Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 23.2°C    73.76°F at Taegu     

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

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Eight Nazis imprisoned in West Germany for war crimes in WWII are released for good behavior after serving five years of seven-year sentences.

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Two SA-16s and three SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. The SA-16s flew 15:15 and the SB-17s flew 24:20, making a total of 40:35 flown on these missions.

Three false alerts were logged at Flight "D" this date.

The Rescue Advance Detachment in Korea made four evacuations of wounded from the front lines to the 8045th evacuation hospital this date.

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Aug. 26: Fifth Air Force organized the 47th and 48th TCSs (Provisional) at Tachikawa with C-46s from all over the Far East theater to augment FEAF airlift resources for UN offensives planned for September. At Ashiya, FEAF organized the 1st troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional) as the nucleus of the new Combat Cargo Command (Provisional).

Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, architect of the Hump airlift of World War II and the Berlin airlift, 1948-49, assumed command of Combat Cargo Command.

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August 26 AUSTRALIAN KOREAN WAR
'K Force' recruiting campaign launched.

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On the 26th, Joy proposed to Radford (copy to the Chief of Naval Operations) that in light of the prospect of future operations he consider sending the commander of Pacific Fleet amphibious forces with his operational staff to the Far East Command in a command ship (specially outfitted, like Mount McKinley, with the extensive communications suite required to control amphibious assaults).

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Taegu - Pusan Area

map

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"The 5th Regimental Combat Team (the 5th Infantry Regiment and the 555th Artillery Battalion) was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division, replacing the 34th Infantry Regiment and the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion which were reduced to paper strength and transferred to Japan to be reconstituted. The 34th Infantry Regiment had been greatly battered in combat at P'yŏngt'aek, Ch'ŏnan, and the Kum River line." 

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"The 65th Infantry Regiment, newly assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division to replace the 30th Infantry Regiment, sailed from Puerto Rico through the Panama Canal for Korea. " 

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"The airlift to Korea is one of the greatest developments of this war. It gives a commander advantages he never had in wars before."

-Maj Gen "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, Commander of I Corps, Eighth Army

At the beginning of the Korean War, the value of large-scale combat zone airlift had yet to be tested. During the war, the extensive use of Air Force transports gave commanders on the ground a flexibility that was previously unavailable, proving the crucial importance of Air Force airlift.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, the US Air Force airlift capability in the Far East suffered from a lack of numbers and central direction. In August 1950, the situation improved considerably with the arrival of Major General William H. Tunner and additional airlift units. On August 26, 1950, Tunner created Combat Cargo Command (Provisional). Combat Cargo performed all intra-theater airlift duties, including the landing and dropping of supplies, troop transport, dropping of paratroopers, psychological operations, medical evacuation, and air rescue.

The Korean airlift provided quick response in both offensive and defensive circumstances. After the Inch'ŏn landing, Combat Cargo supplied the Eighth Army by air after it rapidly outpaced its ground supply. This allowed the Eighth Army to continue its pursuit and maintain pressure on the North Koreans.

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South then North

 

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A .50 Cal. Machine gun squad of Co. E, 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, fires on North Korean patrols along the north bank of the Naktong River, Korea.
26 August 1950. Korea.
Signal Corps Photo #8A/fec-50-7043 (Sfc. Riley)

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Def  

On 21 August, MacArthur requested the Department of the Army by radio for authority to activate Headquarters, X Corps, and, upon receiving approval, he issued GHQ FEC General Order 24 on 26 August activating the corps. All units in Japan or en route there that had been designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to it. [25-7]

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   Unit Info

On 25 and 26 August, C Company beat off a number of North Korean thrusts on Battle Mountain-all coming along one avenue of approach, the long finger ridge extending upward from the mines at Tundŏk. At one point in this series of actions, a flight of Air Force planes caught about 100 enemy soldiers in the open and immediately napalmed, bombed, and strafed them. There were few survivors

 

Task Force Baker, commanded by Colonel Cole, and comprising C Company, a platoon of E Company, 24th Infantry, and a ROK police company, defended Battle Mountain at this time. The special command was established because of the isolated Battle Mountain area and the extended regimental battle frontage. It buried many enemy dead killed within or in front of its positions during these two days. [20-27]

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MSgt. Melvin O. Handrich of C Company, 5th Regimental Combat Team, on 25 and 26 August distinguished himself as a heroic combat leader. From a forward position he directed artillery fire on an attacking enemy force and at one point personally kept part of the company from abandoning its positions. Although wounded, Sergeant Handrich returned to his forward position, to continue directing artillery fire, and there alone engaged North Koreans until he was killed. When the 5th Regimental Combat Team regained possession of his corner "of a foreign field" it counted more than seventy dead North Koreans in the vicinity. [20-35]

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General Walker, after discussing the matter with  General Church on 26 August, ordered the 34th Infantry reduced to paper status and its personnel and remaining equipment transferred to the 19th and 21st Regiments.

