Weather

1950 Pacific Typhoon Season

Korean Climate

Mean Temp 22.5°C 72.5°F at Taegu    

Heavy Overcast

Korea Temps - 1950-1953 - Station 143 (Daegu)


Overview

President Truman apologizes to the Marine Corps for an "unfortunate choice of language" in a letter to a Republican congressman seeking support for the Marines. In the letter Truman wrote that Marines are the Navy's police force and would remain so "as long as I am President. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." In his apology, he praises the Marine Corps history of bravery and dedication. He says he is sure "the Marine Corps itself does not indulge in such propaganda."

-- Truman also vetoes a bill giving Spanish-American War vets out-patient care at VA hospitals because the extra load would deny care to veterans with service-connected injuries and illnesses.

-- U.S. Air Force warplanes fly 625 missions, the most for a single day of the war. Half are in support of the 1st Cav and ROK-U.S. forces below Pohang.

[note]

 

Citations

Medals

19500906 0000 DSC CROW

19500906 0000 DSC FLEISCHMANN

19500906 0000 DSC HITCHNER

19500906 0000 DSC SCHAUER

 

Coleman, Nolan J. [PFC H24thIR]

Cooper, Oren S. [Sgt SS A23rdIR]

Hulsey, Thomas J. [Sgt SS A25thAAAB]

Longbotham, Ralph M. [Capt SS D27thIR]

Porubsey, Sylvester [1stLt SS1 A27thIR]

Richards, Charles A. [SFC SS M7thCR]

Stenhoe, Clarence S. [1stLt SS G38thIR]

 

ACR


One (1) SB-17 and one (1) SB-29 used this date for orbit missions flying a total of 16:25 hours.

ADCC notified Flight "D" that an F-80 aircraft, number 532 was overdue at Itazuke AB. This aircraft had been dispatched from Itazuke AB on a combat mission to Pohang Korea.

The wreckage of the aircraft was located at 33° 54' N - 130° 28 E in sixty five (65) feet of water. the pilots body was not recovered.

Flight "C", Misawa AB, was notified of an aircraft crash at Akita. Investigation disclosed that this was a false alert.

The Helicopter Detachment in Korea evacuated twenty five (25) patients and made six (6) deliveries of medical supplies and personnel to front line aid stations. 19:20 hours flying time was logged on these missions.

[note]

 As North Korean forces approached Taegu, Eighth Army headquarters withdrew to Pusan. Col. Aaron Tyler, airfield commander at Taegu, began moving the remaining aircraft, including the T-6 Mosquitoes of the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron, southward to Pusan.

[note]

Forgotten Regiments

     Unit Info

 

On September 6, Colonel Champeny was wounded and replaced by LtCol Corley.  

[note]

 

Integration

 

 

Among some factors worth noting concerning the 24Inf's initial weeks' commitment to Korean War action are

 

  • On his 1st day in Korea in Jul 1950, the original regimental executive officer feigned a heart attack and cowardly had himself medically evacuated
  • There was not a physically fit/professionally competent regimental commanding officer until LtCol Corley succeeded to command on 9-6
  • During its 1st 3 months in action the 24INF experienced 13 changes (of which only 2 were casualty related) in bn commanders as compared to 1 and 3 changes, respectively, in the 25th Division's other (i.e, white) regiments.
  • [note]

     

     

     

    Congressman Jacob Javits, always a critic of the Army's segregation policy, was particularly disturbed by the segregation of black trainees at Fort Dix, New Jersey. His request that training units be integrated was politely rejected in the fall of 1950 by General Marshall, who implied that the subject was an unnecessary intrusion, an attitude characteristic of the Defense Department's war-distracted feelings toward integration.[17-21]

    [note]

    U.S AIR FORCE B-26 GETS NEW ENGINE. This B-26 receives a new engine to put it in top shape for further missions against the North Korean Communists. Sgt. Paul Cable (standing) from Gastonio, North Carolina, and Corporal Arthur Beauregard, from Danoby (Danby?), Vermont, recondition this U.S. Air Force plane.

    09/06/1950

    [note]

     

     

    This formation of B-29s is shown flying over enemy territory in Korea. Over twenty-four million pounds of bombs have been dropped from B-29 bomb bays during the months of July and August.

    09/06/1950

    Department of the Air Force.

    [note]

     

     

    When members of the United Nations Forces moved north over the 38th Parallel into the well- known industrial cities, they found gutted buildings and mounds of twisted steel, that were formerly vital to Communistic Korea's military forces

    09/13/1950 (original picture is dated 9/6/50)

    Department of the Air Force.

     

    [note]

    South then North

     

    Losses in the American divisions fighting in Korea had been so great in the first two months that special steps had to be taken to obtain replacements. On 19 August to help meet this demand, Eighth Army Rear in Japan ordered what it called "Operation Flush out." This required that all units in Japan reassign part of their troops as replacements for use in Korea.

    By 6 September, 229 officers and 2,201 enlisted men had been reassigned to Korea under this plan.

    [note]

     

     

    The division [ROK 3d Division] withdrew from P'ohang-dong, and on 6 September this coastal town was again in enemy hands. The ROK Army relieved both the ROK I Corps and the 3d Division commanders. [22-16]

    [note]

     

     

         

    It was in this crisis that the 7th Cavalry began its withdrawal northwest of Taegu. In his withdrawal instructions for the 7th Cavalry, Col. Cecil Nist, the regimental commander, ordered, "The 2d Battalion must clear Hill 464 of enemy tonight." This meant that the 2d Battalion must disengage from the enemy to its front and attack to its rear to gain possession of Hills 464 and 380 on the new main line of resistance to be occupied by the regiment. Since efforts to gain possession of Hill 464 by other elements had failed in the past two or three days this did not promise to be an easy mission.

