Weather

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 22.3C 72.14F  at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

Citations

Medals

19500905 0000 DSC CHAMPENY

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Guinn, William H. [1stLt SS Hq2ndBn21stIR]

Hodges, Wesley L. [SFC SS K8thCR]

Perri, Arnold A. [Sgt SS 81mmOb A5thMR]

Sager, Perry A. [Capt SS1 CO E23rdIR]

Thompson, Robert I. [1stLt SS CO F21stIR]

Yeakey, Albert W. [Sgt SS MedCo35thIR]

 

The U.S. notifies the UN that U.S. fighter planes guarding Navy ships off the west coast of South Korea shot down a bomber with a red star on it. The bomber fired at the American planes first, according to the report. A Navy destroyer later pulls the body of a Russian lieutenant from the sea.

-- A Catholic news agency reports that U.S. warplanes destroyed the Cathedral of Seoul after communists began using it to store ammunition.

-- A Moscow Pravda story asserts that Russia is making a list of American "war criminals" responsible for "incredible destruction of all Korea" with "round-the-clock bombing."

[note]

 

Two (2) SB-17's flew orbit missions this date logging 14:55 hours.

Search for an F-51 that crashed on 3 September 1950 was continued with negative results. The area of reported crash was covered 100% and a request for discontinuance of search for this aircraft was made.

One (1) emergency evacuation was made by C-47 rescue aircraft this date. Patient was evacuated from Iwakuni AB, to Atami AB, where he was transferred to an ambulance and taken to the Osaka General Hospital. Four (4) hours flying time was logged on this mission.

At 1535/I ADCC reported a crash near Nagasaki. Investigation disclosed that this was a false alert.

Helicopter Detachment in Korea flew two (2) missions evacuating one (1) patient and making one whole blood delivery to front line aid station. Total flying time logged on these missions 2:05 hours

[note]

     

The 1st Battalion supported the 9th Infantry Regiment on 5 September as that army unit carried Hill 165. The Marines then focused their attention on Observation Hill, which had been held by the 1st Marine Brigade during the first Naktong battle less than two weeks before. Company B took Hill 125 and held it against two NKPA attacks.

[note]

  

 

"Sergeant First Class Loren R. Kaufman, G Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, earned the fourteenth Medal of Honor in the Korean War. With his platoon occupying a strong point two miles from the rest of his company, SFC Kaufman was ordered to reinforce the company when a North Korean battalion attacked it. As the platoon moved along a ridge, it suddenly encountered a hostile force. SFC Kaufman ran forward, bayoneted the lead scout, and engaged the column in a rifle and grenade assault, shocking the enemy into a confused retreat. Joining the company and finding it pinned down, he charged the enemy lines, firing his rifle and throwing grenades, seizing an unmanned machinegun to pour fire on the hostile troops. As the company took advantage of his actions to resume their attack, SFC Kaufman led the assault, destroying a machinegun nest, overrunning a mortar position, and led the pursuit into a nearby village. Unfortunately, he was killed before he could receive his award."
 

[note]

South then North

While four divisions of the N.K. II Corps attacked south in the P'ohang-dong, Kyŏngju, and Yongch'on sectors, the remaining three divisions of the corps; the 3d, 13th, and 1st, in that order from west to east-were to execute their converging attack on Taegu from the north and northwest. The 3d Division was to attack in the Waegwan area northwest of Taegu, the 13th Division down the mountain ridges north of Taegu along and west of the Sangju-Taegu road, and the 1st Division along the high mountain ridges just east of the road. (Map 15)

  

Defending Taegu, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had a front of about thirty-five miles. General Gay outposted the main avenues of entry into his zone and kept his three regiments concentrated behind the outposts.

  

At the southwestern end of his line General Gay initially controlled the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, 2d Division, which had been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division.

27th British Infantry Brigade

On 5 September the British 27th Brigade, in its first commitment in the Korean War, replaced that battalion.

Unit Info    

Next in line northward, the 5th Cavalry Regiment defended the sector along the Naktong around Waegwan and the main Seoul highway southeast from there to Taegu. Eastward, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was responsible for the mountainous area between that highway and the hills bordering the Sangju road. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, responsible for the latter road, was astride it and on the bordering hills. [22-33]

[note]

Unit Info     

The next day it [2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, ] had the utmost difficulty in holding the hill [Hill 303] against enemy counterattacks.

[note]

Unit Info     

By 5 September, although it was not yet known by the 7th Cavalry, Hill 464 to its rear probably had more North Koreans on it than Hill 518 to its front. North Koreans cut the Waegwan - Tabu-dong road east of the regiment so that its communications with friendly units now were only to the west.

 During the day the 7th Cavalry made a limited withdrawal on Hill 518. Any hope that the regiment could capture the hill vanished. One American officer described the situation north of Taegu at this time with the comment, "I'll be damned if I know who's got who surrounded." [22-37]

On the division right, Tabu-dong was in enemy hands, on the left Waegwan was a no-man's land, and in the center strong enemy forces were infiltrating southward from Hill 518. The 7th Cavalry Regiment in the center could no longer use the Waegwan-Tabu-dong lateral supply road behind it, and was in danger of being surrounded.

Unit Info     

After discussing a withdrawal plan with General Walker and Colonel Collier, General Gay on 5 September issued an order for a general withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry Division during the night to shorten the lines and to occupy a better defensive position. The movement was to progress from right to left beginning with the 8th Cavalry Regiment, then the 7th Cavalry in the Hill 518 area, and finally the 5th Cavalry in the Waegwan area.

Unit Info     

This withdrawal caused the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, to give up a hill it had just attacked and captured near the Tabu-dong road on the approaches of the Walled City of Ka-san. In the 7th Cavalry sector the 1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions were to withdraw in that order, after the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, on their right. The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on Hill 303 north of Waegwan was to cover the withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry and hold open the escape road. [22-38]

Crisis in Eighth Army Command

At this time, about 5 September, as the 7th Cavalry Regiment was forced into a withdrawal, and enemy penetrations in the south had opened the way to Pusan, a crisis developed in appraisals and decisions called for in the Eighth Army command. Everywhere around the Perimeter the North Koreans were penetrating the defense positions and in some places making spectacular gains. It was a question whether the Eighth Army and the ROK's could hold anything like the Pusan Perimeter based on the line of the Naktong. The ROK Army and most of the American divisions appeared to be near the breaking point.

Should the United Nations line be withdrawn to the Davidson Line? That question was under debate in Eighth Army headquarters.

The decision to withdraw to that line seemed near as the North Koreans captured P'ohang-dong and drove to the edge of Kyŏngju in the east, reached Yongch'on in the Taegu lateral corridor, captured Waegwan, Tabu-dong, and Ka-san north of Taegu, drove through the old Naktong Bulge area to Yŏngsan, and in the south split the U.S. 25th Division and poured into its rear areas almost to the edge of Masan. (The Naktong Bulge and Masan penetrations have not yet been described, but they had already taken place as part of the North Korean coordinated attack.)

General Walker discussed the issue of withdrawing to the Davidson Line one night with his principal staff officers, most of the division commanders, and General Coulter, his deputy commander in the east. Colonel Dabney, Eighth Army G-3, told General Walker that for once he did not know what to recommend, that the decision was a hard one to make, but that he hoped the Army could stay. He pointed out that North Korean penetrations in the past had waned after a few days and that they might do so again.

[note]

What the South Korean civilian estimate of the situation was at this time can be surmised from the fact that about 5 September prominent Koreans started to leave Pusan for the island of Tsushima, midway in the Korean Strait between Korea and Japan. Operators of small 10- to 20-ton vessels smuggled them across to the island. Wealthy and influential Chinese residing in the Pusan area were planning to leave for Formosa, the first group expecting to depart about 8 September. They, too, were to be smuggled away in small vessels. [22-42]

biography  Army Symbol   biography

This period in early September 1950 tested General Walker as perhaps no other did. Walker was generally an undemonstrative man in public, he was not popular with the press, and he was not always popular with his troops. He could be hard and demanding. He was so at this time. When many of his commanders were losing confidence in the ability of Eighth Army to stop the North Koreans he remained determined that it would. On one occasion in early September he told one of his division commanders in effect, "If the enemy gets into Taegu you will find me resisting him in the streets and I'll have some of my trusted people with me and you had better be prepared to do the same. Now get back to your division and fight it." He told one general he did not want to see him back from the front again unless it was in a coffin. [22-43]

By day, General Walker moved around the Perimeter defense positions either by liaison plane or in his armored jeep. The jeep was equipped with a special iron handrail permitting him to stand up so that he could observe better while the vehicle was in motion, and generally it was in rapid motion. In addition to his .45 automatic pistol, he customarily carried a repeating shotgun with him, because, as he told a fellow officer, "I don't mind being shot at, but ---- these are not going to ambush me." [22-44] Walker was at his best in Korea in the Pusan Perimeter battles. Famous previously as being an exponent of armored offensive warfare, he demonstrated in August and September 1950 that he was also skilled in defensive warfare. His pugnacious temperament fitted him for directing the fighting of a bitter holding action. He was a stout-hearted soldier.

