Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 22.4°C    72.32°F at Taegu  

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Typhoon Jane

Category 3 typhoon (SSHS)
Duration August 29 – September 4
Peak intensity 185 km/h (115 mph) (1-min)  943 mbar (hPa)

Citations

Silver Star

Fujita, Takeshi [PFC SS A5thIR]

Jenkins, John M. [2ndLt SS C24thIR]

[note]

 

27th British Infantry Brigade

British Commonwealth 27th Brigade lands at Pusan

August 29 - Scottish and English Allied troops enter War to create a United Nations fighting force.

Two British units -- First Battalionthe Middlesex Regiment and First Battalion,    Argyll and Sutherland Highland Light Infantry, come ashore at Pusan from a British aircraft carrier.

The first troops of the British 27th Infantry Brigade arrived in Korea from Hong Kong.

 

[note]    [note]   [note]   [note]

 

3rd Rescue Squadron

 

29 August 1950 Two SA-16s and two SB-17s were used this date for orbit missions. The SA-16s flew 15:15 and the SB-17s flew 13:00 making a total of 28:15. The H-5s in Korea flew seven sorties making four evacuations of patients from the front lines and three missions transporting medical personnel and equipment. Three hours and thirty five minutes flying time was logged on these missions.

[note]

 

27th British Infantry Brigade

August 29
British Commonwealth 27th Brigade lands at Pusan, moving at once to Yŏngsan-ni, to become an integral part of the Eighth Army
August - Sept 15
Continuous savage infantry battles around Pusan Perimeter. Complete air superiority and powerful tank and artillery reinforcements help the gradually toughening infantry forces effectively secure the Peninsula.

[note]

 

USN_Units

By the 22nd,  Joy had in turn prepared a directive to the Seventh Fleet, but he had to wait to issue it until he received MacArthur’s directive to him.

Struble was formally appointed the overall commander at Inch'on following the approval of the operation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 August.

[note]

 

 

biography   biography     biography

Struble was formally appointed the overall commander at Inch'ŏn following the approval of the operation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 August. He had given some thought to the name for the organization; he decided on “Joint Task Force 7,” communicating that name to Joy orally (probably on 27 August). As Commander, Seventh Fleet, Struble had authority over no elements outside that fleet; as Commander, JTF 7, however, he controlled all units of the seaborne invasion, including Task Force 90 and X Corps—“and any military man should recognize the soundness of central command for such an operation.” Struble “did not discuss the command relations with MacArthur, Almond, or the staff, because [he] had not made up the command part of his plan. Later [he] told Almond and informed him of [the planned] turnover from Joint Force Command to Com. General X Corps when he had established himself ashore.” Of course, given the forces and command personnel available, there were few other options for that critical aspect of command planning.

Struble believed that he followed a hands-off policy on day-to-day planning for the operation:

 “I could have had twice-daily conferences to review, etc., but did not. I had confidence in Doyle [CTF 90 and Commander, Amphibious Group 1] and Smith [1st Marine Division] and made the decision to tell them to proceed. I also made it clear that on certain phibgroup [amphibious group]–marine views I did not agree and told them what we would do on such subjects.”

Struble later commented that

“many of the elements of the phibgroup advanced planning were accepted and included—certain phibgroup-Mardiv [Marine division] ideas were not accepted—After my first complete meeting with Doyle and Smith I outlined to them the items that would be in my plan when issued and told them they could come to me at any time for further decision.”

In fact, the Amphibious Group 1 and 1st Marine Division staffs had worked on their plans together, on the basis of verbal directives from MacArthur through Joy, until at least 26 August.

Although formally Struble reported to MacArthur through Joy, it appears that his status as a joint task force commander gave him direct access to MacArthur, without going through either Joy or Almond:

“As CJTF-7 I had a right to talk to MacArthur and did. Vis-à-vis highly important decisions if I couldn’t make them myself—I would have included Joy in such a discussion. I did not use back door tactics.” At the same time, Struble “did not at any time during this period ask MacArthur for any decision.”

