Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 22.8°C    73.04°F at Taegu     

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

 

 

Citations

Medals   

Distinguished Service Cross

 

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Silver Star

Clark, Dean O. [PFC SS D35thIR]

Davis, Earl L. [SFC SS 5thIR]

Lundin, William M. [Maj SS DivLdr VMF-214]

 

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Two SA-16s and one SB-17 were used this date for orbit missions. The SA-16s flew fifteen hours and thirty five minutes (15:35) and the SB-17 flew six hours and ten minutes (6:10) making a total of twenty one hours and forty five minutes (21:45) flying time.

The H-5s in Korea flew eight sorties for five hours and fifty five minutes flying time. Four of these missions were emergency evacuations and one was a search mission. Three missions were transportation of VIPs.

One false alert was recorded at Flight "D" this date.

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Aug. 30: Before dawn an experimental B-29 flare mission illuminated the Han River in the Sŏul area for a B-26 strike on an elusive enemy pontoon bridge, but it could not be found. B-26s attacked the permanent bridge.

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KPA "Fourth Phase" terminates

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Koread-War

On August 30, 1950, four American soldiers were captured and after being forced to·carry North Korean ammunition for 1 day, were shot in the back. Two men survived.17

Barry F. Rhoden, formerly a sergeant with Company C of the 23rd
Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division, testified:

Sergeant RHODEN. * * * First they took our boots, our fatigue jackets, or mine, and all of our identification, our dogtags. The officer who was in charge of the group, sir- I guess he was making a collection of dogtags as he had a nice roll of them, with chains, sir. He had all of our watches, rings, everything we had. He was like a kid at a Christma tree. He was getting a big kick out of it.

They had taken our boots * * *· They loaded us down with their ammunition and some of their personal belongings and worked us all day.

* * * * * * * Senator POTTER. When you say "we did that," to whom do you refer? Sergeant RHODEN. The North Koreans, sir * * *· The officer had me up the words, "You are about to die the most horrible kind of death." That was the onlv statement there was on it that I could read. There was some Korean writing-on it, sir. And the rest of the North Koreans had gathered around to watch him. After reading the piece of paper, he motioned for me to go back to where my buddies were, and they were standing a short distance away, sir, approximately the distance from me to you, and as I turned around, sir, I was shot in the back. The force of the bullet knocked me down and I lay there pretending that I was dead, and praying while they shot the other fellows. After they shot the other fellows, they stepped over me, bayoneted the other fellows a couple of times and after a while they left.

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The 3rd Infantry Division (minus the 65th Infantry Regiment) sailed from San Francisco for Japan.

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The US 1st Cavalry Division relieved the ROK 1st Division on the Naktong River front.

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The USAF organized Detachment F of the 3rd Rescue Squadron in Korea and equipped it with Sikorsky H5 helicopters.

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Remenesis

   biography   Veterans Of Foreign Wars Logo.jpg

On August 30th, only two days later, I received this letter from the President: "I am sending you for your information the text of a letter which I sent to Ambassador Warren Austin (U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations) addressed to trygve Lie on August 25. You will understand why my action of the 27th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary." The letter contained seven points:

1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities.

3.The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland: We have no designs on Formosa and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it.

6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa.

7. Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study.

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Def    biography   A flag featuring both cross and saltire in red, white and blue

What was significant about the (above) letter was that its basic premise, as set forth in item 4, was simply not correct. At Cairo on December 1, 1943, an agreement was entered into between the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, represented respectively by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang, and Prime Minister Churchill. The agreement which they all signed reads in part as follows:

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she had seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria , Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

That, and only that, was the reason why Formosa was given to China at the end of World War II. There was no further need to settle the question of who owned Formosa; as far as we were concerned, the Republic of China owned Formosa by the terms of the agreement at Cairo .

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South then North

 

With the enemy turned back north of Taegu, General Walker on 24 August issued orders for the 27th Infantry to leave the Bowling Alley and return to the 25th Division in the Masan area.

The ROK 1st Division was to assume responsibility for the Bowling Alley, but the U.S. 23d Regiment was to remain north of Taegu in its support.

 ROK relief of the 27th Infantry began at 1800, 25 August, and continued throughout the night until completed at 0345, 26 August.

On 30 August the regiment [27th Infantry] received orders to move from near Taegu to Masan, and it started at 0800 the next morning (31st), personnel going by train, vehicles by road.

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On the 29th and 30th, the 1st Cavalry Division got an average of 740, and the 24th Division, 950 recruits daily. Near the end of August the plan changed so that every fourth day each division would receive 500 men until it had a total of 8,300 Korean recruits.

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 Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)        

[Eighth Army made an effort to unscramble the disorder. ] it ordered the 27th Infantry on 30 August to rejoin the 25th Division at Masan;

and it ordered the 5th Regimental Combat Team north from the Masan area to join the 24th Division. [21-40]

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 Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)        

The Eighth Army intelligence officer on [Wednesday] 30 August estimated that the twelve known enemy rifle divisions had an effective strength of 82,590 men, with combat effectiveness varying between 27 percent for the 13th and 15th Divisions to 96 percent for the 7th and 100 percent for the 2nd Division. His estimate gave the North Korean divisions a loss of 26,820 men in August against a gain of only .1,770 replacements. [21-47] This estimate, as noted below, was not entirely correct.

The North Korean Plan

In their action against the Perimeter in August the plan and tactics of the North Koreans showed no departure from those that had characterized their advance south of the Han River in July. Their divisions simply followed the American and ROK forces on all avenues leading south and closed with them as soon as possible. Enemy action followed the familiar pattern of frontal holding attack, envelopment of the flank, and infiltration to the rear. These tactics had paid high dividends during July when the North Koreans were numerically superior to the forces opposing them and when there was no continuous and connected defense line across the width of Korea. When Eighth Army and the ROK Army withdrew into the Pusan Perimeter in early August and there stabilized a line in relatively connected although thinly held defense positions, these tactics failed for the first time in the war to accomplish their desired result.