[note]

Unit Info     

The 7th Cavalry's Withdrawal Battle

It was in this crisis that the 7th Cavalry began its withdrawal northwest of Taegu. In his withdrawal instructions for the 7th Cavalry, Col. Cecil Nist, the regimental commander, ordered, "The 2d Battalion must clear Hill 464 of enemy tonight." This meant that the 2d Battalion must disengage from the enemy to its front and attack to its rear to gain possession of Hills 464 and 380 on the new main line of resistance to be occupied by the regiment. Since efforts to gain possession of Hill 464 by other elements had failed in the past two or three days this did not promise to be an easy mission.

[note]

 

 

   Unit Info

The defensive battles on the Masan front during August and early September brought to a head a problem that had bothered General Kean ever since the 25th Division entered the Korean War; in a larger sense, it was a problem that had concerned Eighth Army as well. Two of the division's regiments, the 27th and the 35th, had performed well in Korea. Not so the 24th Infantry, the division's third regiment. Ever since its entrance into combat in the Sangju area in July the Negro regiment had given a poor performance, although there were some exceptions and many individual acts of heroism and capable performance of duty.

The unstable nature of the regiment was demonstrated in the fighting on Battle Mountain during August. Then, on the night of 31 August-1 September two battalions evaporated in the face of the enemy, and a large part of them repeated this performance four nights later. [on 9/5]

[note]

 

 

   Unit Info latter  Unit Info

The next morning, 4 September, instead of continuing the attack toward the 24th Infantry command post, DeChow, on changed orders, attacked straight ahead into the Komam-ni area where enemy troops were
fighting in the artillery positions. This attack got under way at 0900 in the face of severe enemy small arms fire. In the afternoon, heavy rains slowed the attack, but after an all-day battle, I and K Companies, with the help of numerous air strikes, captured the high ground dominating the Komam-ni crossroads.


Numerous casualties in the battalion had led General Kean to attach C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, to it.

The next day, 5 September, the 3d Battalion turned its attack across rugged terrain toward Haman and drove through to the vicinity of the 24th Infantry command post. In its attack, the 3d Battalion [remaining battalion of the 27th Infantry (technically still the 3d Battalion, 28th [s/b 29th] Infantry), commanded by Lt. Col. George H. DeChow] counted more than 300 enemy dead in the area it traversed. [24-46]

[note]

 

 

Def

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs in Washington expected to receive from MacArthur further details of the pending operation and failing to receive them, sent a message to him on 5 September requesting this information.

[note]

 

 

biography   biography

General Milburn and a small group of staff officers departed Fort Sheridan on 5 September by air for Korea.

[note]

 

 

  

Sept 4

McDoniel and Caldwell started off the hill together, their plan being to make their way to the river and follow it downstream. At the road they encountered so much enemy activity that they had to wait about an hour for the supply-carrying parties, tanks, and artillery to clear so that they could cross. Once across the road the two men found themselves in the middle of a North Korean artillery battery. They escaped unobserved and hid in a field near the river at daybreak. That night the two men became separated when they ran into an enemy outpost.

Sept 5

The next morning two enemy soldiers captured Caldwell, removed his boots and identification, smashed him on the head with a rock, and threw him over a cliff into the Naktong River. Caldwell, not critically injured, feigned death and escaped that night.

[note]

The Forgotten War

 

 

In a mere two days  by September 5  the Marines wiped out the NKPA 9th Division. No exact accounting of its casualties was ever made. Perhaps as many as 5,000 NKPA troops fell. Whatever the number, the 9th Division was "not able to resume the offensive," the Army historian wrote. When the Marines withdrew at midnight  per MacArthur's decision  the remnants of Hill's 9th Infantry took over the ground regained by the Marines.[9-49]

biography   biography   biography

As the Marines were withdrawing from this battle, Commander in Chief Harry Truman delivered them a grievous and gratuitous blow below the belt, which arose from his long and petty distrust of the Navy and its admirals. In response to a letter from a congressman proposing that the Marine Corps be enlarged, Truman wrote, in part: "For your information, the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." The congressman released the letter to the press; Marines worldwide were naturally outraged. Although Truman publicly apologized to Marine Commandant Clifton B. Cates, most Marines remained bitter toward him.[9-50]

  

John Hill did not enjoy the fruits of this victory. Dutch Keiser sacked him, giving the 9th back to Chin Sloane. Hill was the fifth American regimental commander to be fired in Korea. Not much was said about the others, but Hill's case became controversial. Some believed the sacking was justified; others, including Sladen Bradley, believed it was unfair, that the 9th had been mauled principally because it was carrying out Keiser's ill-timed Operation Manchu. When Hill came up for promotion to brigadier general in 1953, Bradley (then a major general) and Matt Ridgway (then Army chief of staff) sided with Hill against Keiser, and Hill got his star. But it was a Pyrrhic victory: Owing to an Army rule, Hill was forced to retire.[9-51]*

 

*The so-called thirty and five rule, put into effect in 1954 and designed to rid the Army of its "bulge" of senior officers left over from World War II. Under its terms, officers who had thirty years' service and had not been promoted within five years were compelled to retire. Hill's promotion came a little too late.

 

* * *

The job of rebuilding the two shattered battalions of the 9th Infantry fell to its new commander, Chin Sloane. He retained John Londahl as commander of the 1/9 but replaced the 2/9 commander, Joe Walker, with the able, aggressive, and combat experienced Butch Barberis from Freeman's 23d. To fill out the depleted ranks in the two battalions Sloane (almost alone among regimental commanders in Korea) willingly accepted black fillers. Barberis remembered the infusion of blacks into his 2/9: "I was very, very low on men - less than half strength - and raised hell to get more troops. The division G-one called and, knowing that I had previously commanded a battalion of black troops [9-in the 25th Infantry], said he had almost two hundred blacks from labor units in Pusan that had served in my battalion who would transfer to the infantry if they could serve with me. I agreed. In fact, I was proud to have them. Keiser asked me if I realized what a can of worms I was opening up, to which I said, 'So what? They are good fighting men. I need men.' "[9-52]*

*Inasmuch as the full-strength 3/9 (still at Pohang) was entirely black, the infusion of black fillers into the 1/9 and 2/9 would give the 9th Regiment as a whole a very high percentage of black personnel.

[note]

 

 

biography  Army Symbol   biography    

These initial NKPA successes compelled General Walker to order a general withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry Division to positions in an arc about eight miles above Taegu on September 5. This maneuver  difficult under ideal circumstances  did not go well. Some troops panicked and bugged out, leaving weapons and equipment. Many were cut off and trapped. Casualties in all three infantry regiments were very heavy.[9-67]

Taegu was again in the grip of crisis, and evacuation seemed almost a certainty. As a precaution Walker ordered some American elements to withdraw to Pusan: most of the Eighth Army staff; the 1st Cav's ammo trains. The ROK Army headquarters followed the Eighth Army staff. But Walker and his "tactical staff" did not abandon the city. By then Walker had apparently made the decision to die defending Taegu, as Robert Martin had died defending Ch'ŏnan and Bill Dean had died (it was believed) defending Taejon. Walker told one American division commander (probably Gay) defiantly: "You will not withdraw your division beyond terrain from which it can cover Taegu. If the enemy gets into Taegu, you will find me resisting him in the streets and I'll have some of my trusted people with me. And you had better be prepared to do the same. Now get back to your division and fight it." The Army historian wrote that Walker told another general "he did not want to see him back from the front again unless it was in a coffin."[9-68]

 

Dug into new positions before Taegu, the 1st Cav was compelled, in the words of one historian, "to fight for its very existence." It was a terrible ordeal. The weather was ghastly: steaming heat and heavy rains. The NKPA swarmed over the hills like goats, taking high ground, lobbing mortars and grenades. They had to be rooted out, hill by hill, in an endless succession of company and platoon attacks. Some hills changed hands four or five times or more.

          

The casualties on both sides were appalling. Among the hundreds of evacuated American wounded were the 2/8 commander Gerald Robbins and his S3, Richard Cohen, who was hit while temporarily serving as commander of the troubled E Company.[9-69]

[note]

 

 

          

In these desperate actions, the 3/8 commander, Johnny Johnson, emerged as a strong, cool, and intelligent commander. His 3/8 suffered appalling casualties  400 of 700 men  but Johnson himself survived unwounded  a miracle, some thought, in view of his continual presence in the very front lines. Hap Gay awarded Johnson a DSC and marked him down as a potential regimental commander, possibly a replacement for Ray Palmer, who had been further sickened and unnerved by the terrible losses in his regiment.[9-70]

19500904 0000 DSC JOHNSON

[note]

 

 

biography

By September 5 the situation on Coulter's front had reached a crisis. On his right the NKPA 5th and 12th divisions had driven south to the outskirts of Kyŏngju. On his left, farther west, the NKPA 8th and 15th divisions were pushing the ROK 6th and 8th divisions back on Yongchon, posing the possibility that Coulter's forces would be cut off, encircled, and destroyed.

