Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 28.6°C 83.48°F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

 

28 Citations issued on this date

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How a man died on the way to Maeson Dong. September 2, 1950. Sgt. Turnbull. (Army)
NARA FILE #: 111-SC-347826
WAR & CONFLICT BOOK #: 1511 

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Citations

 

19500901 0000 SS Citations

 

Remembrances

As supreme commander for the Allied powers, I issued the following statement to the Japanese people on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of V-J Day [9/2/1945]:

 

Five years have passed since the nations of the world entered into solemn covenants designed to restore and preserve the peace. All men then looked forward with new hope and a new resolve to achieve a relationship based upon a mutuality of purpose, a mutuality of understanding, and a mutuality of dedication to higher human and spiritual ideals. Hope found its genesis in the determination enunciated by the major powers that irresponsible militarism, the scourge of mankind since the beginning of time, be driven from the world.

 

This hope has not materialized. While militarism in Japan, largely through the self-dedicated efforts of the Japanese people themselves, has been banished and no longer exists even as a debatable concept, elsewhere imperialistic militarism, marching under different banners but unified direction, is leaving in its wake the stark tragedy of human and spiritual wreckage. Many peoples have fallen under its savage and merciless assaults and fear of conquest and enslavement grips much of the earth.

 

In the universal atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty generated by the clash of opposing forces — good and evil — the Japanese people with calmness and resolution have written a record of political reorientation, economic reconstruction and social progress which attests to Japan's unconditional qualification to resume membership in good standing in the family of free nations.

 

From the ashes left in war's wake there has arisen in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. Thus oriented, Japan may be counted upon to wield a profound influence over the course of events in Asia.

 

The basic objectives of Occupation have been achieved. Politically, economically, and socially, Japan at peace will not fail the universal trust.

 

I had a premonition as I wrote the message that this would be the last time I would address Japan.

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South then North

 

Ruins of Ancient Fortress and stone wall on the crest of Ka-san (Hill 902).

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   15thIR

 

During November the U.S. 3d Infantry Division joined the X Corps in Korea. One of its regiments, the 65th, had been in South Korea for more than two months. It had embarked on two transports in Puerto Rico on 25 August, passed through the Panama Canal, and sailed directly for Korea. It arrived at Pusan on 22 September and disembarked the next day (23 Sept) .

The other two regiments, the 7th and 15th, and the division headquarters sailed from San Francisco between 30 August and [1] 2 September. The last ship of the division transports arrived at its destination, Moji, Japan, on 16 September

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biography   biography

On 2 September Colonel Stephens' 21st Infantry attacked northwest from P'ohang-dong in an effort to help the ROK's recapture Hill 99. A platoon of tanks followed the valley road between P'ohang-dong and Hŭnghae. Stephens assigned K Company Hill 99 as its objective. The 21st Infantry made very slow progress in this attack, and in some quarters none at all. Casualties were heavy.

[note]

 

Of these battles around Hwajong-dong (14 air miles
northwest of Yongch'on) an enemy diarist wrote on 2 September, "Today we opened a general attack"; [next entry was the 7th]

[note]

 

  

On the next road eastward above Yŏngch'ŏn, the N.K. 15th Division launched its attack against the ROK 8th Division on 2 September. Although far under strength, with its three regiments reportedly having a total of only 3,600 men, it penetrated in four days to the lateral corridor at Yŏngch'ŏn. North of the town one regiment of the ROK 8th Division panicked when an enemy tank got behind its lines.  

[note]

 

 

Troopers in the Mountains-Walled Ka-san

Unit Info     

Hard on the heels of Major Kim's warning that the North Korean attack would strike the night of 2 September, the blow hit with full force in the Bowling Alley area north of Taegu. It caught the 8th Cavalry Regiment defending the Sangju road badly deployed in that it lacked an adequate reserve.

[note]

 

 

  

The 2nd Division released E Company to the regiment and the next day it joined F Company to build up what became the main defensive position of the 23rd Regiment in front of Ch'angnyŏng. Lt. Col. James W. Edwards took command of this 2nd Battalion position. [23-30]

[note]

 

 

  

In the evening, relief came in the form of rain. McDoniel spread out two blankets recovered with airdropped supplies the day before, [this day] and wrung from them enough water to fill a 5-gallon can. The men removed their clothing and wrung water from them to fill their canteens.

[note]

 

 

     

On the second day of the fighting at the enemy-held pass, the relief force, [3d Battalion, 38th Infantry] under Maj. Everett S. Stewart, the battalion executive officer and temporarily acting battalion commander, broke through the enemy roadblock [to Hutchin's battalion] with the help of air strikes and artillery and tank fire.

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Unit Info   Unit Info

By 2 September, E Company [35th Infantry] in a heavy battle had destroyed most of an enemy battalion. [N.K. 7th Division troops]

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 Unit Info  

The day before, the 159th Field Artillery Battalion also had distinguished itself in defending its guns in close fighting.

    

Fighting in support of the Nam River front in the northern part of the 25th Division sector were five batteries of the 159th and 64th Field Artillery Battalions (105-mm. howitzers) and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers), for a total of thirty-six guns. One 155-mm. howitzer, called by Colonel Fisher "The Little Professor," fired from Kŏmam-ni on the Notch back of Chungam-ni, through which funneled much of the N.K. 6th Division's supplies. Another forward artillery piece kept the Iryong-ni bridge over the Nam under fire. The 25th Division artillery estimated it killed approximately 1,825 North Korean soldiers during the first three days of September. [24-49]

In this critical time, the Fifth Air Force added its tremendous fire power to that of the division artillery in support of the ground force.

