At 0900 General Walker requested the Air Force to make a maximum effort along the Naktong River from Toksong-dong, [sp Tŭksŏng-dong] just above the 2nd Division boundary, southward and to a depth of ten to fifteen miles west of the river. He wanted the Air Force to isolate the battlefield and prevent enemy reinforcements and supplies from moving across the river in support of the North Korean spearhead units. The Far East Command requested the Navy to join in the air effort, and the Seventh Fleet, pursuant to NAVFE orders, turned back from its strikes in the Inch'ŏn-Sŏul area and sped southward at full steam toward the southern battle front. General Walker came to the 2nd Division front at noon and ordered a "stand or die" defense. He had already ordered ground reinforcements to the Yŏngsan area. [23-34]
For a few hours during the morning of 1 September, General Walker weighed the news coming in from his southern front, wavering in a decision as to which part of the front most needed his Pusan Perimeter reserves. Since midnight the N.K. I Corps had broken his Pusan Perimeter in two places
In the 2nd Division sector enemy troops were at the edge of Yŏngsan, the gateway to the corridor leading twelve air miles eastward to Miryang and the main Pusan-Mukden railroad and highway.
Walker had a critical decision to make. He had in reserve three under strength infantry regiments and the 2-battalion British 27th Infantry Brigade which was not yet completely equipped and ready to be placed in line. Even so, this was an unusually large reserve for Eighth Army in the summer of 1950. The three U.S. regiments available to Walker were the
Walker alerted both the 24th Division headquarters, together with its 19th Regiment, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to move at a moment's notice; the 24th Division either to the 2nd or 25th Division fronts, and the marines to an unannounced destination.