The battle line on both flanks rested on the sea. U.N. naval forces secured these flanks. Flanking operations and a tactical decision by grand maneuver were now impossible. Success could come to the North Korean command now in only one way-by frontal attack and penetration of the Perimeter defense followed by immediate exploitation.

Generals MacArthur and Walker applied classical principles of defense in the Pusan Perimeter battles-interior lines of communications for movement of supplies and reinforcements, superior artillery fire power to break the offensive spirit of enemy soldiers and reduce their numbers, and a strong air force which is ideally suited for operational defense because it can intervene quickly in adding its fire power to turn the tide of battle.

The North Korean Army strength during August fell below the combined strength of the U.S. Eighth and the ROK Armies. It is certain also that its combat effectiveness at the first of September was considerably below what it had been a month earlier. While its numbers may have been as large, its trained troops, tanks, and heavy weapons were fewer. Many of the recruits that filled the North Korean divisions in September had no small arms.

The North Korea People's Army had shown a remarkable ability to maintain transport to its front lines over long lines of communications despite heavy and constant air attacks. This accomplishment is one of the outstanding feats of the North Korean war effort in the Pusan Perimeter period.

The United Nations air effort failed to halt military rail transport.

 Ammunition and motor fuel, which took precedence over all other types of supply, continued to arrive at the front, though in diminished quantity.

There was still a considerable resupply of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and mortars, at the front in early September, although a steady decline in artillery can be traced from the middle of August. There was a sufficient supply of small arms ammunition, but a shortage of small arms themselves became apparent by mid-August and continued to worsen with each passing week. Rear areas were able to fill only about one third of the requisitions from the front for small arms in mid-August and resupply ceased entirely about the middle of September. New trucks were almost impossible to obtain. There was no resupply of clothing. At best there were rations for only one or two meals a day. Most units had to live at least partially off the country.

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The 5th Marines, in Korea, received a warning order on 30 August to prepare for movement to Pusan to join the division. [25-10]

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 biography

MacArthur pressed ahead unswervingly toward the Inch'ŏn landing. On 30 August he issued his United Nations Command operation order for it.

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biography   biography   biography   biography

On 30 August, General Smith had sent a dispatch to X Corps requesting that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in Korea be released from Eighth Army on 1 September to prepare for mounting out for Inch'ŏn. MacArthur ordered that the Marine brigade be available on 4 September for that purpose.

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During November the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division joined the X Corps in Korea. One of its regiments, the 65th, had been in South Korea for more than two months. It had embarked on two transports in Puerto Rico on 25 August, passed through the Panama Canal, and sailed directly for Korea. It arrived at Pusan on 22 September and disembarked the next day. The other two regiments, the 7th and 15th, and the division headquarters sailed from San Francisco between 30 August and 2 September. The last ship of the division transports arrived at its destination, Moji, Japan, on 16 September

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The Forgotten War

 

 

biography   biography   biography   biography

On August 30, Tokyo time, he issued operational orders for Inch'ŏn to proceed in accordance with his plan. However, he deliberately delayed sending copies of his operational order to the Pentagon. They would not arrive in Washington until September 8, one week before the Inch'ŏn D-day. The dodge fooled no one; it served only to undermine further MacArthur's dwindling credibility within the JCS.

* * *

All the while the Truman administration was engaged in secret discussions over the course to take in Korea after the NKPA had been crushed. The key question was: Should the United States be content with its original goal of restoring the status quo ante bellum, or should its ground forces cross the 38th Parallel to ensure the utter destruction of the NKPA and thereafter occupy North Korea with the goal of "unifying" the peninsula under a single, popularly elected government?

Truman, Acheson, the JCS, and others at the top level of the administration leaned toward crossing the 38th Parallel and "unifying" Korea. Not to do so would be indecisive, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory and would leave the administration open to further charges of being "soft on communism. Moreover, the situation presented the administration with a unique opportunity to deliver communism and Joe Stalin a devastating blow. For the first time in the cold war a satellite could be "liberated" from Moscow. The liberation would certainly diminish Soviet influence in the Far East and might diminish it worldwide. The American public, the media, and, ironically, Truman's greatest critics, Republicans or otherwise, shared this view.

However, there were important dissenters within the administration. These included, among others, the foremost Kremlinologists at State, George Kennan and Charles ("Chip") Bohlen; the head of State's Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze; and the leading Soviet experts at the CIA. These experts argued that crossing the 38th Parallel, no matter how the act was cloaked or rationalized, amounted to an invasion of a Soviet satellite the first such invasion and that Joe Stalin was not apt to stand idly by. Aggressive Moscow counter reaction was "likely": either direct Soviet intervention or a Moscow-directed Peking intervention. For these reasons they urged a halt at the 38th Parallel.

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U.S. Air Force

 

 

30 AUGUST 1950

Sent the following to Vandenberg redline for his info:

Suggest USAF initiate immediate project to develop news-reel shorts plus a feature color picture depicting USAF tactical air operations Korea. MAAF picture Thunderbolt and late starting Ninth AF Europe are examples. Assume Navy doing something along lines Fighting Lady. Most desirable USAF be first.

Following is my redline to Partridge:

I want immediate investigation instituted at TOP SECRET level to ascertain fullest details of incident reported your ADV-INT-D-563. Submit partial reports as investigation progresses in order that this headquarters will be kept informed. Matters of special interest which should be reported ASAP are:

a. Weather conditions in areas involved during periods;

b. Details of surrounding territory with special reference to location of river and nearest town, with respect to airfield.

c. Type of construction of runway.

d. Details as to aircraft observed.

e. Flak encountered.

f. Number of aircraft in flight dispatched on 27, 28, 29 August;

g. Corroborating reports from other personnel on flight, if any.


Re my signal to Partridge reference the action that I have taken and my proposed action redline to Vandenberg, General MacArthur at 1143 hours this morning approved wholeheartedly my procedure; he indicated he did not want a copy sent to his hqs, but to handle it strictly with the Air Force. He commented that the F-51 pilot must have been a pretty damn poor navigator and that if he were guilty, disciplinary action should be taken, but insofar as he was concerned, that action should simply be to send the offender to the ZI.