    Heavy rains fell during the night of 5-6 September and mud slowed all wheeled and tracked vehicles in the withdrawal. The 1st Battalion completed its withdrawal without opposition. During its night march west, the 3d Battalion column was joined several times by groups of North Korean soldiers who apparently thought it was one of their own columns moving south. They were made prisoners and taken along in the withdrawal. Nearing Waegwan at dawn, the battalion column was taken under enemy tank and mortar fire after daybreak and sustained about eighteen casualties.

    [22-Caption] GENERAL WALKER CROSSING THE NAKTONG in his armored jeep with handrail.

    [note]

    On the 6th, the day after the American troops were driven off Ka-san, an enemy force established a roadblock three miles below Tabu-dong and other units occupied Hill 570, two miles southwest of the Walled City and overlooking the Taegu road from the east side.

    [note]

     

     

    Argyll And Sutherland Badge.jpg Flag of the United Kingdom.svg

    On 6 September, the day after they went into the line, the British had a taste of what the Korean War was like. A combat patrol of the Argylls under Capt. Neil A. Buchanan encountered an enemy unit and had to make its escape, leaving behind, on his own orders, Captain Buchanan badly wounded and, at his side, his wounded batman. Neither was seen again. The British company nearest Hill 409 was so isolated that airdrops of ice to it replaced carrying water cans up the hill. [24-37]

      biography

    Had the enemy 10th Division thrown its full weight into a drive eastward, south of Taegu, it might well have precipitated a major crisis for Eighth Army. It could have moved either northeast toward Taegu or southeast to help the 2d Division, next in line below it, but it did neither. Its relative inactivity in the vicinity of Hill 409 when its companion divisions were engaged in desperate combat above and below it is something of a mystery. Captured enemy material and statements of prisoners indicate that its mission may have been to stay on Hill 409 until the N.K. II Corps had captured Taegu, but they indicated, also, that the division command was inept.

    The 10th Division caused General Walker much concern at this time. He and his staff found it puzzling to reconcile the division's favorable position with its inactivity. General Walker charged Colonel Landrum, now Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, to watch the situation closely and inform him daily on it. At least twice daily Landrum insisted on a summary from the Army G-3 of activities in front of the N.K. 10th Division. [24-38]

    [note]

     

     

    Unit Info

    Although the 25th Division generally was under much less enemy pressure after 5 September, there were still severe local attacks.

    Unit InfoUnit Info

    On 6 September Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved north from the Haman area to join Murch's 2d Battalion in the clean-up of enemy troops back of the 35th Infantry and below the Nam River. Caught between the 35th Infantry on its hill positions along the river and the attacking 27th Infantry units, large numbers of North Koreans were killed. Sixteen different groups reportedly were dispersed with heavy casualties during the day.

    [note]

     

     

         Unit Info

    The next day, 6 September; a sniper severely wounded Colonel Champeny while the latter was inspecting his front-line positions west of Haman. Champeny was evacuated at once. Colonel Corley, commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, succeeded to the command of the regiment. [24-67]

     Corley, known as "Cash Pays the Rent" because that was a favorite saying of his, became a highly regarded commander of the "Deuce-Four" Regiment. He was destined to fight in four campaigns of the Korean War, winning a Distinguished Service Cross, three Silver Stars, and the Legion of Merit to add to the decorations he had already won as a much-decorated battalion commander of World War II. This 36-year-old energetic West Point combat leader was soon well-known throughout the regiment.

    [note]

     

     

      

    The division troops, the 1st Marines, and the staff of the 7th Marines arrived in Japan between 28 August and 6 September.

    [note]

     

     

    biography biography

    MacArthur pressed ahead unswervingly toward the Inch'ŏn landing. On 30 August he issued his United Nations Command operation order for it. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs in Washington expected to receive from MacArthur further details of the pending operation and failing to receive them, sent a message to him on 5 September requesting this information.

     

     

    MacArthur replied the next day that his plans remained unchanged.

    [note]

     

     

    biography biography

    In the meantime, General MacArthur on 6 September in a letter to all his major commanders confirmed previous verbal orders and announced 15 September as D-day for the Inch'ŏn landing. [25-19]

    [note]

     

     

    The next day, 4 September, General MacArthur/a> sent General Wright to Taegu to tell General Walker that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would have to be released not later than the night of 5-6 September and moved at once to Pusan. At Taegu Wright informed Walker of MacArthur's instructions and told him that the Far East Command was loading the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division for movement to Pusan, where it would be held in floating reserve and be available for use by Eighth Army if necessary.

     

       

    (It (17th Regiment ) sailed from Yokohama for Korea on 6 September.)

    [note]

     

     

       Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

    The Inch'ŏn landing put the United States X Corps in the enemy's rear. Concurrently, Eighth Army was to launch a general attack all along its front to fix and hold the enemy's main combat strength and prevent movement of units from the Pusan Perimeter to reinforce the threatened area in his rear. This attack would also strive to break the enemy cordon that had for six weeks held Eighth Army within a shrinking Pusan Perimeter. If Eighth Army succeeded in breaking the cordon it was to drive north to effect a juncture with X Corps in the Seoul area. The battle line in the south was 180 air miles at its closest point from the landing area in the enemy's rear, and much farther by the winding mountain roads. This was the distance that at first separated the anvil from the hammer which was to pound to bits the enemy caught between them.