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Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)      11thFAB     

At the same time, Eighth Army also reduced to paper status the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, which had been in support of the 34th Infantry, and transferred its troops and equipment to the newly activated C Batteries of the 11th, 13th, and 52nd Field Artillery Battalions. The effective dates for the transfer were 26 August for the artillery and 31 August for the infantry.

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The 1st Cavalry Division on 26 August received the third battalions for its regiments in organizations sent from the United States. It also received 3 provisional artillery batteries to provide the third firing battery for 3 battalions of artillery.

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The course of battle in the ROK eastern sector of the Perimeter and the enemy advance down the Sangju-Taegu road during August caused General Walker near the end of the month to decide on a shift of the boundary eastward between the American and ROK troops.

He considered the existing boundary near the Sangju-Taegu road a source of military weakness. On [Saturday] 26; August he ordered a new boundary line slanting southeast from a point two miles north of the Walled City of Ka-san to a point east of and below Taegu. This placed the Sangju-Taegu road and the former zone of the ROK 1st Division in the American zone.

The 1st Cavalry Division was to move eastward into the ROK 1st Division zone, and the U.S. 2nd Division at the same time was to extend its zone northward into the 1st Cavalry zone. The shift of units was to take place as soon as practicable, but no later than [Wednesday] 30 August. [21-41]

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On 26 August, American and ROK officers in the P'ohang-dong-Kigye area with great optimism congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Pusan Perimeter. In their view the North Koreans were now on the defensive and the war might end by Thanksgiving.

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upon receiving approval [to activate Headquarters, X Corps] he issued GHQ FEC General Order 24 on 26 August activating the corps. All units in Japan or en route there that had been designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to it. [25-7]

It appears that General MacArthur about the middle of August had made up his mind on the person he would select to command the invasion force. One day as he was talking with General Almond about the forthcoming landing, the latter suggested that it was time to appoint a commander for it.

 MacArthur turned to him and replied, "It is you." MacArthur told Almond that he was also to retain his position as Chief of Staff, Far East Command. His view was that Almond would command X Corps for the Inch'ŏn invasion and the capture of Sŏul, that the war would end soon thereafter, and Almond would then return to his old position in Tokyo. In effect, the Far East Command would lend Almond and most of the key staff members of the corps for the landing operation.

General Almond has stated that MacArthur's decision to place him in command of X Corps surprised him, as he had expected to remain in Tokyo in his capacity as Chief of Staff, fec. General MacArthur officially assigned General Almond to command X Corps on 26 August. [25-8]

August

General MacArthur, accompanited by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, discusses the military situation with Ambassador Muecio at ROK Army Headquarters.

General Almond, fifty-eight years old when he assumed command of X Corps, was a graduate of Virginia Military Institute. In World War I he had commanded a machine gun battalion and had been wounded and decorated for bravery. In World War II he had commanded the 92nd Infantry Division in Italy. Almond went to the Far East Command in June 1946, and served as deputy chief of staff to MacArthur from November 1946 to February 1949. On 18 February 1949 he became Chief of Staff, Far East Command, and, on 24 July 1950, Chief of Staff, United Nations Command, as well.

General Almond was a man both feared and obeyed throughout the Far East Command. Possessed of a driving energy and a consuming impatience with incompetence, he expected from others the same degree of devotion to duty and hard work that he exacted from himself. No one who ever saw him would be likely to forget the lightning that flashed from his blue eyes. To his commander, General MacArthur, he was wholly loyal. He never hesitated before difficulties. Topped by iron-gray hair, Almond's alert, mobile face with its ruddy complexion made him an arresting figure despite his medium stature and the slight stoop of his shoulders.

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By 20 July General MacArthur had settled rather definitely on the concept of the Inch'ŏn operation and he spoke of the matter at some length with General Almond and with General Wright, his operations officer.

On 12 August, MacArthur issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B and specifically named the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul area as the target that a special invasion force would seize by amphibious assault. [25-6]


On 15 August General MacArthur established the headquarters group of the Special Planning Staff to take charge of the projected amphibious operation. For purposes of secrecy the new group, selected from the GHQ FEC staff, was designated, Special Planning Staff, GHQ, and the forces to be placed under its control, GHQ Reserve.

