Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 21.5°C 70.7 °F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Citations

biography   Unit Info    

U.S. 5th Marines ordered by General Douglas MacArthur to Inch'ŏn.

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Sept. 4

The UN Commission on Korea tells the General Assembly the invasion of South Korea was "sudden and apparently well-planned and organized." The North Koreans were hostile to the commission's investigation and a reunification proposal by North Korea was merely an attempt to cover invasion preparations.

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American Ceasar

19500904 0000 0ac0

 

Two (2) orbit missions flown by SB-17 and SB-29 aircraft logging 18:05 hours flying time. One (1) rescue SB-29 flew cover for an H-5 rescue aircraft in North Korean territory.

Two (2) SB-17's were used to search the area where an F-51 crashed on 3 September 1950. A 500 feet low altitude search was made with negative results. ADCC notified this Flight that an aircraft had sighted a man in a life-raft at the approximate location [where the] aircraft was supposed to have crashed. Two (2) crash boats were ordered to the scene and investigation disclosed the object in the water to be a large yellow box. No aircraft wreckage was located.

This Squadron held a Commanders conference this date. All matters effecting the overall operation of the Third Air rescue Squadron were discussed, decisions rendered, and plans made to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of this organization.

One (1) SB-17 while on a search mission was requested to intercept a C-46 aircraft between Tsushima island and Pusan AB, and escort it to Ashiya. The C-46 aircraft had sheared approximately four (4) feet of one wing in the process of taking-off from Pusan AB, the aircraft had three (3) crew members and seventeen (17) passengers aboard. Interception was successful and aircraft landed safely at Ashiya AB.

Kokura CIC notified this organization at 2234/I that an F-51 had crashed in Shimone prefecture near the town of Ashkuramura, 25 mi NW of Iwakuni. Iwakuni AB was contacted and information was obtained that the pilot had been returned to his home station.

The Helicopter Detachment in Korea made twenty (20) evacuation and three (3) whole blood deliveries to front line aid stations flying 16:45 hours.

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Sept. 4: In the first H-5 helicopter rescue of a downed US pilot from behind enemy lines in Korea, at Hanggan-dong, Lt. Paul W. Van Boven saved Capt. Robert E. Wayne. Three squadrons of C-119 Flying Boxcars arrived at Ashiya for use in the Korean War.

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North Korean prisoner of Marines who rolled enemy back in Naktong River fighting. He wears a "Prisoner of War" tag.

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"Private First Class Melvin L. Brown, D Company, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, became the thirteenth Korean War Medal of Honor recipient. While his platoon was securing the Walled City (Hill 755) near Kasan, PFC Brown used his position on a fifty foot high wall to deliver heavy rifle fire on an enemy counterattack. Wounded and out of ammunition, he stayed in position, throwing grenades. His and his buddies’ grenades expended, he drew his entrenching tool and knocked a dozen of the enemy from the wall as they climbed up, one by one, until he was ultimately overrun and killed."
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South then North

 

 

 

Def   Army Symbolbiography

In early September a distinguished soldier joined the Eighth Army staff. The Department of the Army sent Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen to Korea to serve as General Walker's chief of staff. General Allen in World War II had been General Omar N. Bradley's army group chief of staff in the European Theater of Operations. He entered on duty at Eighth Army Headquarters in Taegu on 4 September. Colonel Landrum, highly regarded by General Walker, remained as deputy chief of staff. [21-17]

The Korean War was more than two months old before the first United Nations troops, other than those of the United States, arrived in Korea. Since the Republic of Korea was not a member of the United Nations, the ROK Army was considered an allied force.

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biography  Army Symbolbiography   biography

The startling gains of the North Koreans in the east on 4 September caused General Walker to shift still more troops to that area.

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Unit Info     

Other attacks failed on 4 September. An enemy forward observer captured on Hill 518 said that 1,200 North Koreans were dug in on the hill and that they had 120-mm. and 82-mm. mortars with ammunition. [22-36]

While these actions were in progress on its right, the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, on 4 September attacked and captured Hill 303.

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Unit Info    

By 4 September it had become quite clear that the N.K. 3d Division in front of the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments was itself attacking, and that, despite continued air strikes, artillery preparations, and infantry efforts on Hill 518, it was infiltrating large numbers of its troops to the rear of the attacking United States forces. That day the I&R Platoon reported that enemy soldiers held Hill 464, a high hill mass opposite Hill 518 on the south side of the Waegwan-Tabu-dong road, and that it had to destroy its radio and machine gun to keep them from falling into enemy hands.

