Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 22.2°C   71.96 °F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Citations

[note]

 

Silver Star

Stephens, Richard Warburton [Col SS3 21stIR]

 

biography   biography   biography

President Truman signs a law that extends social security benefits to 10 million people, including residents of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

[note]

 

A grief stricken American infantryman whose buddy has been killed in action is comforted by another soldier. In the background a corpsman methodically fills out casualty tags, Haktong-ni area, Korea. August 28, 1950. Sfc. Al Chang. (Army)
NARA FILE # 080-SC-347803
WAR & CONFLICT BOOK #: 1459

[note]

American Ceasear

 

biography   biography

It was almost a minute before his audience shifted in their chairs. Then Sherman said: "Thank you. A great voice in a great cause." The admiral told Shepard that he thought the General had been "spellbinding," and he said to another officer, "I'm going to back the Inchon operation. I think it's sound." As CINCFE's charm wore off, they began to have second thoughts.

The next day Sherman said uneasily, "I wish I had that man's optimism." Collins wanted Kunsan kept alive as an alternative, and one general officer, believing now that he had been "mesmerized by MacArthur," gloomily called Inchon "a 5,000-to-1 shot."

Nevertheless, the following Monday, four days later, the Chiefs wired SCAP:

"We concur after reviewing the information brought back by General Collins and Admiral Sherman in making preparations and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea, either at Inch'ŏn in the event the enemy defenses prove ineffective, or at a favorable beach south of Inch'ŏn if one can be located. . . . We understand that alternative plans are being developed to best exploit the situation as it develops." [73]

[note]

 

PRC officially protests raids into Manchuria

[note]

 

 

CIA

 

Koread-War

The following (2 pages of an 8 page document) are presented here first was printed on 26 July 1950 in a local Korean news paper.  The corespondent was not an ally and his story of POW's is highlly suspect.

[note]

 

biography  

At about this time, Admiral Sherman made a decision that reflected concern about the capacity of Vice Admiral Joy and his staff to handle the burdens imposed by the Korean War, burdens that had been unanticipated in the post–World War II allocation of responsibilities. Joy’s staff was small, intended for occupation duties, and Joy’s World War II experience had been limited to cruiser fire-support units. Sherman also had lingering doubts about the Inch'ŏn operation itself. His answer was to augment Joy’s staff.

Consequently, on 28 August, following his return from a visit to Tokyo, he summoned Captain Arleigh Burke (whose World War II record was distinguished but whose career had nearly ended in the defense-unification struggle "Revolt of the Admiral's") to his office and asked him to report to COMNAVFE as his deputy chief of staff—“as a senior officer to advise him and take charge of the headquarters’ wartime responsibilities.” Sherman had another agenda as well: he wanted Burke to “send a personal radio dispatch to me directly at least once each day. I want you particularly to study the plan for this upcoming Inch'ŏn assault. If you think it likely to fail, let me know and I can block the operation.”

To that end the Chief of Naval Operations offered Burke a box with code wheels for enciphering those dispatches—Sherman would have the only matching set of wheels. A man of exemplary character, Burke agreed to go to Tokyo and send Sherman the reports, but none that he had not previously shown to Joy; if Joy had not concurred, Burke would transmit “another dispatch stating why Admiral Joy disagreed with my report and what I think of his objections.” Sherman acquiesced, and Burke departed for Tokyo,

[note]

 

Koread-War

1950/08/28 - JCS approve Inch'ŏn plan - no order from Truman; only JCS recommendation "let action determine the matter"

[note]

 

August

[note]

 

August

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South then North

 

   Unit Info

On 25 and 26 August, C Company beat off a number of North Korean thrusts on Battle Mountain-all coming along one avenue of approach, the long finger ridge extending upward from the mines at Tundok. At one point in this series of actions, a flight of Air Force planes caught about 100 enemy soldiers in the open and immediately napalmed, bombed, and strafed them. There were few survivors. Task Force Baker, commanded by Colonel Cole, and comprising C Company, a platoon of E Company, 24th Infantry, and a ROK police company, defended Battle Mountain at this time. The special command was established because of the isolated Battle Mountain area and the extended regimental battle frontage. It buried many enemy dead killed within or in front of its positions during these two days. [27]

The 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, now relieved the 1st Battalion in the Battle Mountain-P'il-bong area, except for C Company which, as part of Task Force Baker, remained on Old Baldy. Corley's battalion completed this relief by 1800, 27 August. [28]

The North Korean attacks continued. On the 28th, an enemy company-sized attack struck between C and I Companies before dawn. That night, enemy mortar fire fell on C Company on Old Baldy, some of it obviously directed at the company command post.

[note]

 

 

       eusa    
      
  

In Eighth Army a confused order of battle had prevailed generally throughout August. Battle conditions frequently had compelled the army to separate battalions and regiments from their parent organizations and send them posthaste to distant points of the Pusan Perimeter to bolster a threatened sector. All divisions except the 1st Cavalry at various times were broken up by this process.