On 21 August, MacArthur requested the Department of the Army by radio for authority to activate Headquarters, X Corps, and, upon receiving approval, he issued GHQ FEC General Order 24 on 26 August activating the corps. All units in Japan or en route there that had been designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to it. [25-7]

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The following day, August 26, Truman, "lips white and compressed" in anger, met with Acheson, Louis Johnson, Harriman, the JCS, and advisers in the Oval Office. Dispensing with the "usual greetings," Truman set aside the business for which the meeting had been called to deal with MacArthur's "message." He asked Collins and Sherman, just off the plane from Tokyo, if they had any prior knowledge of it. They did not; it was a complete shock to them as it was to all those present. Harriman, his earlier warning about MacArthur dramatically borne out, declared that the "release" of the message (already, in fact, released) would be a catastrophe. Acheson and Truman agreed emphatically.[8-59]

Finally, it was decided that the message must be "withdrawn" by MacArthur himself, even though that would be complicated and would probably call further attention to the issue and make matters worse. Without mincing words, Truman directed Johnson to telephone or cable MacArthur and order him to withdraw" the message. In part because he was in complete sympathy with MacArthur's message (especially the implied criticism of Acheson), in part because he was still in secret league with Truman's rightwing critics, in part because he did not want to challenge MacArthur's great prestige, Johnson dragged his feet, suggesting alternatives.

Finally, Truman telephoned Johnson and dictated to him the order to be sent to MacArthur: "The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.

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General MacArthur later wrote that upon receiving this cable, he was "utterly astonished." He insisted that the VFW message was in complete harmony with administration views and that others had twisted its meaning. He cabled an appeal to Truman via Johnson to allow the message to stand as a "personal" view, but Truman was adamant that it be withdrawn and it was.

The furor, as expected, was ear shattering. The China Lobby and rightwing critics seized on the incident as another club with which to beat Truman and Acheson for the "loss" of China and "bungling" in the Far East, the list of examples of which now included the Korean War.

The incident was important less for the damage it did the United States than for the damage it did Louis Johnson and Douglas MacArthur. Truman at last decided that Johnson must go. At the same time he seriously considered taking steps to strip MacArthur of all military power and command. He would send Omar Bradley to command military forces in the Far East and Korea leaving MacArthur as a figurehead occupation chief in Japan, probably to remain there until the Japanese peace treaty was signed and the occupation terminated.[8-62]

Perhaps because Inch'ŏn was imminent or because he feared the political consequences, Truman changed his mind about stripping MacArthur of power but held to his decision to fire Johnson. That chore, Truman believed, would be less onerous because he had talked George Marshall, whom he revered, into returning to government to replace Johnson.

Yet the firing of Johnson proved to be extremely painful for Truman. He remembered: "He came and I opened the conversation by telling him he'd have to quit. He was unable to talk. I've never felt quite so uncomfortable. But he finally said he'd like a couple of days to think about it. I said all right." Late on the following day, after a cabinet meeting, Truman met again with Johnson. "He looked like he had been beaten," Truman wrote. "He followed me into my office after the Cabinet adjourned and begged me not to fire him. Then he handed me the . . . letter [8-of resignation] . . . unsigned. I said, `Louis, you haven't signed this sign it.' He wept and said he didn't think I'd make him do it."

The sacking of Louis Johnson had a profoundly positive impact on the professional American Army officers in Korea. An artillery officer, James H. Dill, aboard a ship bound for Korea when the news of the sacking became public, remembered acidly:

The result was a reaction among the troops such as I never saw among American troops at any other time. Cheers broke out all over the ship. Soldiers slapped each other on the back and clapped... .
We hated Louis Johnson. We hated that man with the hatred of a blood feud. We damned him day and night. We damned anyone anywhere who would not damn him... .
He had cut the Army to the bone and then scraped the bone to the quick.... He had declared over and over that we had the most powerful defense establishment in the world and had nothing to fear from anyone. And we knew he lied. . . . We knew the truth... .
To us a simple proposition presented itself. We were apt to get killed and had already had so many friends killed because that man had cut our strength so much.... The last bitter joke on Louis Johnson was that the JCS had advised him he could call off his planned reduction in the armed forces since enough men, had been killed to bring our strength down to his desired level.

So history condemned Louis Johnson. But Dill's venom was misdirected. It was Harry S. Truman who had savaged the United States Army. Johnson was merely Truman's overeager and obnoxious bludgeon.

