Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 23.7 °C   74.66 °F at Taegu   

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

The Army reveals for the first time that the 2nd Infantry Division is fighting in Korea. Lead elements of the division arrived in South Korea Aug. 1. Its soldiers have been repelling daily attacks by North Koreans trying to establish a crossing over the Naktong River southwest of Taegu. The 2nd ID is said to be the heaviest armed of all American units and a fourth of its soldiers are WWII veterans.

[note]

 

The UN command in Tokyo says that at least a dozen political commissars attached to North Korean units have surrendered after becoming disillusioned with the reds' chances of winning the war.

-- The U.S. Army says that two Chinese armies have gathered at the border of North Korea and Manchuria. The statement also says that 120 new Russian heavy tanks have been delivered to North Korea via Manchuria.

-- Two railroad workers unions agree to arbitration after Truman orders the Army to seize and operate the nation's railroads if the unions struck on their Aug. 26 deadline.

[note]

 

Citations

Medals    Medals    Medals

Medal of Honor

HANDRICH, MELVIN O. [MSgt C5thRCT]

 

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500825 0000 DSC BUTLER

19500825 0000 DSC CORCORAN

19500825 0000 DSC HARDY

19500825 0000 DSC SMITH

 

Silver Star

Yoshihara, Elmer J. [PFC SS HqHqCo27thIR]

 

 

American Caesar

 

biography   Veterans Of Foreign Wars Logo.jpg

It was an excellent opportunity to remain silent. U.S. policy in his theater was changing so swiftly that even those close to the oval office had trouble keeping up with it, and a General halfway around the globe, anxious to see in it what he wanted to see, had no business interpreting it for veterans or anybody else. But MacArthur plunged ahead.

He wrote Lewis that

"in view of misconceptions being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific," he deemed it wise to set forth his own opinions on it. "Nothing," he said, "could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument" that "if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia." Those who spoke thus "do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership--to turn quickly from a leadership characterized by, timidity or vacillation and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position." Chief among these was Formosa, which he described as an "unsinkable carrier-tender."

He said:

"The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center"

 of America's strategic dispositions in the Pacific, and he noted that

 "historically, Formosa has been a springboard"

for aggressive powers,

"the most recent example" of this being "the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II," when, at the outbreak of hostilities, "it played an important part as the staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys." It was essential, he continued, to counter "the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery as against liberty, for atheism against God."

He concluded that the President's decision to stand fast against North Korean aggression had

 "lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly towards extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one stroke all the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene." [54]

According to Whitney-and no one ever contradicted him-a duplicate of his remarkable epistle was sent to the Department of the Army on August 18, ten days before it was to be read to the VFW delegates. There it languished, filed or unread, until advance copies were distributed, as a routine courtesy, to correspondents covering SCAP. The first high official in Washington to learn of it was the man who, in the opinion of the GOP, was the government's chief hypocrite and sophist. An Associated Press man called Dean Acheson on the evening of Friday, August 25, and read it to him over the telephone.

The secretary consulted his colleagues, all of whom, he writes,

"were outraged at the effrontery and damaging effect at home and abroad of MacArthur's message" and "agreed that this insubordination could not be tolerated."

By then the White House press room had brought a copy of the statement to the oval office. Truman interpreted it as a call

"for a military policy of aggression,. based on Formosa's position. The whole tenor of the message was critical of. the very policy which he had so recently told Harriman he would support. There was no doubt in my mind that the world would read it that way and that it must have been intended that way." [55]

 The veterans' convention was still three days away, but it was too late to suppress the General's message. Life, which was running it as its editorial that week, was already on the presses; U.S. News and World Report, carrying the full text, was in the mails. In England, the Observer, the Manchester Guardian, and The Times of London were preparing to condemn it. As Wayne Morse later pointed out, its impact could not have been greater had it already been delivered in person. And the timing, from the President's point of view, could hardly have been worse. He had just proposed that the UN investigate the Formosa situation in the hope of reducing the areas of conflict in the Far East. He felt that

"General MacArthur's message--which the world might mistake as an expression of American, policy-contradicted this."