The CHROMITE command arrangement not only suited Struble as a resolution of his conflicts with Doyle and Joy but gave the Navy a mechanism for dealing with its conflicts with the Army and the Air Force. The assault landing force (the 1st Marine Division) would remain under Doyle’s command until its proper commander, Smith, established himself ashore. Smith in turn would command the follow-on force (elements of the 7th Infantry Division), while himself reporting to Struble. Thus, X Corps would effectively remain under Struble’s control until Almond’s command post was established ashore, when Almond would take it over, working directly for CINCFE. In essence this followed standard amphibious doctrine, although in a two-tiered fashion.

A principal point of dispute between Doyle and Smith, on one side, and Struble on the other was the extent of prelanding naval gunfire support to be provided. The two former commanders wished for up to ten days of gunfire; Struble would agree only to two days. Struble’s view prevailed. As to who would control the gunfire support, recollections differ. Struble later contended that he retained control of the gunfire plan, believing that the decision as to its duration required thorough planning; his operation plan

“placed the surface bombardment force under Doyle so he could coordinate the gunfire plans with phibgroup and mardiv planners. He was to submit two courses of action to me for my approval. . . . [He] never reported on these plans and requested that the gunfire force not be placed under his command. I then placed [Commander, Cruiser Division] 5 directly under me, and told him to prepare plans, consulting with phibgroup and mardiv. I retained command and control of these plans and their execution.”

Doyle would remember things differently:

“I have no recollection of asking Struble not to place the gunfire support group under my command and cannot imagine that I did so. . . . [T]he fire was controlled by me in the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7).”

As with that between Almond and Smith, it is tempting to explain the conflicts between Doyle and Struble principally in terms of personalities. Certainly, they were no more than professionally civil to one another. There also appears to have been competition as to who would be remembered by history as the amphibious officer in Korea. Some friction was undoubtedly generated by their respective positions in the operation, which led to different imperatives. More significantly, however, the two officers had come from distinctly different World War II amphibious cultures: Struble from Europe and the Southwest Pacific, Doyle from the Central Pacific. The former was used to working with, and largely under the control of, the Army; the latter was accustomed to the Marines, with the Navy dominating planning and operations. Finally, one supposes that Doyle, having managed the P'ohang-Dong landing under his preferred command structure, now chafed under a new command setup that he did not want but had to accept.

Ultimately, a second amphibious group was sent to the Far East Command—Amphibious Group 3, under Rear Admiral Lyman Thackrey. Rather than give it a status equal to that of Amphibious Group 1, and Thackrey organizational equality with Doyle, Group 3 was made a task group within Task Force 90, under Doyle. It was to control shipping and unloading at Inch'ŏn after the assault phase, freeing Group 1 to focus on planning future operations.

[note]

 

 

Intergration

 

   Seal of the Selective Service System.svg

In effect the Army was offering to assume from Selective Service the task of deciding the race of all draftees. The board obtained the necessary agreement from Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, and Selective Service was thus relieved of an onerous task reluctantly acquired in 1944 [8/44]. On 29 August 1950 The Adjutant General ordered induction stations to begin entering the draftee's race in the records.[15-16]

In August 1944 the Selective Service System decided that the definition of a man's race should be left to the man himself. While this solution no doubt pleased racial progressives and certainly simplified the induction process, not to speak of protecting the War Department from a ticklish court review, it still left the services the difficult and important task of designating racial categories into which men could be assigned.

As late as April 1949 the Army and the Air Force listed a number of specific racial categories, one of which had to be chosen by the applicant or recruiter the regulation left the point unclear to identify the applicant's race. The regulation listed  "white, Negro, Indian (referring to American Indian only), Puerto Rican, Cuban, Mexican, Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, East Indian, etc.," and specifically included mulattoes and "others of negroid race or extraction" in the Negro category, caving other men of mixed race to be entered under their predominant race. [3] The regulation was obviously subject to controversy, and in the wake of the President's equality order it is not surprising that some group a group of Spanish-speaking Americans from southern California, as it turned out would raise the issue. Specifically, they objected to a practice of Army and Air Force recruiters, who often scratched out "white" and inserted "Mexican" in the applications of Spanishspeaking volunteers. These young men wanted to be integrated into every phase of community life, Congressman Chet Holifield told the Secretary of Defense, and he passed on a warning from his California constituents that "any attempt to forestall this ambition by treating them as a group apart is extremely repellent to them and gives rise to demoralization and hostility."[4] If the Department of Defense considered racial information essential, Holifield continued, why not make the determination in a less objectionable manner? He suggested a series of questions concerning the birthplace of the applicant's parents and the language spoken in his home as innocuous possibilities.