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George Marshall was to bring enormous prestige to the office of secretary of defense, but he was  no longer the robust man of the World War II and postwar years. To assist with the tough, tedious day-to-day management of the Pentagon, Marshall recruited Robert A. Lovett, a smart, hardworking public servant who administered with a firm but reasonable hand and disdained the limelight. Simultaneously with Marshall's arrival, President Truman, who was increasingly relying on Omar Bradley as his chief military adviser, promoted Bradley to five stars. The promotion not only gave Bradley added prestige and salary ($17,000 per year) but placed him on a level, in terms of rank, with MacArthur.

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U.S. Air Force

 

 

Two humorous bits of info redlined to Vandenberg - (1) the catchword these days by the 19th Group is - "who has the bombbay door?"¯ Seems doors are transferred from a/c undergoing maintenance to those coming out. One bombbay door is missing. Item (2) Marines were without air cover and under fire from heights near Masan; called for air support and some of our Mustangs returning without ammunition from a raid, "strafed"¯ the North Koreans for 20 minutes without firing a shot - which enabled the Marines to regroup and organize their position.


Informed Vandenberg via redline that next Razon mission scheduled Monday, 28 August with 3 a/c. Technical difficulties today. Razon radio receivers scheduled for airlift and necessary for next mission did not arrive necessitating postponement.  2/3s of all these receivers must be rejected because of deterioration while in storage.


General Partridge called at 1000 hours and stated the following: He is moving more a/c into Taegu and he felt that the Army would reconsider their evacuation of the wounded, possibly utilizing more air evacuation. He further stated that he was having difficulties with the "boys in blue"¯ [Navy] and that they had indicated to the JOC that they didn't intend to participate in close support.


I told General Partridge of the signals sent to CINCFE and dispatched by CINCFE where CINCFE didn't really know what they had said, that Weyland had straightened this out with Wright and it was my opinion that the Navy would be back in close cooperation with the Fifth Air Force and operating under my control.


Sent Norstad a letter inclosing my letters to Walker and Cushman requesting their comments on the Robert Miller article and their replies to me. Forwarded them with my comments, pointing out that Cushman's desire for harmony in line with CNO's directive and that I was disappointed in Walker's reply - he refused to comment, and although did praise the support we have given him, stated that he thought like, as he stated, so many Army personnel, that the Army should have its own tactical support as the Marines. Pointed out in my conversations with Collins that Collins would not ask for Army tactical air force, happy with us in our efforts and cooperation. As a talking point for Van on JCS level, suggested he throw out the idea that perhaps there should be an increase of Marine divisions and a cut in the divisions of the Army.

[WHAT AN ASS]

 

Sent a redline to Vandenberg:

Daily sorties are approaching the 600 mark; with 553 sorties by FEAF a/c and 26 by Australian Mustangs reported up to 0600 this morning. 33 night intruder sorties flown by FEAF a/c and 8 by Marines. 112 C-47s lifted 292 tons of cargo and 314 passengers to Korea.

c-47

Still a mainstay with the USAF, the C-47 performed yeoman service throughout the Korean War.

Following redline sent to Vandenberg:

Statement being released to press here for Sunday morning publication stateside sums up FEAF operation for first 60 days. Says, 20,559 sorties flown, 13,000 of them by fighters, 1300 by B-26s, 1500 by B-29s, and
2,800 by transports and 1,700 reccon, more than half the latter figure being flown by T-6 air controllers. Also states, more than 600 attacks have been made on tanks, armored cars or half-tracks by FEAF. 72 enemy a/c destroyed compared to 58 AF airplanes lost in 20,500 sorties. Our losses for period 26 dead, 23 wounded and 25 missing. [Actually 80 KIA todate]


Informed Turner via signal that since the Navy does not understand the terms "operational control"¯ and in order to be uniform with their understanding, wher ever the words appear in my directive to you in your plans of action on Formosa, change the wording to "coodinational control"¯ as defined and used by the Navy.


With Tunner called on CINCFE.
Annalee and I had dinner with the Pichers, their home - 7:00 P.M.

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August


During July and August the 374th Wing lifted 30,027 passengers and 22,073.4 tons of freight from Ashiya and Tachikawa. Arrival of additional aircraft facilitated some expansion of transport operations, while improved airfields in Korea permitted use of heavier aircraft.