Nor was that all of it. The day before, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews had delivered a speech in Boston openly advocating a "preventive war" with Russia, and Luis Johnson had confided to reporters that he agreed. It looked as though Truman might be losing control of his administration.[56]

[note]

 

Two SB-17s and two SA-16s were used this date for orbit missions. The SB-17s flew 14:25 and the SA-16s flew 15:50, making a total of 30:15 on orbit missions this date.

map

34° 40' N - 125° 05' E

At 0910/K Flight "D" received a call from ADCC requesting an aircraft be dispatched to 34° 40' N - 125° 05' E to pick up two seriously ill patients who were on board a Navy assault transport. These patients needed the facilities of a hospital as their condition necessitated immediate surgery.

 At 1020/K, on SA-16 was airborne from Ashiya AB for the position of the ship. At 1320/K the SA-16 landed in the open sea at 34° 40' N 125° 05' E.

 The SA-16 had been circling the navy vessel for approximately one hour, waiting for a doctor from a nearby aircraft carrier to make a diagnosis of the patients. The patients were placed on board a power launch and approached the aircraft waiting approximately one hundred yards from the navy ship. Two ship type rubber rafts were used to transfer the patients from the launch to the aircraft. There was approximately a three and a half to four foot sea running at the time. The SA-16 proceeded to Itazuke AB where it landed at 1615/K. The patients were transferred to an ambulance from the 118th Station hospital and the SA-16 returned to Ashiya AB landing at 1730/K. Mission completed.

[note]

 

Koread-War  

Aug. 25: FEAF directed 5th Air Force to maintain constant armed surveillance of enemy airfields to prevent enemy buildup of air strength before the Inch'ŏn invasion.

[note]

 

CIA

North Korea's Dependence upon outside supplies are detailed in three CIA documents:

19500825 0000 ciadocs IM 311 upd

 

biography   biography  

Struble was advised informally by Joy on 25 August that he would command the naval forces at Inch'ŏn.

[note]

 

Forgotten Regiments

 

     

When it was relieved by the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division on August 25, the 24th Division numbered 10,600 men--8,000 short of full strength. Only 184 of the original regimental strength of 1,898 men remained in the 34th Infantry.

[note]

 

 

 

kp0

Korean civilians fleeing from the North Korean forces, killed when caught in the line of fire during night attack by guerrilla forces near Yŏngsan-ni,. 08/25/1950 Photographer, Ingram. Corporal, War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography

"Major General William F. Dean, 24th Infantry Division commander, was taken prisoner by the North Koreans after evading capture for forty-six days after the fall of Taejŏn."

[note]

 

"Master Sergeant Melvin O. Handrich of C Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, became the Army’s fourth Korean War Medal of Honor recipient. When a group of one hundred enemy attempted to infiltrate his company’s perimeter during a midnight attack, he voluntarily moved to a forward position where he could direct fire upon the attackers.

 He remained at this post for eight hours directing fire against enemy who often approached to within fifty feet. During an attack the following morning, he continued to direct effective fire, then move through heavy fire to reorganize the defenders to keep up the fight.

A later enemy attack overran Sergeant Handrich’s position and he was mortally wounded. When the position was retaken, over seventy enemy dead were counted in the area he had defended."

[note]

 

Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

"The Army organized the Japan Logistical Command to provide the supplies and equipment needed to support the Korean War, relieving Eighth Army of theater logistical support missions."

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography


"General William F. Dean was reported missing in action as his 24th Infantry Division fought its way out of Taejŏn. During that action, he set the example by single-handedly attacking a T34 tank with a grenade and directing the fire of others from an exposed position. As his division withdrew, he remained with the rearguard, rounding up stragglers and aiding the wounded.

It was learned later that he had been captured about 35 miles south of Taejŏn on 25 August. Since the Communists kept his capture a secret, he was presumed dead.

In early 1951, President Truman presented the Medal of Honor to his wife in a White House ceremony. He was the only general officer and, at fifty-one, the oldest man to receive the Medal of Honor during the Korean War.