At the end of August, Eighth Army made an effort to unscramble the disorder. It ordered the 23d Infantry on 28 August to leave the Taegu front and return to 2nd Division control at Miryang; it ordered the 27th Infantry on 30 August to rejoin the 25th Division at Masan; and it ordered the 5th Regimental Combat Team north from the Masan area to join the 24th Division. [40]

[note]

 

Bio   Bio   Def

The drop in air delivery to Korea caused General Partridge, commanding the Far East Air Forces, to complain on 10 August that the Army was not fully using the airlift's 200-ton daily capacity. That day, Eighth Army ordered curtailment of delivery by the Red Ball Express and increased use of the airlift to its maximum capacity. The reason given for this action was a sudden apprehension that the port of Pusan could not process promptly the flow of water-borne supplies. The absurdity of the logistical situation was illustrated the next day, 11 August, when, upon General Partridge's suggestion, two 2 1/2-ton trucks were airlifted in a C-119 from Tachikawa Air Base in Japan to Taegu.

The Air Force planned to airlift two trucks daily in this manner.

As a result of this development, Eighth Army on 12 August ordered that, effective 15 August, the Red Ball Express be discontinued except on Tuesday and Friday of each week when it would carry cargo difficult for the planes to handle. Under this arrangement airlift tonnage greatly increased. On 16 August, transport planes carried 324 tons of cargo and 595 passengers; on 19 August, 160 tons of cargo and 381 passengers; on 28 August, 398 tons of cargo and 343 passengers; and, on 29 August, 326 tons of cargo and 347 passengers. [11]

[note]

 

biography     

The course of battle in the ROK eastern sector of the Perimeter and the enemy advance down the Sangju-Taegu road during August caused General Walker near the end of the month to decide on a shift of the boundary eastward between the American and ROK troops. He considered the existing boundary near the Sangju-Taegu road a source of military weakness.

On 26 August he ordered a new boundary line slanting southeast from a point two miles north of the Walled City of Ka-san to a point east of and below Taegu. This placed the Sangju-Taegu road and the former zone of the ROK 1st Division in the American zone. The 1st Cavalry Division was to move eastward into the ROK 1st Division zone, and the U.S. 2nd Division at the same time was to extend its zone northward into the 1st Cavalry zone. The shift of units was to take place as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 August.[41]

Pursuant to the army directive [of 8/26] , General Gay on 28 August ordered the 7th Cavalry Regiment  to occupy the left (west) part of the ROK 1st Division sector and the 8th Cavalry Regiment to occupy the right (east) part. This shift placed the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments in mountainous terrain north of Taegu. The supply of these units now became much more difficult than it had been along the Naktong.

[note]

 

Koread-War

The Air Force B-29's on 7 August bombed and largely destroyed the P'yŏngyang Army Arsenal and the P'yŏngyang railroad yards. On 7, 9, and 10 August they bombed and completely destroyed the large Chosen petroleum refinery at Wonsan. This plant, with its estimated capacity of 250,000 tons, annually produced approximately 93 percent of the North Korean petroleum products.

Throughout the month the Air Force (FEAFBC) bombed the chemical complex in the Hungnam area, the largest in Asia, dropping 1,761 tons of bombs there in the period between 30 July and 19 September.

{1+31+19=51 days 34 tons per day, at least 3 B-39's pr day}

It bombed the Najin docks only 17 miles south of the Siberian border and 10 air miles from Vladivostok. (Najin was an important port of entry for vessels carrying supplies from Vladivostok and it was also a rail center.) The bombers struck the metal-working industry at Sŏngjin with 326 tons of bombs on 28 August,

[note]

 

biography   biography

On the 28th, Colonel Emmerich, the KMAG adviser to the ROK 3rd Division, at a time he deemed favorable, advised Brig. Gen. Kim Suk Won, the ROK division commander, to counterattack, but General Kim refused to do so. The next day Kim said he was going to move his command post out of P'ohang-dong. Emmerich replied that the KMAG group was going to stay in P'ohang-dong. Upon hearing that, Kim became hysterical but decided to stay for the time being to avoid loss of face. That day, 28 August, General Walker issued a special statement addressed to the ROK Army, and meant also for the South Korean Minister of Defense. He called on the ROK's to hold their lines in the Perimeter, and said:

It is my belief, that the over-extended enemy is making his last gasp, while United Nations forces are daily becoming stronger and stronger. The time has now come for everyone to stand in place and fight, or advance to a position which will give us greater tactical advantage from which the counter-offensive can be launched. If our present positions are pierced, we must counterattack at once, destroy the enemy and restore the positions.

To you officers and soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Korea, I ask that you rise as one and stop the enemy on your front in his tracks. [22-5]

The ROK disorganization was so great in the face of continued enemy pressure that Task Force Jackson could not launch its planned coordinated attack. Colonel Stephens' 21st Infantry was in an assembly area two miles north of An'gang-ni and ready for an attack the morning of the 28th, but during the night the ROK 17th Regiment lost its position on the high ridge northward at the bend of the Kigye valley, and the attack was canceled.

