Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 23.7°C 74.66 °F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

     

The U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division and 5th Regimental Combat Team fight off heavy North Korean attacks west of Masan.

-- The Army orders 47,000 enlisted unorganized reserve members to active duty, bringing the total of unorganized reservists recalled for the war to 109,000.

-- UN headquarters in Tokyo reports that GIs in the 1st Cavalry Division and 25th ID have praised the actions of ROK units assigned to the two U.S. outfits.

[note]

 

Citations

 

Silver Star

Valdez, Isidro S., Jr. [1stLt SS HqBtry15thFAB]

 

American Ceasar

SecNav   biography   biography

Nor was that all of it. The day before, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews had delivered a speech in Boston openly advocating a "preventive war" with Russia, and Luis Johnson had confided to reporters that he agreed. It looked as though Truman might be losing control of his administration.[56]

[note]

 

biography   biography

The next day Sherman said uneasily, "I wish I had that man's optimism." Collins wanted Kunsan kept alive as an alternative, and one general officer, believing now that he had been "mesmerized by MacArthur," gloomily called Inch'ŏn "a 5,000-to-1 shot."

[note]

 

Two SB-17s and two SA-16s were utilized this date for orbit missions. The two SB-17s flew 14:30 and the two SA-16s flew 15:20, making a total of 29:50 flown on orbit missions this date.

C-47 #9681 departed from Flight "C" with freight and passengers for [the] southern part of Japan and was weathered in at Haneda AB. Two hours, forty five minutes (2:45) was flown enroute.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography

Whatever internal conflict MacArthur may have felt over appointing Almond to command X Corps was probably erased during Shepherd’s second trip to Japan.

 On 24 August, Shepherd communicated to both Admiral Sherman in Washington and Almond his “grave concerns about the hazards and loss of life that would ensue if Inch'ŏn was found to be strongly defended at the time of landing”; he “strongly recommended” an alternate plan he had proposed for a landing farther south.

Later that day, Shepherd met with MacArthur, who turned on his famous charm and asked him to join his staff as an advisor for the operation. Shepherd wisely demurred, recognizing that such an appointment

“carried considerable responsibility, but no authority or command; that in my position as CG, FMFPAC, it would be somewhat embarrassing if my counsel was not followed as had been the case in recent discussions of the proposed landing.”

 He proceeded to reiterate his concerns about Inch'ŏn and to expound his alternate plan. After a thirty-minute disquisition on the merits of Inch'ŏn, MacArthur told Shepherd that “he wished he could give me command of the Corps, that if he had not already given it to Almond he would do so; that at a later date he would give me a comparable command.” In the event, Shepherd went to Inch'ŏn as an “observer” aboard Mount McKinley.

[note]

 

Ebb and Flow

eusa   Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

To permit Walker to concentrate on operations in Korea, MacArthur on 24 August had phased out the Eighth Army's rear headquarters and established the Japan Logistical Command, a separate command subordinate to the Far East Command with headquarters in Yokohama. Walker remained responsible for the receipt, storage, and forward movement of supplies in Korea itself, while the logistical command, under Maj. Gen. Walter L. Weible, absorbed the missions the Eighth Army had been performing in Japan.

[note]

 

August

ES93-60-1 (SC346905) An U.S. Army dump truck dumps a load of dirt on the "red ball express" road whilch runs from Taegu to Waegwan, Korea. 24 Aug 1950.

[note]

 

 

ca-75

Fires her after 8"/55 guns at targets in Korea, August 1950. Original photo is dated 23 August 1950, but this may show the bombardment of Tanch'ŏn on the 24th of that month.

USS Helena (CA-75)

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The US 2nd Infantry Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division on line along the Pusan Perimeter after weeks of continuous combat.