[note]

 

NoGun

   

The 24th Reconnaissance Company War Diary, July 23 - August 25, 1950 -- "At one point where a platoon of this company was forced to withdraw due to enemy envelopment, small arms fire was received from the rear from Koreans dressed in civilian clothing."

[note]

 

    

The G-1 summary of the 24th Infantry Division War Diary, July 23 -August 25, 1950 -- "One of the greatest problems encountered was control of refugees. ...Several armed guerillas were detected, apprehended, and forwarded to EUSAK with incriminating evidence. The extent of this problem is difficult to describe; often a refugee concentration would contain 30-40,000 people plus cattle, horses, cars, etc."

[note]

 

South then North

SC346626 - KOREAN CONFLICT


Major General Hobart R. Gay, CG, 1st Cavalry Division, congratulates 2nd Lieutenant Raymond A. Whelan of Mossap, Conn., after awarding him the Silver Star for meritorious services.


25 August 1950. Korea.
Signal Corps Photo #8A/fec-50-6908 (Cpl. Hutchinson)

 

 

 

[note]

 

 

    eusa    Division Sholder Patch    Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

On 1 July the Far East Command directed Eighth Army to assume responsibility for all logistical support of the United States and Allied forces in Korea. [09-13] This included the ROK Army. When Eighth Army became operational in Korea, this logistical function was assumed by Eighth Army Rear which remained behind in Yokohama. This dual function of Eighth Army-that of combat in Korea and of logistical support for all troops fighting in Korea-led to the designation of that part of the army in Korea
as Eighth United States Army in Korea.  This situation existed until 25 August. On that date the Far East Command activated the Japan Logistical Command with Maj. Gen. Walter L. Weible in command. It assumed the logistical duties previously held by Eighth Army Rear.

The support of American troops in Korea, and indeed of the ROK Army as well, would have to come from the United States or Japan. Whatever could be obtained from stocks in Japan or procured from Japanese manufacturers was so obtained.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography

It was some years before the mystery of what had happened to Dean that night after Taejŏn was finally cleared up. In going after water for the wounded men, General Dean fell down a steep slope and was knocked unconscious. When he regained consciousness he found he had a gashed head, a broken shoulder, and many bruises. For thirty-six days General Dean wandered in the mountains trying to reach safety, but this was the period when the North Koreans were advancing southward as rapidly as he was.

On 25 August, two South Koreans who pretended to be guiding him toward safety led him into a prearranged ambush of North Korean soldiers, and they captured the emaciated, nearly starved, and injured general, who now weighed only 130 pounds instead of his normal 190. His capture took place near Chinan, thirty-five miles due south of Taejŏn and sixty-five air miles west of Taegu. Then began his more than three years of life as a prisoner of the North Koreans that finally ended on 4 September 1953 when he was repatriated to American officials at P'anmunjom. [11-75] General Dean's heroic and fascinating chronicle as told in his book, General Dean's Story, is one of the great documents to come out of the Korean War. That war was destined to add many illustrious names to the roll of honor in United States military annals. But posterity probably will accord to none as high a place as to General Dean in the example he set as a soldier and leader in great adversity and as an unbreakable American in Communist captivity.

[note]

The confirmed enemy loss from 18 to 25 August included 13 T34 tanks, 5 self-propelled guns, and 23 vehicles. [19-80]

[note]

 

Def

on 25 August, The daily rail and water Red Ball Express from Yokohama to Sasebo to Pusan 949 tons.

[note]

 

27th British Infantry Brigade

The British troops sailed from Hong Kong for Pusan, 1,300 miles to the north, on 25 August with bagpipes playing "Auld Lang Syne" and "The Campbells Are Coming."