Secretary Johnson sent the congressman's complaint to the Personnel Policy Board, which, ignoring the larger considerations posed by Holifield, concentrated on simplifying the department's racial categories to five Caucasian, Negroid, Mongolian, Indian (American), and Malayan and making their use uniform throughout the services. The board also adopted the use of inoffensive questions to help determine the applicant's proper race category. Obviously, the board could not abandon racial designations because the Army's quota system, still in effect, depended on this information. Less clear, however, was why the board failed to consider the problem of who should make the racial determination.

[note]

 

 

REMENUSCENCES

 

biography biography

I finished. The silence was complete. Then Sherman, an old associate of the Pacific war, rose and said, "Thank you. A great voice in a great cause." And on August 29th I received a wire from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

 "We concur after reviewing the information brought back by General Collins and Admiral Sherman, in making preparations and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea—at Inch'ŏn ."

I planned to use the 7th Division, until this time retained in Japan, and the 1st Marine Division to make the Inch'ŏn landing. They were to form the X Corps under Almond. This involved the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Brigade from the perimeter. To compensate to some extent for this withdrawal, a regimental combat team of the 7th Division was to be in floating reserve off Pusan . It could be rushed into any gap that might develop in Walker 's line, and, if not, would be the last element to land at Inch'ŏn .

No operation of this size could be performed without taking the chance of disclosure. It is to the credit of the many news correspondents at the front who could not fail to witness these troop dispositions and surmise the reason for them, as well as to the credit of their editors back home, that the projected counterattack was a well-kept secret.

[note]




MacArthur, organizer of bloodthirsty crimes

(The following appeared in the August 20, 1950 edition of Pravda and has been translated and condensed from the Russian.)

Gen. MacArthur's name never leaves the pages of the Hearst press these days. The New York Journal-American calls him "the man of the hour" and "today's hero."

It is no accident that MacArthurs are so zealously extolled in present-day America! Colonizers with generals' insignia, like Douglas MacArthur, have the leading role in predatory adventures in Asia.

MacArthur is a hereditary colonizer in the Philippines. But everything went far from smoothly with MacArthur in Asia. The national liberation movement of the peoples of the East terrified the American colonizers. The existence of the Korean People's Democratic Republic gave the double-eyed colonizer and his masters no peace. The American imperialists wished to avenge their defeat in China by new annexations in Asia. Telegrams and memoranda flew from MacArthur to Washington demanding immediate establishment of a "defense line" from the Philippines through Korea and Formosa. Under pretext of "defense," the seizure of foreign lands and the enslavement of peoples was planned.

The American banks -- Morgan, National City and others -- took over the gold fields in South Korea from the Japanese monopolies. They coveted Korean oil deposits. Korea was necessary to them as an important military-strategic bridgehead in the Far East.

And then John Foster Dulles, envoy of Wall Street and an out-and-out warmonger, hurried from Washington to Tokyo.

Chiefs of American military staffs flew to Tokyo. Commenting on this trip, one American correspondent June 18 wrote significantly that the high-placed Washington guests at MacArthur's headquarters had heard "the point of view of headquarters not only concerning the military situation in Japan but also the strategic picture affecting a large area of Asia."

"Probably," the correspondent added, "the questions of Korea and Formosa will be discussed."

We had not long to wait for the result of the Tokyo conference. Korea was chosen as the current objective of American aggression, and MacArthur, who promised to bring to an end the "whole Korean operation" in one week, was appointed its organizer.

It is common knowledge, however, how seriously MacArthur miscalculated. American weapons and prolonged American training did not help. The Syngman Rhee forces were routed under the blows of the People's Army of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

MacArthur hurled thunder and lightning. He personally flew to Korea to introduce order into the disorganized Syngman Rhee bands. The general's loud basso could not change the situation, however: The Syngman Rhee forces continued to flee southward.

