Chinnamp'o, North Korea
  3. Kilchu, North Korea
  4. Kowon, North Korea
  5. Oro-ri, North Korea
  6. Seishin, North Korea
  7. Sigjin-ni, North Korea
  8. Sinanju, North Korea
  9. Sariwŏn, North Korea

130 U.S. Air Force in Korea

The bridge targets assigned to the FEAF Bomber Command were not easy to destroy, for the Japanese builders had spanned Korea's major rivers with sturdy steel-and-concrete structures. But with a little practice the sharpshooting medium-bomber crews became exceptionally proficient "bridge busters." Since the bomber crews had little to fear from enemy fighters or hostile flak, bridge destruction was mainly a bombing problem. The most successful bombing tactic and the one generally used was a bomber stream of individual aircraft which approached the bridge at an altitude of about 10,000 feet from an angle of 40 degrees. Each plane released a string of four bombs on a run. Bomber Command computed that 13.#3 runs were required to destroy an average bridge, this number including multiple runs against a target by the same aircraft. In its bridge attacks Bomber Command generally employed 500-pound general-purpose bombs, admittedly not always the best ordnance, but the crews usually had to do their own loading and the command wanted to stand prepared for last-minute changes in missions. Larger tonnages of these bombs could also be racked up in the B-29's than could heavier types of bombs. Dropped with minimum inter-val-ometer settings, the 500-pounders were quite satisfactory against flat concrete spans, but 1,000-pound or larger bombs were required for many steel bridges.

At the end of August General O'Donnell wired General Stratemeyer that his medium-bomber crews were running out of assigned bridge targets. And on 4 September, when the final results of Interdiction Campaign No. 1 were calculated, General O'Donnell could report that his groups had destroyed all but seven of the 44 bridges which Stratemeyer had listed for destruction on 2 August. These seven bridges were so badly damaged as to be impassable to Communist traffic.#61

[note]

 

biography   biography

Eighth Army intelligence had assumed that the main Red attack against Taegu would be made from the direction of Waegwan. Instead, the Reds launched their attack from the direction of Kunwi. This drive, which came down from the north against Taegu, penetrated the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions on 18 August. As the fighting raged only 12 miles north of Taegu, General Partridge evacuated everyone he could spare. The Joint Operations Center moved southward to Pusan on 20 August.#112

[note]

 

 

  

When the 98th and 307th Groups arrived in the theater, General Stratemeyer on 8 August ordered O'Donnell to put the strategic offensive into effect, using the maximum effort of two B-29 groups against industrial targets every third day.#14

This allocation of effort continued in force until 20 August, when General Weyland, arguing the fact that several of the newly designated Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic objectives were actually interdiction targets, persuaded the FEC Target Selection Committee to commit three medium-bomber groups to strategic bombing.#15

On the basis of this decision, General Stratemeyer directed General O'Donnell to employ the maximum effort of three groups against strategic targets, with two days' stand-down between strikes.#16

[note]

 

Koread-War

13, 14,15,16,17, 18, 19, 20

FEAFBC

Effective on 12 August, the normal daily effort of three B-29 groups was directed at bridges.

Such a scale of effort continued until 20 August,

[note]

 

In Korea the Eighth Army also knew the need for more helicopters, which it desired to employ as organic aircraft within its division, corps, and army headquarters. On 20 August 1950 General MacArthur forwarded the request to the Department of Army. Back in Washington the Department of Army not only ordered substantial numbers of utility helicopters for assignment as organic aviation, but it also planned the activation of several transport helicopter companies which were to be equipped with light-cargo helicopters •63

[note]

 

Following receipt of the Eighth Army's request for organic helicopters, which was passed through General MacArthur on 20 August, the Department of Army authorized organic helicopters to many of its units and organized helicopter ambulance detachments. #98

[note]

 

 

U.S. Marine Corps

August 20, 1950 it was D-minus 26 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

 

U.S. Navy

 

CINCUNC ordered capture of Inch'ŏn-Sŏul area by amphibious assault using RCT's 1 and 5, 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

USN_Units

Task Force 77 departed from Sasebo at 1742K, 15 August.

This time the route taken was for the east coast of Korea, The next two days were spent off the east coast with operations the first day south of 38*N and the second day north of the 38*N In the south,, bridges and supply dumps were hit; in the north, industrial targets, rail facilities and coastal shipping were attacked.

The ship fueled again on 18 August and took station off the west coast for operations on 19 August.

For this day's operations, the most important target was the railroad bridge at Sŏul. The bridge was knocked out but at a heavy price.

      USN_Units

CDR R. M. Vogel, Commander Air Group ELEVEN embarked on USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) was killed leading the attack.

 Again on the 20th, the scene of action moved to the north- west where rail facilities and warehouses were attacked from Sinanju to P'yŏngyang to Habsong. (See Elastic Bridge)

The third pilot of the operation, ENS C. L. Sixt, USN, was lost this day.