[note]

 

      11thFAB  

    

The strength of the 24th Division on 25 August was approximately 10,600 men. It needed about 8,000 replacements as well as quantities of arms, equipment, and vehicles to bring it up to war strength. The 19th Infantry and the 11th Field Artillery Battalion were attached to the 2nd Division as a reserve force; the 21st Infantry became Eighth Army reserve; the rest of the division assembled in the vicinity of Yŏngsan-ni,, twelve miles southeast of Taegu. [21-36]

[note]

 

Other than the 17th Armored Brigade, the II Corps had no new units along the northern and eastern front for the September offensive.

In the I Corps sector were two new and previously uncommitted infantry formations to strengthen the assault forces there. The 9th Infantry Division, [????? no 9th ID????] formed around the old 3rd Border Constabulary, arrived in the Hyŏpch'ŏn area from Sŏul (less its 3rd Regiment which remained at Inch'ŏn) on or about 25 August. The 7th Infantry Division, in the Chinju-Masan area, had not been committed except for two battalions that fought briefly against ROK marines at T'ongyŏng-si. [21-51]

[note]

 

Task Force Manchu Misfires

  

Five miles north of Agok and A Company's position, B Company, 9th Infantry, held a similar position on Hill 209 overlooking the Paekchin ferry crossing of the river. This ferry was located at the middle of the Naktong Bulge where the Yŏngsan-ni, road came down to the Naktong and crossed it. The U.S. 2nd Division, as it chanced, had planned an important reconnaissance action to start from there the night of 31 August, the very night that the N.K. I Corps offensive rolled across the river.

Near the end of the month two reconnaissance patrols from the 9th Infantry had crossed to the west side of the Naktong and from a hill position watched enemy tank and troop activity at a place approximately two miles west of the river, which they suspected was a division command post. Information obtained later indicated it was in fact the command post of the N.K. 9th Division [???? no such division ????  Fehrenbach, T.R. (2001), This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History – Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, Potomac Books Inc., ISBN 978-1-57488-334-3] .

On 25 August, Col. John G. Hill outlined projected "Operation Manchu," which was to be a company-sized combat patrol to cross the river, advance to the suspected enemy command post and communications center, destroy it, capture prisoners, and gain information of enemy plans. [23-21]

The 9th Infantry Regiment had planned Task Force Manchu on orders from the 2nd Division, which in turn had received instructions from Eighth Army for aggressive patrolling. Colonel Hill selected three possible crossing sites for the operation. General Keiser decided on the one at the Paekchin ferry. The 9th Infantry reserve, E Company, reinforced with one section of light machine guns from H Company, was to be the attack force. The 1st Platoon, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, was to transport it across the river in assault boats the night of 31 August. Two heavy weapons companies, D and H, were each to furnish one section of heavy machine guns, one section of 81-mm. mortars, and one section of 75-mm. recoilless rifles for supporting fires. A platoon of 4.2-inch mortars was also to give support. [23-22]

[note]

 

Naval Plans

   biography

In making ready its part of the Inch'on operation, the Commander, NAVFE outlined the tasks the Navy would have to perform. These included the following:

Joint Task Force Seven was formed to accomplish these objectives with Admiral Struble, Commander, Seventh Fleet, as the task force commander. On 25 August, Admiral Struble left his flagship, USS Rochester (CA-124), at Sasebo and proceeded by air to Tokyo to direct final planning. [25-25]

[note]

 

         15thIR

During November the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division joined the X Corps in Korea. One of its regiments, the 65th, had been in South Korea for more than two months. It had embarked on two transports in Puerto Rico on 25 August, passed through the Panama Canal, and sailed directly for Korea. It arrived at Pusan on 22 September and disembarked the next day (9/23). The other two regiments, the 7th and 15th, and the division headquarters sailed from San Francisco between 30 August and 2 September. The last ship of the division transports arrived at its destination, Moji, Japan, on 16 September.

