Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 24 °C  75.2 °F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

18, 19, 20, 21, 22

     

August 18 to 22 - The battle of "the Bowling Alley" north of Tabu-dong. U.S. forces (23rd and 27th IR] hold back North Korean offensive.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography

U.S. intelligence sources report that Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, former commander of the 24th ID, was killed July 22 in Taejŏn fighting with a rear guard as the division withdrew. American soldiers and North Korean prisoners say that Dean was shot in the side and fell. While he was down he was stabbed to death.

-- The Senate Armed Services Committee urges Congress to enact universal military training before recessing. Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tells the committee that world events require the United States to maintain large standing military forces. The alternative is to develop a method or mobilizing trained reserve units.

-- The House votes to provide $85 or $155 allowances to enlisted soldiers' families. The exact amount has to be worked out, but a GI would contribute $40 to $85, respectively, to the allowance.

[note]

 

Aug. 18-22

U.S. warships fire on military targets between Hamhŭng and Ch'ŏngjin on North Korea's east coast. Both cities are bombed by B-29s on Aug. 19. The bombers revisit Hamhung Aug. 21 and Changjin Aug. 22.

-- On Aug. 21 the Navy says its carrier planes have destroyed 137 locomotives in North Korea since the invasion.

-- P'yŏngyang radio claims Aug. 22 that allied air raids have killed 11,582 civilians in six cities, including P'yŏngyang, from July 2-Aug. 3.

[note]

 

Aug. 22: Anti-aircraft gunners fired from across the Yalu River at RB-29s reconnoitering the border, the first hostile Chinese action against UN aircraft.

[note]

 

   USN_Units

By the 22nd, Joy had in turn prepared a directive to the Seventh Fleet, but he had to wait to issue it until he received MacArthur’s directive to him.

Struble was formally appointed the overall commander at Inch'on following the approval of the operation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 August.

[note]

 

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

 

19500822 0000 DSC MOORE

19500822 0000 DSC YOUNG

Silver Star

 

Freeman, Robert F. [Capt SS 8thFAB]

Goff, Wallace E. [1stLt SS A35thIR]

Jackson, Hobson [Cpl SS B37thFAB]

Kinney, Fay O. [1stLt SS A35thIR]

Pearson, Gerald L. [PFC SS B37thFAB]

Preston, Russell E. [PFC SS B37thFAB]

Sharra, George F. [Maj SS HqHqCo3rdBn27thIR]

 

 Integration

 

555th PIR.gif

On 22 August 1950 the 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion (All Black) was disbanded (removed from the rolls of the Army).

[note]

 

18, 19, 20, 21, 22

     

In savage fighting, ROK 3rd and 8th Divisions stopped three N.K. divisions, N.K.-8, N.K.-12 and N.K.-5. in their assault down the eastern Kyŏngju Corridor to Pusan.

[note]

 

"During the fighting at the ""Bowling Alley"" near Tabudong, North Korean Lieutenant Colonel Chong Pong Uk, commander of the artillery regiment supporting the North Korean 13th Division, surrendered to the ROK 1st Division. Chong, the highest ranking Communist prisoner to date, gave precise information on the location of his artillery. Eighth Army immediately launched air and artillery strikes on the enemy guns. Colonel Chong had defected in protest against what he felt was an unfair reprimand by the 13th Division commander."

[note]

 

South then North

 

A Battery of the 8th F/A, 25th Division, fires a 105-mm howitzer on a North Korean road block.

22 August 1950.
Throughout the 7-week battle of the Pusan Perimeter, the North Koreans attacked fiercely. Usually they would attack frontally while circling around us, block our withdrawal, then attack from all sides. However we now had developed reserves to contain these flanking attacks, and artillery to then blast apart the roadblocks

[note]

 

  Unit Info  

After three days and nights of this battle, C Company of the 35th Infantry and A Company of the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry [now 3rd Battalion, 27 Infantry], moved up astride the Komam-ni road during the morning of 20 August to bolster A and B Companies on Sibidang.

While this reinforcement was in progress, Colonel Fisher from a forward observation post saw a large enemy concentration advancing to renew the attack. He directed artillery fire on this force and called in an air strike. Observers estimated that the artillery fire and the air strike killed about 350 enemy troops, half the attack group. [12]

The North Koreans made still another try in the same place. In the pre-dawn hours of 22 August, enemy infantry started a very heavy attack against the 1st Battalion. Employing no artillery or mortar preparatory fires, the enemy force in the darkness cut the four-strand barbed wire and attacked at close quarters with small arms and grenades. This assault engaged three American companies and drove one of them [A company] from its position.

[note]

 

Def

on 22 August, The daily rail and water Red Ball Express from Yokohama to Sasebo to Pusan 574 tons; and

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

Through 22 August, Eighth Army had lost 20 medium tanks in action. [21-13]

[note]

General Smith and most of the staff officers of the 1st Marine Division arrived in Japan from the United States on 22 August.

[note]

 

The Forgotten War

 

biography   biography

Collins and Sherman arrived in Taegu on August 22 and remained overnight. In addition to long and detailed talks with Walker and his staff, Collins toured the American sector of the perimeter in a light plane, stopping at the CPs of the principal units: Hap Gay's 1st Cav Division; Dutch Keiser's 2nd; John Church's 24th; Bill Kean's 25th; and Eddie Craig's 1st Marine Brigade.

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

In the aftermath of Ridgway's earlier visit the "mediocre" Eighth Army staff had been strengthened. The chief of staff, Gene Landrum, had been replaced, although at Walker's request he remained in the headquarters.

 His replacement was Leven C. ("Lev") Allen, fifty-six (University of San Francisco, 1916), one of the smartest and most likable staff generals in the Army. After obtaining a commission in 1916, Allen had fought with Johnnie Walker in the 13th Machinegun Battalion in France, where he was wounded. Ably climbing the peacetime career ladder, Allen had attended the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College (1935). When World War II erupted he was serving in the war plans division with Walker and Gee Gerow. He had favorably impressed George Marshall and Omar Bradley. The latter chose Allen to replace him as Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1942 and in the following year to serve as his chief of staff in the vast Twelfth Army Group in the ETO. For outstanding performance in these two jobs Allen had been awarded two Distinguished Service medals and had gained an Army wide reputation for fairness and coolness under pressure.