    Most Eighth Army staff officers were none too hopeful that the army could break out with the forces available. And to increase their concern, in September critical shortages began to appear in Eighth Army's supplies, including artillery ammunition. Even for the breakout effort Eighth Army had to establish a limit of fifty rounds a day for primary attack and twenty-five rounds for secondary attack. Fortunately, the Aripa arrived in the Far East with a cargo of 105-mm. howitzer shells in time for their use in the offensive. But, despite some misgivings, General Walker and his chief of staff, General Allen, believed that if the Inch'ŏn landing succeeded Eighth Army could assume the offensive and break through the enemy forces encircling it. [27-1]

    The Eighth Army Plan

    The Eighth Army published its attack plan on 6 September and the next day General Allen sent it to Tokyo for approval. Eighth Army revised the plan on 11 September, and on the 16th made it an operations directive. It set the hour for attack by United Nations and ROK forces in the Perimeter at 0900, 16 September, one day after the Inch'ŏn landing.

    [note]

     

       Army SymbolEighth U.S. Army in Korea

    The Inch'ŏn landing put the United States X Corps in the enemy's rear. Concurrently, Eighth Army was to launch a general attack all along its front to fix and hold the enemy's main combat strength and prevent movement of units from the Pusan Perimeter to reinforce the threatened area in his rear. This attack would also strive to break the enemy cordon that had for six weeks held Eighth Army within a shrinking Pusan Perimeter. If Eighth Army succeeded in breaking the cordon it was to drive north to effect a juncture with X Corps in the Seoul area. The battle line in the south was 180 air miles at its closest point from the landing area in the enemy's rear, and much farther by the winding mountain roads. This was the distance that at first separated the anvil from the hammer which was to pound to bits the enemy caught between them.

    Most Eighth Army staff officers were none too hopeful that the army could break out with the forces available. And to increase their concern, in September critical shortages began to appear in Eighth Army's supplies, including artillery ammunition. Even for the breakout effort Eighth Army had to establish a limit of fifty rounds a day for primary attack and twenty-five rounds for secondary attack. Fortunately, the Aripa arrived in the Far East with a cargo of 105-mm. howitzer shells in time for their use in the offensive. But, despite some misgivings, General Walker and his chief of staff, General Allen, believed that if the Inch'ŏn landing succeeded Eighth Army could assume the offensive and break through the enemy forces encircling it. [27-1]

    The Eighth Army Plan

    The Eighth Army published its attack plan on 6 September and the next day General Allen sent it to Tokyo for approval. Eighth Army revised the plan on 11 September, and on the 16th made it an operations directive. It set the hour for attack by United Nations and ROK forces in the Perimeter at 0900, 16 September, one day after the Inch'ŏn landing.

    [note]/a>

     

     

    TThe Forgotten War

     

         Unit Info

    Who would replace Champeny as commander of the 24th Infantry? Was there anyone willing and able to take what was perceived to be a perilous, thankless, and possibly career ruining chore?

    One man stepped forward: LtCol  Corley. Bill Kean was pleased. Corley had taken a firm grip on the 3/24. Perhaps he could work his magical leadership on the entire 24th Infantry. Kean gave Corley a battlefield promotion to colonel and named him commander. Having turned thirty-six on August 4, Corley became the youngest regimental commander in Korea.[9-18]

    His first task was to assess and reorganize the 24th's subordinate senior white commanders.

    Gerald Miller was not blamed for the BUGOUT of the 1/24; 1st Battalion he retained command.

    The able Paul Roberts, temporarily commanding the disorganized 2/24, 2nd Battalion returned to his job as regimental exec. To the regimental staff, Corley added his combat experienced (ETO) West Point classmate (1938) and best man at his wedding, Joseph B. Missal.

    Both the 2/24 and the 3/24 had several temporary commanders during the next several weeks, until Corley settled on two men with World War II combat experience: George A. Clayton, thirty-three, for the 2/24, and Melvin R. Blair, thirty-four, for the 3/24 3rd Battalion  . Blair seemed a fitting prospect to fill Corley's big shoes in the 3/24. He had won a DSC and a Purple Heart and other awards fighting with Merrill's Marauders in the Burma jungles in World War II.[9-19]

    In an attempt to rebuild morale in the 24th Infantry, Corley adopted "Remember Yech'ŏn!" as the regimental rallying cry and issued a statement to his men: "In sixty days of continuous combat you have witnessed a roughness of battle which I have not seen in five campaigns in Africa, Sicily, Europe with the 1st Infantry Division. You have held ground against superior odds. You have lived up to the regimental motto, Semper Paratus [9-Always ready]. The first United States victory in Korea was your action at Yech'ŏn. It has been noted in Congress. The people back home cover in detail your efforts.... Other units have been unable to accomplish what depleted companies of the fighting 24th have done. I am proud of you."[9-20]

    [note]/a>

     

     

    UU.S. Air Force

     

    General Partridge called; reported that the weather was good; he considered the ground situation the same as yesterday and maybe a little better. There is no rain and that General Walker, with a command group slightly larger than his, was remaining in Taegu.



    At about 1015 hours, went over to the AEP school and talked to Mrs. Overacker's group of volunteer teachers. (These women assist in the established Japanese schools by giving of their time in leading class discussions in English. All is on a volunteer basis.)