After seeing CINCFE, dispatched the following redline to Vandenberg:

Preliminary report from Partridge in Korea indicates strong probability that F-51 aircraft of the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron had strafed workers on an airstrip in Manchuria, near the NK border, on 27 Aug 50. Attack resulted in possibly killing or wounding 10 to 15 workers. Pilot reported the location of airstrip attacked as being near Anju (39°36'N; 125°40'E) however two subsequent flights failed to locate the airfield attacked in this vicinity. This suggested possibility that the airstrip attacked was located at Antung (40°10'N; 124°25'E) some 5 miles inside Manchurian border.

Partridge has been directed to make a detailed investigation at TOP SECRET level with partial reports as investigation progresses. Further details will be forwarded as received. Directive received redline Stratemeyer from Norstad, 021955/Z, was promptly issued 3 July to my responsible AF commander. Further on 14 Aug, following directive was issued to my responsible AF commanders: "it is dir[ected] that no repeat no attacks against targets w/i [within] 50 mile of Manchurian and USSR border be undertaken with- out prior specific approval of this hq."ť If an error has occurred, it will be admitted as soon as facts can be determined. There is doubt in our minds that an attack was made in Manchuria.[243]

August 30, 1950
1400 hours - the meeting in conference room outside General MacArthur's office on the coming amphibious operation was a very good one. Following were present: Admirals Joy and Struble; Generals Almond, Hickey, Wright, Ruffner, Weyland, Crabb, Fox; Colonels Chiles, Ganey, Ferguson, Warren, Zimmerman, a Navy Commander, and Captain Hill, and myself.[244] The point that I want to make in my diary is that I raised the question of coordination control, I being General MacArthur's air commander. I looked at Admirals Joy and Struble and asked if they were satisfied with the agreement that we were operating under and which was issued by General MacArthur. They both indicated that they were and General Almond commented that it was working satisfactorily.

Dispatched the two information redlines to Vandenberg which had to do with our experimental flare mission, and the superb training evidenced by SAC in their GCA landings from a 9-hour mission. These radios as follows:

(1) Re my redline 290551/Z, cite A 4936 CG, mission successful. Seoul bridge complex lighted from 0059 to 0130/K. Eight B-26 a/c attacked in Flare light but full moon interfered. Will utilize again on dark nights when needed. All bridges are out.

(2) All 24 B-29s of 92d Bomb Group at Yokota, after 9-hour mission to Ch'ongjin on 29 Aug, made GCA landings in 300-foot ceiling at 4 repeat
4 minute intervals, all without incident. LeMay advised on efficient results SAC training.

Sent the following to LeMay with info to O'Donnell:

I am happy to report that all 24 B-29s of 92d Bomb Group at Yokota,
after 9-hour mission to Ch'ongjin on 29 August, made GCA landings in
300-foot ceiling at 4 repeat 4 minute intervals, all without incident. The results of SAC training was most evident on the efficiency with which the
92d landed yesterday. All your units as members of FEAF Bomber Com- mand are performing superbly on their destruction of Joint Chiefs of Staff targets and also on their now excellent precision bombing against bridges in our important interdiction program.

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The FEC annex as finally issued deviated somewhat from the arrangements agreed on at the conference of 30 August, and General Stratemeyer promptly protested on 4 September to General MacArthur.

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No one officer was placed in command of air operations over Korea during the amphibious invasion at Inch'ŏn. [Guess what - it didn't happen in Northern Korea either]

On 30 August a joint conference, attended by General Stratemeyer, Admiral Joy, Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble (commander of Joint Task Force 7), and others, had discussed a plan for the coordination of air operations incident to Inch'ŏn. General Stratemeyer carried with him a copy of the policy statement of 8 July, and Admirals Joy and Struble gave verbal assent when Stratemeyer showed the paper and suggested its continuance. A portion of the agreement reached at this conference was incorporated in an air annex to the FEC operations order; this annex also included a map, prepared at the conference, prescribing areas significant to the operation ( see fig. 8 ).

Admiral Joy, through appropriate commanders and agencies, was to control all air operations in the initial objective work (WET-DAMP-MUD) from 0600 hours on D minus 3 until relieved by order of General MacArthur.

For the same period Joy was also responsible for interdiction of transportation and communication directly affecting the objective area in the zone between the outer limits of the objective area and another line (R-R) encircling it. Five other areas (MIKE, NAN, OBOE, PETER, QUEEN) were designated to facilitate coordination between FEAF and NAVFE in the areas outside the objective. FEAF was to control the operations of all aircraft outside the objective area with the exception of those engaged in missions assigned by MacArthur to Joy; the latter were subject to FEAF-NAVFE coordination. During the period 0600 on D minus 3 until the disestablishment of the objective area, FEAF aircraft were not to operate within the NAVFE area except on missions requested directly by the tactical air commander there; or on such other air transport and air courier operations as were in accordance with agreed procedures. Various airfields lying within a radius of 150 miles from the vicinity of the beachhead (a number which included P'yŏngyang, Sinmak, P'yŏnggang, Ongjin, Haeju, Suwŏn, Kimp'o, Taejŏn, and Kunsan) were potential threats to the operation, and MacArthur gave Joy the mission of sweeping them to assure air superiority within the objective. During such sweeps, the Navy air elements were to conduct strikes against targets of opportunity and, at the request of FEAF, undertake such interdiction missions as were consistent with their primary purpose.

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   biography   biography

While the Waegwan (Caret bombing) attack may have had limited effects against the enemy, it appears to have been appreciated by EUSAK ground troops. One sergeant wrote General O'Donnell on 30 August:

Us dough boy say hat off to you on your bomb salute to Gen. Walker and boys on the fighting front . . . . The first cavalry division was holding the line against great odds, when the enemys start to infiltrate our line in the early dawn, also had tanks and artillery to support them, when over our head was bombs away. You should of seeing faces lighten up with smiles. Yet it was a beautiful sight . . . . To some critics and the folks back home it was a complete wash out, but to the boys on the front it was more than morale, it was a coordinated of the ground & air close support operations.