That night large enemy forces came through the gap between the 3d Battalion on the southern slope of Hill 518 and the 2d Battalion westward. For a time those in the 3d Battalion command post thought the attack was going to turn east and overrun them but, instead, the North Koreans turned west and occupied Hill 464 in force.

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The day before, E Company had been delayed in following D Company to Hill 755. Soon after the Engineer company had started up the trail on the 4th, E Company arrived at Colonel Holley's command post at the base of the mountain. Enemy mortar fire was falling on the trail at the time and the company commander said he could not advance because of it. Holley radioed this information to Colonel Palmer who designated another company commander and said, "Tell him to come on through." This second officer broke his glasses on a rock and informed Holley that he could not go on. Holley put him on the radio to Palmer who ordered him to continue up the hill.

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Soldiers of the ROK 1st Division captured a North Korean near Ka-san on 4 September who said that about 800 of his fellow soldiers were in the Walled City area with three more battalions following them from the north. The Engineer company had succeeded only in establishing a perimeter briefly within the enemy-held area.

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The forty-two men of the 2d Platoon, B Company, 23d Infantry, led by 1st Lt. William M. Glasgow held outpost positions on seven hills covering a 2,600-yard front along the east bank of the Naktong north of Pugong-ni.

 Across the river in the rice paddies they could see, in the afternoon of 31 August, two large groups of enemy soldiers. Occasionally artillery fire dispersed them. Just before dusk turned to darkness, Glasgow and the men in his 1st Squad saw "a large and bizarre torchlight parade" come out of the hills and proceed toward the river. Glasgow immediately reported the spectacle to the battalion command post. The artillery forward observer, who estimated the crowd to number 2,000 people, thought they were refugees. When the matter was referred to Colonel Freeman, he immediately ordered the artillery to fire on the torchbearers. With each bursting shell some of the torches disappeared but others took their places and the procession continued unchecked toward the river bank.  [23-28]

At 2100 the first shells of what proved to be a two-hour enemy artillery and mortar preparation against the American river positions jarred the fascinated Glasgow and his companions from their absorbed contemplation of the torchlight scene. As the enemy barrage rolled on, North Korean infantry crossed the river and climbed the hills in the darkness under cover of its fire.

At 2300 the barrage lifted. A green flare signaled the North Korean assault. A few minutes later enemy grenades showered into Glasgow's position. After a short fight at close quarters, Glasgow and his men ran off the hill toward the rear. Similar assaults took place elsewhere along the battalion outpost line.

On the regimental left along the main Pugong-ni-Ch'angnyŏng road enemy soldiers completely overran C Company by 0300, 1 September. Capt. Cyril S. Bartholdi, the company commander, and most of his men were lost.

Only seven men of C Company could be accounted for, and three days later, after all the stragglers and those cut off behind enemy lines had come in, there were fewer than twenty men in the company. [23-28]

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On 4 September, General Haynes changed the boundary between the 38th and 23d Infantry Regiments, giving the northern part of the 23d's sector to the 38th Infantry, thus releasing Colonel Hutchin's 1st Battalion for movement southward to help the 2d Battalion defend the southern approach to Ch'angnyŏng. The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, about 1,100 men strong when the enemy attack began, was now down to a strength of approximately 600 men.

The 23d Infantry now made plans to concentrate all its troops on the position held by its 2d Battalion on the Pugong-ni - Ch'angnyŏng road. Colonel Hutchin succeeded in moving the 1st Battalion there and took a place on the left flank of the 2d Battalion. At the same time the regimental command post moved to the rear of this position. In this regimental perimeter, the 23d Infantry fought a series of hard battles. Simultaneously it had to send combat patrols to its rear to clear infiltrating enemy from Ch'angnyŏng and from its supply road.