    I congratulated these women on their initiative and suggested that they emphasize DEMOCRACY [emphasis in original] - giving all the why's; cover our Constitution, equality of person, institution, etc. Suggested that their teaching not stop in the classroom, but continue their efforts in their own homes. Personalized it by stating from my own experience of one and one-half years, that it tends to build up happiness and efficiency when you endeavor to train your servants.


    Also told the ladies that they have a job here in the occupation just as real as General MacArthur's; through their efforts - and all our efforts - the imprint that we leave behind will stay for many years to come.
    I ended up with Abe Lincoln and his Rail-Splitter's philosophy in dealing with these people - and it was good to keep in mind no matter what job that they attempted to do.


    My above efforts seemed appreciated and well received.

     

    ---

    In answer to my letter to Rosie [Major General Rosie O’Donnell] of 3 Sept on the emergency use of B-29s, I received the following from which I quote in toto:

    1. The proper utilization of B-29 a/c on tactical targets has been of continuous concern to myself and my staff since arrival in this theater. From the outset it has been evident that destruction of vital strategic targets in North Korea could be accomplished with my available effort in very short time. It has been equally apparent that the continued gravity of the ground situation would dictate diversion of medium bombardment air- craft to tactical usage from time to time.

    2. In general, the only limitations in the tactical use of the B-29 are those imposed by the unwieldiness or clumsiness of the weapon itself and the avoidance of self-inflicted damage. Subject to these restrictions, I believe the B-29s can be EFFECTIVELY [emphasis in original] employed against tactical targets under the following conditions:

    a. Assignment of targets before take off with designated aiming points.

    b. Attacking by visual methods only.

    c. Attacking at an altitude such that:

    (1) Self- inflicted damage from bombs dropped will not occur.

    (2) Cluster-type bombs, when used, will open in time for dispersion of the components.

    (3) Synchronous bombing using the bombsight will be permitted. (We must resort to fixed angle bombing below 6000 feet).

    d. Receipt of the directive in time to properly plan the missions, bomb-up, brief the crews, and preflight the aircraft.

    3. I suggest that I be given a list of targets, with designated aiming points, by Lt General Walker, in coordination with Major General Partridge. We will strike using the available bombs by type in accordance with the effects desired, and employing the aircraft either individually or in formation, depending upon the assigned target. I think you will agree that aimless flying in the general battle area in search of targets of opportunity or in wait for flash directives from the ground, is not an efficient way to utilize the weapon. If some special, important unorthodox task seems feasible to you, I know you will pass it on to us. I need not tell you that we will promptly take a crack at it.


    Passed Rosie's comments on to D/Ops and for them to keep me aware of any unusual operations in which B-29s are to be used.

     

    Twin fireballs of napalm dropped by a 452d BW Invader sprout from a North Korean rail yard.

    Partridge answered my query to him of 28 August re the use of napalm. Since difficulties now ironed out in accumulating stocks of tanks, mixers and igniters, and when F-80s can utilize by virtue of their basing in Korea (up to now they have had to carry their own external fuel), employment of napalm is to be stepped up.

    In answer to Fogarty's radio re Woodruff, and particularly to his statement "I shall welcome a combat veteran of the Korean war as he will no doubt be able to teach us a lot - if agreed, I would like to put him into a combat squadron for 3 or 4 months before I employ him on any staff duty" - I sent him the following:

    Part 1. Glad to have your complimentary remarks concerning Woodruff. Concur in your plan to place the officer I send to you with a combat sqdn. Will forward pertinent details regarding this officer very shortly.

    Part 2. Ref your proposed visit, about 26 Oct, I shall be most happy to have you come to Tokyo. This will be an excellent time to discuss mutual problems. Incident to your flight here, we need a roster of personnel, a/c type and number, grade of fuel required and proposed itinerary to Japan. This may be sent at any convenient time, say 10 days before your departure from Singapore. Billeting and messing while in Japan will be arranged for your party by my HQ. Billeting and messing while enroute will be arranged by this HQ upon receipt of your itinerary.

    Part 3. I shall look forward to seeing you again and am sure the visit will be interesting and profitable.

    Colonel Brothers just reported 1405 hours that he felt I should be informed on the possibility of a blow-up reference air evacuation. Col Ohman 263 just returned from a trip where he visited Itazuke and was informed by the Army doctor of the hospital there that some 16 fatalities due to gunshot wounds had occurred where and if they had been evacuated by air from Korea there was a great possibility that many of the lives could have been saved.


    When Colonel Ohman arrived at Taegu, he ran into a reporter who was securing data reference this matter. Further, Colonel Brothers reported that Charlotte Knight had interested herself in this subject and intended riding an air evacuation ship from Korea to Japan and then she intended to ride a surface vessel evacuation ship.


    I queried Colonel Brothers as to the cleanliness of our skirts and he indicated that he and Colonel Kelly,264 the Fifth Air Force surgeon, had both talked with Colonel Dovell,265 8th Army surgeon and Colonel Kelly had talked with Lt Colonel Willis266 at the hospital in Pusan, urging air evacuation. They pooh-poohed the idea and have continued to evacuate by surface ship to Itazuke hospital, and thence to Yokohama and Tokyo by train.


    As of today, though, through General Hume, or because of finally realizing the error of their ways, they are now evacuating from Korea to Itazuke and on to Tokyo by air. Over 200 evacuees came out of Korea yesterday and over 300 from Itazuke area to Tokyo.