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The loading of the 1st Marine Division at Kobe was in full swing on 2 September when word came that the next morning a typhoon would strike the port, where more than fifty vessels were assembled. All unloading and loading stopped for thirty-six hours.

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During November the U.S. 3d Infantry Division joined the X Corps in Korea. One of its regiments, the 65th, had been in South Korea for more than two months. It had embarked on two transports in Puerto Rico on 25 August, passed through the Panama Canal, and sailed directly for Korea. It arrived at Pusan on 22 September and disembarked the next day [9/23].

The other two regiments, the 7th and 15th, and the division headquarters sailed from San Francisco between 30 August and 2 September. The last ship of the division transports arrived at its destination, Moji, Japan, on 16 September

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U.S. Air Force

 

biography   biography

2 SEPTEMBER 1950

T.S. redline, EYES ALONE, Vandenberg to Stratemeyer, received and read 0745 hours:

The operations in Korea are the responsibility of General MacArthur, operating under the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I cannot therefore prescribe any limitations or special rules governing your operations in any particular area or in any special situation. However, the directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from me are clear and complete as to the necessity of avoiding any violations of the Manchurian or Soviet borders. The probable attack of an F-51 on Manchurian territory as reported by you has had, as you know, the gravest political implications. There must repeat must not be any repetition or appearance of repetition of this incident.[253]


My comment is: The signal does not sound like Van. To me, it is a passing the buck signal and indicates that the crossing of the border by an F-51 was condoned - and that we had not attempted to carry out the directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Again, I say this does not sound like Vandenberg. It is one of those signals sent purely for the record. Such signals do not help morale. Again, I quote Lincoln: "I do the very best I know how - the very best I can; and I mean to keep doing so until the end - if the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything; if the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference."ť


First Lieutenant Thomas C. Langstaff [254] reported on permanent change of station from the 49th Fighter Bomber Group; he will make it possible for Bob Melgard to go on detached service and join the 8th Fighter Bomber Group at Itazuke where I have instructed him to be given the opportunity to fly some 50 or 60 missions. Lt Langstaff has flown 53 F-80C combat missions; he is the nephew of Elise Boyd.[255]

Dispatched to Admiral Joy (info copies to CINCFE and Partridge)

the following letter:

I would like to express my appreciation and admiration for the way Task Group 77.4 was put into battle line support on 1 September 1950. All of us realize the difficulty of making emergency changes in plans and my staff and I am unanimous in our respect for your efficient handling of yesterday's operations. Please convey to your staff and the officers and men of Task Group 77.4 my thanks (and I am sure, General Walker's) for the prompt and aggressive support they gave. Best regards.

In answer to LeMay's letter of 21 Aug in which he raised several questions, following extract is my answer to his letter:

Ref Par. 2. In reply to your first question, I am of the opinion that your training program is very sound and is producing crews capable of doing excellent bombing, both visually and by radar. The crews of your units in this theater have demonstrated outstanding professional skill in bombing operations against industrial targets. Although not trained for bombing attacks against bridges, the crews are gradually mastering the techniques peculiar to such bombing. The results achieved recently have been most gratifying. Low altitude, visual bombing, when it is necessary to perform missions when the cloud deck is low, in my opinion, needs attention. When I say this I realize this is not a normal technique for SAC, but there will always be occasions in war where low altitude, visual bombing will be a requirement should the targets be fruitful. This is not a criticism, Curt, it is merely a suggestion.

Ref Par. 3: Concerning your 2nd question, I think your mobility plan is adequate for the mission for which it was designed, that is, conducting only atomic bombing operations for a period of approx. 1 month. Operations employing conventional bombs as Rosie is now doing require a large amount of base support. Both at Kadena and at Yokota, we are furnishing the equivalent of the wing support provided by your bases in the ZI. In this connection, I might add that we are in a position to furnish better support than you can hope to find in any other part of the world. This fortunate situation is largely attributable to the fact (1) we have the largest AF organization outside the ZI, and (2) we enjoy a highly advantageous priority because of the war and we are not competing with other areas for resources.

Ref Par. 4: Depending upon the world location of bases, various augmentations of your mobility plan in personnel and equipment will very probably be necessary. Because the problem is rather complex, I heartily welcome your proposal to send over a couple of your organizational experts.

Ref Par. 5: Rosie O'Donnell has just returned from a visit to Guam. Heflin returned with him and briefed me and some members of my staff, including Trask. Nevertheless, I am planning to send Trask, as soon as possible, for a visit with Heflin and his organization.

Redline to Vandenberg with info to CINCFE, 5th AF, 20th AF, 13th AF, FEAMCOM, 5th AF in Korea:

Part I. Because of critical conditions in Korea and contemplated offensive operations demanding additional fighter-bomber support, I am decreasing the air defenses of FEC by 4 F-80 sqdrs [squadrons] and supporting elements, and augmenting the offensive effort of the 5th AF in Korea by the same amount. This action places 4 day fighter groups in offensive tactical air operations, and leaves one day and one all-weather fighter group for air defense of Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

Part II. Request that a 4 squadron fighter wing be transferred to FEAF to rebuild our air defense capability as expeditiously as possible.


