Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp     21.8°C       71.24°F at Taegu 

23.2C      73.76F at Pusan

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)

Temperature Station 159 (K-1 Pusan (Busan))


Overview

week 010

Today begins the sixth week of the Korean war. xxxxx American Servicemen will have be killed by the end of this week 19yymm02_0000_

[note]

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

19500827 0000 DSC McDANIEL

 

Silver Star

Philipsen, Clifford A. [1stLt SS K38thIR]

Rohde, Bernard E. [PFC SS A5thRCT]

Scott, Robert Frederick [1stLt SS VMF-323 CVE-116]

August 27 to September 15 - Pusan Perimeter battles, some of the heaviest fighting of the War. U.N. troop strength exceeds that of North Korea.

[note]

 

AnnaWallisSuh1930.png

"Sŏul City Sue," the reds' propagandist broadcasting from Sŏul, is identified as American-born Mrs. Anna Wallace Suhr, wife of a Korean newsman, by the Methodist Missionary Organization. The group says that Suhr, in her mid-40s, is a former missionary schoolteacher in Korea, and had tutored American diplomats' children in Sŏul. Methodists also claim the dull tone of her broadcasts is proof that she is being forced to do them. GIs have given her the nickname.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography

The President "gave serious thought," he wrote,

 "to relieving General MacArthur as our military field commander in the Far East and replacing him with General Bradley. I could keep MacArthur in command of the Japanese. occupation, taking Korea and Formosa out of his hands. But after weighing it carefully I decided against such a step. It would have been difficult' to avoid the appearance of a demotion, and I had no desire to hurt General MacArthur personally. My only concern was to let the world know that his statement was not official Policy."

He had at least two other concerns. Even then, he knew that curbing MacArthur's authority would set off a major political firestorm in the United States. And he could not have done it without dismissing Matthews and Johnson, who were friends and good Democrats. Still, he felt he had to do something about the General. He summoned Acheson, Johnson, Harriman, the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of the treasury John W. Snyder, and Steve Early, Johnson's deputy, to a Saturday morning council of war.[57]

His "lips white and compressed," in Acheson's phrase, the President dispensed with the usual greetings and polled them, asking each man whether he had known of the VFW letter in advance. None had; it had come, Truman later wrote, as "a surprise and a shock to all." He said he wanted a public retraction from MacArthur and then, still in a cold anger, he stalked from the meeting. His instructions had seemed concise, but after his departure there was no unanimity among the others over what the next step should be, and how it should be taken. MacArthur was a fearsome figure to the Chiefs. Early was uneasy; he felt that a public retraction would violate MacArthur's right to free speech, and suggested that the President and the General confer on telecon screens. Johnson, who as secretary of defense would have the thankless task of dealing directly with MacArthur, proposed that they let the letter be read to the veterans and then announce that it was "only one man's opinion and not the official policy of the government:" The secretary of state disagreed, commenting caustically that the issue seemed to him to be who was President. Johnson, still unhappy, persisted:

"Do we dare send a message that the President directs him to withdraw his statement?"

 Since those were Truman's orders, Acheson replied, there was no alternative. That afternoon the reluctant Johnson cabled the Dai Ichi:

 ""The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations." [58]

[note]

 

biography biography

MacArthur instantly complied, but he was, he said, "utterly astonished." Sending for a copy of his VFW statement and reexamining it, he wrote, he "could find no feature that was not in complete support of the President." He replied to Johnson: "My message was most carefully prepared to fully support the President's policy position. My remarks were calculated only to support his declaration and I am unable to see wherein they might be interpreted otherwise:" He was hurt and angry, and with some justification.

 He was capable of impudence and provocation; but in this instance his only sin was in taking Truman's pronouncements on Formosa at face value. The President was following one course in the United Nations and another in fencing with his critics on Capitol Hill. MacArthur, believing that the administration was determined to keep the island out of hostile hands as a link in the U.S. defense system, had unintentionally embarrassed the chief executive in the world forum. He was wrong to have said anything the contretemps [controversy] over his trip to Taipei should have taught him that but right in his paraphrasing of what the White House was telling the American people. He was a casualty of rough politics, a loser in a game whose rules he never mastered [59]

[note]

 

biography biography

This bruising encounter fueled his paranoia. "To this day," he wrote at the end of his life, "I do not know who managed to construe my statement as meaning exactly the opposite of what it said, and how this person or persons could have so easily deceived the President." Somebody had to be to blame, there must be a villain somewhere so his reasoning went, and Whitney, his starlets, encouraged him in it.