It became clear to MacArthur and his masters that it was impossible to conduct the Korean adventure through other people. They had to hurl into Korea American forces, the Air Force and Navy, and to shift to open military aggression against the Korean people. The same MacArthur, of course, became head of the American army of interventionists.

For almost two months now Korean patriots have been waging a heroic struggle against U.S. interventionist forces. Step by step, inch by inch, in severe conflict, they are purging their native land of the foreign usurpers. The American interventionists, armed to the teeth, have proved unable to stand up in open battle against the heroic Korean People's Army.

The land is on fire under the interventionists' feet. The valiant Korean guerrillas give them no rest by day or night. Gen. MacArthur is growing furious over this. He is taking vengeance on the Korean people by savage bombing of peaceful towns and villages and the slaughter of thousands of women, children and old men.

MacArthur hates the Korean people. He treats them as a "low, colored race." Like Truman, he calls the Koreans no better than "bandits." "When American soldiers meeting a Korean in the rear have doubts about him," American journalists write, "they fire at him." "Others," the correspondents cynically add, "first fire at a Korean and then ask questions."

The American interventionists burn down whole villages "on suspicion" that they conceal guerrillas. Captured partisans have their spines broken before they are shot.

The American imperialists want to make Korea their colony and Koreans servile slaves of Wall Street. The proud, freedom-loving Korean people will never kneel before the American dollar or the executioner MacArthur, however. They will fight for the freedom and independence of their country to final victory.

[note]

 

 

South then North

 

Bio   Bio   Def

The drop in air delivery to Korea caused General Partridge, commanding the Far East Air Forces, to complain on 10 August that the Army was not fully using the airlift's 200-ton daily capacity. That day, Eighth Army ordered curtailment of delivery by the Red Ball Express and increased use of the airlift to its maximum capacity. The reason given for this action was a sudden apprehension that the port of Pusan could not process promptly the flow of water-borne supplies. The absurdity of the logistical situation was illustrated the next day, 11 August, when, upon General Partridge's suggestion, two 2 1/2-ton trucks were airlifted in a C-119 from Tachikawa Air Base in Japan to Taegu.

The Air Force planned to airlift two trucks daily in this manner.

As a result of this development, Eighth Army on 12 August ordered that, effective 15 August, the Red Ball Express be discontinued except on Tuesday and Friday of each week when it would carry cargo difficult for the planes to handle. Under this arrangement airlift tonnage greatly increased. On 16 August, transport planes carried 324 tons of cargo and 595 passengers; on 19 August, 160 tons of cargo and 381 passengers; on 28 August, 398 tons of cargo and 343 passengers; and, on 29 August, 326 tons of cargo and 347 passengers. [11]

[note]

 

   HMS Ceylon.jpg
Ceylon
at anchor in August 1943
Unicorn-g427411.jpg
HMS Unicorn at a Japanese port (probably Sasebo)

Five ships, including the cruiser HMS Ceylon (30) and the carrier HMS Unicorn (I72), carried the British to Pusan where they docked on 29 August. En route at sea, the rumor had spread among the troops that the North Koreans were only five miles from Pusan. Instead of the anticipated sound of gunfire the British soldiers found relative quiet in the port city. Debarking at once, the 27th Infantry Brigade, on Eighth Army orders, moved by train that night to an assembly area near Yŏngsan-ni,, ten miles southeast of Taegu. [21-18]

[note]

 

  

On 20 August, the American divisions in Korea received their first augmentation recruits-the 24th and 25th Divisions, 250 each; the 2d and 1st Cavalry Divisions, 249 each. For the next week each of the divisions received a daily average of 250 Korean recruits.

On the 29th and 30th, the 1st Cavalry Division got an average of 740, and the 24th Division, 950 recruits daily.

[note]

 

        

On 29 August, the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, relieved the 7th Cavalry Regiment  in the southern part of the division sector, and the 7th Cavalry in turn relieved the ROK 13th Regiment and part of the 12th.