[note]

 

South then North

 

Book Image

Men of Battery A, 159th Field Arillery Battalion, fire a 105-mm howitzer in an indirect firing mission on the Korean battle line, near Uirson.
24 August 1950. Korea.
Signal Corps Photo #8A/fec-50-7424 (Pfc. Wayne H. Weidner)

[note]

 

  

The next day, 24 August, the 23rd Infantry continued clearing the rear areas and by night it estimated that there were not more than 200 of the enemy behind the forward positions. The Bowling Alley front was quiet on the 24th except for an unfortunate accident. An Eighth Army tank recovery team came up to retrieve a T34 tank that had stopped just in front of the forward American mine field. As the retriever began to pull the T34 forward, an American mine unseen and pushed along in some loose dirt underneath the tank, exploded, badly damaging the tank and wounding twelve men standing nearby. [19-79]

[note]

 

        

With the enemy turned back north of Taegu, General Walker on 24 August issued orders for the 27th Infantry to leave the Bowling Alley and return to the 25th Division in the Masan area. The ROK 1st Division was to assume responsibility for the Bowling Alley, but the U.S. 23rd Regiment was to remain north of Taegu in its support.

[note]

 

    

by 24 August, Fifth Air Force B-26's alone averaged thirty-five sorties nightly.

[note]

 

Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

On 24 August, General MacArthur established the Japan Logistical Command (JLC) as a major organization of the Far East Command. It relieved Eighth Army Rear of all responsibilities concerning posts, camps, and stations in Japan and assumed responsibility as well for the logistical support of all U.N. forces in Korea, except those specifically delegated to other commands.

[note]

 

On 24 August, about 300,000 refugees assembled in collecting points near Yŏngsan-ni, and Changnyong, began moving under ROK police control to areas away from the front lines. They were warned not to stray from their assigned routes of travel lest they be mistaken for guerrillas and shot.

The 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK divisions eastward had similar experiences with refugees. In all cases, the ROK police, working in collaboration with the local army commanders, screened the refugees and moved them away from the combat area as quickly as possible. [21-20]

[note]

 

        

The U.S. 7th Infantry Division in Japan was far understrength, having contributed key personnel to the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions in succession when they mounted out for Korea.

In an effort to rebuild this division, the first Korean augmentation recruits KATUSA were assigned to it rather than to the divisions in Korea. The first three platoons of 313 recruits left Pusan by ship the morning of 16 August and arrived in Japan the afternoon of the 18th. Once started, the shipments of recruits left Pusan at the rate of nearly 2,000 daily.

 

The final shipment arrived at Yokohama on the 24th

 

and debarked the next day, making a total of 8,625 Korean officers and men for the division. The South Korean Government at first obtained many of these recruits directly from the streets of Pusan and Taegu. In the contingents shipped to Japan, schoolboys still had their schoolbooks; one recruit who had left home to obtain medicine for his sick wife still had the medicine with him. [30]

[note]

 

On 24 August, Maj. Gen. Pang Ho San, commanding general of the N.K. 6th Division, much decorated for the exploits of his division thus far, issued an order calculated to improve troop morale. He said the mission of the division was

"to liberate Masan and Pusan within a few days."

He demanded stricter discipline and more perseverance than ever before, and stated that tactics must adjust to the changes

"this epoch-making conflict has introduced into the art of warfare."

 He summed up the battle lessons:

Our experience in night combat up to now shows that we can operate only four or five hours in the dark since we start night attacks between 2300 and 2400 hours, and, therefore, if the battle continues until dawn, we are likely to suffer losses. From now on, use daylight hours for full combat preparation, and commence attacks soon after sunset.

 Concentrate your battle actions mostly at night and capture enemy base positions. From midnight on, engage enemy in close combat by approaching to within 100 to 150 meters of him. Then, even with the break of dawn, the enemy planes will not be able to distinguish friend from foe, which will enable you to prevent great losses. This is the most valuable battle experience we have gained from the Chinju operation. [23-3]

[note]

 

 

The Forgotten War

 

27th British Infantry Brigade

On August 24 the British two battalion 27th Infantry Brigade in Hong Kong embarked for Korea.)

[note]

 

biography   biography      biography

On the following day, August 24, Sherman, Radford, Joy, and Doyle, with the two Marine generals Shepherd and Smith in tow, met again with MacArthur in an effort to change his mind. In reply, MacArthur delivered another long soliloquy stressing the psychological importance of liberating Sŏul and refused to consider an alternate site. As they left, Sherman said:

 "I wish I could share that man's optimism."