  

In response to yet another call. for help, Walker committed Ned Moore's 19th Infantry and, hard on its heels, all available support units of the 24th Division, plus the black 3/9.[9-81]

[note]

 

 

biography  biography

Walker was to credit John Coulter for his personal courage at Kyŏngju and for restoring some order in the ROK high command, but he was not impressed with his battlefield tactics. Some of Coulter's orders, the Army historian wrote harshly, had resulted in a "useless dispersion" of the American reinforcements. Furthermore, Tychsen had antagonized the Eighth Army staff by his frequent and insistent cries for help. Upon commitment of all available 24th Division units, Walker ordered Coulter back to Taegu, as the historian put it, to "resume his planning duties" and placed John Church in charge of the northeast front.[9-82]

  

The arrival of the 19th and 21st Infantry and McMains's 3/9 prevented a cave-in on the northeast front. In the first few days the fighting was intense and the American losses were heavy. In a single engagement Ned Moore's 3/19 lost eight lieutenants killed. Eventually all American forces in this sector were grouped into a task force commanded by the 24th Division ADC, Gar Davidson. Under his able leadership the Americans gradually drove the NKPA back and stabilized the front. The reorganized ROK units, commanded by new generals, went back into the line with determination.[9-83]

[note]

 

 

       eusa

The defense of the Pusan Perimeter was truly a great victory for Eighth Army, but the extent of the victory was not immediately apparent, especially in distant Washington. Looking at battle maps during the first week of September, the JCS had rightly grown increasingly apprehensive and once again questioned the Inch'ŏn landing. In view of the precarious state (as it seemed) of Eighth Army, it appeared absurd to be pulling the Fifth Marines from the Pusan Perimeter to land at Inch'ŏn. Moreover, even if Walker held on without them, it seemed impossible that Eighth Army could rebound from the NKPA offensive in time to mount a successful breakout and link up with the Inch'ŏn forces.[9-85]

[note]

 

 

Def

Accordingly, the JCS resumed a tactful campaign to persuade MacArthur to delay Inch'ŏn or switch the landing from Ich'ŏn to Kunsan, as Collins and Sherman had urged in Tokyo. Having had no response to its August 28 cable suggesting the switch to Kunsan and requesting the Pentagon be kept informed, on September 5 the JCS cabled MacArthur that it "desired to be informed of any modifications which may have been made in your plans for a mid-September amphibious operation." MacArthur's reply was terse: "General outline of the plan remains as described to you."

[note]

US Air Force

 

1 950

Wrote Jack Slessor a letter, telling him because of a telephone conversation I had had with Bouchier, apparently he (Bouchier) was a bit unhappy about the channels we used to Slessor. Bouchier too had apparently dressed down both Squadron Leader Sach and Group Captain Barclay inasmuch as he thought they had been presumptuous. Told Slessor that Bouchier had never indicated to me that he was out here to help us - my understanding was that his level was too high to approach, as in the case of obtaining flares - which is the case in point - and that Sach and Barclay had both done a superior job for us and that Gascoigne, too, had been most helpful.

 "I write this letter to you in order to protect Squadron Leader J. F. Sach (he is a real member of my team) who is doing a superior job for me as an exchange officer from Air Marshal Sir F. J. Fogarty's show in Singapore and Group Captain Barclay. They have both gone out of their way to assist me in my dealings with the RAF - both in Singapore and in London."


Decided not to send the Banfill "nickel" as suggested info to Vandenberg as it had not been confirmed. (See reference under date of 4 September.)
After the briefing, had a nice talk this morning with Air Vice Marshal C. A. Bouchier, RAF, and he was sorry that he had not made it clear that he was in a position to act direct between myself and Slessor on any of our needs. He indicated that he had made all arrangements for flares for Partridge's night intruders and Squadron Leader Sach is preparing a signal, Norstad from Stratemeyer, requesting that the flares be lifted from the British Isles to Japan.


I instructed Squadron Leader Sach to confer with Wing Commander Wykeham-Barnes when the latter returns to Tokyo and secure from him two or three names of RAF officers that he considers capable of being assigned out here to assist Partridge in his night operations and then utilizing these names, prepare a memorandum from me to Air Vice Marshal Bouchier, requesting that a signal be sent to Jack Slessor for their assignment here.


Received a call from Partridge at 0955 hours and he stated that things were all right and that he was hopeful. He pointed out though that the weather over there was not good and that the T-6s reported the weather in the P'ohang - Kigye area was so bad that fighter bombers could not operate. He related to me the following incident which was witnessed by General Lowe in a T-6.


A Lt Wayne,260 who was recently on the cover of Life as having shot down the first two Yaks in the war (Lt Wayne was flying an F-80), was forced to bail out in a rice paddy, after the F-51 he was in was hit, behind enemy lines. A helicopter was dispatched immediately, it went back of the lines and rescued Wayne - all of which was taking place under enemy fire. When Wayne arrived back at Itazuke, he discovered that his wife had had a baby.


General Lowe stated to General Partridge, relating the incident to him, that all participants should receive not less than the Medal of Honor. Partridge said recommendations for awards would be forthcoming.


After talking with Bouchier, I added the following P.S. to Slessor in my letter which is quoted above: "Had a nice talk with Bouchier this morning and everything is properly channeled and all my dealings with you from here on out will be through Air Vice Marshal C. A. Bouchier. I am still sending the letter, though, Jack - just for the record."

Redline to Vandenberg:

Razon operations successful 3 September from research point of view. We experienced several malfunctions but all can be evaluated and corrective action taken. Two direct hits accomplished resulting in span out of bridge, with other near misses. Reason known for misses and corrective action can be taken. Will keep you advised.

With respect to "affair Manchuria," I sent this date the following letter to Partridge:

(1) Enclosed for appropriate action is copy of the report of investigation of violation of the Manchurian border by two F-51 a/c of the 5th AF on 27 Aug 50. The investigation reveals that the border was violated and that the leading airplane of the flight fired on an airstrip southwest of Antung, Manchuria. The investigation was confined to establishing the truth or falsity of the allegation. There are many questions left unanswered as to the contributing causes of this incident which I am sure you will want to check and eliminate in present and future operations. (2) I do not wish to dictate the corrective action that should be taken as a result of this case. You are well aware of the seriousness of the violation. I consider that the lack of judgment on the part of the flight leader, 1st Lt Ray I. Carter, war- rants careful consideration by a Flying Evaluation Board. (3) In reading the report, I find several serious deficiencies in operational procedures.

As examples, when new targets in unfamiliar territory are assigned, greater study of maps and terrain features should be made by the pilots; positive steps to insure that the latest weather reports brought in by earlier flights is considered in the dispatch of later flights. The fact that there was no specific briefing on the importance of staying clear of the Manchurian border is not only a reflection on the briefing at squadron level, but suggests that my instructions to you are not reaching the operating levels. (4) Corrective action will be taken by you to remedy all deficiencies brought out by this case. G.E.S.

On same subject as above, the following was dispatched to Vandenberg: (1) Per statement made in my radio AO 233 CG, I am inclosing, herewith, a report of the investigation of the Manchurian incident. (See Inclosure No. 1). The investigation definitely shows that two of our F-51s of the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 18th Fighter Bomber Group, 6002d Fighter Bomber Wing, now designated as the 6002d Fighter Bomber Wing, did, in the late afternoon of 27 August 1950, violate Manchurian territory by flying over the Manchurian border and the lead airplane fired on an airstrip just southwest of Antung, Manchuria. (2) The investigation discloses that both pilots involved had had combat experience in ETO and had flown combat missions in Korea prior to this incident.


They knew that they were not to fly over Manchurian territory. (3) The mission involved was to destroy six barges near the mouth of the Chongeh'on gang 261 River in North Korea. The weather was not good,
as had been forecast, and the flight had to fly at 14,000 feet, and came out of the clouds at a place the pilots thought was south of their target.


Instead, they were north of it and mistook the Yalu River for the Chongeh'on-gang River. Being fired upon, they turned and circled to their left to avoid the flak, turned south and passed over the airstrip involved. Not until the 29th of August, when they made another flight to determine where they had been, was it definitely ascertained that they had been in Manchurian territory. (4) Specific instructions from this Headquarters have been given to the various Air Forces to avoid Manchurian and Soviet territory and to brief their crews accordingly. Note our radios enclosed. (See inclosures Nos. 2, 3, and 4.) (5) The investigation disclosed several deficiencies in the operational procedure of Fifth Air Force in Korea. These have been called to General Partridge's attention and he has been instructed to remedy them. (See Inclosure No. 5). (6) The report of the officers investigating the incident has recommended that Lt Carter, the flight leader and pilot of the airplane that fired on the airstrip, be ordered to appear before a Flying Evaluation Board, special attention being called to Lt Carter's lack of judgment, which I approved. The report of investigation has been forwarded to General Partridge for necessary action. G.E.S.


1130 hours, Major General Harris, U.S. Marines, called with Brigadier
General Cushman
.

1500 hours, Mrs. Nora Waln, 262 novelist, visited me with Colonel Nuckols for about 30 minutes, during which time she discussed her coming article for the Saturday Evening Post, in which she writes about the Air Force cadet training in Korea, with particular emphasis on character building of the Korean cadets, our treating them as equals - all of which will be presented most favorably to the Air Force. She asked if I had any comments or quotes for her story and I stated that I felt the main part of the instruction which she should convey to her readers was that the democratic way of life was being instilled in these cadets and that all of our instructions to them emphasized equality for all and that the most competent should lead - all of which is the basis for our way of doing things.