 The ROK's regained their position in the afternoon but that night lost it again. At the same time, elements of the enemy 5th Division penetrated the ROK 3rd Division southwest of P'ohang-dong. General Coulter directed Colonel Stephens to repel this penetration.

[note]

 

       eusa     

On 28 August the Eighth Army intelligence officer warned that a general attack "may be expected at any time along the 2nd Division and 25th Division front," aimed at severing the Taegu-Pusan railroad and highway and capturing Masan. [23-1]

[note]

 

Agok

On the 35th Regiment's right flank, in the 9th Infantry, 2nd Division, sector across the Naktong, the enemy also made deep penetrations.

 (Map VI)

There, in the southern part of the U.S. 2nd Division zone, the 9th Infantry Regiment held a sector more than 20,000 yards long, including the bulge area of the Naktong where heavy fighting had taken place earlier in August. The rifle companies on the river line here had frontages of 3,000 to 4,000 feet, and, like the units to the north and south of them, they held only key hills and observation points.

As August neared its end, men on these hills could see minor enemy activity across the river, which they interpreted as North Koreans organizing the high ground on the west side of the Naktong against a possible American attack. There was moderate enemy infiltration into the 9th Infantry forward positions, but to the men in the front line this appeared to be only normal patrol action.

Opposite, on the west side of the Naktong, General Pak Kyo Sam, commanding the N.K. 9th Division, [*** NO SUCH DIVIION ***]issued his operational order to the division on 28 August. Its mission in the forthcoming attack was stated in part as follows:

To outflank and destroy the enemy by capturing the Miryang and Samnangjin areas, thereby cutting off his [Eighth Army] route of withdrawal between Taegu and Pusan, is the mission of this division. [23-14]

The North Koreans apparently did not know on the eve of their attack that the U.S. 2nd Division had replaced the 24th Division in this sector of the front, since they named the latter division in the attack order as being opposite it in the attack zone.

On the left and southern flank of the 9th Infantry river line, just above the junction of the Nam River with the Naktong, A Company was dug in on a long finger ridge paralleling the Naktong that terminates in Hill 94 at the Kihang ferry site. The river road from Namji-ri running west along the Naktong passes the southern tip of this ridge and crosses to the west side of the river at the ferry. A small village of a few huts, called Agok, lay at the base of Hill 94 and 300 yards from the river. Two medium tanks of A Company, 72nd Tank Battalion and two antiaircraft vehicles of D Battery, 82nd AAA Battalion, one mounting twin 40-mm. guns and the other four .50-caliber machine guns, together with two rifle squads of A Company, 9th Infantry, held a roadblock near the ferry and close to Agok.

[note]

 

Def

On 28 August the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur which seemingly concurred in the Inch'ŏn plans yet attached conditions. Their message said in part:

"We concur in making preparations for and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea, either at Inch'ŏn in the event the enemy defenses in the vicinity of Inch'ŏn prove ineffective, or at a favorable beach south of Inch'ŏn if one can be located. We further concur in preparations, if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We understand that alternative plans are being prepared in order to best exploit the situation as it develops. [25-18]

[note]

 

Intelligence Estimate

biography biography

General MacArthur's view at the end of August that the North Koreans had concentrated nearly all their combat resources against Eighth Army in the Pusan Perimeter coincided with the official G-2 estimate.

On 28 August the X Corps  G-2 Section estimated the enemy strength in Sŏul as approximately 5,000 troops, in Inch'ŏn as 1,000, and at Kimp'o Airfield as 500, for a total of 6,500 soldiers in the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul area.

[note]

 

Division Sholder Patch

The Far East Command considered the possibility that the enemy might reinforce the Inch'on-Sŏul area from forces committed against Eighth Army in the south. If this were attempted, it appeared that the North Korean 3d, 13th, and 10th Divisions, deployed on either side of the main Sŏul-Taejon- Taegu highway, could most rapidly reach the Inch'on area.

North Korean air and naval elements were considered incapable of interfering with the landing.

On 28 August the Far East Command estimated there were only nineteen obsolescent Soviet-manufactured aircraft available to the North Korean Air Force. The U.N. air elements, nevertheless, had orders to render unusable any known or suspected enemy air facilities, and particularly to give attention to new construction at Kimp'o, Suwŏn, and Taejŏn. North Korean naval elements were almost nonexistent at this time. Five divisions of small patrol-type vessels comprised the North Korean Navy; one was on the west coast at Chinnamp'o, the others at Wŏnsan on the east coast. At both places they were bottled up and rendered impotent.