Collins, meanwhile, went to work on MacArthur's G3, Pinky Wright, urging a landing at Kunsan, but he, too, met a stone wall.

In all these tedious discussions the emphasis had been placed on the landing, the Eighth Army breakout, and the linkup. There was no discussion of what would happen after the capture of Sŏul. What would the next objective be? Would X Corps continue to operate more or less as an independent army, directed from Tokyo? Or would the two forces be merged? If they were merged, who would command, Walker or Almond? The failure to address these questions would come back to haunt all concerned.

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER

19th Bomb Gp, employing 3 aircraft with 8 each 1,000 lb bombs from an altitude of 16,000 to 17,400 ft struck the RR bridge west of P'yongyang.


Bombing results: one direct hit on bridge and one near miss.
One bomb hit a building near south edge of bridge causing building to explode on impact and burn viciously. Functioning of bombs: functioning of control: - due to Razon equip malfunction, control over all bombs not accomplished.[230]


Only one bomb which scored a direct hit reacted properly to control equipment. Control of other bombs ranged from fair to poor. Weather factor: Weather was clear and was not a factor in poor results. Anticipated improvement: - Next scheduled combat mission is 26 Aug. Practice mission to be flown locally on 25 Aug to air check all item of equip[ment]. Upon elimination of technical difficulties, subsequent Razon bombing should be highly successful.

Upon receiving above report, sent following Redline to Vandenberg:

"Razon bombing initiated 23 August on trial basis without previous practice or tests. Results poor due to malfunction Razon control. Combat mission 26 August after equipment checks."

Pacific Air Forces patch   biography


General Turner and Partridge in headquarters.


The United States Navy hqrs in Tokyo announced in the Nippon Times this date its participation in a campaign to destroy industrial facilities with possible links to the Russian atomic program. This article was released through International News Service.


It is my impression that this type of information was of the very highest classification; further it was announced that the Navy with destroyers had bombarded Ch'ongjin as well as the Mitsubishi Iron Works. The harbor installations and warehouses were also hit. All of these targets had been previously struck by the FEAF Bomber Command.


Here again the Navy with destroyers as they have done with carrier based aviation have hit targets that the FEAF Bomber Command have practically destroyed. Mark my words, when the history is written, the Navy will claim the destruction of targets throughout North Korea that FEAF Bomber Command had destroyed. This entry in my diary is made for the record that might be made of the history of Air Force participation in the Korean War. [and because I'm a jerk]


When I arrived at my desk found the following radio from CINCFE to FEAF
and COMNAVFE which stated:

(1) in view of current planning CINCFE is concerned with the increased evidence of a build-up in enemy air potential. Reference is made to the recent sporadic enemy air attacks, including the attack yesterday on a British destroyer off the west coast. Reference is also made to the reports of revetments being constructed on airfields at Kimp'o, Suwon and Taejon and the possibility of an air operations hqrs near Kunsan.

(2) it is desired that all FEAF and Navy air operations provide for frequent interdiction of known or suspected enemy air facilities, with particular regard to those facilities, other than the runways, at Kimp'o, Suwon and Taejon. It is considered desirable that these targets also be frequently utilized as secondary targets. The use by the enemy of these or other airfields south of 39 degrees north must be refused from this date forward.

       

Sent a buck slip to Plans thru Weyland to prepare a FEAF plan to support the contemplated amphibious landing. This is to be a plan, separate and apart from anything that is done by GHQ staff; further, the plan is to encompass the use of all FEAF combat aircraft except the minimum essential to the close support of the ground troops in Korea. Suggested they call in representatives of Fifth, FEAF BomCom, and Twentieth. I feel that it is incumbent upon me to present to CINCFE our conception of a FEAF Plan to support this operation.


The Collins-Sherman-Edwards party to take-off tonight from Haneda at
2100 hours.


Annalee and I have invited to have dinner with us tonight at Mayeda House: Colonel and Mrs. Brothers, Colonel and Mrs. Nuckols, General Edwards, General Armstrong, and General O'Donnell.