[note]

 

The Forgotten War

 

biography   biography   biography   biography


Bill Dean wandered the hills and back roads of South Korea, assisted occasionally by friendly Koreans, for a total of thirty-six days, trying to get to friendly lines. Emaciated and barely able to stand, he was captured in a village thirty-five miles south of Taejŏn by a "gang" of civilians and turned over to the police on August 25 - a week or so after his son, William, Jr., entered West Point as a plebe. He was the NKPA's highest-ranking POW, but for reasons still not clear, the NKPA kept his capture a secret until December 18, 1951. Some American POWs were brainwashed and became propaganda tools for the Communists, but Bill Dean remained adamantly "unbreakable" throughout his nearly three years of incarceration. He was repatriated on September 3, 1953.[5-68]

[note]

 

Veterans Of Foreign Wars Logo.jpg   biography

On August 25, while Collins and Sherman, still torn by doubt over Inch'ŏn, were flying back to Washington, MacArthur's "message" on Formosa to the VFW leaked. The conservative newsmagazine U.S. News & World Report and the Associated Press had obtained advance copies. US. News went to press with the full text; the AP distributed lengthy excerpts for publication on August 27.

Learning of this and the thrust of the message Truman and Acheson were monumentally outraged.

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

Sent following redline to Vandenberg:

A/C from 31st Strat Recon Sq while engaged in recon mission on 24 August reports receiving 40 bursts of flak near Manchurian border at approximately 40°04' N - 124° 20'E.

map

This a/c had reconnoitered rail line leading NE from Sinanju (K-29) to Yalu River and then proceeded SW on Korean side of Yalu River to vicinity of Sinuiju (K-30). Crew estimates 6 of these bursts came from across Yalu River in Antung area. Estimate caliber 88 or 90 mm. All bursts missed a/c but firing was definitely more accurate than most flak encountered to date.

 Comment: Firing encountered from characteristics described indicates predicted concentrations. This is first indication of this type of fire in Korean conflict. This is also second report within three-day period of flak suspected as originating from Manchurian territory. Due to difficulty of aircrew accurately pin-pointing flak positions, this report should not be considered as completely reliable.


At 1100 hours a Mr. Maxwell Kleiman who was preceded by a letter of introduction from Cy Marriner dropped by the office.[232] Mr. Kleiman's forte "matters which will assist to restore some degree of Japanese industrial economy and assist U.S. industrialists in re-establishing their interests in Japan."


Sent Courtney Hodges[233] a letter assuring him the C-47 assigned to him was undergoing check at Clark and for him to let me know when he receives it, and if received in satisfactory condition. Also told him to call on me any time with reference to airplane for assistance.

Redline message sent to Vandenberg as follows:

Study of strike photos taken during mission on Kōnan yesterday reveals that the one building thorium plant indicated to us by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as critical target has been 35 percent destroyed and has suffered an estimated additional 40 percent heavy damage. Plant area immediately adjacent to this building is heavily and accurately hit. Post strike photos still not available because weather forced reconnaissance aircraft to land at Misawa. It is thought that buildings in this area were used to process monazite which is a primary source of thorium and other elements in the atomic energy program. Mission conducted by 92nd Group. Final evaluation from post-strike photos will be forthcoming soonest.

 

135

PART ONE: THE BITTER DAYS

Following "cipher message" from Australian Military Forces received 31 July (Col. Marson from Charlesworth)[234] and for my information:

Australia agrees that the procedure for accounting for transfers of sup- plies and equipment between FEAF and BCOF in Japan and Korea is the recording of all such transfers the reconciliation to be effected later on an inter-governmental level. Major aircraft maintenance is to be done at Iwakuni and replacement aircraft and spares are to be from Australian sources where readily available supplies such as rations, fuel, bombs, etc. to from American sources.

British furnished me a copy of their message to Air Ministry re my request to them for a night-intruder specialist, dated 10 August:

Foreign Office please pass to Air Ministry for Pearson from Barclay. The Commanding General of the United States Far East Air Forces has an immediate requirement for an RAF officer experienced in latest night bombing and light bomber night intruder techniques to advise the United States Fifth Air Force in planning a night tactical bombing plan employing B-26 aircraft. Paragraph two. This officer would be required for 14 days upwards. I suggest that in the RAF and Allied interests an officer should be supplied as requested and that as soon as possible he should proceed to Tokyo by air. I suggest that the most suitable ranking would be wing commander. Gascoigne.