The above radio, re additional squadrons and utilization for air defense of
Japan put in form of directive in a letter to Partridge and Stearley this date.
Drafted a letter to O'Donnell re plans and methods of new techniques in the utilization of B-29s; asked him to come up with some ideas. Sent my draft over to Operations for them to mull over letter before I send it out.
Called General Marquat and pointed out to him that the complete approval, that he concurred in on the employment of Japanese National engineers at FEAMCOM, has been complied with insofar as we are concerned; but it is held up there in his office, by his people, and has been since 23 August. He said he would immediately get on it.


I telephoned Colonel Bunker and asked him to tell the boss that the three B-29 sorties against targets in rear of the battle line had been excellent, and, further, that we would operate 48 B-29s, 3 September, against targets, data for which is being flown to BOMCOM direct from Fifth Air Force.

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biography   biography

On 2 September General Stratemeyer ordered his subordinate commanders to brief their crews that when in the vicinity of the borders, unless positive of their location, they must leave at once.

Despite these explicit orders there were some mistakes and compromises of the border by pilots who became lost in the confusing geography of North Korea. Two fighter pilots strafed a Red Chinese airstrip near Antung on 27 August.

[Guess they were not mind readers didn't know what Stratemeyer was going to do on  the 2nd of September.]

A 98th Group B-29 bombed near Antung on the night of 22 September when similarity of the topography of Antung and Sinanju, 60 miles south, led the crew to believe that they were bombing in the vicinity of Sinanju.

 Missions of this type up the northwest coast of Korea were necessary because of the large amounts of military supplies brought across the Manchurian border daily from Antung, but the crew had been briefed to remain 50 miles or more from the border. General Stratemeyer specifically directed that any crew given a mission north of the line P'yŏngyang   -  Wŏnsan should be briefed on North Korean geography and that if they could not positively locate themselves they were not to attack.

When two F-80 's attacked a Siberian airfield on 8 October, General Stratemeyer removed the group commander.

[note]

 

 

  

The 25th Division, fighting on the front south of the Nam River where  there were few natural defense lines, received 108 of the Fifth Air Force's close-support sorties and used them to withstand a heavy enemy assault. At a press conference on 2 September Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, the 25th's commander, was outspoken in praise of the Fifth Air Force. "The close air support strikes rendered by the Fifth Air Force," Kean told newsmen, "again saved this Division, as they have many times before."  General Kean cited one instance in which a company was surrounded on a hill. Mustangs came in to blaze a circle of fire upon the enemy troops, knocking out enough of them to lighten the pressure. Since the company was running short of ammunition it called for airdropped resupply, which was promptly delivered by a 21st Troop Carrier Squadron transport. The company held its position. "I am not just talking," General Kean said, "I have made this a matter of official record." #122

A large share of the credit for this outstanding employment of tactical airpower was undoubtedly attributable to the fact that General Kean always took a personal interest in air support. In the September fighting, for example, General Kean had his division TACP up close to the front where the forward air controller could locate, pinpoint, and report enemy targets to the Mosquito controllers.#123

 At the Joint Operations Center, more-over, General Kean was known for making no request for air support that was not strictly legitimate. "When the Air Force received a request from the 25th Division," said an officer of the Joint Operations Center, "they pulled a string and gave them everything they could." #124

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The Communists continued their offensive on 2 September, exerting pressure all around the defensive perimeter. On the southwestern front the 25th Division withstood the enemy and launched strong counterattacks which drove the Reds back beyond their original positions. The 2nd Division, however, continued to find itself in trouble, for the enemy had forced across the Naktong and was seeking to capture the town of Yŏngsan. Weather in Korea was generally poor, particularly in the battle areas, but the Fifth Air Force, making good use of squadrons released from air defense in Japan and the Marine air squadron, flew a total of 201 close-support sorties.#126

 The 307th Bombardment Group sent 25 B-29's to blanket Communist supplies in the towns of Kŭmch'ŏn, Kŏch'ang, and Chinju with 863 x 500-pound bombs.#127

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On the previous evening [1 Sept] Task Force 77 had sent a representative to the Joint Operations Center to plan missions and arrange flight schedules.

 The Navy also agreed to furnish airborne controllers to work with the Mosquitoes in front of the 2nd Division, this being the area in which it was agreed that carrier planes would provide close support. In view of this agreement, General Partridge was willing to waive his requirement that Navy planes would report to "Mellow" before making close-support strikes.

These coordinated operations went very well, and during the day pilots from Task Force 77 flew 127 close-support sorties. On this day the 2nd and 25th Division continued to secure the bulk of available close-support effort. Together, Navy and Air Force planes provided the two divisions nearly 300 close-support sorties. #128

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biography  biography   biography  biography

In view of the haze of discussion in which many of these decisions were undertaken, some misunderstandings would not have been remarkable. The United Nations Command operations plan air annex, which was issued on 2 September, however, deviated significantly from the basic air-coordination agreement of 8 July 1950* and the specific decisions made on 30 August. On 4 September General Stratemeyer wrote General MacArthur a letter requesting clarification of the air annex.#11

 

*The CINCFE "coordination control" directive was actually issued on 15 July 1950 as an answer to General Stratemeyer's letter of 8 July 1950, but it was generally referred to as the "8 July" directive. See Chapter 2, pp. 49-50.