Sent a redline message to Vandenberg telling him that 441 night intruder missions have been flown between the dates of 24 July and 23 August inclusive; break-down: B-26s - 335; F-82s - 36; F-51s - 25; F-80s - 2; Marine F4Us - 43.


385 of the above flown after 4 August; highest number in one night was night of 9 - 10 August - 42 flown and since that date we have averaged about 35.


In answer to TS 3746 (re Turner's mission - scope of same etc and in which USAF voiced the subject of possible evidence of NK Air Force build-up and activities) sent the following redline to Vandenberg; courier to Partridge and O'Donnell:


...Fifth AF and 31st Strat[egic] Rcn [Reconnaissance] Sq are maintaining constant surveillance of all NK airfields. 5th AF fighter bombers have made and are continuing strikes on these airfields. All sources available are being used to determine any movements of aircraft along Manchurian border.

SOP [standing operating procedures] set up whereby strat rcn air- craft covering most of the NK daily must stay in constant radio contact with 5th AF control center near Pusan and with Bomber Command near Tokyo. They have standing instructions to report in the clear to 5th AF control center and Bomber Command any targets of opportunity or air- craft sightings.

In addition, one aircraft in each B-29 formation has now been directed to come up on this recon broadcast frequency and to augment sightings reported by strat rcn ships. I have directed 5th AF to increase daily air reconnaissance fighter sweeps in NK to assure a force on the spot and to destroy rail and road traffic now being disrupted by progress of interdiction program. The tactical rcn RF-80s have the same SOP of reporting to control any target of opportunity. All flights entering Korea area check in with 5th AF control, thus providing means of diverting effort to any target reported by recon as profitable. The system has been slow in getting into action, but we are getting some results now with continued attention from my staff.

 

Also in answer to TS 3784, sent a redline to Norstad stating that Tunner[231] will get picture while here and depart for U.S. on 26 August. Desire that he return for 60 to 90 days, departing U.S. not later than 3 Sept with small staff, also TDY. Tunner has selected those he wishes - 5 colonels, 2 lt. colonels, 3 majors and 1 captain.

[note]

 

    

Establishment of U. N. control over South Korea permitted the Fifth Air Force to move its fighters over from Japan, thus greatly increasing the amount of ordnance they could carry and enabling them to range into North Korea. Before the air units could move, however, aviation engineers had to build and rehabilitate Korean air facilities.

During late August, when all engineer activity had been withdrawn from forward airfields and it seemed that Taegu might be lost like the field at P'ohang, the Fifth Air Force had located an old Japanese airfield site nine miles east of Pusan [K-9 Pusan East] which, despite surrounding hills, held good possibilities for development into an air base. After negotiations led to the removal of an ammunition storage dump from the site, engineers sank test pits to find the old Japanese runway, reopened and repaired the clogged drainage system, and began work in earnest on a 6,000-foot pierced steel plank (PSP** runway about 24 August.

**The pierced steel plank (PSP) or Marston Mat was developed during World War II and was widely used in every theater of operations. Though rigid enough to bridge over small surface inqualities of the ground, it was used to best effect on stabilized sub-grade. This combination provided an adequate semi-permanent runway.

By 4 September the runway was in use by liaison planes, on 12 September it was fully operational for planes as heavy as a C-54, and by 1 November the field, designated K-9, [K-9 Pusan East] was nearing completion, with housing for 3,200 troops.

[note]

 

biography   biography    452  

 731st Bombardment Squadron - Emblem.png   Unit Info

Partridge therefore put most of his B-26 effort on night intrusion missions, and by 24 August he was averaging 35 sorties each night. Concurring in Stratemeyer's emphasis on night attacks, General Vandenberg proposed conversion of the entire 3rd Bombardment Group to night operations, offering the 452nd Bombardment Group (L) to make up for the lost day effort. The 731st Bombardment Squadron (L-NA) of this air reserve group had been specially trained for night operations, and General Vandenberg proposed that it be assigned to the 3rd Group as soon as the squadron could reach the theater.