    From all the information I could gain, the Air Force has gone out of its way to set up this air evacuation but have been stymied by 8th Army surgeon and by, as Colonel Brother's put it, a nincompoop lieutenant Colonel in Pusan.267

    The medical evacuation problem was not quite as simple as General Stratemeyer makes it out to be. A short- age of ambulances restricted the Army's choices. With the Taegu airfield eight miles over rough roads from the hospital, the Army thought it better to place patients on the train from Taegu to Pusan, thence by ship to Japan. Also, those patients awaiting evacuation by air from Pusan often were kept for inordinate lengths of time, a problem not of the Army's making. (Futrell No. 71, p 108.) Eventually, a smooth-running operation was achieved by Combat Cargo Command using C-46s, C-47s, and C-54s.

    [note]

     

     

    Unit Info   731st Bombardment Squadron - Emblem.png

     

    Although the improvised night-intruder effort slowed the flow of Communist logistical support, it was manifestly unable to interdict Communist night movements with the same degree of certainty with which daytime fighter-bombers interdicted hostile day movements. "Since the start of operations in Korea," observed General Vandenberg, "the problem of night attack on moving targets has obviously been one of our greatest weaknesses. "#90

     

    On 6 September Vandenberg accordingly suggested that General Stratemeyer convert the 3d  Group completely to night attack. As   soon as it reached the theater, the 452d   Bombardment Wing could make up for the lost daytime effort. The 731st   Squadron (Light-Night Attack) of this  air-reserve wing was especially trained for low-level night operations, and General Vandenberg proposed that this  squadron should be assigned to the  understrength 3d Group.#91

    [note]

     

     

          

    On 6 September Col. Aaron Tyer, commander of the 6149th and of Taegu Airfield, ordered the 6147th Squadron to begin to move its Mosquitoes to Pusan Airfield. Unless the Eighth Army could assemble forces in sufficient strength to hold the line between Taegu and Pohang, General Partridge said that he thought that Taegu would have to be evacuated. 1#37

    [note]

     

     

    biography   biography

    At this critical juncture General Partridge once again exploited air-power's flexibility and ability to concentrate where it was most needed. Once again General Partridge used the Fifth Air Force to blunt the enemy's attack and to give General Walker time to bring up such reinforcements as he had.

    Beginning on 4 September, the ROK divisions to the east of Taegu received the lion's share of Fifth Air Force capabilities: 160 sorties on 4 September, 51 sorties on 5 September (when weather seriously hampered flying), 183 sorties on 6 September.#138

    Heartened by the air support, the ROK divisions rallied and counterattacked, while the U.S. 24th Division raced northward from its rest camps to secure Kyŏngju and Yongchon. Having secured these communications routes this combat-wise American division joined with the ROK's in a flanking attack which promised to cut off and destroy the North Korean troops who had penetrated into the Eighth Army lines.#139

     

    Fighting in the meanwhile on a diminishing arc around the city of Taegu, the U.S. 1st Cavalry and the ROK 1st Divisions enjoyed a second priority for air support. The number of close-support missions sent to this area was not large, but the missions were carefully controlled to do the most good. Fifth Air Force fighters and B-26's had some share in thwarting the Red advances at the ruined city of Waegwan and at the "Walled City" of Tabudong, eight miles north of Taegu.#140

     

    [note]/a>

     

    UU.S. Marine Corps

     

     

    6 September 1950

    Dear General Cates:

    I sincerely regret the unfortunate choice of language which I used in my letter of August 29 to Congressman McDonough concerning the Marine Corps.

    What I had in mind at the time this letter was written was the specific question raised by Mr. McDonough, namely the representation of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have been disturbed by the number of communications which have been brought to my attention proposing that the Marine Corps have such representation. I feel that, inasmuch as the Marine Corps is by law an integral part of the Department of the Navy, it is already represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chief of Naval Operations. That the Congress concurs in this point of view is evidenced by the fact that, in passing the National Security Act of 1947, and again in amending that Act in 1949, the Congress considered the question of Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and did not provide for it. It is my feeling that many of the renewed pleas for such representation are the result of propaganda inspired by individuals who may not be aware of the best interests of our Defense Establishment as a whole, and it was this feeling which I was expressing to Mr. McDonough. I am certain that the Marine Corps itself does not indulge in such propaganda.

    I am profoundly aware of the magnificent history of the United States Marine Corps, and of the many heroic deeds of the Marines since the Corps was established in 1775. I personally learned of the splendid combat spirit of the Marines when the Fourth Marine Brigade of the Second Infantry Division fought in France in 1918.

    On numerous occasions since I assumed office, I have stated my conviction that the Marine Corps has a vital role in our organization for national security and I will continue to support and maintain its identity. I regard the Marine Corps as a force available for use in any emergency, wherever or whenever necessary. When I spoke of the Marines as the “Navy police force”, I had in mind its immediate readiness, and the provision of the National Security Act which states that “The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”

    The Corps’ ability to carry out whatever task may be assigned to it has been splendidly demonstrated many times in our history. It has again been shown by the immediate response of the Marine Corps to a call for duty in Korea. Since Marine ground and air forces have arrived in Korea I have received a daily report of their actions. The country may feel sure that the record of the Marines now fighting there will add new laurels to the already illustrious record of the Marine Corps.