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Throughout the battle for South Korea, FEAF gave top priority to the close support of the out-numbered U. N. ground forces, and without this close support the Eighth Army would surely have been driven from the Korean peninsula. table 1 reveals the predominance of close support missions in FEAF's total air effort during the time of the defensive in South Korea:

table 1

TYPES OF SORTIES FLOWN BY FEAF AIRCRAFT

25 JUNE-30 SEPTEMBER 1950

August

* This category covers all types of reconnaissance, transport, air rescue, and miscellaneous operational flying.

Most of the close support sorties were flown by Fifth Air Force fighters under the direction of a MOSQUITO controller or a TACP on the ground. These missions are most difficult to describe in any detail. Very often the fighter pilot was routed to a forward area by the control system and there directed to bomb and strafe a target which he frequently did not actually see because of covering vegetation; consequently, he knew little of his mission accomplishment. The form of intelligence report required for missions over Korea, moreover, was little more than a, statistical recapitulation of the mission. Such a report furnished little information from which higher headquarters could determine operational conditions, pilot problems, tactics and technique found profitable, and the many other valuable details incorporated in the narrative missions reports of World War II . Yet in the final analysis, all

interpretation of the effect of close support air action must be in terms of its relationship to the friendly ground campaign and to its destruction of the enemy. The South Korean campaign permits such an analysis.

Period Duration Close Support Sorties per Day Interdiction Sorties per Day Strategic Sorties per Day Other Sorties per Day Total Sorties per Day
25-30 June 6 408 68.00 59 9.83 0 0.00 100 16.67 94.50
1-31 July 31 4635 149.52 1023 33.00 56 1.81 1827 58.94 243.26
1-30 August 30 7397 246.57 2963 98.77 539 17.97 1582 52.73 416.03
1-30 September 30 5969 198.97 3818 127.27 158 5.27 5382 179.40 510.90

This is an excel spread sheet - did they have that many planes 510.90?

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biography    biography

The pontoon bridge at Sŏul used at night by the North Koreans caused the Fifth Air Force almost as much trouble. Weyland suggested that Partridge try to put napalm incendiaries either on the pontoons or directly upstream, but when this was attempted the pontoons would not burn. Photo interpretation later revealed that the pontoon bridge was constructed from sectional ramp extensions (sometimes called pontoon causeways) of U.S. Navy origin.

An experimental B-29 flare mission over the bridge, timed to coincide with a B-26 strafing and bombing attack, was attempted on the early morning of 30 August; the area was successfully lighted and eight B-26's bored in - only to find the bridge not in place.

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The most successful bombing tactic and the one generally used against bridges by medium bomber crews was an individual aircraft attack at an angle of 40 degrees, each plane releasing a string of four bombs on its run.

CRAZY - why not bomb it 90 degrees, and garintee all bombs dropped miss instead of just 9 out of 10.  Hell follow the road and drop all the bombs on the damn bridge.   SHIT!!!!!  (Elastic Bridge)

Oh, they did drop them 90 degrees to the length of the bridge.

Two groups adopted a procedure of dropping one bomb in the first run to obtain correct ballistic data and establish target altitude. In several instances the bridge so attacked was destroyed by this one bomb, but other bridges required many direct hits. Bomber Command, in fact, computed that 13.3 runs were required to destroy an average bridge, this number including multiple runs against a bridge by the same aircraft. For bridge attacks, Bomber Command generally used 500-pound GP bombs, admittedly not always the best ordnance, but crews often had to do their own loading and the command had to be prepared for last-minute changes in mission. In addition, larger tonnages of these bombs could be racked up in the B-29's than the heavier types. The 500-pound bomb, dropped with a minimum intervalometer setting, was found satisfactory for flat concrete spans, but 1,000-pound or larger bombs were required for steel bridges. The degree of proficiency obtained in such attacks was shown in mission accomplishments: by 30 August [68 days into the war] Bomber Command had about completed work on the 44 key bridge targets assigned, and when on 4 September FEAF listed 56 more, Bomber Command destroyed 12 of them in three days.

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biography

According to the best American intelligence estimate, the Chinese Communists had about 116,000 regular troops in Manchuria on 8 July, 217,000 on 8 August, 246,000 on 30 August, and, by 21 September, transfers from southern and central China had augmented the Manchurian garrisons to an estimated 450,000 men.

Many of these troops belonged to Communist General Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, which was normally stationed in Manchuria, but which had been transferred south to participate in operations against Hainan and Formosa, and, following the postponement of this aggression, might merely be returning to its home stations.#8

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On occasions, moreover, the night intruders struck telling blows against the enemy. Two F-82 crews of the 68th Squadron, reconnoitering marshaling yards north of Sŏul on the night of 30 August, located and knocked out three locomotives, plus a number of railway cars. General Partridge commended the squadron for skillful, aggressive, and determined action.#88

  

Because their all-weather Corsairs were short-ranged, the Marine pilots of VMF(N)-513 operated almost entirely over hostile lines of communication immediately behind the Naktong perimeter. The bigger part of this squadron's missions sought enemy supply movements, but the Corsair pilots also helped the ground troops by strafing or bombing night-firing Red artillery.#89

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In this same area northwest of P'ohang on 30 August a flight of Mustangs bombed and rocketed hostile troops, after which the ROK's moved in and counted the bodies of 700 enemy soldiers. These were among the first ground verifications of enemy casualties resulting from close-support air operations.#115

While the front lines were relatively quiet, the Fifth Air Force emphasized interdiction sweeps for several days after 24 August. For the first time in the Korean hostilities the Fifth Air Force flew more interdiction sorties than close-support missions.#116

Pusan Perimeter 141

 

 

(top) Damaged F-80 makes a forced belly landing in a rice paddy; (bottom) the same airplane after the pilot walked away unhurt.