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biography

Guerrilla activity increased, with the most tragic single incident taking place during the night of 3-4 September. That night about fifteen guerrillas, including one woman, attacked a radio relay station near Ch'angwŏn, only four miles from Masan. They surprised a group of seven Americans and two South Koreans inside a tent on a hilltop. The guerrillas tied up the Americans, took documents from files, gathered up all weapons, and then the woman shot every one of the prisoners with a tommy gun. Two wounded Americans lived to tell the story. [24-54]

Even in Masan, General Kean faced a dangerous situation. The town was a nest of Communist sympathizers and agents. At the peak of the enemy offensive, Han Gum Jo, manager of the Masan branch of the Korean Press Association, confessed that he was chief of the South Korean Labor Party in Masan and that he funneled information to the enemy through a Pusan headquarters. The chief of guards of the Masan prison was the head of a Communist cell and seven of his guards were members. This and other counterintelligence information came to light at a time when desperate fighting was in progress only a few miles away. General Kean considered the situation so menacing that he ordered Masan evacuated of all people except the police, public officials, railroad and utility workers, and necessary laborers and their families. Evacuation was to be completed in five days.

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Coinciding with this heavy fighting at the Pusan Perimeter in the south a new and disturbing element appeared far to the north. In Tokyo and Washington, American military leaders studied reports they received indicating that Chinese Communist troops were moving north through China and concentrating along the Yalu River opposite Korea.

An incident at this time added to the build-up of threatening storm clouds to the north. On 4 September, a twin-engine bomber wearing a red star passed over a screening ship of a U.N. naval task force operating in the Yellow Sea off the west coast of Korea, approximately at the 38th Parallel. The bomber continued on toward the center of the naval formation and opened fire on a U.N. fighter plane patrol which returned its fire and shot it down. A destroyer of the task force recovered the body of one of the bomber crew members-he was an officer of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. [24-75]

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From 23 August to 3 September the Far East Command allotted to the 7th Division the entire infantry replacement stream reaching FEC, and from 23 August through 8 September the entire artillery replacement stream.

By 4 September the division had received 390 officers and 5,400 enlisted replacements. General MacArthur obtained service units for the X Corps in the same way-by diverting them from scheduled assignments for Eighth Army. The Far East Command justified this on the ground that, while Eighth Army needed them badly, X Corps' need was imperative. [25-12]

In response to General MacArthur's instructions to General Walker on 11 and 13 August to send South Koreans to augment the 7th Infantry Division, 8,637 of them arrived in Japan before the division embarked for Inch'ŏn. Their clothing on arrival ranged from business suits to shirts and shorts, or shorts only. The majority wore sandals or cloth shoes. They were civilians-stunned, confused, and exhausted. Only a few could speak English. Approximately 100 of the South Korean recruits were assigned to each rifle company and artillery battery; the buddy system was used for training and control. [25-13]

The quality of the artillery and infantry crew-served weapons troops received from the United States and assigned to the 7th Division during August and early September was high. The superior training provided by the old infantry and artillery noncommissioned officers who arrived from the Fort Benning Infantry and the Fort Sill Artillery Schools brought the 7th Division to a better condition as the invasion date approached than could have been reasonably expected a month earlier. The 7th Division strength on embarkation,[ ??? when???]  including the attached South Koreans, was 24,845. [25-14]

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biography biography Army Symbolbiography

The next day, 4 September, General MacArthur sent General Wright to Taegu to tell General Walker that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would have to be released not later than the night of 5-6 September and moved at once to Pusan. At Taegu Wright informed Walker of MacArthur's instructions and told him that the Far East Command was loading the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division for movement to Pusan, where it would be held in floating reserve and be available for use by Eighth Army if necessary.

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biography Army Symbolbiography 

He [Wright informed Walker ] also said that MacArthur intended to divert to Pusan for assignment to Eighth Army the first regiment (65th Infantry) of the 3d Infantry Division arriving in the Far East, the expected date of arrival being 18-20 September.

General Walker, in discussing his part in the projected combined operation set for 15 September, requested that the Eighth Army attack be deferred to D plus 1, 16 September. Wright agreed with this timing and said he would recommend it to MacArthur, who subsequently approved it. [25-24]

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On 4 September the estimate remained about the same [as 8/28] except that the enemy force in the Inch'ŏn landing area was placed at 1,800-2,500 troops because of an anticipated build-up there. This estimate remained relatively unchanged four days later, and thereafter held constant until the landing. [25-32]