It was "logical," Whitney told him, to assume that the VFW letter had "innocently" run afoul of "plans being hatched in the State Department to succumb to British pressure and desert the Nationalist government on Formosa," and it was a "clear illustration of the devious workings of the Washington-London team."

 As Walter Millis observes, "a theater commander in wartime who really believed that the civil authorities were working against him would surely be compelled to resign." Instead MacArthur nursed this new grudge, watched warily for more blows from Washington, and vowed to confound his enemies by unsheathing his sword in a dazzling stroke that would blind them all. [60]

[note]

 

Two SA-16s and two SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. The SA-16s flew fifteen hours and thirty minutes (15:30) and the SB-17s flew fourteen hours and fifty minutes (14:50) for a total of thirty hours and thirty minutes (30:30).

One L-5 was used this date for emergency evacuation from Flight "D". The evacuation was from Sasebo, Japan to Itazuke AB. The patient was suffering from a ruptured ulcer and was bleeding internally. The L-5 was flown by Capt. Oscar H. Tibbetts. A total of two hours and five minutes was flown on this mission.

The Advance rescue Detachment in Korea made one front line evacuation this date. H-5 aircraft was used twenty minutes for this mission.

[note]

 

Aug. 27: Two USAF Mustang pilots accidentally strayed into China and strafed an airstrip near Antung, mistaking it for a North Korean airstrip at Sinuiju. The Chinese exploited the incident to the fullest for propaganda and diplomatic purposes.

The 92nd BG sent 24 B-29s to Kyŏmip'o, to bomb the largest iron and steel plant in Korea. FEAF experimented with delayed action bombs to discourage enemy repairs on bridges.

[note]

 

Command and Control

 

biography       biography

The next day, Radford sent to Joy (Sherman as information addressee),

It is my understanding [from prior] conversations with you that two amphibious groups under direction [of Commander] Seventh Fleet could adequately take care of future operations from an amphibious standpoint.

 If an additional flag officer is needed for planning and/or control of future amphibious operations[, I] request that you make recommendations and outline the organization that you desire.

Joy replied that indeed he meant simply to request a second amphibious group commander and staff.

[note]

 

biography   Def

Struble was formally appointed the overall commander at Inch'ŏn following the approval of the operation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 August. He had given some thought to the name for the organization; he decided on Joint Task Force 7, communicating that name to Joy orally (probably on 27 August).

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

August 27, 1950 it was D-minus 19 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

 

Forgotten Regiments

 

biography      biography  

On August 27, Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, U.S. Eighth Army commander in Korea, dissolved the 34th, converting the 1/34th into the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the 3/34th into the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry.

The 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) became the 2nd Division's third regiment.

 General Church preferred having the 5th fully manned to rebuilding the 34th. He then reassigned the men of the 34th to give his other two regiments their authorized third battalions.

The 34th was reconstituted in Japan and later served again in Korea.

[note]

 

 August

Gun crew of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, fire a 105mm howitzer on North Korean positions near Uirson, South Korea, 27 August 1950. Photographed by PFC Wayne H. Weidner.

[note]

 

    

"Fifth Air Force established a Rescue Liaison Office in the Joint Operations Center at Nagoya Air Base, Japan."

[note]

 

August

The N.K. Attacks in the east 27-August - 15 September 1950

[note]

 

South then North

 

   Koread-War

Attacks against the Han River pontoon bridges at Sŏul do not seem to have been successful until FEAF on 27 August ordered the Bomber Command to lay delayed action bombs alongside the bridges, set to detonate at night. This method of attack seems to have caused such heavy casualties among the North Korean labor force trying to keep the pontoons in repair that the enemy finally abandoned the effort. These bridges remained unfinished when the American forces recaptured Sŏul. [21-8]

August

[21-Caption] EXPLODING PHOSPHORUS BOMBS dropped by B-29's over a North Korean barracks create an unusual pattern.