With the decision to convert the 3rd Group to night flight, FEAF instituted special experiments in search of an attack technique. RAF Wing Commander Peter Wykeham-Barnes visited the 3rd Group at Iwakuni to brief them on his experiences as a night intruder pilot in Europe during World War II .

[note]

 

If the Chinese Communists did intervene in Korea, General Stratemeyer knew their first move would be to employ their air forces. As Stratemeyer viewed the course of events, he saw some danger of Communist air intervention. In two separate instances, on 22 and 24 August, Chinese antiaircraft gunners fired bursts of flak across the Yalu at RB-29's reconnoitering the border.#7

[note]

 

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

 August 24, 1950 it was D-minus 22 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force WingArmy Air Forces

In short order, the necessary unit transfers and personnel joining were made and the authorized composition and strength of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing achieved.

Units of the 1st Wing mounted out and sailed for the Far East on 17 and 24 August, and the remaining units, including an augmentation detail for MAG-33 containing 60 percent reservists, sailed on 1 September. By 17 September, all these units had arrived at their destinations.

[note]

 

  

Orders came to El Toro on 16 August for the overseas movement of the remaining elements of the 1st MAW.

MWHS-1 insignia 2010 v2.png   
 

Units affected were

Wing Headquarters Squadron 1 and MAG–12, comprising

VMF–312 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)–513 were loaded on the USS Sitkoli Bay (CVE-86) with their aircraft and sailed on 24 August.

Three days later VMF–212 and VMF(N)–542 embarked on the USS Cape Esperance (CVE-88) and the USNS General C.G. Morton (T-AP-138) weighed anchor with the remaining components on 1 September.[5] This completed the overseas movement of the 1st MAW, since General Harris and his staff had departed from El Toro by air for Japan the day before, on 31 August.

[note]

 

  

Meanwhile, the 1st Division, less the 7th Marines, sailed for the Far East. The first cargo vessels weighed anchor on 10 August, followed on 14 August by the first attack transport.

 

Loading was completed on 21 August, and the last ship sailed on the 24th; and a week later, on 1 September, the 7th Marines (Reinforced), less one infantry battalion, shipped out, close on the heels of its parent organization.

[note]

 

In short order, the necessary unit transfers and personnel joining were made and the authorized composition and strength of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing achieved.

Units of the 1st Wing mounted out and sailed for the Far East on 17 and 24 August, and the remaining units, including an augmentation detail for MAG-33 containing 60 percent reservists, sailed on 1 September. By 17 September, all these units had arrived at their destinations.

[note]

 

 

U.S. Navy

 

NOTS patch

In a test conducted at the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, Calif., a Terrier surface-to-air guided missile intercepted an F6F drone at a range of more than 11 miles from the point of launch.

[note]

 

Place_Names/Army_Map_Service/usn_navy_map09.pdf

USS Helena (CA-75)

USS Wiltsie (DD-716)

USS Horace A. Bass (APD-124)

[note]

 

biography  USN_Units   USN_Units

On the 24th Admiral Hartman, with USS Helena (CA-75) and four destroyers, arrived off Tanch'ŏn, undisturbed since the USS Toledo (CA-133) group’s bombardment of the 7th. Railroad cars and warehouses were worked over with the aid of helicopter spotting, after which the group proceeded northward to Sŏngjin, where on the next day (25th) heavy damage was inflicted on marshalling yards and railroad cars.

[note]

 

 USN_Units

Back on the line at P'ohang a period of comparative quiet was followed, on the 22nd, by increased enemy pressure. On the next day (23rd) a conference with Army representatives on board USS Toledo (CA-133) led to improved procedures in air spotting.

These [led to improved procedures] paid off on the 24th, as the cruisers’ gunners had the gratifying experience of putting an 8-inch shell in one end of a tunnel reported to contain a supply dump, and of observing smoke come out of the other.

[note]

 

eusa        Koread-War

Some consolation was provided EUSAK by the assignment of a quarter of the total effort to the support of the perimeter. But the autonomy of the carrier force was emphasized in a ComNavFE dispatch of the 24th, which reported CincFE’s decision to give freedom of action in the northern areas, both as to date of attacks and as to targets, to the task force commander.