General Partridge called about 6:00 P.M. and stated that all was well in Korea - that he was not worried about the North [Koreans] or the battlefront. He stated that there would probably be a change in the location of General Walker's set up tomorrow, but that his present location would remain the same.

[note]

 

 

On the next day the 2d Division had the battle so well in hand that General Walker was able to relieve the 1st Marine Brigade and permit it to prepare for the impending amphibious operation. #136  

Although thwarted on the southwestern front, the North Korean People's Army intensified its offensive against the northern flank of the Eighth Army perimeter. Attacking from Waegwan and from Hajang, two North Korean divisions forced the 1st Cavalry and 1st ROK Divisions backward to within seven miles of Taegu. On the Kigye front two other North Korean divisions drove ROK troops backward almost to the towns of Yongchon and Kyŏngju. On the east coast a resurgent North Korean division again captured the port of P'ohang.

[note]

 

biography   biography

At this critical juncture General Partridge once again exploited air-power's flexibility and ability to concentrate where it was most needed. Once again General Partridge used the Fifth Air Force to blunt the enemy's attack and to give General Walker time to bring up such reinforcements as he had.

Beginning on 4 September, the ROK divisions to the east of Taegu received the lion's share of Fifth Air Force capabilities: 160 sorties on 4 September, 51 sorties on 5 September (when weather seriously hampered flying), 183 sorties on 6 September.#138

[note]

 

US Marine

 

 

2nd Naktong Counteroffensive

Enemy Counterattack 5 Sept. 50

[note]

 

US Navy

 

Russian twin-engine bomber shot down by CAP near TF 77; incident announced to UN.

Marine Brigade relieved from front lines and moved to Pusan to embark for Inch'ŏn operation.

Elements of 1st Marine division arrived in Japan.

[note]

 

 

   USN_Units

        Although the fast carriers had withdrawn to Sasebo on 5 September, following the strikes against the P'yŏngyang area, naval activity continued along Korea’s western shore. Between Kunsan and the 38th parallel, aircraft from Triumph and Badoeng Strait scoured the land, concentrating on railroad bridges, rolling stock, and electrical transformer stations. While continuing to interdict coastal traffic, Admiral Andrewes’ surface ships found opportunity to bombard Inch'ŏn on the 5th and Kunsan the next day.

[note]

 

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The engineers were busy in 1/5’s zone until after midnight, creeping to the front and flanks to lay mines. The 3d Battalion was shelled heavily throughout the night, and 1/5’s CP took direct hits killing 1 Marine and wounding 2 others. One of the wounded was Second Lieutenant James R. Young, Newton's Assistant S–3. The artillery liaison officer, First Lieutenant Joris J. Snyder, was knocked unconscious for several hours, though he received not a scratch from the 120-mm. explosion a few yards away.

[note]

 

 

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Once across the road the two men [McDoniel and Caldwell] found themselves in the middle of a North Korean artillery battery.

[note]

 

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biography   biography  

North of P'ohang-dong the situation worsened. At 0200 5 September Colonel Emmerich hastened to Yonil Airfield where he conferred with Lt. Col. D. M. McMains, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, stationed there, and informed him of the situation in P'ohang-dong. Emmerich obtained a platoon of tanks and returned with them to the town. He placed the tanks in position and awaited the expected enemy armored attack.

[note]

0230 Korean Time

 

  

At 0230 night-fighter planes of Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)–513 bombed the North Korean mortar position causing most of the damage, and the shelling slackened appreciably. Completing this mission, the Marine pilots dumped general purpose and fragmentation bombs on enemy vehicles and troops in the area.[3]

[note]

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North and east of the Hill 409  and Hyŏnp'ung area lay a virtually road less, high mountain area having no fixed U.N. defensive positions. This, too, was a no man's land in early September. Four miles north of
Hyŏnp'ung was the Yongp'o bridge across the Naktong and the 1st Cavalry Division boundary. The Yongp'o bridge site was defended by the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, attached to the 1st Cavalry Division
for that purpose, until 0410, 5 September, when the British 27th Infantry Brigade relieved it and went into the line there. This, as previously noted, was the British brigade's first commitment in the Korean War. [24-36]

 

  27th British Infantry Brigade  

During the first two weeks of September large numbers of the enemy 10th Division came off Hill 409 and roamed the mountain mass northeast of Hyŏnp'ung in the gap between the U.S. 2d Division and the British 27th Brigade. This caused Eighth Army concern for the safety of Taegu. Gradually, ROK police and British combat patrols forced the North Koreans back to Hill 409.

[note]

 

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Enemy fire stopped the company [E Company ] 500 yards short of the crest before dawn. It was this same company that the N.K. 13th Division had cut off when it launched its attack the evening of 2 September and overran the 2d Battalion north of Tabu-dong. Tired and dispirited from this experience and their roundabout journey to rejoin the regiment, E Company men were not enjoying the best of morale. [22-63]

[note]

 

 

until just before dawn. The North Koreans then launched an attack against the 9th Infantry on the right of the marines, the heaviest blow striking G Company. It had begun to rain again and the attack came in the midst of a downpour. In bringing his platoon from an outpost position to the relief of the company, SFC Loren R. Kaufman encountered an encircling enemy force on the ridge line. He bayoneted the lead enemy scout and engaged those following with grenades and rifle fire. His sudden attack confused and dispersed this group. Kaufman led his platoon on and succeeded in joining hard-pressed G Company. In the ensuing action Kaufman led assaults against close-up enemy positions and, in hand-to-hand fighting, he bayoneted four more enemy soldiers, destroyed a machine gun position, and killed the crew members of an enemy mortar. American artillery fire concentrated in front of the 9th Infantry helped greatly in repelling the North Koreans in this night and day battle. [24-21]

[note]

 

 

   Unit Info

Before dawn, 5 September, an enemy force of two companies, only half-armed, moved against Haman. A part of this force approached the hill at the western edge of Haman where H Company was posted as security for the 24th Regimental command post situated at its base. The H Company men left their post without firing a shot, abandoning two new machine guns. Men in the regimental command post had their first intimation that enemy troops were in the vicinity when the North Koreans opened fire on them with the captured machine guns. A small group of North Koreans infiltrated into Haman within 100 yards of the command post, where members of the I&R Platoon drove them off in a grenade battle. In the course of this action, an enemy grenade blew up an ammunition truck. The exploding shells and resulting fires gave the impression from a distance that a heavy fight was in progress.

About twenty enemy soldiers approached, undiscovered, close enough to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, command post west of Haman to throw grenades and fire burp guns into it. Perhaps 45 soldiers of the battalion command group and 20 South Korean recruits were in position there at the time.

[note]

 

 

Unit Info  

At the time of this enemy infiltration, a white officer and from 35 to 40 Negro soldiers left their position south of Haman at a roadblock and fled to the rear until they reached Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, command post a mile and a half away. There, at 0500 this officer said 2,000 North Koreans had overrun his position and others near Haman, including the 24th Regiment command post. Check reported this story to General Kean, and then sent a platoon of tanks with a platoon of infantry toward Haman to find out what had happened. Some of his officers, meanwhile, had stopped about 220 soldiers streaming to the rear. Colonel Check ordered these men to follow his tank and infantry patrol back into Haman. Some of them did so only when threatened with a gun. The tank-led column entered Haman unopposed, where they found the 24th Regiment command post intact and everything quiet. [24-66]

[note]

 

 

         

Companies G and H reported movement forward of their lines before dawn, and 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars quickly illuminated the front, disclosing several small groups of enemy. There was a flurry of fire, but the Reds gave no indication of organizing for an assault. One of the groups, either by error or suicidal folly, stumbled into the area of Taplett’s CP. A listening post of Weapons Company took the intruders under fire, killing an NKPA officer and routing the others.

[note]

 

 

     

North of P'ohang-dong the situation worsened. At 0200 5 September Colonel Emmerich hastened to Yonil Airfield where he conferred with Lt. Col. D. M. McMains, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, stationed there, and informed him of the situation in P'ohang-dong. Emmerich obtained a platoon of tanks and returned with them to the town. He placed the tanks in position and awaited the expected enemy armored attack.

biography   biography

At 0530 he [Emmerich] received information that elements of the ROK 22d Regiment had given way.

[note]

 

 

       

Marines of the 3d Battalion were startled at daybreak, 5 September, when a company of North Koreans attacked the 9th Infantry’s left flank in full view of 3/5’s positions on the adjacent high ground. George, How, and H & S Companies poured machinegun fire into the mass of Reds at ranges of 600–1,000 yards. Most of the Red attackers were cut down before they could flee into the hills west of the Army lines.[4]

Company B, on its high ground south of Hwayong-ni, heard the firing in 3/5’s area at daybreak and steeled itself for a possible counterattack from the right flank. When Newton received word of the abortive attack on the 9th Infantry, he ordered his two rifle companies to prepare to move out at 0800 as planned.

The Marines of Companies A and B were organizing their attack formation on Cloverleaf Hill when two Air Force P–51’s came in for an uncontrolled air strike on the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. Strafing the ridge from north to south, the planes riddled Cloverleaf Hill as they pulled out of their dives. The 2 exposed companies were showered with bullets, and it seemed miraculous that only 1 Marine was wounded.