Four C-119 's, for example, were assigned to the 374th Wing on 22 July, and were able to land in Korea with a load of trucks. In addition, on 26 August the 374th Wing received two new provisional squadrons, the 46th and 47th, each with 29 C-46 aircraft.

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On 31 August FEAF announced its decision to assume direct operational control of the 1st troop Carrier Task Force. General Tunner, who had returned temporarily to Washington, again reached Tokyo on the afternoon of 3 September, where he was briefed by FEAF on the mission of his command which he preferred to call the FEAF Combat Cargo Command (P). This change in designation was accomplished and back-dated to 26 August, the effective date of Tunner's assumption of command. As originally established the Cargo Command got operational control of the

These actions completed the organizational framework necessary to the expanding transport operations into Korea.

[Even so on 25 July General MacArthur had asked for C-119 aircraft to implement the employment of one airborne RCT, and even though the USAF had made the 314th troop Carrier Group (M) available to FEAF after 15 August by 9/10 (two months later) they still didn't have the required aircraft].

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During July and August the 374th troop Carrier Wing lifted 30,027 passengers and 22,073.4 tons of freight from Ashiya and Tachikawa. Arrival of additional aircraft facilitated some expansion of transport operations, while improved airfields in Korea permitted use of heavier aircraft. Four C-119 's, for example, were assigned to the 374th Wing on 22 July, and were able to land in Korea with a load of trucks. In addition, on 26 August the 374th Wing received two new provisional squadrons, the 46th and 47th, each with 29 C-46 aircraft.

Under Fifth Air Force control air cargo and transport was handled by the troop Carrier Division's Director of Operational Services.

Since the lift was critical and could be used only on high priority or emergency, FEC, EUSAK, and FEAF requirements were channeled to the FEAF transport Operations Office, which in turn relayed them to the Fifth Air Force troop Carrier Division.

Here, Fifth Air Force requirements were combined with those coming from FEAF, and the troop Carrier Division established priorities on the basis of total airlift available. The Fifth Air Force daily field order to the 374th Wing carried airlift priorities for evacuation, emergency fuel, ammunition, rations, medical supplies, and special and routine projects.

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At Fairfield-Suisun, California, the equipment was diverted to water shipment for some reason, so that it was not until 26 August, 53 days after the alert at Langley, that the 162nd Squadron was finally ready and equipped for its first mission. The squadron moved to Taegu on 8 October.

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The 162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (NP) was sent to the theater in order to provide Fifth Air Force some form of night reconnaissance. Alerted at Langley Air Force Base on 5 July, and hurriedly filled to near peacetime strength (a part of the fillers were jet mechanics with little experience on the squadron's conventional RB-26's), it was shipped to Itazuke where the ground echelon arrived on 19 August. Meanwhile, the air crews had moved to Ogden, Utah for depot installation of flash cartridge equipment on their RB-26's, only to find that but 10 of the squadron's 16 planes could be modified for the new equipment. Then the flash equipment was pronounced too heavy for the old B-26's on the long over-water flight to Japan and was removed to be crated for air shipment. At Fairfield-Suisun, California, the equipment was diverted to water shipment for some reason, so that it was not until 26 August, 53 days after the alert at Langley, that the 162nd Squadron was finally ready and equipped for its first mission. The squadron moved to Taegu on 8 October.

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In the years of reduced military budgets prior to 1950, the USAF Tactical Air Command had become an operational headquarters under the USAF Continental Air Command in December 1948. Even though it realized that tactical air units required global mobility, the Continental Air Command had had no funds to stand the costs of such a program.

 Alerted at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on 5 July, the 162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Night Photography) was hurriedly filled to near peacetime strength (a part of the fillers were jet mechanics with little experience on the squadron's conventional RB-26's). Its ground echelon, traveling by water, reached Itazuke on 19 August. Mean-while, the aircrews had moved to Ogden, Utah, for depot installation of a new-type flash cartridge illumination system on their RB-26's. Then the flash equipment was pronounced too heavy for the old B-26's on the long, over-water flight to Japan, and it was removed to be crated for air shipment. But someone diverted the flash equipment to water shipment, so that it was not until 26 August, fifty-three days after the alert at Langley, that the 162nd Squadron was finally ready and equipped for its first mission over Korea. traveling with the air echelon of the 162nd Squadron, the 1st Sharon Beacon Unit arrived at Johnson Air Base on 9 August. Conveyed by air and water, the 363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron assembled both of its echelons at Itazuke Air Base on 18 August.#129

Considering their lack of mobility training and the mistakes that had been made, these Tactical Air Command units reached Japan in an acceptable length of time. (fifty-three days is ok, the war TODAY is 63 days old)

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Since full and regular coverage of the enemy's airfields by his reconnaissance crews revealed very few planes and almost no activity, General Partridge saw little need to do more than to continue frequent interval surveillance of Communist fields in North Korea.#108

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27th ROK IR

Although the Communists remained active everywhere along the perimeter they made no more major attacks during August. The pattern was one of Communist attack and United Nations counterattack. As the friendly ground troops counterattacked into terrain held by the enemy they began to get their first appreciation for the value of close air support.