American intelligence considered the enemy's ability to reinforce quickly the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul area as inconsequential. It held the view that only small rear area garrisons, line of communications units, and newly formed, poorly trained groups were scattered throughout Korea back of the combat zone around the Pusan Perimeter. Aerial reconnaissance reported heavy movement of enemy southbound traffic from the Manchurian border, but it was not clear whether this was of supplies or troops, or both. Although reports showed that the Chinese Communist Forces had increased in strength along the Manchurian border, there was no confirmation of rumors that some of them had moved into North Korea. [25-33]

The Far East Command considered the possibility that the enemy might reinforce the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul area from forces committed against Eighth Army in the south. If this were attempted, it appeared that the North Korean 3d, 13th, and 10th Divisions, deployed on either side of the main Sŏul-Taejon-Taegu highway, could most rapidly reach the Inch'ŏn area.

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Air attacks intended to isolate the invasion area began on 4 September and continued until the landing.  

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U.S. Air Force

 

biography   biography

4 SEPTEMBER 1950

Dispatched my weekly letter to Gill Robb Wilson. Banfill brought in this "nickel" in line with my policy to keep Vandenberg abreast of items of interest, but decided to hold it for 24 hours. Banfill stated:

 

 

Observation of 162d TAC Rcn Sq aircraft from 3,000 feet at 040030/K Sept 50: Scattered lights of estimated 200 vehicles going generally south
from Yangsi (39°59'N - 124°28'E). Numerous vehicles coming across Manchurian border above Yangsi into Korea. Other vehicular convoys observed on adjacent roads in general area between Yangsi and P'yŏngyang. Fifth AF reports missions have been laid on to attack these targets.

Def        biography   biography

AG Ltr, 370.2 (8 July) CG, signed by General Almond reads as follows:

In order to obtain the maximum effectiveness in the employment of all air resources in the Far East Command and to insure coordination of air efforts, the following conclusions agreed to by the Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, and Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, are approved and adopted as policy:

 

(a) CG, FEAF, will have command or operational control of all aircraft operating in the execution of Far East Air Forces mission as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East. This includes operational control of naval land based air when not in execution of naval missions which include naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and support of naval tasks such as an amphibious assault.

(b) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East, will have command or operational control of all aircraft in execution of missions assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to Naval Forces, Far East.

(c) Coordination: (1) Basic selection and priority of target areas will be accomplished by the GHQ target analysis group with all services participating.(2) Tasks assigned by CINCFE, such as amphibious assault, will prescribe the coordination by designation of specific areas of operation. (3) When both Navy Forces, Far East, and Far East Air Forces are assigned missions in Korea, coordination control, a Commander-in-Chief, Far East, prerogative, is delegated to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.[259]

(The above ltr sent to both COMNAVFE and myself)


 

On 4 September, I sent to CINCFE, subject: Coordination of Air Operations, as follows:

1. References:

(a) Annex 'F' to Operations Order No. 1, "Coordination of Air Operations, Headquarters United Nations Command," 2 September 1950 (TS).

(b) Letter, CINCFE, AG 370.2, (8 July 1950) CG, subject: "Coordination of Air Effort of Far East Air Forces and United States Naval Forces, Far East." (Secret)

2. During the joint meeting of Army, Navy and Air Force commanders held in the office of Chief of Staff, GHQ, 30 August 1950, I presented the air coordination directive of 8 July 1950 (reference b), and it was agreed by the commanders present that this agreement would remain applicable to future operations. Annex 'F' to Operations Order No. 1 (reference a) contains some elements which are not in accordance with this agreed to directive. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I deem it imperative that Annex 'F' be in complete consonance with this directive.

 

3.    

a. Par. 3 of reference a states in substance that aircraft operating outside of the objective area on missions assigned by CINCUNC [Commander in Chief, United Nations Command] to COMNAVFE are subject to coordination as arranged between COMNAVFE and CG FEAF.

b. It is recognized that COMNAVFE must have control of air operations within the objective area during the amphibious phase. Air operations outside of the objective area are part of the overall air campaign, and during the amphibious phase contribute to the success of the amphibious operation. Air operations before and after D-Day, outside of the objective area, must be coordinated in accordance with paragraph c (3), reference b, which states: "When both Navy Forces, Far East, and Far East Air Forces are assigned missions in Korea, coordination control, a Commander-in-Chief prerogative, is delegated to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces."