The Eighth Army staff had been further strengthened by a new G3, replacing William Bartlett. The new man was a senior colonel, John A. Dabney (University of Kentucky, 1926), forty-six, a brainy officer whose promising career had been (like Landrum's) thwarted by an unlucky assignment in World War II. Dabney had been chief of staff to Lloyd R. Fredendall, the general in charge of American forces (II Corps) at Kasserine Pass in North Africa when they were routed in their first battle with the Germans. In the wake of this disaster Eisenhower had sacked Fredendall, and his replacements (Patton temporarily, followed by Bradley) did not want Dabney. He had returned with Fredendall to the States, where he sat out World War II as G3 of the Second (paper) Army. In the postwar years Dabney had helped establish the CIA, then transferred to Japan, first as commander of the 21st Infantry Regiment, next as a senior assistant in the G3 section of GHQ.

Dabney was introduced to Johnnie Walker's love of speed in a traumatic fashion. He remembered:

One day I accompanied General Walker in a jeep convoy to inspect ROK units on the north front. On the return trip we were going like crazy down the road, Walker's jeep leading. A ROK truck, reacting to the siren in Walker's jeep, pulled off the road to let Walker's jeep pass. But before my jeep could pass, the truck pulled onto the road again. My jeep hit it head on, going sixty miles an hour. We were all thrown out. My steel helmet probably saved my life. I woke up in a M.A.S.H. unit. The doctor wanted to send me to a hospital in Japan, but Walker sent word for him to sew me up and send me back. Forty-eight hours later, somewhat bruised and battered, I was back at my desk, doing the best I could.[8-36]

[note]

 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

It was a time of momentary triumph for Walker and Eighth Army. In the previous three weeks Eighth Army had repulsed the NKPA 6th Division attack on Masan-Pusan and fought it to a standstill; destroyed the NKPA 4th Division during its attack on the Naktong Bulge; destroyed the NKPA 3rd Division and decisively repulsed the NKPA 10th Division, in the upper Naktong River crossings; severely mauled the NKPA 1st and 13th divisions in the Bowling Alley; and, on the east coast, shattered the NKPA 12th Division and regained P'ohang. For the moment the Pusan Perimeter was stabilized, and a lull had set in. The American troops were "weary," Collins found, but still "confident of their ability to hold the perimeter.

One reason for the confidence was the impressive extent of the American buildup within the perimeter. By that time Eighth Army's infantry strength in all tactical units totaled 122,000 men, about half American, half ROKs. Both the Americans and the ROK divisions were backed up by about 24,000 "service" troops. Additional infantry units, comprising about 5,000 men, would arrive within the week: three American battalions from the States and the two British battalions from Hong Kong. The American tactical forces now included five tank battalions and some regimental tank companies (in all, about 500 tanks) and about twenty battalions of artillery (in all, about 360 howitzers). Additional equipment and supplies were now pouring into Pusan by air and ship at the rate of about 1,000 tons a day.

Another reason for the confidence was the poor generalship and declining strength and professionalism of the NKPA. The North Korean strategy of spreading its forces around the whole of the perimeter for sporadic and uncoordinated attacks, rather than massing for a concerted offensive, had cost it dearly perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 casualties in the August fighting. Intelligence sources indicated that the NKPA was running out of tanks, artillery, trucks, ammo, gasoline, and medical supplies.[8-39]

There were still, however, acute weaknesses on the American side. Although most American units had been bloodied and were steadying down and fighting with greater skill and spirit, battlefield leadership at the division, regimental, battalion and company level was still, on the whole, below standard and over-age. Notwithstanding the increased flow of individual American replacements, there was still a dire manpower shortage.  John Church's 24th Division was down to 10,000 men 40 percent under strength and so exhausted it was no longer capable of sustained combat.0]

In fact, Walker was in the process of drastically overhauling the 24thDivision. The aged and battle weary ADC, Pearson Menoher, would be replaced by a vigorous, younger general: West Pointer (1927) Garrison H. ("Gar) Davidson, forty-six, a famous football player and head football coach at West Point from 1932 to 1938 who was married to Al Gruenther's sister. An engineer, Davidson had fought under Patton in North Africa and Sicily and with Patch's Seventh Army in France. After hostilities ceased, he had presided over the first German War Crimes tribunal. He had come to Korea to prepare a defensive line (the Davidson Line) for the evacuation of Eighth Army through Pusan. Since that drastic course no longer appeared to be necessary, he was in need of a job and was deemed the ideal man to prop up the frail and sickly John Church.

[note]

 

        

Aug 22

The three shattered regiments of the 24th Division the 19th, 21st, and 34th were also undergoing assessment and overhaul. In Ned Moore's 19th Infantry both battalion commanders Robert Rhea (1/19) and Tom McGrail (2/19) were transferred out, replaced by newly arrived, combat experienced and decorated veterans: Morris J. Naudts, thirty-six, for Rhea and Oliver G. Kinney, thirty-seven, for McGrail. Both the 19th and 21st regiments received hundreds of replacements.

Ned Moore remembered that among his fillers were about 100 blacks, volunteers or draftees, from Eighth Army service units. Moore scattered the blacks among his white rifle squads, where they performed as well as and in some cases better than the whites.[8-42]

The 34th Infantry, commanded by  Charles Beauchamp, presented Walker with a difficult situation. Influenced by a stream of derogatory comments from Bill Dean, John Church, and others, Walker believed, perhaps unfairly, that the regiment lacked a will to fight and was beyond repair. (Of its 2,000 men who landed at Pusan, only 184 had survived.) In a harsh and drastic decision, with which Collins concurred, Walker decided to deactivate the regiment (and its normal artillery support, the 63rd FAB) and replace it with Johnny Throckmorton's 5th Infantry and its attached 555th FAB.*

*Officially the 5th Infantry and 555th FAB would remain designated an RCT "attached" to the 24th Division.

The deactivation of the 34th Infantry yielded two "surplus battalions in the 24th Division. Walker and Church utilized these to build the 19th and 21st Regiments to conventional three battalion units.

 Red Ayres's 1/34 went to Ned Moore's 19th Infantry to become the 3/19.

 Gines Perez's 3/34 went to Stephens's 21st Infantry to become the 2/21.