On the 21st, the Task Force again moored in Sasebo to replenish.

[note]

 

biography  

On the next day the force had another chance at the type of operation favored by Admirals Joy and Struble. From a launching point west of the Tŏkchŏk Islands strikes were flown against transport facilities and warehouses along the line Sinanju-P'yŏngyang-Kaesŏng in Area E.

[note]

 

      USN_Units

At 0645 on the 19th the hill was taken and the bulge secured, while west of the Naktong spreading waves of confusion, radiating outward from this setback, were expanded by attacks of strike groups from USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)  against troop concentrations and supply dumps between Hyŏpch'ŏn and the river.

 

 Its task completed, the Marine Brigade was detached on the next day, assigned to Eighth Army reserve, and moved back to the Masan area. There the infantry bivouacked in a bean patch, and undertook a training program for Korean Marines, while the artillery was sent back to work at Chindong-ni, where enemy pressure had again begun to be apparent.

In the three days fighting in the bulge the Marines had captured 22 pieces of artillery and large amounts of other materiel; estimates of enemy personnel losses varied between 2,500 and 4,500. Marine casualties, in contrast, totaled 345, of whom 66 were killed and one missing, an extraordinary disproportion which testifies to what professionalism can do, and to what command of the air can accomplish when exploited by a unitary air-ground force. For the invaders the elimination of the Naktong bulge and the destruction inflicted on the 4th Division constituted the greatest defeat thus far. For the U.N. the time gained by the action was beyond all price: ten days were to go by before the enemy succeeded in reestablishing this bridgehead across the Naktong.

While the forces of the United Nations were grappling with the crises at P'ohang and on the Naktong, the southern end of the perimeter remained quiescent. The Kosŏng spoiling attack had been a success, and the enemy was licking his wounds. But while land action had diminished, activity in coastal waters was on the rise: the increasing unpleasantness of highway travel had stimulated diligent efforts by the Communists to improve their seaborne logistics, and between 13 and 20 August the Korean Navy fought five engagements in the arc between Kunsan and the peninsula’s southwestern tip. The most considerable of these took place on the15th, a day of widespread action on western and southern coasts, when YMS 503 encountered 45 small craft in the gut between the end of the peninsula and the offshore islands, captured 30, and sank 15.

[note]

 

On the evening of the 20th the carriers turned southward and headed for Sasebo, where they arrived at 1400 on the 21st.

[note]

 

USN_Units

On the 20th, in denying an Eighth Army request for permanent assignment of one of the fast carriers to the defense of the perimeter, CincFE spelled out the intended employment of naval force. HMS Triumph (R16) and the gunnery strength of Task Group 96.5, and the escort carriers of Task Group 96.8, were at EUSAK’s disposition. But except in great emergency the large carriers were not to operate singly; future plans made necessary a replenishment period for Task Force 77; its subsequent employment would be communicated when known.

[note]

 

USN_Units

on the 20th the destroyer USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729), from the northern barrier patrol post, arrived offshore and put 102 rounds into iron works, harbor installations, railroad yards, and radio stations, starting flames that were visible for 18 miles to seaward.

[note]

 

Korean_War

But while the enemy had abandoned his endeavors to bring supplies down from the north by sea, in the south and southwest he was vigorously attempting the forward movement of materiel and troops by small boat. This effort to improve the logistics of his southern flank led to a crescendo in the inshore operations of the ROK Navy.

Off Chin-do, the island prolongation of Korea’s southwestern tip, the ROK YMS 503 found considerable activity on 20 and 21 August. Three enemy motorboats of between 30 and 100 tons were engaged, and one captured, one sunk, and the third damaged.

[note]

 

Off Chin-do, the island prolongation of Korea’s southwestern tip, the ROK YMS 503 found considerable activity on 20 and 21 August. Three enemy motorboats of between 30 and 100 tons were engaged, and one captured, one sunk, and the third damaged.

[note]

 

USN_Units

The approach to this area, therefore, had necessarily been somewhat tentative. Early strikes on North Korea had been launched from south of 37°, and operations against southern targets had been conducted from the waters west of Mokp'o. But the tendency had been northward: on 20 August aircraft had been flown off in about 37°, and now on the night of 3 September Admiral Ewen took his force into the pocket, through the narrows between the Shantung Peninsula and Korea’s western tip, to launch on the morning of the 4th from a position on the 38th parallel against targets in the P'yŏngyang-Chinnampo region.

[note]

 

Koread-War  

CincFE had published his directive for "Chromite" on the 12th, and ComNavFE’s derivative operation plan had been issued on the 20th.

[note]

 

On the 20th a landing party from HMCS Athabaskan (R79) destroyed the radio gear in the lighthouse on P'almi-do at the mouth of Inch'ŏn harbor.