While it is clear that air power wrought great destruction of enemy equipment and troops during this period of the war, it is not possible to state accurately just how great it really was. Pilot claims are the basis of most estimates of air damage and destruction. Experience has shown that these are subject to many kinds of error. As an example, pilots often mistakenly claimed the destruction of enemy equipment if it remained immobile after attack. It is often impossible for a pilot of a high-speed aircraft to determine if his target is live or not, and three or four different pilots may claim as a "kill" a vehicle already knocked out by ground action.

 One study revealed a surprisingly great discrepancy between pilot claims and a ground study of destroyed enemy equipment. Pilots claimed to have destroyed ten times as many tanks with rockets as with napalm in the first three months of the Korean War, but a ground survey of destroyed enemy tanks after the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter showed three times as many tanks destroyed with napalm as with rockets. This gives a discrepancy factor of thirty to one in relation to pilot claims.

 Napalm seldom destroyed a tank by the burst of flame itself. But it did set off chain events that often led to the complete destruction of the tank. The splashing napalm on the bogie wheels set the rubber tires on fire, it heated ammunition to the point where it detonated inside the tank, or it set fuel on fire, and sometimes it splashed into the air intake vents and started fires inside the tank. [21-9]

[note]

 

Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

On 24 August, General MacArthur established the Japan Logistical Command (JLC) as a major organization of the Far East Command. It relieved Eighth Army Rear of all responsibilities concerning posts, camps, and stations in Japan and assumed responsibility as well for the logistical support of all U. N. forces in Korea, except those specifically delegated to other commands.

Other organizational changes came on 27 August when General MacArthur designated the Far East Air Forces and the U.S. Naval Forces, Far East, officially as part of the United Nations Command, thus clarifying his relationship to them as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. This action served as a precedent for subsequent attachments of other U.N. air and naval forces to the United Nations Command. [21-19]

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

Sent a personal redline to Vandenberg:

An interesting report on POW reaction has come from SK Navy. Among 25 NK POW's, captured at T'ongyŏng (3450' N/ 12826' E) by SK Marines, was an infantry company commander who reported that his unit departed Haeju (38 02' N - 125 46' E) 28 July, in high spirits, confident of success of North Korean Army but as they traveled southward and observed blown bridges and the deep fear of air attacks noted among other North Korean troops met on the way, they lost their confidence and, by time they reached point of capture, they were sure that they would lose and only expected to be killed upon capture as they had been informed ROK troops took no prisoners.


Prepared memo to Plans thru VC A&P with info copies to CINCFE and
General Tunner, reminding them that Lt. Col. J. L. McGinn, now at Tsuiki, in the 6131st Wing, knows more about Suwon Airport, its surrounding terrain than anyone in FEAF and urging that General Tunner and his operational and plans people should discuss same with McGinn.


Sent Gill Robb Wilson another weekly letter - which I intend to have dispatched to him by each Monday. (Also inclosed my 60-day FEAF Summary of Air Activities - the PIO official release.)


Reference the article that was received late today from Sory Smith,[236] appearing in the Baltimore Sun, written by Phillip Potter, I have directed that the following action be taken. That Colonel Nuckols answer Sory Smith's radio and give him the best reply available from our records - including a statement that I referred the article to Admiral Joy and to General Partridge.[237]


In my letter to Admiral Joy I directed that General Craigie include the following: that if I have at any time since the Korean war indicated an inhospitable attitude reference any matter, it was certainly unintentional and I apologize; that it was my impression from the records and from memory and from Admiral Joy's letter to me dated 10 August that the relationship between naval air, Admiral Joy's office, and my headquarters has been most amicable and that we tried in every instance to meet their many requests for assistance.

Our records show that as a result of our meeting with the 7th Fleet aviators and my staff, it was agreed that the Navy would furnish some three (3) control teams and a mutual agreement, which met everyone's satisfaction, was resolved; I did not know there was a shortage of maps or charts and if there are, will meet every possible request that they have; that I constantly requested the 7th Fleet air to participate with the Fifth Air Force in air support to the ground forces, and that if there are any deficiencies existing as of this writing on our part, that I can remedy, it is requested that he make them known and that I will do everything possible to correct those deficiencies; that I do desire his comments on the article since the article indicates that admirals of the 7th Fleet are unhappy with cooperation of FEAF.