 Charles  Beauchamp returned to Japan to resume command of the 32nd Infantry in the 7th Division; the surviving 34th Infantry staffers either left Korea or went to the 19th and 21st as replacements.[8-44]

In addition, Red Growdon's newly arrived and attached 6th Tank Battalion, equipped with new Patton (M-46) heavy tanks, gave the 24th Division added-punch and confidence. West Pointer Growdon was a flamboyant, combat experienced tanker who had served in the ETO with the 9th Armored Division, which made history by capturing the Ludendorff Railway Bridge over the Rhine River. Growdon, who had won a decoration for his role in that outstanding feat, arrived in Korea eager to fight. A war correspondent in Korea wrote: Growdon is a tough, rough, hard driving tank commander of the old George Patton type. . . . [8-He] likes nothing better than smashing his way through enemy strong points with lightning speed and ear shattering fire.

On 8 August 1950, the first M46 Patton tanks, belonging to the 6th Tank Battalion, landed in South Korea.

[note]

 

         biography

This drastic overhaul greatly strengthened the 24th Division. Its regimental commanders Moore, Stephens, and Throckmorton were judged to be first-rate. All nine battalion commanders were combat experienced. As a result, the 24th Division was to become one of the most reliable outfits in Eighth Army.

* * *

Following the staff discussions and the tour of Eighth Army, Joe Collins concluded that Johnnie Walker should not be relieved of command. As a "personality" Walker was less than inspiring, and he was certainly no military genius. He had made mistakes, but he was an aggressive "fighter," and considering the slim resources at hand, he had done a commendable job. On the whole the army was improving day by day. The new chief of staff, Leven C. ("Lev") Allen, would greatly strengthen the senior staff and provide Walker urgently needed administrative backup.

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

TUESDAY

22 AUGUST

1 950

Visited Korea taking over with me General Collins, Colonel Nutter and Colonel Everest; General Edwards and General Armstrong and Colonel Brothers.[221]

We visited Taegu; attended General Walker's briefing (which was the best I've heard so far) and before the meeting broke up, asked that General Partridge give the air side. He did, and without question, the best job there for which I was very very proud. General Armstrong and Colonel Brothers pointed out to me that the Army was not using our air evacuation as it could be used. They attempted to investigate the why's, but were unable to contact the proper people. General Armstrong while here in Tokyo will look into this on a high-level with Major General Hume,[222] Far East Command Surgeon.


We landed and spent a short time at Pusan and while there General Partridge thoroughly explained our plan for the jet fields in Korea to General Edwards. We then visited Itazuke; Colonel Jack Price[223] gave a quick picture to General Edwards of his problems and while there, General Edwards and the rest of us listened to a very interesting debriefing of three (3) F-80 pilots. Theirs is a great story to be written on the air controller and the jets.


We departed Itazuke and landed Iwakuni where we were entertained by the RAAF, after which I presented the Legion of Merit to Wing Commander Louis T. Spence.[224] We dined with Colonel McWhorter,[225] wing commander of 3d Bomb Group, with 15 RAAF officers as guests.
Arrived back at Haneda about 1000 hours.

[note]

 

3rd Rescue Squadron


22 August 1950
Two SB-17s and two SA-16s were used this date for orbit missions. The SB-17s flew 11:30 and the SA-16s flew 15:30 making a total of 27:00 flown on orbit missions this date.

One SB-17 was used this date for escort of flights of F-80s from Itazuke to Okinawa. The SB-17 was airborne at 1020/K and proceeded directly to the orbit point, 28° 20' N 129° 30' E and remained there until all the F-80s had made landfall at Okinawa. Four hours and twenty minutes (4:20) flying time was logged on this mission.

One false alert logged at Flight "D" this date.

[note]

 

When FEAF requested that the 314th troop Carrier Wing provide enough experienced personnel for a provisional cargo command headquarters, USAF complied on 22 August and also made available Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner , who by coincidence was in Tokyo inspecting the Military Air transport Service (MATS) Pacific airlift. Tunner, veteran of the China-Burma "Hump" operations and the Berlin airlift , was thought by USAF to be the best possible commander.

Elements of the 314th Group began to arrive in Japan late in August, and on 22 August (effective 26 August) the Fifth Air Force organized the 1st troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional), with headquarters at Ashiya. The mission of the new command was the conduct of air crew training, planning and execution of airborne assault operations, planning and preparation for aerial resupply and air-landed resupply, air evacuation of casualties, airlift for personnel and supplies, maintenance of liaison with airborne troops, and special missions directed by FEAF.

[Even so on 25 July General MacArthur had asked for C-119 aircraft to implement the employment of one airborne RCT, and even though the USAF had made the 314th troop Carrier Group (M) available to FEAF after 15 August by 9/10 (two months later) they still didn't have the required aircraft].

[note]

 

If the Chinese Communists did intervene in Korea, General Stratemeyer knew their first move would be to employ their air forces. As Stratemeyer viewed the course of events, he saw some danger of Communist air intervention. In two separate instances, on 22 and 24 August, Chinese antiaircraft gunners fired bursts of flak across the Yalu at RB-29's reconnoitering the border.#7

[note]

 

FIFTH Air Force

Reasoning that the Korean airborne assault would be a short-time, one-shot affair, the Fifth Air Force on 22 August organized the 1st troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional), with headquarters at Ashiya.#30

This organization was to become effective on 26 August, but before this the role to be played by transport aviation took on new importance. General MacArthur, for example, warned FEAF that the forces in Korea would require 700 to 1,000 tons of airlifted cargo each day for an indefinite period of time.#31

Victory in the South 155

Cargo aircraft like the C-124 Globemaster (rear) and the C-46 Commando airlifted tons of war supplies.