[note]

 

 

 

0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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9:00 AM
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0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
10:00 AM
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0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
11:00 AM
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0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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12:00 PM
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0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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Unit Info  Unit Info

17, 18, 19, 20, 21

and an hour later enemy infantry attacked A Company, forcing two of its platoons from their positions, and overrunning a mortar position. After daylight, a counterattack by B Company regained the lost ground. This was the beginning of a 5-day battle by Colonel Teeter's 1st Battalion along the southern spurs of Sibidang, two miles west of Kŏmam-ni. The North Koreans endeavored there to turn the left flank of the 35th Infantry and split the 25th Division line.

[note]

 

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
2:00 PM
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/31/50
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0550 Sunrise

[note]

 

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
3:00 PM
07/30/50
4:00 PM
07/30/50
9:00 PM
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0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
4:00 PM
07/30/50
5:00 PM
07/30/50
10:00 PM
07/31/50
7:00 AM

0736 Korean Time

Moon Phase

19500820 0736 First Qtr

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
5:00 PM
07/30/50
6:00 PM
07/30/50
11:00 PM
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0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
6:00 PM
07/30/50
7:00 PM
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12:00 AM
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Unit Info   Unit Info     

17, 18, 19, 20, 21

After three days and nights of this battle, C Company of the 35th Infantry and A Company of the 29th Infantry 1st Battalion, 29th [20-now 3rd Battalion, 27 Infantry], moved up astride the Komam-ni road during the morning of 20 August to bolster A and B Companies on  Sibidang. While this reinforcement was in progress, Colonel Fisher from a forward observation post saw a large enemy concentration advancing to renew the attack. He directed artillery fire on this force and called in an air strike. Observers estimated that the artillery fire and the air strike killed about 350 enemy troops, half the attack group. [20-12]

[note]

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
7:00 PM
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/31/50
1:00 AM
07/31/50
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1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
8:00 PM
07/30/50
9:00 PM
07/30/50
2:00 AM
07/31/50
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1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
9:00 PM
07/30/50
10:00 PM
07/31/50
3:00 AM
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1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
10:00 PM
07/30/50
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On 20 August, the American divisions in Korea received their first augmentation recruits-the 24th and 25th Divisions, 250 each; the 2nd and 1st Cavalry Divisions, 249 each. For the next week each of the divisions received a daily average of 250 Korean recruits.

[note]

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/30/50
11:00 PM
07/31/50
12:00 AM
07/31/50
5:00 AM
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1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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12:00 AM
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   USN_Units

On 20 July the 19th Group returned to the Sŏul railway bridge, but the crews found that two spans of the weakened structure were in the water. These spans had evidently collapsed sometime during the night. The medium-bomber crews bombed the bridge as directed, and this attack chopped down a third span of the structure.#65

General MacArthur presented a trophy to both the 19th Group and to Navy Air Group 11 for their participation in the destruction of the west railway bridge at Sŏul, and General Stratemeyer provided a case of Scotch for each group.#66

[note]

 

 

 

 

 

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
1:00 AM
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1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
2:00 AM
07/31/50
3:00 AM
07/31/50
8:00 AM
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By contrast, that night was not quiet. At 1700, a barrage of enemy 120-mm. mortar shells fell in the Heavy Weapons Company area. A bright moon silhouetted enemy tanks against the dark flanking mountains as they rumbled down the narrow, green valley, leading another attack. Artillery and mortar fire fell among them and the advancing enemy infantry. Waiting Americans held their small arms and machine gun fire until the North Koreans were within 150-200 yards' range. The combined fire of all weapons repulsed this attack.

[note]

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
3:00 AM
07/31/50
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1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
4:00 AM
07/31/50
5:00 AM
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10:00 AM
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1916 Sunset

[note]


 

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
5:00 AM
07/31/50
6:00 AM
07/31/50
11:00 AM
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Twice more the enemy gun shelled Taegu, the third and last time on Sunday night, 20 August. At this time, six battalions of Korean police moved to important rail and highway tunnels within the Pusan Perimeter to reinforce their security. [19-51]

[note]

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
6:00 AM
07/31/50
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07/31/50
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2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
7:00 AM
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8:00 AM
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2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
07/31/50
8:00 AM
07/31/50
9:00 AM
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Casualties

Sunday August 20, 1950 (Day 57)

16 Casualties

1 11TH MARINE REGIMENT
5 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
2 6148TH TACTICAL CONTROL SQUADRON
1 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 VF-112 FIGHTER SQUADRON
   
   
   
   
   
16 19500820 0000 Casualties by unit

 

 

As of August 20, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 71 4201 130 12 4414
Today 2 12 1 1 16
Total 73 4213 131 13 4430

Aircraft Losses Today 001

 

Aircraft Losses Today 004

 

 

Notes for Sunday August 20, 1950 (Day 57)

 

 

 

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