4.

a. Par. 4 of reference a states in substance that the sweeping of airfields within a radius of 150 miles from a point located at latitude 37 degrees and longitude 125 degrees is a mission assigned COMNAVFE, effective on receipt of the order.

b. The mission of maintaining air supremacy over all of Korea is the continuing responsibility of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces. With the exception of Kimp'o and Suwŏn airfields, the remaining airfields are outside of the objective area. The mission of sweeping airfields at all times, with the exception of the two fields in the objective area during the amphibious assault, is a responsibility of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, and coordination control must be exercised by him in accordance with paragraph c (3), reference a.

5. Par. 8, reference a, states in substance that COMNAVFE will designate approach and retirement routes for aircraft such as troop carrier and cargo aircraft in the objective area. The operations of troop carrier aircraft are of special nature and require thorough knowledge for the successful accomplishment of their mission. Before designating retirement routes in the objective area, COMNAVFE must coordinate with CG FEAF.

6. The principle established in par. a of reference b that CG FEAF will have "control of naval land-based air when not in execution of naval missions which include naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and support of naval tasks, such as amphibious assault" has been omitted in reference a.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, this principle should be applied and stated in ANNEX 'F' to OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 1.

7. I therefore recommend that:

a. The last line of paragraph 3, reference a, be changed to read: "These latter missions are subject to coordination control of CG FEAF."

b. The 3d sentence of par 4, reference a, be changed to read: "The sweeping of these and other located fields in the area indicated, to insure air supremacy within the objective area, is a mission assigned jointly to COMNAVFE and to CG FEAF with coordination control exercised by CG FEAF." Delete the 4th sentence of par. 4, reference a.

c. The 1st line of Par 8, reference a, be changed to read "COMNAVFE, through appropriate commanders, and after coordination with and approval by CG FEAF, will designate approach and retirement routes for a/c such as troop carrier and cargo a/c and other transient a/c in the objective area."

d. Add par. 9 to reference a to read as follows: "Control of air operations including those of land-based naval and marine units in the objective area will pass from COMNAVFE to CG FEAF when directed by CINCUNC after completion of the amphibious phase."

8. The foregoing recommendations are indicated in Inc. C, recommended "Re- vised Copy - Annex 'F' to OPERATIONS Order No. 1." Signed G. E. S., etc.

(Recommended Revision - Annex 'F' - Coordination of Air Operations to
OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 1.)

1. Appendix 1 delineates the Initial Objective Area. Within this area, COM- NAVFE, thru appropriate commanders and agencies, control all air operations, including air defense and close support of troops from 0600 D-3 until relieved by orders of CINCUNC.

2. Appendix I further indicates:

a. A number of areas, designated as areas MIKE, NAN, OBOE, PETER, and QUEEN, which will be employed both in the pre-assault and post- assault phases to assist in the coordination between Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East in the area outside the objective area.

b. A zone in which COMNAVFE is responsible for tactical interdiction affecting the objective area from 0600 D-3 until relieved by CINCUNC. This zone is the area between the outer limits of the objective area and the line R-R as shown on Appendix I

 

3. Far East Air Forces controls the operation of all a/c outside the objective area with the exception of a/c operating in the execution of missions assigned by CINCUNC to COMNAVFE. These latter missions are subject to coordination control by CG FEAF. [emphasis in original.]


4. Various airfields lying within a radius of 150 miles from a point located at
Latitude 37 degrees and Longitude 125 degrees constitute a definite threat to the conduct of the operation. Such fields have been located at or in the vicinity of P'yŏngyang, Sinmak, P'yŏnggang, Ongjin, Haeju, Kimp'o, Suwŏn, Taejon and Kunsan. The sweeping of these and other located fields in the area indicated, to insure air supremacy within the objective area, is a mission assigned jointly to CG FEAF and [emphasis in original] COMNAVFE effective on receipt of this order, with coordination control exercised by CG FEAF. (See paragraph 3, above). In correlation with such sweeps, Navy air elements will conduct strikes against military targets of opportunity and will, at the request of FEAF, undertake such interdiction missions as are consistent with the primary mission.

5. Requirements for air operations in the objective area, during the period 0600 D-3 to disestablishment of the objective area, which exceed the capabilities of COMNAVFE, will be requested from CG FEAF by COMNAVFE. In the event CG FEAF is unable to provide such support without undue interference with other missions assigned, he will so report to CINCUNC and inform COMNAVFE.