USN_Units

Thus by the end of August the frustrations of the perimeter and the attractions of interdiction had had their combined effect. Except in situations of real emergency, close support had been abandoned by the fast carriers, and within the context of the Korean conflict Task Force 77 had become an independent striking force.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography      biography

There followed two days of conferences of an extraordinary nature. Two members of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Sherman and General Collins, had flown out from Washington; Admiral Radford and General Shepherd had flown in from Pearl; Admiral Joy and Admiral Doyle were there, along with numerous high-ranking officers from CincFE’s headquarters.

In these discussions it speedily became clear that in Tokyo the amphibious techniques which Navy and Marines had brought to high perfection, and which dominant Washington opinion considered obsolete, were held in the greatest esteem. The situation, indeed, was almost embarrassing, for without denying the strategic importance of Sŏul or the desirability of its capture, naval and Marine planners could not forget the extraordinary tides and currents of the Yellow Sea, the mud banks which restricted and the islands which pockmarked the long approach to Inch'ŏn, and the absence of suitable landing beaches at the objective.

Not since Admiral Rodgers (1871 expedition to Korea) sent them against the Han River forts had the Navy or Marines undertaken such a maneuver; Rodgers, at least, had not sent his landing force into the heart of a city; the last such effort, the British raid on Dieppe, had not proven an experience of a sort to inspire confidence in this type of assault.

Although the rule book says that what is tactically impossible can never be strategically desirable, the doubts of the experts were of no avail. The Commander in Chief was firm, both as to the amphibious assault and as to the objective, while the headquarters staff, seeing the strategic desirability clear, seemed to feel that tactical obstacles could be solved by the issuance of orders. Naval reservations were brushed aside, and increasingly the conferences took on the air of the attack on stout Horatius, when

. . . those behind cried, "Forward!"
And those before cried, "Back!"

Horatius Cocles

Navy doubts about the proposed operation had developed well before General Smith’s arrival, and had led ComNavFE’s staff to investigate some possible alternatives. In the search for a better objective the fast transport Horace A. Bass had been sent into the Yellow Sea and provided with fighter cover by Badoeng Strait; there between 20 and 25 August, and despite the presence of a full moon, her raider and UDT group had conducted night reconnaissance of possible beaches north and south of Kunsan, and of one in Asan Man, 38 miles below Inch'ŏn. But these efforts came to naught.

 Although preliminary plans had been developed for Kunsan, and although Admiral Sherman and General Collins both favored a landing in this area, the suggestion was ruled out by CincFE.

Even General Shepherd, whose early support of Inch'ŏn had helped in the materialization of the Marine Division, had by now developed second thoughts, but his plea for the Asan Man alternative suffered the same fate.

Having felt themselves somewhat in the dark, the dignitaries from Washington had come out to see what was going on. Now they knew. At the final conference the best that Admiral Doyle could say about Inch'ŏn was that it was "not impossible." There the situation rested. None would gainsay CincFE. And while formal approval of the Joint Chiefs had still to be obtained, Admiral Sherman’s agreement to support the plan and the appointment of Admiral Struble to command the operation had already shifted the emphasis from debate to action.

USN_Units

At Sasebo, having learned of his large impending responsibilities, Struble had been expanding his staff. A squadron commander was lifted from the destroyers, an air planner from Admiral Hoskins’ staff, and on the 25th, leaving his flagship to follow him, Commander Seventh Fleet flew to Tokyo.

[note]

 

       USN_Units

On 24 August a Fifth Air Force staff officer-Col. T. C. Rogers-visited the USS Philippine Sea (CV-47), where fleet air officers informed him that they felt qualified to select their own interdiction targets and preferred not to accept such targets from either FEAF or the Fifth Air Force. #57

[note]

 

 

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[note]

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   Def

Late in August, after comprehensive inspections of the 3rd Division, its ranks now swelled from a low of about 5,000 to over {11,000} General Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, reported the division to be about 40 percent combat-ready. There were no major equipment shortages, and since the division was believed to be structurally sound General Clark felt it could be brought to an excellent state of combat readiness in about two and a half months. [07-52]

[note]

 

      biography   Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

Aware that General Walker could ill afford to divide his attention between the battlefield and his responsibilities in Japan, General MacArthur on 24 August established a new and separate command relieving the Eighth Army commander of all duties not directly related to his combat mission.

