19500819 0000 SATURDAY
Three wars of Stratemeyer
General Partridge called at 0920 and reported the following: He is consolidating his hqrs at Pusan and the opening of the JOC took place last night at 2000 hours at Pusan. He with a small command group will remain along side General Walker with his small command group at Taegu. He has excellent communications (telephone) with the JOC.
Yesterday morning apparently the Communists spread a rumor in Taegu that any of the civilian population that remained there would be shot, and, as a con- sequence, nearly the complete evacuation of Taegu took place by the civilians. The military did not know why this happened, but finally got the information. As a result, the roads to the rear from Taegu were a mass of humanity. They feel though the civilian population will begin to flow back to Taegu.
General Partridge reported the ground situation far less tense and that he along with General Walker was most optimistic.
I queried him as to whether he was obtaining "flash" reports from the 31st Recon Sq.  He said he knew of one, but couldn't answer as to whether they were coming in daily. I asked that he investigate and let me know as I am not satisfied that the information that should get to Partridge is being sent by "flash" report from the 31st Recon airplanes. (Carbon copies of above made - given to Craigie and Weyland.)
Prepared an official letter (T.S.) to CINCFE subject: Evaluation of B-29
Area Bombing Effort 16 August 1950. Enclosed with this letter were copies of evaluation reports from Walker, Partridge, O'Donnell, and FEAF director of intelligence highlights of photo interpretation of post strike photos. Also enclosed was a map. I summarized the above enclosures and made the following recommendation: (a) that the B-29s not be employed on additional areas tentatively selected near the battle line. (b) that the B-29s be employed on the interdiction program and JCS targets in North Korea. (c) that aircraft of the Seventh Fleet normally be available for tactical employment.
The above letter delivered to Colonel Bunker, CINCFE's ADC at 1240 hours, today (19 Aug).
Following quoted in toto:
The above statement was read and initialed by: Craigie, Weyland and
Crabb, 18 Aug 50.
207. A "flash" report gave the first available details pertaining to a given mission, usually the number of aircraft or personnel lost on the mission. A "flash" message (see later entries), on the other hand, was a message of such importance as to have transmission priority over all other messages.
208. Lt Col Rollins S. Emmerich, senior advisor to the 3d ROK Division; Capt Gerald D. Putnam, advisor to the ROK 23rd Regiment; Maj Britten and Capt Austin are unidentified.
209. "Wanson" has not been identified. It is possible that the named area is actually Sŏsan, located about 65 miles west of P'ohang [and on the west coast??? see map].
210. Brig Gen Francis W. Farrell had been scheduled to command the artillery of one of the divisions. Dean's loss caused a change of plans and he assumed command of KMAG on July 25.
211. Lt Col Louis C. Adams, commander of the 6131st Air Base Group.
212. Brig Gen J. Sladen Bradley , 2nd Infantry Division assistant division commander. During World War II he had been a regimental commander and chief of staff of the 32nd Infantry Division.
213. According to the official Army history, there had been
no effective mortar fire on the airfield and that reports of the small-arms
fire were greatly exaggerated. (Appleman, p 329.) The feeling was that the field
was abandoned precipitously.