 

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biography

Staff planners buckled down to the job, and on 30 August United Nations Command Operations Order No. 1 outlined the general concept of the Inch'ŏn invasion.#5

On D-day the U.S. X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, MacArthur's chief of staff, would seize and secure Inch'ŏn. Following the initial assault, the X Corps would take Kimp'o Airfield and Sŏul. The forces of the X Corps would be the 1st Marine Division and the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, an under-strength occupation division in Japan, which would be filled up with South Korean recruits.
The Naval Forces Far East would transport the landing forces, seize the beachhead in the Inch'ŏn area, and, when Almond assumed command ashore, establish a naval support force for air, naval gunfire, and initial logistical support of the land troops. In coordination with the X Corps landing, the Eighth Army would begin to drive northward along the Taegu-Taejŏn-Suwŏn axis on D plus 1.
The Far East Air Forces would provide general air support as directed, isolate the objective area, and furnish air-ground support to the Eighth Army. If General MacArthur so ordered, FEAF would transport, cover, and drop the 187th Airborne RCT, and, in any event, it would provide cargo air support, initially at Kimp'o Airfield and later at Suwŏn.

During the summer of 1950 General MacArthur's intelligence officers had not been blind to the "sinister connotations" of a growing Chinese Communist order of battle in Manchuria, and the Inch'ŏn planners recognized that Chinese Communist entry into action at the time of the invasion at Inch'ŏn might be fatal to the United Nations Command.#6

U.S. Army paratroopers of the 187th Regimental Combat Team.

General MacArthur, however, was willing to gamble that the Inch'ŏn operation would surprise both the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. In fact, General MacArthur was so confident of his diagnosis of the enemy situation that he was willing to divide the command of the United Nations ground and air forces in Korea. General Almond would not be subordinate to General Walker, but both ground commanders would be independently responsible to General MacArthur.

If the Chinese Communists did intervene in Korea, General Stratemeyer knew their first move would be to employ their air forces. As Stratemeyer viewed the course of events, he saw some danger of Communist air intervention. In two separate instances, on 22 and 24 August, Chinese antiaircraft gunners fired bursts of flak across the Yalu at RB-29's reconnoitering the border.#7

Victory in the South 149

In Korea, moreover, the Communists were repairing airfields and building revetments on a priority schedule. Many air-intelligence reports emphasized that the Chinese Communists were transferring aircraft to Manchuria, particularly to the two airfields at Antong.

[note]

 

Fully convinced of the danger of Communist air intervention, cognizant that some one United Nations air commander had to have the over-all responsibility for meeting an enemy air attack, and no longer certain whether the principle of "coordination control" still applied in Korea, General Stratemeyer displayed a copy of the CINCFE air-coordination policy agreement at a joint planning conference held on 30 August and suggested its continuance. Both Admiral Joy and Admiral Struble gave verbal assent to the proposal.

The conference then turned to its major business, which was to secure a coordination of air operations in support of the Inch'ŏn invasion. It was agreed that Navy aircraft, beginning on D minus 3, would sweep all enemy airfields within 150 miles of Inch'ŏn, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. Everyone agreed, however, that the Fifth Air Force would be free to make coordinated attacks against these same airfields. As long as naval support units were present, Navy aircraft would provide air support for the landing forces.

When the X Corps got ashore, it would be supported according to Marine procedures by the 1st Marine Air Wing, which would establish a part of its squadrons at Kimp'o Airfield. The Navy agreed to establish approach corridors for troop carrier aircraft to and from Kimp'o in accordance with Air Force desires. To prevent undue congestion at the Kimp'o airhead, the size of the Marine establishment there would be determined by NavFE and FEAF In order that emergency requests for mutual assistance might be flashed without delay, the Navy agreed to establish positive and solid communications between the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center and the Navy Combat Information Center.#9

[note]

 

biography  biography   biography  biography

In view of the haze of discussion in which many of these decisions were undertaken, some misunderstandings would not have been remarkable. The United Nations Command operations plan air annex, which was issued on 2 September, however, deviated significantly from the basic air-coordination agreement of 8 July 1950* and the specific decisions made on 30 August. On 4 September General Stratemeyer wrote General MacArthur a letter requesting clarification of the air annex.#11

*The CINCFE "coordination control" directive was actually issued on 15 July 1950 as an answer to General Stratemeyer's letter of 8 July 1950, but it was generally referred to as the "8 July" directive. See Chapter 2, pp. 49-50.

[note]

 

biography   biography

When he was called to Tokyo and briefed on the forthcoming operations. General Partridge took a studied look at his available forces which seemed to him to be "meager at best." Navy and Marine aircraft were going to be employed in the operation at Inch'ŏn, at the same time as the Fifth Air Force would be called upon to intensify its counter-air alert and provide all-out support for the Eighth Army.

Looking about FEAF, Partridge noted that he was fighting a war with eight fighter squadrons while six other fighter squadrons were deployed for the air defense of Japan and five other fighter squadrons defended Okinawa and the Philippines. After this examination of the problem, Partridge recommended that the Fifth Air Force be released from its commitment to provide day-fighter squadrons for the defense of Itazuke and Misawa, that the entire 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing should be released from the defense of Okinawa and sent to Korea or Kyushu, and that the remaining units of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing should be sent to join the 18th Group in Korea.

General Partridge pointed out that the F-82 all-weather squadrons and the F-80 squadron at Johnson could continue to provide a shell of defense. If the need arose, all fighter squadrons could be redistributed throughout Japan and Okinawa within a few hours.#15

At the start of the Korean war General Partridge had made these same proposals, only to have them turned down by General MacArthur's staff, but now his bid for more fighters gained better acceptance.

[note]

 

Bomber Command would support the Inch'ŏn invasion by continuing its industrial and interdiction attacks, but General MacArthur's planners calculated that the Eighth Army would need the support of all five B-29 groups during its breakout from the Pusan perimeter. General Stratemeyer was willing to make the commitment for "carpet bombing," provided Bomber Command got five days' advance notice of army requirements in order that it might perform maintenance, load the correct types of bombs, and preplan its missions.#22

[note]

 

Def   biography   biography

After the plan was completed by the Strategic Air Command, it was presented to Major General Emmett O'Donnell, who carried it to Japan and submitted it for General Stratemeyer's approval. As a veteran of the strategic air war against Japan, General O'Donnell personally endorsed the concept of area attacks with incendiary munitions.