 He directed the establishment of Japan Logistical Command (JLC), FEC, with headquarters located in Yokohama in the buildings vacated by Eighth Army. By this order, responsibilities and functions formerly assigned General Walker within the geographical areas of the four main islands of Japan were delegated to the commanding general of JLC, General Weible. Excluded from his jurisdiction, although within these geographical limits, were posts, camps, and stations assigned to the

[note]

 

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biography

General MacArthur's able presentation did not completely convince the naval and Marine officers. On the morning of 24 August, these officers, in a meeting which included Admiral Sherman, Admiral Joy, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd and the lesser naval and Marine commanders, assembled in a private airing of their grievances. All present felt strongly that MacArthur should give greater consideration to the P'osŭng-myŏn area. They selected General Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific who was reputed to enjoy particular influence with General MacArthur, to make a personal appeal for the P'osŭng-myŏn area. General Shepherd called upon General MacArthur and presented the Navy-Marine case but to no avail. From that hour, the naval and Marine officers abandoned P'osŭng-myŏn and concentrated on Inch'ŏn. [08-21]

Upon their return to Washington, General Collins and Admiral Sherman explained to their fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the concept and the state of preparation for the attack on Inch'ŏn. Now that the veil had been lifted, the Joint Chiefs examined the plans carefully.

[note]

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biography   biography

General Shepherd, after being informed as to the Tokyo conferences, accompanied General Smith on the morning of 24 August to a meeting with Admirals Sherman, Radford, Joy, and Doyle. It was generally agreed that not enough weight had been given to amphibious considerations in the final decision to attack at Inch'ŏn. Navy opinion held that one more attempt should be made to propose another landing point with fewer hydrographic objections. The area south of Inch'ŏn had been investigated by Navy UDT and Marine amphibious scouts of the Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, who had sailed to the Far East with the Brigade. As a preliminary, this group had embarked on the USS Horace A. Bass (APD–124) and gone ashore undetected to stage several raids during the period 12–16 August on the enemy’s main line of communications along the west coast. Three tunnels and two railway bridges were destroyed without the loss of a man.[12]

Next the raiders successfully carried out a survey and reconnaissance of available landing beaches during the period 22–25 August in the P'osŭng-myŏn area. Their findings impressed General Shepherd so much that before his departure from Tokyo he called on CinCFE to make a last plea for reconsideration of the landing area. General MacArthur, however, remained firm in his preference for Inch'ŏn.[13]

The meeting of the admirals and Marine generals on the 24th broke up with a general agreement that the decision as to Inch'ŏn on 15 September must be accepted as the basis for final planning. That same afternoon General Smith instructed his planning group to begin work on a scheme of maneuver. Modern amphibious tactics were in their infancy during World War I when an appalling object lesson seemed to have been left by the Allied disaster at Gallipoli in 1915–16. Brilliant in strategic conception, this major amphibious operation might have knocked Turkey out of the war and opened the unlocked back door of Austria and Germany. Unfortunately, the execution fell short; and the failure was too often charged to amphibious warfare itself rather than a wholesale violation of its basic principles.

Seal of the United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command.png

In 1920 the new Marine Corps Schools at Quantico became the center of Marine amphibious study and research. Marine units participated in fleet problems at Panama and Culebra during the post-war years; and in 1927 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy (fore-runner of JCS) stated in a directive that the Marine Corps had the mission of “special preparation in the conduct of landing operations.”[14]

During the early 1920s the writings of a brilliant Marine officer, Major Earl H. Ellis, had a tremendous influence on current amphibious thought.

Predicting that Japan would strike first in the Pacific and win initial successes, he drew up a strategic plan for assaults on Japanese-mandated islands which was approved by Major General John A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Later known as Operation Plan No. 712, this Top Secret document helped to shape the ORANGE plans adopted by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy for offensive operations against Japan if it came to war.