    Sincerely yours

    /s/ Harry S. Truman

    General Clifton B. Cates, USMC
    United States Marine Corps
    Washington, DC

    [note]

     

     

    Def   Def

    Even as enlisted Volunteer Reservists were beginning to flow into Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Headquarters on 6 September ordered the first large group of Volunteer Reserve officers to active duty. On the next day, Headquarters also directed that quotas of Volunteer Reserve staff noncommissioned officers, with or qualifying for certain specified MOS numbers be ordered to active duty by reserve district directors. (5)

    5. A small number of Volunteer Reservists had previously been ordered to active duty to fill specific billets.

    [note]

     

     

    The main body of the Division’s third rifle regiment, the 7th Marines, was scheduled to land in Japan on 17 September. Colonel Litzenberg, the commanding officer, arrived at Itami Airfield on the 6th, having flown from Camp Pendleton ahead of his troops to make arrangements.

     

    Command relationships during the assault and embarkation phase were as follows:  

     

     

     

    The movement of JTF–7 to the objective area was planned in the most exacting detail, owing to the dispersion of the ships to begin with, the need for secrecy, and the limited time. Another complication entered the picture at the last minute, when a second typhoon loomed on the Pacific horizon with considerably more menace than its exotic name would imply.

    Navy meteorologists had been plotting the movement of Typhoon KEZIA since the first signs of turbulence near the Marianas Islands on 6 September. Generating winds of 100 miles per hour three days later, the typhoon was churning a steady course toward the East China Sea and Tsushima Strait, where it was expected to hit on 12 or 13 September. The timing could not have been worse as far as Admiral Doyle and General Smith were concerned. KEZIA threatened to strike the ships of the task force during the last stages of embarkation and the first phase of the approach to Inchon. And any serious disruption of the Navy’s delicate timetable would place the 15 September deadline hopelessly beyond reach.

    With the carriers, cruisers, and destroyers scheduled to be in the Yellow Sea, beyond the path of the storm, Admiral Doyle’s amphibious vessels were the most imperiled elements. The Attack Force Commander planned to move his ships to the objective area in six increments, three of them loading in Japan, one in Pusan, and two at both places simultaneously. Because of the last two, certain rendezvous areas were designated so that fragments of a group could converge at sea to form the whole. Obviously, then, the mathematics of navigation was a dominant factor. Success hinged on coordination in terms of hours, not weeks or days.

    Each of the six increments had its own time schedule for an independent voyage. The route to Inchon was marked off on maps by a chain of check points, the most significant of which bore the code names ARKANSAS, IOWA, and CALIFORNIA. The first two, lying in the East China Sea off the southwestern tip of Korea, formed the junction of the sea lanes from Japan and Pusan. Consequently, there was no alternative to their remaining fixed in the direct path of the oncoming typhoon. Point CALIFORNIA was important in that it marked the end of the open sea phase and the beginning of the treacherous offshore approach to Inchon via Flying Fish and East channels.[14]

     Movement to the Objective Area

    The departure schedule for the Attack Force was set out in Doyle’s Operation Order 14–50 as follows:

    1. Pontoon Movement Group (2 ATFs, 3 LSUs, 1 YTB, 1 YW): Yokohama, 5 Sep.
    2. LSMR Movement Element (3 LSMRs): Yokohama, 9 Sep.
    3. Tractor Movement Element A (LSM, 1 AMS, 1 AM, 1 ARS, 2 LSDs, 36 LSTs): Kobe, 10 Sep.
    4. Tractor Movement Element B (1 ARL, 1 PF, 1 PCEC, 12 LSTs): Kobe, 10 Sep.
    5. Transport Movement Group (5 APAs, 8 AKAs, 1 AP, 2 PFs): Kobe, 12 Sep.
    6. Advanced Attack Group (Wŏlmi-do) (1 LSD, 3 APDs): Pusan, 13 Sep.

    The chart shows the basic pattern, which would evolve only after considerable shuffling and secondary routing. For instance, two vessels of the cumbersome Pontoon Movement Group, carrying vital equipment for the expansion of Inchon’s port facilities, would not leave Sasebo until 11 September. They were to join the slow Yokohama convoy near Point IOWA the same day. Tractor Elements A and B, the latter trailing at a distance of six miles, would pick up the Pusan LSTs at IOWA on 13 September. The Kobe contingent of the Transport Movement Group was to pass through Point ARKANSAS on the 14th, joining the USS Cavalier (APA-37), USS Pickaway (APA-222), USS Henrico (APA-45) , and USS Seminole (AKA-104) from Pusan.

    [note]

     

    U.S. Navy

     

     

    USN_Units

    On the 5th, as an early morning weather flight disclosed unfavorable conditions over North Korea, Admiral Ewen turned his force southward and headed for Japan. USS Sicily (CVE-118)was still in the yard at Sasebo, but USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) was getting underway for the Yellow Sea. On the east coast a new crisis was developing with heavy enemy pressure against Pohang. At 1120 the KMAG detachment ashore asked the fire support unit to call for Navy air support to check an attack which had reached within half a mile of the town; an emergency dispatch to this effect reached ComNavFE shortly after noon and was at once relayed to Task Force 77, to Admiral Ruble, and to FEAF, with the request that all practicable help be given. But the fast carriers were 300 miles away, and bad weather left behind by Jane prevented flight operations by Badoeng Strait.

    The immediate threat was checked by the fire support ships. Five-inch rapid fire from Toledo and De Haven broke up a tank attack and destroyed enemy artillery, while the destroyer provided further help by vectoring Fifth Air Force aircraft onto useful targets.

    But heavy enemy attacks continued, Pohang was lost again the next day, and by the 7th North Korean forces had gained the Hyŏngsan River south of the town, although still failing to reach the airfield.