My instructions to General Craigie that the article be referred to General Partridge for his comments with the statement in my letter of transmittal that I do not want him to worry nor to personally answer the letter, but to have one of his staff people investigate the whole operations with the Seventh Fleet for my information and to remedy any deficiencies that exist on our part.


General Mundy[238] checked in at headquarters and Colonel Sykes arrives to take over the spot that I requested a Brig. General Leach for - to document the history of our activities out here that will be available and valuable as source material for Hq USAF.

Received a "thank you" letter from Bozo McKee for the flags and which also included the following paragraphs:

We are very proud here of the fine job the Air Force is doing in Korea. It is a great tribute to you and your staff. As a purely personal suggestion from me - why don't you write the Chief a letter occasionally, telling him the picture as you see it, and in which you could put a lot of things that you probably do not wish to put in a cable. My idea is that it would be purely an informative matter between you and the Chief and not an action letter to the Staff.

In answer to the above letter from McKee, sent him the following

"Top Secret - Eyes Only" [underlining in original] (This letter, AG#

112-OL-50 burned 27 Sept as per my instructions (answered by McKee's ltr dtd 13 Sept.) See full quote of letter contained in diary under date of 27 Sept.) letter:

Your letter of 22 Aug just received and I have already beaten you to the punch on your suggestion of a letter to the Chief - having mailed quite a lengthy one 23 August 1950. Thanks for the suggestion and I will continue a letter every now and then giving him the unfavorable as well as the favorable. During the visit of Collins and Sherman, Sherman was very cool towards me which was quite a contrast to his trip out here with Van several months ago. Collins, of course, was just the opposite and during one of my conversations with Collins reference Robert Miller's critical news item on the Air Force versus Marine close-support for the Army, Collins indicated that Van had shown to Sherman my personal redline to Norstad, dated 16 August 1950, number V 0193 (Top Secret). I am in great hopes that the only part of that radio that he showed to Sherman was Part Two.

 Of course, if Part One was shown to Sherman, I can readily understand Sherman's coolness towards me. For my own defense and knowledge could you diplomatically find out if Sherman saw the whole message which included Part One or did he only see Part Two? It is very important that I know because of my close relationship with the Navy (Admirals Joy and Struble) out here.

Please treat the latter part of this letter with the very highest of classification and for your eyes alone. Am glad that you like the flags, etc.

Sent a letter to Partridge asking why I have been receiving no reports on the use of napalm and why it has not been used more both in your close support missions as well as against trucks, tanks, convoys, and concentrations of troops. I had success in India and Burma with it; Chennault with it in China, and George Kenney had success with its use in his campaign here in the Far East. With all the enthusiasm for its use and the lack of reports from you on your using same is a bit disturbing. Requested his comments reference napalm.


PHILLIP POTTER STORY WHICH APPEARED IN BALTIMORE SUN


NEWSRELEASE - Story, Tokyo, August 23.

19500827 StratemeyeR 01


Navy airmen hesitate to speak out openly on the subject for fear reopening old wounds in the unification struggle, but they believe the Korean conflict has shown up the glaring deficiencies in American ground support aviation. Admirals responsible for aviation of the United Nations Task Force 77 which is primarily an American show - complain that failure of the Far Eastern Air Force[s] to provide adequate tactical air control has kept the effectiveness of carrier based planes at about 30 percent of their potential at a time when doughboys in Korea need all the help they can get.

19500827 StratemeyeR 02

 


Their complaints and suggestions for remedying the situation, including a proposal for use of the Navy's own tactical control parties, have been thoroughly gone into at recent conferences in Japan between Douglas MacArthur's Far Eastern Command and such distinguished visitors as General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet. Those who have been directing operations from the two American carriers already operating in Korean waters are known to have told superiors the Fleet is experiencing difficulties which must be remedied if effective support of Army Ground Forces is to be achieved.

19500827 Stratemeyer 03

 


Specifically, they have complained that there is no adequate direct means of communication between the JOC, the Far Eastern Air Forces have set up in Korea, and naval forces; that no properly gridded air-support charts have yet been made available; that there has been trouble in establishing communications with the Air Forces' mosquito planes whose job it is to direct fighters and bombers to their targets; and there have not been enough mosquitoes to adequately carry out their mission.