Moreover, General Vandenberg cabled Stratemeyer that the air-transport effort ought to be commanded by the "best man possible." The man whom Vandenberg had in mind for the job was Major General William H. Tunner, who had commanded the India-China "Hump" operations and the Berlin airlift.#32

General Tunner, who was currently the deputy commander of the Military Air transport Service, happened to be in Tokyo inspecting that service's Pacific airlift when his services were offered to General Stratemeyer. In a conference at FEAF operations General Tunner made arrangements to receive the 314th Group. At first General Tunner said that he wanted only 64 of the Flying Boxcars, but he wanted double crews and additional maintenance men to enable each C-119 to fly 200 hours a month. This, however, was not possible, for parts and engine shortages would not permit the C-119's to achieve a utilization rate higher than 100 hours a month. General Tunner therefore requested that the first 64 C-119's arrive in Japan by 10 September and that the additional 32 C-119's would arrive as soon as they could be fitted with self-sealing fuel tanks but not later than 21 September.#33

After making these arrangements, [8/22] General Tunner returned to Washington to gather a small staff for his new headquarters.

[note]

 

biography

Late in August General Timberlake announced plans to move the Fifth Air Force's tactical groups to Korea "as soon as they can be assured they are safe there and have operating facilities ready for them. "#87

[note]

 

Def

On 22 August 64 B-29's retraced their way to Rashin, but bad weather forced the bombers to attack secondary targets at Ch'ŏngjin (Seishin). At this juncture the State Department strongly objected to the continuance of Rashin as an air target, and on 1 September the Joint Chiefs put the city off limits for air attacks.#33

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

 August 22, 1950 it was D-minus 24 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

The reason for the Marine Corps' choice of the

p042

42

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946–196 2

Sikorsky S–55 was readily apparent. Since Sikorsky had not received the contract for the Arctic rescue model, the company could commence production immediately on a first-come, first-serve basis with delivery of the first aircraft in six months.

Piasecki, on the other hand, also had the capability of building an assault version of its H–21, the PD–22C, (HRP-2) although delivery could not be made until approximately September 1951, a difference of eight months.

The PD–22C' s specification appeared somewhat similar to the HRS– 1 as the model was predicted to have the capability to carry 15 combat troops or 3,400 pounds over a short radius of 50 miles. A three-months additional wait beyond the September date would have provided Piasecki with sufficient time to construct its proposed PD–22nd; a version similar to the PD–22C except for the incorporation of a much larger engine. According to Piasecki, it would have been able to carry a load of 20 combat troops, or the equivalent weight in cargo, over an operating radius of 70 miles .[7]

[note]

 

  

The Division did not go out in convoy, but had been moving a ship or two at a time until August 8, when loading began on the fleet of nineteen vessels, which was to bear Puller’s First Regiment and others.  Loading was complete by August 22, but a blown boiler delayed them further.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 

 

biography

CNO, Adm Forrest Sherman broke his flag in USS Rochester (CA-124) at Sasebo.

[note]

 

USN_Units

For the first few days of August, while these coastal activities were in progress, the Seventh Fleet Striking Force lay at anchor in Buckner Bay.

 During this interval Admiral Struble visited Formosa, in company with General MacArthur, to perfect planning and liaison against the chance of a Communist invasion; the carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) arrived from the United States (Leaving Pearl Harbor, Philippine Sea sailed at full speed for the Western Pacific, reaching Okinawa, 4 August. Philippine Sea sailed into action off Korea as flagship of Task Force 77 on 5 August.), and Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen, Commander Carrier Division 1, flew in from Pearl and reported aboard.

From 21 to 25 August, while the perimeter continued generally quiet and the coasts busy, Task Force 77 was replenishing at Sasebo.

On the 22nd Admiral Sherman, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, arrived by air, following a brief trip to Pusan, to visit the force and to apprise Commander Seventh Fleet of his appointment to command the Inch'ŏn operation.

 On the 25th, as Admiral Struble left the fleet, command of the Fast Carrier Task Force devolved on Rear Admiral Ewen, Commander Carrier Division 1.

[note]

 

map Map 9. Support of the Perimeter, 14–24 August 1950

 

Support of the Perimeter August 14-24

[note]

 

Two

days later the destroyer USS Mansfield (DD-728) shot up Sŏngjin, just south of 41°, and in a night bombardment inflicted apparently severe damage on the docks, railroad facilities, and bridges of this mineral and lumber export center.

[note]

 

 USN_Units

Back on the line at P'ohang a period of comparative quiet was followed, on the 22nd, by increased enemy pressure. On the next day a conference with Army representatives on board Toledo led to improved procedures in air spotting.

[note]

 

In the Yellow Sea, throughout this period, Admiral Andrewes’ units continued to man the west coast barrier stations and to interdict enemy traffic around the headlands. Here the principal excitement was the appearance of two enemy aircraft, the first in more than a month, one of which surprised and damaged the British destroyer HMS Comus (R-43) on the 22nd and the other an ROK vessel the next day.

[note]

 

   Koread-War

Inevitably, this period in port involved further consideration of fast carrier employment. ComNavFE had by now switched over completely to the semi-strategic party and on the 22nd, in a dispatch to CincFE, argued that best results would come from strikes north of 38°, where many extremely lucrative and profitable targets" existed, even though the effect at the front would be felt with "some delay."

This recommendation was accepted by General MacArthur, and a new schedule was promulgated which called for a sequence similar to that of the previous sortie: two days on the east coast commencing on the 26th, a day in fuelling and in transit, and two days of attacks in the west. On each coast the effort of the first day would be divided between close support and interdiction; throughout the operation first priority in interdiction would be given to railroad and other transportation targets. This dispatch was followed by another in which CincFE, in view of current planning," expressed concern about a possible enemy air buildup, as evidenced by the attack on HMS Comus (R-43);

FEAF and Task Force 77 were adjured to emphasize interdiction of air facilities, and while avoiding damage to runways, to refuse the enemy the use of airfields south of 39°.

Finally, a request from FEAF for cooperation in the destruction of specified North Korean bridges was approved by ComNavFE, insofar as not inconsistent with previous arrangements.

[note]

 

By now some intellectual order had been made out of the Korean chaos, at least on the upper levels of command, by the imposition of a three-phase concept upon the operations in the peninsula. The first of these phases involved the halting of the North Korean advance, the second the reinforcement of U.N. forces in the perimeter to permit offensive action, the third the amphibious counterstroke. Yet these phases were not wholly separable; planning for phase three had to begin before the success of phase one was assured; the requirements of the first two phases had serious implications regarding the availability of forces for the Inch'ŏn landing.