[note]

 

0600 Sunrise

[note]

 

 

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It rained most of the night, and 5 September dawned wet and foggy on top of Hill 755. Just after daylight in a cold drizzle the North Koreans attacked. The engineers repulsed this attack but suffered some casualties. Enemy fire destroyed Vandygriff's radio, forcing him to use runners to communicate with Kennedy's command post. Ammunition was running low and three C-47 planes came over to make an airdrop. Kennedy put out orange identification panels, then watched the enemy put out similarly colored one. The planes circled, and finally dropped their bundles of ammunition and food-to the enemy. Immediately after the airdrops, two F-51 fighter planes came over and attacked D Company. It was obvious that the enemy panels had misled both the cargo and fighter planes. The fighters dropped two napalm tanks within D Company's perimeter, one of which fortunately failed to ignite; the other injured no one. The planes then strafed right through the 2d Platoon position, but miraculously caused no casualties. Soon after this aerial attack, enemy burp gun fire wounded Kennedy in the leg and ankle. [22-61]

[note]

 

 

   

At 0600, 3 September, an estimated 300 North Koreans launched an attack from Hill 284 against Colonel Peploe's 38th Regiment command post. Colonel Peploe organized all officers and enlisted men present, including members of the mortar and tank companies and attached antiaircraft artillery units, to fight in the perimeter defense. Peploe requested a bombing strike which was denied him because the enemy target and his defense perimeter were too close to each other. But the Air Force did deliver rocket and strafing strikes.

 

This fight continued until 5 September. On that day Capt. Ernest J. Schauer captured Hill 284 with two platoons of F Company after four efforts. He found approximately 150 enemy dead on the hill. From the crest he and his men watched as many more North Koreans ran into a village below them. Directed artillery fire destroyed the village. Among the abandoned enemy materiel on the hill, Schauer's men found twenty-five American BAR's and submachine guns, a large American radio, thirty boxes of unopened American fragmentation and concussion grenades, and some American rations. [24-29]

[note]

 

 

    

About twenty enemy soldiers approached, undiscovered, close enough to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, command post west of Haman to throw grenades and fire burp guns into it. Perhaps 45 soldiers of the battalion command group and 20 South Korean recruits were in position there at the time.

 

September 5, 1950 0600

The enemy was driven off at dawn, but Maj. Eugene J. Carson, battalion executive officer, then discovered that he had on position with him only 30 men, 7 of them wounded. Looking back down the hill, Carson saw approximately 40 men get up out of the rice paddies and go over to a tank at a roadblock position. These men reported to the regiment that they had been driven off the hill. Three tanks near the command post helped clear the town of North Koreans. [24-65]

[note]

 

0630 Korean Time

  

They  [McDoniel and Caldwell]  escaped unobserved and hid in a field near the river at daybreak.

[note]

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23 August 1950
By 23 August, the United States had accepted forces offered by seven nations, totaling almost 25,000 ground combat troops.

Troops of four more nations had been accepted by 5 September. [07-9] But most of these troops were a long way from Korea and many would not arrive for months.

Rebuilding the U.S. Army

Rushing thousands of men and officers to the Far East left great gaps in the defenses of the continental United States and completely vitiated, for the moment, American plans for emergency operations in western Europe and other areas vital to the free world. Yet nothing substantive had been done to repair the damage. Nor did the Army's top planners have any basis for planning to reconstitute the reserve forces.

[note]

 

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Def  biography

When, by 5 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite their request of 28 August, had heard nothing more from General MacArthur on his plans, they again called upon him, saying, "Pursuant to the request ... desire to be informed of any modification which may have been made in your plans for the mid-September amphibious operation." [08-27]

This terse reminder triggered only a casual reaction from MacArthur. He replied that "the general outline of the plan remains as described to you." He promised that by 11 September, using officer courier, he would send them a detailed description of his planned operations. [08-28]

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been weighing the possible fruits of success at Inch'ŏn against the certain price of failure. They lacked General MacArthur's complete faith in ultimate victory at Inch'ŏn. They feared a debacle at Inch'ŏn from which the U.N. forces might not recover. North Korean gains along the Pusan Perimeter had continued into September and, from Washington, chances of a mid-September victory on the west coast appeared to be diminishing rapidly.

[note]

 

 

          

about 0800, Kennedy had visited Brown [Pfc. Melvin L. Brown, a BAR man in the 3d Squad] and had seen five enemy dead that Brown had killed with BAR fire.

[note]

 

 

    

the next morning, 5 September, eight transport planes accomplished the resupply and the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, was ready to resume its attack to the rear.

[note]

 

 

       

At 0820, 1/5 jumped off to the west to seize the Brigade’s portion of Phase Line Two—Hill 125 and Observation Hill. Beyond these hills lay Obong-ni Ridge, blocking the path to the Naktong River, third and final phase line of the 2d Division counterattack. Because of its tactical importance and great significance, battle-scarred Obong-ni was designated a special objective, apart from the phase lines.

Half a mile west of Hwayong-ni the MSR makes a right-angle turn to the south, proceeds in that direction for 1,000 yards, then resumes its westward course through the cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill.

Companies A and B, with the latter on the right, moved rapidly through the rice paddy below the MSR after leaving their line of departure on Cloverleaf Hill. At the road bend mentioned above, the MSR turned across Baker Company’s front. When Fenton’s unit crossed over to the base of the high ground leading to Hill 125, Companies A and B were separated by the MSR as it resumed its westward course. Stevens’ unit started up the long eastern slopes of Observation Hill, while Fenton’s men secured the eastern extension of Hill 125.

[note]

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biography  Army Symbol   biography  

General Walker complied with his orders and withdrew the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade from the perimeter on the night of 5-6 September.

[note]

 

 

biography  Army Symbol   biography

The next morning, 5 September, General Walker  reached the decision to move the main army headquarters back to the old Fisheries College between Pusan and Tongnae, north of Pusan, and it made the move during the day. The ROK Army headquarters moved to Pusan.

[note]

 

 

    

That morning (5 September), after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the American troops moved out in their third day of counterattack. It was a day of rain. As the attack progressed, the Marines approached Obong-ni Ridge and the 9th Infantry neared Cloverleaf Hill - their old battleground of August. There, at midmorning, on the high ground ahead, they could see enemy troops digging in. The marines approached the pass between the two hills and took positions in front of the enemy-held high ground.

[note]

 

 

 

Action on the 5th started with an enemy counterattack against Army troops north of the road, which was dissolved by automatic weapons fire. Preparations were then made to continue the move westward, and during the morning, despite heavy rain and fog which hampered air operations, the Marines moved out into position for an attack on Obong-ni Ridge.

[note]

 

 

USN_Units   USN_Units

the 5th, as an early morning weather flight disclosed unfavorable conditions over North Korea, Admiral Ewen turned his force southward and headed for Japan. USS Sicily (CVE-118)was still in the yard at Sasebo, but USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) was getting underway for the Yellow Sea. On the east coast a new crisis was developing with heavy enemy pressure against Pohang.

[note]

 

0935 Korean Time

 

 

Obong-ni Ridge rumbled its first greeting to 1/5 at 0935 when mortars and artillery fired at the Marine attackers from emplacements around the hill. The Reds were answered immediately by 1/11 and Newton’s 81-mm. mortar platoon; and the rifle companies continued the advance to Phase Line Two, securing their objectives at 1100.

[note]

 

 

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The next day when American fighter planes strafed the hilltop [Hill 755] it confirmed his belief that no D Company [D Company, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion] men were there.

Some of the men in the advanced squad made their way to safety, but North Koreans captured Jones 2d Lt. Thomas T. Jones, commanding the 3d Platoon] and the eight men with him near the bottom of Ka-san on 10 September as they were trying to make their way through the enemy lines. This account of the 3d Platoon explains why-except for the 3d Squad which rejoined D Company that evening-it was out of the action and off the crest almost as soon as it arrived on top, all unknown to Lieutenant Kennedy and the rest of the company at the time. [22-59]

[note]

 

 

 

          

Shortly after the E Company platoon joined Vandygriff, the North Koreans attacked again. The E Company infantrymen had brought no mortars with them-only small arms. In this situation, Vandygriff took a 3.5-inch rocket launcher and fired into the North Koreans. They must have thought that it was mortar or 75-mm. recoilless rifle fire for they broke off the attack. Vandygriff checked his platoon and found it was nearly out of ammunition. He then instructed his men to gather up all the weapons and ammunition from enemy dead they could reach, and in this manner they obtained for emergency use about 30 to 40 rifles, 5 burp guns, and some hand grenades.

In the course of gathering up these enemy weapons, Vandygriff passed the dug-in position of Pfc. Melvin L. Brown, a BAR man in the 3d Squad. Brown was next to the wall on the extreme left of the platoon position at a point where the wall was only about six or seven feet high. At the bottom of the wall around Brown's position lay about fifteen or twenty enemy dead. Vandygriff asked Brown what had happened. The latter replied, "Every time they came up I knocked them off the wall." Earlier in the day, about 0800, Kennedy had visited Brown and had seen five enemy dead that Brown had killed with BAR fire. Subsequently Brown exhausted his automatic rifle ammunition, then his few grenades, and finally he used his entrenching tool to knock the North Koreans in the head when they tried to climb over the wall. Brown had received a flesh wound in the shoulder early in the morning, but had bandaged it himself and refused to leave his position. [22-64]

[note]

 

 

Unit Info  

At 1000, while 1/5 was attacking to the west, the 3d Battalion had swung southward behind Cloverleaf Hill to take positions on the 5th Marines’ left. This was in preparation for Murray’s contemplated assault on Obong-ni Ridge  by two battalions. It was planned that Newton’s unit would take the northern half of the long hill and 3/5 the southern portion.