Charts are gridded on a scale too large to allow speed and accuracy of control, but they claim they have been inadequately supplied even with such charts.


Navy flyers have frequently reached Korea, where they were to be assigned targets by the Air Forces' mosquito planes, only to find that they were already busy with the Air Forces' F-80 jets and Mustangs, or they had to leave a target area due to gasoline exhaustion without making arrangements for proper relief. Navy men have suggested use of the Navy's own tactical air control parties, some of which are aboard a communications ship which is now in Japanese waters, but is operating with Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle's Amphibious task Force instead of with the carriers.

19500827 Stratemeyer 04

 


Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commander of the Far East Air Forces, however, is reported to have been inhospitable to this proposal although the Army is crying for air support equivalent to that Marine flyers provide for Marine ground forces.

19500827 Stratemeyer 05

 


A feeling that their potential striking power is being aborted is universal among fleet airmen, from ensigns to admirals, and this is reflected in reports of virtually all carrier pilots returning from combat missions. The following are typical examples:

19500827 Stratemeyer 06


Many naval aviators are as well trained as are Marine Corps flyers in close support work but there has been no system in Korea such as the Marine Corps employs to put their talents to use. Special mobile tactical control units accompany all the Marine ground forces into action, communicating by radio with squadron leaders who know with what ordnance each of their planes is loaded. If the ground party wants a machine gun next taken out with a general purpose bomb, the squadron leader goes down and marks the target with a smoke rocket, then he calls down the plane he wants to make the strike. If the target is a NK tank, a plane loaded with rockets does the job.

19500827 Stratemeyer 07


There is "nothing mysterious about close air support," Rear Adm. Edward C. Ewen said. "There are a few simple principles. It is mainly a matter of proper communication between AF and GF." He said that due to chaotic Air Force communications in Korea, the carriers contribution as far as close support is concerned is almost negligible." The kids just wander around, the racks loaded with bombs and rockets, and [no] place to put them," he said.

19500827 Stratemeyer 08


Ensign Sam Clauzel, Avista, California, one of the carrier pilots put it even more pungently: "This carrier has almost 3,000 men aboard," he said, "and there is a tremendous effort put forth by every one of them to get out planes in the air, then we are useless." We have and are capable of putting in the field tactical control parties with whom we trained in maneuvers, but they won't let us use them.

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EDITORIAL


Mr. Phillip Potter, Sun paper's war correspondent, reports that in Korea the effectiveness of carrier-based airplanes is being held to about 30 percent of its potential because of inadequate tactical air control. The Navy lays the blame on the Far Eastern Air Forces.


According to Navy men there is no adequate means of communication between the Air Forces JOC and Navy Air Force: Support charts, they say are not properly gridded and sometimes are not even available. The Navy flyers all report trouble establishing communication with the Air Forces' mosquito planes whose job it is to direct fighters and bombers to their targets.

The result of this, they say, is that they often receive no instructions. In consequence they have to look for a target themselves or else fly home with a bomb-load unused. Mr. Potter states that these complaints are now receiving the attention from the Big Brass. Well they might, for they are serious and should be fully investigated. It is conceivable that the trouble is due to some oversight in planning that could be readily adjusted. The emergency in Korea came so suddenly that there had to be a good deal of improvisation. The use of carrier-based planes to support Army ground forces was a novel combination, and it would be surprising indeed if 100 percent efficiency were had immediately.

 Such a failure as the Navy complain of, if only temporary, might be excused. What can not be excused is that condition should be permitted to continue. In particular, it should not be allowed to go on if the failure is in any way attributable to Service prejudice which so often has bedeviled unification. The American public is being called upon to throw into this Korean operation both its blood and its treasure. It has the right to demand that both be used with the strictest economy but they will not be used economically if responsible officers of the respective services carry into the war any of the silly, childish notions of Service loyalty that have prevailed during the peace.


This is the problem for the President of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General MacArthur to handle. If those on the top level let it be known that service jealousies will not be tolerated, such misplaced loyalty will soon disappear.

The American public is very much a party to this matter.

In the specific case of air control, it will insist that the attention the subject is getting from the High Command will not be diverted until the conditions of which the Navy flyers complain have been corrected or the complaints have been shown to be unjustified.