Ltr rcvd today, dtd 24 August from General Cushman in reply to my letter of 16 August which refers to the Miller story of 14 August. Cushman reports:

(1) It is most unfortunate and regrettable that such a press release had been published when all services are doing their utmost to bring the present conflict to a speedy and successful conclusion.

(2) The subject correspondent originated the article while visiting a carrier at Sasebo on which one of our squadrons was based. He is not accredited to this headquarters and the views expressed are entirely his own. The basis of this article is unknown to this office.

(3) The portion of paragraph three of the subject release, Enclosure 1 to reference a, which has been underlined, "first constant air coverage," is obviously incorrect.

(4) In regard to statements attributed to certain individuals, measures have been taken from the Chief of Naval Operations on down to prevent statements of a controversial nature on the part of naval and marine personnel.

(5) The cooperation and assistance rendered this command by both the U.S. Air Force and Army in becoming established in Japan has been splendid. Without this whole-hearted support, our units could not have been deployed into action as rapidly as they were.

(6) I have the highest regard and admiration for the work the U. S. Air Force and Army are doing and have done in the past. To insure speedy and suc- cessful termination of hostilities it is mandatory that the armed services con- tinue to maintain close and harmonious relations.

s/ T. J. Cushman.

136

THE THREE WARS OF LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER : HIS KOREAN WAR DIARY

I turned the entire Marine-Army-Air Force controversy file over to Colonel Tidwell,[235] FEAF JA [Judge Advocate], to prepare a letter for my signature to General Norstad reference the reply to the Cushman letter which came in today and the reply to the Walker letter which has been on hand for some time.


Group Captain Barclay came to see me this morning and stated that he was on the spot with the British Foreign Office because he had used their "emergency immediate" communications set up in order to get word to the Air Ministry and wondered if I would give him some support in his reply. I told him he could use my name and very firmly state that it was an emergency and that I had urged the quickest action possible to get an RAF night-intruder specialist out here to the Far East to assist the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, in his night-intruder work. Group Captain Barclay was very grateful and said he would use my name.

[note]

 

Def

Back in Washington during July the Joint Chiefs of Staff became increasingly impatient with the delayed strategic bombing attack. So long as the North Koreans drew support from virtually bomb-free industries in North Korea, United Nations forces would find it difficult to defeat them on the battlefields of South Korea. More mature study, moreover, demonstrated that North Korean industry was contributing significant strength to Russia in the cold war.

At some plant in the chemical complex at Hungnam the North Koreans were reportedly processing monazite, a primary source of thorium and other radioactive elements used by Soviet Russia's atomic-energy program. In view of the geopolitical importance of the Hungnam chemical combine, General MacArthur authorized "special missions" against it, but he cautioned General Stratemeyer not to lessen the support which the Superfortresses were giving to the ground troops in South Korea.#8

[note]

 

      363rd RTS

Conveyed by air and water from the United States, the 162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Night Photography) and the 363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron reached Itazuke late in August 1950.

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 August 25, 1950 it was D-minus 21 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

Def

All the top commanders were concentrated in Tokyo with the arrival of Admiral Struble on 25 August. This facilitated the planning and allowed important decisions to be worked out in conferences between the principal commanders.[8]

Planning was based mainly on studies made by ComPhibGru One as prospective Attack Force Commander. It was conducted entirely on a concurrent basis by the Attack Force and Landing Force groups aboard the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7). No step was taken by either without the full knowledge and consent of the other.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

CVG-2 (24 Aug 1950-11 Nov 1950)

CV-21 USS Boxer
24 August 1950 - 11 November 1950
West Pacific (Korea)
Squadron Aircraft Tail Code
VF-23 F4U-4 M 100
VF-63 F4U-4 M 200
VF-64 F4U-4 M 300
VA-24 F4U-4 M 400
VA-65 AD-4 M 500
VC-3 Det. A F4U-5N NP 00
VC-11 Det. A AD-3W ND 00
VC-33 Det. A AD-4N SS 00
VC-61 Det. A F4U-4P PP 00
HU-1 Det. 1 HO3S-1 UP 00

[note]

 

USN_Units

and Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen, Commander Carrier Division 1, flew in from Pearl and reported aboard.