This had been conceived of as a two-division operation, with the 1st Marine Division leading the assault. The timely presence of this unit in the Far East now seemed certain, but one of its RCTs was fully committed within the perimeter and one would not arrive in time for the initial landings. Given the continued shortage of forces in the theater, certain specific problems required solution before the planning could go forward: 1. the availability of the Marine Brigade had to be assured; 2. another division had to be found to follow the Marines across the beaches; 3. a corps headquarters was needed to supervise the post-assault conduct of the campaign.

1. As to the first requirement, release of the brigade was promised by CincFE and the bad news communicated to General Walker.

2. The follow-up assignment was given the 7th Infantry Division, Major General David G. Barr, USA, the last of the pre-war divisional units of the Far East Command, which had been first skeletonized to fill the ranks of units committed to Korea and then strengthened by the integration of some 8,600 South Korean recruits.

3. To solve the command problem it was proposed either to borrow a ready-made organization from the staff of Fleet Marine Force Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, or to create a provisional corps headquarters from personnel available in Japan. Although the Marines were eager, the decision of CincFE was that the organization of a provisional X Corps Headquarters would be accomplished locally; command of the corps would be entrusted to Major General Edward M. Almond, USA, Chief of Staff of the Far East Command.

With the landing force provided for, it remained to get it there and put it ashore. This would be the job of the naval components of Joint Task Force 7, the combined force of which X Corps formed a part, command of which was assigned to Admiral Struble. The mission of Commander JTF 7 was to land the X Corps on D-Day at H-Hour on the west coast of Korea in order to seize and secure Inch'ŏn, Kimp'o airfield, and Sŏul, and sever North Korean lines of communication. This accomplished, the harvest would follow as X Corps, in conjunction with a planned offensive by Eighth Army and with the help of theater air and naval forces, would destroy the North Korean Army south of the line Inch'ŏn-Sŏul-Ulchin.

Much of this preliminary planning was water over the dam by 22 August when the commander of the 1st Marine Division reached Tokyo.

[note]

 

biography   biography

General Smith had previously heard only rumors of his task, but now he got the word. Two hours after his arrival, following a hasty fill-in by the Navy planners in Tokyo, the Marine commander had an audience with General MacArthur at which CincFE communicated his vision of the inevitable victory.

[note]

 

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The men of F Company, 27th Infantry apparently coined the name Bowling Alley during the night battle of 21-22 August. The enemy T34 tanks fired armor-piercing shells straight up the road toward the American positions, hoping to knock out the American tanks. The balls of fire hurtling through the night and the reverberations of the gun reports appeared to the men witnessing and listening to the wild scene like bowling balls streaking down an alley toward targets at the other end. [19-70]

During the night battle, enemy forces infiltrated along the high ridge line around the east flank of the 27th Infantry and appeared the next day about noon 6 miles in the rear of that regiment and only 9 miles from Taegu.

[note]

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Unit Info  Unit Info

After three days and nights of this battle, C Company of the 35th Infantry and A Company of the 29th Infantry 1st Battalion, 29th [now 3rd Battalion, 27 Infantry], moved up astride the Komam-ni road during the morning of 20 August to bolster A and B Companies on Sibidang.

While this reinforcement was in progress, Colonel Fisher from a forward observation post saw a large enemy concentration advancing to renew the attack. He directed artillery fire on this force and called in an air strike. Observers estimated that the artillery fire and the air strike killed about 350 enemy troops, half the attack group. [12]

 

The North Koreans made still another try in the same place. In the pre-dawn hours of 22 August, enemy infantry started a very heavy attack against the 1st Battalion. Employing no artillery or mortar preparatory fires, the enemy force in the darkness cut the four-strand barbed wire and attacked at close quarters with small arms and grenades. This assault engaged three American companies and drove one of them from its position.

 

[note]

 

0552 Sunrise

[note]

 

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Shortly after dawn, 22 August, I and L Companies resumed the attack. Lt. R. P. Stevens led L Company up the mountain, with I Company supplying a base of fire. Lt. Gerald N. Alexander testified that, with no enemy fire whatever, it took him [Stevens?] an hour to get his men to move 200 yards. When they eventually reached their objective, three enemy grenades wounded six of then, and at this his group ran off the hill. Alexander stopped them 100 yards down the slope and ordered them to go back up. None would go. Finally, he and a BAR man climbed back and found no defending enemy on the crest. His men slowly rejoined him. The remainder of the company reached the objective on Battle Mountain with a total loss of 17 casualties in three hours' time. A few hours later, when a small enemy force worked around its right flank, the company withdrew back down the hill to I Company's position. [20-25]

[note]

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biography   biography

The Chief of Staff, United States Army, toured the Pusan Perimeter in late August, visiting all American divisions and conferring with the army commander. He found the morale of the troops at the front to be uniformly high and the major commanders confident and optimistic. But there had been no letup in the enemy's determined pressure. The point of greatest concern to General Walker was still the slow arrival of replacements in the combat zone.

 0700 AP

He told General Collins, on 22 August at Taegu , that the replacement flow was replacing only about 75 percent of actual Eighth Army losses and his units were fighting at less strength than that authorized them when they came to Korea. [07-64]

On the brighter side, the North Korean Army had assumed an unbalanced and vulnerable disposition. By the end of August, virtually all enemy combat troops were south of the 37th Parallel and being supported over long, exposed lines of communications. UNC air and naval units, now in complete command of the sky and sea around Korea, kept these exposed routes under constant attack so that North Korean logistical problems worsened daily.

General MacArthur, foreseeing the enemy's vulnerable disposition, had decided early in the war that the old precept, "Hit 'em where they ain't," fitted such a situation perfectly. The golden chance to strike deep behind the enemy's mass, cut his lines of supply, then smash his front-line divisions by attacking from two directions was enticing to the general who, in World War II, had proved so well the value of amphibious envelopment against the Japanese.

Of course, before such a blow could be struck, General Walker had to halt North Korean Army short of Pusan and General MacArthur had to build an amphibious force almost from the ground up. By the opening of September, both generals had progressed considerably in meeting these essentials.

[note]

 

     

American artillery and mortar fire bombarded the enemy, trying to separate the tanks from the infantry. Machine gun fire opened on the N.K. infantry only after they had entered the mine field and were at close range. The Pershing tanks in the front line held their fire until the enemy tanks came very close. One of the American tanks knocked out the lead enemy tank at a range of 125 yards. A 3.5-inch bazooka team from F Company knocked out a SP gun, the third vehicle in column. The trapped second tank was disabled by bazooka fire and abandoned by its crew.