On 26 August, for example, the 27th ROK Regiment pushed the enemy back near Kigye and found 600 enemy soldiers who had been killed by air strikes.#114

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FIFTH Air Force

Reasoning that the Korean airborne assault would be a short-time, one-shot affair, the Fifth Air Force on 22 August organized the 1st troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional), with headquarters at Ashiya.#30

This organization was to become effective on 26 August, but before this the role to be played by transport aviation took on new importance. General MacArthur, for example, warned FEAF that the forces in Korea would require 700 to 1,000 tons of airlifted cargo each day for an indefinite period of time.#31

Victory in the South 155

Cargo aircraft like the C-124 Globemaster (rear) and the C-46 Commando airlifted tons of war supplies.

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Moreover, General Vandenberg cabled Stratemeyer that the air-transport effort ought to be commanded by the "best man possible." The man whom Vandenberg had in mind for the job was Major General William H. Tunner, who had commanded the India-China "Hump" operations and the Berlin airlift.#32

General Tunner, who was currently the deputy commander of the Military Air transport Service, happened to be in Tokyo inspecting that service's Pacific airlift when his services were offered to General Stratemeyer. In a conference at FEAF operations General Tunner made arrangements to receive the 314th Group. At first General Tunner said that he wanted only 64 of the Flying Boxcars, but he wanted double crews and additional maintenance men to enable each C-119 to fly 200 hours a month. This, however, was not possible, for parts and engine shortages would not permit the C-119's to achieve a utilization rate higher than 100 hours a month. General Tunner therefore requested that the first 64 C-119's arrive in Japan by 10 September and that the additional 32 C-119's would arrive as soon as they could be fitted with self-sealing fuel tanks but not later than 21 September.#33

After making these arrangements, [8/22] General Tunner returned to Washington to gather a small staff for his new headquarters.

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21st Airlift Squadron - Emblem.jpg   x   47   48 AS.jpg

Early in July the Fifth Air Force had converted the 21st troop Carrier Squadron (374th Group) to C-47's and these planes could be used by paratroopers. To get the remainder of the needed airlift, the Fifth Air Force drew key personnel from the 374th Wing, pilots from desk jobs, and C-46 aircraft from all over the theater, and organized at Tachikawa on 26 August the 47th and 48th troop Carrier Squadrons (Provisional).#27

From Tokyo General Weyland reported that the 187th Regiment's liaison officers were "most unhappy over plans to use C-46 aircraft  and . . . do not want to use C-47 aircraft,"#28

but it was soon apparent that the 187th would not reach the Far East before 21 September. Informed that the 187th would arrive too late for Inch'ŏn, General MacArthur announced he would go ahead with the amphibious invasion anyway, but he asked that the airborne regiment would proceed to the theater as soon as possible and be prepared for either an airlanding or a paratroop assault in Korea.#29

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Like other supposedly temporary arrangements of that optimistic season, General Stratemeyer had organized the FEAF Combat Cargo Command (Provisional) on 26 August 1950, under command of Major General William H. Tunner.

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315

2. Flexible Air transport Sustained Combat in Korea

As employed in Korea, the FEAF Combat Cargo Command (Provisional) and the 315th Air Division represented a new concept in transport aviation-one fleet of cargo planes was to be sufficiently flexible to handle airborne assault and air-dropped resupply as well as air landed movements of cargo and personnel. Major General William H. Tunner and his staff officers brought the concept to Japan when they organized the FEAF Combat Cargo Command (Provisional) on 26 August 1950. After the provisional organization proved its merit, it was replaced by the regularly constituted 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) on 25 February 1951.

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The Eighth Army would not begin to receive its organic helicopters in any numbers until January 1951, but a tacit decision had been made which would be of long-lasting significance. The Army would handle aeromedical evacuation forward of its mobile army surgical hospitals, while Air Force transports would provide medical air evacuation rear-ward of the initial points of medical treatment in the combat zone.