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biography   biography  

[FEAF Ops Plan 3-50] During the days in which General Stratemeyer was seeking to establish some unity of air action over Korea, FEAF had also been delegating mission responsibilities to its subordinate commands. The Fifth Air Force was charged to maintain air superiority in Korea, to interdict the battle areas and provide close air support to EUSAK, to accept, where possible, emergency requests for air support from the X Corps tactical air commander. It was to rehabilitate Kimp'o and Suwŏn airfields and to be prepared to move tactical air groups to those airfields. It was to be prepared to establish its advance headquarters in the Kimp'o-Sŏul  area.#14

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 The new interdiction plan represented some careful thought. The interdiction planners recognized that the destruction of bridges would not decisively influence the military situation at the front lines in a short time, for a North Korean division had proved able to continue to fight with only 50 tons of resupply each day. But in the event of a Chinese or Russian intervention the new interdiction program was calculated to hinder the movement of troops to the front, to disrupt their resupply, and to place limits on the numbers of Chinese or Russian troops who could be employed at the front lines.#20

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U.S. Marine Corps

 

September 02, 1950 it was D-minus 13 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

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USN  

The USS Noble (APA-218) pulled into Kobe on September 2.  Since the Inch'ŏn plan called for the regimental headquarters and 1/1 to use the same ship, these troops remained aboard and served as a labor pool.  They spent the next several days combat-loading the Noble and the dozen LSTs that would carry the rest of the regiment. 

[note]

 

biography   biography  biography   biography

General Almond informed the Marine general on 23 August that the release of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade for participation in the Inch'ŏn landing would depend on the military situation. He seemed doubtful and added that the withdrawal of the Marines would be bad for Eighth Army morale.


The Attack Force and Landing Force began their planning, however, on the basis of Brigade availability.


It had been the intention of CinCFE to employ a full Marine division, but an embarkation date of 1 September would not permit the 7th Marines to arrive in time. This left the 1st Marines as the only RCT of the Landing Force unless the 5th Marines and other Brigade units could be released.

 On 30 August, Smith brought up the issue again in a dispatch to X Corps, whereupon CinCFE issued an order making the Brigade troops available to the Division on 4 September.

 

This might have settled the issue if the enemy had not launched an all-out offensive on 1 September to smash through the Pusan Perimeter. Although the Brigade had already sent heavy equipment to Pusan for embarkation, the Marines were rushed up to the front on 2 September as a mobile reserve. That same day the order for their release was revoked.  

There could be no doubt about the gravity of the military situation. Thirteen NKPA divisions were making a final effort, and the Marines were needed in the Naktong Bulge sector, where the Korean Reds were attempting to cut the Pusan-Taegu lifeline.  

On the other hand, time was also running out for the Inch'ŏn planners. Colonel Forney, the new deputy chief of staff for X Corps, informed Smith on 2 September that Almond planned to use the 32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division if the 7th Marines could not arrive in time for the Inch'ŏn landing. Recently, the cadres of this Army division had been brought up to strength with 8,000 South Koreans. The remaining 12,000 U.S. troops had received no adequate amphibious training, though instructors from Training Team Able [Troop Training Unit] had made a start with some of the units.  

This turn of affairs resulted in a meeting in General Almond’s office. The Navy was represented by Admirals Joy, Struble, and Doyle; the Army by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright; and the Marines by General Smith.  

Wright opened the discussion by stating that Walker needed the Brigade troops urgently as a mobile reserve to hold the line in the current NKPA offensive. Almond conceded that the question of Brigade availability must be decided on a basis of Eighth Army requirements and tactical considerations. But if the 5th Marines could not be released, he reiterated his decision to substitute the 32d Infantry for the Inch'ŏn operation. Admiral Joy declared that the success of the Inch'ŏn assault depended on the employment of Marines trained in amphibious techniques; and he called upon Smith for his opinion. The Marine general said that a hastily instructed unit could not be expected to take the place of a combat-experienced regiment in the Landing Force, and that last-minute substitutions of this sort could not be made in complicated ship-to-shore landings without courting trouble. He added that it would be necessary in such an event to land in column on one beach instead of two, with the 1st Marines in advance of the 32d Infantry. These comments had the support of Doyle, who agreed that the availability of the 5th Marines might mean the difference between success and failure at Inch'ŏn.  

At this point Admiral Struble commented that the issue boiled down to the need for a mobile Eighth Army reserve. He suggested as a compromise that a regiment of the 7th Infantry Division be embarked and moved to Pusan as a floating reserve to be landed in an emergency as a substitute for the 5th Marines. This solution was accepted. Almond called up Eighth Army Headquarters immediately, and within an hour Wright telephoned to inform Smith that the Brigade would be relieved at midnight on 5 September.[18] As it turned out, the 17th Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division was embarked and transferred to Pusan to substitute for the 5th Marines, with Marine officers of Training Team Able assisting in the outloading. After the amphibious assault, the regiment landed administratively at Inch'ŏn to rejoin its parent unit.  

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U.S. Navy

map10t Map 10. The Period of Crisis, 25 August–4 September 1950

Click on map for higher resolution image (218 KB).

[note]

 

 

biography   biography  

On the next day, despite deteriorating weather, the carriers sent in 127 close support sorties, to which Fifth Air Force and the Ashiya-based Marines added 201. Ninety-nine of the carrier sorties received positive direction, and the troubles of most of the other 28 were attributable to a morning ground fog over the target area.