6. Except under emergency conditions, requests on CG FEAF for medium bomber strikes will be requested at least 72 hours prior to the TOT [time over target] desired. Where a question arises as to priority of missions, the decision will be made by CINCUNC.

7. In emergency, the tactical air commander in the objective area may request air support direct from CG 5th AF. If such support is not consistent with 5th AF commitments and capabilities, priority for such support will be designated by CINCUNC.

8. COMNAVFE, thru appropriate commanders, and after coordination with and approval by CG FEAF [emphasis in original], will designate approach and retirement routes for a/c, such as troop carrier and cargo a/c, and other transient a/c in the objective area. Such a/c will be subject to the control of established control agencies in the objective area.


9. Control of air operations, including those of land-based naval and Marine units in the objective area, will pass from COMNAVFE to CG FEAF when directed by CINCUNC after completion of the amphibious phase [emphasis in original]. (By Command of General MacArthur.)


 

259. The term "coordination control" was almost an oxymoron in the Korean War. Throughout the war, both General Stratemeyer and his successors had trouble establishing either "coordination" or "control" of the various Air Force, Navy, Marine, and foreign air units fighting in Korea. One reason for this problem was that the term was a newly-coined one and had not been officially defined. Almost as an afterthought, the following unofficial definition was prepared by a GHQ staff officer later in the war:

"Coordination control is the authority to prescribe methods and procedures to effect coordination in the operations of air elements of two or more forces operating in the same area. It comprises basically the authority to disapprove operations of one force which might interfere with the operations of another force and to coordinate air efforts of the major FEC commands by such means as prescribing boundaries between operating areas, time of operations in areas and measures of identification between air elements." (Futrell No. 71, p 12.) Despite the fact there was no official definition of the term, General MacArthur never clarified its meaning and apparently never intended to. MacArthur evidently attached little importance to this matter, his July 8 directive on this subject being written in such a way as to indicate that his headquarters would retain the final say on "coordination control."

With the term un-clarified by MacArthur and only an unofficial definition written much later, it is no wonder "coordination control" would remain ambiguous and subject to diverse interpretations by the various services. It remained a problem area for Stratemeyer for months, causing him to expend much energy and time on the subject that could have been better spent in other areas. (Futrell, pp 49-51, 54-55; Futrell No. 71, p 12.)

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At the end of August General O'Donnell wired General Stratemeyer that his medium- bomber crews were running out of assigned bridge targets. And on 4 September, when the final results of Interdiction Campaign No. 1 were calculated, General O'Donnell could report that his groups had destroyed all but seven of the 44 bridges which Stratemeyer had listed for destruction on 2 August. These seven bridges were so badly damaged as to be impassable to Communist traffic.#61

 

An initial list of interdiction targets was issued on July 28 and expanded on August 2. The following day, Stratemeyer ordered 5AF to destroy targets along a belt between the 37th and 38th parallels while the B–29s of Bomber Command went after targets farther north. Thus, when General MacArthur told Stratemeyer on the evening of the 3d to “stop all communications moving south,” Stratemeyer already had a comprehensive interdiction plan in place. (Futrell, pp 125-128.)

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On the western front the Communists had crossed the Naktong at many places and had driven a salient into the Eighth Army's defenses at Yŏngsan. Marine F4U's and Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers defied bad weather to fly 43 close-support sorties in the 2d Division sector on 4 September and claimed the destruction of 11 North Korean tanks, which were spearheading the Yŏngsan attack.#134

 

This attack accordingly began to falter, and the same rain storms that impeded air operations turned the Naktong into a torrent which crippled enemy efforts to transport additional troops to the east bank.#135

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biography  Army Symbolbiography   biography   biography

As Walker and Partridge viewed the enemy situation on 4 September, the main threat to Taegu was the hostile thrust toward Kyŏngju and Yongchon, which promised to sever the lateral rail and highway communications supporting the northern flank of the perimeter.

  

General Walker issued orders that all but a skeleton staff of Eighth Army head-quarters would evacuate to Pusan. Already the Fifth Air Force had reduced its personnel at Taegu, and, other than a minimum headquarters staff, the only air units remaining at Taegu Airfield were the 6149th Air Base Unit and the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron.