With the establishment of the FEAF Combat Cargo Command on 26 August 1950, General Tunner directed his staff to take a look at aeromedical evacuation. Up until this time in Korea aeromedical evacuation was judged to have had "a rather spotty history." Although one flight of the 801st Medical Air Evacuation Squadron was attached to the 374th Wing, the Head-quarters, 801st Squadron and two flights were in the Philippines, where their personnel authorizations augmented the staff of the Clark Air Force Base hospital.

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U.S. Marine Corps

 

August 26, 1950 it was D-minus 26 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

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U.S. Navy

 

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28, 29, 30, 31

And when Admiral Hartman and the USS Helena (CA-75) group arrived to relieve next day P'ohang was still in U.N. hands. Aircraft from Task Force 77 took off some pressure on the 26th, reinforcements were again moved in by EUSAK, and from the 28th to the 31st close support was provided by the Marine airmen from USS Sicily (CVE-118). The last day of August saw friendly forces making sizable gains.

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On 26 August the destroyerUSS Wiltsie (DD-716) was assigned to duty there in support of the 25th Infantry Division, and this service was continued by various ships in rotation until late September. Since the 25th Division had trained fire control parties, in contrast to the somewhat catch-as-catch-can arrangements at P'ohang, this Chinhae effort paid off handsomely.

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      USN_Units   USN_Units

On the 26th enemy lines of communications were swept, attacks on targets of opportunity were carried out, and another attempt was made to provide support for the ground forces.

Three USS Valley Forge (CV-45) flights of F4Us and ADs attacked troops, tanks, and trucks with good results, and two reported that despite crowded radio channels the work of the controllers was satisfactory. For Air Group11 in USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) the day started with a jet sweep which attacked troops in a tunnel north of P'ohang, which was followed up by a strike of Corsairs and Skyraiders on a vehicle concentration west of the Naktong. It ended with another jet sweep led by Commander Ralph Weymouth, the air group’s new commander, which reported good results: in the hills northwest of P'ohang an attack in battalion strength had been broken up by strafing; west of the town a competent airborne controller had directed rocket and strafing runs within a hundred yards of friendly forces. Air operations were thus successfully routine, but as the force cruised the neighborhood of Ullung Do the sonarmen on the destroyers were kept jumping by numerous contacts attributed to the whales which frequent the neighborhood of that island.

[note]

 

   Koread-War

Inevitably, this period in port involved further consideration of fast carrier employment. ComNavFE had by now switched over completely to the semi-strategic party and on the 22nd, in a dispatch to CincFE, argued that best results would come from strikes north of 38°, where many extremely lucrative and profitable targets" existed, even though the effect at the front would be felt with "some delay."

This recommendation was accepted by General MacArthur, and a new schedule was promulgated which called for a sequence similar to that of the previous sortie: two days on the east coast commencing on the 26th, a day in fuelling and in transit, and two days of attacks in the west. On each coast the effort of the first day would be divided between close support and interdiction; throughout the operation first priority in interdiction would be given to railroad and other transportation targets. This dispatch was followed by another in which CincFE, in view of current planning," expressed concern about a possible enemy air buildup, as evidenced by the attack on HMS Comus (R-43);

FEAF and Task Force 77 were adjured to emphasize interdiction of air facilities, and while avoiding damage to runways, to refuse the enemy the use of airfields south of 39°.

[note]

 

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August–4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

 

[note]

0000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
9:00 AM
08/25/50
10:00 AM
08/25/50
3:00 PM
08/26/50
12:00 AM

0100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
10:00 AM
08/25/50
11:00 AM
08/25/50
4:00 PM
08/26/50
1:00 AM

0200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
11:00 AM
08/25/50
12:00 PM
08/25/50
5:00 PM
08/26/50
2:00 AM

0300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
12:00 PM
08/25/50
1:00 PM
08/25/50
6:00 PM
08/26/50
3:00 AM

 

0345 Korean Time

     

ROK relief of the 27th Infantry began at 1800, 25 August, and continued throughout the night until completed at 0345, 26 August.