[note]

 

Bio   Bio   Def

The drop in air delivery to Korea caused General Partridge, commanding the Far East Air Forces, to complain on 10 August that the Army was not fully using the airlift's 200-ton daily capacity. That day, Eighth Army ordered curtailment of delivery by the Red Ball Express and increased use of the airlift to its maximum capacity. The reason given for this action was a sudden apprehension that the port of Pusan could not process promptly the flow of water-borne supplies.

The absurdity of the logistical situation was illustrated the next day, 11 August, when, upon General Partridge's suggestion, two 2 1/2-ton trucks were airlifted in a C-119 from Tachikawa Air Base in Japan to Taegu.

The Air Force planned to airlift two trucks daily in this manner.

As a result of this development, Eighth Army on 12 August ordered that, effective 15 August, the Red Ball Express be discontinued except on Tuesday and Friday of each week when it would carry cargo difficult for the planes to handle. Under this arrangement airlift tonnage greatly increased. On 16 August, transport planes carried 324 tons of cargo and 595 passengers; on 19 August, 160 tons of cargo and 381 passengers; on 28 August, 398 tons of cargo and 343 passengers; and, on 29 August, 326 tons of cargo and 347 passengers. [11]

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During the 29th, B Company, 21st Infantry, supported by a platoon of tanks of B Company, 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, successfully counterattacked northwest from the southern edge of P'ohang-dong for a distance of a mile and a half, with ROK troops following.

The American units then withdrew to P'ohang-dong. That night the ROK's withdrew, and the next day (30th) an American infantry-tank force repeated the action of the day before.

 Colonel Stephens now received orders to take over from the ROK 3rd Division a sector extending 1,000 yards north and 3,000 yards northwest of-P'ohang-dong. [22-6]

Also on the 29th, the ROK Capital Division, with American tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against enemy counterattacks,

 only to lose it finally at dawn on the 30th. American air attacks continued at an increased tempo in the Kigye area.

[note]

 

When the 1st Cavalry Division on 29 August assumed responsibility for the old ROK 1st Division sector north of Taegu it sent a patrol from the I&R Platoon to the top of Ka-san. There the patrol found 156 South Korean police. There was some discussion between General Gay and Eighth Army about whether the 1st Cavalry Division or the ROK 1st Division should have the responsibility for the mountain. General Gay maintained that his under strength division with a 35-mile front was already overextended and could not extend eastward beyond the hills immediately adjacent to the Tabu-dong road.

[note]

 

        

North of the 9th Infantry sector of the 2nd Division front along the Naktong, the 23d Regiment on 29 August had just relieved the 3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment, which in turn had only a few days before relieved the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division.

On 31 August, therefore, the 23d Regiment was in a new sector of which it had only a limited knowledge. It took over a 16,000-yard Naktong River front without its 3d Battalion which had been attached to the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division.

Colonel Freeman, the regimental commander, deployed the 1st Battalion on the high ground along the river with the three companies abreast. Actually, the 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., little more than outposted the hills with platoons and squads.

 He placed the 2d Battalion in a reserve position approximately eight miles in the rear of the 1st Battalion and in a position where it commanded the road net in the regimental sector.

On the last day of the month the 2d Division moved E Company south to a reserve position in the 9th Infantry sector. [23- 27]

[note]

 

Many of the intelligence reports received at Tokyo, as is usual in such matters, were inaccurate and unreliable. Such were several reports in August and September that CCF troops had crossed the border into North Korea. One of these reports, on 29 August, alleged that four CCF armies had crossed the Yalu and were deployed in North Korea. [39-25]

[note]

 

U.S. Air Force

 

Sent following two redlines to Vandenberg in line with my policy of keeping him informed of happenings that might not otherwise get to his immediate attention and which he can pass on to Bradley for the President:

(1) Following just received from Chinese sources and evaluated B-3 by FEAF: "54th, 55th, 56th, and 74th Chinese Communist armies all crossed Yalu River and are now in North Korea." [no such divisions] This report, if true, assumes additional significance in the light of earlier intelligence indicating (a) hurried large-scale construction and repair of revetments in Korea, some capable of sheltering twin-engine bombers or transports, (b) continuing frantic efforts, despite heavy air attacks, to reconstruct bridges across the Han River, and (c) Monday's charge by the Chinese Communists that American airplanes have violated Manchuria 5 different times which is without foundation. We did scare hell out of the Ruskies though when we bombed Rashin and patrolled in Korea across Manchurian border opposite Antung.[241]

 

(2) As experimental mission FEAF BomCom to furnish 1 B-29 to drop flares over bridge complex at Seoul during period 0001 through 0300, 30 Aug, while 5th AF strafes and bombs the Seoul bridge complex.