    [note]

     

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    At 0015, 6 September, the marines began leaving their lines at Obong-ni Ridge and headed for Pusan. [24-24]

    The American counteroffensive of 3-5 September west of Yongsan, according to prisoner statements, resulted in one of the bloodiest and most terrifying debacles of the war for a North Korean division. Even though remnants of the division, supported by the low strength 4th Division, still held Obong-ni Ridge, Cloverleaf Hill, and the intervening ground back to the Naktong on 6 September, the division's offensive strength had been spent at the end of the American counterattack. The 9th and 4th enemy divisions were not able to resume the offensive. [24-25]

    Once again the fatal weakness of the North Korean Army had cost it victory after an impressive initial success-its communications and supply were not capable of exploiting a breakthrough and of supporting a continuing attack in the face of massive air, armor, and artillery fire that could be concentrated against its troops at critical points.

    [note]

     

     

    Shortly after midnight the brigade marched back through the rain to load into trucks and move to the Pusan staging area.

    [note]

     

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    Heavy rains fell during the night of 5-6 September and mud slowed all wheeled and tracked vehicles in the withdrawal. The 1st Battalion completed its withdrawal without opposition. During its night march
    west, the 3d Battalion column was joined several times by groups of North Korean soldiers who apparently thought it was one of their own columns moving south. They were made prisoners and taken along in the withdrawal. Nearing Waegwan at dawn, the battalion column was taken under enemy tank and mortar fire after daybreak and sustained about eighteen casualties.

           

    The 2d Battalion disengaged from the enemy and began its withdrawal at 0300, 6 September. The battalion abandoned two tanks, one because of mechanical failure and the other because it was stuck in the mud. The battalion moved to the rear in two main groups: G Company to attack Hill 464 and the rest of the battalion to seize Hill 380, half a mile farther south. The North Koreans quickly discovered that the 2d Battalion was withdrawing and attacked it. The battalion commander, Maj. Omar T. Hitchner, and his S-3, Capt. James T. Milam, were killed.

    [note]

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    Army Symbol Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)     

    They [withdrawal orders for Eighth Army] were published and ready for issuing at 0500 in the morning, but they were held in the G-3 Section pending General Walker's personal order to put them into effect. The order was not given. At some time during the night Walker reached the decision that Eighth Army would not withdraw. [22-39]

    [note]

     

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    The 1st Battalion was the last Marine unit out, moving to Yongsan at about 0600 on the sixth. The Second Battle of the Naktong was the last combat action in this area for the regiment. The Pusan Perimeter had been saved, and the 5th Marines were now needed elsewhere.

    In thirty-five days at Pusan the 5th Marines had traveled more than 380 miles, inflicted more than nineteen hundred casualties on three different NKPA divisions, and won three major engagements that helped to turn the tide in Korea. For its superior performance, the regiment was awarded U.S. and Korean Presidential Unit Citations for combat actions from 7 August–7 September 1950.

    [note]

     

     

    The Marine Brigade could finally be withdrawn because the situation in the Pusan Perimeter was no longer critical, and highly skilled amphibious experts were desperately needed elsewhere. General MacArthur had been planning an amphibious turning movement since the very beginning of the war. His original concept, Operation Bluehearts, would use the army's 1st Cavalry Division to spearhead a landing at Inch'ŏn and then cut off the NKPA's supply lines by capturing Seoul deep in the enemy rear. The timetable called for the landing to occur on 22 July, but this ambitious plan had to be canceled due to the press of events on the battlefield. Indeed, by mid July every American soldier and Marine available was needed in the front lines. It was, in fact, with only great reluctance that Bulldog Walker let "his" Marines go. But, MacArthur had dusted off his amphibious concept and now had the perfect instrument to make a successful landing: The 1st Marine Division was on its way to Korea.

    [note]

     

     

    biography 

    In the vicinity of Hill 464 and Hill 380 the battalion [2d Battalion ] discovered at daybreak that it was virtually surrounded by enemy soldiers. Colonel Nist thought that the entire battalion was lost. [22-45]

    [note]

     

    0604 Sunrise

    [note]

    0605 Korean Time

     

     

    By dawn of 6 September, the two battalions were loading aboard trucks to follow the rest of the Brigade.

    Numbed by fatigue and icy rain, the bent forms huddled together in the cargo vehicles had no regrets as they bade good-bye to the Pusan perimeter.

    [note]

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    The startling gains of the North Koreans in the east on 4 September caused General Walker to shift still more troops to that area. The day before, he had ordered the 24th Division to move from its reserve
    position near Taegu to the lower Naktong River to relieve the marines in the Naktong Bulge area of the 2d Division front. It bivouacked that night in a downpour of rain on the banks of the Naktong near Susan-ni.


    On the morning of the 4th, before it could begin relief of the marines, the 24th received a new order to proceed to Kyŏngju. General Davidson, the assistant division commander, proceeding at once by jeep, arrived at Kyŏngju that evening.

      

    Division troops and the 18th Infantry [Should be 19th IR]  started at 1300 the next day, 5 September, and, traveling over muddy roads, most of them arrived at Kyŏngju just before midnight.


    General Church had arrived there during the day. All division units had arrived by 0700, 6 September. [22-18]

    [note]

     

      

    The next morning two enemy soldiers captured Caldwell, removed his boots and identification, smashed him on the head with a rock, and threw him over a cliff into the Naktong River. Caldwell, not critically injured, feigned death and escaped that night.

    [note]

     

     

     

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      Army Symbol Eighth U.S. Army (Forward)     

    The ROK Army headquarters opened at Pusan at 0800 and Eighth Army headquarters [opened at Pusan ] at 1600, 6 September.