On the 25th, as Admiral Struble left the fleet, command of the Fast Carrier Task Force devolved on Rear Admiral Ewen, Commander Carrier Division 1.

[note]

 

    biography    biography  

On the 24th Admiral Hartman, with USS Helena (CA-75) and four destroyers, arrived off Tanch'ŏn, undisturbed since the USS Toledo (CA-133) group’s bombardment of the 7th. Railroad cars and warehouses were worked over with the aid of helicopter spotting, after which the group proceeded northward to Sŏngjin, where on the next day heavy damage was inflicted on marshalling yards and railroad cars.

[note]

 

ROKN

Back on the line at P'ohang a period of comparative quiet was followed, on the 22nd, by increased enemy pressure. On the next day (23rd) a conference with Army representatives on board USS Toledo (CA-133) led to improved procedures in air spotting. These paid off on the 24th, as the cruisers’ gunners had the gratifying experience of putting an 8-inch shell in one end of a tunnel reported to contain a supply dump, and of observing smoke come out of the other.

The 25th was a day of variety as enemy tanks and guns were taken under fire, and as the North Koreans in their turn attempted an amphibious movement against the town by the use of motorboats and sailboats. But this effort was beaten off by small units of the ROKN,

[note]

 

For a few days there were only minor contacts, but the 25th brought seven engagements with enemy coastal shipping. At P'ohang the North Korean attempt at a landing was repelled. Twenty miles off Inch'ŏn PC 701 sank a large sailboat. In a small estauary east of Chin-do YMS 512 sank one 100-ton motorboat and another of 70 tons, and drowned full loads of enemy troops on both. Off Namhae Island on the south coast YMS 504 damaged 14 of 15 small sailboats encountered. But the big work of the day was done by YMS 514, which in three separate engagements in less than three hours sank three enemy vessels and damaged eight.

[note]

 

USN_Units

From 21 to 25 August, while the perimeter continued generally quiet and the coasts busy, Task Force 77 was replenishing at Sasebo.

[note]

 

On the 25th, as Admiral Struble left the fleet, command of the Fast Carrier Task Force devolved on Rear Admiral Ewen, Commander Carrier Division 1

[note]

 

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August–4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

[note]

 

biography   biography

At Sasebo, having learned of his large impending responsibilities, Struble had been expanding his staff. [On the 24th] A squadron commander was lifted from the destroyers, an air planner from Admiral Hoskins’ staff, and on the 25th, leaving his flagship to follow him, Commander Seventh Fleet flew to Tokyo. There, where all principal commanders were now united, there was plenty of work for all.

[note]

 

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Shortly after midnight of 24 August the North Koreans launched what had by now become their regular nightly attack down the Bowling Alley. This attack was in an estimated two-company strength supported by a few tanks. The 27th Infantry broke up this fruitless attempt and two more enemy tanks were destroyed by the supporting artillery fire. This was the last night the 27th Infantry Regiment spent in the Bowling Alley.

[note]

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0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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0554 Sunrise

[note]

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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biography   biography

The Chief of Staff, United States Army, toured the Pusan Perimeter in late August, visiting all American divisions and conferring with the army commander. He found the morale of the troops at the front to be uniformly high and the major commanders confident and optimistic. But there had been no letup in the enemy's determined pressure. The point of greatest concern to General Walker was still the slow arrival of replacements in the combat zone.

[note]

 

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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biography   biography

General Collins, on a second visit to Tokyo late in August, found General MacArthur still insistent that the airborne RCT be sent in time to take part in Operation CHROMITE, Collins promised to do what he could and, upon returning to Washington, made a special effort to expedite arrangements.

His investigation convinced him that his staff had been doing its best, and on 25 August he explained to General MacArthur that he had satisfied himself that an airborne RCT could not be sent by 10 September. He had even considered taking a regiment from the 82nd Airborne instead of the 11th, but had found that this drastic action would have made no appreciable difference in the arrival date. For the delay was no longer caused by personnel shortages but by difficulties in procuring, assembling, and loading the specialized equipment required for airborne operations.