      USN_Units   USN_Units

          Once the fog lifted things went well. Valley Forge aircraft destroyed 3 tanks, 12 trucks, and 3 barges, and successfully attacked 7 troop concentrations; Philippine Sea strike groups claimed 2 trucks and a tank, and many casualties in attacks on 11 troop concentrations.

 Communications with control planes were good, the controllers were complimentary about the attacks, the commanding officer of Philippine Sea reported that "the operation was a success," and the pilots were cheered by the thought that they were getting into the war. The last strike of the day was directed against enemy troops retreating across the Nam River south of the bulge, and in this sector at least things seemed to be looking up.

[note]

 

 

        The Marine Brigade, in the meantime, had been on the move, northward to Miryang on the 1st, and westward to Yŏngsan on the 2nd, prior to attacking once more into the Naktong bulge. There the situation was even worse than a month before: the better part of two Communist divisions was now across the river, and the enemy had broken out of the bulge and advanced about four miles eastward along the Yŏngsan road.

 Local Army commanders wanted the Marines to attack at once, but General Craig, not wishing to commit his force until all troops had reached their assembly points or until his air control personnel had arrived, resisted an afternoon advance.

[note]

 

 

USN_Units 

 

So the concept of the operation took form. In early September, and again in the days preceding the landing, the three carrier units of Joint Task Force 7Admiral Ewen’s fast carriers, Admiral Ruble’s escort carriers, and the British light carrier Triumph—would work over the west coast with their efforts gradually converging toward Inch'ŏn.

Prior to D-Day a destroyer and cruiser bombardment of Wŏlmi Do would be carried out.

On the early morning tide of 15 September a battalion landing team of the 5th Marines would assault Wŏlmi in order to secure that commanding position.

On the afternoon tide, at about 1700, the main attack into the city would be carried out by the 5th Marines’ remaining two battalions and by the 1st Marines. While the two Marine regiments moved rapidly to expand their holdings to Kimp'o airfield and the Han River line, the 7th Infantry Division (Reinforced) and corps troops would be landed administratively and would then operate as ordered by the corps commander.

Throughout the operation bombardment and fire support would be provided by cruisers and destroyers, and air cover, air strikes, and close support by carrier aviation.

So far as the air was concerned Joint Task Force 7 was self-sufficient: complications of coordination or control during the landing phase were fended off by the proviso that except at the request of Admiral Struble no FEAF aircraft would operate in the objective area subsequent to D minus 3, while for the later stages of the campaign X Corps was provided with its own Tactical Air Command, composed of Marine aircraft and commanded by a Marine brigadier general.

Such was the plan for the operation as worked out by the staffs of Seventh Fleet, the Amphibious Group, and the Marine Division. For Inch'ŏn, as for Pohang-dong, the planning was necessarily carried out in violation of all the rules and in record time.

 

By 2 September, when the Joint Task Force operation plan and the Amphibious Group’s operation order were issued, Marine planning was nearing completion,

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Upon moving back from Fern's platoon [2nd Platoon , A Company, 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division] during the night battle, he had taken his group all the way back up to the top of the ridge. They had stayed there in seclusion all day, watching many enemy groups moving about in all directions below them. Freeman assumed that most of A Company had been killed or captured. For five days and nights he maintained his squad and the four wounded behind enemy lines, finally guiding them all safely to friendly lines. [24-1]

[note]

 

 

2 Eng Bn DUI.jpg

About 0300, 2 September, D Company of the 2nd Engineer Battalion alerted A Company that a long line of white-garbed figures was moving through Yŏngsan toward its roadblock. Challenged when they approached, the white figures opened fire-they were enemy troops. Four enemy tanks and an estimated battalion of North Koreans were in Yŏngsan.

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Fern's [2nd Platoon ,  A Company, 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division] decided shortly before dawn that he must try to escape before daylight. He sent word by a runner back to Freeman, who should have been about 500 yards in the rear, to rejoin the platoon. The runner returned and said he could not find Freeman. There had been no firing to the rear, so Fern knew that Freeman had not encountered enemy troops. Two men searched a second time for Freeman without success. Fern then decided that he would have to try to lead those with him to safety.

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2 Eng Bn DUI.jpg

The North Koreans now attempted a breakthrough of the 2nd Engineer Battalion position. After daylight, they were unable to get reinforcements into the fight since D Company commanded the town and its approaches.

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0601 Sunrise

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The 23d Infantry in Front of Ch'angnyŏng

North of the 9th Infantry and the battles that ebbed and flowed in the big bulge of the Naktong and around Yŏngsan, the 23d Infantry Regiment after daylight of 1 September found itself in a very precarious position. Its 1st Battalion had been driven from the river positions and isolated three miles westward. Approximately 400 North Koreans now overran the regimental command post, compelling Colonel Freeman to withdraw it about 600 yards. There, approximately five miles northwest of Ch'angnyŏng, the 23d Infantry Headquarters and Headquarters Company, miscellaneous regimental units, and regimental staff officers checked the enemy in a 3-hour fight. Capt. Niles J. McIntyre of the Headquarters Company played a leading role. [24-26]

[note]

 

0800 Korean Time

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0900 Korean Time

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A heavy ground fog, so thick that one could hardly see twenty-five yards, developed in the early morning of 2 September and this held until midmorning. Under this cloak of concealment Fern's  [2nd Platoon ,  A Company, 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division] group made its way by compass toward Yŏngsan.