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biography  Army Symbolbiography   biography   biography

At this critical juncture  General Partridge once again exploited air-power's flexibility and ability to concentrate where it was most needed. Once again General Partridge used the Fifth Air Force to blunt the enemy's attack and to give General Walker time to bring up such reinforcements as he had.

 Beginning on 4 September, the ROK divisions to the east of Taegu received the lion's share of Fifth Air Force capabilities: 160 sorties on 4 September, 51 sorties on 5 September (when weather seriously hampered flying), 183 sorties on 6 September.#138

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USN_Units

These would be the last close-support strikes the Navy could provide for some time, for Task Force 77 would operate against communications targets in northwestern Korea on 4 and 5 September and then retire to Sasebo to outfit for the amphibious operation coming up at Inch'ŏn.

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In view of the haze of discussion in which many of these decisions were undertaken, some misunderstandings would not have been remarkable. The United Nations Command operations plan air annex, which was issued on 2 September, however, deviated significantly from the basic air-coordination agreement of 8 July 1950* and the specific decisions made on 30 August. On 4 September General Stratemeyer wrote General MacArthur a letter requesting clarification of the air annex.#11

 

*The CINCFE "coordination control" directive was actually issued on 15 July 1950 as an answer to General Stratemeyer's letter of 8 July 1950, but it was generally referred to as the "8 July" directive. See Chapter 2, pp. 49-50.

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9th Attack Squadron - Emblem.png   Unit Info     

On 4 September the 9th Fighter-Bomber Squadron* left Misawa and rejoined its parent 49th Group at Itazuke. Elements of the Johnson-based 41st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (35th Group) moved to Misawa to provide skeleton air defenses.#16

7th Fighter Squadron.jpg

*The 9th Squadron had seen service over Korea in the first days of hostilities, but on 14 August it had traded duties and stations with the 49th Group's 7th Squadron, a transfer designed to give the squadron some rest at Misawa after strenuous operations.

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Covered by a rescue combat air patrol (ResCAP) of friendly fighters, Lt. Paul W. Van Boven flew his H-5 to Hanggan-dong on 4 September and successfully retrieved Captain Robert E. Wayne.

When the United Nations front lines advanced, (after 9/15/50) Detachment F moved from Pusan (K-1) to Taegu (K-2) and then on to Sŏul (K-16).

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U.S. Marine Corps

 

 

September 04, 1950 it was D-minus 11 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.

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biography

On the fourth, Lieutenant Colonel Murray ordered the 3d Battalion to pass through the hard-hit 2d Battalion. Company H made a wide arc north of Hill 117 as Company G attacked straight on. This envelopment worked, and Hill 117 quickly fell.

Thereafter, the 3d Battalion conducted a daylong attack that carried the Marines beyond Kang-ni. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion moved with Companies A and B abreast from Hill 91 East past Yu-ri village, crossed a barren valley, and secured Cloverleaf Hill. There was little resistance during most of the day in the 1st Battalion zone of action south of the road. The Marines advanced three thousand yards over broken ground that day and took all of their objectives before nightfall.

[note]

 

 

Landing Force Plan—1st Marine Division OpnO 2–50

[note]

 

 

   USN_Units

On 4 September the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) set sail for Kobe, arriving at 1445 the next day to be welcomed by an Army band at the pier.

[note]

 

X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so much progress that Embarkation Order 1–50 was issued on the last day of the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO 2-50 OO-2-50-(1st_MARDIV)   Operations orders of JTF–7 and TF–90 were issued concurrently.

[note]

 

2nd Naktong Counteroffensive 3-5 September 1950

[note]

 

 

U.S. Navy

 

 Def      biography   USN_Units

COMNAVFE ordered change of Fleet Base from Buckner Bay to Sasebo.

USS McKean (DD784) destroyed 4 mines 38°28'W_124°24'E minefield.

(note W should be N).

[note]

 

 

USN_Units

The first positive mine sightings had been made on 4 September, southwest of Chinnamp'o, by the destroyer USS McKean (DD784); three days later British units heading north through these same waters had encountered many floaters;

[note]

 

0000 Korean Time

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0100 Korean Time

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0200 Korean Time

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0220 Korean Time

That night, 3-4 September, the ROK I Corps front collapsed. Three enemy tanks overran a battery of ROK artillery and then scattered two battalions of the newly arrived ROK 5th Regiment. Following a mortar preparation, the North Koreans entered An'gang-ni at 0220.