[note]

 

 

The Forgotten War

 

Koread-War

The JCS, meanwhile, received a thorough briefing from Collins and Sherman on Inch'ŏn. It was far from optimistic; both men still foresaw possible disaster. Yet the JCS was reluctant to overrule MacArthur and cancel Inch'ŏn for several reasons. One was the "tradition," born in the Civil War and religiously adhered to in World War II, of giving the theater commander wide latitude in tactical operations. Another was the fear of incurring MacArthur's wrath.

The JCS did, however, do its utmost to persuade MacArthur to choose an alternate site to Inch'ŏn. On August 28 it cabled him a tactful message, which was drafted by Sherman and approved by Truman, urging a landing at Kunsan:

After reviewing the information brought back by General Collins and Admiral Sherman we concur in making preparations and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea, either at Inch'ŏn in the event that enemy forces in the vicinity of Inch'ŏn prove ineffective or at a favorable beach south of Inch'ŏn if one can be located.
 We further concur in preparation, if desired ... for envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We understand that alternative plans are being prepared in order to best exploit the situation as it develops. We desire such information as becomes available with respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and timely information as to your intentions and plans for offensive operations.

[note]

 

Koread-War

Perhaps fearing that the JCS would ultimately order a cancellation of Inch'ŏn, MacArthur embarked on an astounding course of deceit and deception designed to thwart such an order. He did not reply at all to the JCS August 28 cable.

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

 

Had a fine conference (1530) with Mr. Ben Wright[239] this afternoon and will lend him every possible assistance. Sent a redline to Vandenberg so stating.


I was impressed with the PIO (alert) abilities of Colonel Wright. I agreed with him that he should do his job out here as a representative of American Airlines rather than as a consultant for General Vandenberg. I feel confident that his stay here, after he thoroughly sees our set up and operations and with his contact with the Army, the Marines and the Navy at his service back home, General Vandenberg will be benefited. Just prior to his departure from FEAF, he will pay me another visit.

Sent the following cryptic message to Cabell (in answer to his T.S., "Eyes Only' handwritten letter):

Reference the conversation I had with you just prior to your departure and at which time I brought Banfill into the picture, and in view of receipt of your letter written in longhand dated 21 August, I assume you are not interested in further reports of the nature that we discussed at the airport. The initiative is now in your hands as your letter referred to above absolutely stymies me. I have issued instructions accordingly.

As per my instructions to Nuckols, quoted in full, is his interim reply to Sory Smith re the Phillip Potter newstory released in the Baltimore Sun, and the Sun's editorial comments re the release:

Sory Smith from Nuckols - This is radnote #41, 28 Aug 50, reur USAF-
49 dated 25 Aug. I have discussed the matter in great detail with General Stratemeyer and suggest you advise General Norstad that the following action is being taken:

(1) General Stratemeyer is writing a letter to Admiral Joy, transmitting both the story and the editorial and asking for specific comments on the allegations contained in said story. Specifically he is asking, do the quotations attributed to senior naval commanders in fact represent the views of these commanders?

He is also specifically requesting Admiral Joy to provide additional Navy controllers and controller teams both at JOC and at combat troop level if, in Admiral Joy's opinion, such a requirement continues to exist.

(2) General Stratemeyer is asking General Partridge, CG Fifth AF, for detailed information as to allegations contained in story and on Fifth AF acceptance or request for additional Navy controllers and controller teams.

He is impressing on Partridge that he is not repeat not to let the above request interfere with his operational responsibilities. These comments, both from Admiral Joy and General Partridge, will be forwarded by General Stratemeyer to General Norstad as soon as available with his comments.

 

It is interesting to note the following extracts from a memo dated 10 Aug from COMNAVFE (Admiral Joy) to General Stratemeyer:

 the letter is in reply to a letter of congratulation to COMNAVFE from General Stratemeyer expressing his gratification of 47 enemy aircraft destroyed by naval aviation.

Following are extracts from Admiral Joy's reply:

"Your hq furnished most of the target information, coordination effort and photographic data which materially assisted in the success of the 18-19 July strike. The spirit of willing and energetic cooperation exhibited by your staff and the members of the Far East Air Forces, with whom they deal, has brought forth much favorable comment from officers of my command. This fine spirit continues to build a higher mutual regard and warm bond of understanding between the U. S. Navy and U. S. Air Force in this theater.'

It is difficult to reconcile the above statement with the allegations contained in the BALTIMORE SUN article, none of which have been brought to FEAF's attention through official channels. General Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, during his recent visit to this theater, discussed the general subject of Air Force-Navy cooperation in great detail with General Stratemeyer. Believe General Edwards understands the problem, both as it exists here and also as it exists Stateside.

 Stratemeyer recommends Norstad discuss whole problem with Edwards. The following item from Combat Ops Center diary, dated 11 August, is quoted for your information:

"The AF combat ops officer, in discussing difficulties in coordinating Navy strikes, pointed out three deficiencies:
(1) Navy was sending too great a number of aircraft into the areas at one time.
(2) JOC did not have info as to their time of arrival.
(3) No naval liaison officers were present.'