[note]

 

 

By that morning (2 September) the need for hand grenades was desperate. About 0900 MSgt. Travis E. Watkins of H Company shot and killed two enemy soldiers 50 yards outside the northeast edge of the perimeter. He jumped from his hole to get the weapons and grenades of the dead men; 20 yards from them three hidden enemy soldiers jumped to their feet and opened fire on him. Watkins killed them and gathered weapons, ammunition, and insignia from all five before returning to the perimeter. An hour later a group of six enemy soldiers gained a protected spot 25 yards from a machine gun position of the perimeter and began throwing hand grenades into it. Although already wounded in the head, Watkins rose from his hole to engage them with rifle fire. An enemy machine gun immediately took him under fire and hit him in the left side, breaking his back. Watkins in some manner managed to kill all six of the nearby enemy soldiers before he sank into his hole paralyzed from the waist down. Even in this condition, Watkins never lost his nerve, but shouted encouragement to his companions. He refused any of the scarce rations, saying that he did not deserve them because he could no longer fight. [24-3]

[note]

 

 

biography  

In the morning, under cover of a heavy ground fog, the North Koreans struck Check's battalion in a counterattack. This action began a hard fight which lasted all morning. Air strikes using napalm burned to death many North Koreans and helped the infantry in gaining the ridge.

[note]

 

0935 Korean Time

At 0935 that morning (2 September), while the North Koreans were attempting to destroy the Engineer troops at the southern edge of Yŏngsan and clear the road to Miryang, General Walker talked by telephone with Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, in Tokyo. He [General Walker] described the situation around the Perimeter and said the most serious threat was along the boundary between the U.S. 2nd and 25th Divisions. He  [General Walker] described the location of his reserve forces and his plans for using them. He  [General Walker] said he had started the marines toward Yŏngsan but had not yet released them for commitment there and he wanted to be sure that General MacArthur approved his use of them, since he knew that this would interfere with other plans of the Far East Command. Walker said he did not think he could restore the 2nd Division lines without using them. General Hickey replied that General MacArthur had the day before approved the use of the marines if and when Walker considered it necessary. [On the 5th at midnight it will be taken away]

[note]

1000 Korean Time

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On the morning of 2 September the Air Force delivered a 37-minute strike against Hills 518 and 346. The artillery then laid down its concentrations on the hills, and after that the planes came over again napalming and leaving the heights ablaze. Just after 1000, and immediately after the final napalm strike, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attacked up Hill 518.

The plan of regimental attack unfortunately brought a minimum of force against the objective. While the 1st Battalion made the attack, the 2nd Battalion was in a blocking position on its left (west) and the newly arrived 3d Battalion, in its first Korean operation, was to be behind the 2nd Battalion and in an open gap between that battalion and Hill 518. The 1st Battalion moved up through ROK forces and, from high ground, was committed along a narrow ridge line, attacking from the southeast in a column of companies.

This in turn resolved itself in a column of platoons, and finally in a column of squads. The final effect, therefore, was that of a regimental attack amounting to a one-squad attack against a strongly held position.

The attack was doomed to failure from the start. The heavy air strikes and the artillery preparations had failed to dislodge the North Koreans. From their positions they delivered mortar and machine gun fire on the climbing infantry, stopping the weak, advanced force short of the crest.

[note]

 

1100 Korean Time

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2 Eng Bn DUI.jpg

In this fight, which raged until 1100, the engineers had neither artillery nor mortar support. D Company remedied this by using its 9 new 3.5-inch and 9 old 2.36-inch rocket launchers against the enemy infantry. The fire of the 18 bazookas plus that from 4 heavy and 4 light machine guns and the rifles, carbines, and grenades of the company inflicted very heavy casualties on the North Koreans, who desperately tried to clear the way for a push eastward to Miryang.

 Tanks of A and B Companies, 72nd Tank Battalion, at the southern and eastern edge of Yŏngsan shared equally with the engineers in the honors of this battle. Lieutenant Beahler was the only officer of D Company not killed or wounded in this melee, which cost the company twelve men killed and eighteen wounded. The edge of Yŏngsan and the slopes of the hill south of the town became a shambles of enemy dead and destroyed equipment. [24-13]

While this battle raged during the morning at Yŏngsan, Colonel Hill reorganized about 800 men of the 9th Infantry who had arrived in that vicinity from the overrun river line positions. Among them were F and G Companies, which were not in the path of major enemy crossings and had succeeded in withdrawing eastward. They had no crew-served weapons or heavy equipment.

[note]

 

1200 Korean Time

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From a hill at noon, after the fog had lifted, the men [2nd Platoon ,  A Company, 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division] looked down on the battle of Yŏngsan which was then in progress.

[note]

 

 

Unit Info      Unit Info

At noon, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, at last secured the former positions of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, and took over the same foxholes that unit had abandoned two nights before. Its crew-served weapons were still in place. During 2 September, the Air Force flew 135 sorties in the 25th Division sector, reportedly destroying many enemy soldiers, several tanks and artillery pieces, and three villages containing ammunition dumps. [24-62]

 

[24-Caption] COMMAND POST of the 27th Infantry under a bridge east of Haman.