Late this afternoon received the following from Admiral Joy:

Your confidential letter of 28 Aug is acknowledged with misgiving. The Baltimore Sun editorial has given a misleading picture of Navy-FEAF cooperation which has been excellent from my observation; the article in question has been the subject of previous strong dispatch from the CNO. An investigation is being conducted. I will reply to your letter in detail at an early date when facts bearing on the case are made known to me. Be assured that your personal interest in the success of our joint efforts is well known and appreciated at this headquarters.


At 7:00 P.M. we had dinner at the Craigies; Craigie was most thoughtful and had the Supply and Maintenance people; namely, Col. and Mrs. Alkire, Col. and Mrs. Ausman;[242] also General Banfill and his daughter.

[note]

 

Problems of Operations and Material

The success with which the B-29 air and ground crews surmounted operational and materiel difficulties bespoke the high degree of training and steady morale within the SAC groups dispatched to combat. "Probably the most important single factor contributing to our achievement," wrote General O'Donnell , "was the technical competence and high esprit of our combat crews." The men were not the over-cocky "Off we go into the wild blue yonder" types often credited to the Air Force, but a mature and responsible lot who approached their tasks in a professional manner. Unit surgeons' reports indicate that the crews maintained their morale despite long hours of daily duty: the avenge duty time of 92nd Group crews at Yokota, for example, was 12 hours and 15 minutes -

This of course precluded complications. Crews from Okinawa, which flew an average of one flight every third day, had slightly longer hours since their missions averaged 9.5 hours in length. Crews of the B-29 units based in Japan received rest leaves on the basis of one crew per squadron every 3 days and were able to visit Japanese resorts.

Operations at both Kadena and Yokota were equally complicated by overcrowded conditions. With 78 B-29's at Kadena, traffic control and stringent GCA techniques were necessary; emphasis on GCA training brought control personnel up from a "relatively weak and inefficient" status during initial operations to an "efficient and effective" status.

During August the Kadena GCA provided 553 controlled landings. Yokota flight control was threatened by the congested traffic of the Tokyo area. Low ceilings, usual over the Tokyo area during the fall, required GCA control, the use of which paid off on 29 August when 24 B29's were landed safely under a 300-foot ceiling after a nine hour mission to Ch'ŏngjin.

On large-scale missions, the groups, were carefully staggered over the target so that the greatest interval between groups returning to the same bases could be obtained; in fact even the squadrons were often scheduled over the target at 5- to 10-minute intervals. This of course did not bring the maximum concentration on the target in the shortest period of time, but weak enemy defenses permitted the necessary dispersion of effort. If North Korean antiaircraft and fighter opposition had been greater, such a practice, together with the patterned routes flown to and from Korea, would have been extremely hazardous.

[note]

 

   Unit Info

On 29 August some 21 U.S. and ROK troops of the 24th Regiment were injured by strafing, but on this occasion EUSAK found the ground troops at fault for improperly marking their lines.

[note]

 

Flight control at Yokota was additionally hazarded by the congested air traffic always found over the Tokyo area, and low summer cloud ceilings over central Japan necessitated heavy reliance on GCA control. The skill of the GCA controllers paid off handsomely on 29 August when 24 B-29's were landed safely at Yokota under a 300-foot ceiling after a nine-hour mission to Ch'ŏngjin.#30

[note]

 

Early in August 1950 General Partridge accordingly directed the 3d Squadron to station six of its nine helicopters in Korea, and General Stratemeyer asked USAF to give him 25 H-5's to be used by a special evacuation and utility squadron. By stripping other commands, USAF started 14 H-5's to the Far East, but it ruled that the 3d Squadron would continue to handle the mercy missions.