Artillery and 90-mm. tank fire destroyed seven more enemy tanks, three more SP guns, and several trucks and personnel carriers. This night battle lasted about five hours.

The fire from both sides was intense. On the American side, a partial tabulation shows that in support of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, B Battery, 8th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers), fired 1,661 rounds, the 4.2-inch mortar platoon fired 902 rounds, the 81-mm. mortar platoon fired 1,200 rounds, and F Company itself fired 385  60-mm. mortar rounds. The enemy column was destroyed. 

Patrols after daylight counted enemy dead in front of the perimeter position, and on that basis, they estimated the North Koreans had suffered 1,300 casualties in the night battle. Eleven prisoners captured by the patrol said the action had decimated their units and that only about one-fourth of their number remained. [19-69]

[note]

 

After three hours of fighting A Company of the 29th Infantry counterattacked at 0700 and regained its lost position.

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biography   biography   biography

The Navy and Marines had objected and argued with General MacArthur's staff from time to time in general terms, but when the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, reported to Admiral Doyle, Commander, Amphibious Group One, on 22 August in Tokyo , these objections suddenly became concrete and specific. General Smith had flown to Tokyo ahead of his division to take command of the landing force under Admiral Doyle who would command the attack force. These two officers and their staffs worked very closely in arranging the details of the amphibious assault on Inch'ŏn. [08-17]

On 22 August, General Smith heard for the first time that the assault was scheduled for 15 September. He had been told before leaving the United States that the target date was 23 September. He found Admiral Doyle very, very skeptical about landing at Inch'ŏn, across mud flats, over docks and seawalls, and in the face of a city of sizable population. Doyle told Smith that he had sent his reconnaissance parties in at various sites along the Korean west coast to find a better landing site than Inch'ŏn. He had found what he regarded as a better location for an amphibious assault. This area, P'osŭng-Myŏn, was about twenty miles south of Inch'ŏn and almost due west of Osan. Navy underwater demolition teams had made several trial landings there and had found that beach conditions were much better than at Inch'ŏn and would not restrict the landing to a particular day or hour. The area was not built up and, according to Doyle, was in striking distance of the enemy's lines of communications south of Sŏul .

That evening, General Smith reported to the Dai Ichi Building for an interview with General MacArthur. He first met General Almond to whom he briefly raised his objections to Inch'ŏn, without, however, mentioning P'osŭng-Myŏn. Almond dismissed Smith's protests by telling him that the enemy had no organized forces at Inch'ŏn, that the difficulties to be met there were only mechanical, and that the date and place of the landing had already been fixed. He then ushered Smith into General MacArthur's office where the Marine general received not only a warm greeting, but assurance that the Inch'ŏn landing would be decisive and that the war could be over in one month after the assault.

General MacArthur insisted that the North Koreans had committed all of their troops against the Pusan Perimeter, and he shared Almond's view that the Marines would meet no heavy opposition at Inch'ŏn. When Smith objected that 15 September would be too early to assemble his forces, General MacArthur admitted that the landings would have to be somewhat helter-skelter. But he would not consider any date other than 15 September.

These doubts within MacArthur's own headquarters were matched at a higher level by mounting suspicions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suspicions arising from ignorance of exactly what General MacArthur was up to. Under the directives given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as through precedent in the considerable latitude granted comparable American commanders in the past, General MacArthur had authority to dispose and employ his forces as he saw fit. This authority reflected the fact that planning for major operations of the Korean War and decisions of tactical and local strategic significance originated with General MacArthur.

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff set for him broad objectives and sometimes voiced their concern over his handling of matters of political significance. They entered into the planning picture most influentially in matters involving allotment of forces and supply. But in the case of the proposed Inch'ŏn landing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew increasingly worried during August because MacArthur did not keep them informed of the development of his plans. He submitted no campaign plan to them and, aside from his requisitions for

Page 149

forces, passed along only the bare outline of his plans.

Knowing full well the weakened condition of American military resources at the time, observing the continued successes of the North Korean Army, but ignorant of the exact nature of MacArthur's preparations and plans for an amphibious counterblow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to wonder if MacArthur was not getting ready to bite off more than the United States could chew.

[note]

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Seal of the United States Marine Corps.svg   biography   biography  

While aware of the problems facing the Marine Corps in readying units for shipment, Admiral Sherman was equally aware of General MacArthur's problem. He ordered the expediting of the departure from the United States of the 7th Marines' RCT elements. Granting that a division commander could best judge his division's training requirements, Sherman nevertheless told naval officers in Washington that they must take account of the requirements of the Korean campaign and the great need for bringing the division up to strength as early as possible after the Inch'ŏn landing. "It must be assumed," Admiral Sherman radioed his staff, "that the operation will not be delayed and if two battalions are late, the division will fight without them." [09-28] But for all of Sherman's urging, the 7th Marines with accompanying troops did not embark until 3 September, and reached Korea on the 21st, too late for the landing.

     biography

A minor controversy centered around General Walker's very natural unwillingness to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The brigade had been in almost constant action since its arrival, attacking and counterattacking in the southern sector of the Pusan Perimeter, and had proved to be a mainstay of General Walker's defense.

[note]

 

   Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

The next day the Brigade commander took a helicopter to 24th Division Headquarters to confer with  General Church. There he was informed that the Marines had been detached from 24th Division operational control to Eighth Army reserve. Church complimented the Brigade warmly on its performance, and letters of commendation were later received both from him and CG EUSAK.

[note]

 

   USN_Units

The area south of Inch'ŏn had been investigated by Navy UDT and Marine amphibious scouts of the Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, who had sailed to the Far East with the Brigade. As a preliminary, this group had embarked on the USS Horace A. Bass (APD–124) and gone ashore undetected to stage several raids during the period 12–16 August on the enemy’s main line of communications along the west coast. Three tunnels and two railway bridges were destroyed without the loss of a man.[12]

Next the raiders successfully carried out a survey and reconnaissance of available landing beaches during the period 22–25 August in the P'osŭng-Myŏn area. Their findings impressed General Shepherd so much that before his departure from Tokyo he called on CinCFE to make a last plea for reconsideration of the landing area. General MacArthur, however, remained firm in his preference for Inch'ŏn.[13]

[note]

 

biography  

When General Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, reached Tokyo on 22 August, he had assumed the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would be released to him. He had already ordered liaison officers exchanged between his division headquarters and the brigade staff, and key officers of the brigade had come to Tokyo for briefing on the landing operation.