Haman, South Korea

[note]

 

1250 Korean Time

 

   Unit Info  

After Murch had left the Chung-ni area on 2 September in his attack toward G Company, enemy infiltrators attacked the 24th Infantry command post and several artillery positions. To meet this new situation, General Kean, again acting on his own authority as the responsible commander on the ground, ordered the remaining battalion of the 27th Infantry (technically still the 3d Battalion, 28th [29th] Infantry), commanded by Lt. Col. George H. DeChow, to attack and destroy the enemy operating there. General Kean notified Eighth Army of his action at 1250, 2 September. [24-44]

[note]

 

1300 Korean Time

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Not only were the controllers unavailable on the afternoon of the 2nd but the whole air situation was somewhat problematical. Fifth Air Force had asked ComNavFE to continue all available effort between Tŭksŏng-dong and the coast, but Sunday the 3rd was fuelling day for the task force, which was scheduled to meet the replenishment group west of Mokp'o, and both of the escort carriers were now at Sasebo.

[note]

 

 

The infallible sign of approaching enemy troops could be seen in Ch'angnyŏng itself during the afternoon of 2 September-at 1300 the native population began leaving the town. A little later a security force of 300 local police under the command of Maj. Jack T. Young and Capt. Harry J. White withdrew into the hills eastward when two groups of enemy soldiers approached from the northwest and southwest.

[note]

 

 

With his communications broken southward to the 2nd Division headquarters and the 9th Infantry, General Haynes during the day decided to send a tank patrol down the Yŏngsan road in an effort to re-establish communication. Capt. Manes R. Dew, commanding officer of C Company, 72nd Tank Battalion, led the tanks southward. They had to fight their way down the road through enemy roadblocks. Of the three tanks that started, only Dew's tank got through to Yŏngsan. There, Captain Dew delivered an overlay of Task Force Haynes' positions to General Bradley. [24-28]

[note]

 

 

1315 Korean Time

 

 

biography  Army Symbolbiography   biography

September 2, 1950

A few hours after this conversation [at 0935 General Walker talked by telephone with Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, in Tokyo.] General Walker, at 1315, attached the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the 2nd Division and ordered a coordinated attack by all available elements of the division and the marines, with the mission of destroying the enemy east of the Naktong River in the 2nd Division sector and of restoring the river line. The marines were to be released from 2nd Division control just as soon as this mission was accomplished. [24-15]

Army Symbolbiography

A conference was held that afternoon at the 2nd Division command post attended by Colonel Collier, Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, General Craig and Maj. Frank R. Stewart, Jr., of the Marine Corps, and General Keiser and 2nd Division staff officers. A decision was reached that the

 

3915 on map 8 miles south of Miryang, 1-2 miles east of the Miryang River.

[24-Caption] U.N. TROOPS CROSS RICE PADDIES to attack west of Yŏngsan.

[note]

 

1400 Korean Time

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That afternoon Fern [2nd Platoon ,  A Company, 9th Infantry of the 2nd Division] brought the nineteen men with him into the lines of the 72nd Tank Battalion near Yŏngsan .

[note]

 

 

  

In the afternoon of 2 September Schmitt succeeded in radioing a request to the 1st Battalion for an airdrop of supplies. A division liaison plane attempted the drop, but the perimeter was so small and the slopes so steep that virtually all the supplies went into enemy hands.

[note]

 

 

   biography

Upon reporting to Lt. Col. John E. Londahl, Fern asked for permission to lead a patrol in search of Sergeant Freeman's group. Londahl denied this request because every available man was needed in the defense of Yŏngsan. As it turned out, Freeman brought his men to safety.

[note]

 

 

1500 Korean Time

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The next day another major enemy attack was forming north and northwest of Kigye. In the afternoon, KMAG advisers with the Capital Division estimated that 2,500 enemy soldiers had penetrated a gap between the ROK 17th and 18th Regiments.

At the same time, enemy pressure built up steadily north of P'ohang-dong, where the N.K. 5th Division fed replacements on to Hill 99 in front of the ROK 23rd Regiment. This hill became almost as notorious as had Hill 181 near Yŏngdök earlier because of the almost continuous and bloody fighting there for its control. Although aided by U.S. air attacks and artillery and naval gunfire, the ROK 3d Division was not able to capture this hill, and suffered many casualties in the effort.

[note]

 

 

   

In the afternoon the battalion [1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry] withdrew from Hill 518 and attacked northeast against Hill 490, from which other enemy troops had fired in support of the North Koreans on Hill 518.

[note]

 

 

      2 Eng Bn DUI.jpg

In mid-afternoon (2 September) tanks and the reorganized 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, attacked through A Company, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, into Yŏngsan, and regained possession of the town at 1500.

[note]

 

1525 Korean Time

      6thMTBn

By 15:25 that afternoon K Company [ 21st Infantry ] could account for only thirty-five men. The company was unable to take Hill 99 from the well dug-in North Koreans who threw showers of hand grenades to repel all efforts to reach the top. Two tanks of the 6th Tank Battalion were lost in this attack, one in an enemy mine field and another because of a thrown track.