By 29 August the Helicopter Detachment had evacuated 83 soldiers whom the Eighth Army surgeon said would never have survived a ten-to-fourteen-hour trip by ambulance to a field hospital. #78

Because of its ability to land on water and land, the SA-16 Albatross is used to cover aircraft water routes throughout the Far East.

[note]

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

August 29, 1950 it was D-minus 17 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

 

My dear Congressman McDonough:

I read with a lot of interest your letter in regard to the Marine Corps. For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy’s police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.

Nobody desires to belittle the efforts of the Marine Corps but when the Marine Corps goes into the army it works with and for the army and that is the way it should be.

I am more than happy to have your expression of interest in this naval military organization. The Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry S. Truman

Honorable Gordon L. McDonough
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

see 6 September 1950

 

[note]

 

biography    biography 

South Korean president Syngman Rhee visited the 1st Brigade on 29 August. Eighty-seven Marines were decorated in what was commonly called the "Purple Heart Parade." In a moving speech, Rhee promised that each member of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would receive a special decoration, then declared: "You have brought us victory when all we had known was defeat." But the official proclamations were not nearly as important to the morale of most of the assembled Marines as the hot chow, refreshing cold baths, and the opportunity to catch up on much needed sleep that they enjoyed during this break from frontline duty.

 Replacements, most of them volunteers from units already in the Far East, filled spaces left by the casualties. Unfortunately, plans to release the regiment to its parent 1st Marine Division, which had just arrived in Japan, had to be shelved when the NKPA once again crossed the Naktong.

[note]

 

  

The first echelons of the regiment arrived in Kobe, Japan, on August 29 and moved ashore to Camp Otsu.  There they commenced an intensive program of physical conditioning, small unit tactical exercises, and night operations. 

[note]

 

biography    biography

On the 29th an honor guard of 87 Marines received Purple Heart medals at a ceremony attended by President Syngman Rhee, who arrived in a helicopter provided by VMO–6. General Craig had paid an official call on him the day before at Chinhae, being most courteously received. And after the presentation of medals, President Rhee gave a talk to the Marines.

He confided to Craig afterwards that he would like to confer some sort of an award on every man in the Brigade for heroic service in Korea. This was undoubtedly the inception of the Korean Presidential Unit Citation which the Brigade later received from the ROK executive.

General Craig, it may be recalled, had insisted that replacements be sent to the Brigade. Thanks to his determination, a long column of trucks arrived at the Bean Patch with more than 800 Marines just landed at Pusan.

Some of the 5th Marines outfits had been so thinned by combat that an appeal was made for volunteers from supporting units to serve temporarily in rifle companies, with the privilege of returning to their former status after the emergency. The hearty response was a tribute to Marine morale as well as Marine basic training which made every man a potential rifleman. Engineers, shore party troops and headquarters personnel came forward in such numbers that some could not be accepted after the arrival of replacements eased the situation.

No attempt was made at the Bean Patch to form the newcomers into third rifle companies. They were simply used to build up the strength of the present companies and given intensive unit training. Rumors of an impending Marine amphibious operation had already filtered down to every PFC, and there were wild speculations as to when and where. At least, it could hardly be denied that the Brigade would soon be taking another voyage; for convoys of trucks left the Bean Patch every day laden with heavy supplies and equipment to be unloaded at Pusan.[3]

This was once that lower-echelon “scuttlebutt” came close to the mark. In fact, planning for the Inch'ŏn landing had already gone so far that General Craig sent his chief of staff, G–3 and G–4 to Tokyo to confer with staff officers of the 1st Marine Division about the projected operation.[4]

biography   biography

Major General Oliver P. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, had relieved General Erskine early in July when the latter was sent on a secret State Department mission. As the ADC of the Division during the fight for Peleliu in 1944, Smith knew how tough an amphibious operation can become when it encounters unexpected obstacles. He was determined to keep his Division intact with its three infantry regiments, the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. And after his arrival in Japan with the advance party, he returned a firm negative to proposals that the 5th Marines and other Brigade troops remain with the Eighth Army.