"It was my intention and hope ...," said O'Donnell, "that we would be able to get out there and to cash in on our psychological advantage in having gotten into the theater and into the war so fast by putting a very severe blow on the North Koreans, with an advance warning, perhaps, telling them that they had gone too far in what we all recognized as being an act of aggression . . . and [then] go to work burning five major cities in North Korea to the ground, and to destroy completely every one of about 18 major strategic targets."#5

[note]

 

According to the best American intelligence estimate, the Chinese Communists had about 116,000 regular troops in Manchuria on 8 July, 217,000 on 8 August, 246,000 on 30 August, and, by 21 September, transfers from southern and central China had augmented the Manchurian garrisons to an estimated 450,000 men.

Many of these troops belonged to Communist General Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, which was normally stationed in Manchuria, but which had been transferred south to participate in operations against Hainan and Formosa, and, following the postponement of this aggression, might merely be returning to its home stations.#8

[note]

 

  

Evacuation of front-line Army casualties continued to be a major concern, but the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron and the Fifth Air Force recognized that new arrangements would be needed as United Nations Command forces attacked northward from the Pusan perimeter. On 27 August 1950 the Fifth Air Force accordingly established a Rescue Liaison Office in the Joint Operations Center, and on 30 August the 3rd Squadron formally organized Detachment F in Korea, under the command of Captain Oscar N. Tibbetts. The close coordination between the Joint Operations Center and Detachment F soon permitted the first rescue of a pilot from behind the enemy's lines.

[note]

 

 

U.S. Marine Corps

 

 

August 30, 1950 it was D-minus 16 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

[note]

 

biography   biography  

On 30 August he sent a dispatch to X Corps—the new Army tactical organization activated by CINCFE especially for the Inch'ŏn operation—requesting that the Brigade be released from its Army commitments on 1 September.

[note]

 

On 30 August, Smith brought up the issue [of employment of the 5th Marines (The PB) first raized on 9/23] again in a dispatch to X Corps, whereupon CinCFE issued an order making the Brigade troops available to the Division on 4 September.

[note]

 

On 30 August, ComNavFE issued his Operation Plan 108–50, assigning to JTF–7, of which X Corps was a part, the mission of seizing by amphibious assault a beachhead at Inch'ŏn.

X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so much progress that Embarkation Order 1–50 was issued on the last day of the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO 2-50. Operations orders of JTF–7 and TF–90 were issued concurrently.

This meant that the assault RCTs, contrary to amphibious doctrine, were to receive rigid landing plans drawn up completely by the Division. Lack of time caused this variation from usual procedure, but General Smith had confidence in the ability of his troops to overcome the handicap. “Under the circumstances,” he asserted, “adoption of such methods was justified by the common background and training of all elements and individuals in amphibious doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques.”[1]

[note]

 

X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so much progress that Embarkation Order 1–50 was issued on the last day of the month (8/31), followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO 2-50. Operations orders of JTF–7 and TF–90 were issued concurrently.

[note]

 

 

U.S. Navy

 

USN_Units

On the 30th, still enjoying their new-found freedom, the fast carriers attacked bridges, docks, shipping, and the water-works at Chinnampo and P'yŏngyang, and road and rail targets to the northward, and on conclusion of these operations steamed south to refuel and rearm off southwestern Korea

[note]

 

USN_Units   USN_Units   USN_Units

28, 29, 30, 31

And when Admiral Hartman and the USS Helena (CA-75) group arrived to relieve next day P'ohang was still in U.N. hands. Aircraft from Task Force 77 took off some pressure on the 26th, reinforcements were again moved in by EUSAK, and from the 28th to the 31st close support was provided by the Marine airmen from USS Sicily (CVE-118). The last day of August saw friendly forces making sizable gains.

[note]

 

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August–4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

[note]

 

biography     biography

On the 30th Andrewes, Ruble, Higgins, and Austin flew up from Sasebo for a conference of prospective task force commanders. And while the planning proceeded the preliminary operations were begun: new operating areas and operating schedules, intended to ensure adequate preparation of the objective without an overconcentration which would alert the enemy, were made up by Struble’s staff for broadcast by ComNavFE to the carrier forces at sea.

The Plan

So the concept of the operation took form. In early September, and again in the days preceding the landing, the three carrier units of Joint Task Force 7—Admiral Ewen’s fast carriers, Admiral Ruble’s escort carriers, and the British light carrier HMS Triumph (R16)would work over the west coast with their efforts gradually converging toward Inch'ŏn. Prior to D-Day a destroyer and cruiser bombardment of Wolmi Do would be carried out.

On the early morning tide of 15 September a battalion landing team of the 5th Marines would assault Wolmi in order to secure that commanding position.

On the afternoon tide, at about 1700, the main attack into the city would be carried out by the 5th Marines’ remaining two battalions and by the 1st Marines.

While the two Marine regiments moved rapidly to expand their holdings to Kimp'o airfield and the Han River line, the 7th Infantry Division (Reinforced) and corps troops would be landed administratively and would then operate as ordered by the corps commander. Throughout the operation bombardment and fire support would be provided by cruisers and destroyers, and air cover, air strikes, and close support by carrier aviation. So far as the air was concerned Joint Task Force 7 was self-sufficient: complications of coordination or control during the landing phase were fended off by the proviso that except at the request of Admiral Struble no FEAF aircraft would operate in the objective area subsequent to D minus 3, while for the later stages of the campaign X Corps was provided with its own Tactical Air Command, composed of Marine aircraft and commanded by a Marine brigadier general.

Such was the plan for the operation as worked out by the staffs of Seventh Fleet, the Amphibious Group, and the Marine Division. For Inch'ŏn, as for P'ohang, the planning was necessarily carried out in violation of all the rules and in record time.