Diary item continues to say that items 1 and 3 have been eliminated. Navy has reduced number of aircraft coming into the area at one time and 4 naval officers and one Marine officer have been assigned as liaison officers.

Diary item continues,

"JOC expresses no complaint against coordination with Navy and commends their excellent job.'

Diary item then contains the following paragraph: which deals with conversation between Major Lynch, 5th AF officer in JOC and Commander Murch, USN[240] -

"When asked if a briefed secondary target should be assigned each Navy flight, Maj Lynch queried Commander Murch, USN, who answered 'No' as he was satisfied with their present procedures, and if forward controllers were filled up at the time, armed recn areas are and can be assigned.' The above is completely at variance with the Potter article. For your info, it is interesting to note that CG FEAF has constantly requested Navy air to operate in battle area and that 7th Fleet has consistently asked for area assignments outside of enemy battle area due to "scarcity of targets in battle area.'

Further interesting to note that an agreed upon Navy plan, arrived at after joint AF-naval planner conference, states that for close support work Navy would supply three controllers from the close support carrier. One controller would be relieved about 1700 each day to return to carrier to provide day to day exchange of information. Copy of memo of record is on file in this HQ. Personal comment from Nuckols to Smith: The pattern of the planned attack on tactical aviation is similar if not identical to the recent abortive attack of strategic air power. Cast of characters remains the same. Plan of maneuver essentially the same. The only difference being change in target.


General Craigie presented the following letter to Partridge for my signature re the Potter article:


I am referring to you the attached article and editorial which were published in the 23 August issue of the Baltimore Sun and which were referred to this Hq for comment by Headquarters, USAF. This is the third example of this type of malicious attack against our operations in support of the ground forces which has come to my attention. I realize that inquiring into this sort of thing can very seriously detract from the time and effort which you are able to devote to your primary operational responsibilities. It is my desire that you turn this over to a staff officer for preparation of comment in order that it may interfere as little as possible. It is my desire that your comments include statements relative to the utilization you have made of Seventh Fleet controllers or control teams. Please inform me also relative to direct offers of such teams which you may have received from the Seventh Fleet. One of the serious allegations concerns deficiencies in the communications between 7th Fleet and your headquarters. I would appreciate your comments relative to that matter also. I am enclosing copy of letter written this date to Admiral Joy.

My letter to Admiral Joy:

Dear Turner, I have had brought to my attention an article and editorial which have appeared in the Baltimore Sun in which the writer, Mr. Phillip Potter, after having interviewed various high-ranking members of the United States Navy in the Pacific, including Rear Admiral Ewen, has made very derogatory statements relative to:

(1) the operation of FEAF in Korea;

(2) the cooperation which exists between FEAF and Unites States Navy carrier aviation;

(3) my inhospitality toward the Navy's proffered assistance, and

(4) the failure on the part of FEAF to supply the Navy with information and/or equipment which the Navy required.

 

As I indicated to you previously, during our discussion on the Miller article on "Marine close support aviation,' this sort of thing upsets me very greatly. I am concerned because the picture which is created in the mind of the reader of such an article is vastly different from the picture which I carry in my mind of the cooperative spirit which has characterized the actions of my staff in dealing with the Navy. Contrary, to the impression created in this article, I have urged maximum participation of the Navy in close support of the battle line. I have, in fact, been quite disturbed over repeated (occasional) indications that the Seventh Fleet was more anxious to operate in North Korea than in the close support zone. Admittedly, good battle area targets are, and have been from the beginning, rather scarce and hard to locate during daylight hours. The importance to the ground effort has, at times, however, dictated the use of practically all available Naval air strength, as well as all FEAF tactical air strength, in this less lucrative area. Thus, we have endeavored to insure our ability to attack a worthwhile target when and if it did appear. This has, at times, resulted in what might appear as an over-saturation of the battle area which after all is a cap. As the ground situation improves, the necessity for this will become much less. The statement is made that I have been inhospitable and non-receptive to offers of the Navy to supply controller teams. This is not the case. On the contrary, following a joint meeting on 3 August, there was delivered to my headquarters on the following day an agreed upon Navy plan which stated that, for close support work, the Navy would supply three controllers from the close support carrier. One controller would be relieved about 1700 each day, returning to the carrier in order to provide day-to-day exchange of information. A copy of this memorandum is on file in this headquarters. If, at any time in your opinion, the requirement exists in Korea for additional Navy controllers or controller teams, please be assured they will be very welcome. General Partridge has informed me that he shares this view. With reference to our failure to supply proper grids, maps and target material to Fleet personnel, I am informed that the Navy has been supplied the same material which has been made available to our own personnel and in at least as generous quantities.


