19500905 0000 TUESDAY

5 SEPTEMBER

1 950

Wrote Jack Slessor a letter, telling him because of a tele- phone conversation I had had with Bouchier, apparently he (Bouchier) was a bit unhappy about the channels we used to Slessor. Bouchier too had apparently dressed down both
Squadron Leader Sach and Group Captain Barclay inasmuch as he thought they had been presumptuous. Told Slessor that Bouchier had never indicated to me that he was out here to help us - my understanding was that his level was too high to approach, as in the case of obtaining flares - which is the case in point - and that Sach and Barclay had both done a superior job for us and that Gascoigne, too, had been most helpful. “I write this letter to you in order to protect Squadron Leader J. F. Sach (he is a real member of my team) who is doing a superior job for me as an exchange officer from Air Marshal Sir F. J. Fogarty’s show in Sin- gapore and Group Captain Barclay. They have both gone out of their way to assist me in my dealings with the RAF - both in Singapore and in London.”
Decided not to send the Banfill “nickel” as suggested info to Vandenberg as it had not been confirmed. (See reference under date of 4 September.)
After the briefing, had a nice talk this morning with Air Vice Marshal C. A. Bouchier, RAF, and he was sorry that he had not made it clear that he was in a position to act direct between myself and Slessor on any of our needs. He indi- cated that he had made all arrangements for flares for Partridge’s night intruders and Squadron Leader Sach is preparing a signal, Norstad from Stratemeyer, requesting that the flares be lifted from the British Isles to Japan.
I instructed Squadron Leader Sach to confer with Wing Commander Wyke- ham-Barnes when the latter returns to Tokyo and secure from him two or three names of RAF officers that he considers capable of being assigned out here to

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THE THREE WARS OF LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER : HIS KOREAN WAR DIARY

assist Partridge in his night operations and then utilizing these names, prepare a memorandum from me to Air Vice Marshal Bouchier, requesting that a signal be sent to Jack Slessor for their assignment here.
Received a call from Partridge at 0955 hours and he stated that things were all right and that he was hopeful. He pointed out though that the weather over there was not good and that the T-6s reported the weather in the P’ohang - Kigye area was so bad that fighter bombers could not operate. He related to me the following incident which was witnessed by General Lowe in a T-6.
A Lt Wayne,260 who was recently on the cover of Life as having shot down the first two Yaks in the war (Lt Wayne was flying an F–80), was forced to bail out in a rice paddy, after the F–51 he was in was hit, behind enemy lines. A heli- copter was dispatched immediately, it went back of the lines and rescued Wayne - all of which was taking place under enemy fire. When Wayne arrived back at Itazuke, he discovered that his wife had had a baby.
General Lowe stated to General Partridge, relating the incident to him, that all participants should receive not less than the Medal of Honor. Partridge said recommendations for awards would be forthcoming.
After talking with Bouchier, I added the following P.S. to Slessor in my let- ter which is quoted above: “Had a nice talk with Bouchier this morning and everything is properly channeled and all my dealings with you from here on out will be through Air Vice Marshal C. A. Bouchier. I am still sending the letter, though, Jack - just for the record.”

Redline to Vandenberg:

Razon operations successful 3 September from research point of view. We experienced several malfunctions but all can be evaluated and correc- tive action taken. Two direct hits accomplished resulting in span out of bridge, with other near misses. Reason known for misses and corrective action can be taken. Will keep you advised.

With respect to “affair Manchuria,” I sent this date the following let- ter to Partridge:

(1) Enclosed for appropriate action is copy of the report of investigation of violation of the Manchurian border by two F–51 a/c of the 5th AF on

27 Aug 50. The investigation reveals that the border was violated and that the leading airplane of the flight fired on an airstrip southwest of Antung, Manchuria. The investigation was confined to establishing the truth or falsity of the allegation. There are many questions left unanswered as to the contributing causes of this incident which I am sure you will want to check and eliminate in present and future operations. (2) I do not wish to dictate the corrective action that should be taken as a result of this case. You are well aware of the seriousness of the violation. I consider that the lack of judgment on the part of the flight leader, 1st Lt Ray I. Carter, war- rants careful consideration by a Flying Evaluation Board. (3) In reading the report, I find several serious deficiencies in operational procedures.