[note]

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During the 29th, B Company, 21st Infantry, supported by a platoon of tanks of B Company, 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, successfully counterattacked northwest from the southern edge of P'ohang-dong for a distance of a mile and a half, with ROK troops following.

The American units then withdrew to P'ohang-dong. That night the ROK's withdrew, and the next day (30th) an American infantry-tank force repeated the action of the day before.

 Colonel Stephens now received orders to take over from the ROK 3rd Division a sector extending 1,000 yards north and 3,000 yards northwest of-P'ohang-dong. [22-6]

Also on the 29th, the ROK Capital Division, with American tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against enemy counterattacks,

 only to lose it finally at dawn on the 30th. American air attacks continued at an increased tempo in the Kigye area.

[note]

 

 

Unit Info

An hour before midnight, North Koreans attacked C Company. Men on the left flank of the company position jumped from their holes and ran down the mountain yelling, "They have broken through!" The panic spread. Again the enemy had possession of Battle Mountain. Capt. Lawrence M. Corcoran, the company commander, was left with only the seventeen men in his command post, which included several wounded. [30]

After daylight on the 30th, air strikes again came in on Battle Mountain, and artillery, mortar, and tank fire from the valley concentrated on the enemy-held peak. A wounded man came down off the mountain where, cut off, he had hidden for several hours. He reported that the main body of the North Koreans had withdrawn to the wooded ridges west of the peak for better cover, leaving only a small covering force on Old Baldy itself.

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biography    biography

Orders for the attack followed almost immediately. General MacArthur, on 30 August, issued his operations order for the Inch'ŏn landing, setting forth the objectives and assigning specific missions to his commanders.

He directed the U.S. X Corps, the headquarters of which he established within the theater (see ch. IX), to land on D-day at H-hour on the west coast of Korea to seize Inch'ŏn, Kimp'o Airfield, and Sŏul, and to sever all North Korean lines of communication in the area.

He ordered coordinated attacks from the southern perimeter by Eighth Army and all available ground, naval, and air forces, to destroy the North Korean Army south of the line Inch'ŏn-Sŏul-Utchin.

Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, would command while afloat. He would furnish Navy and Marine assault forces and would transport follow-up landing forces. Once the lodgment ashore had been seized, Joy would land the follow-up troops on the beachhead. After the beachhead was secured, commanding general, U.S. X Corps, would land, inform the naval commander of his readiness to assume responsibility for further operations, and take command of all forces ashore.

The U.S. X Corps would operate directly under General MacArthur until otherwise ordered. MacArthur charged General Stratemeyer, Commanding General, FEAF, with general air support to isolate the objective area and with giving required close support. The principal air effort would support the Eighth Army breakout. If so ordered, General Stratemeyer was to ferry, protect, and drop an airborne RCT.

General Walker on D plus X would launch a general offensive from his perimeter, making his main effort along the Taegu-Taejŏn-Suwŏn axis. Annexes to the operations order gave detailed instructions to all commanders on all phases of the operation, including intelligence, logistical support, and command relationships. [08-26]

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biography   biography  biography   biography

On 30 August, Smith asked Almond for the brigade at once. According to Smith, General Almond appeared very reluctant to commit himself. He apparently did not want to decide, in his capacity as chief of staff, GHQ, on a definite date at which the brigade would be released to the 1st Marine Division to operate under himself as commanding general, X Corps. General Smith, after his talk, made his request more official, sending a radio to commanding general, X Corps, asking for the brigade by 1 September.

[note]

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   Unit Info

At 1100, B Company, with the 3rd Battalion in support, attacked toward the heights and two hours later was on top. [20-31]

Units of the 24th Infantry always captured Battle Mountain in the same way. Artillery, mortar, and tank fire raked the crest and air strikes employing napalm blanketed the scorched top. Then the infantry attacked from the hill beneath Old Baldy on the east slope, where supporting mortars set up a base of fire and kept the heights under a hail of steel until the infantry had arrived at a point just short of the crest. The mortar fire then lifted and the infantry moved rapidly up the last stretch to the top, usually to find it deserted by the enemy. [20-32]

[note]

 

Other reports, often conflicting and of doubtful credence, told of troops of Korean ancestry being sent into North Korea by the Chinese. Throughout July and August 1950, the Department of the Army received a mass of second- and third-hand reports that more Chinese troops were moving from south China to Manchuria. Willoughby estimated by the end of August that the Chinese had moved nine armies totaling 246,000 men to Manchuria. [11-22]

Indications that the Chinese Communists possibly intended to enter the fighting continued to be reported to the Department of the Army by the G-2 Section of the Far East Command. In daily teleconferences between officers at the Department of the Army and MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, General Willoughby, or his officers, relayed the latest information of Communist Chinese military activities. Each day, also, the United Nation Command's Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) went to the Department of the Army by courier, arriving several days later in Washington. This summary carried all reports received from intelligence sources on the Chinese Communists and made an effort to evaluate these reports. At the top intelligence level, the Central Intelligence Agency combined reports from its own sources with those of the United Nations Command and then analyzed the actions and intentions of the Chinese for high-level governmental agencies.

To determine through outward manifestations alone whether the Chinese intended to intervene was virtually impossible. But by using such indications as movements of troops and supplies, American intelligence agencies could gauge this intention with some hope of accuracy. Penetration of Communist China to ascertain these movements was an almost impossible task. But certain agencies, particularly those allied with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa and others operating out of Hong Kong, relayed reports of Chinese Communist military movements.

[note]

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When the newly arrived 3rd Battalion of the 5th Cavalry assumed responsibility on 30 August for the generally quiet 14,000-yard sector of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, the result was a 32,000-yard front for the 5th Cavalry. The 8th Cavalry Regiment then moved to the sectors of the ROK 11th and part of the 12th Regiments.

The 1st Cavalry Division completed the relief of the ROK 1st Division at 1300 on 30 August, whereupon the ROK division moved to its new sector just eastward of the new boundary. The contemplated shift of the 2nd Division zone of responsibility northward proved impracticable because the area could be supplied only over the road net from Taegu, and Eighth Army reestablished the old boundary between the two divisions, effective 30 August.