    [note]

     

     

    biography 

    In the vicinity of Hill 464 and Hill 380 the battalion [2d Battalion ] discovered at daybreak that it was virtually surrounded by enemy soldiers. Colonel Nist thought that the entire battalion was lost. [22-45]

    Moving by itself and completely cut off from all other units, G Company, numbering only about eighty men, was hardest hit. At 0800, nearing the top of Hill 464, it surprised and killed three enemy soldiers. Suddenly, enemy automatic weapons and small arms fire struck the company. All day G Company maneuvered around the hill but never gained its crest.

    [note]

     

     

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    The 187th Airborne RCT left Camp Stoneman, California, on 6 September and arrived in Japan on 20 September with a strength of about 4,400 men and officers. [09-49]

    The U.S. X Corps, at its embarkation, numbered slightly less than 70,000 men. Included as its major units were the

    The 1st Marine Division had a strength of 25,040 men, including 2,760 attached Army troops and 2,786 Korean marines.

    [note]

     

     

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    biography

    On 6 September, the U.N. Security Council voted down Malik's 4 August proposal and

    [note]

     

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    On the next road eastward above Yongch'on, the N.K. 15th Division launched its attack against the ROK 8th Division on 2 September. Although far understrength, with its three regiments reportedly having a
    total of only 3,600 men, it penetrated in four days to the lateral corridor at Yongch'on. North of the town one regiment of the ROK 8th Division panicked when an enemy tank got behind its lines.

    Elements of the enemy division [N.K. 15th Division] were in and south of Yongch'on by mid-afternoon 6 September. The North Koreans did not remain in the town, but moved to the hills south and southeast of it overlooking the Taegu-Kyŏngju-Pusan road.

    [note]

     

     

    biography 

    Moving by itself and completely cut off from all other units, G Company, numbering only about eighty men, was hardest hit. At 0800, nearing the top of Hill 464, it surprised and killed three enemy soldiers. Suddenly, enemy automatic weapons and small arms fire struck the company. All day G Company maneuvered around the hill but never gained its crest.

     

    At mid-afternoon it [G Company] received radio orders to withdraw that night.

    [note]

     

     

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    Army Symbol8usa       biography

    Eighth Army headquarters [opened at Pusan ] at 1600, 6 September. Walker himself and a few staff officers remained in Taegu as an advanced echelon of the army command post, constituting a tactical headquarters. The principal reason General Walker moved Eighth Army headquarters to Pusan was for the greater protection of the army signal communication equipment. Had the Eighth Army teletype equipment been destroyed or captured by the enemy there was no other similar heavy equipment in the Far East to replace it. The Army's operations would have been seriously handicapped had this signal equipment been lost or damaged. [22-40]

    At this time, General Garvin issued verbal orders to service troops in the 2d Logistical Command at Pusan to take defensive positions on the hills bordering the port city and within the city itself if and when the tactical situation required it. [22-41]

    [note]

     

     

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    [note]

     

     

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    Unit Info     

    The company left six dead on the hill and, carrying its wounded on improvised litters of ponchos and tree branches, it started down the shale slopes of the mountain in rain and darkness. Halfway down, a friendly artillery barrage killed one of the noncommissioned officers, and a rock thrown by one of the exploding shells hit Capt. Herman L. West, G Company commander, inflicting a painful back injury. The company scattered but Captain West reassembled it. Cautioning his men to move quietly and not to fire in any circumstances, so that surrounding enemy troops might think them one of their own columns, West led his men to the eastern base of  Hill 464 where he went into a defensive position for the rest of the night. [22-46]

    On the division left, meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on Hill 303 came under heavy attack and the battalion commander wanted to withdraw. Colonel Crombez, the regimental commander, told him he could not do so until the 7th Cavalry had cleared on its withdrawal road. This battalion suffered heavy casualties before it abandoned Hill 303 on the 6th to the enemy. [22-47]

    While G Company was trying to escape from Hill 464, the rest of the 2d Battalion was cut off at the eastern base of Hill 380, half a mile southward. Colonel Nist organized all the South Korean carriers he could find before dark and loaded them with water, food, and ammunition for the 2d Battalion, but the carrier party was unable to find the battalion.

    [note]

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    Casualties

    Wednesday September 6, 1950 (Day 74)

    143 Casualties

    1 16TH ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
    1 187TH AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
    1 1ST ORDNANCE MEDIUM MAINTENANCE COMPANY
    2 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
    2 22ND TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
    23 23RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
    15 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
    1 25TH ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AW BATTALION
    10 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
    1 27TH ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY
    1 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
    1 2ND ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
    1 31ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
    2 35TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
    1 38TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
    13 38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
    1 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
    2 5TH MARINE REGIMENT
    2 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
    1 6147TH TACTICAL CONTROL SQUADRON
    1 71ST HEAVY TANK BATTALION
    1 72ND MEDIUM TANK BATTALION
    1 77TH ENGINEER COMBAT COMPANY
    15 7TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
    1 7TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
    18 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
    1 8TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (105MM)
    22 9TH_INFANTRY_REGIMENT
    1 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION - UNKNOWN UNITS
       
       
       
    143 19500906 0000 Casualties by unit

    Date USAF  USA  USMC  USN  Other  Total
    Previous 87 5602 175 17 5511
    Losses 3 137 2 1 143
    To Date 90 5739 177 17 1 5654

    Aircraft Losses Today 3

     

     

     

    Notes for Wednesday September 6, 1950 (Day 74)

     

     

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