Regardless of the nature of the articles which certain misguided writers or publishers are printing in the United States, my single idea in connection with the Korean effort has been and is to do my utmost, and encourage all under me to do their [both words emphasised in original] utmost, to bring about a United Nations victory. If I have at any time appeared inhospitable to offers from you or your people, I apologize and if I have appeared non-receptive to suggestions submitted by the Navy, I would appreciate it if you would bring such incidents to my attention in order that I may take appropriate corrective action. I consider it of vital importance that you and I and our staffs work together smoothly and with a minimum of public recrimination and criticism. Anything less than this can only result in a loss of confidence in the military establishment on the part of the American people. I, therefore, am asking you to inform me if and when in your opinion, misunderstandings have developed or are developing between us or between our respective staffs. It is possible that the time has come for a meeting of appropriate individuals on our respective staffs for the purpose of ironing out such differences as may be developing.

After all, there have been many new arrivals (both Navy and Air Force) to the theater during the past few weeks and it may well be possible that some of these individuals have brought with them ideas which are not in consonance with agreements which you and I reached relative to the coordination of the operation of our respective combat air units. It is possible that it is necessary at this time to again reiterate the terms of the CINCFE directive (GHQ, FEC, file AG 370.2 (8 July 50) CG) which delegated to me coordination control of United Nations air over Korea "when both Navy Forces, Far East, and FEAF are assigned missions in Korea.'

If you believe that we are not seeing eye to eye on such subjects as the utilization of Navy tactical control teams or, as I said before, on any matter of mutual interest, I would consider it a favor if you would bring such matters to my attention with the view of having appropriate individuals on our respective staffs get together and iron out the difficulties. It appears to me that such a get together between your operations people and mine would be appropriate in the immediate future in order to preclude the recurrence of that which occurred on 26 Aug. On that date, the CG 5th AF expected and counted on approximately 80 sorties from the Seventhth Fleet in direct support of the ground forces in the battle line; only 4 flights of 4 a/c each reported in to the JOC although I note that 19 additional close support sorties were reported in your flash summary, Air Ops, 26 August. I am sure that you will agree with me it could be extremely serious for misunderstandings of such a nature to occur at that level. Lastly, I would appreciate receiving your personal views as follows: in your opinion do the deficiencies alleged in the article, in fact, exist? Does the picture painted by this article accurately portray the views held by senior commanders in the 7th Fleet? If the deficiencies do exist, it is indeed unfortunate that they have to be brought to my attention through the press rather than through a meeting between the two of us.

Issued following Stratline to Partridge:

re 15-mile column enemy troops sighted vicinity of Kyomip'o (38°35';
125°45')
: CINCFE desires hourly reports starting 1500 hours today on location, progress, results our air attacks, and any other pertinent information to include negative reports throughout the hours of daylight and such reports as you can obtain during hours of darkness.

Radio - to Ramey from Stratemeyer:

Officers of this and my AF hqs have had earlier "M' atomic energy clearances continued here. Disregarding duty assignment of officer, request statement of AF policy on allowing officers holding M or Q clearances to go on combat missions over Korea. Because of rapid changes and improvements in atomic weapons, and because of great amount of information previously classified which has appeared in press and periodicals believe any restrictions that may exist should be tied to date officer when to school at Kirtland or was briefed by General LeMay at his hqrs. Any policy applying to staff officers of this and my AF hq should be in consonance with any restrictions that have been placed on SAC units operating in this theater.

[note]

 

 

28 August 1950

Two SA-16s and two SB-17s were used this date on orbit missions. The SA-16s flew fifteen hours and forty minutes (15:40) and the SB-17s flew fifteen hours and fifteen minutes (15:15) making a total of thirty hours and fifty five minutes (30:55).

Flight "D", one C-47 was used this date for emergency evacuation from Miazaki, Japan, to the 118th Station Hospital at Fukuoka. The patient was suffering from possible peptic ulcers. One C-47 piloted by Capt. Oscar H. Tibbetts, was used to make this evacuation. A total of two hours and twenty minutes flying time was logged on this mission.

Flight "D", one C-47 was used this date to fly personnel and equipment to Pusan, Korea. This aircraft was piloted by Capt. Jack Charles accompanied by three crew members. A total of two hours flying time was logged.

The Advance Rescue Detachment in Korea made six evacuations by H-5 this date. Seven hours and thirty minutes (7:30) flying time was logged on these missions.

Flight "D", at 0820/K, the SB-17 on orbit mission received a call that a F-51 was in trouble 40 miles south of Suwŏn. The SB-17 intercepted the F-51 at 0912/K at 34°23' N - 126°35' E and escorted him to Pusan. The aircraft landed safely at Pusan at 0943/K and the SB-17 returned to his orbit.

[note]

 

    

The 6204th Photo Mapping Flight, with two unarmed RB-17's, was ordered from Clark to Johnson Air Base on 15 July. After much difficulty in getting the two planes armed at Clark and FEAMCOM, one plane was finally ready on 23 August, the same day that two additional unarmed RB-17's flew in from the Zone of Interior.