After making good progress in the early 1920s, with landing exercises being held annually, the Marine amphibious program bogged down from 1927 to 1932 because of the necessity of sending expeditionary forces to China and Nicaragua. The turning point came in 1933, a memorable date in the evolution of modern amphibious warfare. It was then that Major General John H. Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, urged that a staff be set up at Quantico to plan for the organization of a mobile Marine striking force. This force, under the Commandant, and fully prepared for service with the fleet, was to be in readiness for tactical employment subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy. General Russell further proposed that the old name “Expeditionary Force” be discontinued and “Fleet Marine Force” adopted as a name better expressing this mission.[15]

The Inch'ŏn-Sŏul Operation, Ch 3, The Marine Amphibious Mission Page 1 of 2

After the acceptance of these recommendations, the Commandant ordered classes discontinued at the Marine Corps Schools and a concerted effort applied to the preparation of a new amphibious manual. Both the Army and Navy had treated some of the procedures in existing manuals, but it remained for the Marine Corps in 1934 to put out the first complete work of the sort. Known as the Tentative Manual on Landing Operations, it became either directly or indirectly the guide for exercises and maneuvers of the Navy and Marine Corps down to World War II.

Most of its suggested procedures were endorsed with revisions in the Navy’s Fleet training Publication 167, published in 1938. This work in its turn became the model three years later for the Army’s first basic field manual for landing operations.[16]

'Fleet Landing Exercises' (FLEX)

training exercises were held every year, usually at Culebra or Vieques in the Caribbean and San Clemente Island off San Diego. At the suggestion of the Fleet Marine Force, the Navy purchased Bloodsworth Island in Chesapeake Bay as the first amphibious gunfire range used for that purpose alone. Schools were set up to train Army and Navy as well as Marine officers as specialists in fire control parties. Air support was closely integrated with naval gunfire, shore artillery, and troop movements.

 Technology came to the aid of tactics when the Fleet Marine Force encouraged and supervised the designing of strange new amphibious craft and vehicles. Concepts were actually based in several instances on landing craft not yet developed and the confidence of the Marine Corps in American inventiveness proved to be justified. Thus the Nation entered World War II with a system of offensive tactics which opened Europe, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific to American invasion without incurring a single major defeat. Not only was the United States ahead of the enemy in the development of amphibious operations but the Axis Powers never found the key to an adequate defense. In an often quoted summary, the British military critic and historian, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, has asserted that these techniques were “in all probability . . . the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war.”[17]

During the next few years the Marine Corps was twice officially given the major responsibility for American amphibious tactics. The National Security Act of 1947 made it the function of the Corps “to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”[18]

At the so-called Key West Conference the following spring (March 11–14, 1948), the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff restated the Marine Corps’ mission to include that of developing “in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those landing force tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.”[19]

During these post-war years, the Marine Corps was grappling with the new amphibious problems posed by atomic weapons. It was fitting, therefore, that the three men who formed the Special Board for this research— Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith—should have been at the forefront in 1950 when the Marine Corps faced its next amphibious test.

As veterans of World War II operations, they could recall the scramble for the beaches of Bougainville, the fight for Bloody Nose on Peleliu, the off-the-cuff landing on Oroku Peninsula in Okinawa. There had been some tense moments in those battles, but never had Marine generals contemplated an objective which held more potentialities for trouble than the harbor area at Inch'ŏn.

[note]

 

 

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The 2nd Division completed relief of the 24th Division in its Naktong River positions on 24 August and Keiser, 2nd Division commander, assumed responsibility for the sector at 1800 that date.

[note]


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Casualties

Thursday August 24, 1950 (Day - 61)

Korean_War 12 Casualties
19500824 0000 Casualties by unit


6 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMEN
1 40TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON
2 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
12 19500824 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 78 4322 133 13 4546
Today 2 10     12
Total 80 4332 133 13 4558

Aircraft Losses Today 002

 

Thursday August 24, 1950 (Day - 61)

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