[note]

 

On 27 August FEAF directed Bomber Command to lay a string of delayed action bombs along the Sŏul bridges, set to detonate only at night, and this procedure seems to have persuaded the North Koreans not to attempt the pontoon crossing.

[note]

 

biography   biography

On 2 September General Stratemeyer ordered his subordinate commanders to brief their crews that when in the vicinity of the borders, unless positive of their location, they must leave at once.

Despite these explicit orders there were some mistakes and compromises of the border by pilots who became lost in the confusing geography of North Korea. Two fighter pilots strafed a Red Chinese airstrip near Antung on 27 August.

[Guss they were not mindreaders]

A 98th Group B-29 bombed near Antung on the night of 22 September when similarity of the topography of Antung and Sinanju, 60 miles south, led the crew to believe that they were bombing in the vicinity of Sinanju.

 Missions of this type up the northwest coast of Korea were necessary because of the large amounts of military supplies brought across the Manchurian border daily from Antung, but the crew had been briefed to remain 50 miles or more from the border. General Stratemeyer specifically directed that any crew given a mission north of the line P'yŏngyang   -  Wŏnsan should be briefed on North Korean geography and that if they could not positively locate themselves they were not to attack.

When two F-80 's attacked a Siberian airfield on 8 October, General Stratemeyer removed the group commander.

[note]

 

biography


*General Stratemeyer had issued positive orders cautioning against any violation of the Manchurian or Siberian borders on 3 July and again on 14 August 1950. Some errors nevertheless occurred, though not so many as the Communists alleged. Two American Mustang pilots apparently strayed across the border and strafed a Red Chinese airstrip near Antung on 27 August.

[note]

 

Evacuation of front-line Army casualties continued to be a major concern, but the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron and the Fifth Air Force recognized that new arrangements would be needed as United Nations Command forces attacked northward from the Pusan perimeter. On 27 August 1950 the Fifth Air Force accordingly established a Rescue Liaison Office in the Joint Operations Center, and on 30 August the 3rd Squadron formally organized Detachment F in Korea, under the command of Captain Oscar N. Tibbetts.

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

     

Orders came to El Toro on 16 August for the overseas movement of the remaining elements of the 1st MAW. Units affected were Wing Headquarters Squadron 1 and MAG12, comprising Headquarters
Squadron 12, Service Squadron 12, VMF312, VMF212, VMF(N)542, and the rear echelon of VMF(N)513.


VMF312 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)513 were loaded on the USS Sitkoli Bay (CVE-86) with their aircraft and sailed on 24 August.

 

Three days later (27th) VMF212 and VMF(N)542 embarked on the USS Cape Esperance (CVE-88), and the USNS General C.G. Morton (T-AP-138)  weighed anchor with the remaining components on 1 September.[5] This completed the overseas movement of the 1st MAW, since General Harris and his staff had departed from El Toro by air for Japan the day before Aug 31.

[note]

 

      USN_Units   USN_Units

On the 26th enemy lines of communications were swept, attacks on targets of opportunity were carried out, and another attempt was made
to provide support for the ground forces.

Three USS Valley Forge (CV-45) flights of F4Us and ADs attacked troops, tanks, and trucks with good results, and two reported that despite crowded radio channels the work of the controllers was satisfactory. For Air Group II in USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) the day started with a jet sweep which attacked troops in a tunnel north of Pohang, which was followed up by a strike of Corsairs and Skyraiders on a vehicle concentration west of the Naktong. It ended with another jet sweep led by Commander Ralph Weymouth, the air groups new commander, which reported good results: in the hills northwest of Pohang an attack in battalion strength had been broken up by strafing; west of the town a competent airborne controller had directed rocket and strafing runs within a hundred yards of friendly forces. Air operations were thus successfully routine, but as the force cruised the neighborhood of Ullung Do the sonarmen on the destroyers were kept jumping by numerous contacts attributed to the whales which frequent the neighborhood of that island.

 

During the night the carriers steamed northward, and on the 27th launched against transportation and other targets in the Wŏnsan-Ch'ŏngjin coastal strip and shipping in Wŏnsan harbor. These strikes were described by the task force commander as more profitable than the previous days work in support of troops.

Quite possibly they were, but the comments on the support effort appear to have stemmed largely from memories of earlier chaos: although pilot reports indicated improved results in routine support missions, the effort was characterized as ineffective, owing to inadequate communications, poor radio discipline, and poor control.