[note]

 

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An hour later the command post of the Capital Division withdrew from the town and fighting became increasingly confused.

[note]

 

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By 0400 American tanks (? - tank units) ceased firing because remnants of the Capital Division had become hopelessly intermingled with enemy forces.

[note]

 

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Colonel Perez said, "We couldn't tell friend from foe." At daylight, G Company, 21st Infantry, discovered that it was alone in An'gang-ni, nearly surrounded by the enemy. ROK troops had disappeared.

[note]

 

 

The startling gains of the North Koreans in the east on 4 September caused General Walker to shift still more troops to that area. The day before, (3rd) he had ordered the 24th Division to move from its reserve
position near Taegu to the lower Naktong River to relieve the marines in the Naktong Bulge area of the 2d Division front. It bivouacked that night in a downpour of rain on the banks of the Naktong near Susan-nil.

 

On the morning of the 4th, before it could begin relief of the marines, the 24th received a new order to proceed to Kyŏngju.

24th ID moved from Taegu to Susan-nil to Kyŏngju.

[note]

 

 

       

The next morning (4 September) at breakfast, D Company [D Company, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion] received orders to move immediately as infantry to Ka-san. One platoon had to forego its breakfast. The company carried no rations since E Company, 8th Cavalry, was to bring food and water later.

The Engineer troops arrived at their assembly area near the village of Kisŏng-dong two miles east of the Tabu-dong road, where Colonel Holley set up a communications command post. Sniper fire came in on the men as they moved up the trail half a mile to the base of Ka-san's steep slope. Word was given to the company that there were about seventy-five disorganized enemy troops on Ka-san. [But actually, during the afternoon and evening of 3 September, the N.K. 2d Battalion, 2d Regiment, 1st Division, had occupied the summit of Ka-san]

[note]

 

September 4 dawned clear. [in the Yŏngsan area]

[note]

0602 Sunrise

[note]

 

 

  

At daylight on the morning of 4 September only two officers, McDoniel and Caldwell, and approximately half the men who had assembled on the hill, were alive. Some men had broken under the strain and in a state of shock had run from their holes and were killed.

As the day passed, with ammunition down to about one clip per man and only a few grenades left and no help in sight, McDoniel decided to abandon the position that night. He told Caldwell that when it got dark the survivors would split into small groups and try to get back to friendly lines.

[note]

 

0603 Korean Time

 

      

Shortly after dawn on the 4th, the 1st Platoon of engineers went forward and removed the mines ahead of 1/5’s positions.

[note]

 

 

0700 Korean Time

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0750 Korean Time

 

      

Preparatory fires by 1/11 at 0750 routed a group of enemy on the peak on Baker Company’s front, and the Marine riflemen had a field day as the Reds threw away their weapons and pelted westward.

[note]

 

0800 Korean Time

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Chaplain Sheen led one group of soldiers back to friendly lines on 4 September. [23-25]

[note]

 

 

       

The counterattack continued at 0800, 4 September, at first against little opposition. North of the road the 2d Battalion quickly completed occupation of Hill 116, from which the North Koreans had withdrawn during the night. South of the road the 1st Battalion occupied what appeared to be a command post of the N.K. 9th Division. Tents were still up and equipment lay scattered about. Two abandoned T34 tanks in excellent condition stood there. Tanks and ground troops advancing along the road found it littered with enemy dead and destroyed and abandoned equipment.

[note]

 

 

 

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1856 Sunset

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(Notes)

 


Casualties

Monday September 4, 1950 (day 72

127 Casualties
3 159TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
2 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
12 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
9 23RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
11 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
2 2ND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
3 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
17 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 503RD FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (155MM )
1 555TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
6 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 5TH MARINE REGIMENT
3 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
6 65TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 6TH MEDIUM TANK BATTALION
1 72ND MEDIUM TANK BATTALION
1 76TH ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION BATTALION
1 77TH ENGINEER COMBAT COMPANY
2 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 80TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
8 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
15 8TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
1 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
12 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
   
127  19500904 0000 Casualties by unit

September 4

Date USAF    USA USMC USN Other Total
Previous 86 5,345 169 16 5,616
Today 1 125 1   127
Total 87 5,470 170 16 5,743

Aircraft Losses Today 004

 

 Notes for Tuesday August 1, 1950 - Day 037

 

 

 

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