[note]

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A bit of drama of a kind unusual in the Korean War occurred north of  Tabu-dong on the 22nd. About 1000, Lt. Col. Chong Pong Uk, commanding the artillery regiment supporting the N.K. 13th Division, walked up alone to a ROK 1st Division position three miles north of Tabu-dong. In one hand he carried a white flag; over his shoulder hung a leather map case. The commanding general of the 13th Division had reprimanded him, he said, for his failure to shell Tabu-dong. Believing that terrain obstacles made it impossible for his artillery fire to reach Tabu-dong and smarting under the reprimand, Chong had deserted.

Colonel Chong, the highest ranking prisoner thus far in the war, gave precise information on the location of his artillery. According to him, there were still seven operable 122-mm. howitzers and thirteen 76-mm. guns emplaced and camouflaged in an orchard four and a half miles north of Tabu-dong, in a little valley on the north side of Yuhak-san. Upon receiving this information, Eighth Army immediately prepared to destroy the enemy weapons. Fighter-bombers attacked the orchard site with napalm, and U.S. artillery took the location under fire. [19-76]

[note]

 

 

 

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biography   biography

On 22 August, Malik warned that any continuation of the Korean War would lead inevitably to a widening of the conflict. This statement seemed to signal a turning point for Chinese propagandists who, in public journals and official statements, began to hint darkly that if necessary the Chinese people would defend North Korea against its enemies.

 

[note]

 

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The men of F Company, 27th Infantry apparently coined the name Bowling Alley during the night battle of 21-22 August. The enemy T34 tanks fired armor-piercing shells straight up the road toward the American positions, hoping to knock out the American tanks. The balls of fire hurtling through the night and the reverberations of the gun reports appeared to the men witnessing and listening to the wild scene like bowling balls streaking down an alley toward targets at the other end. [19-70]

During the night battle, enemy forces infiltrated along the high ridge line around the east flank of the 27th Infantry and appeared the next day about noon 6 miles in the rear of that regiment and only 9 miles from Taegu.

[note]

 

biography      Unit Info

At noon the next day, the 1st Battalion again attacked the heights, and five hours later B Company seized the peak.  General Kean/a> now changed the boundary line between the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 24th Infantry, giving the Sobuk-san peak to the former. During the night, the North Koreans launched counterattacks against the 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, and prevented it from consolidating its position.

[note]

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biography  

As it was, Kean had been authorized by Eighth Army to employ Brigade artillery along with his own; and 1/11 proceeded the next day to the familiar Chindong-ni area in support of 25th Division Infantry.

[note]

 

 

The afternoon of 22 August, Lt. Col. James W. Edwards' 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, guarding the support artillery behind the 27th Infantry, came under attack by the N.K. 1st Division troops that had passed around the forward positions.

[note]

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biography   biography   biography

THE SCARS OF WAR heal rapidly. From the air General Smith could see jungle covering the battlefields of Guam. Iwo Jima looked as untouched as if it had never been the scene of Marine casualties exceeding the losses of the Union army at Gettysburg. Even fire-blasted Tokyo had recovered to a surprising extent from the terrible bombings of 1945.

Now, five years later, the United States had entered upon a new military effort. As the Marine general landed at Haneda Airfield on the afternoon of 22 August 1950, he was met by Admiral Doyle and driven to the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), tied up at the dock in Tokyo harbor. And though assigned to the cabin reserved for the landing force commander, CG 1st MarDiv found it an ironical circumstance that he did not yet know the prospective D-day and H-hour of the landing.[1]

He had not long to wait for such data. The advance section of the Marine planning group being already aboard the Mount McKinley, he was quickly informed by Colonel Bowser, the G–3 of the incomplete Division staff. D-day at Inch'ŏn had been tentatively set for 15 September, and the landing must be made during the high tide of late afternoon. It meant assaulting a port of 250,000 prewar population over the mud flats and seawalls, with little opportunity to consolidate positions before nightfall. Nor would there be time for training and rehearsals, since the troops would reach Japan barely in time to unload and reload in amphibious shipping before proceeding to the objective area.

General Smith learned further that a new command structure, to be known as X Corps, was being hastily erected by FECom especially for the operation. No announcement had been made of a project still classified as Top Secret, but it was known to the planning group that General Almond would command a corps not yet activated. The 1st Marine Division would be under his control as the landing force.

Admiral Doyle, an old hand at amphibious warfare, was not happy about Inch'ŏn when he considered the naval aspects. Initiated at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in 1942, he had taken part in some rugged ship-to-shore assaults of World War II. Afterwards, as Commander of Amphibious Shipping for the Pacific Fleet, he had made a career of it. And Admiral Doyle considered Inch'ŏn a hard nut to crack. He refused to admit that any amphibious operation was impossible as long as the United States Navy remained afloat, but he did maintain that Inch'ŏn bristled with risks.

In twenty minutes that Tuesday afternoon General Smith heard enough to convince him that the forthcoming assault would take a great deal of doing.

[note]

 

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An intense barrage began falling on the headquarters area of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at 1605, and 25 minutes later two direct hits on the fire direction center utterly destroyed it, killing four officers and two noncommissioned officers.

[note]

1640 Korean Time

 

     

The afternoon of 22 August, Lt. Col. James W. Edwards' 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, guarding the support artillery behind the 27th Infantry, came under attack by the N.K. 1st Division troops that had passed around the forward positions. The regimental commander, Col. Paul L. Freeman, Jr., reported to Eighth Army at 1640 that the enemy had shelled the rear battery of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, that enemy riflemen were between the 27th and 23rd Regiments on the road, and that other enemy groups had passed around the east side of his forward battalion.

[note]

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biography   biography   biography   biography

But there was no time for discussion. For at 1730, just two hours after stepping from his plane, he had an appointment with the commander in chief.