[note]

 

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

[note]

 

 

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Nearest to the N.K. 12th Division was the ROK Capital Division. At 0400, 27 August, a North Korean attack overran one company of the ROK 17th Regiment, Capital Division, north of Kigye. This caused the whole regiment to give way. Then the 18th Regiment on the right fell back because of its exposed flank. The 17th Regiment lost the town of Kigye, and the entire Capital Division fell back three miles to the south side of the Kigye valley. This enemy blow fell with startling impact on Eighth Army in the predawn hours of 27 August. [22-1]

[note]

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0556 Sunrise

[note]

 

 

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biography      biography

At the briefing at Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu on Sunday, 27 August, General Walker showed his concern over this development. One of those present was Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter who had arrived in Korea about a month earlier. Half an hour after the briefing ended, General Walker called General Coulter to him and said, "I can't get reliable reports. I want you to go to the eastern front and represent me. I am sending a regiment from the 24th Division to help." [22-2]

[note]

 

  

The U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment on the morning of 27 August was moving to a position north of Taegu, when General Walker revoked its orders and instructed Colonel Stephens to turn the regiment around and proceed as rapidly as possible to KYŏngju [is due East of Taegu 40 miles, and South of P'ohang-dong 30 miles ]and report to Gen. John B. Coulter.

[On map 11 you will see that the 24th ID is relieved by the 2nd ID on August 24th. At 1800. It is located North of the 25th ID and south of Taegu and the 1st Cav. The 21st IR is part of the 24th ID.]

map

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The regiment [21st Infantry Regiment] departed Taegu at 1000 and arrived at KYŏngju that afternoon. Coulter immediately sent the 3rd Battalion north to An'gang-ni where it went into a position behind the ROK Capital Division. [22-4]

General Coulter's plan to attack on 28 August had to be postponed. The ROK I Corps commander told him he could not attack, that there were "too many enemy, too many casualties, troops tired." Also, the N.K. 5th Division above P'ohang-dong had begun to press south again and the ROK 3rd Division in front of it began to show signs of giving way.

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biography   biography   biography

Coulter flew to Yŏngju at once, arriving there at noon. Walker in the meantime formally appointed Coulter Deputy Commander, Eighth Army, placing him in command of the ROK I Corps, the U.S. 21st Infantry, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, less C Company. General Coulter designated these units Task Force Jackson and established his headquarters in the same building in Kyŏngju in which the ROK I Corps commander and the KMAG officers had their command post. He assumed command of Task Force Jackson at 1200, 27 August. [22-3]

When he arrived at Kyŏngju that Sunday, General Coulter found the ROK I Corps disintegrating rapidly and in low morale. Coulter talked to the ROK commanders and their staffs about the terrible effect of their failure to stop the North Koreans and the danger it posed for the entire Pusan Perimeter. General Walker had instructed him to issue his orders to the ROK I Corps commander or his chief of staff in the form of advice, which Coulter did. Coulter had the mission of eliminating the enemy penetration in the Kigye area and of seizing and organizing the high ground extending from north of Yŏngch'ŏn northeasterly to the coast at Wŏlp'ŏ-ri, about twelve miles north of P'ohang-dong. This line passed ten miles north of Kigye. Coulter was to attack at once with Task Force Jackson, his immediate objective being to gain the first high ground north of Kigye.

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 August

Full Moon

 

 

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   Unit Info

The 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, now relieved the 1st Battalion in the Battle Mountain-P'il-bong area, except for C Company which, as part of Task Force Baker, remained on Old Baldy. Corley's battalion completed this relief by 1800, 27 August. [20-28]

 

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1907 Sunset

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Casualties

Sunday August 27, 1950 (Day - 64)

Korean_War 25 Casualties


19500827 0000 Casualties by unit

1 11TH MARINE REGIMENT
2 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 2ND REPLACEMENT COMPANY - DIVISION
1 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
8 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
10 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION - UNKNOWN UNITS
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
25 19500827 0000 Casualties by unit

As of August 27, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4364 134 13 4591
Today 23 1 1 25
Total 80 4387 135 14 4616

Aircraft Losses Today 000

 

 

Notes for Sunday August 27, 1950 (Day - 64)

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