General Collins felt that every reasonable and practicable measure had been taken to expedite the arrival of the RCT but that the unit would not be there for CHROMITE.

[note]

 

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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On 25 August, China formally charged the United States with strafing its territory across the Yalu.

[note]

1200 Korean Time

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USN_Units

Shortly after noon on 25 August Admiral Ewen sortied his ships from Sasebo for operations in the Japan Sea. As another consequence of the (August 22nd HMS Comus (R-43) episode, antiaircraft practice was conducted during sortie, but a submarine contact, later evaluated as false, brought an abrupt termination of the exercise.

[note]

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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The U.S. 7th Infantry Division in Japan was far understrength, having contributed key personnel to the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions in succession when they mounted out for Korea. In an effort to rebuild this division, the first Korean augmentation recruits were assigned to it rather than to the divisions in Korea. The first three platoons of 313 recruits left Pusan by ship the morning of 16 August and arrived in Japan the afternoon of the 18th. Once started, the shipments of recruits left Pusan at the rate of nearly 2,000 daily.

 

The final shipment arrived at Yokohama on the 24th and debarked the next day (25th), making a total of 8,625 Korean officers and men for the division. The South Korean Government at first obtained many of these recruits directly from the streets of Pusan and Taegu. In the contingents shipped to Japan, schoolboys still had their schoolbooks; one recruit who had left home to obtain medicine for his sick wife still had the medicine with him. [21-30]

[note]

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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As August progressed, Fifth Air Force armed reconnaissance pilots found very little hostile traffic moving during daylight, but tightened procedures for reporting such enemy sightings as were made permitted some effective attacks. Medium-bomber crews or reconnaissance pilots who sighted enemy movements initiated voice calls on their radios and reported the targets to the first armed reconnaissance flight that answered.#78

 

Such a procedure worked well east of P'yŏngyang on 25 August. Here a fighter flight which was returning from an airfield attack noticed a train about to take shelter in a tunnel. One of the fighters still had a napalm bomb left in his racks and used it to block the entrance to the tunnel. The fighter flight hurriedly summoned armed reconnaissance planes which destroyed the double-header locomotive, 12 tank cars, and 13 boxcars of the train.#79

[note]

 

 

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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With the enemy turned back north of Taegu, General Walker on 24 August issued orders for the 27th Infantry to leave the Bowling Alley and return to the 25th Division in the Masan area. The ROK 1st Division was to assume responsibility for the Bowling Alley, but the U.S. 23rd Regiment was to remain north of Taegu in its support.

ROK relief of the 27th Infantry began at 1800, 25 August, and continued throughout the night until completed at 0345, 26 August.

[note]


1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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1910 Sunset

[note]

 

 

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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   biography

In August, the Peiping regime  accused the United States of aggression against Formosa and asked the United Nations Security Council to order the withdrawal of ". . . all of the United States armed invading forces from Taiwan...." [20-20]

biography   biography   biography   biography

In refutation of this charge, President Truman on 25 August directed United States Ambassador Austin to address the Secretary-General, trygve Lie, on the matter. Austin sent Lie a complete account of the official American attitude toward Formosa, including a 19 July statement to the Congress by President Truman in which he declared ". . . that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa."

[note]

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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7:00 AM
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2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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8:00 AM
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9:00 AM
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11:00 PM


Casualties

Friday August 25, 1950 (Day - 62)

Korean_War 33 Casualties
19500825 0000 Casualties by unit


8 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 24TH MEDICAL BATTALION
6 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
5 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
3 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
2 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 MAG 33 - MARINE AIR GROUP 33
   
   
   
   
   
   
33 19500825 0000 Casualties by unit


As of August 25, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4332 133 13 4558
Today   32 1   33
Total 80 4364 134 13 4591

Aircraft Losses Today 000

Notes for Friday August 25, 1950 (Day - 62)

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