Arriving on the minute at the Dai Ichi building, General Smith reported to FECom Headquarters. He was met by an aide, who escorted him to General Almond’s office. On the way down echoing corridors, he responded at frequent intervals to the salutes of sentries who presented arms with fixed bayonets.[2] The offices of CinCFE and his chief of staff were connected by an imposing conference room with paneled walls and pillars along one side. General Smith had an opportunity to survey his surroundings at leisure before General Almond appeared. The new X Corps commander explained that his chief had a habit of taking a long afternoon break and would arrive later.

Of medium height and stocky build, Almond gave the impression at the age of 58 of a buoyant temperament and restless energy. A native Virginian and graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he had been an ETO division commander in World War II. After joining MacArthur’s staff, he became one of the most loyal officers of a group noted for devotion to their famous chief.

Almond greeted the reserved, white-haired Marine general cordially. He launched at once into the topic of the Inch'ŏn operation, expressing the utmost confidence in the ability of the UN forces to prevail. It was the initial contact of the two men. Mutual respect was not lacking, but differences in temperament made it inevitable that these generals would not always see eye to eye. History teaches that this is by no means a deplorable situation when kept within reasonable bounds. Character can be as decisive a factor as logistics, and some of the greatest victories of the ages have been won by colleagues who did not agree at times. Friction, in fact, is more likely to sharpen than to blunt military intellects; and Smith’s precision had potentialities of being a good counterpoise for Almond’s energy.

While they were discussing the tactical problems, the commander in chief returned to his office. He summoned his chief of staff for a brief conference, then requested that Smith be presented. MacArthur shook hands warmly, grasping the Marine general’s elbow with his left hand. Without the celebrated “scrambled eggs” cap, he looked his 70 years in moments of fatigue, but the old fire and dash were not lacking. The very simplicity of his attire—shirtsleeves and open collar—made a dramatic contrast to the military pomp and ceremony surrounding him in this former Japanese commercial building, one of the few earthquakeproof and air-conditioned structures in Tokyo.

In a cigarette-smoking age, both MacArthur and Smith preferred the calm comfort of a pipe. The commander in chief lit up and puffed reflectively a moment. Then he leaned back in his chair and gave his concept of the Inch'ŏn operation. But it was more than a concept in the usual military sense; it was a vision of a victory potent enough to end the Korean conflict at a stroke. And it was more than confidence which upheld him; it was a supreme and almost mystical faith that he could not fail.

He granted, of course, that there were difficulties and risks. Evidently Almond had mentioned Smith’s reservations, for he proceeded to reassure the Marine general. His voice full of feeling, he expressed his deep conviction that the war could be won in a month at Inch'ŏn, and that the 1st Marine Division could win it. The enemy, he explained, had committed nearly all of his troops in the Pusan Perimeter. Thus the Marines would not be heavily opposed when they stormed ashore at Inch'ŏn and drove inland to cut the main NKPA line of communications at Sŏul.

The Inch'ŏn-Sŏul Operation, Ch 3, Interview with General MacArthur Page 1 of 2

MacArthur said he knew that the Marines had high standards, having commanded them in the New Britain operations of the last war. He realized that the Marines strove for perfection, and the Inch'ŏn landing was bound to be somewhat helter-skelter by the very nature of things. But there was no doubt, he affirmed, that the victory soon to be gained by the 1st Marine Division would make 15 September 1950 a glorious date in American history.

His voice was charged with fervor as it rose and fell eloquently. Once General Smith made a move as if to depart, but the commander in chief motioned him back to his chair. At last he brought the conversation to a close by standing suddenly, grasping the Marine general’s hand, and bidding him a cordial good-bye.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography

Conflict between Almond and Oliver Smith at the 1st Marine Division began almost immediately, as the usually taciturn Marine noted in his personal log on 22 August 1950:

At 1730 I reported to GHQ in the  Dai Ichi building and found only Captain Ladd, General Almond’s Aide. To get to the inner sanctum it was necessary to pass at least a dozen of the palace guards. The sentries near the office were armed with rifles at fixed bayonets and presented arms. After about an hour and a half, General Almond, GHQ Chief of Staff, arrived. He is to be the Commanding General of the new X Corps of which the First Marine Division is to be a part. The first impression of General Almond was not very favorable. He was supercilious in manner. He discussed the forthcoming operation with me. I voiced the objections noted above. With a wave of the hand he said there was no organized enemy anyway, that our difficulties were purely mechanical, and that the date was fixed. Then he questioned me as to my command experience. He insisted upon calling me “son.”

[note]

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1914 Sunset

[note]


 

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The afternoon of 22 August, Lt. Col. James W. Edwards' 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, guarding the support artillery behind the 27th Infantry, came under attack by the N.K. 1st Division troops that had passed around the forward positions. The regimental commander, Col. Paul L. Freeman, Jr., reported to Eighth Army at 1640 that the enemy had shelled the rear battery of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, that enemy riflemen were between the 27th and 23rd Regiments on the road, and that other enemy groups had passed around the east side of his forward battalion.

An intense barrage began falling on the headquarters area of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at 1605, and 25 minutes later two direct hits on the fire direction center utterly destroyed it, killing four officers and two noncommissioned officers.

The individual batteries quickly took over control of the battalion fires and continued to support the infantry, while battalion headquarters displaced under fire. [19-74]

Air Force, Navy, and Australian planes delivered strikes on the enemy-held ridge east of the road and on the valley beyond. These strikes included one by B-26's employing 44,000 pounds of bombs.

That night, (2000) General Walker released control of the 23rd Infantry, less the 1st Battalion, to the 1st Cavalry Division with orders for it to clear the enemy from the road and the commanding ground overlooking the main supply road. [19-75]

[note]

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Casualties

Tuesday August 22, 1950 (Day 59)

34 Casualties

19500822 0000 Casualties by unit

1 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 23RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
3 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
2 3RD ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 519TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
2 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
2 6147TH TACTICAL CONTROL SQUADRON
1 65TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
4 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
6 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
   
34 19500822 0000 Casualties by unit

As of August 22, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 73 4239 132 13 4457
Today 3 31     34
Total 76 4270 132 13 4491

Aircraft Losses Today 001

 

19500822 0000 loss 004

 

Notes for Tuesday August 22, 1950 (Day 59)

 

cc cc