On 22 August 64 B-29's retraced their way to Rashin, but bad weather forced the bombers to attack secondary targets at Ch'ŏngjin (Seishin). At this juncture the State Department strongly objected to the continuance of Rashin as an air target, and on 1 September the Joint Chiefs put the city off limits for air attacks.#33
TS-3297, USAF to CG FEAF, 5 Aug. 1950;
TS-3515, USAF to CG FEAF, 12 Aug. 1950;
VO-183, CG FEAF to CofS USAF, 13 Aug. 1950;
ltr., Col. C. J. Bondley, CofS FEAF BomCom to CG FEAF, 17 Aug. 1950;
DA-TT-3681, 22 Aug. 1950;
FEAF Opns. Hist., I, 140.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently reasoned that Rashin was an important center of Communist supplies but that the movement of these supplies could be effectively interdicted somewhere along the long coastal route leading southward from the border city. Later on, during the course of congressional hearings on affairs in the Far East, General MacArthur's supporters would cite the Rashin experience as "a flagrant example of political interference in military decisions. "#34
#34 82nd Cong. 1st Sess., Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2591, 2260-61, 750, 1063, 1331, 3097, 3587.
Strategic Bombing 193