[note]

 

 

0400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
1:00 PM
08/25/50
2:00 PM
08/25/50
7:00 PM
08/26/50
4:00 AM

0500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
2:00 PM
08/25/50
3:00 PM
08/25/50
8:00 PM
08/26/50
5:00 AM

0555 Sunrise

[note]

 

0600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
3:00 PM
08/25/50
4:00 PM
08/25/50
9:00 PM
08/26/50
6:00 AM

0700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
4:00 PM
08/25/50
5:00 PM
08/25/50
10:00 PM
08/26/50
7:00 AM

 

         101 Sig Bn COA.png

Late in August, arrangements were sufficiently advanced for a schedule giving anticipated arrival dates of the corps units to be sent to General MacArthur. The I Corps with attached units, including the 4th Signal Battalion at reduced strength, was on the high seas and due to reach Japan on 3 September. The IX Corps headquarters would arrive in Pusan about 10 October and would be followed within three weeks by the artillery units and the 101st Signal Battalion. [07-61]

[note]

 

0800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
5:00 PM
08/25/50
6:00 PM
08/25/50
11:00 PM
08/26/50
8:00 AM

0900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
6:00 PM
08/25/50
7:00 PM
08/26/50
12:00 AM
08/26/50
9:00 AM

 

biography   

General MacArthur formally established the X Corps on 26 August. The Special Planning Staff, GHQ, became Headquarters, X Corps, and General Almond was officially designated commanding general in addition to his duties as chief of staff and deputy commander, Far East Command, United Nations Command. All units or detachments in or en route to Japan and previously designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to X Corps.

Next, on X September, MacArthur assigned the code name, Operation CHROMITE, to the planned landing at Inch'ŏn; and, on 6 September, he confirmed in writing what he had already told his major commanders orally, that D-day for Operation CHROMITE was 15 September 1950. [09-10]

[note]

1000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
7:00 PM
08/25/50
8:00 PM
08/26/50
1:00 AM
08/26/50
10:00 AM

1100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
8:00 PM
08/25/50
9:00 PM
08/25/50
2:00 AM
08/26/50
11:00 AM

biography

On 26 August, in Tokyo Lt(jg) Eugene Franklin Clark was asked by General Holmes E. Dager and Captaion Edward Pearce to slip into In'chon harbor two weeks before the invasion to obtain critical information on its physical evnirons, and enemy garrison.

(Notes)

 

 

On 26 August an OY crashed on a spotting mission over the front lines and the pilot, First Lieutenant Harold J. Davis, was seriously injured. His observer, Second Lieutenant Patrick G. Sivert, sustained less serious injuries. Two VMO-6 helicopters were dispatched to the area, which was under counterbattery fire, to bring them out. The helicopters successfully extracted the injured pilot and his observer and delivered them to the hospital train at Masan. Two days later Davis and Sivert were evacuated ro a hospital ship at Pusan, Davis died from his injuries on 6 September.

[note]

1200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
9:00 PM
08/25/50
10:00 PM
08/26/50
3:00 AM
08/26/50
12:00 PM

1300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
10:00 PM
08/25/50
11:00 PM
08/26/50
4:00 AM
08/26/50
1:00 PM

1400 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/25/50
11:00 PM
08/26/50
12:00 AM
08/26/50
5:00 AM
08/26/50
2:00 PM

1500 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
12:00 AM
08/26/50
1:00 AM
08/26/50
6:00 AM
08/26/50
3:00 PM

1600 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
1:00 AM
08/26/50
2:00 AM
08/26/50
7:00 AM
08/26/50
4:00 PM

1700 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
2:00 AM
08/26/50
3:00 AM
08/26/50
8:00 AM
08/26/50
5:00 PM

1800 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
3:00 AM
08/26/50
4:00 AM
08/26/50
9:00 AM
08/26/50
6:00 PM


1900 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
4:00 AM
08/26/50
5:00 AM
08/26/50
10:00 AM
08/26/50
7:00 PM


1908 Sunset

[note]

2000 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
5:00 AM
08/26/50
6:00 AM
08/26/50
11:00 AM
08/26/50
8:00 PM

2100 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
6:00 AM
08/26/50
7:00 AM
08/26/50
12:00 PM
08/26/50
9:00 PM

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
7:00 AM
08/26/50
8:00 AM
08/26/50
1:00 PM
08/26/50
10:00 PM

2300 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
08/26/50
8:00 AM
08/26/50
9:00 AM
08/26/50
2:00 PM
08/26/50
11:00 PM


Casualties

Saturday August 26, 1950 (Day - 63)

Korean_War 17 Casualties



19500826 0000 Casualties by unit
4 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 2ND QUARTERMASTER COMPANY - DIVISION
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
6 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 65TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 VMO 6 - MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON 6
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
17 19500826 0000 Casualties by unit

As of August 26, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4364 134 13 4591
Today   16 1   17
Total 80 4380 135 13 4608

Aircraft Losses Today 001

Notes for Saturday June 24, 1950