Company G led the 3d Battalion advance through the rice paddy south of Cloverleaf Hill. Artillery and 75-mm. recoilless guns paved the way by raking possible enemy hiding places, enabling the infantrymen to proceed rapidly. Bohn’s destination was Hill 91, a shoe-like projection jutting out from the southern reaches of Obong-ni Ridge. Reaching the base of the high ground, Bohn requested that supporting fires be lifted. Attached tanks, 75’s, and 1/11 immediately shifted their destruction to Obong-ni Ridge.

Company G started up the slopes of Hill 91, while an attached 75-mm. recoilless gun obliterated a wheel-mounted machinegun and its crew going into position on the crest.

[note]

 

1030 Korean Time

 

      

Because the big gap between the ROK Capital and 8th Divisions made it impossible for I Corps at Kyŏngju to direct the action of the 8th Division, the ROK Army at 1030, 5 September, transferred that division to the control of the ROK II Corps, and attached to it the 5th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division.

This shift of command came just as the N.K. 15th Division penetrated the ROK 8th Division lines to enter Yongch'on in the Taegu-P'ohang-dong corridor. From west of An'gang-ni the ROK 3d Regiment drove toward Yongch'on, still trying to close the gap. [22-17]

[note]

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biography   biography

Enemy troops entered this gap and just before 1100 the American tanks in P'ohang-dong were under heavy enemy machine gun fire. Five N.K. self-propelled guns approached and began firing. At a range of one city block the tanks knocked out the lead gun, killing three crew members. In the ensuing exchange of fire the other four withdrew. Emmerich then directed air strikes and artillery fire which destroyed the other four guns.

[note]

 

 

Unit Info      

Sometime between 1000 and 1100 the advanced platoon of E Company, 8th Cavalry Regiment, arrived on top of Hill 755 and came into D Company's perimeter. Some of the engineers fired on the E Company men before the latter identified themselves. The E Company platoon went into position on the right of Vandygriff, and Kennedy turned over command of the combined force to the E Company commander.

Kennedy then assembled twelve wounded men and started down the mountain with them. The party was under small arms fire most of the way. A carrying party of Korean A-frame porters led by an American officer had started up the mountain during the morning with supplies. Enemy fire, killing several of the porters, turned it back. [22-62]

[note]

 

 

biography  

Obong-ni Ridge  rumbled its first greeting to 1/5 at 0935 when mortars and artillery fired at the Marine attackers from emplacements around the hill. The Reds were answered immediately by 1/11 and Newton’s 81-mm. mortar platoon; and the rifle companies continued the advance to Phase Line Two, securing their objectives at 1100.

Murray ordered 1/5 to hold up until the 9th Infantry tied in on Fenton’s right. Communist automatic weapons on Obong-ni Ridge fired on the Marines sporadically during this interlude.

[note]

 

1120 Korean Time

 

 

Koread-War  Def      biography

At 1120 the KMAG detachment ashore asked the fire support unit to call for Navy air support to check an attack which had reached within half a mile of the town; an emergency dispatch to this effect reached ComNavFE shortly after noon

USN_Units

and was at once relayed to Task Force 77, to Admiral Ruble, and to FEAF, with the request that all practicable help be given. But the fast carriers were 300 miles away, and bad weather left behind by Jane prevented flight operations by USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116)

          The immediate threat was checked by the fire support ships. Five-inch rapid fire from USS Toledo (CA-133) and USS DE HAVEN (DD-727) broke up a tank attack and destroyed enemy artillery, while the destroyer provided further help by vectoring Fifth Air Force aircraft onto useful targets.

[note]

 

1145 Korean Time

 

 

The 2d Battalion arrived in the Kyŏngju area shortly before noon. [22-12]

 

[22-Caption] ASSAULT TROOPS OF COMPANY K, 21st Infantry, under mortar fire on Hill 99, 2 September.

[note]

 

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But at mid-day the attack was cancelled. Although the bulge had not been cleared the situation was vastly improved; D-Day at Inch'ŏn was approaching and the brigade was needed there. On receipt of this order the Marines formed up defensively along ridges south of the road, and during the evening were relieved by elements of the 2nd Infantry Division.

[note]

 

 

 USN_Units   De Haven

          The immediate threat was checked by the fire support ships. Five-inch rapid fire from USS Toledo (CA-133) and USS DE HAVEN (DD-727) broke up a tank attack and destroyed enemy artillery, while the destroyer provided further help by vectoring Fifth Air Force aircraft onto useful targets.

[note]

 

 

1230 Korean Time

     biography

Bohn was ordered by Taplett at 1230 to withdraw the company to Observation Hill.

Company H, then passing between Hill 91 and Observation Hill on its way to Obong-ni’s eastern approaches, received the same order from the Battalion commander. The assault on the ridge had been canceled, and Murray was concentrating his regiment along the MSR.

   

Throughout the Brigade advance on 5 September, the Marines were hampered by heavy rain and fog which prevented MAG–33 and VMO–6 from operating effectively. Thus the enemy was offered a rare opportunity to mount a daylight attack.[5]

    

After Company B received orders to hold up on Hill 125, Fenton ordered his men to dig foxholes along the rain-soaked crest facing Tugok village and Finger Ridge to the west and Obong-ni Ridge to the southwest. The company commander directed the attached 1st Platoon of tanks to remain in the road cut, just to the rear of the famous bend around the forward slopes of Hill 125. Peering through the rain and fog, the Marine tankmen could see the dead, black hulls of the three T–34’s knocked out by the Brigade 2 weeks earlier.

[note]

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Division troops and the 18th Infantry [Should be 19th IR]  started at 1300 the next day, 5 September, and, traveling over muddy roads, most of them arrived at Kyŏngju just before midnight.


General Church had arrived there during the day. All division units had arrived by 0700, 6 September. [22-18]

[note]

 

 

Unit Info     

At 1330 General Gay ordered the 8th Cavalry Regiment to withdraw its men off Ka-san. Gay decided to give up the mountain because he believed he had insufficient forces to secure and hold it and that the enemy had insufficient ammunition to exploit its possession as an observation point for directing artillery and mortar fire. It is not certain that this order actually reached anyone on the hill. Colonel Holley could not reach anyone in D Company, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion. [22-65]

Rain started falling again and heavy fog closed in on the mountain top so that it was impossible to see more than a few yards. Again the enemy attacked the 2d Platoon and the adjacent E Company infantrymen. One of the engineers was shot through the neck and Vandygriff sent him to the company command post.

[note]

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Unit Info     

In about thirty minutes he returned. "What's wrong?" asked Vandygriff . Barely able to talk from his wound and shock, the man replied that there was no longer a command post, that he could not find anyone and had seen only enemy dead. Vandygriff now went to the infantry sergeant who was in command of the E Company platoon and asked him what he intended to do. The latter replied, in effect, that he was going to take his platoon and go over the wall.

Vandygriff went back to his own platoon, got his squad leaders together and told them the platoon was going out the way it came in and that he would give the wounded a 30-minute start. Enemy fire was falling in the platoon area now from nearly all directions and the situation looked hopeless. Sgt. John J. Philip, leader of the 3d Squad, started to break up the weapons that the platoon could not take out with them. Vandygriff, noticing that Brown was not among the assembled men, asked Philip where he was. The latter replied that he didn't know but that he would try to find out. Philip returned to the squad's position and came back fifteen minutes later, reporting to Vandygriff that Brown was dead. Asked by Philip if he should take the identification tags off the dead, Vandygriff said, "No," that he should leave them on because they would be the only means of identification later. Vandygriff put his platoon in a V formation and led them off the hill the same way they had come up, picking up four wounded men on the way down. [22-66]

[note]

 

 

1420 Korean Time

 

 

During this fight the Marines destroyed two more T34 tanks and an enemy armored personnel carrier at about 1420.

[note]

 

    

At 1420 the sporadic sniping from the front suddenly increased to the intensity of preparatory fire, and Baker Company was pinned down on its ridgeline positions. The northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge blazed with NKPA machineguns, whose chatter was soon joined by that of automatic weapons concealed in Tugok and at the northern base of Observation Hill. A Communist antitank gun on Finger Ridge added its voice intermittently to the chorus.

Fenton’s radio went dead just as he reported the situation to Newton at his OP on the high ground to the east. As luck would have it, every other radio in the company area was inoperative because of the mud and rain; and Fenton was unable to warn the Marine tanks in the road cut that enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the road bend from the west.

As the Communist vehicles swung into the turn, a company of Red soldiers left the road and assaulted

Company B’s positions by advancing up the draw on the Marines’ left front. The intense overhead fire supporting the Red Infantry enabled them to get well up the forward slopes. Meanwhile, a squad of North Koreans advanced  up the draw leading from Tugok and harassed Fenton’s right front.