One month and 8 days after the detachment was given the mission of combat-mapping photography for North Korea, it was ready for action, and on 28 August it flew its first mission. Despite the fact that a shortage of operational aircraft naturally impeded the work of the detachment, FEAMCOM was not able to arm the two new RB-17's until the end of October, for the depot had to resort to local manufacture of gun mounts, brackets, and turret mechanisms. By this time one of the two original planes had been sent in for depot repair with mechanical troubles.

The 6204th Photo Mapping Flight was a United States Air Force unit that fought in the Korean War. The unit was attached to Far East Air Forces Fifth Air Force

 

In mid-July 1950, the 6204th Photo Mapping Flight, located at Clark AB, Philippines, deployed the Flight's two RB-17 aircraft complete with combat crews and maintenance personnel to Johnson AB, Japan. The FEAF deployment order specified that the two RB-17 aircraft be equipped with normal armament insofar as practicable, not to interfere with the photographic capability of the aircraft. This posed a problem for the Flight, since the RB-17s had been flying peacetime missions and were not equipped for combat.

 However, the 6204th found the necessary gunners and equipment, made the modifications to the aircraft, and by late August 1950 the detachment began flying photo-mapping missions over Korea. By the end of November 1950, it had photographed the entire North Korean area at least once and re-photographed some areas as far north as weather conditions permitted. By early December the detachment returned to Clark AB and resumed the flight's mapping program in the Philippine area.

Stations:

Aircraft Flown:

See also
References

[note]

 

Under the command of Lt. Col. Klair E. Back after 28 August 1950, the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron pioneered in the employment of new search and rescue equipment and techniques, which, for the first time as a standing procedure, included the rescue of stranded personnel from behind enemy lines. At first the 3rd Squadron employed its SB-17's primarily as orbit aircraft for the B-29 strikes, and the new SA-16's maintained continuous daylight patrols over the Tsushima Straits.

[note]

 

biography   biography   biography   biography

Already, on 20 August, General Stratemeyer had warned General Partridge that he must devote enough attention to the enemy's airfields to prevent him from making "any sacrificial strike" against United Nations forces.[106] General MacArthur, who saw the attack upon the British destroyer as an evidence of an increased enemy air potential, instructed General Stratemeyer to provide for frequent inspection and attack against known or suspected enemy air facilities. "The use by the enemy of these or other airfields south of 39 degrees north," said MacArthur, "must be refused from this date forward."[107] Since full and regular coverage of the enemy's airfields by his reconnaissance crews revealed very few planes and almost no activity, General Partridge saw little need to do more than to continue frequent interval surveillance of Communist fields in North Korea.[108]

During August the reconnaissance crews periodically reported small numbers of enemy planes which seemed serviceable, and Fifth Air Force fighter pilots went where they were located and knocked them out. At the end of August FEAF estimated that the North Korean Air Force could not possess more than 18 planes. By a most generous reckoning the North Korean Air Force could be expected to launch no more than 16 sorties in any one day.#[109]

[note]

 

On 28 August the Peking foreign office officially protested that American planes had violated Manchurian territory five times.* General Stratemeyer warned that the Chinese protest note could well be the final indication that the Chinese Communists intended to carry out their announced determination to aid the North Korean invaders. Stratemeyer notified Generals Partridge and O'Donnell that he considered Chinese air and ground assistance to the hard-pressed North Koreans to be "a distinct possibility." #8

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

August 28, 1950 it was D-minus 18 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so much progress that Embarkation Order 1–50 was issued on the last day of the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO 2-50. Operations orders of JTF–7 and TF–90 were issued concurrently.

[note]

 

 

On 30 August, ComNavFE issued his Operation Plan 108–50, assigning to JTF–7, of which X Corps was a part, the mission of seizing by amphibious assault a beachhead at Inchon. X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by Division until the 30th.

By that time, Division planning had made so much progress that Embarkation Order 1–50 was issued on the last day of the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO 2-50.

 Operations orders of JTF–7 and TF–90 were issued concurrently.

This meant that the assault RCTs, contrary to amphibious doctrine, were to receive rigid landing plans drawn up completely by the Division. Lack of time caused this variation from usual procedure, but General Smith had confidence in the ability of his troops to overcome the handicap.

“Under the circumstances,” he asserted, “adoption of such methods was justified by the common background and training of all elements and individuals in amphibious doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques.”[1]

 

The most that could be done was to summon Brigade staff officers from Korea for a conference. Colonel Edward D. Snedeker (Chief of Staff), Captain Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN (Brigade Surgeon), Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester (G–4), and Major Donald W. Sherman (G–1) arrived on board the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) for a conference on 28 August and the following day.

[note]

 

X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so much progress that Embarkation Order 1–50 was issued on the last day of the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO 2-50. Operations orders of JTF–7 and TF–90 were issued concurrently.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 

USN_Units   USN_Units   USN_Units

28, 29, 30, 31

And when Admiral Hartman and the USS Helena (CA-75) group arrived to relieve next day P'ohang was still in U.N. hands. Aircraft from Task Force 77 took off some pressure on the 26th, reinforcements were again moved in by EUSAK, and from the 28th to the 31st close support was provided by the Marine airmen from USS Sicily (CVE-118). The last day of August saw friendly forces making sizable gains.

