19500906 0000 WEDNESDAY

6 SEPTEMBER

1 950

remaining in Taegu.
General Partridge called; reported that the weather was good; he considered the ground situation the same as yesterday and maybe a little better. There is no rain and that General Walker, with a command group slightly larger than his, was
At about 1015 hours, went over to the AEP school and talked to Mrs. Over- acker’s group of volunteer teachers. (These women assist in the established Japanese schools by giving of their time in leading class discussions in English. All is on a volunteer basis.)
I congratulated these women on their initiative and suggested that they emphasize DEMOCRACY [emphasis in original] - giving all the why’s; cover our Constitution, equality of person, institution, etc. Suggested that their teach- ing not stop in the classroom, but continue their efforts in their own homes. Personalized it by stating from my own experience of one and one-half years, that it tends to build up happiness and efficiency when you endeavor to train your servants.
Also told the ladies that they have a job here in the occupation just as real as General MacArthur’s; through their efforts - and all our efforts - the imprint that we leave behind will stay for many years to come.
I ended up with Abe Lincoln and his Rail-Splitter’s philosophy in dealing with these people - and it was good to keep in mind no matter what job that they attempted to do.
My above efforts seemed appreciated and well received.

In answer to my letter to Rosie of 3 Sept on the emergency use of B–29s, I received the following from which I quote in toto:

1. The proper utilization of B–29 a/c on tactical targets has been of contin- uous concern to myself and my staff since arrival in this theater. From the outset it has been evident that destruction of vital strategic targets in North Korea could be accomplished with my available effort in very

 

262. In addition to several novels, Waln had also written numerous articles for various magazines. It was in this latter capacity that she was visiting Japan and Korea.

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short time. It has been equally apparent that the continued gravity of the ground situation would dictate diversion of medium bombardment air- craft to tactical usage from time to time.

2. In general, the only limitations in the tactical use of the B–29 are those imposed by the unwieldiness or clumsiness of the weapon itself and the avoidance of self-inflicted damage. Subject to these restrictions, I believe the B–29s can be EFFECTIVELY [emphasis in original] employed against tactical targets under the following conditions: a. Assignment of targets before take off with designated aiming points. b. Attacking by visual methods only. c. Attacking at an altitude such that: (1) Self- inflicted damage from bombs dropped will not occur. (2) Cluster-type bombs, when used, will open in time for dispersion of the components. (3) Synchronous bombing using the bombsight will be permitted. (We must resort to fixed angle bombing below 6000 feet). d. Receipt of the directive in time to properly plan the missions, bomb-up, brief the crews, and preflight the aircraft.

3. I suggest that I be given a list of targets, with designated aiming points, by Lt General Walker, in coordination with Major General Partridge. We will strike using the available bombs by


type in accordance with the effects desired, and employing the aircraft either individually or in formation, depending upon the assigned target. I think you will agree that aimless flying in the general battle area in search of targets of opportunity or in wait for flash directives from the ground, is not an efficient way to utilize the weapon. If some special, important unorthodox task seems feasible to you, I know you will pass it on to us. I need not tell you that we will promptly take a crack at it.
Passed Rosie’s comments on to D/Ops and for them to keep me aware of any unusual operations in which B–29s are to be used.

Twin fireballs of napalm dropped by a

452nd BW Invader sprout from a North

Korean rail yard.

Partridge answered my query to him of 28 August re the use of napalm. Since difficulties now ironed out in accumulating stocks
of tanks, mixers and igniters, and when F–80s can utilize by virtue of their basing in Korea (up to now they have had to carry their own external fuel), employment of napalm is to be stepped up.

In answer to Fogarty’s radio re Woodruff, and particularly to his statement “I shall welcome a combat veteran of the Korean war as he will no doubt be able to teach us a lot - if agreed, I would like to

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put him into a combat squadron for 3 or 4 months before I employ him on any staff duty” - I sent him the following:

Part 1. Glad to have your complimentary remarks concerning Woodruff. Concur in your plan to place the officer I send to you with a combat sqdn. Will forward pertinent details regarding this officer very shortly. Part 2. Ref your proposed visit, about 26 Oct, I shall be most happy to have you come to Tokyo. This will be an excellent time to discuss mutual problems. Incident to your flight here, we need a roster of personnel, a/c type and number, grade of fuel required and proposed itinerary to Japan. This may be sent at any convenient time, say 10 days before your departure from Singapore. Billeting and messing while in Japan will be arranged for your party by my hq. Billeting and messing while enroute will be aranged by this hq upon receipt of your itinerary. Part 3. I shall look forward to seeing you again and am sure the visit will be interesting and profitable.

Colonel Brothers just reported 1405 hours that he felt I should be informed on the possibility of a blow-up reference air evacuation. Col Ohman263 just returned from a trip where he visited Itazuke and was informed by the Army doctor of the hospital there that some 16 fatalities due to gunshot wounds had occurred where and if they had been evacuated by air from Korea there was a great possibility that many of the lives could have been saved.
When Colonel Ohman arrived at Taegu, he ran into a reporter who was securing data reference this matter. Further, Colonel Brothers reported that Charlotte Knight had interested herself in this subject and intended riding an air evacuation ship from Korea to Japan and then she intended to ride a surface vessel evacuation ship.
I queried Colonel Brothers as to the cleanliness of our skirts and he indicated that he and Colonel Kelly,264 the Fifth Air Force surgeon, had both talked with Colonel Dovell,265 8th Army surgeon and Colonel Kelly had talked with Lt Colonel Willis266 at the hospital in Pusan, urging air evacuation. They pooh-poohed the idea and have continued to evacuate by surface ship to Itazuke hospital, and thence to Yokohama and Tokyo by train.
As of today, though, through General Hume, or because of finally realizing the error of their ways, they are now evacuating from Korea to Itazuke and on to Tokyo by air. Over 200 evacuees came out of Korea yesterday and over 300 from Itazuke area to Tokyo.
From all the information I could gain, the Air Force has gone out of its way to set up this air evacuation but have been stymied by 8th Army surgeon and by, as Colonel Brother’s put it, a nincompoop lieutenant Colonel in Pusan.267

263. Lt Col Nils O. Ohman commanded the 97th BG in World War II. At this time he was a FEAF operations staff officer. In June 1951, he became the 3d BW commander.

264. Col Frederick C. Kelly.

265. Col Chauncey E. Dovell.

266. Lt Col William D. Willis was an Army medical officer.

267. The medical evacuation problem was not quite as simple as General Stratemeyer makes it out to be. A short- age of ambulances restricted the Army’s choices. With the Taegu airfield eight miles over rough roads from the hospital, the Army thought it better to place patients on the train from Taegu to Pusan, thence by ship to Japan. Also, those patients awaiting evacuation by air from Pusan often were kept for inordinate lengths of time, a problem not of the Army’s making. (Futrell No. 71, p 108.) Eventually, a smooth-running operation was achieved by Combat Cargo Command using C–46s, C–47s, and C–54s.

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