It would be putting the case mildly to say that this was the eleventh hour. The 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) had landed at Kobe from 28 August to 3 September. And though a typhoon (Jane) caused a good deal of damage, little time was lost at the gigantic task of unloading mixed-type shipping and combat-loading it into assault-type shipping. The LST’s had to be ready to sail for the target area by 10 September, and the transports by the 12th.

The Marines at the Bean Patch would have been flattered to know that they were the objects of an official tug of war at Tokyo. It was maintained by the EUSAK command and staff that Army morale would be hurt by taking the Brigade away from the Pusan Perimeter at a critical moment. On the other hand, General Smith contended that he needed the Brigade all the more urgently because the 7th Marines,[5] sailing belatedly from San Diego, would not be able to reach Inch'ŏn until a week after the proposed D-day of 15 September 1950.

The Marine general was informed that the decision would depend upon the tactical situation in Korea.

[note]

 

U.S. Navy

 

USN_Units   USN_Units

28, 29, 30, 31

And when Admiral Hartman and the USS Helena (CA-75) group arrived to relieve next day P'ohang was still in U.N. hands. Aircraft from Task Force 77 took off some pressure on the 26th, reinforcements were again moved in by EUSAK, and from the 28th to the 31st close support was provided by the Marine airmen from USS Sicily (CVE-118). The last day of August saw friendly forces making sizable gains.

[note]

 

Koread-War   Def  

The trend away from the perimeter was continuing. Where CincFE’s dispatch of the 23rd had called for such close support on the 29th as was desired by JOC, ComNavFE’s new message called merely for strikes on that day.

In fact, no support missions were flown, and the attacks of the 29th were directed against railroad bridges, airfields, and highways in the Sŏul-Inch'ŏn region and to the southward. FAFJK had hoped for more than this, and had requested four-plane sorties at 20-minute intervals throughout the day, but its dispatch, delayed by communication failure, was received too late to permit compliance.

[note]

 

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August–4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

[note]

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Unit Info

The 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, now relieved the 1st Battalion in the Battle Mountain-P'il-bong area, except for C Company which, as part of Task Force Baker, remained on Old Baldy. Corley's battalion completed this relief by 1800, 27 August. [28]

The North Korean attacks continued. On the 28th, an enemy company-sized attack struck between C and I Companies before dawn. That night, enemy mortar fire fell on C Company on Old Baldy, some of it obviously directed at the company command post.

 After midnight on th 29th, an enemy force appeared in the rear area and captured the command post.

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Unit Info

Some men of C Company left their positions on Battle Mountain when the attack began at 0245, 29 August. The North Koreans swung their attack toward E Company and overran part of its positions.

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0557 Sunrise

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Unit Info

Some men of C Company left their positions on Battle Mountain when the attack began at 0245, 29 August. The North Koreans swung their attack toward E Company and overran part of its positions.

Airdrops after daylight kept C Company supplied with ammunition, and a curtain of artillery fire, sealing off approaches from the enemy's main position, prevented any substantial reinforcement from arriving on the crest. All day artillery fire and air strikes pounded the North Koreans occupying E Company's old positions.

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August

Reconnaissance photos prove the "elastic bridge" is sunk, 29 August 1950.

 

[note]

 

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Unit Info

Then, in the evening, E Company counterattacked and reoccupied the lost ground. [20-33]

[note]


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1904 Sunset

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Unit Info

An hour before midnight, North Koreans attacked C Company. Men on the left flank of the company position jumped from their holes and ran down the mountain yelling, "They have broken through!" The panic spread. Again the enemy had possession of Battle Mountain. Capt. Lawrence M. Corcoran, the company commander, was left with only the seventeen men in his command post, which included several wounded. [20-30]

[note]


Casualties

Tuesday August 29, 1950 (Day - 66)

Korean_War 12 Casualties
19500829 0000 Casualties by unit

3 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
7 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
12 19500829 0000 Casualties by unit

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4398 136 14 4628
Today 12     12
Total 80 4410 136 14 4640

Aircraft Losses Today 003

Notes for Saturday June 24, 1950

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