[note]

 

1600 Korean Time

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1700 Korean Time

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At dusk an enemy penetration occurred along the boundary between the Capital Division and ROK 3d Division three miles east of Kigye. [22-8]

[note]

 

 

      2 Eng Bn DUI.jpg

Later, two bazooka teams from A Company, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, knocked out three T34 tanks just west of Yŏngsan. American ground and air action destroyed other enemy tanks during the day southwest of the town. By evening the North Koreans had been driven into the hills westward. In the evening, the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry and A Company, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, occupied the first chain of low hills half a mile beyond Yŏngsan, the engineers west and the 2nd Battalion northwest of the town. For the time being at least, the North Korean drive toward Miryang had been halted. [24-14]

[note]

 

 

  
23rdIR

The advanced elements of the battalion joined Hutchin's battalion at 1700, 2 September. That evening, North Koreans strongly attacked the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, on Hill 209 north of the road and opposite Hutchin's battalion, driving one company from its position. [24-31]

[note]

 

 

biography

While G Company held its positions on Hill 179 on 2 September against enemy attack, Colonel Murch's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, started an attack northwest toward it at 1700 from the Chung-ni area. The battalion made slow progress against formidable enemy forces. The night was extremely dark and the terrain along the Kuhe-ri ferry road was mountainous.

[note]

1800 Korean Time

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This planned attack against Hill 518 chanced to coincide with the defection and surrender on 2 September of Maj. Kim Song Jun, the S-3 of the N.K. 19th Regiment, 13th Division. He reported that a full-scale North Korean attack was to begin at dusk that day. The N.K. 13th Division, he said, had just taken in 4,000 replacements, 2,000 of them without weapons, and was now back to a strength of approximately 9,000 men. Upon receiving this intelligence, General Gay alerted all front-line units to be prepared for the enemy attack. [22-34]

 

(MAP 15: THE N.K. ATTACKS ON TAEGU, 2-15 September 1950)

[note]

 

 

 

North Koreans were in Ch'angnyŏng that evening. [24-27]

[note]

1859 Sunset

[note]


 

1900 Korean Time

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The men in the perimeter did, however, recover from a drop made later at 1900 a case of carbine ammunition, 2 boxes of machine gun ammunition, 11 hand grenades, 2 1/2 cases of rations, part of a package of medical supplies, and 21 cans of beer. Pfc. Joseph R. Ouellette, H Company, left the perimeter to retrieve an airdrop of water cans but found on reaching them that they were broken and empty. Like Watkins, he distinguished himself by leaving the perimeter to gather weapons, ammunition, and grenades from the enemy dead. On one such occasion an enemy soldier suddenly attacked Ouellette, who killed the North Korean in hand-to-hand combat. [24-4]

In helping to recover the airdropped supplies on the evening of 2 September, Lieutenant Schmitt was wounded but continued to exercise his command, encouraging the diminishing group by his example. That same afternoon, the North Koreans sent an American prisoner up the hill to Schmitt with the message, "You have one hour to surrender or be blown to pieces." Failing in frontal infantry attack to reduce the little defending force, the enemy now obviously meant to take it under observed and registered mortar fire. [24-5]

[note]

 

 

  

At 1900 the evening of 2 September, Colonel Hill returned to his command post east of Yŏngsan where he conferred with Colonel Murray, commanding the 5th Marines, and told him that his line of departure for the attack the next morning was secure. The troops holding this line on the first hills west of Yŏngsan were: G Company, 9th Infantry, north of the road running west through Kogan-ni to the Naktong; A Company, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, southward across the road; and, below the engineers, F Company, 9th Infantry.

[note]

 

1945 Korean Time

  

Forty-five minutes later enemy antitank fire came in on the knob and two machine guns from positions northward and higher on the slope of Hill 209 swept the perimeter. Soon, enemy mortars emplaced on a neighboring high finger ridge eastward registered on  Schmitt's perimeter and continued firing until dark. The machine gun fire forced every man to stay in his hole. The lifting of the mortar fire after dark was the signal for renewed enemy infantry attacks, all of which were repulsed. But the number of killed and wounded within the perimeter was growing, and food, water, and ammunition were needed. There were no medical supplies except those carried by one aid man.

[note]


 

2000 Korean Time

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2100 Korean Time

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2200 Korean Time

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Koread-War

At 2205 a dispatch from FAFIK informed Admiral Ruble that the Marines desired his air effort on the 3rd and inquired as to his availability; the message was forwarded with emergency precedence to Ashiya Air Base where both VMF 214 and VMF 323 were now located. But Typhoon Jane was nearing Japan, and at Ashiya the weather was very bad.

[note]

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Casualties

Saturday September 2, 1950 (Day 70)

195 Casualties


19500902_9999_Casualties_by_unit.html

2 159TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
2 15TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
23 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
12 23RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
8 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 25TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY - DIVISION
1 25TH REPLACEMENT COMPANY - DIVISION
27 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
7 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
20 2ND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
1 2ND MILITARY POLICE COMPANY - DIVISION
1 2ND REPLACEMENT COMPANY - DIVISION
1 34TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
14 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 36TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
2 38TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
21 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 3RD ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
2 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
2 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
2 65TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 70TH TANK BATTALION
4 72ND MEDIUM TANK BATTALION
8 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 80TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
1 82ND ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AW BATTALION
3 8TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON
11 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
13 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
   
   
195 19500902_9999_Casualties_by_unit.html

Date USAF    USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 80 4901 138 15 5134
Today 5 190     195
Total 85 5091 138 15 5329

Aircraft Losses Today 005

 

 

Notes for Saturday September 2, 1950 (Day 70)

 

 

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