[note]

 

biography
Task Force 95

The attack on HMS Comus (R-43) [on the 22nd] produced a call for air cover from the escort carriers, which otherwise spent most of their effort during the latter part of the month in close support of Army forces on the perimeter. Despite the difficult hydrographic conditions in the west, the blockade here, as in the east, appears to have been effective: no traffic was moving south around the headlands patrolled by British units, and on 28 August Admiral Andrewes conducted a photographic reconnaissance of the entire coastline with satisfactorily negative results.

[note]

 

USN_Units

On the 28th, as Task Force 77 was fuelling south of Korea and recovering replacement aircraft flown out from Japan, another list of bridges was received from FEAF and a schedule for future operations from ComNavFE. The planned activities on the west coast would now be but the start of a second sequence: fuelling on the 31st would be followed by two more days of strikes, a day in replenishment, and strikes on 4–5 September.

[note]

 

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August–4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

 

[note]

 

USN_Units

On 25 July the Chief of Naval Operations had ordered the activation of the fast carrier USS Princeton (CV-37), then in reserve at Bremerton. Recommissioned on 28 August, under command of Captain William 0. Gallery and with a crew largely composed of recalled reservists, Princeton had completed her period of shakedown training, had embarked Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, Commander Carrier Division 5, and had sailed from the west coast in early November. On the 25th she departed Pearl Harbor for the Western Pacific; on the 27th, on orders from CincPacFleet to proceed at maximum safe speed, she went up to 30 knots; on the 30th ComNavFE instructed her to proceed directly to the operating area. Ariving on December 5th.

[note]

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Log Cmd Japanese fe-a.gif (29906 bytes)

On 28 August, with the concurrence of GHQ, FEC, General Weible established a subordinate command, the Northern, at Sapporo, Japan. The Commanding General, Northern Command, Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Piburn, was made responsible for the island of Hokkaido and certain areas on the northern portion of Honshu.

[note]

 

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Def

Upon their return to Washington, General Collins and Admiral Sherman explained to their fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the concept and the state of preparation for the attack on Inch'on. Now that the veil had been lifted, the Joint Chiefs examined the plans carefully.

They found no real disagreement with what MacArthur intended to do and, on 28 August, notified him that they approved his plans for an amphibious operation on the west coast of Korea. They suggested, though, that he also prepare plans for an amphibious envelopment in the vicinity of Kunsan. [08-22]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff very pointedly told MacArthur that, from here on in, they wanted to know what went on in his theater.

 "We desire such information as becomes available with respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and timely information as to your intentions and plans for offensive operations." [08-23]

Why had the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to send MacArthur approval of his plans? General Collins may have felt that the controversy evident at the Tokyo briefing had now been resolved and took this way of clearing any doubt from MacArthur's mind. The Inch'ŏn landing would tie up a major share of the nation's ready combat forces and, while by strict interpretation, the landing would be a purely tactical maneuver at the discretion of the theater commander, failure would have repercussions far beyond Korea. This may have led the Joint Chiefs to identify themselves with the operation by granting approval, at the same time placing them in a better position to call off the maneuver if the risks suddenly appeared too great. Their admonition requiring "timely information" is in line with this latter possibility. Certainly the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not tell MacArthur that they were taking the reins from his hands. [08-24]

[note]

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biography   biography  

In his final word to General MacArthur on 28 August, he (General Collins) pointed out that by expediting to the maximum extent, the 187th Airborne RCT could reach Sasebo, Japan, on 21 September. The unit could then complete preparations for an airborne drop of the entire regiment by 29 September, but no earlier. "I strongly urge," General Collins said, "it not be committed prior to that date. The unit is presently capable of daylight operations only. However, I am confident that this unit will, in all respects, meet the high combat standards set by our airborne units in the last war." There appeared to be no appeal from these opinions of the Chief of Staff, and General MacArthur acquiesced, replying that his plans would be adjusted. [09-48]

[note]

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1910 Sunset

[note]

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 Def    biography

On 28 August, the President sent Austin more ammunition with which to demolish the Communist charges concerning Formosa by telling him that the United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. [20-21]

[note]

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Casualties

Monday August 28, 1950 (Day - 65)

 

Korean_War 12 Casualties

19500828 0000 Casualties by unit

4 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 2ND ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
1 2ND REPLACEMENT COMPANY - DIVISION
1 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION - UNKNOWN UNITS
1 VMF 323 - MARINE FIGHTER SQUADRON 323
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
12 19500828 0000 Casualties by unit

As of August 28, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4387 135 14 4616
Today 11 1   12
Total 80 4398 136 14 4628

Aircraft Losses Today 002

 

Notes for Monday August 28, 1950 (Day - 65)

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