         714th Railway Operating Battalion

To defend this old 7th Cavalry sector, Eighth Army attached the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, to the 1st Cavalry Division. [21-42]

    714th Railway Operating Battalion

On 30 August the 714th transportation Railway Operating Battalion arrived in Korea and became responsible for operating the approximately 500 miles of rail lines within the Pusan Perimeter. [21-43] The rail lines usually carried supplies from Pusan to a division railhead. From there they were trucked forward to regiment and battalion.

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By the end of August, counting work that had been done earlier by the medium bombers and by naval aircraft, the Fifth Air Force could report that 140 bridges between Sŏul and the front lines were unserviceable and that 93 highway bridges, generally around the perimeter, had been destroyed.#68

Unit Info

In view of General Stratemeyer's interest in the target, the 3rd Bombardment Group did its utmost to destroy the pontoon bridge at Sŏul. Since the pontoons were concealed during the day, only night-flying B-26's could attack this objective. Supposing that the pontoons might be flammable, General Weyland suggested that Partridge employ napalm against them. But when this was attempted, the pontoons did not burn. Photo interpreters then revealed that the bridge was composed of sectional steel ramp extensions, or pontoon causeways, which appeared to be of the type used by the United States Navy.#69

In the early morning hours of 30 August an experimental B-29 flare mission illuminated the Sŏul bridge area, while eight B-26's bored in to attack the pontoon bridge-only to find that the bridge was not in place.#70

When the Fifth Air Force was unable to get results, General Stratemeyer directed Bomber Command to lay and renew strings of delayed-action bombs set to explode at night along the path of the pontoon bridge. This tactic doubtless harassed the Communists, but it did not prevent movement across the Han.#71

[note]

 

READ ALL OF THIS

Fifth Air Force armed reconnaissance attacks not only destroyed Communist troops and equipment while they were en route to the battleground, but they also forced the enemy to move his supplies only at night over damaged roads. But so long as the Reds moved at all neither General Stratemeyer nor General Partridge would be satisfied.

 Weather reconnaissance pilots over Korea at night told of lighted enemy truck convoys moving southward to the front lines. To combat this enemy traffic, General Partridge needed a night-intruder unit, but the Air Force possessed no such organization. During World War II the 47th Bombardment Group (Light) had flown night-intruder missions in Italy's Po River Valley, and after the war the 47th had returned to the United States to experiment and determine optimum night-intruder tactics. In 1948, however, the 47th Group had traded its B-26's for B-45 jet bombers and was no longer concerned with night attacks.#81

Pusan Perimeter 135

Since the USAF possessed no night-intruder organization, the Fifth Air Force would have to devise its own means of combating Communist night travel.

 

During July the Fifth Air Force used one flight of the 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron's F-82's (three aircraft) for offensive night operations over Korea, but General Partridge did not think that these planes had much value except against known and fixed targets, such as airfields and towns.

  

Early in August, (8/7/50) when Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513 began to operate from Itazuke, the all-weather Corsairs provided eight to ten sorties per night. (BS - 995 sorties in little more than four weeks of fighting. 35.5 sorties per day in 4 weeks) More effort was needed. The F-80 pilots tried their hand at night interdiction, but they found it all but impossible to strafe enemy road traffic, which could not be easily identified at jet speeds, even on moonlit nights. Mustang pilots attempted night-harassing missions with "almost nil" results: the Mustang pilots located targets easily enough but their rocket and machine-gun fire blinded them.#82

Unit Info

 

Late in July a few 3rd Bombardment Group crews who had been assigned to the 47th Group began to fly night-intruder sorties. The 3rd Group B-26's were quite different from the planes they had flown in the 47th Group, for they had no radar altimeters, short-range navigation radar (shoran), or AN/APQ-13 blind-bombing radar, but in their initial employment over Korea the 3rd Group crews met apparent success. They could sight the lights of a Red convoy and even though the hostile vehicles almost always blacked out before the B-26's could make a pass the light-bomber crews felt that they could remember the convoy's position well enough to get in one good strafing pass.#83

Disturbed by reports that night movements were allowing supplies to reach the Communists, General Stratemeyer directed Partridge on 8 August to step up night-attack sorties to 50 each night, using any of his airplanes which could operate in the dark.#84

General Partridge was not willing to reduce day operations so sharply in order to get more night sorties, but he nevertheless directed the 3rd Group to place half its effort on night operations. The 8th and 13th Squadrons accordingly alternated in the night-intruder role, one squadron flying night missions one week and day missions the following week. By using the light-bomber squadrons in addition to the all-weather squadrons the Fifth Air Force managed to fly an average of 35 night-intruder sorties each night during August.#85 [USAF BS - VMF(N)-513 alone provided 35.5 sorties per day]

Each intruder organization dispatched its crews singly at periodic intervals during the night to reconnoiter pre-briefed transportation routes-the assigned mission being to harass enemy convoys and force them to move without their lights, thus increasing the enemy's problem of resupplying his combat forces.

136 U.S. Air Force in Korea

As August wore on 3rd Group night intruders, who had begun to supplement their strafing attacks with 160-pound fragmentation bombs, reported that they were sighting fewer and fewer lighted convoys. Communist night convoys were now creeping and not speeding to the front lines.#86

Other evidence indicated that the North Koreans, already hypersensitive to fear of the night intruders. While he was being carried northward by his Communist captors, General Dean reported that his guards dismounted from their truck and took cover each time they heard an airplane, no matter how black the night.#87

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1903 Sunset

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Casualties

Wednesday August 30, 1950 (Day - 67)

Korean_War 16 Casualties


19500830 0000 Casualties by unit


2 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
5 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 5TH MARINE REGIMENT
6 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
2 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
16 19500830 0000 Casualties by unit


As of August 30, 1950

 

Date USAF USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4410 136 14 4640
Today 15 1   16
Total 80 4425 137 14 4656

Aircraft Losses Today 001

 

Notes for Wednesday August 30, 1950 (Day - 67)

 

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