To stop the attack, the Marines were forced to man the crest of Hill 125. Thus exposed to the enemy’s supporting fire, Company B had to pay a heavy price in casualties.

During the advance of the Communist armor, it was determined that the first 2 of the 3 vehicles were T–34 tanks and the last a tracked armored personnel carrier. Fenton immediately deployed his assault squad on the slopes below his left flank to meet the threat on the MSR.

Lieutenant Pomeroy, unaware of the enemy tanks around the bend, advanced his M–26’s so that the machineguns on Obong-ni Ridge could be taken under massed fire. Thus, as the first Marine tank reached the bend, its 90-mm. gun was pointing to the left front, a quarter turn away from the enemy armor.

The lead T–34 fired on the Marine vehicle as soon as it came into view. Before the turret of the M–26 could be turned to take aim, several more 85-mm. projectiles struck; and the Brigade lost its first tank to enemy action. The second M–26 in column tried to squeeze by the first to render assistance, and it too was knocked out by 85-mm. fire in the restricted passageway.

The crews of both Marine tanks managed to get out of their vehicles through the escape hatches. Some of the wounded were aided by the engineer mine-clearance team accompanying the tank column.

Since the road bend was now blocked, the remainder of Pomeroy’s tanks could do nothing but park in the road cut. It was Marine infantrymen who stepped in at this point and blunted the NKPA victory on the MSR. Company B’s assault squad plastered the lead T–34 with 3.5" rocket fire and stopped it cold. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Battalion’s assault platoon reached the fight scene and went into action with its 3.5’s. In short order the infantrymen had completed the destruction of the first tank, knocked out the second, and destroyed the enemy personnel carrier. The historic road bend, as seen through the rain and mist, had become a graveyard of armor. A total of 8 steel monsters were sprawled there in death: 5 T–34’s and 1 armored carrier of the NKPA, and 2 Pershing tanks of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

On Hill 125 the fight reached a climax as Marines exchanged grenades and small-arms fire with the North Koreans slithering up the slopes in the driving rain. Company B had used all of its 60-mm. mortar shells and was running low on grenades and small arms ammunition.

[note]

 

1430 Korean Time

 

     

At 1430 approximately 300 enemy infantry came from the village of Tugok and concealed positions, striking B Company on Hill 125 just north of the road and east of Tugok. Two enemy T34 tanks surprised and knocked out the two leading Marine Pershing M26 tanks. Since the destroyed Pershing tanks blocked fields of fire, four others withdrew to better positions. Assault teams of B Company and the 1st Battalion with 3.5-inch rocket launchers rushed into action, took the tanks under fire, and destroyed both of them, as well as an armored personnel carrier following behind. The enemy infantry attack was quite savage and inflicted twenty-five casualties on B Company before reinforcements from A Company and supporting Army artillery and the Marine 81-mm. mortars helped repel it. [24-22]

September 5 was a day of heavy casualties everywhere on the Pusan Perimeter. Army units had 102 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action for a total of 1,119 casualties. Marine units had 35 killed, 91 wounded, and none missing in action, for a total of 126 battle casualties.

[Actually 138 total,  with 1 navy and 5 Marine] Total American battle casualties for the day were 1,245 men.

 Col. Charles C. Sloane, Jr., who had commanded part of Task Force Bradley, resumed command of the 9th Infantry, relieving Col. John G. Hill. [24-23]

[note]

 

1435 Korean Time

 

 

  

North of P'ohang-dong the situation worsened. At 0200 5 September Colonel Emmerich hastened to Yonil Airfield where he conferred with D. M. ("Mac") McMains, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, stationed there, and informed him of the situation in P'ohang-dong. Emmerich obtained a platoon of tanks and returned with them to the town. He placed the tanks in position and awaited the expected enemy armored attack. At 0530 he received information that elements of the ROK 22d Regiment had given way.

Enemy troops entered this gap and just before 1100 the American tanks in P'ohang-dong were under heavy enemy machine gun fire. Five N.K. self-propelled guns approached and began firing. At a range of one city block the tanks knocked out the lead gun, killing three crew members. In the ensuing exchange of fire the other four withdrew. Emmerich then directed air strikes and artillery fire which destroyed the other four guns.

But, nevertheless, that afternoon at 1435 the order came to evacuate all materiel and supplies from the Yonil airstrip. [22-15]

[note]

 

 

1445 Korean Time

 

   USN_Units

On 4 September the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) set sail for Kobe, arriving at 1445 the next day to be welcomed by an Army band at the pier. The soothing powers of music were needed by Marine officers who learned that fire had broken out in the hold of the SS Noonday as she belatedly approached Kobe. This “Jonah” had taken so long to load at San Diego that she lagged behind the others, and now large quantities of much-needed Marine clothing were apparently ruined by water when the fire was extinguished. Once again the Army came to the rescue with wholehearted cooperation by taking the water-soaked boxes to a reclamation depot where the garments were dried, repackaged and sent back to the docks in time for loading out on the originally scheduled ships. Only the most basic troop training could be conducted at Kobe to supplement the individual and amphibious instruction the men had received on shipboard.

 At this time, moreover, an order from the Secretary of the Navy made it necessary to reduce the size of the landing force by withdrawing about 500 Marines who had not yet reached their 18th birthday. They were transferred to the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which was to be left behind at Kobe when the Division embarked for Inch'ŏn.

This unit had been organized at Camp Pendleton in accordance with a directive from the Commandant. It was found necessary, however, to transfer most of its combat-ready men to the 1st Tank Battalion in order to bring that outfit up to full strength. The tank battalion was given priority because its vehicles would be used throughout the operation while the armored amphibians might be employed only occasionally. As a consequence, the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion left San Diego with new personnel lacking in the skills to make it fully combat ready.

Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Cooper, the commanding officer, recommended at Kobe that the unit be withheld from action until drivers, gunners, and maintenance crews could be properly trained. General Smith and his staff concurred, having learned that a trained Army unit, Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, could be made available. Orders were given for Cooper’s battalion to remain at Kobe, therefore, with the 17-yearold Marines attached.

 

Several other U.S. Army units were to take part along with the Marines—the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, the 73d Engineer (c) Battalion, the 73d Tank Battalion, the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company, and the 65th Ordnance and Ammunition Company. These units comprised a total of about 2,750 troops.

 

Plans called for the commanding officer of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade to head a logistical task organization which also included several Marine units—the 1st Shore Party Battalion, the 1st Combat Service Group, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion. The Shore Party troops were to initiate unloading at the objective, whereupon the over-all control would pass to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, on order, to insure continuity of development of unloading facilities.[5]

 

Division service units, in accordance with current directives, were to carry the 30-day replenishment of spare parts appropriate to the unit concerned. Although the Combat Service Group had neither spare parts nor supplies, it was to have custody of both after the landing. Thus the units would be freed immediately to move away from the beach in support of the Division as it drove toward Kimp'o and Seoul.[6]

At Kobe the men of the 1st Marine Division were required to leave the full clothing bags they had brought from San Diego and embark for Inch'ŏn with field transport packs containing only the most essential items. This meant that some 25,000 sea bags must be stored at the Japanese port in such a way that future casualties and rotation drafts could reclaim their personal effects without delay. As a reminder of the grim task ahead, provisions must be also made to return to proper custody the effects of deceased personnel.

 

Intelligence reports on the eve of embarkation did not depart from earlier estimates of a maximum of 2,500 NKPA troops in the objective area. From 400 to 500 were believed to be garrisoning Wŏlmi-do, 500 defending Kimp'o, and the balance stationed in and about Inch'ŏn.[7] Despite the estimates of low to moderate enemy resistance, however, General Smith differed with the command of X Corps when a commando-type raid on Kimp'o was proposed.

[note]

 

 

 

1500 Korean Time

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biography

Company A took the northern half of Obong-ni Ridge and then moved over to reinforce Company B in mid-afternoon. The 3d Battalion crossed the familiar ground between Cloverleaf and Observation Hills to clear the southern ridge facing Obong-ni Ridge.

Regimental plans were being formulated to continue the attack to clear the rest of the Naktong Bulge when Lieutenant Colonel Murray learned the 5th Marines was going to be pulled out of the line. The regiment was to begin moving to a staging area near Pusan by road the next morning. Ironically, the 3d Battalion was hard hit by enemy artillery and suffered twenty-four casualties as it left Observation Hill.

[note]

 

 

          

At the base of the mountain, Colonel Holley and others in the afternoon saw E Company men come down from the top and, later, men from the engineer company. Each group thought it was the last of the survivors and told confused, conflicting stories. When all remaining members of D Company had been assembled, Colonel Holley found that the company had suffered 50 percent casualties; eighteen men were wounded and thirty were missing in action. [22-67]

Koread-War

POW

Among the wounded carried off the mountain was an officer of D Company, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion. Enemy machine gun fire struck him in the leg just before he jumped off a high ledge. Two men carried him to the bottom and at his request left him in a Korean house, expecting to come back in a jeep for him. A little later, other members escaping off the mountain heard his screams. Two weeks passed before the 1st Cavalry Division recaptured the area. They found the officer's body in the house. The hands and feet were tied, the eyes gouged, a thumb pulled off, and the body had been partly burned. Apparently he had been tied, tortured, and a fire built under him.