260. 1st Lt Robert E. Wayne was the first pilot to be rescued from behind enemy lines, being saved by Lt Paul W.

Van Boven in an H–5 helicopter on September 4. (Futrell, p 577.) Wayne shot down two Il–10s on June 27.

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PART ONE: THE BITTER DAYS

As examples, when new targets in unfamiliar territory are assigned, greater study of maps and terrain features should be made by the pilots; positive steps to insure that the latest weather reports brought in by ear- lier flights is considered in the dispatch of later flights. The fact that there was no specific briefing on the importance of staying clear of the Manchurian border is not only a reflection on the briefing at squadron level, but suggests that my instructions to you are not reaching the oper- ating levels. (4) Corrective action will be taken by you to remedy all deficiencies brought out by this case. G.E.S.

On same subject as above, the following was dispatched to Vandenberg: (1) Per statement made in my radio AO 233 CG, I am inclosing, here-

with, a report of the investigation of the Manchurian incident. (See Inclo-
sure No. 1). The investigation definitely shows that two of our F–51s of the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 18th Fighter Bomber Group, 6002nd Fighter Bomber Wing, now designated as the 6002nd Fighter Bomber Wing, did, in the late afternoon of 27 August 1950, violate Manchurian territory by flying over the Manchurian border and the lead airplane fired on an airstrip just southwest of Antung, Manchuria. (2) The investi- gation discloses that both pilots involved had had combat experience in
ETO�
and had flown combat missions in Korea prior to this incident.
They knew that they were not to fly over Manchurian territory. (3) The mission involved was to destroy six barges near the mouth of the Chongeh’on-gang261 River in North Korea. The weather was not good,
as h�ad been forecast, and the flight had to fly at 14,000 feet, and came out of the clouds at a place the pilots thought was south of their target.
Instead, they were north of it and mistook the Yalu River for the Chongeh’on-gang River. Being fired upon, they turned and circled to their left to avoid the flak, turned south and passed over the airstrip involved. Not until the 29th of August, when they made another flight to determine where they had been, was it definitely ascertained that they had been in Manchurian territory. (4) Specific instructions from this Headquarters have been given to the various Air Forces to avoid Manchurian and Soviet territory and to brief their crews accordingly. Note our radios enclosed. (See inclosures Nos. 2, 3, and 4.) (5) The investigation disclosed several deficiencies in the operational procedure of Fifth Air Force in Korea. These have been called to General Par- tridge’s attention and he has been instructed to remedy them. (See Inclo- sure No. 5). (6) The report of the officers investigating the incident has recommended that Lt Carter, the flight leader and pilot of the airplane that fired on the airstrip, be ordered to appear before a Flying Evaluation Board, special attention being called to Lt Carter’s lack of judgment, which I approved. The report of investigation has been forwarded to General Partridge for necessary action. G.E.S.
1130 hours, Major General Harris, U.S. Marines, called with Brigadier
General Cushman. � �

261. Also known as the Ch’ongch’on River.

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THE THREE WARS OF LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER : HIS KOREAN WAR DIARY

1500 hours, Mrs. Nora Waln,262 novelist, visited me with Colonel Nuckols for about 30 minutes, during which time she discussed her coming article for the Saturday Evening Post, in which she writes about the Air Force cadet training in Korea, with particular emphasis on character building of the Korean cadets, our treating them as equals - all of which will be presented most favorably to the Air Force. She asked if I had any comments or quotes for her story and I stated that I felt the main part of the instruction which she should convey to her readers was that the democratic way of life was being instilled in these cadets and that all of our instructions to them emphasized equality for all and that the most competent should lead - all of which is the basis for our way of doing things.
General Partridge called about 6:00 P.M. and stated that all was well in Korea - that he was not worried about the North [Koreans] or the battlefront. He stated that there would probably be a change in the location of General Walker’s set up tomorrow, but that his present location would remain the same.