[note]

 

 

On another occasion, probably early in September, [9/5] a flight of Fifth Air Force fighters did far more damage to the Red war effort than it must have imagined. A few miles north of Andong fighters evidently dropped a tank of napalm on a truck seen entering a tunnel and then placed another tank of the incendiary mixture at the other end of the tunnel. This flight probably reported one truck destroyed, but a ground reconnaissance party, happening on the scene some-what later, [Feb 51]  discovered that the tunnel was crammed with burned North Korean equipment. The reconnaissance party "conservatively estimated" that ten 76-mm. field guns, eight 120-mm. mortars, five trucks, and four jeeps-the table of equipment of a North Korean artillery battalion and heavy mortar company-had been destroyed. Judging by the odor, the party sup-posed that a number of enemy soldiers had also perished in the napalm-filled tunnel.#80

[note]

 

 

biography   biography   USN_Units

General Partridge had already asked Task Force 77 to continue to fly close support on 3 September, but he had been informed that the carriers had to refuel and could not operate that day. The Eighth Army, however, dispatched an urgent message to Tokyo, and, as a result, Task Force 77 broke off refueling and sent 28 sorties to support the ground troops at Yongsan. These Navy planes went directly to the Yongsan area and contacted air controllers there. Neither FEAF, the Fifth Air Force, nor the Joint Operations Center knew of the missions prior to the receipt of a routine message reporting the results of Navy operations.

These would be the last close-support strikes the Navy could provide for some time, for Task Force 77 would operate against communications targets in northwestern Korea on 4 and 5 September and then retire to Sasebo to outfit for the amphibious operation coming up at Inch'ŏn.

[note]

 

 

    

Enemy automatic weapons on the ridges to the front were still cutting down the Marine defenders at 1500 when Fenton sent a runner to Newton requesting more ammunition.[6]

[note]

 

 

The endurance contest was still in progress half an hour later, as the 9th Infantry moved into positions on the high ground north of  Hill 125.

    

Having no communications with his own supporting arms, Fenton sent a messenger to the Army unit commander, asking that he place artillery fire on the Marine front.

When Army shells began falling in answer to the request, 1/5’s 81-mm. mortars belatedly got into the fight and worked over the forward slopes of Hill 125 to within 50 yards of Company B’s positions. The heavy supporting fire turned the tide, and enemy pressure slackened considerably.

During the final stage of the enemy’s attack, Company A was being relieved on Observation Hill by 3/5. Stevens told his platoon leaders to leave their grenades and extra ammunition on the hill, since his orders were to withdraw to the rear. While the relief was taking place, however, Company A was ordered to reinforce Fenton’s unit against the enemy’s attack on Hill 125. Muetzel’s 2d Platoon, after recovering its ammunition, was augmented by a machinegun section, mortar squad, and two SCR–300 radios, before the young officer led the unit across the MSR to lend a hand.

When Stevens’ relief by 3/5 was completed, he added the 1st Platoon to Company B’s reinforcements, and himself withdrew to Cloverleaf Hill with the 3d Platoon as ordered.

The reinforcements were fed into Fenton’s line as fast as they reached the summit of Hill 125. By this time every man in Company B had been committed to the forward wall — mortarmen, clerks, signalmen, and all.

Lieutenant Howard Blank combined his Able Company mortars with those of the defenders and immediately followed up the artillery and 81-mm. fire which had blunted the attack. These final concentrations of 60-mm. mortar fire on Obong-ni  and Finger Ridge and the forward slopes of Hill 125 ended the enemy attack. The surviving Reds withdrew to Tugok.

[note]

 

 

1600 Korean Time

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At 1600, during the dying minutes of the Brigade’s final action in the Pusan Perimeter, Newton was ordered back to the regimental CP for a conference. The executive officer, Major Merlin R. Olson, took over 1/5 from the battalion OP on the ridge east of Hill 125.

The 5th Marines commander had called the leaders of his battalions to brief them on General Craig’s last field directive, which began with the long awaited words:

“THIS MY OPN ORDER 22–50 X

COMMENCING AT 2400 5 SEPT BRIG MOVES BY RAIL AND MOTOR TO STAGING AREA PUSAN FOR FURTHER OPERATION AGAINST THE ENEMY X

PRIOR TO

COMMENCEMENT OF MOVEMENT 5TH MARS WILL STAND RELIEVED BY ELMS OF 2ND INF DIV COMMENCING AT DARKNESS . . . CONCEAL FROM THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH

YOUR WITHDRAWAL . . .”

Taplett’s 3d Battalion had sustained 24 casualties from artillery and mortar fire between its occupation of Observation Hill and the time it was relieved by a company of the 23d Infantry shortly after midnight. Plodding rearward through mud and driving rain, 3/5’s long column began its three-and-a-half-mile march to an en-trucking point 2,000 yards west of Yŏngsan.

Following 3/5 were the weary, mud-soaked troops of the 1st Battalion. Having successfully defended Hill 125 at a cost of 2 killed and 23 wounded, Baker Company had filed down to the road after being relieved by another company of the 23d Infantry. Muetzel brought up the rear with Company A’s contingent, and a battalion column was formed at Olson’s check point east of Hill 125.

[note]

1700 Korean Time

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1800 Korean Time

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By evening of 5 September, Ka-san was securely in enemy hands with an estimated five battalions, totaling about 1,500 enemy soldiers, on the mountain and its forward slope. A North Korean ox-train carrying 82-mm. mortar shells and rice reportedly reached the top of Ka-san during the day. The ROK 1st Division captured this ox-train a few days later south of Ka-san. [22-68]

[note]

 

 

Now, with Ka-san firmly in their possession, the N.K. 13th and 1st Divisions made ready to press on downhill into Taegu.

[note]

 

 

biography   biography

By evening that day it had cleared the supply road and adjacent terrain of enemy soldiers for a distance of 8,000 yards to the rear of G Company's front-line positions. There Murch received orders to halt and prepare to attack northeast to link up with Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. [24-43]

[note]

 

 

 

On the evening of September 5th, the 1st Marine Brigade was relieved by elements of the 2d Division of Eighth Army. The Marines commenced moving to Pusan in the icy rain preparatory to embarkation for the Inch'ŏn landing ten days later. The score for 42 days of violent combat was 148 killed, 15 died of wounds, nine missing (of whom seven were reclassified "killed in action" when their bodies were found in September), and 730 wounded in action[1].

1Montross and Canzona, I, 239.

 An estimated 9,900 casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The two missing Marines were never found, and screening of all repatriated prisoners of war failed to disclose any information concerning their fate. It is reasonable to presume that they were killed in the action and their bodies lost.

Considering the intensity of action and the losses suffered by other units during the same period, the Brigade casualties were remarkably light.

[note]

 

 

 

But at mid-day the attack was cancelled. Although the bulge had not been cleared the situation was vastly improved; D-Day at Inch'ŏn was approaching and the brigade was needed there. On receipt of this order the Marines formed up defensively along ridges south of the road, and during the evening were relieved by elements of the 2d Division.

[note]

1844 Sunset

 

 

1900 Korean Time

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That night the two men  [McDoniel and Caldwell] became separated when they ran into an enemy outpost. [McDoniel was not seen again (I guess)]

[note]


 

2000 Korean Time

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2100 Korean Time

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biography  Army Symbolbiography   biography 

General Walker discussed the issue of withdrawing to the Davidson Line one night with his principal staff officers, most of the division commanders, and General Coulter, his deputy commander in the east.

Colonel Dabney, Eighth Army G-3, told General Walker that [22-37] for once he did not know what to recommend, that the decision was a hard one to make, but that he hoped the Army could stay. He pointed out that North Korean penetrations in the past had waned after a few days and that they might do so again.

Upon orders from Colonel Landrum, Dabney started the G-3 Section that evening working on preparing withdrawal orders for Eighth Army. The staff section worked all night long on them. They were published and ready for issuing at 0500 in the morning, but they were held in the G-3 Section pending General Walker's personal order to put them into effect. The order was not given. At some time during the night Walker reached the decision that Eighth Army would not withdraw. [22-39]

[note]

 

2200 Korean Time

Central East Coast Zulu Korea
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2300 Korean Time

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That night, 5-6 September, events reached a climax inside P'ohang-dong.

At midnight, after ten rounds of enemy mortar or artillery fire struck near it, the ROK 3d Division command post moved to another location. Enemy fire that followed it to the new location indicated observed and directed fire. The ROK division commander and his G-2 and G-3 "got sick."

[note]

 

 

 


Casualties

Tuesday September 5, 1950 (day 73)

138 Casualties

2 159TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
1 19TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
15 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
21 23RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
9 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
5 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 2ND ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
1 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
3 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
22 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
5 5TH MARINE REGIMENT
3 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
1 72ND MEDIUM TANK BATTALION
12 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
21 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
1 8TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
3 99TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
7 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
1 NAVY HOSPITAL CORPSMAN
   
138 19500905 0000 Casualties by unit



Date USAF  USA  USMC  USN  Other  Total
Previous 87 5,470 170 16 5,743
Losses   132 5 1 138
To Date 87 5602 175 17 5511

Aircraft Losses Today 000

 

Notes for Tuesday September 5, 1950 (day 73)

 

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